1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, EntropySource};
21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use crate::util::test_utils;
34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use crate::prelude::*;
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
66 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
67 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
68 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
69 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
70 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
71 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
72 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
73 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
75 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
77 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
78 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
79 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
81 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
82 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
84 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
85 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
87 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
88 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
89 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
90 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
91 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
92 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
93 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
94 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
96 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
97 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
99 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
101 } else { assert!(false); }
104 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
106 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
107 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
116 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
122 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
127 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
129 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
131 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
132 *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
136 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
137 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
138 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
145 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
146 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
147 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
148 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
149 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
150 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
151 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
152 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
153 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
155 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
156 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
157 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
158 let opt_anchors = false;
159 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
160 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
162 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
163 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
164 if !send_from_initiator {
165 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
166 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
170 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
171 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
172 if send_from_initiator {
173 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
176 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
178 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
179 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
180 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
181 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
182 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
183 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
184 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
187 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
188 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
189 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
191 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
192 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
193 if send_from_initiator {
194 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
195 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
196 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
197 // well as an additional HTLC.
198 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
200 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
205 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
206 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
207 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
211 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
215 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
219 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
223 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
224 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
225 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
226 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
227 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
228 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
229 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
230 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
231 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
232 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
234 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
236 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
238 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
240 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
243 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
246 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
247 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
248 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
249 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
250 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
255 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
257 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
258 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
259 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
262 let payment_event = {
263 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
264 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
265 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
267 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
268 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
270 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
271 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
272 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
273 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
274 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
277 // deliver(1), generate (3):
278 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
279 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
280 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
283 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
284 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
285 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
286 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
287 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
288 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
289 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
292 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
293 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
294 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
295 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
296 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
297 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
298 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
301 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
302 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
303 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
306 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
307 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
310 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
313 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
314 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
316 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
320 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
325 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
326 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
327 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
328 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
329 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
330 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
331 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
332 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
335 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
337 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
339 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
342 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
345 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
346 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
347 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
348 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
351 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
354 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
356 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
357 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
358 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
361 let payment_event = {
362 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
363 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
364 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
366 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
367 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
369 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
370 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
371 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
372 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
373 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
376 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
379 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
383 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
384 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
385 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
386 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
387 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
388 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
391 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
392 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
393 // update_fee (never committed) ->
395 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
396 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
397 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
398 // <- (1) RAA delivered
399 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
400 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
401 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
402 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
404 // B should send no response here
405 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
406 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
409 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
412 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
413 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
414 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
416 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
419 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
420 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
421 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
422 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
423 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
425 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
428 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
429 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
430 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
431 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
434 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
437 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
438 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
440 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
441 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
442 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
444 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
445 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
446 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
447 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
450 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
452 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
454 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
456 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
457 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
458 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
460 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
461 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
462 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
463 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
464 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
465 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
466 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
468 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
469 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
470 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
472 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
474 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
475 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
479 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
480 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
483 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
484 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
487 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
488 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
489 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
492 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
493 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
497 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
498 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
499 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
500 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
503 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
504 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
505 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
506 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
508 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
510 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
513 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
514 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
517 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
518 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
519 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
521 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
522 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
523 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
525 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
526 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
528 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
530 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
531 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
533 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
535 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
536 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
538 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
539 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
540 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
541 added_monitors.clear();
543 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
545 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
546 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
548 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
549 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
550 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
551 added_monitors.clear();
554 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
555 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
557 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
558 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
560 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
561 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
562 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
563 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
564 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
568 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
590 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
591 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
592 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
593 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
594 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
595 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
598 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
601 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
604 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
605 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
606 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
607 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
608 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
610 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
612 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
614 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
615 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
618 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
619 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
622 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
623 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
624 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
627 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
628 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
633 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
634 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
637 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
638 let channel_value = 5000;
640 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
641 let channel_id = chan.2;
642 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
643 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
644 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
646 let opt_anchors = false;
648 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
649 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
650 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
652 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
653 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
655 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
656 *feerate_lock = feerate;
658 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
660 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
662 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
664 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
666 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
668 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
670 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
671 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
672 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
673 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
674 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
675 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
679 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
680 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
683 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
684 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
687 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
689 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
690 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
691 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
692 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
693 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
694 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
695 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
696 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
697 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
698 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
700 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
701 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
702 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
703 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
704 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
705 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
706 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
707 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
708 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
711 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
712 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
713 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
716 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
717 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
718 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
719 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
720 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
721 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
722 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
724 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
725 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
726 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
727 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
729 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
731 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
734 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
737 htlc_signatures: res.1
740 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
742 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
745 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
747 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
748 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
749 //Should produce and error.
750 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
751 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
753 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
754 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
758 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
759 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
760 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
761 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
762 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
763 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
766 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
769 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
772 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
775 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
776 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
777 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
778 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
779 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
781 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
783 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
784 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
785 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
788 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
790 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
791 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
793 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
794 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
795 added_monitors.clear();
797 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
798 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
799 // node[1] has nothing to do
801 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
802 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
805 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
806 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
807 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
809 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
811 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
813 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
814 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
815 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
816 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
817 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
818 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
820 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
821 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
823 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
825 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
827 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
829 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
831 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
832 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
834 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
836 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
838 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
840 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
841 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
843 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
844 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
847 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
849 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
850 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
851 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
852 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
853 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
857 fn test_update_fee() {
858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
861 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
862 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
863 let channel_id = chan.2;
866 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
867 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
868 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
869 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
870 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
871 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
872 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
873 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
874 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
875 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
876 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
879 // Create and deliver (1)...
882 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
883 feerate = *feerate_lock;
884 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
886 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
889 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
890 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
891 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
892 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
893 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
895 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
897 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
899 // Generate (2) and (3):
900 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
901 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
905 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
906 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
909 // Create and deliver (4)...
911 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
912 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
914 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
916 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
917 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
918 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
919 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
920 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
922 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
925 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
926 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
929 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
930 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
932 // Handle (3), creating (6):
933 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
935 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
936 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
939 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
940 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
943 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
944 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
945 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
946 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
947 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
948 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
949 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
950 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
954 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
956 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
957 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
959 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
961 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
963 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
964 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
965 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
966 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
967 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
971 fn fake_network_test() {
972 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
973 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
974 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
975 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
976 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
977 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
979 // Create some initial channels
980 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
981 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
982 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
984 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
985 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
986 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
987 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
988 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
990 // Send some more payments
991 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
992 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
993 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
995 // Test failure packets
996 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
997 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
999 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1000 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1002 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1003 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1004 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1005 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1006 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1011 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1012 hops.push(RouteHop {
1013 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1014 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1015 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1016 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1018 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1020 hops.push(RouteHop {
1021 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1022 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1023 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1024 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1026 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1028 hops.push(RouteHop {
1029 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1030 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1031 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1032 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1034 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1036 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1037 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1038 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1040 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1041 hops.push(RouteHop {
1042 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1043 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1044 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1045 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1047 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1049 hops.push(RouteHop {
1050 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1051 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1052 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1053 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1055 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1057 hops.push(RouteHop {
1058 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1059 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1060 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1061 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1063 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1065 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1066 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1067 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1069 // Claim the rebalances...
1070 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1071 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1073 // Close down the channels...
1074 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1075 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1078 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1080 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1081 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1083 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1084 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1089 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1090 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1091 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1092 // commitment dance rounds.
1093 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1094 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1095 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1096 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1097 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1098 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1100 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1101 for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1102 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1103 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1104 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1108 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1109 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1110 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1111 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1113 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1114 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1116 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1118 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1119 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1120 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1121 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1124 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1125 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1127 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1131 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1132 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1133 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1134 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1136 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1137 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1138 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1139 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1140 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1141 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1144 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1145 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1146 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1148 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1150 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1151 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1152 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1155 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1156 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1158 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1160 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1162 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1164 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1165 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1167 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1169 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1171 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1173 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1175 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1177 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1179 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1182 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1184 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1185 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1186 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1188 &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1189 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1195 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1196 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1199 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1203 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1204 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1205 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1206 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1207 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1208 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1209 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1211 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1212 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1213 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1214 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1215 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1218 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1220 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1221 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1223 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1224 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1226 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1227 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1228 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1232 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1233 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1234 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1235 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1236 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1237 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1238 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1239 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1241 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1244 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1246 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1248 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1249 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1250 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1252 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1253 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1254 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1257 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1258 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1260 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1261 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1262 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1263 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1264 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1265 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1266 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1269 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1271 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1273 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1274 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1276 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1277 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1279 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1280 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1281 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1282 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1283 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1284 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1286 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1289 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1290 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1292 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1293 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1294 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1296 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1297 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1298 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1299 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1301 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1302 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1305 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1306 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1307 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1308 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1310 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1311 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1312 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1313 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1314 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1315 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1323 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1324 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1325 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1326 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1327 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1328 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1330 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1331 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1333 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1334 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1335 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1336 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1337 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1339 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1341 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1342 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1343 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1346 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1348 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1349 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1351 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1355 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1356 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1357 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1358 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1359 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1360 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1362 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1363 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1364 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1365 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1367 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1369 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1370 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1371 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1372 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1375 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1376 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1377 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1378 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1381 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1383 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1384 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1385 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1387 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1389 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1391 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1392 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1393 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1394 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1395 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1396 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1397 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1398 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1399 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1401 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1402 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1403 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1404 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1405 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1407 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1408 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1409 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1410 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1411 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1412 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1413 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1414 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1415 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1418 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1419 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1420 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1422 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1423 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1424 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1426 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1428 amount_msat: 3460001,
1429 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1431 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1434 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1437 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1438 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1439 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1440 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1441 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1445 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1446 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1448 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1449 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1451 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1454 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1457 htlc_signatures: res.1
1460 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1461 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1462 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1464 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1465 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1467 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1468 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1470 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1472 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1473 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1474 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1476 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1477 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1478 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1480 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1482 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1483 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1489 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1490 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1491 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1492 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1493 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1495 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1496 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1497 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1498 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1499 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1500 let opt_anchors = false;
1502 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1503 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1505 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1507 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1509 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1510 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1511 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1514 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1515 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1516 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1517 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1518 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1519 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1523 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1524 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1525 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1526 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1527 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1528 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1529 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1530 let opt_anchors = false;
1532 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1533 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1534 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1535 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1536 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1537 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1538 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1540 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1541 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1542 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1545 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1546 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1547 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1548 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1549 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1550 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1551 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1552 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1553 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1555 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1556 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1557 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1558 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1559 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1562 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1563 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1564 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1565 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1566 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1567 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1569 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1573 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1574 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1575 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1576 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1577 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1579 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1580 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1581 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1582 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1583 let opt_anchors = false;
1585 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1586 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1587 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1588 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1589 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1590 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1591 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1593 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1594 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1595 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1596 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1597 // commitment transaction fee.
1598 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1600 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1601 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1602 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1605 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1606 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1607 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1608 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1612 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1613 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1614 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1615 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1616 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1617 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1618 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1619 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1620 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1621 let opt_anchors = false;
1623 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1625 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1626 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1627 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1628 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1630 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1631 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1632 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1633 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1634 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1635 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1636 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1638 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1639 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1640 match msg_events[0] {
1641 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1642 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1644 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1649 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1650 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1651 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1652 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1653 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1654 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1655 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1656 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1658 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1659 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1660 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1666 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1673 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1674 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1675 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1679 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1680 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1681 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1682 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1683 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1684 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1685 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1688 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1689 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1690 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1691 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1693 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1694 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1695 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1696 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1698 // Add a pending HTLC.
1699 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1700 let payment_event_1 = {
1701 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1704 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1705 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1706 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1708 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1710 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1711 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1712 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1713 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1714 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1716 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1717 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1718 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1719 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1720 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1721 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1722 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1723 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1726 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1727 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1728 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1729 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1732 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1733 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1734 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1735 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1736 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1737 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1739 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1743 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1744 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1745 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1747 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1748 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1749 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1750 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1751 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1752 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1753 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1755 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1756 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1757 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1759 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1760 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1763 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1764 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1768 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1769 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1770 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1771 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1772 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1773 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1774 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1775 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1776 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1777 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1778 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1780 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1781 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1783 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1784 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1786 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1788 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1789 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1790 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1791 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1796 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1797 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1798 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1799 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1801 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1803 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1805 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1806 .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1807 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1808 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1809 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1811 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1812 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1813 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1814 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1817 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1818 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1820 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1821 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1822 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1823 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1824 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1825 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1826 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1830 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1831 .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1832 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1833 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1834 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1836 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1837 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1838 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1839 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1840 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1843 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1844 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1845 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1846 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1847 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1850 // adding pending output.
1851 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1852 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1853 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1854 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1855 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1856 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1857 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1858 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1859 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1861 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1862 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1863 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1865 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1866 let payment_event_1 = {
1867 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1870 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1871 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1872 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1874 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1876 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1877 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1879 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1880 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1881 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1882 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1885 // split the rest to test holding cell
1886 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1887 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1888 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1889 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1891 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1892 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1895 // now see if they go through on both sides
1896 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1897 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1898 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1900 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1901 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1903 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1905 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1906 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1907 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1908 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1909 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1912 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1913 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1914 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1916 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1917 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1919 // flush the pending htlc
1920 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1921 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1924 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1925 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1927 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1929 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1930 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1931 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1934 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1935 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1938 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1940 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1941 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1942 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1944 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1945 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1947 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1948 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1949 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1950 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1951 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1952 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1954 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1955 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1956 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1957 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1959 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1960 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1962 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1963 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1965 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1966 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1967 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1968 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1969 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1971 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1972 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1973 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1975 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1981 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1982 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1983 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1984 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1985 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1987 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1988 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1989 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1991 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1997 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1998 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1999 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2001 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2002 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2003 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2005 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2006 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2007 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2008 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2009 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2011 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2012 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2016 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2017 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2018 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2019 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2020 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2021 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2022 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2023 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2025 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2026 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2027 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2028 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2029 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2030 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2031 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2032 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2034 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2035 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2036 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2037 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2038 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2039 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2040 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2041 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2042 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2043 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2045 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2046 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2047 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2048 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2049 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2051 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2052 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2054 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2056 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2057 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2058 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2061 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2062 // initial fulfill/CS.
2063 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2064 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2066 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2068 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2069 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2070 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2071 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2075 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2076 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2078 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2079 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2081 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2082 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2084 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2085 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2087 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2089 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2091 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2093 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2095 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2097 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2099 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2100 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2101 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2102 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2103 // on-chain as necessary).
2104 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2105 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2107 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2108 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2110 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2112 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2114 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2115 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2117 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2118 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2119 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2121 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2122 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2124 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2125 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2126 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2128 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2130 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2131 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2132 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2135 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2136 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2138 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2140 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2142 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2144 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2146 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2149 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2151 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2152 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2154 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2156 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2158 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2161 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2162 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2164 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2165 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2169 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2170 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2171 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2172 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2173 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2174 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2175 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2177 // Create some initial channels
2178 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2179 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2180 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2181 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2183 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2184 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2185 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2186 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2187 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2188 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2190 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2191 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2192 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2193 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2194 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2196 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2197 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2199 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2201 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2202 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2203 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2205 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2207 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2208 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2209 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2210 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2211 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2213 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2214 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2216 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2217 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2218 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2219 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2222 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2223 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2224 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2225 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2227 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2229 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2230 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2231 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2232 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2233 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2235 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2236 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2238 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2239 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2240 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2242 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2243 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2245 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2246 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2247 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2248 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2250 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2256 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2257 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2258 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2260 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2261 let node2_commitment_txid;
2263 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2264 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2265 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2266 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2268 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2269 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2270 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2272 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2274 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2275 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2276 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2277 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2278 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2280 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2281 // confusing us in the following tests.
2282 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2284 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2285 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2286 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2289 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2290 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2291 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2292 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2293 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2294 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2300 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2301 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2307 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2309 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2310 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2311 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2317 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2319 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2320 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2322 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2323 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2325 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2326 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2332 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2333 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2338 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2340 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2341 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2342 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2344 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2345 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2346 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2347 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2349 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2350 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2351 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2352 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2356 fn test_justice_tx() {
2357 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2358 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2359 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2360 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2361 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2362 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2363 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2364 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2365 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2366 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2367 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2368 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2369 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2370 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2371 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2372 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2373 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2374 // Create some new channels:
2375 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2377 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2378 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2379 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2380 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2381 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2382 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2383 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2384 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2385 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2386 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2387 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2388 // Revoke the old state
2389 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2392 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2394 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2395 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2396 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2398 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2399 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2402 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2403 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2405 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2406 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2407 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2408 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2410 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2411 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2412 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2413 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2415 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2417 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2418 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2420 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2421 // Create some new channels:
2422 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2424 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2428 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2429 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2430 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2431 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2432 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2433 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2434 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2435 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2436 // Revoke the old state
2437 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2439 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2442 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2443 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2445 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2446 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2449 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2451 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2452 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2453 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2455 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2456 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2457 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2459 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2460 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2461 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2465 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2466 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2467 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2468 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2470 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2471 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2472 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2473 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2474 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2475 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2476 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2477 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2478 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2479 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2481 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2482 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2484 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2485 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2486 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2488 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2490 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2491 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2492 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2494 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2498 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2499 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2500 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2501 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2502 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2503 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2504 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2506 // Create some new channel:
2507 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2509 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2510 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2511 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2512 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2513 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2515 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2516 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2517 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2518 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2519 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2520 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2521 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2522 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2523 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2525 //Revoke the old state
2526 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2529 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2531 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2532 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2534 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2535 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2536 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2538 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2539 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2541 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2542 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2545 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2546 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2547 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2548 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2549 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2550 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2551 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2553 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2554 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2555 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2556 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2557 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2559 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2560 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2561 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2565 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2566 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2567 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2568 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2569 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2571 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2573 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2575 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2576 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2577 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2578 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2579 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2580 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2582 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2583 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2585 //Revoke the old state
2586 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2589 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2591 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2593 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2594 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2595 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2596 match events.last().unwrap() {
2597 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2601 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2602 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2604 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2605 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
2607 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2608 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2609 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2610 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2611 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2612 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2613 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2615 // Justice transactions are indices 2-3-4
2616 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2617 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2618 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2620 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2621 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2622 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2624 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2625 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2626 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2627 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2628 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2629 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2630 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2631 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2633 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2634 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2635 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2636 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2637 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2638 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2639 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2641 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2642 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2643 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2647 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2648 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2649 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2650 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2651 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2652 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2653 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2654 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2655 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2657 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2658 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2659 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2660 // PaymentSent event).
2662 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2665 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2667 // Create some initial channels
2668 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2669 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2671 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2672 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2673 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2674 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2675 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2677 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2678 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2679 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2681 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2682 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2684 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2685 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2686 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2687 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2688 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2689 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2690 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2691 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2692 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2694 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2695 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2696 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2697 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2698 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2700 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2701 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2703 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2704 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2705 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2706 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2707 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2708 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2709 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2710 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2711 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2712 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2713 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2715 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2716 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2717 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
2718 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2720 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2721 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2722 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2723 added_monitors.clear();
2725 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2726 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2727 match forwarded_events[0] {
2728 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2729 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2731 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2732 match forwarded_events[1] {
2733 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2734 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2735 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2736 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2737 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2741 match forwarded_events[2] {
2742 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2743 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2744 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2745 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2746 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2750 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2752 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2753 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2754 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2755 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2756 added_monitors.clear();
2758 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2760 let (nodes_2_event, events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &events);
2761 let (nodes_0_event, events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &events);
2763 match nodes_2_event {
2764 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2765 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2768 match nodes_0_event {
2769 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2770 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2771 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2772 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2773 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2774 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2776 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2779 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2781 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2785 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2786 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2787 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2788 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2789 // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2790 // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2791 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2792 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2793 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2794 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2796 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2797 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2798 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2799 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2801 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2802 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2803 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2804 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2809 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2810 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2812 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2813 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2814 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2815 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2816 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2817 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2819 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2820 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2821 assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2822 let commitment_spend =
2823 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2826 // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2827 // FullBlockViaListen
2828 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2829 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2830 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2831 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2834 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2835 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2836 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2841 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2842 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2843 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2844 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2845 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2846 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2847 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2848 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2850 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2851 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2852 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2853 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2854 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2856 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2857 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2858 let mut first_claimed = false;
2859 for event in events {
2861 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2862 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2863 assert!(!first_claimed);
2864 first_claimed = true;
2866 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2867 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2870 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2871 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2875 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2878 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2879 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2880 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2881 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2882 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2883 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2885 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2887 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2888 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2889 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2890 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2891 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2892 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2893 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2895 // Create some intial channels
2896 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2897 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2899 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2900 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2901 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2903 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2905 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2906 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2907 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2908 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2910 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2913 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2914 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2916 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2917 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2918 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2919 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2920 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2921 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2925 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2926 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2928 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2929 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2930 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2932 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2933 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2934 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2935 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2936 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2939 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2940 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2942 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2943 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2945 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2946 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2947 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2948 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2950 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2954 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2956 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2958 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2960 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2962 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2963 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2965 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2966 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2967 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2968 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2969 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2970 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2972 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2975 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2976 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2977 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2979 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2980 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2982 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2984 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2985 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
2986 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2987 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2988 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2992 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2993 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2994 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2995 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2999 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3000 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3001 // and fail backward accordingly.
3003 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3004 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3005 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3006 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3008 // Create some initial channels
3009 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3010 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3012 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3013 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3014 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3015 // Revoke the old state
3016 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3018 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3020 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3021 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3022 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3024 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3026 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3028 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3029 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3031 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3032 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3033 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3034 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3035 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3036 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3038 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3039 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3040 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3046 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3047 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3048 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3049 // commitment transaction anymore.
3050 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3051 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3052 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3053 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3054 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3055 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3057 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3058 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3059 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3060 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3061 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3062 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3063 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3064 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3065 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3067 // Create some initial channels
3068 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3069 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3071 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3072 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3073 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3074 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3075 // Revoke the old state
3076 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3078 let value = if use_dust {
3079 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3080 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3081 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3082 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3085 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3086 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3087 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3089 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3090 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3092 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3093 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3094 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3095 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3096 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3097 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3098 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3099 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3100 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3102 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3105 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3106 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3107 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3108 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3109 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3110 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3111 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3112 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3114 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3115 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3116 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3119 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3120 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3122 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3123 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3124 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3125 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3126 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3127 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3128 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3129 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3130 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3131 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3133 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3134 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3135 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3138 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3139 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3140 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3141 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3142 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3143 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3147 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3148 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3149 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3151 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3152 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3154 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3155 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3158 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3159 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3161 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3162 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3165 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3166 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3168 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3170 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3172 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3173 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 3 + nodes.len() });
3175 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3176 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3179 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3180 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3184 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3186 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3187 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3189 nodes[1].node.abandon_payment(PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0));
3190 let payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3191 assert_eq!(payment_failed_events.len(), 1);
3192 match payment_failed_events[0] {
3193 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3194 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3199 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3202 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3203 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3205 let events = if deliver_bs_raa {
3206 let (nodes_2_event, events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &events);
3207 match nodes_2_event {
3208 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3209 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3210 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3211 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3212 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3213 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3215 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3220 let (nodes_2_event, events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &events);
3221 match nodes_2_event {
3222 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3223 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3224 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3226 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3229 let (nodes_0_event, events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &events);
3230 match nodes_0_event {
3231 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3232 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3233 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3234 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3235 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3236 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3238 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3239 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3240 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3242 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3244 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3245 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3247 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3248 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3249 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3250 // that we should update our routing table for.
3251 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3252 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3255 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3258 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3259 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3260 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3262 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3265 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3266 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3267 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3269 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3272 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3275 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3277 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3278 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3281 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3282 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3283 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3287 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3288 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3289 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3290 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3291 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3295 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3296 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3297 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3298 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3299 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3303 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3304 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3305 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3306 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3307 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3308 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3310 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3312 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3313 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3316 let payment_event = {
3317 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3318 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3319 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3321 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3322 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3325 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3326 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3328 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3331 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3334 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3336 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3338 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3339 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3340 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3341 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3342 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3343 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3345 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3346 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3352 onion_routing_packet,
3354 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3356 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3357 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3358 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3360 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3361 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3363 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3366 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3367 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3369 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3371 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3376 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3377 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3378 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3379 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3380 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3381 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3382 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3383 if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3384 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3385 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3389 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3391 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3392 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3393 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3394 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3396 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3398 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3399 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3400 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3402 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3403 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3404 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3406 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3408 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3409 // registering new transactions
3410 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3414 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3415 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3416 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3417 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3418 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3419 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3420 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3421 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3423 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3425 let mut payment_event = {
3426 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3429 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3430 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3431 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3434 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3435 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3437 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3439 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3440 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3441 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3442 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3445 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3446 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3448 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3450 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3451 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3452 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3454 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3455 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3457 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3459 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3460 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3461 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3462 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3463 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3467 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3469 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3470 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3472 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3474 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3476 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3477 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3479 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3480 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3481 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3482 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3483 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3484 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3485 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3487 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3491 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3492 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3493 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3494 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3495 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3497 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3498 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3499 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3500 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3501 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3503 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3505 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3506 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3508 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3509 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3510 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3512 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3513 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3515 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3516 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3520 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3521 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3522 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3523 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3526 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3528 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3529 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3530 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3531 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3532 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3533 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3534 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3536 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3537 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3539 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3541 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3542 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3544 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3545 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3548 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3551 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3552 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3553 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3554 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3556 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3557 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3561 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3562 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3563 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3564 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3565 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3566 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3567 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3568 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3570 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3571 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3572 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3574 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3575 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3576 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3577 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3579 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3580 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3581 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3583 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3584 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3585 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3586 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3588 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3589 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3591 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3592 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3594 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3596 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3597 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3599 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3600 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3601 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3603 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3606 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3607 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3608 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3610 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3613 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3614 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3618 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3619 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3622 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3623 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3624 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3625 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3626 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3627 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3629 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3630 let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3631 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3632 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3633 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3634 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3635 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3638 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3641 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3643 let payment_event = {
3644 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3647 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3648 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3649 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3651 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3653 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3654 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3656 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3657 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3658 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3660 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3662 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3663 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3664 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3667 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3668 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3669 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3670 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3673 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3674 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3675 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3683 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3684 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3685 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3686 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3687 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3688 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3690 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3691 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3692 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3694 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3695 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3697 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3698 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3699 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3700 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3701 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3702 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3703 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3704 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3705 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3706 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3707 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3708 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3709 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3710 // Everything was delivered...
3711 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3714 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3715 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3716 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3718 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3719 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3722 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3723 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3726 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3728 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3729 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3733 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3734 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3735 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3737 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3739 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3740 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3742 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
3743 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3744 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3745 assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3746 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3748 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3749 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3750 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3752 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3755 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3758 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3760 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3762 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3763 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3764 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3765 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3766 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3767 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3768 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3769 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3770 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3771 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3772 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3777 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3778 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3780 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3781 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3783 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3784 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3785 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3787 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3790 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3791 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3793 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3795 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3796 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3797 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3800 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3801 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3802 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3803 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3806 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3807 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3808 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3816 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3817 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3818 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3819 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3820 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3821 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3823 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3825 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3826 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3827 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3828 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3829 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3830 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3831 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3832 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3833 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3834 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3835 // Everything was delivered...
3836 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3839 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3840 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3843 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3844 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3845 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3847 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3848 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3851 // Channel should still work fine...
3852 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3853 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3854 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3858 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3859 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3860 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3861 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3862 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3866 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3867 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3868 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3869 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3870 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3874 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3875 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3876 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3877 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3878 // channel_ready immediately instead.
3879 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3880 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3881 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3882 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3883 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3885 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
3887 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3888 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3889 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3890 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3891 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3892 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3894 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3895 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3896 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3900 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3901 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3902 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3903 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3904 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3905 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3906 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3907 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3909 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3911 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3912 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3913 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3916 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3917 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3919 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3920 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3923 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3924 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3927 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3928 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3930 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3931 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3932 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3933 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3934 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3935 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3936 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3938 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3939 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3940 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3942 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3943 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3944 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3946 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3949 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3950 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3951 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3954 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3957 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3958 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3960 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3961 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3962 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3963 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3964 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3965 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3967 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3968 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3969 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3970 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3972 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3973 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3975 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3976 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3978 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3980 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3981 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3982 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3983 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3984 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3985 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3986 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3987 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3988 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3991 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3992 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3993 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3994 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3995 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3996 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3997 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4000 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4001 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4002 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4003 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4004 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4005 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4006 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4009 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4010 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4011 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4014 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4015 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4016 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4017 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4019 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4020 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4023 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4025 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4026 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4028 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4029 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4031 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4032 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4033 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4035 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4038 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4041 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4042 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4045 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4046 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4049 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4050 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4051 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4052 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4053 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4054 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4055 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4057 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4059 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4060 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4061 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4062 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4063 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4064 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4065 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4066 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4068 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4070 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4071 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4072 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4075 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4078 let mut block = Block {
4079 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4082 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4083 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4084 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4085 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4086 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4087 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4088 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4091 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4094 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4095 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4096 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4097 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4098 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4100 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4101 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4102 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4103 let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4104 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4105 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4109 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4110 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4111 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4114 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4115 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4116 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4117 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4118 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4119 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4120 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4121 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4123 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4124 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4125 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4126 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4128 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4129 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4131 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4133 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4136 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4137 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4138 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4139 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4142 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4143 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4144 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4145 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4149 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4151 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4152 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4155 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4157 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4158 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4159 match fail_commit[0] {
4160 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4161 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4162 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4164 _ => unreachable!(),
4166 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4168 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4173 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4174 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4175 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4178 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4179 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4181 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4182 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4183 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4184 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4185 for event in events.drain(..) {
4187 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4188 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4189 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4190 all_outputs.push(outp);
4193 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4196 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4197 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4207 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4208 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4209 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4210 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4211 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4212 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4214 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4215 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4216 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4218 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4219 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4220 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4221 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4222 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4224 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4225 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4227 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4228 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4229 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4230 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4231 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4235 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4236 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4237 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4238 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4239 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4240 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4241 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4243 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4244 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4245 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4247 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4249 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4250 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4251 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4252 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4254 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4255 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4257 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4258 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4260 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4261 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4262 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4266 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4267 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4268 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4270 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4271 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4272 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4273 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4275 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4276 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4277 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4278 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4279 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4281 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4282 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4283 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4285 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4287 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4288 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4289 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4291 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4292 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4293 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4294 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4295 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4299 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4300 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4301 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4302 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4303 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4305 // Create some initial channels
4306 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4308 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4310 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4311 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4312 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4314 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4315 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4316 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4318 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4320 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4322 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4323 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4326 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4327 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4330 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4331 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4332 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4333 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4334 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4336 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4337 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4338 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4340 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4341 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4342 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4346 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4347 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4348 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4349 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4350 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4352 // Create some initial channels
4353 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4355 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4356 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4358 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4360 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4361 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4362 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4364 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4365 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4366 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4367 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4369 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4370 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4372 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4374 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4375 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4376 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4377 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4378 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4380 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4381 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4382 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4383 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4385 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4386 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4387 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4388 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4389 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4393 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4394 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4395 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4396 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4397 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4399 // Create some initial channels
4400 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4402 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4403 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4404 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4405 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4407 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4409 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4410 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4412 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4414 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4415 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4416 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4417 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4419 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4420 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4422 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4423 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4424 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4428 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4429 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4430 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4431 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4432 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4433 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4435 // Create some initial channels
4436 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4438 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4439 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4440 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4441 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4443 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4445 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4446 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4447 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4449 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4450 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4452 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4453 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4454 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4455 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4456 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4457 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4459 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4460 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4461 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4462 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4464 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4466 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4467 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4468 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4469 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4470 // transactions next...
4471 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4472 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4474 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4475 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4476 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4477 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4479 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4480 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4483 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4484 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4486 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4487 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4488 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4489 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4490 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4494 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4495 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4496 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4497 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4498 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4499 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4501 // Create some initial channels
4502 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4504 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4505 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4506 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4507 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4509 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4510 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4512 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4514 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4515 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4516 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4518 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4519 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4521 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4522 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4523 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4524 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4526 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4527 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4528 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4530 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4531 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4532 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4533 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4535 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4537 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4538 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4540 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4541 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4542 // transactions next...
4543 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4544 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4545 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4546 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4548 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4549 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4552 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4553 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4555 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4556 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4558 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4559 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4561 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4562 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4563 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4564 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4565 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4566 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4567 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4568 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4572 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4573 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4574 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4575 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4576 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4578 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4581 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4584 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4586 // Create some initial channels
4587 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4588 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4590 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4591 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4592 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4593 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4594 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4596 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4597 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4598 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4600 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4601 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4602 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4603 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4604 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4606 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4607 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4608 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4609 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4610 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4612 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4613 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4615 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4617 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4618 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4619 check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4620 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4621 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4622 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4624 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4625 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4626 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]});
4627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4628 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4629 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4631 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4632 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4635 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
4636 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4637 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4638 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4639 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4641 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4644 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4645 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4646 let (nodes_2_event, msg_events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg_events);
4647 let (nodes_0_event, msg_events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg_events);
4649 match nodes_2_event {
4650 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4651 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4654 match nodes_0_event {
4655 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4656 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4657 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4658 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4659 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4660 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4662 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4665 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4666 match msg_events[0] {
4667 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4671 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4672 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4673 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4674 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4675 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4676 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4677 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4678 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4679 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4680 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4681 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4683 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4688 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4689 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4690 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4691 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4692 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4693 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4694 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4695 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4696 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4697 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4698 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4699 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4700 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4701 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4703 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4704 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4705 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4707 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4708 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4709 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4710 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4711 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4713 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4715 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
4716 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4717 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4718 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4719 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
4720 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
4721 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4722 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4724 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4725 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4726 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4728 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4729 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4731 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4732 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4734 let htlc_timeout_tx;
4735 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4736 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4737 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4738 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4740 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4741 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4743 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4744 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4745 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4746 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4748 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4749 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4751 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4752 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4755 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4756 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4757 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4758 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4760 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
4763 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4764 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4766 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4768 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4769 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4771 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4775 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4776 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4778 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4779 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4780 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4781 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4782 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4783 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4784 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4785 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4786 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4787 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4789 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4790 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4791 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4792 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4793 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4794 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4795 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4796 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4797 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4800 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4801 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4803 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4805 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4807 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4808 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
4809 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
4810 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4811 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
4812 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4813 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4814 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4815 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4816 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4817 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4820 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4821 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4823 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4825 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4826 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4827 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4829 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4834 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4835 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4836 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4837 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4838 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4840 // Create some initial channels
4841 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4843 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4844 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4845 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4846 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4847 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4849 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4850 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4851 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4854 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4856 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4857 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4859 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4860 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4863 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4864 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4867 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4868 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4869 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4870 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4871 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4875 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4876 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4878 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4879 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4880 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4881 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4882 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4883 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4886 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4887 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4888 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4889 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4890 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4891 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4892 // use the same payment hashes.
4893 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4898 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4899 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4900 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4901 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4902 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4903 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4904 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4905 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4906 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4907 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4909 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
4910 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4911 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4912 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4913 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4915 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4916 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4917 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4918 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4920 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
4921 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4923 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4925 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4926 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4928 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4930 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4932 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4934 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4935 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4937 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
4939 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
4942 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4944 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4945 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4948 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4950 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4951 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
4953 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
4954 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
4955 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
4956 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
4957 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
4959 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
4960 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
4961 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
4962 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
4963 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
4964 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
4965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
4967 let failed_destinations = vec![
4968 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
4969 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
4970 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
4971 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
4973 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
4974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
4976 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
4977 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4978 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4979 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
4980 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
4981 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
4983 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
4984 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
4985 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
4986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
4988 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
4989 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
4990 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
4992 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
4993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
4995 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
4996 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4997 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4998 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5000 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5002 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5003 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5004 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5005 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5006 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5007 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5008 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5009 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5011 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5013 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5014 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5015 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5016 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5017 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5018 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5019 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5020 if deliver_last_raa {
5021 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5023 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5026 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5027 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5028 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5029 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5031 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5032 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5033 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5035 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5036 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5037 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5039 if announce_latest {
5040 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5042 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5044 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5045 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5046 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5047 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5049 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5050 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5053 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5054 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5057 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5058 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5059 if deliver_last_raa {
5060 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5062 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5063 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5065 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5066 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5068 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5071 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5075 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5076 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5077 let mut a_done = false;
5078 for msg in cs_msgs {
5080 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5081 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5082 // should be failed-backwards here.
5083 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5084 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5085 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5086 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5088 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5093 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5094 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5095 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5097 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5098 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5101 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5102 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5103 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5104 if announce_latest {
5105 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5106 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5107 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5110 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5112 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5116 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5117 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5118 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5119 let mut as_updates = 0;
5120 for event in as_events.iter() {
5121 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5122 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5123 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5124 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5126 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5128 if network_update.is_some() {
5131 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5133 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5134 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5135 if announce_latest {
5136 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5137 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5139 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5141 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5142 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5143 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5144 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5145 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5146 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5147 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5148 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5149 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5151 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5153 if network_update.is_some() {
5156 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5158 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5159 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5160 if announce_latest {
5161 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5163 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5165 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5166 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5167 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5168 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5169 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5170 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5174 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5175 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5179 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5180 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5184 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5185 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5186 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5187 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5191 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5192 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5193 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5194 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5195 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5197 // Create some initial channels
5198 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5200 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5201 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5202 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5203 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5205 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5206 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5207 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5209 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5210 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5212 let htlc_timeout = {
5213 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5214 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5215 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5216 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5217 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5221 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5222 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5223 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5225 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5226 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5227 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5228 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5229 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5230 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5231 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5232 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5233 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5234 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5235 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5239 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5240 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5241 // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5242 // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5243 // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5245 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5247 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5248 let seed = [42; 32];
5249 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5250 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5251 let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5252 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone());
5253 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5254 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5255 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5256 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5258 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5259 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5261 // Create some initial channels
5262 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5264 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5265 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5266 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5268 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5269 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5270 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5271 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5272 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5274 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5275 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5276 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5277 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5278 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5280 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5281 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5282 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5283 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5284 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5285 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5286 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5287 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5290 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5291 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5292 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5293 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5295 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5297 let htlc_timeout = {
5298 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5299 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5300 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5301 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5302 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5306 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5307 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5308 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5310 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5311 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5312 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5313 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5314 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5315 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5316 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5317 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5318 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5319 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5320 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5321 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5325 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5326 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5327 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5328 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5329 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5331 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5333 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5334 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5336 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5337 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5338 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5340 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5341 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5342 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5344 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5345 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5346 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5348 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5349 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5350 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5353 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5354 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5355 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5356 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5357 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5358 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5360 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5362 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5363 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5364 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5366 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5368 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5369 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5370 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5372 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5374 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5375 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5378 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5379 let mut block = Block {
5380 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5383 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5384 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5385 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5387 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5388 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5390 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5393 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5394 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5395 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5396 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5397 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5398 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5400 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5401 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5404 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5406 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5407 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5408 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5410 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5411 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5413 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5414 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5415 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5417 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5418 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5420 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5423 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5424 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5425 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5426 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5427 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5428 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5430 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5431 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5432 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5433 // actually revoked.
5434 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5435 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5436 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5437 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5440 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5441 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5442 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5444 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5445 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5447 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5449 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5451 if check_revoke_no_close {
5452 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5456 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5457 let mut block = Block {
5458 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5461 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5462 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5463 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5465 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5466 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5467 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5469 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5471 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5475 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5476 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5477 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5478 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5479 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5480 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5481 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5483 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5484 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5485 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5487 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5488 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5489 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5491 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5492 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5496 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5497 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5498 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5499 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5500 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5505 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5506 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5507 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5508 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5509 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5510 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5511 for node in nodes.iter() {
5512 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5515 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5516 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5517 let push_msat=10001;
5518 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5519 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5520 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5521 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5523 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5524 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5525 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5529 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5530 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5531 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5532 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5533 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5535 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5536 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5537 let push_msat=10001;
5538 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5540 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5541 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5542 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5543 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5544 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5546 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5547 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5548 let push_msat=10001;
5549 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5550 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5551 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5553 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5554 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5555 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5557 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5558 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5559 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5561 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5562 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5563 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5565 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5566 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5567 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5568 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5569 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5570 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5574 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5575 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5576 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5577 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5578 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5580 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5581 let push_msat=10001;
5582 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5583 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5584 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5585 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5587 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5588 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5589 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5590 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5593 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5595 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5598 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5599 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5600 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5601 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5603 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5604 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5605 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5606 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5607 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5608 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5610 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5611 // pending_update_fee.
5613 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5614 *feerate_lock += 20;
5616 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5619 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5620 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5621 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5622 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5623 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5625 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5628 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5630 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5631 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5632 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5633 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5635 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5636 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5637 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5639 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5640 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5641 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5642 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5644 // Flush the pending fee update.
5645 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5646 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5648 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5651 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5652 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5653 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5654 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5655 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5656 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5657 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5658 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5659 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5661 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5662 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5663 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5665 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5666 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5667 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5668 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5669 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5670 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5671 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5673 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5677 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5678 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5679 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5681 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5682 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5683 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5684 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5685 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5686 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5688 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5689 // pending_update_fee.
5691 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5692 *feerate_lock += 200;
5694 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5697 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5698 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5699 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5700 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5701 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5703 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5706 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5708 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5709 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5710 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5711 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5713 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5715 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5716 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5717 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5719 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5720 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5721 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5722 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5723 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5724 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5725 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5726 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5728 // Flush the pending fee update.
5729 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5730 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5732 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5733 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5736 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5737 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5738 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5739 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5740 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5741 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5742 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5743 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5744 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5746 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5747 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5748 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5750 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5751 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5752 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5753 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5754 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5755 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5756 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5761 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5762 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5763 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5764 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5765 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5767 let raa = match send_raa_event {
5768 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5769 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5771 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5773 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5774 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5775 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5776 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5778 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5779 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5781 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5782 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5783 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5785 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5786 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5788 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5790 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5792 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5793 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5794 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5795 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5798 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5799 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5800 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5803 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5804 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5805 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5806 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5807 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5808 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5809 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5810 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5811 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5812 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5813 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
5815 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5816 // pending_update_fee.
5818 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5819 *feerate_lock += 20;
5821 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5824 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5825 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5826 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5827 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5828 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5830 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5833 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5835 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5836 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5837 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5838 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5840 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5842 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5843 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5844 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5845 let payment_event = {
5846 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5849 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5850 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5852 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5854 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5856 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5857 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5859 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5860 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5862 // Flush the pending fee update.
5863 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5864 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5866 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5867 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5870 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5871 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5872 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5874 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5875 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5878 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5881 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5883 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5885 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5886 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5887 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5888 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5889 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5890 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5893 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5894 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5897 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5898 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5899 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5900 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5901 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5902 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5903 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5904 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5905 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5906 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5908 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5911 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5912 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5913 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5915 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5916 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5918 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5919 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5921 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5922 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5923 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5924 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5925 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5927 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5928 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
5929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5932 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
5933 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
5934 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
5937 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
5938 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
5939 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5940 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5941 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5942 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5943 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5945 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5946 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
5948 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5949 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
5950 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5951 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
5955 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
5956 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5957 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5958 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5959 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5960 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5961 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5963 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5964 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
5965 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5966 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
5968 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5969 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5973 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
5974 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5975 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5976 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5977 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5978 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5979 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5981 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5982 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5984 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5985 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
5987 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5988 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5989 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
5990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5991 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
5995 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
5996 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
5997 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
5998 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5999 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6000 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6001 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6002 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6004 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6005 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6006 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6007 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6008 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6009 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6013 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6014 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6015 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6016 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6017 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6018 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6019 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6020 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6021 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6022 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6023 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6025 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6026 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6027 let payment_event = {
6028 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6031 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6032 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6033 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6034 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6038 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6040 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6042 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6044 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6045 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6047 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6048 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6049 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6051 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6052 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6056 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6057 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6058 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6059 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6060 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6061 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6062 let channel_value = 100000;
6063 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6064 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6066 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6068 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6069 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6071 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6072 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6073 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6075 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6076 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6078 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6081 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6083 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6084 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6085 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6086 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6087 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6088 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6089 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6090 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6092 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6093 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6094 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6095 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6098 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6099 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6101 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6102 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6103 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6104 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6105 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6106 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6108 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6112 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6113 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6114 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6115 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6116 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6117 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6118 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6120 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6121 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6122 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6123 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6124 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6125 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6127 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6128 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6129 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6131 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6133 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6134 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6135 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6136 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6137 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6139 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6140 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6141 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6143 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6147 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6148 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6149 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6150 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6151 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6152 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6153 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6154 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6156 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6157 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6158 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6159 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6160 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6161 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6163 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6167 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6168 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6169 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6172 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6173 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6174 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6176 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6177 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6179 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6180 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6181 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6183 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6187 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6188 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6189 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6190 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6191 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6192 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6193 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6195 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6196 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6198 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6199 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6200 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6202 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6203 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6204 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6206 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6210 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6211 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6215 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6217 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6218 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6219 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6221 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6222 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6223 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6225 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6226 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6227 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6229 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6233 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6234 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6235 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6236 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6237 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6238 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6239 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6240 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6242 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6243 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6244 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6246 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6247 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6249 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6250 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6251 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6252 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6253 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6254 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6255 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6256 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6257 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6258 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6259 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6260 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6261 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6264 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6265 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6266 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6268 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6270 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6272 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6273 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6274 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6276 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6280 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6281 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6283 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6284 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6285 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6286 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6287 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6288 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6289 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6292 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6293 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6295 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6298 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6301 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6303 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6304 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6305 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6307 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6311 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6312 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6314 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6315 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6316 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6317 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6318 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6320 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6321 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6323 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6324 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6326 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6329 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6332 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6334 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6335 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6336 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6338 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6342 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6343 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6345 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6346 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6347 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6348 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6349 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6351 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6352 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6354 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6355 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6356 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6359 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6360 failure_code: 0x8000,
6363 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6365 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6366 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6367 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6369 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6373 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6374 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6376 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6377 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6378 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6379 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6380 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6382 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6384 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6386 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6388 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6389 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6390 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6392 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6393 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6394 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6395 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6396 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6397 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6398 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6400 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6404 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6406 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6408 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6409 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6410 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6412 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6416 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6417 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6419 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6420 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6421 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6422 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6423 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6425 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6427 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6429 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6431 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6432 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6433 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6435 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6436 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6437 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6438 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6439 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6440 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6441 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6443 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6447 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6449 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6451 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6452 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6453 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6455 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6459 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6460 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6462 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6463 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6464 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6465 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6466 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6468 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6469 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6472 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6473 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6475 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6477 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6479 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6481 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6483 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6484 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6485 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6486 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6487 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6488 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6489 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6491 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6494 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6495 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6497 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6498 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6499 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6501 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6505 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6506 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6507 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6509 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6510 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6511 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6512 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6513 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6514 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6516 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6519 let mut payment_event = {
6520 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6522 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6523 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6524 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6526 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6528 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6529 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6530 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6531 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6533 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6534 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6537 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6538 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6540 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6542 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6543 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6544 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6546 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6547 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6548 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6549 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6550 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6551 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6552 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6554 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6558 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6561 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6562 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6563 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6564 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6566 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6568 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6569 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6570 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6571 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6572 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6573 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6575 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6582 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6586 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6587 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6588 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6590 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6593 let mut payment_event = {
6594 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6596 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6599 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6600 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6601 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6603 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6604 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6607 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6608 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6610 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6612 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6613 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6615 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6616 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6617 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6618 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6620 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6621 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6623 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6626 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6627 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6628 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6629 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6630 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6634 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6635 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6636 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6638 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6641 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6642 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6644 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6645 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6647 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
6648 Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
6650 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6651 assert!(is_permanent);
6652 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6657 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6660 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6661 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6662 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6663 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6665 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6666 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6667 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6668 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6669 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6670 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6672 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6673 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6675 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6676 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6677 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6678 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6680 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6681 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6683 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6684 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6686 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6689 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6690 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6691 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6694 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6695 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6697 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6699 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6700 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6702 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6705 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6706 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6708 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6711 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6712 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6713 if announce_latest {
6714 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6716 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6719 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6721 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6723 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6724 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6725 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6726 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6727 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6728 let mut first_failed = false;
6729 for event in events {
6731 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6732 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6733 assert!(!first_failed);
6734 first_failed = true;
6736 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6739 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6745 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6746 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6747 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6750 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6751 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6752 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6753 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6754 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6755 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6756 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6758 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6759 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6760 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6761 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6762 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6764 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6765 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6767 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6768 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6770 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6771 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6773 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6775 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6776 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6779 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6781 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6782 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6783 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6784 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6785 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6787 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6788 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6790 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6791 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6792 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6793 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6794 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6795 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6796 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6797 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6799 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6800 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6801 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6803 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6804 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6806 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6807 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6808 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6809 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6810 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6811 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6812 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6815 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6817 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
6819 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6820 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6821 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6822 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6823 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6828 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6829 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6830 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6831 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6835 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6836 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6838 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6839 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6840 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6841 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6842 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6843 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6844 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6845 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6846 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6848 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6849 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6850 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6851 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6854 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6855 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6857 } else { assert!(false) }
6859 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6860 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6861 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6862 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6863 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6864 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6865 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6868 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6869 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6871 } else { assert!(false); }
6873 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6874 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6875 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6876 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6877 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6878 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
6880 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6882 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6883 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6884 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6888 } else { panic!(); }
6889 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6891 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6892 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6893 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6894 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6895 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6896 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6897 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6900 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6901 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6903 } else { assert!(false); }
6907 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
6908 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
6909 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
6910 // to B, B should refuse payment.
6912 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6913 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6914 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6915 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6917 // Create some initial channels
6918 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6920 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
6921 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6922 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6923 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
6924 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6925 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
6926 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6929 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6930 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6931 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
6932 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6933 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6935 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
6936 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
6937 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6938 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6940 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
6941 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
6942 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6944 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6945 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6946 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6947 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6948 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6949 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6950 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6951 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6952 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6953 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
6955 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6959 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
6960 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6962 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
6963 let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6964 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
6965 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
6969 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
6970 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
6971 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
6973 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6974 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6975 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6976 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6978 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6979 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
6980 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6983 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6984 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6986 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
6987 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
6988 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6989 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
6990 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
6991 for e in msg_events {
6993 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
6994 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
6995 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
6996 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
6997 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7000 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7004 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7005 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7006 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7007 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7008 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7009 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7011 // Reestablish chan_1
7012 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7013 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7014 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7015 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7016 // Reestablish chan_2
7017 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7018 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7019 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7020 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7021 // Reestablish chan_3
7022 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7023 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7024 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7025 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7027 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7028 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7029 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7030 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7031 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7032 for e in msg_events {
7034 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7035 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7036 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7037 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7039 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7040 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7043 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7046 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7047 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7051 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7052 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7053 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7055 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7056 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7057 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7058 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7060 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7062 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7063 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7064 .with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7065 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7066 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7068 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7069 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7070 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7071 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7072 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7073 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7075 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7076 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7077 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7078 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7082 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7083 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7085 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7086 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7087 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7088 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7091 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7095 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7096 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7097 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7098 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7099 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7100 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7101 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7102 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7106 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7107 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7108 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7109 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7111 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7112 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7113 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7114 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7115 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7116 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7117 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7118 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7119 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7120 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7121 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7122 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7123 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7127 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7129 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7130 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7132 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7134 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7135 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7136 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7137 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7138 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7139 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7140 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7141 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7142 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7143 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7144 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7145 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7146 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7150 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7152 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7153 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7157 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7158 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7159 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7161 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7162 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7163 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7164 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7165 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7167 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7168 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7169 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
7170 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7171 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7172 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7173 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7174 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7175 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7176 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7177 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7178 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7180 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7181 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7182 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7184 // Revoke local commitment tx
7185 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7187 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7188 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7189 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7190 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7192 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7193 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7195 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7196 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7198 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7199 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7200 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7202 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7203 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7204 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7205 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7207 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7208 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7209 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7210 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7211 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7212 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
7213 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7214 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7215 match events.last().unwrap() {
7216 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7217 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7223 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7224 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7225 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7227 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7228 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7229 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7230 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7232 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7233 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7234 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7235 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7236 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7237 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7239 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7240 // available, which we check here:
7241 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7242 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7243 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7245 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7246 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7248 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7249 // output, checked above).
7250 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7251 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7252 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7254 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7255 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7256 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7257 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7258 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7262 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7263 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7264 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7265 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7266 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7268 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7269 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7270 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7271 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7273 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7274 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7276 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7277 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7278 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7279 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7280 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7281 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7282 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7283 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7287 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7288 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7289 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7290 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7292 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7293 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7294 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7295 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7296 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7297 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7298 // up bumped justice generation.
7299 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7302 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7307 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7308 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7309 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7312 // Provide preimage for one
7313 // Check aggregation
7315 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7316 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7317 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7318 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7320 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7321 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7322 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7324 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7325 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7326 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7327 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7328 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7330 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7331 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7332 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7333 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7335 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7337 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7341 let feerate_timeout;
7342 let feerate_preimage;
7344 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7345 // 3 transactions including:
7346 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7347 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7348 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7349 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7350 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7351 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7352 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7353 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7355 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7356 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7357 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7358 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7360 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7361 (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7363 (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7366 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7367 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7368 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7370 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7371 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7372 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7373 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7377 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7378 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7380 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7381 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7383 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7384 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7385 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7386 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7387 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7388 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7390 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7391 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7392 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7393 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7394 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7396 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7397 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7398 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7399 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7400 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7405 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7406 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7410 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7411 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7412 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7413 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7414 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7415 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7416 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7417 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7419 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7420 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7421 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7422 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7423 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7425 let per_commitment_secret;
7426 let next_per_commitment_point;
7428 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7429 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7430 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7432 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7434 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7435 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7436 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7438 // Must revoke without gaps
7439 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7440 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7442 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7443 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7444 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7447 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7448 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7449 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7451 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7455 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7456 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7457 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7459 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7460 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7461 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7462 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7464 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7465 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7466 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7467 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7469 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7470 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7471 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7473 // Revoke local commitment tx
7474 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7476 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7477 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7478 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7479 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7481 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7482 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7484 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7486 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7487 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7488 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7489 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7490 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7491 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7495 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7496 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7497 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7499 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7500 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7501 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7506 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7507 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7508 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7509 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7510 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7511 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7512 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7513 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
7515 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7516 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7517 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7519 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7521 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7522 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7523 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7525 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7527 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7528 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7529 // can get our balance.
7531 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7532 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7533 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7534 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7535 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7536 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7537 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7538 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7540 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7544 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7545 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7546 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7547 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7548 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7549 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7550 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7552 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7554 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7555 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7556 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7557 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7558 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7560 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7561 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7563 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7565 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7567 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7568 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7569 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7571 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7572 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7573 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7575 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7580 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7581 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7584 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7586 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7587 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7588 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7590 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7592 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7593 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7594 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7595 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7599 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7600 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7601 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7602 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7603 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7604 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7605 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7607 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7608 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7609 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7611 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7612 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7613 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7617 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7618 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7619 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7620 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7621 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7622 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7624 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7625 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7626 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7627 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7628 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7629 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7630 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7631 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7632 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7633 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7634 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7635 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7637 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7638 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7639 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7640 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7642 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7643 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7644 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7645 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7646 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7648 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7649 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7651 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7652 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7653 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7654 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7655 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7656 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7658 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7659 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7661 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7662 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7663 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7665 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7669 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7670 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7671 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7672 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7673 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7674 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7675 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7677 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7678 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7680 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7682 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7683 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7684 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7686 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7688 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7689 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7691 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7694 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7695 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7697 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7698 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7699 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7701 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7704 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7706 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7707 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7709 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7711 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7712 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7714 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7719 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7720 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7721 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7722 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7723 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7724 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7725 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7727 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7728 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7730 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7732 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7733 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7734 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7736 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7738 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7739 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7741 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7744 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7745 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7747 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7748 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7749 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7753 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7757 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7758 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7759 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7760 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7761 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7762 // and the channel should be closed.
7763 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7764 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7765 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7766 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7767 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7768 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7770 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7771 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7772 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7774 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7776 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7777 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7779 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7780 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7782 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7783 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7784 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7785 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7786 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7787 let accept_chan_msg = {
7788 let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
7789 let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
7790 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
7791 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7793 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
7795 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7797 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7798 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7800 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7801 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7803 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7804 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7806 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7807 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7808 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7809 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7810 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7811 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7813 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7816 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7820 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7821 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7822 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7823 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7824 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7825 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7826 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7828 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7829 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7831 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7833 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7834 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7835 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7837 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7839 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7840 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7841 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7843 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7844 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7846 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7847 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7850 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7853 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7854 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7855 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7857 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7858 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7859 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7861 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7866 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7867 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7868 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7869 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7870 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7872 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7873 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7875 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7876 assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7878 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7879 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7884 fn test_simple_mpp() {
7885 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
7886 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7887 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7888 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7889 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7891 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7892 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7893 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7894 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7896 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7897 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7898 route.paths.push(path);
7899 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7900 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7901 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7902 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7903 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7904 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7905 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
7906 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
7910 fn test_preimage_storage() {
7911 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
7912 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7913 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7914 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7915 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7917 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7920 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7921 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7922 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7924 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7925 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7926 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7927 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7929 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7930 // values from previous calls.
7931 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7932 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7933 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7935 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
7937 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
7938 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
7940 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
7943 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7948 #[allow(deprecated)]
7949 fn test_secret_timeout() {
7950 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
7951 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
7952 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7953 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7954 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7955 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7957 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7959 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7961 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
7962 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
7963 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7964 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7965 } else { panic!(); }
7967 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
7969 header: BlockHeader {
7971 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
7972 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
7973 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7977 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
7978 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7979 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7980 } else { panic!(); }
7982 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
7983 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
7984 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
7985 block.header.time += 1;
7986 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
7987 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7988 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
7991 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7992 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7994 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7995 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7996 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7997 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7999 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8000 // values from previous calls.
8001 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8002 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8003 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8005 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8006 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8007 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8008 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8010 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8015 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8016 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8017 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8018 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8019 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8020 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8022 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8024 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8025 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8026 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8027 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8029 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8030 // resulting events.
8031 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8032 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8034 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8035 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8036 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8037 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8039 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8040 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8041 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8042 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8045 // We should fail the payment back
8046 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8047 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8048 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8049 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8050 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8052 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8057 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8058 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8059 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8061 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8062 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8063 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8064 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8066 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8067 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8068 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8069 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8071 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8072 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8073 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8074 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8078 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8079 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8080 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8081 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8084 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8085 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8086 // commitment at same time.
8088 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8089 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8090 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8091 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8093 // Create some initial channel
8094 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8095 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8097 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8098 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8100 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8101 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8103 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8104 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8105 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8106 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8108 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8109 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8110 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8111 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8112 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8113 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8114 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8115 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8118 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8119 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8120 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8121 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8122 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8123 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8125 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8126 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8128 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8130 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8131 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8132 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8134 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8135 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8136 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8137 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8138 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8139 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8140 } else { assert!(false); }
8142 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8144 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8145 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8149 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8150 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8151 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8152 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8153 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8155 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8156 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8157 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8158 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8160 // Create some initial channel
8161 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8162 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8164 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8165 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8167 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8168 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8170 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8171 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8172 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8173 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8174 let watchtower_alice = {
8175 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8176 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8177 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8178 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8179 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8180 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8181 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8182 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8185 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8186 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8187 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8188 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8189 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8190 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8192 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8194 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8195 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8199 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8200 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8201 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8202 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8203 let watchtower_bob = {
8204 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8205 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8206 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8207 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8208 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8209 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8210 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8211 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8214 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8215 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8217 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8218 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8220 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8224 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8225 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8226 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8228 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8229 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8230 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8231 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8232 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8233 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8234 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8235 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8236 } else { assert!(false); }
8238 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8241 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8242 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8243 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8245 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8248 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8249 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8250 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8254 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8255 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8256 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8258 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8259 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8260 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8265 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8266 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8267 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8270 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8271 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8273 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8274 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8275 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8276 // before receiving funding_signed.
8277 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8278 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8279 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8280 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8282 // Create an initial channel
8283 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8284 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8285 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8286 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8287 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8289 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8290 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8292 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8295 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8296 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8297 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8298 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8299 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8303 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8304 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8305 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8306 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8307 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8308 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8309 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8311 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8312 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8313 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8314 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8316 // Create some initial channels
8317 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8319 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8320 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8321 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8322 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8323 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8324 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8326 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8327 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8328 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8329 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8330 // this test before #653 fix.
8331 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8332 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8334 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8335 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8337 let htlc_timeout = {
8338 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8339 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8340 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8341 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8342 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8346 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8347 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8348 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8349 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8352 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8353 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8354 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8355 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8357 // Steps of the test:
8358 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8359 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8360 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8361 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8362 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8363 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8364 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8365 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8366 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8367 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8368 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8369 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8371 // Create some initial channels
8372 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8373 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8375 // Steps (1) and (2):
8376 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8377 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8379 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8380 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8381 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8382 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8383 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8384 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8385 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8387 // Steps (3) and (4):
8388 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8389 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8390 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8391 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8394 if !broadcast_alice {
8395 force_closing_node = 1;
8396 counterparty_node = 0;
8398 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8399 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8401 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8402 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8403 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8404 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8405 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8407 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8408 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8409 if broadcast_alice {
8410 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8412 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8417 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8418 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8419 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8421 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8423 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8424 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8425 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8426 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8427 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8428 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8430 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8431 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8432 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8433 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8434 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8435 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8437 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8438 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8440 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8443 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8444 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8445 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8448 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8449 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8450 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8451 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8452 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8455 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8457 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8458 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8459 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8462 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8465 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8467 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8470 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8471 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8472 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8473 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8474 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8477 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8479 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8482 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8483 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8484 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8485 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8486 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8487 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8488 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8489 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8490 if broadcast_alice {
8491 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8493 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8495 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8496 if broadcast_alice {
8497 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8498 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8500 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8501 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8506 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8507 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8509 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8510 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8511 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8513 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8514 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8515 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8516 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8517 if broadcast_alice {
8518 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8519 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8520 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8522 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8523 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8524 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8530 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8531 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8532 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8533 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8534 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8538 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8539 // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8540 // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8541 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8542 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8543 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8544 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8546 // Create an first channel channel
8547 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8548 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8550 // Create an second channel
8551 nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8552 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8554 // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8555 // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8556 open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8558 // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8559 // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8560 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8562 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8563 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8565 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8566 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8567 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8569 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8573 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8575 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8576 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8578 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8579 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8580 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8588 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8589 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8590 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8592 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8593 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8594 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8595 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8596 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8597 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8598 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8599 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8601 // Create an initial channel
8602 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8603 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8604 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8605 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8607 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8608 // that it is rejected.
8609 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8611 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8612 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8614 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8615 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8616 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8617 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8618 // move forward with it.
8619 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8620 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8626 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8627 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8629 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8632 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8633 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8635 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8636 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8637 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8638 added_monitors.clear();
8640 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8642 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8643 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8645 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8648 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8649 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8650 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8651 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8652 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8654 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8655 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8657 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8658 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8659 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8660 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8661 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8663 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8667 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8668 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8669 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8670 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8671 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8672 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8674 let funding_created = {
8675 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8676 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8677 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8678 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8679 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8680 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8681 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8682 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8683 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8686 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8687 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8688 // still needs to be cleared here.
8689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8691 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8693 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8694 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8696 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8697 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8698 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8699 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8700 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8702 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8706 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8707 // everything is functional.
8708 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8710 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8711 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8712 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8713 added_monitors.clear();
8716 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8717 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8718 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8719 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8721 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8722 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8723 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8725 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8729 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8730 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8732 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8733 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8734 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8735 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8736 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8737 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8738 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8740 // Create some initial channels
8741 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8742 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8743 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
8745 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8746 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8747 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8749 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8750 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8751 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8753 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8754 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8756 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8757 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8758 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8759 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8760 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8761 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8763 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8764 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8765 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8767 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8768 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8769 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8771 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8772 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8777 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8778 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8780 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8782 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8783 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8784 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8785 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8786 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8787 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8789 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8790 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8791 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8795 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8796 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8798 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8799 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8800 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8801 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8803 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
8804 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
8805 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
8806 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8807 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8808 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8809 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8811 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8812 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8813 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8815 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8817 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
8818 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
8819 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
8821 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
8822 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
8823 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8824 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8825 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
8828 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8829 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8832 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8835 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8836 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8838 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8839 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8840 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8842 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8843 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8844 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8846 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8847 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8848 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8849 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8850 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8851 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8852 } else { panic!(); }
8853 } else { panic!(); }
8854 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8856 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
8857 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
8858 // as its not 32 bytes long.
8859 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8860 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
8861 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
8862 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
8866 script_sig: Script::new(),
8867 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
8868 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
8870 output: vec![TxOut {
8872 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
8875 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
8876 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
8879 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8880 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8881 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8882 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8883 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8884 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8885 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8886 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8887 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8888 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8889 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8890 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8891 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8892 // until we learned about an additional block.
8894 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8895 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8896 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8897 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8898 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8899 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8900 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8902 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8903 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8904 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8905 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8906 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8908 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8909 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8910 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8912 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8913 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8915 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8916 if !test_height_before_timelock {
8917 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8919 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8920 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8921 if test_height_before_timelock {
8922 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8923 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8924 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8925 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8927 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8928 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8929 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8930 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8931 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8932 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8934 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8935 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8937 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8938 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8939 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8940 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8941 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
8942 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
8943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8945 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8946 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8947 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8948 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8949 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8950 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8951 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8952 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8953 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
8958 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
8959 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
8960 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
8963 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
8964 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8965 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8966 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8967 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8969 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8971 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
8972 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
8973 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8975 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
8978 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8980 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8981 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8982 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8983 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8984 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8986 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8987 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
8990 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
8991 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
8992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8993 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8994 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8995 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8996 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8997 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8998 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
8999 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9000 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9001 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9004 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9005 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9007 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9008 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9009 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9011 let expected_destinations = vec![
9012 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9013 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9015 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9016 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9019 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9020 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9022 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9023 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9024 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9026 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9027 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9028 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9029 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9031 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9032 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9033 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9036 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9037 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9038 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9040 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9042 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9047 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9048 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9049 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9050 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9051 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9052 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9056 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9057 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9058 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9059 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9063 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9064 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9065 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9066 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9067 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9068 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9069 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9071 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9072 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9073 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9074 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9076 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9077 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
9078 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9079 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9080 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9081 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9082 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9083 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9085 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9087 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9089 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9090 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9092 let session_privs = {
9093 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9094 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9095 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9096 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9097 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9100 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9103 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9104 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9105 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9107 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9110 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9113 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9114 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9115 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9117 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9118 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9120 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9123 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9124 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9125 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9127 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9129 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9131 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9132 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9133 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9135 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9136 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9137 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9138 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9142 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9143 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9144 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9146 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9149 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9150 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9151 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9153 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9155 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9158 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9159 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9160 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9162 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9166 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9167 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9168 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9169 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9170 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9172 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9173 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9174 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9175 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9176 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9177 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9178 final_value_msat: 10000,
9179 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9181 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9182 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9183 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9185 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9186 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9188 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9189 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9190 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9191 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9192 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9193 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9197 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9198 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9199 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9200 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9201 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9203 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9204 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9205 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9206 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9208 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9209 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9210 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9211 final_value_msat: 10000,
9212 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9214 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9215 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9216 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9217 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9218 let route = find_route(
9219 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9220 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9223 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9224 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9226 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9227 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9228 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9229 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9230 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9231 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9235 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9236 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9237 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9238 // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9240 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9241 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9242 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9243 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9245 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9246 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9247 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9248 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9250 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9251 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9252 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9253 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9254 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9255 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9258 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9259 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9260 // amount of time to respond to.
9262 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9263 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9264 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9266 let failed_destinations = vec![
9267 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9268 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9270 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9272 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9274 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9275 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9278 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9279 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9280 let (node_1_msgs, _events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &events);
9281 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9283 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9284 // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9285 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9287 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9290 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9291 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9292 enum ExposureEvent {
9293 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9295 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9297 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9298 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9301 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9302 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9305 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9306 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9307 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9308 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9309 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9310 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9311 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9312 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9314 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9315 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9316 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9317 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9318 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9319 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9321 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9322 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9323 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9324 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9326 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9328 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9329 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9330 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9332 let opt_anchors = false;
9334 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9337 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9338 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9339 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9340 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9343 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9344 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9347 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9350 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9351 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9352 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9354 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9355 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9356 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9357 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9358 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9360 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9361 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9363 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9364 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9366 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9367 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9370 if dust_outbound_balance {
9371 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9372 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9373 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9374 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9375 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9376 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9379 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9380 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9381 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9382 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9383 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9387 if dust_outbound_balance {
9388 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9389 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9390 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9391 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9392 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9395 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9396 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9397 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9398 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9403 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9404 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9405 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9406 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9407 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9409 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9410 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9411 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9413 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9415 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9416 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9417 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9419 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9420 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9421 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9422 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9423 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9425 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9426 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9427 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9428 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9430 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9431 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9433 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9434 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9435 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9437 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9438 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9440 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9442 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9445 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9446 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9447 added_monitors.clear();
9451 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9452 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9453 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9454 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9455 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9456 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9457 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9458 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9459 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9460 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9461 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9462 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9463 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9467 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9468 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9470 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9471 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9473 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9474 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9475 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9476 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9477 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9479 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9481 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9482 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9483 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9484 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9485 let mut tx = match events[0] {
9486 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9487 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9488 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9489 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9492 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9494 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9495 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9496 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9497 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9502 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9503 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9504 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9505 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9509 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9510 // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9511 // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9512 // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9513 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9516 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9518 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9520 // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9522 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9523 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9526 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9528 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9529 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9531 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9534 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9535 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9537 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9538 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9539 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9541 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9544 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9547 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9548 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9550 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9553 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9554 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9556 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9557 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9558 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9560 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9563 // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9566 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9567 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9569 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9572 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9573 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9575 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9576 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9577 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9578 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9579 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),