1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
34 use util::errors::APIError;
35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
46 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
59 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
60 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
63 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
64 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
65 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
66 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
67 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
68 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
70 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
72 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
73 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
74 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
76 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
77 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
79 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
80 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
82 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
83 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
84 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
85 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
86 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
87 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
88 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
89 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
91 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
92 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
94 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
96 } else { assert!(false); }
99 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
100 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
102 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
103 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
105 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
107 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
109 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
111 insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
113 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
115 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
117 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
119 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
123 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
124 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
125 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
126 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
127 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
128 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
131 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
135 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
136 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
137 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
138 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
139 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
140 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
141 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
142 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
143 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
144 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
146 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
148 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
150 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
152 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
155 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
158 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
159 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
160 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
161 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
162 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
167 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
169 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
170 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
171 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
174 let payment_event = {
175 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
176 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
177 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
179 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
180 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
182 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
183 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
184 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
185 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
186 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
189 // deliver(1), generate (3):
190 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
191 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
192 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
195 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
196 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
197 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
198 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
199 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
200 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
201 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
204 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
205 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
206 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
207 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
208 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
209 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
210 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
213 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
214 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
215 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
218 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
219 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
222 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
225 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
226 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
228 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
232 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
237 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
238 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
239 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
240 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
241 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
242 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
243 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
244 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
247 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
249 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
251 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
254 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
257 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
258 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
259 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
260 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
263 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
266 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
268 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
269 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
270 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
273 let payment_event = {
274 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
275 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
276 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
278 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
279 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
281 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
282 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
283 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
284 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
285 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
288 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
291 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
295 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
299 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
300 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
303 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
304 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
305 // update_fee (never committed) ->
307 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
308 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
309 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
310 // <- (1) RAA delivered
311 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
312 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
313 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
314 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
316 // B should send no response here
317 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
318 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
321 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
324 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
325 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
326 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
328 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
331 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
332 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
333 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
334 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
335 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
337 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
340 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
341 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
342 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
343 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
346 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
349 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
350 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
352 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
353 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
354 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
356 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
357 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
358 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
359 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
362 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
364 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
366 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
368 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
369 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
370 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
372 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
373 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
374 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
375 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
376 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
377 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
378 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
380 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
381 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
382 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
384 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
386 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
387 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
391 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
392 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
395 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
396 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
399 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
400 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
401 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
404 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
405 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
409 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
410 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
411 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
412 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
413 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
414 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
415 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
416 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
417 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
418 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
419 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
420 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
421 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
422 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
423 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
424 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
426 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
427 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
428 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
430 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
431 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
432 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
435 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
436 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
437 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
441 fn test_1_conf_open() {
442 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
443 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
444 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
447 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
448 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
449 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
450 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
453 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
454 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
455 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
456 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
458 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
460 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
463 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
464 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
467 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
468 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
469 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
471 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
472 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
473 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
475 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
476 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
478 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
480 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
481 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
483 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
485 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
486 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
488 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
489 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
490 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
491 added_monitors.clear();
493 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
495 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
496 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
498 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
499 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
500 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
501 added_monitors.clear();
504 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
505 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
507 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
508 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
510 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
511 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
512 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
513 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
517 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
518 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
519 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
520 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
521 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
522 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
523 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
524 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
525 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
526 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
527 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
528 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
529 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
530 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
531 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
532 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
533 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
534 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
535 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
539 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
540 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
541 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
542 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
543 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
544 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
547 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
550 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
553 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
554 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
555 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
556 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
557 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
559 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
561 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
563 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
564 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
567 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
568 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
571 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
572 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
573 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
576 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
577 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
582 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
586 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
587 let channel_value = 5000;
589 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
590 let channel_id = chan.2;
591 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
592 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
594 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
595 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
596 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
598 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
599 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) as u32;
601 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
602 *feerate_lock = feerate;
604 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
606 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
608 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
610 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
612 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
614 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
616 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
617 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
618 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0) / 1000;
619 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
620 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
621 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
625 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
626 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
629 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
630 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
633 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
635 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
636 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
637 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
638 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
639 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
640 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
641 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
642 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
643 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
645 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
646 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
647 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
648 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
649 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
650 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
651 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
652 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
655 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
656 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
657 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
660 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
661 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
662 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
663 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
664 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
665 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
667 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0) / 1000,
668 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
669 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
670 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
672 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
674 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
677 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
680 htlc_signatures: res.1
683 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
685 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
688 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
690 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
691 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
692 //Should produce and error.
693 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
694 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
696 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
697 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
701 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
702 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
703 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
704 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
705 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
706 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
709 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
712 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
715 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
718 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
719 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
720 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
721 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
722 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
724 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
726 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
727 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
728 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
731 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
733 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
734 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
736 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
737 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
738 added_monitors.clear();
740 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
741 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
742 // node[1] has nothing to do
744 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
745 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
748 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
749 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
750 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
752 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
753 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
754 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
756 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
757 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
758 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
759 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
760 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
761 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
763 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
764 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
766 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
768 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
770 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
772 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
774 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
775 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
777 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
779 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
781 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
783 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
784 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
786 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
787 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
790 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
792 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
793 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
794 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
795 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
796 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
800 fn test_update_fee() {
801 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
802 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
803 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
804 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
805 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
806 let channel_id = chan.2;
809 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
810 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
811 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
812 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
813 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
814 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
815 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
816 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
817 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
818 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
819 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
822 // Create and deliver (1)...
825 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
826 feerate = *feerate_lock;
827 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
829 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
832 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
833 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
834 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
835 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
836 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
838 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
840 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
842 // Generate (2) and (3):
843 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
844 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
848 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
849 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
852 // Create and deliver (4)...
854 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
855 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
857 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
859 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
860 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
861 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
862 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
863 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
868 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
869 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
872 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
873 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
875 // Handle (3), creating (6):
876 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
878 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
879 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
882 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
883 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
886 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
887 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
888 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
889 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
890 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
891 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
892 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
893 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
897 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
899 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
900 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
902 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
904 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
906 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
907 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
908 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
909 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
910 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
914 fn fake_network_test() {
915 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
916 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
917 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
918 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
919 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
920 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
922 // Create some initial channels
923 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
924 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
925 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
927 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
928 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
929 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
930 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
931 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
933 // Send some more payments
934 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
935 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
936 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
938 // Test failure packets
939 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
940 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
942 // Add a new channel that skips 3
943 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
945 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
946 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
947 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
948 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
949 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
950 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
951 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
953 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
954 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
956 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
957 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
958 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
959 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
961 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
964 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
965 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
966 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
967 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
969 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
972 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
973 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
974 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
975 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
977 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
979 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
980 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
981 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
983 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
985 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
986 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
987 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
988 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
990 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
993 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
994 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
995 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
996 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
998 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1000 hops.push(RouteHop {
1001 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1002 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1003 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1004 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1006 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1008 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1009 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1010 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1012 // Claim the rebalances...
1013 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1014 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1016 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1017 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1019 // Send some payments across both channels
1020 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1021 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1022 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1025 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1026 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1027 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1028 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1030 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1032 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1033 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1034 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1036 // Close down the channels...
1037 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1038 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1039 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1040 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1041 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1042 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1043 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1044 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1045 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1046 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1047 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1048 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1049 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1050 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1051 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1055 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1056 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1057 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1058 // commitment dance rounds.
1059 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1060 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1061 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1062 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1063 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1064 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1066 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1067 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1068 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1069 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1070 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1074 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1075 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1076 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1077 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1079 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1080 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1082 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1084 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1085 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1086 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1087 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1090 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1091 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1093 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1097 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1098 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1099 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1100 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1102 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1103 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1104 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1105 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1106 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1107 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1110 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1111 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1112 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1114 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1116 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1117 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1118 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1121 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1122 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1124 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1126 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1128 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1130 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1131 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1133 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1135 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1137 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1139 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1141 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1143 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1145 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1148 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1150 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1151 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1152 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1154 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1155 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1157 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1161 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1162 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1165 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1169 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1170 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1171 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1172 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1173 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1174 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1175 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1177 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1178 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1179 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1180 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1181 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1182 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1184 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1186 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1187 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1189 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1190 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1192 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1193 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1194 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1198 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1199 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1200 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1201 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1202 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1203 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1204 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1205 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1207 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1210 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1212 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1214 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1215 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1216 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1218 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1219 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1222 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1223 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1225 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1226 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1227 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1228 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1229 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1230 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1231 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1234 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1236 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1238 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1239 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1241 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1242 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1243 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1244 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1245 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1246 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1247 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1248 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1250 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1251 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1252 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1254 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1255 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1256 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1257 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1258 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1259 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1260 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1261 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1263 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1264 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1267 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1268 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1269 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1270 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1272 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1273 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1274 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1275 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1276 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1277 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1279 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1285 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1286 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1287 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1288 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1289 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1290 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1292 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1293 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1295 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1296 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1297 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1298 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1299 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1301 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1303 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1304 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1305 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1308 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1310 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1311 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1313 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1317 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1321 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1322 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1324 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1325 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1326 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1327 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1329 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1331 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1332 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1333 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1334 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1337 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1338 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1339 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1340 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1343 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1345 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1346 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1347 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1349 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1351 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1353 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1354 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1355 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1356 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1357 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1358 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1359 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1360 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1362 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1363 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1364 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1365 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1366 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1368 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1369 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1370 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1371 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1372 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1373 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1374 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1375 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1378 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1379 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1380 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1382 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1383 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1384 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1386 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1388 amount_msat: 3460001,
1389 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1391 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1394 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1397 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1398 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1399 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1400 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1404 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1405 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1407 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1408 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1410 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1413 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1416 htlc_signatures: res.1
1419 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1420 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1421 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1423 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1424 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1426 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1427 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1429 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1431 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1432 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1433 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1435 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1436 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1437 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1441 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1442 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1448 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1449 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1450 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1451 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1452 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1454 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1455 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1456 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1457 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1459 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1460 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1461 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1463 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1465 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1466 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1467 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1470 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1471 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1472 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1473 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1474 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1475 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1479 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1480 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1481 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1482 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1483 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1484 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1486 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1487 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1488 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1489 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1490 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1491 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1492 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1494 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1495 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1496 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1499 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1500 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1501 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1502 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1503 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1504 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1505 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1506 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1507 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1509 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1510 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1511 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1512 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1513 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1516 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1517 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1518 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1519 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1520 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1521 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1523 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1527 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1528 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1529 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1530 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1531 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1533 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1534 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1535 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1537 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1538 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1539 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1540 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1541 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1542 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1543 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1545 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1546 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1547 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1548 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1549 // commitment transaction fee.
1550 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1552 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1553 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1554 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1557 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1558 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1559 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1560 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1564 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1565 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1566 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1567 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1568 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1569 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1571 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1573 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1575 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1576 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1577 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1578 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1580 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1581 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1582 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1583 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1584 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1585 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1586 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1588 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1589 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1590 match msg_events[0] {
1591 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1592 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1594 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1599 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1600 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1601 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1602 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1603 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1604 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1605 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1606 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1608 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1609 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1610 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1611 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1612 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1613 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1615 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1616 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1617 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1618 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1619 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1620 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1622 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1623 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1624 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1625 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1629 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1630 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1631 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1632 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1633 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1634 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1635 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1638 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1639 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1640 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1642 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1643 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1644 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1645 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1647 // Add a pending HTLC.
1648 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1649 let payment_event_1 = {
1650 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1653 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1654 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1655 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1657 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1659 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1660 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1661 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1662 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1663 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1665 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1666 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1667 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1668 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1669 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1670 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1671 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1672 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1675 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1676 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1677 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1678 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1681 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1682 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1683 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1684 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1685 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1686 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1688 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1692 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1693 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1694 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1695 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1696 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1697 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1698 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1699 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1700 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1701 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1703 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1704 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1705 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1707 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1708 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1711 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1712 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1716 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1717 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1718 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1719 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1720 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1721 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1722 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1723 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1724 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1725 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1726 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1728 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1729 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1731 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1732 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1734 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1736 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1737 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1738 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1739 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1744 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1745 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1746 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1748 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1750 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1752 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1753 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1754 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1755 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1756 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1757 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1758 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1761 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1762 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1764 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1765 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1766 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1767 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1768 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1769 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1770 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1773 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1775 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1776 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1777 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1778 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1779 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1782 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1783 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1784 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1785 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1786 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1789 // adding pending output.
1790 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1791 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1792 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1793 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1794 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1795 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1796 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1797 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1798 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1800 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1801 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1802 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1804 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1805 let payment_event_1 = {
1806 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1809 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1810 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1811 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1813 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1815 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1816 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1818 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1819 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1820 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1821 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1824 // split the rest to test holding cell
1825 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1826 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1827 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1828 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1830 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1831 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1834 // now see if they go through on both sides
1835 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1836 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1837 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1839 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1840 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1842 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1844 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1845 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1846 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1847 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1848 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1851 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1852 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1853 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1855 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1856 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1858 // flush the pending htlc
1859 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1860 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1863 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1864 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1866 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1868 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1869 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1870 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1873 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1874 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1875 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1877 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1879 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1880 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1881 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1883 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1884 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1886 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1887 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1888 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1889 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1890 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1891 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1893 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1894 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1895 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1896 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1898 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1899 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1901 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1902 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1904 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1905 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1906 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1908 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1909 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1910 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1912 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1918 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1919 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1920 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1922 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1923 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1924 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1926 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1929 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1932 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1933 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1934 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1936 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1937 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1938 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1940 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1941 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1942 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1943 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1944 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1946 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1947 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1951 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1952 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1953 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1954 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1955 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1956 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1957 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1958 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1960 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1961 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1962 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1963 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1964 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1965 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1966 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
1967 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1969 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1970 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1971 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1972 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1973 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1974 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1975 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1976 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1977 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1978 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1980 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1981 // Route the first two HTLCs.
1982 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1983 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1985 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1986 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
1988 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1990 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1991 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1992 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1995 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1996 // initial fulfill/CS.
1997 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1999 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2001 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2002 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2003 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2005 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2007 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2008 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2010 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2011 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2013 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2014 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2016 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2017 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2019 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2021 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2023 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2025 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2027 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2029 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2031 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2032 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2033 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2034 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2035 // on-chain as necessary).
2036 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2037 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2039 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2040 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2042 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2044 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2046 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2047 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2049 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2050 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2051 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2053 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2054 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2056 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2057 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2058 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2060 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2062 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2063 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2064 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2067 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2068 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2069 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2070 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2072 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2074 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2076 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2078 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2081 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2083 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2084 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2086 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2088 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2090 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2093 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2094 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2096 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2097 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2101 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2102 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2103 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2104 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2105 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2106 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2107 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2109 // Create some initial channels
2110 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2111 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2112 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2113 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2115 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2116 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2117 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2118 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2119 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2120 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2122 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2123 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2124 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2125 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2126 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2128 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2129 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2131 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2133 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2134 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2135 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2137 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2139 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2140 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2141 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2142 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2143 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2145 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2146 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2148 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2149 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2150 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2151 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2154 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2155 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2156 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2157 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2159 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2161 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2162 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2163 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2164 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2165 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2167 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2168 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2170 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2171 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2173 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2174 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2176 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2177 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2178 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2179 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2181 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2187 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2188 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2189 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2191 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2192 let node2_commitment_txid;
2194 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2195 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2196 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2197 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2199 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2200 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2201 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2203 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2205 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2206 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2207 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2208 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2209 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2211 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2212 // confusing us in the following tests.
2213 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2215 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2216 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2217 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2220 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2221 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2222 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2223 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2224 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2225 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2231 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2232 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2234 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2238 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2240 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2241 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2242 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2248 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2250 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2251 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2253 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2254 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2255 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2256 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2257 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2263 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2264 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2266 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2269 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2271 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2272 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2273 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2275 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2276 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2277 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2278 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2280 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2281 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2282 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2286 fn test_justice_tx() {
2287 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2288 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2289 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2290 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2291 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2292 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2293 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2294 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2295 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2296 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2297 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2298 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2299 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2300 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2301 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2302 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2303 // Create some new channels:
2304 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2306 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2307 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2308 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2309 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2310 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2311 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2312 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2313 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2314 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2315 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2316 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2317 // Revoke the old state
2318 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2321 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2323 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2324 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2325 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2327 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2328 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2329 node_txn.truncate(1);
2331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2332 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2333 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2335 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2336 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2337 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2338 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2340 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2341 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2342 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2343 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2345 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2347 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2348 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2350 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2351 // Create some new channels:
2352 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2354 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2358 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2359 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2360 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2361 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2362 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2363 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2364 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2365 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2366 // Revoke the old state
2367 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2369 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2371 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2372 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2373 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2375 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2376 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2379 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2381 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2382 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2383 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2385 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2386 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2387 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2389 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2390 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2391 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2395 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2396 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2397 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2398 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2399 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2400 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2401 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2402 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2403 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2404 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2405 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2406 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2407 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2408 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2409 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2411 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2412 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2414 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2415 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2416 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2418 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2419 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2421 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2422 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2423 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2425 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2429 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2430 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2431 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2432 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2433 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2434 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2435 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2437 // Create some new channel:
2438 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2440 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2441 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2442 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2443 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2444 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2446 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2447 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2448 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2449 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2450 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2451 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2452 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2453 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2454 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2456 //Revoke the old state
2457 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2460 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2462 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2463 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2465 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2466 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2467 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2469 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2470 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2472 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2473 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2475 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2476 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2477 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2478 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2479 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2480 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2481 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2482 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2484 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2485 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2486 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2488 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2489 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2490 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2494 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2495 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2496 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2497 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2498 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2499 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2500 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2502 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2504 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2505 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2506 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2507 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2508 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2509 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2511 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2512 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2514 //Revoke the old state
2515 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2518 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2520 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2522 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2523 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2524 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2526 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2527 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2530 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2531 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2533 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2534 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2535 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2536 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2537 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2538 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2540 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2541 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2542 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2543 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2544 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2545 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2546 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2548 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2549 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2550 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2551 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2553 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2554 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2555 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2557 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2558 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2559 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2560 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2561 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2562 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2563 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2564 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2566 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2567 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2568 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2572 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2573 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2574 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2575 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2576 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2577 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2578 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2579 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2580 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2582 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2583 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2584 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2585 // PaymentSent event).
2587 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2588 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2589 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2590 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2592 // Create some initial channels
2593 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2594 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2596 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2597 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2598 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2599 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2600 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2602 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2603 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2604 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2606 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2607 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2609 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2610 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2611 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2612 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2613 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2614 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2615 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2617 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2618 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2619 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2620 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2621 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2623 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2624 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2626 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2627 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2628 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2629 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2630 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2631 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2632 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2633 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2634 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2635 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2636 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2637 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2638 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2639 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2641 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2642 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2643 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2644 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2646 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2647 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2648 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2649 added_monitors.clear();
2651 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2652 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2653 match forwarded_events[0] {
2654 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2655 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2657 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2658 } else { panic!(); }
2659 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2660 } else { panic!(); }
2661 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2663 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2664 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2665 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2666 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2667 added_monitors.clear();
2669 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2671 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2672 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2675 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2676 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2680 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2681 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2682 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2683 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2684 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2685 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2687 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2689 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2690 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2691 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2692 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2693 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2694 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2695 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2696 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2697 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2698 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2700 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2701 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2702 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2703 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2705 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2706 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2707 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2708 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2710 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2711 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2715 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2716 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2717 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2718 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2720 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2721 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2722 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2723 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2724 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2725 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2727 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2728 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2729 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2730 let commitment_spend =
2731 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2732 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2733 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2734 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2737 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2738 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2739 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2743 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2744 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2745 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2746 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2747 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2748 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2749 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2750 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2751 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2752 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2753 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2754 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2756 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2757 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2758 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2759 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2760 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2762 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2763 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2764 let mut first_claimed = false;
2765 for event in events {
2767 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2768 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2769 assert!(!first_claimed);
2770 first_claimed = true;
2772 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2773 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2776 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2777 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2778 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2781 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2784 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2785 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2786 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2787 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2788 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2789 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2791 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2793 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2794 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2795 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2796 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2797 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2798 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2799 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2801 // Create some intial channels
2802 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2803 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2805 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2806 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2807 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2809 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2811 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2812 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2813 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2814 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2816 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2819 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2820 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2822 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2823 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2824 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2825 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2826 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2827 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2829 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2831 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2832 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2834 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2835 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2836 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2837 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2838 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2840 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2841 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2842 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2843 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2844 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2847 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2848 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2849 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2850 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2852 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2853 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2855 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2856 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2857 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2858 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2860 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2864 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2866 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2868 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2869 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2870 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2871 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2874 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2876 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2877 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2878 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2879 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2880 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2881 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2882 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2884 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2888 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2890 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2891 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2893 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2894 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2895 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2896 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2897 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2898 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2900 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2903 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2904 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2905 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2907 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2908 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2910 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2912 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2913 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2914 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2915 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2916 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2917 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2918 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2922 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2923 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2924 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2925 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2929 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2930 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2931 // and fail backward accordingly.
2933 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2934 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2935 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2936 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2938 // Create some initial channels
2939 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2940 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2942 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2943 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2944 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2945 // Revoke the old state
2946 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2948 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2950 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2951 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2952 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2954 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2956 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2958 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2959 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2961 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2962 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2963 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2964 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2965 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2966 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2968 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2969 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2970 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2972 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2976 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2977 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2978 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2979 // commitment transaction anymore.
2980 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2981 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2982 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2983 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2984 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2985 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2987 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2988 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2989 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2990 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2991 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2992 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2993 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2994 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2995 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2997 // Create some initial channels
2998 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2999 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3001 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3002 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3003 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3004 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3005 // Revoke the old state
3006 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3008 let value = if use_dust {
3009 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3010 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3011 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3014 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3015 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3016 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3018 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3019 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3021 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3022 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3023 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3024 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3025 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3026 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3027 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3028 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3029 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3031 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3032 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3034 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3035 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3036 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3037 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3038 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3039 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3040 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3041 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3043 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3044 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3045 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3048 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3049 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3051 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3052 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3053 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3054 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3055 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3056 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3057 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3058 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3059 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3060 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3062 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3063 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3064 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3067 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3068 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3069 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3070 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3071 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3072 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3076 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3077 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3078 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3080 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3081 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3083 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3084 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3086 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3087 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3090 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3091 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3093 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3095 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3097 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3098 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
3100 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3101 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3104 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3105 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3107 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3109 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3111 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3112 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3115 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3118 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3119 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3120 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3121 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3122 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3124 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3125 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3126 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3127 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3129 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3133 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3134 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3135 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3136 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3137 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3138 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3143 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3144 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3145 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3146 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3147 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3148 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3149 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3151 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3152 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3153 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3155 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3157 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3158 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3160 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3161 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3162 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3163 // that we should update our routing table for.
3164 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3165 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3168 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3171 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3172 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3173 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3175 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3178 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3179 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3180 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3188 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3189 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3190 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3194 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3195 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3196 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3197 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3198 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3202 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3203 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3204 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3205 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3206 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3210 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3211 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3212 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3213 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3214 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3215 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3217 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3219 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3220 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3223 let payment_event = {
3224 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3225 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3226 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3228 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3229 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3232 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3233 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3235 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3238 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3241 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3243 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3245 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3246 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3247 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3248 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3249 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3250 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3252 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3253 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3259 onion_routing_packet,
3261 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3263 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3264 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3265 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3267 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3268 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3270 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3273 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3274 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3276 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3278 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3283 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3284 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3285 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3286 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3287 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3288 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3289 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3290 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3292 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3293 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3294 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3295 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3297 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3299 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3300 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3301 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3303 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3304 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3305 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3307 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3309 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3310 // registering new transactions
3311 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3312 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3316 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3317 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3321 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3322 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3323 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3325 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3327 let mut payment_event = {
3328 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3331 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3332 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3333 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3336 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3337 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3339 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3341 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3342 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3343 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3344 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3347 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3348 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3350 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3352 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3353 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3354 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3356 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3357 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3359 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3361 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3362 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3363 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3364 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3365 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3369 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3371 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3372 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3374 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3376 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3378 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3379 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3381 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3382 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3383 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3384 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3385 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3386 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3387 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3389 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3393 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3394 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3395 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3396 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3397 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3399 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3400 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3401 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3402 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3403 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3405 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3407 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3409 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3410 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3411 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3413 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3414 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3416 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3417 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3421 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3422 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3423 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3424 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3425 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3426 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3427 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3428 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3430 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3431 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3432 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3434 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3435 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3436 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3437 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3439 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3440 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3441 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3443 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3444 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3445 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3446 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3448 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3449 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3451 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3452 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3454 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3456 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3457 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3459 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3460 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3461 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3463 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3466 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3467 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3468 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3470 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3473 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3474 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3478 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3479 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3482 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3483 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3484 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3485 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3486 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3487 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3489 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3490 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3491 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3492 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3493 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3494 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3495 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3497 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3500 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3502 let payment_event = {
3503 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3506 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3507 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3508 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3510 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3512 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3513 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3515 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3516 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3517 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3519 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3521 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3522 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3523 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3526 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3527 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3528 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3529 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3532 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3533 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3534 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3542 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3543 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3544 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3545 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3546 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3547 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3549 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3550 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3551 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3553 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3554 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3556 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3557 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3558 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3559 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3560 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3561 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3562 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3563 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3564 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3565 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3566 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3567 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3568 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3569 // Everything was delivered...
3570 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3573 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3574 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3576 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3577 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3580 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3581 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3582 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3584 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3586 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3587 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3589 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3590 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3591 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3593 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3594 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3595 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3597 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3600 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3603 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3606 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3607 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3608 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3609 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3610 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3611 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3612 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3613 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3614 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3615 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3616 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3618 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3621 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3622 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3624 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3625 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3627 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3628 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3629 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3631 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3634 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3635 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3637 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3639 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3640 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3641 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3644 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3645 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3646 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3647 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3650 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3651 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3652 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3660 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3661 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3662 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3663 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3664 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3665 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3667 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3669 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3670 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3671 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3672 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3673 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3674 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3675 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3676 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3677 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3678 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3679 // Everything was delivered...
3680 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3683 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3684 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3687 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3688 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3689 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3691 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3692 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3695 // Channel should still work fine...
3696 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3697 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3698 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3702 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3703 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3704 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3705 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3706 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3710 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3711 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3712 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3713 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3714 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3718 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3719 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3720 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3721 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3722 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3723 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3724 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3725 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3726 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3727 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3729 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3730 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3732 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3733 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3735 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3737 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3738 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3739 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3741 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3744 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3746 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3747 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3749 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3750 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3751 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3752 let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3753 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3754 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3757 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3759 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3760 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3761 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3764 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3767 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3769 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3770 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3771 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3772 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3773 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3774 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3775 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3778 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3780 let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3781 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3782 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3787 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3788 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3789 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3790 let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3791 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3792 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3794 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3797 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3798 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3799 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3801 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3802 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3803 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3805 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3806 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3807 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3809 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3810 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3811 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3813 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3814 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3815 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3816 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3817 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3818 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3819 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3820 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3822 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3823 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3824 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3825 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3826 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3827 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3829 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3830 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3831 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3832 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3836 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3837 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3839 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3840 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3843 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3845 // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3846 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3847 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3848 let mut found_announcement = false;
3849 for event in msgs.iter() {
3851 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3852 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3854 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3855 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3858 assert!(found_announcement);
3862 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3863 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3864 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3865 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3866 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3867 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3868 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3869 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3871 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3873 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3874 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3875 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3878 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3879 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3881 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3882 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3885 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3888 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3889 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3891 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3892 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3893 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3894 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3895 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3896 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3897 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3899 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3900 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3901 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3903 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3904 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3905 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3907 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3910 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3911 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3912 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3918 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3919 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3921 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3922 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3923 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3924 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3925 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3926 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3928 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3929 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3930 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3931 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3933 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3934 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3936 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3937 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3939 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3941 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3942 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3943 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3944 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3945 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3946 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3947 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3948 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3949 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3952 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3953 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3954 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3955 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3956 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3957 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3958 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3961 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3962 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3963 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3964 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3965 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3966 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3967 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3970 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3971 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3972 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3975 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3976 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3977 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3980 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3981 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3984 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3986 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3987 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3989 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3990 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3992 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3993 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3994 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3996 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3999 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4002 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4003 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4006 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4007 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4010 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4011 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4012 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4013 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4014 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4015 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4016 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4018 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4020 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4021 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4022 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4023 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4024 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4025 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4026 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4028 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4029 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4030 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4031 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4032 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4035 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4038 let mut block = Block {
4039 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4042 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4043 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4044 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4045 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4046 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4047 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4048 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4051 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4054 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4055 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4056 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4057 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4058 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4060 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4061 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4062 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4063 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4064 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4065 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4069 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4070 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4071 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4074 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4075 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4076 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4077 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4078 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4079 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4080 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4081 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4083 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4084 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4085 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4086 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4088 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4089 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4091 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4093 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4096 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4097 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4098 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4099 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4102 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4103 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4104 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4105 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4109 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4110 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4111 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4112 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4115 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4117 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4118 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4119 match fail_commit[0] {
4120 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4121 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4122 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4124 _ => unreachable!(),
4126 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4128 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4133 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4134 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4135 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4139 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4140 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4141 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4142 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4143 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4144 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4145 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4146 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4147 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4148 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4150 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4152 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4154 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4155 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4156 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4157 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4159 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4160 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4161 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4162 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4163 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4164 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4165 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4166 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4167 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4168 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4170 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4171 let config = UserConfig::default();
4172 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4173 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4174 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4175 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4176 default_config: config,
4178 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4179 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4180 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4185 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4186 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4188 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4189 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4190 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4193 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4194 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4195 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4196 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4198 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4199 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4200 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4201 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4203 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4204 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4205 for node in nodes.iter() {
4206 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4207 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4208 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4211 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4215 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4216 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4217 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4218 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4219 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4220 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4221 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4222 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4223 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4224 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4225 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4227 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4228 let channel_value = 100000;
4229 let push_msat = 10001;
4230 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4231 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4232 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4233 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4234 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4235 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4236 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4238 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4240 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4241 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4243 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4245 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4246 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4247 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4248 added_monitors.clear();
4251 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4252 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4254 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4255 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4256 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4257 added_monitors.clear();
4259 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4264 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4265 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4266 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4267 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4269 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4270 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4271 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4272 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4273 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4274 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4275 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4276 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4277 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4278 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4280 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4281 let config = UserConfig::default();
4282 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4283 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4284 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4285 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4286 default_config: config,
4288 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4289 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4290 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4295 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4296 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4298 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4300 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4301 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4303 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4304 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4305 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4306 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4307 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4309 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4310 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4313 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4314 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4315 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4316 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4318 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4319 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4320 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4321 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4323 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4324 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4325 for node in nodes.iter() {
4326 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4327 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4328 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4331 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4335 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4336 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4337 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4338 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4339 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4340 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4341 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4342 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4343 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4344 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4345 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4347 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4348 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4350 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4352 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4353 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4354 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4356 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4357 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4358 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4359 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4360 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4361 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4362 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4363 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4364 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4365 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4367 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4368 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4369 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4370 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4371 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4372 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4374 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4375 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4376 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4381 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4382 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4384 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4385 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4388 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4390 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4391 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4395 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4396 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4397 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4398 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4399 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4400 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4401 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4402 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4403 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4404 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4405 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4406 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4407 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4408 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4410 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4411 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4412 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4413 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4414 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4417 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4419 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4420 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4422 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4423 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4424 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4425 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4427 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4429 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4430 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4431 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4432 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4433 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4436 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4437 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4438 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4439 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4440 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4441 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4444 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4445 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4446 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4447 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4448 assert!(read.is_empty());
4449 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4452 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4453 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4454 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4455 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4456 assert!(read.is_empty());
4457 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4460 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4461 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4462 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4463 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4465 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4466 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4467 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4469 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4471 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4474 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4475 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4476 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4477 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4479 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4480 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4481 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4483 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4485 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4486 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4488 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4489 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4490 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4491 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4492 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4495 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4496 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4499 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4500 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4502 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4503 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4504 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4505 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4506 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4508 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4509 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4510 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4511 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4512 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4513 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4514 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4516 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4517 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4519 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4524 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4525 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4527 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4528 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4529 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4530 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4531 for event in events.drain(..) {
4533 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4534 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4535 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4536 all_outputs.push(outp);
4539 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4542 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4543 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4553 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4554 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4555 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4556 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4557 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4558 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4560 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4561 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4562 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4564 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4565 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4566 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4567 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4568 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4570 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4571 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4573 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4574 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4575 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4576 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4577 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4581 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4582 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4583 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4584 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4585 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4586 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4587 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4589 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4590 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4591 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4593 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4595 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4596 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4597 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4598 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4600 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4601 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4603 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4604 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4606 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4607 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4608 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4612 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4613 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4614 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4616 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4617 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4618 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4619 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4621 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4622 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4623 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4624 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4625 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4627 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4628 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4629 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4631 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4633 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4634 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4635 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4637 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4638 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4639 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4640 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4641 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4645 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4646 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4647 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4648 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4649 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4651 // Create some initial channels
4652 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4654 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4656 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4657 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4658 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4660 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4661 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4663 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4665 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4667 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4671 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4672 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4675 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4676 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4677 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4678 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4679 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4680 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4681 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4683 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4684 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4685 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4687 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4688 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4689 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4693 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4694 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4695 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4696 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4697 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4699 // Create some initial channels
4700 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4702 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4703 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4705 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4707 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4708 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4709 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4711 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4712 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4714 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4716 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4717 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4719 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4721 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4722 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4723 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4724 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4725 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4726 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4728 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4729 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4730 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4731 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4733 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4734 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4735 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4736 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4737 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4741 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4742 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4743 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4744 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4745 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4747 // Create some initial channels
4748 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4750 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4751 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4752 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4753 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4755 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4757 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4758 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4760 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4762 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4763 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4764 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4765 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4767 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4768 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4770 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4771 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4772 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4776 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4777 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4778 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4779 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4780 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4781 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4783 // Create some initial channels
4784 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4786 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4787 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4788 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4789 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4791 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4793 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4794 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4795 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4797 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4798 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4800 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4801 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4802 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4803 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4804 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4805 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4806 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4808 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4809 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4810 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4811 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4813 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4815 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4816 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4817 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4818 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4819 // transactions next...
4820 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4821 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4823 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4824 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4825 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4826 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4828 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4829 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4832 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4833 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4835 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4836 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4838 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4839 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4840 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4841 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4842 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4846 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4847 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4848 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4849 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4850 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4851 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4853 // Create some initial channels
4854 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4856 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4857 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4858 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4859 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4861 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4862 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4864 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4866 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4867 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4868 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4870 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4871 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4873 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4874 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4875 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4876 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4878 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4879 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4880 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4882 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4883 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4884 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4885 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4887 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4889 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4890 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4892 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4893 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4894 // transactions next...
4895 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4896 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4897 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4898 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4900 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4901 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4904 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4905 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4907 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4909 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4910 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4912 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4913 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4915 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4916 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4917 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4918 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4919 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4920 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4921 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4922 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4926 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4927 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4928 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4929 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4930 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4932 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4935 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4936 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4937 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4938 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4940 // Create some initial channels
4941 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4942 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4944 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4945 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4946 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4947 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4948 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4950 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4951 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4952 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4954 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4955 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4956 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4957 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4959 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4960 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4961 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4962 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4963 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4965 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4966 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4968 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4970 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4971 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4972 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4973 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4974 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4975 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4976 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4977 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4978 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4979 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4981 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4982 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4983 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4985 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4986 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4988 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4989 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4992 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
4993 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4994 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4996 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4999 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5000 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5001 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5002 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5006 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5007 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5008 match msg_events[0] {
5009 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5010 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5012 match msg_events[1] {
5013 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5014 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5016 match msg_events[2] {
5017 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5018 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5019 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5020 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5021 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5022 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5024 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5026 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5027 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5028 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5029 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5030 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5031 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5032 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5033 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5034 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5035 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5036 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5037 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5038 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5040 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5045 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5046 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5047 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5048 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5049 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5050 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5051 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5052 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5053 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5054 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5055 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5056 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5057 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5058 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5060 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5061 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5062 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5064 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5065 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5066 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5067 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5068 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5070 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5072 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5073 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5074 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5075 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5076 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5077 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5079 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5080 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5081 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5083 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5084 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5086 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5087 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5089 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5090 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5091 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5092 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5093 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5094 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5096 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5097 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5098 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5099 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5100 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5101 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5102 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5104 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5105 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5106 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5107 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5110 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5111 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5113 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5114 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5116 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5117 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5120 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5121 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5123 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5124 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5125 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5126 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5127 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5128 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5129 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5130 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5131 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5132 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5133 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5134 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5135 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5137 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5138 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5139 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5140 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5141 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5142 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5143 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5144 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5145 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5148 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5149 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5151 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5153 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5155 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5156 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5157 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5158 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5159 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5160 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5161 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5162 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5163 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5164 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5165 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5168 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5169 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5171 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5173 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5174 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5175 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5177 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5182 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5183 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5184 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5185 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5186 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5188 // Create some initial channels
5189 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5191 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5192 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5193 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5194 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5195 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5197 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5198 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5200 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5202 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5203 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5205 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5206 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5209 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5210 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5213 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5214 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5215 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5216 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5217 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5218 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5219 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5223 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5224 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5226 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5227 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5228 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5229 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5230 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5231 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5234 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5235 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5236 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5237 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5238 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5239 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5240 // use the same payment hashes.
5241 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5246 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5247 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5248 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5249 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5250 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5251 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5252 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5253 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5254 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5255 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5257 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5258 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5259 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5260 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5261 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5263 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5264 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5265 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5266 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5268 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5270 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5272 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5273 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5275 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5277 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5279 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5281 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5282 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5284 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5286 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5289 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5291 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5292 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5295 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5297 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5298 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5300 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5301 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5302 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5303 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5304 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5306 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5307 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5308 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5309 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5310 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5311 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5313 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5316 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5317 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5318 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5319 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5320 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5321 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5323 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5324 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5325 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5327 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5330 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5331 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5332 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5333 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5335 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5337 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5339 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5340 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5341 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5342 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5343 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5344 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5345 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5346 if deliver_last_raa {
5347 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5349 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5352 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5353 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5354 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5355 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5357 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5358 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5359 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5361 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5362 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5363 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5365 if announce_latest {
5366 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5368 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5370 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5371 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5372 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5375 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5379 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5380 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5383 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5384 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5385 if deliver_last_raa {
5386 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5388 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5392 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5393 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5394 let mut a_done = false;
5395 for msg in cs_msgs {
5397 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5398 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5399 // should be failed-backwards here.
5400 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5401 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5402 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5403 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5405 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5410 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5411 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5412 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5414 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5415 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5418 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5419 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5420 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5421 if announce_latest {
5422 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5423 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5424 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5427 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5429 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5433 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5434 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5435 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5436 let mut as_updates = 0;
5437 for event in as_events.iter() {
5438 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5439 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5440 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5441 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5443 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5445 if network_update.is_some() {
5448 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5450 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5451 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5452 if announce_latest {
5453 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5454 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5456 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5458 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5459 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5460 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5461 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5462 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5463 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5464 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5465 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5466 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5468 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5470 if network_update.is_some() {
5473 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5475 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5476 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5477 if announce_latest {
5478 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5480 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5482 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5483 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5484 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5485 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5486 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5487 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5491 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5492 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5496 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5497 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5501 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5502 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5503 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5504 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5508 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5509 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5510 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5511 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5512 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5514 // Create some initial channels
5515 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5517 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5518 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5519 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5520 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5522 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5523 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5524 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5526 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5527 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5529 let htlc_timeout = {
5530 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5531 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5532 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5533 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5534 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5535 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5539 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5540 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5541 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5543 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5544 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5545 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5546 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5547 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5548 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5549 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5550 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5551 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5552 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5553 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5557 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5558 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5559 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5560 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5562 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5564 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5565 let seed = [42; 32];
5566 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5567 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5568 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5569 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5570 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5571 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5573 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5574 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5576 // Create some initial channels
5577 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5579 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5580 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5581 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5583 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5584 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5585 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5586 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5587 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5589 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5590 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5591 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5592 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5593 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5595 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5596 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5597 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5598 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5599 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5600 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5601 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5602 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5605 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5606 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5607 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5608 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5610 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5612 let htlc_timeout = {
5613 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5614 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5615 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5616 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5620 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5621 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5622 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5624 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5625 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5626 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5627 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5628 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5629 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5630 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5631 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5632 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5633 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5634 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5635 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5639 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5640 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5641 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5642 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5643 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5645 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5647 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5648 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5650 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5651 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5652 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5654 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5655 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5656 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5658 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5659 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5660 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5662 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5663 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5664 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5667 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5668 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5669 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5670 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5671 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5672 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5674 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5676 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5677 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5678 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5681 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5682 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5683 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5685 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5687 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5688 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5691 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5692 let mut block = Block {
5693 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5696 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5697 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5698 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5700 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5701 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5703 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5706 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5707 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5708 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5709 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5710 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5711 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5713 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5714 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5717 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5719 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5720 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5721 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5723 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5724 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5726 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5727 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5728 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5730 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5731 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5733 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5736 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5737 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5738 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5739 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5740 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5741 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5743 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5744 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5745 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5746 // actually revoked.
5747 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5748 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5749 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5750 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5753 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5754 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5755 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5757 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5758 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5760 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5762 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5764 if check_revoke_no_close {
5765 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5769 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5770 let mut block = Block {
5771 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5774 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5775 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5776 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5778 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5779 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5780 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5782 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5784 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5788 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5789 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5790 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5791 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5792 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5793 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5794 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5796 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5797 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5798 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5800 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5801 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5802 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5804 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5805 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5809 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5810 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5811 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5812 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5813 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5818 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5819 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5820 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5821 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5822 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5823 //Force duplicate channel ids
5824 for node in nodes.iter() {
5825 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5828 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5829 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5830 let push_msat=10001;
5831 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5832 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5833 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5835 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5836 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5840 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5841 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5842 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5843 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5844 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5846 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5847 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5848 let push_msat=10001;
5849 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5851 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5852 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5853 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5854 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5855 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5857 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5858 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5859 let push_msat=10001;
5860 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5861 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5862 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5864 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5865 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5866 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5868 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5869 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5870 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5872 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5873 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5874 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5876 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5877 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5878 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5879 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5880 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5881 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5885 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5886 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5887 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5888 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5889 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5891 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5892 let push_msat=10001;
5893 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5894 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5895 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5896 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5898 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5899 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5900 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5901 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5904 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5906 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5909 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5910 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5911 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5912 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5914 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5915 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5916 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5917 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5918 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5919 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5921 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5922 // pending_update_fee.
5924 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5925 *feerate_lock += 20;
5927 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5930 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5931 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5932 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5933 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5934 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5936 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5939 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5941 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5942 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5943 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5945 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5946 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5947 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5949 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5950 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5951 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5952 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5954 // Flush the pending fee update.
5955 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5956 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5958 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5961 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5962 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5963 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5964 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5965 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5966 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5967 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5968 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5969 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5971 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5972 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5973 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5975 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
5976 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5977 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5978 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5979 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5980 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5981 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
5982 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5983 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5985 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5989 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5990 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5991 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5993 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5994 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5995 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5996 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5997 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5998 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6000 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6001 // pending_update_fee.
6003 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6004 *feerate_lock += 200;
6006 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6009 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6010 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6011 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6012 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6013 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6015 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6018 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6020 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6021 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6022 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6024 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6026 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6027 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6028 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6030 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6031 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6032 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6033 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6034 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6035 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6036 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6038 // Flush the pending fee update.
6039 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6040 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6042 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6043 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6046 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6047 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6048 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6049 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6050 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6051 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6052 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6053 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6054 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6056 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6057 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6058 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6060 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6061 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6062 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6063 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6064 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6065 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6066 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6067 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6068 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6070 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6073 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6074 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6075 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6076 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6077 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6079 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6080 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6081 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6083 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6085 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6086 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6087 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6088 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6090 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6091 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6093 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6094 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6095 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6097 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6098 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6100 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6102 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6103 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6104 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6105 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6108 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6109 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6110 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6113 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6114 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6115 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6116 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6117 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6118 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6119 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6120 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6121 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6122 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6123 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6125 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6126 // pending_update_fee.
6128 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6129 *feerate_lock += 20;
6131 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6134 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6135 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6136 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6137 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6138 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6143 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6145 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6146 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6147 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6149 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6151 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6152 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6153 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6154 let payment_event = {
6155 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6158 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6159 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6161 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6163 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6165 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6166 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6168 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6169 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6171 // Flush the pending fee update.
6172 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6173 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6175 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6176 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6179 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6180 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6181 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6183 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6184 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6187 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6190 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6192 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6194 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6195 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6196 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6197 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6198 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6202 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6203 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6206 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6207 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6208 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6209 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6210 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6211 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6212 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6213 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6214 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6215 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6217 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6220 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6221 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6222 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6224 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6225 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6227 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6228 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6230 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6231 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6232 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6233 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6234 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6236 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6237 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6241 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6242 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6243 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6246 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6247 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6248 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6249 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6250 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6251 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6252 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6254 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6255 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6257 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6258 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6259 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6260 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6264 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6265 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6266 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6267 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6268 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6269 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6270 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6272 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6273 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6274 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6275 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6277 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6278 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6282 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6283 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6284 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6285 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6286 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6287 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6288 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6290 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6291 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6293 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6294 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6296 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6297 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6298 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6300 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6304 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6305 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6306 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6307 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6308 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6309 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6310 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6311 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6313 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6314 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6315 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6319 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6320 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6321 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6322 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6323 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6324 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6325 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6326 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6327 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6328 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6330 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6331 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6332 let payment_event = {
6333 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6336 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6337 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6338 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6339 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6343 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6345 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6347 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6349 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6350 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6352 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6353 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6354 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6356 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6357 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6361 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6362 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6363 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6364 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6365 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6366 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6367 let channel_value = 100000;
6368 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6369 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6371 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6373 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6374 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6376 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6377 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6378 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6380 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6381 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6383 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6386 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6388 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6389 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6390 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6391 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6392 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6393 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6394 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6395 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6397 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6398 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6399 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6402 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6403 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6405 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6406 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6407 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6408 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6409 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6410 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6412 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6416 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6417 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6418 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6419 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6420 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6421 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6422 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6424 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6425 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6426 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6427 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6428 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6430 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6431 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6432 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6434 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6436 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6437 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6438 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6439 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6440 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6442 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6443 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6444 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6446 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6450 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6451 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6452 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6453 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6454 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6455 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6456 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6457 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6459 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6460 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6461 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6462 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6463 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6464 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6466 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6470 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6471 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6472 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6475 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6476 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6477 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6479 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6480 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6482 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6483 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6484 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6486 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6490 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6491 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6492 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6493 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6494 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6495 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6496 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6498 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6499 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6501 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6502 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6503 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6505 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6506 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6507 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6509 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6513 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6514 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6515 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6516 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6517 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6518 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6520 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6521 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6522 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6524 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6525 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6526 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6528 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6529 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6530 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6532 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6536 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6537 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6538 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6539 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6540 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6541 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6542 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6543 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6545 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6546 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6547 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6549 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6550 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6552 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6553 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6554 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6555 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6556 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6557 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6558 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6559 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6560 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6561 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6562 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6563 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6564 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6567 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6568 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6569 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6571 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6573 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6575 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6576 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6577 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6579 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6583 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6584 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6586 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6587 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6588 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6589 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6590 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6591 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6592 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6595 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6596 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6598 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6601 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6604 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6606 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6607 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6608 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6610 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6614 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6615 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6617 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6618 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6619 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6620 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6621 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6623 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6624 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6626 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6627 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6629 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6632 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6635 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6637 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6638 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6639 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6641 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6645 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6646 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6648 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6649 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6650 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6651 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6652 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6654 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6655 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6657 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6658 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6659 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6662 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6663 failure_code: 0x8000,
6666 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6668 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6669 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6670 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6672 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6676 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6677 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6679 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6680 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6681 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6682 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6683 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6685 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6687 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6690 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6691 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6692 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6694 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6695 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6696 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6697 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6698 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6699 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6700 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6702 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6706 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6708 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6710 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6711 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6712 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6714 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6718 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6719 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6721 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6722 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6723 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6724 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6725 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6727 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6729 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6732 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6733 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6734 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6736 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6737 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6738 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6739 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6740 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6741 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6742 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6748 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6750 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6752 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6753 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6754 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6756 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6760 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6761 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6763 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6764 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6765 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6766 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6767 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6769 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6770 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6773 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6774 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6776 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6777 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6778 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6780 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6782 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6784 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6785 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6786 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6787 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6788 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6789 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6790 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6792 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6795 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6796 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6798 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6799 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6800 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6802 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6806 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6807 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6808 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6810 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6811 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6812 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6813 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6814 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6815 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6817 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6820 let mut payment_event = {
6821 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6823 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6824 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6825 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6827 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6829 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6830 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6831 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6832 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6834 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6835 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6838 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6839 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6841 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6843 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6844 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6845 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6847 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6848 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6849 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6850 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6851 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6852 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6853 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6855 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6859 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6862 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6863 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6864 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6865 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6867 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6869 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6870 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6871 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6872 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6873 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6874 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6876 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6882 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6883 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6884 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6885 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6887 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6888 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6889 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6890 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6891 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6892 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6894 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6896 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6897 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6898 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6899 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6901 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6902 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6904 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6905 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6907 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6910 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6911 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6912 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6915 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6916 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6918 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6920 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6921 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6926 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6927 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6929 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6932 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6933 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6934 if announce_latest {
6935 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6937 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6940 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6942 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6944 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6945 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6946 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6947 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6948 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6949 let mut first_failed = false;
6950 for event in events {
6952 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6953 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6954 assert!(!first_failed);
6955 first_failed = true;
6957 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6960 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6966 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6967 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6968 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6971 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6972 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6973 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6974 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6975 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6976 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6977 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6979 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6980 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6981 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6982 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6983 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6985 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6987 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6988 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6990 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6991 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6993 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6995 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6996 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6999 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7001 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7002 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7003 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7004 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7005 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7007 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7008 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7010 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7011 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7012 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7013 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7014 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7015 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7016 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7017 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7019 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7020 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7021 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7023 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7024 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7025 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7026 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7028 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7029 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7030 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7031 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7032 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7033 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7034 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7036 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7038 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7039 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7042 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7043 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7044 else { first = false; }
7046 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7049 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7050 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7051 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7053 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7060 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7061 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7062 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7063 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7067 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7068 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7070 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7071 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7072 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7073 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7074 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7075 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7076 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7077 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7078 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7080 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7081 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7083 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7084 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7086 } else { assert!(false) }
7088 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7089 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7090 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7091 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7092 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7094 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7097 } else { assert!(false); }
7099 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7100 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7101 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7102 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7103 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7104 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7106 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7108 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7109 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7110 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7114 } else { panic!(); }
7115 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7117 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7118 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7119 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7120 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7121 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0) {
7123 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7124 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7126 } else { assert!(false); }
7130 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7131 // We want to be sure that :
7132 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7133 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7134 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7135 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7136 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7142 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7143 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7144 // during signing due to revoked tx
7145 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7146 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7149 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7150 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7151 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7153 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7155 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7156 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7157 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7158 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7160 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7161 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7163 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7164 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7166 // Restore node A from previous state
7167 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7168 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7169 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7170 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7171 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7172 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7173 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7175 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7176 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7177 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7178 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7179 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7180 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7182 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7183 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7187 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7188 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7189 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7190 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7194 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7195 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7197 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7199 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7200 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7204 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7205 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7208 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7209 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7210 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7211 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7212 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7213 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7214 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7216 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7217 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7222 panic!("Unexpected event")
7226 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7227 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7228 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7229 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7232 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7233 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7234 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7235 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7236 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7237 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7238 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7239 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7240 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7241 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7242 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7246 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7247 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7248 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7249 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7251 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7252 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7253 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7254 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7256 // Create some initial channels
7257 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7259 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7260 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7261 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7262 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7263 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7264 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7267 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7268 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7269 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7270 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7271 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7273 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7274 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7275 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7276 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7278 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7279 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7280 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7282 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7283 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7284 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7285 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7286 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7287 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7288 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7289 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7290 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7291 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7293 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7297 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7298 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7300 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7301 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7302 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7303 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7307 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7308 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7309 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7311 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7312 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7313 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7314 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7316 let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7317 let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7318 let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7321 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7322 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7324 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7325 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7326 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7327 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7328 let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7329 for e in msg_events {
7331 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7332 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7333 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7334 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7335 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7338 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7342 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7343 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7344 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7345 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7346 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7347 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7349 // Reestablish chan_1
7350 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7351 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7352 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7353 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7354 // Reestablish chan_2
7355 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7356 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7357 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7358 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7359 // Reestablish chan_3
7360 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7361 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7362 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7363 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7365 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7366 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7367 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7368 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7369 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7370 chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7371 for e in msg_events {
7373 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7374 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7375 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7376 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7377 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7380 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7386 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7387 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7388 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7389 // to forward through that channel.
7390 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7391 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7392 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7393 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7394 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7395 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7396 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7397 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7398 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7399 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7401 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7403 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7404 // not send for private channels.
7405 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7406 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7407 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7408 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7409 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7411 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7412 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7413 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7416 let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7417 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7420 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7421 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7422 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7423 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7424 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7425 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7426 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7427 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7428 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7429 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7431 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7432 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7433 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7435 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7437 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7439 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7440 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7441 let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7442 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7443 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7444 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7445 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7446 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7447 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7449 let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7450 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7452 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7454 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7455 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7456 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7458 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7459 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7460 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7461 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7462 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7464 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7465 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7466 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7468 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7469 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7471 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7472 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7474 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7475 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7476 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7477 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7478 get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7480 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7481 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7482 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7483 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7485 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7486 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7487 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7488 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7489 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7490 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7492 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7494 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7495 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7496 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7497 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7498 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7499 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7500 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7502 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7503 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7504 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7505 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7509 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7510 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7512 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7513 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7515 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7517 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7518 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7519 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7520 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7521 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7522 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7523 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7524 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7526 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7527 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7528 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7529 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7530 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7531 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7532 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7533 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7535 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7537 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7538 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7542 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7543 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7544 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7546 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7547 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7548 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7549 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7551 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7553 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7554 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7555 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7557 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7558 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7559 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7560 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7561 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7562 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7564 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7565 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7566 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7567 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7571 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7572 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7574 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7575 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7576 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7577 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7580 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7584 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7585 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7586 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7587 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7588 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7589 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7590 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7591 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7595 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7596 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7597 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7598 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7600 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7601 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7602 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7603 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7604 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7605 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7606 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7607 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7608 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7609 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7610 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7611 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7612 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7616 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7618 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7619 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7621 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7623 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7624 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7625 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7626 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7627 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7628 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7629 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7630 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7631 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7632 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7633 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7634 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7635 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7639 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7641 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7642 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7646 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7647 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7648 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7650 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7651 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7652 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7653 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7654 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7656 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7657 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7658 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7659 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7660 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7661 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7662 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7663 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7664 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7665 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7666 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7668 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7669 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7670 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7672 // Revoke local commitment tx
7673 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7675 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7676 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7677 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7678 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7680 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7681 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7683 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7684 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7685 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7687 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7688 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7689 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7691 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7692 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7693 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7694 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7696 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7697 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7698 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7699 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7700 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7701 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7702 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7703 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7705 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7712 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7713 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7714 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7716 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7717 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7718 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7719 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7721 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7722 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7723 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7724 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7725 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7726 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7728 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7729 // available, which we check here:
7730 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7731 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7732 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7734 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7735 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7737 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7738 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7739 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7740 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7742 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7743 // output, checked above).
7744 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7745 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7746 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7748 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7749 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7750 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7751 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7752 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7756 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7757 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7758 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7759 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7760 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7762 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7763 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7765 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7766 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7767 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7768 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7769 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7771 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7772 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7778 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7779 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7780 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7781 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7783 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7784 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7786 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7787 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7788 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7789 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7790 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7791 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7792 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7793 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7797 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7798 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7799 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7800 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7802 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7803 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7804 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7805 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7806 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7807 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7808 // up bumped justice generation.
7809 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7812 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7817 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7818 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7819 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7822 // Provide preimage for one
7823 // Check aggregation
7825 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7826 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7827 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7828 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7830 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7831 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7832 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7834 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7835 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7836 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7837 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7838 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7840 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7841 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7842 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7844 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7846 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7850 let feerate_timeout;
7851 let feerate_preimage;
7853 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7854 // 9 transactions including:
7855 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7856 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7857 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7859 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7860 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7861 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7862 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7863 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7864 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7865 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7867 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7868 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7869 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7870 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7872 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7873 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7874 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7875 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7877 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7878 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7879 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7880 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7884 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7885 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7887 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7888 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7890 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7891 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7892 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7893 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7894 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7895 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7897 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7898 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7899 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7900 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7901 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7903 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7904 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7905 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7906 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7907 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7912 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7913 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7917 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7918 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7919 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7920 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7921 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7922 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7923 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7924 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7926 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7927 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7928 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7929 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7930 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7932 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7933 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7935 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7937 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7938 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7939 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7941 // Must revoke without gaps
7942 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7943 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7945 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7946 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7947 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7949 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7950 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7951 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7953 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7957 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7958 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7959 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7961 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7962 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7963 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7964 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7966 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7967 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7968 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7969 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7971 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7972 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7973 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7975 // Revoke local commitment tx
7976 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7978 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7979 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7980 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7981 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7983 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7984 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7986 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7988 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7989 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7990 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7991 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7992 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7993 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7997 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7998 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7999 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8001 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8002 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8003 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8008 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8009 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8010 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8011 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8012 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8013 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8014 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8016 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8018 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8019 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8020 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8021 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8022 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8024 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8025 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8027 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8029 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8031 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8032 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8033 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8035 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8036 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8037 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8039 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8044 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8045 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8046 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8047 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8048 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8050 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8051 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8052 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8054 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8056 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8057 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8058 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8059 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8063 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8064 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8065 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8066 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8067 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8068 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8069 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8071 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8072 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8073 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8075 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8076 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8077 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8081 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8082 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8083 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8084 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8085 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8086 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8088 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8089 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8090 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8091 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8093 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8094 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8095 route.paths.push(path);
8096 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8097 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8098 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8099 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8100 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8101 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8102 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8103 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8107 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8108 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8109 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8110 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8111 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8112 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8114 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8117 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200);
8118 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8119 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8121 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8122 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8123 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8124 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8126 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8127 // values from previous calls.
8128 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8129 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8130 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8132 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8134 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8135 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8137 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8145 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8146 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8147 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8148 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8149 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8150 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8152 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8154 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8156 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8157 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8158 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8159 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8160 } else { panic!(); }
8162 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8164 header: BlockHeader {
8166 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8167 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8168 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8172 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8173 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8174 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8175 } else { panic!(); }
8177 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8178 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8179 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8180 block.header.time += 1;
8181 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8182 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8183 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8186 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8187 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8189 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8190 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8191 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8192 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8194 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8195 // values from previous calls.
8196 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8197 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8198 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8200 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8201 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8202 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8203 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8205 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8210 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8211 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8215 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8217 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8219 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8220 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8221 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8222 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8224 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8225 // resulting events.
8226 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8229 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8230 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8231 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8232 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8234 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8235 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8236 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8237 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8240 // We should fail the payment back
8241 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8242 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8243 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8244 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8245 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8247 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8252 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8253 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8254 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8256 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8257 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8258 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8259 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8261 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8262 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8263 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8264 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8266 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8267 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8268 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8269 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8273 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8274 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8275 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8276 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8278 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8279 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8280 // commitment at same time.
8282 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8283 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8284 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8285 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8287 // Create some initial channel
8288 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8289 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8291 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8292 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8294 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8295 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8297 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8298 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8299 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8300 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8302 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8303 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8304 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8305 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8306 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8307 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8308 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8309 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8312 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8313 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8314 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8315 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8316 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8318 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8319 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8321 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8322 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8323 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8324 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8325 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8326 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8327 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8328 } else { assert!(false); }
8329 } else { assert!(false); };
8330 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8332 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8333 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8337 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8338 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8339 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8340 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8341 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8343 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8344 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8345 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8346 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8348 // Create some initial channel
8349 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8350 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8352 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8353 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8355 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8356 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8358 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8359 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8360 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8361 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8362 let watchtower_alice = {
8363 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8364 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8365 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8366 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8367 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8368 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8369 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8370 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8373 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8374 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8375 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8376 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8377 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8379 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8381 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8382 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8386 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8387 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8388 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8389 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8390 let watchtower_bob = {
8391 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8392 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8393 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8394 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8395 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8396 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8397 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8398 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8401 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8402 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8404 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8405 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8407 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8411 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8412 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8413 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8414 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8415 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8416 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8417 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8418 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8419 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8420 } else { assert!(false); }
8421 } else { assert!(false); };
8422 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8425 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8426 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8427 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8429 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8432 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8433 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8434 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8438 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8439 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8440 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8442 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8443 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8444 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8445 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8446 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8447 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8452 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8453 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8454 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8457 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8458 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8460 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8461 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8462 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8463 // before receiving funding_signed.
8464 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8465 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8466 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8467 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8469 // Create an initial channel
8470 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8471 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8472 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8473 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8474 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8476 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8477 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8479 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8482 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8483 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8484 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8485 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8486 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8490 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8491 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8492 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8493 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8494 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8495 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8496 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8498 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8499 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8500 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8501 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8503 // Create some initial channels
8504 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8506 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8507 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8508 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8509 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8510 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8511 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8513 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8514 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8515 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8516 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8517 // this test before #653 fix.
8518 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8519 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8521 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8522 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8524 let htlc_timeout = {
8525 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8526 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8527 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8528 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8532 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8533 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8534 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8535 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8538 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8539 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8540 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8541 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8543 // Steps of the test:
8544 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8545 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8546 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8547 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8548 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8549 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8550 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8551 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8552 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8553 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8554 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8555 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8557 // Create some initial channels
8558 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8559 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8561 // Steps (1) and (2):
8562 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8563 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8565 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8566 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8567 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8568 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8569 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8570 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8571 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8573 // Steps (3) and (4):
8574 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8575 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8576 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8577 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8578 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8579 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8581 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8582 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8583 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8584 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8585 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8587 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8588 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8589 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8590 if broadcast_alice {
8591 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8593 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8595 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8596 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8600 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8601 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8602 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8604 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8605 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8606 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8607 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8608 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8609 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8611 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8612 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8613 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8614 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8615 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8616 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8618 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8619 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8624 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8625 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8626 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8629 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8630 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8631 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8632 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8633 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8636 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8638 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8639 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8640 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8643 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8646 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8648 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8651 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8652 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8653 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8654 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8655 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8658 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8660 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8663 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8664 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8665 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8666 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8667 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8668 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8669 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8670 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8671 if broadcast_alice {
8672 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8674 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8676 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8677 if broadcast_alice {
8678 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8679 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8680 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8681 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8683 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8684 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8686 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8687 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8692 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8693 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8695 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8696 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8697 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8698 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8700 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8701 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8702 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8704 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8705 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8706 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8707 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8708 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8709 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8710 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8712 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8713 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8719 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8720 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8721 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8722 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8723 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8727 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8728 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8729 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8731 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8732 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8733 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8734 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8735 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8736 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8737 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8738 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8740 // Create an initial channel
8741 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8742 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8743 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8744 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8746 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8747 // that it is rejected.
8748 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8750 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8751 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8753 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8754 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8755 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8756 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8757 // move forward with it.
8758 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8759 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8765 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8766 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8768 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8771 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8772 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8774 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8775 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8776 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8777 added_monitors.clear();
8779 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8781 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8782 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8784 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8787 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8788 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8789 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8790 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8791 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8793 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8794 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8796 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8797 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8798 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8799 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8800 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8802 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8806 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8807 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8808 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8809 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8810 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8811 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8813 let funding_created = {
8814 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8815 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8816 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8817 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8820 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8821 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8822 // still needs to be cleared here.
8823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8825 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8827 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8828 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8830 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8831 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8832 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8833 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8834 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8836 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8840 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8841 // everything is functional.
8842 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8844 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8845 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8846 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8847 added_monitors.clear();
8850 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8851 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8852 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8853 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8855 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8856 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8857 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8858 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8862 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8863 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8865 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8866 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8867 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8868 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8869 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8870 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8871 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8873 // Create some initial channels
8874 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8875 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8876 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8878 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8879 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8880 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8882 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8883 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8884 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8886 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8887 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8889 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8890 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8891 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8892 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8893 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8894 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8896 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8897 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8898 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8900 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8901 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8902 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8904 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8905 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8907 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8910 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8911 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8913 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8915 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8916 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8917 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8918 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8919 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8920 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8922 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8923 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8924 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8928 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8929 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8931 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8932 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8933 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8934 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8935 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8936 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8937 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8938 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8940 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8941 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8942 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8944 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8945 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8946 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8947 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8950 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8951 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8954 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8957 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8958 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8960 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8961 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8962 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8964 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8965 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8966 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8968 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8969 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8970 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8971 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8972 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8973 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8974 } else { panic!(); }
8975 } else { panic!(); }
8976 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8979 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8980 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8981 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8982 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8983 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8984 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8985 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8986 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8987 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8988 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8989 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8990 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8991 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8992 // until we learned about an additional block.
8994 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8995 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8996 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8997 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8998 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8999 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9000 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9002 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9003 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9004 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9005 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9006 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9008 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9009 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9010 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9012 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9013 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9015 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9016 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9017 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9019 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9020 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9021 if test_height_before_timelock {
9022 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9023 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9024 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9025 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9027 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9028 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9029 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9030 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9031 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9032 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9034 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9035 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9037 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9038 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9039 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9040 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9041 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9042 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9045 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9046 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9047 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9048 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9049 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9050 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9051 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9052 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9053 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9058 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9059 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9060 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9064 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9065 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9066 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9068 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9070 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9071 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9072 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9073 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9074 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9075 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9076 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9077 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9078 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9080 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9081 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9082 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9085 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9086 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9087 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9088 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9089 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9091 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9093 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9094 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9095 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9098 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9099 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9100 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9101 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9102 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9104 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9106 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9108 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9109 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9110 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9112 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9113 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9114 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9115 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9116 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9118 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9119 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9120 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9121 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9123 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9124 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9125 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9126 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9127 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9128 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9129 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9130 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9132 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9133 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9134 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9135 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9136 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9137 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9138 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9140 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9141 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9142 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9143 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9147 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9148 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9150 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9151 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9152 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9155 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9156 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9157 // the commitment state.
9158 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9160 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9162 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9163 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9166 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9167 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9168 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9169 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9170 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9171 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9172 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9174 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9175 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9179 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9183 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9185 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9186 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9187 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9188 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9189 let params = RouteParameters {
9190 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9191 final_value_msat: 10000,
9192 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9194 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9195 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9197 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9198 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9200 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9201 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9202 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9203 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9204 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9205 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9209 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9210 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9211 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9212 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9213 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9215 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9216 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9217 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9218 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9220 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9221 let params = RouteParameters {
9222 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9223 final_value_msat: 10000,
9224 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9226 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9227 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9228 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9229 let route = find_route(
9230 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9231 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9234 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9235 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9237 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9238 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9239 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9240 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9241 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9242 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9245 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9246 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9247 enum ExposureEvent {
9248 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9250 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9252 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9253 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9256 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9257 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9260 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9261 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9262 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9263 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9264 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9265 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9266 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9267 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9269 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9270 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9271 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9272 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9273 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9274 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9276 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9277 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9278 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9279 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9281 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9283 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9284 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9285 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9287 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9290 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9291 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9295 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9296 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9299 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9302 let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9303 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9304 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9306 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9307 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9308 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9309 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9311 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9312 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9314 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9315 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9317 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9318 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9321 if dust_outbound_balance {
9322 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9323 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9324 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9325 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9326 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9327 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9330 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9331 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9332 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9333 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9334 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9338 if dust_outbound_balance {
9339 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9340 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9341 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9342 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9343 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9346 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9347 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9348 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9349 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9354 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9355 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9356 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9357 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9358 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9360 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9361 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9362 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9364 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9366 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9367 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9368 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9370 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9371 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9372 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9373 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9374 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9376 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9377 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9378 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9379 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9381 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9382 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9384 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9385 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9386 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9388 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9389 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9391 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9393 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9396 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9397 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9398 added_monitors.clear();
9402 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9403 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9404 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9405 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9406 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9407 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9408 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9409 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9410 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9411 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9412 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9413 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9414 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);