_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
  27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  29 use ln::msgs;
  30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  34 use util::errors::APIError;
  35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  36 use util::config::UserConfig;
  37
  38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  44
  45 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  46 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use io;
  54 use prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  58
  59 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  60 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  61
  62 #[test]
  63 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  64         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  65         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  66         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  67         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  68         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  69
  70         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  71         // funding satoshis
  72         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  73         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  74         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  75
  76         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  77         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  78
  79         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  80         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  81
  82         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  83         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  84         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  85                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  86                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  87                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  88                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  89                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  90                         match action {
  91                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  92                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  93                                 },
  94                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  95                         }
  96                 } else { assert!(false); }
  97         };
  98
  99         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
 100         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 101
 102         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 103         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
 104
 105         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 106
 107         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 108
 109         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 110
 111         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 118 }
 119
 120 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 121         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 122         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 123         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 124         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 125         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 126         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 127         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 128         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 129
 130         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 131         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 132         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 133         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 134         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
 135
 136         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 137         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 138         if !send_from_initiator {
 139                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 140                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 141         }
 142         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
 143
 144         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 145         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 146         if send_from_initiator {
 147                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 148                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 149         }
 150         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
 151         {
 152                 let mut lock;
 153                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 154                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 155                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 156         }
 157
 158         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 159         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 160         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 161
 162         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 163         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 164         if send_from_initiator {
 165                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 166                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 167                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 168                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 169                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2));
 170         } else {
 171                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 172         }
 173 }
 174
 175 #[test]
 176 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 177         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 178         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 179 }
 180
 181 #[test]
 182 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 183         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 184         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 185         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 186         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 187         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 188
 189         // balancing
 190         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 191
 192         // A                                        B
 193         // update_fee                            ->
 194         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 195         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 196         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 197         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 198         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 199         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 200         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 201         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 202         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 203         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 204         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 205         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 206         //                                       <- RAA
 207         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 208
 209         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 210         {
 211                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 212                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 213         }
 214         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 215         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 216
 217         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 218         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 219         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 220                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 221                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 222                 },
 223                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 224         };
 225
 226         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 227
 228         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 229         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 230         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 231         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 232
 233         let payment_event = {
 234                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 235                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 236                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 237         };
 238         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 239         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 240
 241         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 242         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 243         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 244         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 245         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 247
 248         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 249         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 250         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 251         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 252         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 253
 254         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 255         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 256         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 257         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 258         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 259         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 260         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 262
 263         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 264         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 265         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 266         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 267         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 268         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 269         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 270         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 271
 272         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 273         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 274         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 275         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 276
 277         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 278         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 279         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 280
 281         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 282         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 283
 284         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 285         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 286         match events_2[0] {
 287                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 288                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 289         }
 290
 291         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 293 }
 294
 295 #[test]
 296 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 297         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 298         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 299         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 300         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 301         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 302         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 303         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 304
 305         // balancing
 306         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 307
 308         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 309         {
 310                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 311                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 312         }
 313         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 314         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 315
 316         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 317         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 318         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 319                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 320                         update_fee.as_ref()
 321                 },
 322                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 323         };
 324
 325         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 326
 327         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 328         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 329         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 330         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 331
 332         let payment_event = {
 333                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 334                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 335                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 336         };
 337         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 338         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 339
 340         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 341         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 342         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 343         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 344         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 345         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 346
 347         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 348         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 349
 350         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 351 }
 352
 353 #[test]
 354 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 355         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 356         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 357         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 358         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 359         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 360
 361         // A                                        B
 362         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 363         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 364         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 365         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 366         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 367         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 368         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 369         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 370         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 371         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 372         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 373         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 374         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 375         //                                          B should send no response here
 376         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 377         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 378         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 379
 380         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 381         let initial_feerate;
 382         {
 383                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 384                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 385                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 386         }
 387         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 388         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 389
 390         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 391         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 392         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 393                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 394                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 395                 },
 396                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 397         };
 398
 399         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 400         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 401         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 402         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 403         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 404
 405         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 406         // transaction:
 407         {
 408                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 409                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 410         }
 411         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 412         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 413         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 414
 415         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 416         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 417                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 418                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 419         };
 420
 421         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 422
 423         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 424         // Deliver (3)
 425         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 426
 427         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 428         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 429         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 430         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 431         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 432         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 433         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 434         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 435         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 436         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 437         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 438
 439         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 440         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 441         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 442         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 443         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 444
 445         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 446         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 447         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 448
 449         // Delever (4)
 450         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 451         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 452         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 453
 454         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 455         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 457
 458         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 459         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 460         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 461         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 462
 463         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 464         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 465         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 466 }
 467
 468 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
 469         // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
 470         // tests that we properly send one in that case.
 471         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
 472         alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 473         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 474         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 475         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
 476         bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 477         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 478         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 479         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 480         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 481         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
 482         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 483         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
 484
 485         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 486         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
 487         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
 488
 489         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
 490         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 491         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
 492
 493         for node in nodes {
 494                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
 495                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
 496                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
 497         }
 498 }
 499 #[test]
 500 fn test_1_conf_open() {
 501         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
 502         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
 503         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
 504 }
 505
 506 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 507         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 508         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 509         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 510         // Node objects.
 511
 512         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 513         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 514         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 515         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 516
 517         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 518                 let block = Block {
 519                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 520                         txdata: vec![],
 521                 };
 522                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 523                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 524         }
 525
 526         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 527         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 528         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 529
 530         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 531         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 532         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 533
 534         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 535         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 536
 537         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 538
 539         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 540         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 542         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 543
 544         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 545         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 546         {
 547                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 548                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 549                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 550                 added_monitors.clear();
 551         }
 552         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 553
 554         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 555         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 556         {
 557                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 558                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 559                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 560                 added_monitors.clear();
 561         }
 562
 563         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 564         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 565
 566         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 567         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 568
 569         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 570         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 571         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 572         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 573 }
 574
 575 #[test]
 576 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 589         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 590         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 591         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 592         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 593         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 594         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 595 }
 596
 597 #[test]
 598 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 599         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 600         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 601         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 602         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 603         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 604
 605         {
 606                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 607                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 608         }
 609         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 610         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 611
 612         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 613         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 614         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 615                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 616                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 617                 },
 618                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 619         };
 620         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 621
 622         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 623         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 624         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 625
 626         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 627         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 628         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 629
 630         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 631         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 632         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 633         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 634
 635         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 636         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 637         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 638 }
 639
 640 #[test]
 641 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 642         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 643         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 644         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 645         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 646         let channel_value = 5000;
 647         let push_sats = 700;
 648         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 649         let channel_id = chan.2;
 650         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 651         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 652
 653         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 654         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 655         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 656         // remote limit.
 657         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 658         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) as u32;
 659         {
 660                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 661                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 662         }
 663         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 664         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 665         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 666
 667         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 668
 669         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 670
 671         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 672         {
 673                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 674
 675                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 676                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 677                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0) / 1000;
 678                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 679                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 680                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 681         }
 682
 683         {
 684                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 685                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 686                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 687         }
 688         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 689         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 690         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 691
 692         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 693
 694         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 695         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 696         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 697                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 698                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 699                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 700                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 701                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 702                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 703         };
 704         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 705                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 706                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 707                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 708                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 709                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 710                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 711                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 712         };
 713
 714         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 715         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 716                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 717
 718         let res = {
 719                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 720                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 721                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 722                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 723                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 724                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 725                         push_sats,
 726                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0) / 1000,
 727                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
 728                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 729                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 730                         &mut htlcs,
 731                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 732                 );
 733                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 734         };
 735
 736         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 737                 channel_id: chan.2,
 738                 signature: res.0,
 739                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 740         };
 741
 742         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 743                 channel_id: chan.2,
 744                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 745         };
 746
 747         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 748
 749         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 750         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 751         //Should produce and error.
 752         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 753         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 754         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 755         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 756         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 757 }
 758
 759 #[test]
 760 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 761         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 762         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 763         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 764         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 765         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 766
 767         // balancing
 768         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 769
 770         {
 771                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 772                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 773         }
 774         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 775         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 776
 777         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 778         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 779         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 780                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 781                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 782                 },
 783                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 784         };
 785         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 786         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 787         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 788         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 789
 790         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 791
 792         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 793         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 794         {
 795                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 796                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 797                 added_monitors.clear();
 798         }
 799         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 800         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 801         // node[1] has nothing to do
 802
 803         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 804         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 805         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 806
 807         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 808         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 809         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 810         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 811         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 812         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 813         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 814
 815         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 816         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 817         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 818         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 819         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 820         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 821
 822         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 823         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 824         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 825         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 826
 827         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 828         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 829         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 830
 831         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 832         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 833         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 834         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 835
 836         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 837         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 838         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 839
 840         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 841
 842         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 843         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 844         match events[0] {
 845                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 846                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 847         };
 848
 849         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 850
 851         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 852         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 853         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 854         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 855         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 856 }
 857
 858 #[test]
 859 fn test_update_fee() {
 860         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 861         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 862         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 863         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 864         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 865         let channel_id = chan.2;
 866
 867         // A                                        B
 868         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 869         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 870         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 871         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 872         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 873         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 874         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 875         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 876         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 877         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 878         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 879         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 880
 881         // Create and deliver (1)...
 882         let feerate;
 883         {
 884                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 885                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 886                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 887         }
 888         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 889         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 890
 891         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 892         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 893         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 894                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 895                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 896                 },
 897                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 898         };
 899         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 900
 901         // Generate (2) and (3):
 902         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 903         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 904         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 905
 906         // Deliver (2):
 907         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 908         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 910
 911         // Create and deliver (4)...
 912         {
 913                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 914                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 915         }
 916         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 918         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 919         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 920         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 921                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 922                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 923                 },
 924                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 925         };
 926
 927         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 928         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 930         // ... creating (5)
 931         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 932         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 933
 934         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 935         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 936         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 937         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 938         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 939
 940         // Deliver (5):
 941         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 942         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 943         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 944
 945         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 946         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 947         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 948         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 949         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 950         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 951         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 952         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 954
 955         // Deliver (7)
 956         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 957         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 958         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 959         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 960
 961         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 962         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 963         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 964
 965         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 966         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 967         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 968         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 969         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 970 }
 971
 972 #[test]
 973 fn fake_network_test() {
 974         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 975         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 976         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 977         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 978         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 979         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 980
 981         // Create some initial channels
 982         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 983         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 984         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 985
 986         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 987         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 988         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 989         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 990         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 991
 992         // Send some more payments
 993         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 994         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 995         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 996
 997         // Test failure packets
 998         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 999         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1000
1001         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1002         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1003
1004         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1005         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1006         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1009         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1011
1012         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1013         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1014         hops.push(RouteHop {
1015                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1016                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1017                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1018                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1019                 fee_msat: 0,
1020                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1021         });
1022         hops.push(RouteHop {
1023                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1024                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1025                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1026                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1027                 fee_msat: 0,
1028                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1029         });
1030         hops.push(RouteHop {
1031                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1032                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1033                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1034                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1035                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1036                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1037         });
1038         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1039         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1040         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1041
1042         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1043         hops.push(RouteHop {
1044                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1048                 fee_msat: 0,
1049                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1050         });
1051         hops.push(RouteHop {
1052                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1053                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1054                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1055                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1056                 fee_msat: 0,
1057                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1058         });
1059         hops.push(RouteHop {
1060                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1061                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1062                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1063                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1064                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1065                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1066         });
1067         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1068         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1069         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1070
1071         // Claim the rebalances...
1072         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1073         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1074
1075         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1076         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1077
1078         // Send some payments across both channels
1079         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1080         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1081         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1082
1083
1084         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1085         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1086         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1087         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1088
1089         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1090
1091         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1092         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1093         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1094
1095         // Close down the channels...
1096         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1097         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1098         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1099         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1100         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1101         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1102         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1103         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1104         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1105         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1106         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1107         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1108         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1109         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1110         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1111 }
1112
1113 #[test]
1114 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1115         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1116         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1117         // commitment dance rounds.
1118         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1119         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1120         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1121         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1122         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1123         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1124
1125         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1126         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1127                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1128                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1129                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1130         }
1131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1132
1133         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1134         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1135         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1136         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1137
1138         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1139         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1140         // another HTLC.
1141         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1142         {
1143                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1144                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1145                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1146                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1147         }
1148
1149         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1150         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1151         {
1152                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1153                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1154         }
1155
1156         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1157         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1158         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1159         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1160
1161         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1162         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1163         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1164         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1165         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1166         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1167         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1168
1169         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1170         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1171         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1172
1173         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1174
1175         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1176         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1177         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1179
1180         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1181         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1183         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1184
1185         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1187         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1188
1189         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1190                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1191         }
1192         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1194         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1195         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1196         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1197
1198         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1200         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1201         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1202         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1203
1204         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1205         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1206
1207         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1208
1209         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1210         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1211         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1212                 match event {
1213                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1214                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1215                         },
1216                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1217                 };
1218         }
1219
1220         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1221                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1222         }
1223
1224         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1225 }
1226
1227 #[test]
1228 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1229         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1230         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1231         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1232         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1233         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1234         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1235
1236         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1237         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1238         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1239         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1240         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1241         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1242
1243         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1244
1245         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1246         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1247
1248         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1249         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1250
1251         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1252         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1253         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1254 }
1255
1256 #[test]
1257 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1258         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1259         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1260         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1261         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1262         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1263         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1264         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1265
1266         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1267
1268         // balancing
1269         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1270
1271         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1272
1273         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1274         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1275         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1276
1277         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1278         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1279         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1280
1281         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1282         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1283
1284         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1285         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1286         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1287                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1288                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1289                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1290                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1291                 }
1292         }
1293         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1294
1295         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1297         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1298         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1299
1300         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1301         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1302         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1303         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1304         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1305         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1306         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1307         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1308
1309         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1310         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1311         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1312
1313         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1314         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1315         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1316         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1317         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1318         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1319         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1320         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1321
1322         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1323         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1324         for e in events {
1325                 match e {
1326                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1327                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1328                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1329                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1330                         },
1331                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1332                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1333                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1334                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1335                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1336                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1337                         },
1338                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1339                 }
1340         }
1341 }
1342
1343 #[test]
1344 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1345         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1346         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1347         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1348         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1349         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1350
1351         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1352         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1353
1354         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1355         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1356         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1357         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1358         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1359         match err {
1360                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1361                         match &fails[0] {
1362                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1363                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1364                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1365                         }
1366                 },
1367                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1368         }
1369         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1370         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1371
1372         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1373 }
1374
1375 #[test]
1376 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1377         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1378         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1379         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1380         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1381         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1382
1383         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1384         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1385         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1386         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1387
1388         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1389
1390         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1391         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1392         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1393         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1394                 channel_id: chan.2,
1395                 htlc_id: 0,
1396                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1397                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1398                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1399                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1400         };
1401
1402         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1403
1404         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1405         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1406         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1407
1408         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1409
1410         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1411
1412         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1413         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1414         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1415                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1416                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1417                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1418                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1419                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1420
1421                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1422                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1423                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1424                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1425                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1426         };
1427         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1428                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1429                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1430                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1431                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1432                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1433                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1434                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1435         };
1436
1437         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1438         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1439                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1440
1441         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1442         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1443         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1444
1445         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1446                 offered: false,
1447                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1448                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1449                 payment_hash,
1450                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1451         };
1452
1453         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1454
1455         let res = {
1456                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1457                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1458                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1459                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1460                         commitment_number,
1461                         95000,
1462                         local_chan_balance,
1463                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1464                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1465                         feerate_per_kw,
1466                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1467                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1468                 );
1469                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1470         };
1471
1472         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1473                 channel_id: chan.2,
1474                 signature: res.0,
1475                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1476         };
1477
1478         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1479         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1480         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1481
1482         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1483         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1484                 channel_id: chan.2,
1485                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1486                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1487         };
1488         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1489
1490         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1491         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1492         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1493         match events[0] {
1494                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1495                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1496                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1497                 },
1498                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1499         };
1500         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1501                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1502
1503         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1504 }
1505
1506 #[test]
1507 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1508         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1509         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1510         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1511         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1512         // this situation.
1513         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1514         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1515         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1516         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1517
1518         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1519         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1520         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1521
1522         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1523
1524         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1525         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1526                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1527         }
1528
1529         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1530         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1531         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1532                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1533         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1534         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1535 }
1536
1537 #[test]
1538 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1539         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1540         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1541         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1542         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1543         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1544
1545         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1546         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1547         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1548         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1549         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1550         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1551         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1552
1553         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1554         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1555                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1556         }
1557
1558         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1559         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1560         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1561         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1562         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1563         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1564         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1565         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1566         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1567                 channel_id: chan.2,
1568                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1569                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1570                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1571                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1572                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1573         };
1574
1575         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1576         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1577         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1578         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1579         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1580         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1581         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1582         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1583 }
1584
1585 #[test]
1586 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1587         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1588         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1589         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1590         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1591
1592         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1593         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1594         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1595
1596         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1597         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1598         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1599         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1600         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1601         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1602         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1603
1604         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1605                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1606         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1607         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1608         // commitment transaction fee.
1609         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1610
1611         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1612         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1613                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1614         }
1615
1616         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1617         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1618         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1619                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1620 }
1621
1622 #[test]
1623 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1624         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1625         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1626         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1627         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1628         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1629         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1630         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1631
1632         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1633         // HTLC.
1634         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1635         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1636         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1637                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1638
1639         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1640         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1641         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1642         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1643         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1644         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1645         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1646
1647         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1648         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1649         match msg_events[0] {
1650                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1651                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1652                 },
1653                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1654         }
1655 }
1656
1657 #[test]
1658 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1659         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1660         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1661         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1662         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1663         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1664         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1665         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1666
1667         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1668         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1669         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1671         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1673
1674         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1675         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1676         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1677         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1678         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1679         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1680
1681         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1682         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1683         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1684         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1685 }
1686
1687 #[test]
1688 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1689         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1690         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1691         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1692         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1693         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1694         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1695
1696         let feemsat = 239;
1697         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1698         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1699         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1700
1701         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1702         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1703         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1704         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1705
1706         // Add a pending HTLC.
1707         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1708         let payment_event_1 = {
1709                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1710                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1711
1712                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1713                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1714                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1715         };
1716         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1717
1718         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1719         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1720         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1721         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1722         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1723
1724         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1725         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1726         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1727         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1728         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1729         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1730         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1731         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1732                 channel_id: chan.2,
1733                 htlc_id: 1,
1734                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1735                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1736                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1737                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1738         };
1739
1740         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1741         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1742         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1743         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1744         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1745         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1747         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1748 }
1749
1750 #[test]
1751 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1752         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1753         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1754         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1755         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1756         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1757         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1758         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1759         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1760         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1761
1762         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1763         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1764         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1765
1766         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1767         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1768 }
1769
1770 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1771         (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1772 }
1773
1774 #[test]
1775 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1776         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1777         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1778         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1779         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1780         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1781         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1782         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1783         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1784         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1785         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1786
1787         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1788         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1789
1790         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1791         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1792
1793         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1794                 ($node: expr) => {{
1795                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1796                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1797                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1798                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1799                         payment_event
1800                 }}
1801         }
1802
1803         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1804         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1805         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1806
1807         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1808
1809         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1810         {
1811                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1812                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1813                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1814                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1815                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1816                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1817                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1818         }
1819
1820         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1821         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1822         loop {
1823                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1824                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1825                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1826                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1827                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1828                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1829                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1830                         break;
1831                 }
1832                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1833
1834                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1835                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1836                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1837                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1838                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1839                 );
1840
1841                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1842                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1843                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1844                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1845                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1846         }
1847
1848         // adding pending output.
1849         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1850         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1851         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1852         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1853         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1854         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1855         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1856         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1857         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1858         // policy.
1859         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1860         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1861         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1862
1863         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1864         let payment_event_1 = {
1865                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1866                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1867
1868                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1869                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1870                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1871         };
1872         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1873
1874         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1875         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1876         {
1877                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1878                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1879                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1880                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1881         }
1882
1883         // split the rest to test holding cell
1884         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1885         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1886         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1887         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1888         {
1889                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1890                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1891         }
1892
1893         // now see if they go through on both sides
1894         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1895         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1896         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1897         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1898         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1899         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1900
1901         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1902         {
1903                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1904                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1905                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1906                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1907                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1908         }
1909
1910         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1911         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1912         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1913         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1914         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1915         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1916
1917         // flush the pending htlc
1918         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1919         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1921
1922         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1923         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1925         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1926
1927         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1928         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1929         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1930         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1931
1932         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1933         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1934         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1935
1936         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1937
1938         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1939         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1940         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1941
1942         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1943         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1944
1945         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1946         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1947         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1948         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1949         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1950         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1951
1952         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1953         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1954         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1955         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1956
1957         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1958         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1959
1960         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1961         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1962         match events[0] {
1963                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1964                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1965                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1966                         match &purpose {
1967                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1968                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1969                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1970                                 },
1971                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1972                         }
1973                 },
1974                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1975         }
1976         match events[1] {
1977                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1978                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1979                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1980                         match &purpose {
1981                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1982                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1983                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1984                                 },
1985                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1986                         }
1987                 },
1988                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1989         }
1990
1991         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1992         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1993         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1994
1995         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1996         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1997         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1998
1999         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
2000         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2001         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2002         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2003         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2004
2005         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2006         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2007 }
2008
2009 #[test]
2010 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2011         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2012         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2013         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2014         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2015         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2016         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2017         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2018         // To test this we:
2019         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2020         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2021         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2022         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2023         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2024         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2025         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2026         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2027         //    claim,
2028         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2029         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2030         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2031         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2032         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2033         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2034         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2035         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2036         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2037         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2038
2039         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2040         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2041         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2042         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2043
2044         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2045         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2046         let send_1 = {
2047                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2048                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2049                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2050                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2051                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2052         };
2053
2054         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2055         // initial fulfill/CS.
2056         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2057         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2058         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2059
2060         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2061         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2062         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2064         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2065
2066         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2067         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2069         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2070         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2071
2072         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2073         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2074         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2075         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2076         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2077
2078         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2079         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2080         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2081
2082         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2083         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2084         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2085
2086         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2087         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2088         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2089
2090         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2091         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2092         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2093         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2094         // on-chain as necessary).
2095         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2096         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2097         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2098         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2099         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2100
2101         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2102         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2103         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2104
2105         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2106         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2107
2108         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2109         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2110         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2111         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2112         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2113         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2114
2115         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2116         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2117         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2118         let send_2 = {
2119                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2120                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2121                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2122                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2123                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2124         };
2125
2126         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2127         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2129         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2130
2131         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2132
2133         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2135         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2136
2137         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2139
2140         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2142         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2143         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2144
2145         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2147         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2148
2149         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2151
2152         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2153         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2154
2155         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2156         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2157 }
2158
2159 #[test]
2160 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2161         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2162         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2163         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2164         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2165         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2166         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2167
2168         // Create some initial channels
2169         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2170         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2171         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2172         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2173
2174         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2175         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2176         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2177         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2178         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2179         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2180
2181         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2182         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2184         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2185         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2186
2187         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2188         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2190         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2191         {
2192                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2193                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2194                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2195                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2196                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2197         }
2198         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2199         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2200         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2201         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2202         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2203
2204         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2205         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2206
2207         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2208         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2209         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2210         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2212         {
2213                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2214                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2215                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2216                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2217                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2218                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2219         }
2220         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2221         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2222         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2223         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2224         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2225
2226         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2227                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2228                         {
2229                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2230                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2231
2232                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2233                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2234                                 match events[0] {
2235                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2236                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2237                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2238                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2239                                         },
2240                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2241                                 };
2242                         }
2243                 }
2244         }
2245
2246         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2247         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2248         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2250         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2251         let node2_commitment_txid;
2252         {
2253                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2254                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2255                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2256                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2257
2258                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2259                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2260                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2261                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2262                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2263         }
2264         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2265         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2266         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2267         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2268         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2269
2270         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2271         // confusing us in the following tests.
2272         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2273
2274         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2275         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2276         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2277         // buffer space).
2278
2279         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2280                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2281                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2282                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2283                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2284                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2285                                 msg.clone()
2286                         },
2287                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2288                 };
2289                 match events[1] {
2290                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2291                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2292                         },
2293                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2294                 }
2295                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2296
2297                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2298                 {
2299                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2300                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2301                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2302                                         false
2303                                 } else { true }
2304                         });
2305                 }
2306
2307                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2308
2309                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2310                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2311
2312                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2313                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2314                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2315                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2316                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2317                                 msg.clone()
2318                         },
2319                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2320                 };
2321                 match events[1] {
2322                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2323                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2324                         },
2325                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2326                 }
2327                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2328                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2329
2330                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2331                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2332                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2333         };
2334         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2335         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2336         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2337         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2338
2339         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2340         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2341         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2342 }
2343
2344 #[test]
2345 fn test_justice_tx() {
2346         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2347         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2348         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2349         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2350         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2351         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2352         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2353         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2354         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2355         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2356         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2357         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2358         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2359         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2360         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2361         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2362         // Create some new channels:
2363         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2364
2365         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2366         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2367         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2368         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2369         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2370         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2371         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2372         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2373         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2374         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2375         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2376         // Revoke the old state
2377         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2378
2379         {
2380                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2381                 {
2382                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2383                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2384                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2385
2386                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2387                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2388                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2389                 }
2390                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2391                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2392                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2393
2394                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2395                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2396                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2397                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2398                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2399                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2400                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2401                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2402                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2403         }
2404         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2405
2406         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2407         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2408
2409         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2410         // Create some new channels:
2411         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2412         {
2413                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2414                 node_txn.clear();
2415         }
2416
2417         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2418         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2419         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2420         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2421         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2422         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2423         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2424         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2425         // Revoke the old state
2426         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2427         {
2428                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2429                 {
2430                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2431                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2432                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2433
2434                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2435                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2436                 }
2437                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2438                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2439
2440                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2442                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2443                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2444                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2445                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2446                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2447         }
2448         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2449         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2450         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2451 }
2452
2453 #[test]
2454 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2455         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2456         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2457         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2458         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2459         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2460         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2461         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2462         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2463         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2464         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2465         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2466         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2467         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2468         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2469
2470         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2471         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2472         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2473         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2474         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2475         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2476
2477         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2478         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2479
2480         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2481         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2482         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2484         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2485 }
2486
2487 #[test]
2488 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2489         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2490         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2491         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2492         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2493         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2494         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2495
2496         // Create some new channel:
2497         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2498
2499         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2500         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2501         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2502         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2503         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2504
2505         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2506         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2507         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2508         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2509         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2510         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2511         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2512         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2513         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2514
2515         //Revoke the old state
2516         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2517
2518         {
2519                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2520                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2521                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2522                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2523                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2524                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2525                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2526                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2527
2528                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2529                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2530
2531                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2532                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2533
2534                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2535                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2536                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2537                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2538                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2539                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2540                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2541                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2542
2543                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2544                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2545                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2546         }
2547         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2548         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2549         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2550 }
2551
2552 #[test]
2553 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2554         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2555         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2556         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2557         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2558         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2559         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2560
2561         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2562
2563         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2564         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2565         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2566         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2567         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2568         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2569
2570         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2571         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2572
2573         //Revoke the old state
2574         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2575
2576         {
2577                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2578                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2579                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2580                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2581                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2582                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2583                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2584                 match events[1] {
2585                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2586                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2587                 }
2588
2589                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2590                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2591
2592                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2593                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2594                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2595                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2596                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2597                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2598
2599                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2600                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2601                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2602                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2603                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2604                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2605                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2606
2607                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2608                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2609                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2610                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2611
2612                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2613                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2614                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2615
2616                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2617                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2618                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2619                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2620                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2621                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2622                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2623                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2624         }
2625         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2626         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2627         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2628 }
2629
2630 #[test]
2631 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2632         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2633         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2634         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2635         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2636         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2637         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2638         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2639         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2640         // towards B.
2641         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2642         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2643         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2644         // PaymentSent event).
2645
2646         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2647         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2648         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2649         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2650
2651         // Create some initial channels
2652         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2653         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2654
2655         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2656         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2657         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2658         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2659         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2660
2661         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2662         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2663         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2664
2665         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2666         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2667
2668         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2669         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2670         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2671         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2672         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2673         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2674         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2675         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2676         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2677         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2678         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2679         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2680         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2681
2682         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2683         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2684         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2685         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2686         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2687         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2688         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2689         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2690         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2691         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2692         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2693         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2694         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2695         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2696         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2697         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2698         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2699
2700         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2701         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2702         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2703         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2704         {
2705                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2706                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2707                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2708                 added_monitors.clear();
2709         }
2710         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2711         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2712         match forwarded_events[0] {
2713                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2714                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2715         }
2716         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2717                 } else { panic!(); }
2718         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2719                 } else { panic!(); }
2720         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2721         {
2722                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2723                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2724                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2725                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2726                 added_monitors.clear();
2727         }
2728         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2729         match events[0] {
2730                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2731                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2732         }
2733         match events[1] {
2734                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2735                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2736         }
2737
2738         match events[2] {
2739                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2740                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2741                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2742                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2743                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2744                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2745                 },
2746                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2747         };
2748         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2749                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2750                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2751                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2752                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2753                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2754                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2755                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2756                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2757                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2758                         if $htlc_offered {
2759                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2760                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2761                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2762                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2763                         } else {
2764                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2765                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2766                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2767                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2768                         }
2769                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2770                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2771                         node_txn.clear();
2772                 } }
2773         }
2774         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2775         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2776         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2777         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2778
2779         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2780         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2781         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2782         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2783         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2784         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2786         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2787         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2788         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2789         let commitment_spend =
2790                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2791                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2792                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2793                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2794                         &node_txn[0]
2795                 } else {
2796                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2797                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2798                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2799                         &node_txn[2]
2800                 };
2801
2802         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2803         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2804         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2805         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2806         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2807         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2808         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2809         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2810         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2811         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2812         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2813         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2814
2815         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2816         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2817         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2818         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2819         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2821         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2822         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2823         let mut first_claimed = false;
2824         for event in events {
2825                 match event {
2826                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2827                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2828                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2829                                         first_claimed = true;
2830                                 } else {
2831                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2832                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2833                                 }
2834                         },
2835                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2836                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2837                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2838                 }
2839         }
2840         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2841 }
2842
2843 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2844         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2845         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2846         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2847         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2848         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2849         //            \                                  \
2850         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2851
2852         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2853         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2854         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2855         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2856         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2857         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2858         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2859
2860         // Create some intial channels
2861         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2862         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2863
2864         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2865         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2866         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2867
2868         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2869
2870         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2871         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2872         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2873         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2874         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2875         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2876         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2877
2878         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2879         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2880         match events[0] {
2881                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2882                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2883                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2884                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2885                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2886                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2887                 },
2888                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2889         };
2890         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2891         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2892         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2893         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2894         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2895         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2896         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2897         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2898
2899         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2900         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2901         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2902         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2903         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2904         let timeout_tx;
2905         {
2906                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2907                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2908                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2909                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2910
2911                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2912                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2913
2914                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2915                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2916                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2917                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2918
2919                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2920                 node_txn.clear();
2921         }
2922
2923         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2925         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2926         {
2927                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2928                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2929                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2930                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2931         }
2932
2933         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2934         {
2935                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2936                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2937                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2938                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2939                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2940                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2941                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2942                 } else {
2943                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2944                 }
2945         }
2946
2947         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2948         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2949         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2950         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2951         match events[0] {
2952                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2953                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2954                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2955                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2956                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2957                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2958                 },
2959                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2960         };
2961
2962         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2963         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2964         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2965
2966         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2967         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2968
2969         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2970         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2971         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2972         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2973         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2974         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2975         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2976         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2977         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2978 }
2979
2980 #[test]
2981 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2982         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2983         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2984         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2985 }
2986
2987 #[test]
2988 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2989         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2990         // and fail backward accordingly.
2991
2992         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2993         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2994         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2995         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2996
2997         // Create some initial channels
2998         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2999         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3000
3001         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3002         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3003         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3004         // Revoke the old state
3005         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3006
3007         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3008
3009         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3010         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3011         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3012         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3013         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3014
3015         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3016         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3017         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3018         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3019         match events[0] {
3020                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3021                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3022                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3023                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3024                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3025                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3026
3027                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3028                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3029                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3030                 },
3031                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3032         }
3033 }
3034
3035 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3036         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3037         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3038         // commitment transaction anymore.
3039         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3040         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3041         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3042         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3043         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3044         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3045         // transactions:
3046         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3047         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3048         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3049         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3050         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3051         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3052         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3053         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3054         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3055
3056         // Create some initial channels
3057         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3058         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3059
3060         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3061         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3062         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3063         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3064         // Revoke the old state
3065         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3066
3067         let value = if use_dust {
3068                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3069                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3070                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3071         } else { 3000000 };
3072
3073         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3074         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3075         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3076
3077         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3078         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3079         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3080         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3081         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3082         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3083         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3084         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3085         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3086         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3087         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3088         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3089
3090         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3091         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3092         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3093         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3094         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3095         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3096         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3097         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3098         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3099         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3100         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3101         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3102         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3103         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3104         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3105         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3106
3107         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3108         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3109         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3110         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3111         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3112         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3113         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3114         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3115         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3116         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3117         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3118         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3119         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3120         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3121         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3122         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3123         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3124         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3125
3126         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3127         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3128         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3129         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3130         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3131         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3132         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3133
3134         if deliver_bs_raa {
3135                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3136                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3137                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3138                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3139                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3140                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3141                 match events[0] {
3142                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3143                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3144                 };
3145                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3146                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3147         }
3148
3149         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3150         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3151
3152         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3154         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3155
3156         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3157         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
3158         match events[0] {
3159                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3160                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3161         }
3162         match events[1] {
3163                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3164                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3165                 },
3166                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3167         }
3168         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3169                 match events[2] {
3170                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3171                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3172                 };
3173         }
3174         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3176
3177         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3178         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3179         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3180                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3181                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3182         }
3183         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3184                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3185                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3186                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3187                 },
3188                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3189         }
3190         if deliver_bs_raa {
3191                 match events[0] {
3192                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3193                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3194                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3195                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3196                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3197                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3198                         },
3199                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3200                 }
3201         }
3202         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3203                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3204                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3205                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3206                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3207                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3208                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3209
3210                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3211                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3212                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3213
3214                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3215
3216                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3217                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3218                         match events[0] {
3219                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3220                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3221                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3222                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3223                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3224                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3225                                         }
3226                                 },
3227                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3228                         }
3229                         match events[1] {
3230                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3231                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3232                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3233                                 },
3234                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3235                         }
3236                         match events[2] {
3237                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3238                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3239                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3240                                 },
3241                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3242                         }
3243                 },
3244                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3245         }
3246
3247         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3248         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3249         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3250 }
3251
3252 #[test]
3253 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3254         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3255         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3256         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3257         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3258 }
3259
3260 #[test]
3261 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3262         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3263         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3264         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3265         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3266 }
3267
3268 #[test]
3269 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3270         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3271         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3272         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3273         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3274         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3275
3276         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3277         {
3278                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3279                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3280                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3281
3282                 let payment_event = {
3283                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3284                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3285                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3286                 };
3287                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3288                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3289         }
3290
3291         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3292         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3293         {
3294                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3295                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3296
3297                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3298         }
3299
3300         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3301         {
3302                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3303
3304                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3305                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3306                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3307                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3308                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3309                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3310
3311                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3312                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3313                         channel_id: chan.2,
3314                         htlc_id: 0,
3315                         amount_msat: 0,
3316                         payment_hash,
3317                         cltv_expiry,
3318                         onion_routing_packet,
3319                 };
3320                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3321         }
3322         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3323         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3324         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3325         match events[0] {
3326                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3327                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3328                 },
3329                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3330         }
3331         match events[1] {
3332                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3333                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3334                 },
3335                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3336         }
3337         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3338         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3339 }
3340
3341 #[test]
3342 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3343         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3344         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3345         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3346         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3347         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3348         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3349         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3350
3351         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3352         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3353         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3354         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3355         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3356         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3357
3358         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3359         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3360         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3361
3362         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3363         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3364         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3365         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3366         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3367
3368         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3369         // registering new transactions
3370         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3371         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3372 }
3373
3374 #[test]
3375 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3376         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3377         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3378         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3379         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3380         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3381         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3382         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3383
3384         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3385
3386         let mut payment_event = {
3387                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3388                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3389
3390                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3391                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3392                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3393         };
3394
3395         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3396         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3397
3398         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3399
3400         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3401         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3402         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3403         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3404
3405         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3406         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3407         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3408         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3409         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3410
3411         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3412         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3413         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3414
3415         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3416         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3417         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3418         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3419         let tx = {
3420                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3421                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3422                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3423                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3424                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3425                 node_txn.remove(0)
3426         };
3427
3428         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3429
3430         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3431         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3432         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3433         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3434
3435         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3436         {
3437                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3438                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3439         }
3440         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3441         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3442         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3443         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3444         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3445         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3446         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3447
3448         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3449 }
3450
3451 #[test]
3452 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3453         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3454         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3455         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3456         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3457
3458         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3459         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3460         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3461         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3462         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3463
3464         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3465
3466         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3467         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3468         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3469         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3470         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3471
3472         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3473         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3474
3475         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3476         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3477 }
3478
3479 #[test]
3480 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3481         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3482         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3483         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3484         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3485         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3486         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3487         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3488
3489         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3490         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3491         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3492
3493         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3494         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3495         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3496         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3497
3498         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3499         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3500         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3501
3502         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3503         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3504         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3505         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3506
3507         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3508         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3509
3510         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3511         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3512
3513         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3514         {
3515                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3516                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3517                 match events[0] {
3518                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3519                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3520                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3521                         },
3522                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3523                 }
3524                 match events[1] {
3525                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3526                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3527                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3528                         },
3529                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3530                 }
3531                 match events[2] {
3532                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3533                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3534                 }
3535         }
3536
3537         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3538         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3539 }
3540
3541 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3542         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3543         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3544         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3545         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3546         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3547
3548         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3549         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3550                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3551                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3552                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3553                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3554                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3555         } else {
3556                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3557         }
3558
3559         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3560
3561         let payment_event = {
3562                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3563                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3564
3565                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3566                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3567                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3568         };
3569         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3570
3571         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3572                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3573         } else {
3574                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3575                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3576                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3577                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3578                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3579
3580                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3581                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3582                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3583                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3584
3585                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3586                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3587                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3588                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3589                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3590
3591                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3592                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3593                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3594                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3595                                         }
3596                                 }
3597                         }
3598                 }
3599         }
3600
3601         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3602         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3603         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3604                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3605                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3606                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3607                         //
3608                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3609                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3610                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3611                         //
3612                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3613                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3614                 }
3615                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3616                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3617                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3618         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3619                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3620                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3621         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3622                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3623                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3624         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3625                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3626                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3627         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3628                 // Everything was delivered...
3629                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3630         }
3631
3632         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3633         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3634         match events_1[0] {
3635                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3636                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3637         };
3638
3639         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3640         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3641         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3642
3643         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3644
3645         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3646         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3647         match events_2[0] {
3648                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3649                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3650                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3651                         match &purpose {
3652                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3653                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3654                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3655                                 },
3656                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3657                         }
3658                 },
3659                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3660         }
3661
3662         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3663         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3664
3665         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3666         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3667         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3668                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3669                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3670                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3671                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3672                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3673                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3674                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3675                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3676                 },
3677                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3678         };
3679
3680         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3681                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3682
3683                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3684                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3685                 match events_4[0] {
3686                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3687                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3688                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3689                         },
3690                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3691                 }
3692
3693                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3694                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3695                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3696                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3697
3698                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3699                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3700                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3701                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3702
3703                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3704                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3705                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3706                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3707                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3708
3709                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3710                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3711                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3712                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3713                                         }
3714                                 }
3715                         }
3716                 }
3717         }
3718
3719         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3720         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3721         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3722                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3723                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3724                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3725                 } else {
3726                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3727                 }
3728         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3729                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3730                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3731         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3732                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3733                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3734         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3735                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3736                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3737         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3738                 // Everything was delivered...
3739                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3740         }
3741
3742         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3743                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3744         }
3745
3746         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3747         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3748         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3749
3750         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3751                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3752         }
3753
3754         // Channel should still work fine...
3755         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3756         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3757         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3758 }
3759
3760 #[test]
3761 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3762         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3763         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3764         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3765         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3766 }
3767
3768 #[test]
3769 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3770         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3771         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3772         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3773         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3774 }
3775
3776 #[test]
3777 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3778         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3779         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3780         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3781         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3782         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3783         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3784         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3785         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3786         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3787
3788         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3789         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3790
3791         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3792         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3793         let chan_id;
3794         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3795         match events_1[0] {
3796                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3797                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3798                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3799                 },
3800                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3801         }
3802
3803         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3804
3805         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3806         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3807
3808         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3809         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3810         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3811         let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3812                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3813                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3814                         msg.clone()
3815                 },
3816                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3817         };
3818         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3819                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3820                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3821                         msg.clone()
3822                 },
3823                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3824         };
3825
3826         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3827
3828         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3829         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3830         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3831         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3832         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3833                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3834                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3835                         msg.clone()
3836                 },
3837                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3838         };
3839         let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3840                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3841                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3842                 },
3843                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3844         };
3845
3846         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3847         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3848         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3849         let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3850                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3851                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3852                 },
3853                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3854         };
3855
3856         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3857         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3858         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3859
3860         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3861         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3862         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3863
3864         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3865         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3866         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3867
3868         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3869         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3870         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3871
3872         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3873         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3874         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3875         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3876         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3877         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3878                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3879         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3880
3881         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3882         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3883                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3884                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3885                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3886                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3887                         keys_manager,
3888                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3889                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3890                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3891                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3892                         channel_monitors,
3893                 }).unwrap()
3894         };
3895         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3896         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3897
3898         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3899         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3900         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3901
3902         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3903
3904         // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3905         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3906         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3907         let mut found_announcement = false;
3908         for event in msgs.iter() {
3909                 match event {
3910                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3911                                 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3912                         },
3913                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3914                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3915                 }
3916         }
3917         assert!(found_announcement);
3918 }
3919
3920 #[test]
3921 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3922         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3923         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3924         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3925         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3926         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3927         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3928         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3929
3930         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3931
3932         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3933         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3934         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3936
3937         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3938         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3939         match events_1[0] {
3940                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3941                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3942         }
3943
3944         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3946
3947         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3948         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3949         match events_2[0] {
3950                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3951                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3952                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3953                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3954                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3955                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3956                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3957
3958                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3959                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3960                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3961                         match events_3[0] {
3962                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3963                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3964                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3965                                 },
3966                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3967                         }
3968
3969                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3970                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3971                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3972                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3973                 },
3974                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3975         }
3976
3977         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3978         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3979
3980         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3981         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3982         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3983         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3984         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3985         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3986
3987         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3988         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3989         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3990         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3991
3992         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3993         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3994
3995         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3996         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3997
3998         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3999
4000         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4001         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4002         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4003         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4004         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4005         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4006         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4007         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4008         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4010
4011         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4012         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4013         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4014         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4015         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4016         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4017         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4018         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4019
4020         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4021         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4022         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4023         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4024         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4025         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4026         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4027         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4028
4029         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4030         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4031         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4032         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4033
4034         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4035         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4036         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4037         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4038
4039         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4040         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4042
4043         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4044
4045         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4046         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4047         match events_5[0] {
4048                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4049                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4050                         match &purpose {
4051                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4052                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4053                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4054                                 },
4055                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4056                         }
4057                 },
4058                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4059         }
4060
4061         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4062         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4064
4065         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4066         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4067 }
4068
4069 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4070         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4071         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4072         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4073         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4074         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4075         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4076
4077         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4078
4079         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4080                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4081                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4082                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4083                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4084                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4085                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4086                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4087                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4088                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4089                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4090                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4091                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4092                 our_payment_hash
4093         } else {
4094                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4095         };
4096
4097         let mut block = Block {
4098                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4099                 txdata: vec![],
4100         };
4101         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4102         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4103         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4104         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4105                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4106                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4107                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4108         }
4109
4110         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4111
4112         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4113         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4114         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4115         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4116         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4117         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4118
4119         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4120         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4121         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4122         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4123         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4124         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4125 }
4126
4127 #[test]
4128 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4129         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4130         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4131 }
4132
4133 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4134         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4135         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4136         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4137         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4138         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4139         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4140         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4141
4142         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4143         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4144         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4145         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4146
4147         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4148         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4149         {
4150                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4151         }
4152         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4154
4155         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4156         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4157         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4158         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4159         if forwarded_htlc {
4160                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4161                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4162                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4163                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4164                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4165         }
4166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4167
4168         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4169         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4170         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4171         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4172
4173         if forwarded_htlc {
4174                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4175                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4176                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4177                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4178                 match fail_commit[0] {
4179                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4180                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4181                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4182                         },
4183                         _ => unreachable!(),
4184                 }
4185                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4186         } else {
4187                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4188         }
4189 }
4190
4191 #[test]
4192 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4193         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4194         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4195 }
4196
4197 #[test]
4198 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4199         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4200         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4201         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4202         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4203         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4204         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4205         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4206         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4207         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4208
4209         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4210
4211         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4212
4213         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4214         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4215         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4216                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4217
4218         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4219         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4220         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4221         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4222         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4223         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4224         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4225         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4226                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4227         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4228
4229         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4230         let config = UserConfig::default();
4231         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4232                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4233                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4234                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4235                         default_config: config,
4236                         keys_manager,
4237                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4238                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4239                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4240                         logger: &logger,
4241                         channel_monitors,
4242                 }).unwrap()
4243         };
4244         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4245         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4246
4247         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4248         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4249         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4250         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4251
4252         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4253         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4254         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4255         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4256
4257         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4258         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4259         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4260         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4261
4262         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4263         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4264         for node in nodes.iter() {
4265                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4266                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4267                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4268         }
4269
4270         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4271 }
4272
4273 #[test]
4274 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4275         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4276         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4277         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4278         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4279         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4280         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4281         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4282         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4283         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4284         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4285
4286         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4287         let channel_value = 100000;
4288         let push_msat = 10001;
4289         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4290         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4291         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4292         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4293         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4294         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4295         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4296
4297         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4298
4299         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4300         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4301
4302         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4303         {
4304                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4305                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4306                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4307                 added_monitors.clear();
4308         }
4309
4310         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4311         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4312         {
4313                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4314                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4315                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4316                 added_monitors.clear();
4317         }
4318         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4319
4320         nodes.push(node_a);
4321         nodes.push(node_b);
4322
4323         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4324         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4325         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4326         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4327
4328         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4329         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4330         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4331         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4332         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4333         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4334         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4335         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4336                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4337         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4338
4339         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4340         let config = UserConfig::default();
4341         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4342                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4343                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4344                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4345                         default_config: config,
4346                         keys_manager,
4347                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4348                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4349                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4350                         logger: &logger,
4351                         channel_monitors,
4352                 }).unwrap()
4353         };
4354         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4355         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4356
4357         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4358
4359         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4360         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4361
4362         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4363         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4364         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4365         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4366         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4367
4368         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4369         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4370         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4371
4372         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4373         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4374         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4375         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4376
4377         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4378         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4379         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4380         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4381
4382         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4383         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4384         for node in nodes.iter() {
4385                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4386                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4387                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4388         }
4389
4390         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4391 }
4392
4393 #[test]
4394 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4395         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4396         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4397         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4398         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4399         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4400         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4401         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4402         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4403         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4404         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4405
4406         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4407         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4408
4409         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4410
4411         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4412         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4413         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4414
4415         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4416         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4417         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4418         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4419         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4420         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4421         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4422         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4423                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4424         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4425
4426         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4427         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4428                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4429                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4430                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4431                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4432                         keys_manager,
4433                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4434                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4435                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4436                         logger: &logger,
4437                         channel_monitors,
4438                 }).unwrap()
4439         };
4440         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4441         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4442
4443         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4444         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4445         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4446
4447         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4448
4449         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4450         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4451 }
4452
4453 #[test]
4454 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4455         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4456         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4457         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4458         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4459         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4460         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4461         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4462         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4463         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4464         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4465         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4466         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4467         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4468
4469         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4470         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4471                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4472                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4473                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4474         }
4475
4476         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4477
4478         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4479         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4480
4481         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4482         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4483         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4484         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4485
4486         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4487         // nodes[3])
4488         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4489         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4490                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4491                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4492                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4493         }
4494
4495         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4496         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4497         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4498         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4499         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4500         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4501
4502
4503         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4504         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4505                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4506                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4507                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4508                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4509         }
4510
4511         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4512         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4513                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4514                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4515                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4516                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4517         }
4518
4519         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4520         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4521                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4522                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4523                 keys_manager,
4524                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4525                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4526                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4527                 logger: &logger,
4528                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4529         }) { } else {
4530                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4531         };
4532
4533         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4534         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4535                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4536                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4537                 keys_manager,
4538                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4539                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4540                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4541                 logger: &logger,
4542                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4543         }).unwrap();
4544         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4545         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4546
4547         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4548                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4549                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4550                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4551                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4552         }
4553
4554         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4555                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4556                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4557         }
4558         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4559         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4560
4561         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4562         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4563         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4564         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4565         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4566
4567         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4568         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4569         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4570         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4571         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4572         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4573         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4574                 match action {
4575                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4576                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4577                         },
4578                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4579                 }
4580         }
4581 }
4582
4583 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4584         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4585                 {
4586                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4587                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4588                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4589                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4590                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4591                                 match event {
4592                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4593                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4594                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4595                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4596                                                 }
4597                                         },
4598                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4599                                 };
4600                         }
4601                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4602                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4603                                         txn.push(tx);
4604                                 }
4605                         }
4606                         txn
4607                 }
4608         }
4609 }
4610
4611 #[test]
4612 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4613         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4614         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4615         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4616         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4617         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4618
4619         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4620         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4621         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4623         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4624         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4625         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4626         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4627         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4628
4629         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4630         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4631
4632         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4633         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4634         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4635         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4636         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4637 }
4638
4639 #[test]
4640 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4641         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4642         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4643         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4646         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4647
4648         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4649         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4650         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4651         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4652         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4653
4654         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4655         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4656         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4657         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4658
4659         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4660         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4662         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4663         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4664
4665         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4666         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4667         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4668 }
4669
4670 #[test]
4671 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4672         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4673         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4674
4675         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4676         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4677         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4678         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4679
4680         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4681         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4682         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4683         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4684         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4685
4686         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4687         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4688         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4689         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4690         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4691
4692         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4693         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4694         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4695
4696         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4697         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4698         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4699         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4700         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4701 }
4702
4703 #[test]
4704 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4705         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4706         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4707         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4708         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4709
4710         // Create some initial channels
4711         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4712
4713         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4714
4715         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4716         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4717         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4718
4719         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4720         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4721         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4722         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4723         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4724         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4725         match events[0] {
4726                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4727                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4728         }
4729         match events[1] {
4730                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4731                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4732         }
4733
4734         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4735         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4736         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4737         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4738         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4739         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4740         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4741
4742         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4743         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4744         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4745
4746         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4747         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4748         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4749 }
4750
4751 #[test]
4752 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4753         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4754         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4755         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4756         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4757
4758         // Create some initial channels
4759         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4760
4761         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4762         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4763
4764         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4765
4766         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4767         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4768         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4769
4770         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4771         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4773         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4774         match events[0] {
4775                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4776                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4777         }
4778         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4779
4780         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4781         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4782         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4783         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4784         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4785         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4786
4787         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4788         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4789         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4790         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4791
4792         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4793         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4794         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4795         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4796         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4797 }
4798
4799 #[test]
4800 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4801         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4802         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4803         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4804         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4805
4806         // Create some initial channels
4807         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4808
4809         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4810         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4811         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4812         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4813
4814         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4815
4816         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4817         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4818         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4819         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4820
4821         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4822         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4823         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4824         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4825
4826         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4827         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4828
4829         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4830         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4831         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4832 }
4833
4834 #[test]
4835 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4836         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4837         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4838         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4839         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4840         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4841
4842         // Create some initial channels
4843         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4844
4845         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4846         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4847         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4848         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4849
4850         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4851
4852         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4853         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4854         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4855         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4856         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4857         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4858
4859         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4860         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4861         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4862         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4863         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4864         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4865         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4866
4867         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4868         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4869         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4870         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4871         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4872         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4873
4874         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4875         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4876         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4877         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4878         // transactions next...
4879         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4880         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4881
4882         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4883         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4884         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4885                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4886         } else {
4887                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4888                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4889         }
4890
4891         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4892         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4893
4894         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4895         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4896
4897         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4898         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4899         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4900         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4901         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4902 }
4903
4904 #[test]
4905 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4906         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4907         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4908         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4909         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4910         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4911
4912         // Create some initial channels
4913         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4914
4915         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4916         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4917         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4918         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4919
4920         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4921         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4922
4923         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4924
4925         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4926         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4927         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4929         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4930         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4931
4932         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4933         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4934         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4935         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4936
4937         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4938         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4939         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4940
4941         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4942         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4943         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4944         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4946         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4947
4948         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4949         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4950
4951         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4952         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4953         // transactions next...
4954         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4955         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4956         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4957                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4958         } else {
4959                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4960                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4961         }
4962
4963         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4964         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4965
4966         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4967
4968         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4969         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4970
4971         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4972         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4973
4974         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4975         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4976         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4977         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4978         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4979         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4980         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4981         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4982 }
4983
4984 #[test]
4985 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4986         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4987         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4988         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4989         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4990         // channel.
4991         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4992         // gets broadcast.
4993
4994         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4995         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4996         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4997         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4998
4999         // Create some initial channels
5000         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5001         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5002
5003         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5004         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5005         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5006         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5007         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5008
5009         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5010         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5011         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5012
5013         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5014         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5015         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5016         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5017         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5018         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5019         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5020         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5021         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5022         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5023
5024         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5025         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5027         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5028
5029         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5030         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5031         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5032         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5033         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5034         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5035         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5036         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5037         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5038         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5039
5040         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5041         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5042         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5043         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5044         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5045         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5046         match events[0] {
5047                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5048                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5049         }
5050         match events[1] {
5051                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5052                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5053                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5054                 },
5055                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5056         }
5057         {
5058                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5059                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5060                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5061                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5062                 b_txn.clear();
5063         }
5064         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5065         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5066         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5067         match msg_events[0] {
5068                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5069                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5070         }
5071         match msg_events[1] {
5072                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5073                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5074         }
5075         match msg_events[2] {
5076                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5077                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5078                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5079                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5080                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5081                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5082                 },
5083                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5084         };
5085         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5086         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5087         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5088         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5089         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5090         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5091         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5092         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5093         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5094         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5095         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5096         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5097         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5098
5099         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5101 }
5102
5103 #[test]
5104 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5105         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5106         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5107         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5108         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5109         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5110         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5111         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5112         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5113         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5114         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5115         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5116                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5117         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5118
5119         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5120         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5121         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5122
5123         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5124         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5125         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5126         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5127         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5128
5129         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5130
5131         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5132         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5133         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5134         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5135         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5136         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5137
5138         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5139         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5140         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5141
5142         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5143         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5145         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5146         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5147
5148         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5149         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5150                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5151                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5152                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5153                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5154
5155                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5156                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5157                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5158                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5159                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5160                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5161                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5162
5163                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5164                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5165                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5166                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5167         }
5168
5169         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5170         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5172         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5173         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5174         match events[0] {
5175                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5176                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5177         }
5178         match events[1] {
5179                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5180                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5181         }
5182         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5183         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5184         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5185         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5186         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5187         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5188         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5189         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5190         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5191         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5192         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5193         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5194         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5195
5196         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5197         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5198         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5199         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5200         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5201         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5202         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5203         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5204         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5205         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5206
5207         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5208         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5209         {
5210                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5211         }
5212         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5213
5214         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5215         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5216         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5217         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5218         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5219         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5220         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5221         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5222         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5223         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5224         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5225         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5226
5227         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5228         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5229
5230         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5231         match events[0] {
5232                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5233                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5234                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5235                 }
5236                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5237         }
5238 }
5239
5240 #[test]
5241 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5242         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5243         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5244         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5245         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5246
5247         // Create some initial channels
5248         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5249
5250         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5251         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5252         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5253         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5254         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5255
5256         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5257         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5259         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5260         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5261         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5262         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5263         match events[0] {
5264                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5265                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5266         }
5267         match events[1] {
5268                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5269                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5270         }
5271         let node_tx = {
5272                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5273                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5274                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5275                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5276                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5277                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5278                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5279                 node_txn[0].clone()
5280         };
5281
5282         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5283         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5284
5285         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5286         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5287         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5288         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5289         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5290         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5291 }
5292
5293 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5294         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5295         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5296         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5297         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5298         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5299         // use the same payment hashes.
5300         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5301         //
5302         // A \         / E
5303         //    - C - D -
5304         // B /         \ F
5305         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5306         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5307         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5308         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5309         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5310         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5311         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5312         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5313                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5314         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5315
5316         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5317         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5318         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5319         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5320         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5321
5322         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5323         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5324         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5325         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5326
5327         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5328         // 0th HTLC:
5329         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5330         // 1st HTLC:
5331         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5332         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5333         // 2nd HTLC:
5334         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5335         // 3rd HTLC:
5336         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5337         // 4th HTLC:
5338         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5339         // 5th HTLC:
5340         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5341         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5342         // 6th HTLC:
5343         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5344         // 7th HTLC:
5345         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5346
5347         // 8th HTLC:
5348         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5349         // 9th HTLC:
5350         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5351         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5352
5353         // 10th HTLC:
5354         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5355         // 11th HTLC:
5356         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5357         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5358
5359         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5360         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5361         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5362         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5363         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5364
5365         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5366         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5367         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5368         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5369         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5370         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5372         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5373         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5374
5375         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5376         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5377         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5378         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5379         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5380         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5381
5382         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5383         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5384         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5385         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5386         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5387         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5388
5389         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5390         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5391         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5392         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5393
5394         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5395
5396         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5397         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5398         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5399         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5400         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5401         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5402         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5403         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5404         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5405         if deliver_last_raa {
5406                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5407         } else {
5408                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5409         }
5410
5411         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5412         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5413         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5414         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5415         //
5416         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5417         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5418         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5419         //
5420         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5421         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5422         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5423
5424         if announce_latest {
5425                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5426         } else {
5427                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5428         }
5429         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5430         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5431                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5432                 events[1].clone()
5433         } else {
5434                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5435                 events[0].clone()
5436         };
5437         match close_event {
5438                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5439                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5440         }
5441
5442         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5443         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5444         if deliver_last_raa {
5445                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5446         } else {
5447                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5448         }
5449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5450
5451         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5452         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5453         let mut a_done = false;
5454         for msg in cs_msgs {
5455                 match msg {
5456                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5457                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5458                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5459                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5460                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5461                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5462                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5463                                         }
5464                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5465                                         assert!(!a_done);
5466                                         a_done = true;
5467                                         &nodes[0]
5468                                 } else {
5469                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5470                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5471                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5472                                         }
5473                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5474                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5475                                         &nodes[1]
5476                                 };
5477                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5478                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5479                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5480                                 if announce_latest {
5481                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5482                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5483                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5484                                         }
5485                                 }
5486                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5487                         },
5488                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5489                 }
5490         }
5491
5492         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5493         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5494         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5495         let mut as_updates = 0;
5496         for event in as_events.iter() {
5497                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5498                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5499                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5500                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5501                         } else {
5502                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5503                         }
5504                         if network_update.is_some() {
5505                                 as_updates += 1;
5506                         }
5507                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5508         }
5509         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5510         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5511         if announce_latest {
5512                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5513                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5514         }
5515         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5516
5517         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5518         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5519         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5520         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5521         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5522                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5523                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5524                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5525                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5526                         } else {
5527                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5528                         }
5529                         if network_update.is_some() {
5530                                 bs_updates += 1;
5531                         }
5532                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5533         }
5534         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5535         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5536         if announce_latest {
5537                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5538         }
5539         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5540
5541         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5542         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5543         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5544         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5545         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5546         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5547 }
5548
5549 #[test]
5550 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5551         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5552 }
5553
5554 #[test]
5555 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5556         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5557 }
5558
5559 #[test]
5560 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5561         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5562         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5563         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5564 }
5565
5566 #[test]
5567 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5568         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5569         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5570         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5571         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5572
5573         // Create some initial channels
5574         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5575
5576         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5577         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5578         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5579         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5580
5581         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5582         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5583         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5584         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5585         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5586         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5587
5588         let htlc_timeout = {
5589                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5590                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5591                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5592                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5593                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5594                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5595                 node_txn[1].clone()
5596         };
5597
5598         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5599         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5600         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5601
5602         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5603         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5604         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5605         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5606         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5607         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5608         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5609         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5610         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5611         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5612                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5613 }
5614
5615 #[test]
5616 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5617         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5618         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5619         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5620
5621         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5622
5623         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5624         let seed = [42; 32];
5625         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5626         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5627         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5628         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5629         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5630         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5631
5632         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5633         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5634
5635         // Create some initial channels
5636         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5637         // for node 0
5638         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5639         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5640         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5641
5642         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5643         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5644         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5645         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5646         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5647
5648         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5649         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5650         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5651         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5652         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5653
5654         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5655         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5656         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5657         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5658             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5659             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5660             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5661                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5662         }
5663
5664         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5665         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5666         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5667         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5668         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5669         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5670
5671         let htlc_timeout = {
5672                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5673                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5674                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5675                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5676                 node_txn[1].clone()
5677         };
5678
5679         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5680         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5681         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5682
5683         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5684         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5685         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5686         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5687         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5688         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5689         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5690         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5691         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5692         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5693         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5694                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5695 }
5696
5697 #[test]
5698 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5699         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5700         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5701         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5702         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5703
5704         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5705
5706         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5707         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5708
5709         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5710         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5711         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5712
5713         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5714         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5715         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5716
5717         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5718         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5719         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5720
5721         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5722         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5723         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5724 }
5725
5726 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5727         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5728         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5729         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5730         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5731         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5732
5733         let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5734
5735         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5736         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5737         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5738         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5739
5740         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5741         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5742         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5743
5744         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5745         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5746         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5747         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5748         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5749
5750         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5751         let mut block = Block {
5752                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5753                 txdata: vec![],
5754         };
5755         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5756                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5757                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5758         }
5759         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5760         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5761         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5762         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5763 }
5764
5765 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5766         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5767         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5768         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5769         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5770         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5771
5772         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5773         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5774         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5775
5776         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5777
5778         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5779         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5780         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5781
5782         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5783         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5784
5785         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5786                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5787                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5788         }
5789         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5790         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5791         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5792         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5793 }
5794
5795 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5796         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5797         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5798         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5799         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5800         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5801
5802         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5803         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5804         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5805         // actually revoked.
5806         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5807         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5808         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5809         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5810         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5811
5812         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5813         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5814         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5816         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5817         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5818         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5819         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5821         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5822
5823         if check_revoke_no_close {
5824                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5825                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5826         }
5827
5828         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5829         let mut block = Block {
5830                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5831                 txdata: vec![],
5832         };
5833         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5834                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5835                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5836         }
5837         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5838                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5839                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5840                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5841                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5842         } else {
5843                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5844         }
5845 }
5846
5847 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5848 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5849 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5850 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5851 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5852 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5853 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5854 // non-dust HTLCs.
5855 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5856 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5857 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5858 #[test]
5859 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5860         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5861         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5862
5863         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5864         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5865 }
5866
5867 #[test]
5868 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5869         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5870         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5871         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5872         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5873 }
5874
5875 #[test]
5876 #[should_panic]
5877 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5878         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5879         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5880         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5881         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5882         //Force duplicate channel ids
5883         for node in nodes.iter() {
5884                 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5885         }
5886
5887         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5888         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5889         let push_msat=10001;
5890         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5891         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5892         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5893
5894         //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5895         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5896 }
5897
5898 #[test]
5899 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5900         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5901         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5902         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5903         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5904
5905         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5906         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5907         let push_msat=10001;
5908         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5909
5910         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5911         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5912         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5913         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5914         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5915
5916         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5917         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5918         let push_msat=10001;
5919         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5920         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5921         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5922
5923         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5924         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5925         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5926
5927         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5928         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5929         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5930
5931         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5932         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5933         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5934
5935         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5936         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5937         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5938         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5939         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5940         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5941 }
5942
5943 #[test]
5944 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5945         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5946         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5947         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5948         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5949
5950         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5951         let push_msat=10001;
5952         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5953         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5954         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5955         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5956
5957         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5958         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5959         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5960                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5961                         msg.clone()
5962                 },
5963                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5964         };
5965         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5966 }
5967
5968 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5969 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5970 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5971 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5972 #[test]
5973 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5974         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5975         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5976         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5977         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5978         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5979
5980         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5981         // pending_update_fee.
5982         {
5983                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5984                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5985         }
5986         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5987         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5988
5989         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5990         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5991         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5992                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5993                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5994                 },
5995                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5996         };
5997
5998         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5999
6000         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6001         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6002         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6003
6004         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6005         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6006         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6007
6008         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6009         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6010         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6011         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6012
6013         // Flush the pending fee update.
6014         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6015         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6016         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6017         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6018         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6019
6020         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6021         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6022         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6023         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6024         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6025         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6026         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6027                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6028         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6029
6030         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6031         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6032         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6033         match &events[0] {
6034                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6035                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6036                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6037                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6038                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6039                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6040                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6041                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6042                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6043                 },
6044                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6045         }
6046 }
6047
6048 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6049 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6050 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6051 #[test]
6052 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6053         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6054         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6055         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6056         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6057         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6058
6059         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6060         // pending_update_fee.
6061         {
6062                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6063                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6064         }
6065         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6066         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6067
6068         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6069         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6070         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6071                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6072                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6073                 },
6074                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6075         };
6076
6077         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6078
6079         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6080         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6081         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6082
6083         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6084         let amt_1 = 20000;
6085         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6086         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6087         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6088
6089         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6090         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6091         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6092         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6093         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6094         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6095         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6096
6097         // Flush the pending fee update.
6098         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6099         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6101         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6102         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6104
6105         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6106         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6107         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6108         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6109         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6110         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6111         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6112                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6113         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6114
6115         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6116         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6117         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6118         match &events[0] {
6119                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6120                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6121                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6122                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6123                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6124                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6125                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6126                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6127                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6128                 },
6129                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6130         }
6131
6132         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6133         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6134                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6135                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6136                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6137         };
6138         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6139                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6140                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6141         };
6142         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6144         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6145         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6146         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6147         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6148         match events[0] {
6149                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6150                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6151         }
6152         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6153         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6154         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6155         match events[0] {
6156                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6157                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6158         }
6159         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6161         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6162         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6163         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6164         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6165 }
6166
6167 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6168 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6169 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6170 // once it's freed.
6171 #[test]
6172 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6173         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6174         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6175         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6176         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6177         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6178         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6179         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6180         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6181         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6182         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6183
6184         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6185         // pending_update_fee.
6186         {
6187                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6188                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6189         }
6190         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6192
6193         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6194         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6195         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6196                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6197                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6198                 },
6199                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6200         };
6201
6202         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6203
6204         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6205         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6206         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6207
6208         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6209         let feemsat = 239;
6210         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6211         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6212         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6213         let payment_event = {
6214                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6215                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6216
6217                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6218                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6219
6220                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6221         };
6222         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6224         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6225         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6226
6227         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6228         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6229
6230         // Flush the pending fee update.
6231         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6232         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6233         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6234         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6235         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6236         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6237
6238         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6239         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6240         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6241
6242         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6243                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6244                         msg.clone()
6245                 },
6246                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6247         };
6248
6249         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6250         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6251         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6252
6253         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6254         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6255         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6256         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6257                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6258                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6259         }
6260
6261         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6262         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6263         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6264
6265         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6266         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6267         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6268         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6269                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6270                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6271                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6272                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6273                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6274                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6275                 },
6276                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6277         };
6278
6279         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6280         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6281         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6282
6283         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6284         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6285         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6286         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6287         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6288         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6289         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6290         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6291         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6292                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6293                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6294         };
6295         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6296         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6297         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6298 }
6299
6300 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6301 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6302 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6303
6304 #[test]
6305 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6306         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6307         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6308         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6309         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6310         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6311         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6312
6313         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6314         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6315
6316         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6317                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6318         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6319         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6320 }
6321
6322 #[test]
6323 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6324         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6325         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6326         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6327         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6328         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6329         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6330
6331         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6332         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6333         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6334                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6335
6336         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6337         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6338 }
6339
6340 #[test]
6341 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6342         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6343         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6344         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6345         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6346         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6347         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6348
6349         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6350         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6351         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6352         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6353         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6354
6355         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6356         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6357         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6358         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6359         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6360 }
6361
6362 #[test]
6363 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6364         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6365         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6366         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6367         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6368         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6369         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6370         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6371
6372         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6373         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6374                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6375 }
6376
6377 #[test]
6378 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6379         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6380         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6381         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6382         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6383         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6384         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6385         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6386         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6387         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6388
6389         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6390                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6391                 let payment_event = {
6392                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6393                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6394
6395                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6396                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6397                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6398                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6399                         } else {
6400                                 assert!(false);
6401                         }
6402                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6403                 };
6404                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6405                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6406                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6407
6408                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6409                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6410         }
6411         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6412         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6413                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6414
6415         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6416         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6417 }
6418
6419 #[test]
6420 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6421         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6422         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6423         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6424         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6425         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6426         let channel_value = 100000;
6427         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6428         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6429
6430         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6431
6432         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6433         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6434         // limits us to.
6435         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6436         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6437                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6438
6439         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6440         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6441
6442         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6443 }
6444
6445 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6446 #[test]
6447 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6448         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6449         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6450         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6451         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6452         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6453         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6454         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6455         {
6456                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6457                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6458                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6459         }
6460
6461         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6462         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6463         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6464         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6465         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6466         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6467         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6468         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6469         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6470         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6471         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6472 }
6473
6474 #[test]
6475 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6476         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6477         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6478         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6479         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6480         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6481         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6482
6483         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6484         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6485         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6486         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6487         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6488
6489         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6490         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6491         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6492         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6493         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6494
6495         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6496         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6497         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6498         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6499         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6500
6501         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6502         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6503         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6504         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6505         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6506 }
6507
6508 #[test]
6509 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6510         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6511         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6512         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6513         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6514         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6515         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6516         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6517
6518         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6519         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6520         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6521         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6522         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6523         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6524
6525         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6526                 channel_id: chan.2,
6527                 htlc_id: 0,
6528                 amount_msat: 1000,
6529                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6530                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6531                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6532         };
6533
6534         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6535                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6536                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6537         }
6538         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6539         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6540
6541         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6542         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6543         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6544         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6545         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6546 }
6547
6548 #[test]
6549 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6550         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6551         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6552         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6553         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6554         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6555         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6556
6557         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6558         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6559         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6560         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6561         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6562         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6563
6564         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6565         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6566         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6567         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6568         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6569 }
6570
6571 #[test]
6572 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6573         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6574         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6575         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6576         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6577         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6578
6579         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6580         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6581         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6582         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6583         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6584         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6585         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6586
6587         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6588         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6589         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6590         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6591         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6592 }
6593
6594 #[test]
6595 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6596         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6597         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6598         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6599         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6600         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6601         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6602         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6603
6604         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6605         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6606         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6607         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6608         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6609         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6610
6611         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6612         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6613         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6614         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6615         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6616         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6617         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6618         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6619         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6620         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6621         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6622         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6623         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6624
6625         //Resend HTLC
6626         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6627         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6628         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6629         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6630         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6631
6632         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6633
6634         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6635         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6636         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6637         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6638         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6639 }
6640
6641 #[test]
6642 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6643         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6644
6645         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6646         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6647         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6648         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6649         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6650         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6651         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6652
6653         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6654         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6655         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6656
6657         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6658                 channel_id: chan.2,
6659                 htlc_id: 0,
6660                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6661         };
6662
6663         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6664
6665         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6666         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6667         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6668         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6669         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6670 }
6671
6672 #[test]
6673 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6674         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6675
6676         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6677         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6678         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6679         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6680         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6681
6682         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6683         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6684         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6685         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6686         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6687
6688         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6689                 channel_id: chan.2,
6690                 htlc_id: 0,
6691                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6692         };
6693
6694         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6695
6696         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6697         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6698         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6699         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6700         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6701 }
6702
6703 #[test]
6704 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6705         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6706
6707         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6708         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6709         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6710         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6711         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6712
6713         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6714         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6715         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6716         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6717         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6718         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6719                 channel_id: chan.2,
6720                 htlc_id: 0,
6721                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6722                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6723         };
6724
6725         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6726
6727         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6728         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6729         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6730         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6731         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6732 }
6733
6734 #[test]
6735 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6736         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6737
6738         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6739         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6740         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6741         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6742         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6743
6744         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6745
6746         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6747         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6748
6749         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6750         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6751         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6752                 match events[0] {
6753                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6754                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6755                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6756                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6757                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6758                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6759                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6760                         },
6761                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6762                 }
6763         };
6764
6765         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6766
6767         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6768
6769         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6770         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6771         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6773         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6774 }
6775
6776 #[test]
6777 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6778         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6779
6780         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6781         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6782         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6783         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6784         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6785
6786         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6787
6788         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6789         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6790
6791         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6792         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6793         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6794                 match events[0] {
6795                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6796                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6797                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6798                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6799                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6800                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6801                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6802                         },
6803                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6804                 }
6805         };
6806
6807         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6808
6809         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6810
6811         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6812         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6813         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6814         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6815         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6816 }
6817
6818 #[test]
6819 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6820         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6821
6822         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6823         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6824         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6825         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6826         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6827
6828         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6829         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6831
6832         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6833         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6834
6835         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6836         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6837         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6838
6839         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6840
6841         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6842                 match events[0] {
6843                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6844                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6845                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6846                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6847                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6848                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6849                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6850                         },
6851                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6852                 }
6853         };
6854         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6855         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6856
6857         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6858         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6859         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6860         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6861         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6862 }
6863
6864 #[test]
6865 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6866         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6867         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6868
6869         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6870         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6871         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6872         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6873         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6874         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6875
6876         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6877
6878         //First hop
6879         let mut payment_event = {
6880                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6881                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6882                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6883                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6884                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6885         };
6886         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6887         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6888         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6889         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6890         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6891         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6892         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6893         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6894         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6895
6896         //Second Hop
6897         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6898         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6899         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6900         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6901
6902         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6903         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6904         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6905                 match events_3[0] {
6906                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6907                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6908                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6909                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6910                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6911                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6912                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6913                         },
6914                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6915                 }
6916         };
6917
6918         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6919
6920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6921         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6922         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6923         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6924         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6925
6926         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6927         match events_4[0] {
6928                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6929                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6930                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6931                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6932                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6933                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6934                 },
6935                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6936         };
6937
6938         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6939 }
6940
6941 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6942         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6943         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6944         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6945
6946         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6947         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6948         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6949         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6950         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6951         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6952
6953         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6954
6955         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6956         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6957         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6958         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6959
6960         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6961         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6962
6963         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6964         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6966         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6968
6969         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6970         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6971         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6972         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6973
6974         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6975         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6976
6977         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6978         match events[0] {
6979                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6980                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6981                 },
6982                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6983         }
6984         match events[1] {
6985                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6986                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6987                 },
6988                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6989         }
6990
6991         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6992         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6993         if announce_latest {
6994                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6995         } else {
6996                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6997         }
6998
6999         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7000         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7001         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7002
7003         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7004         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7005         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7006         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7007         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7008         let mut first_failed = false;
7009         for event in events {
7010                 match event {
7011                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7012                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7013                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7014                                         first_failed = true;
7015                                 } else {
7016                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7017                                 }
7018                         }
7019                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7020                 }
7021         }
7022 }
7023
7024 #[test]
7025 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7026         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7027         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7028 }
7029
7030 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7031         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7032         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7033         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7034         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7035         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7036         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7037
7038         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7039         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7040         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7041         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7042         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7043
7044         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7045
7046         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7047         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7048
7049         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7050         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7051
7052         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7053         if revoked {
7054                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7055                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7056         }
7057
7058         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7059         if local {
7060                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7061                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7062                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7063                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7064                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7065
7066                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7067                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7068                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7069                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7070                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7071                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7072                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7073                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7074                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7075                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7076                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7077         } else {
7078                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7079                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7080                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7081                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7082                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7083                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7084                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7085                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7086                 if !revoked {
7087                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7088                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7089                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7090                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7091                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7092                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7093                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7094                 } else {
7095                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7096                         // commitment tx
7097                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7098                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7099                         let first;
7100                         match events[0] {
7101                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7102                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7103                                         else { first = false; }
7104                                 },
7105                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7106                         }
7107                         match events[1] {
7108                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7109                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7110                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7111                                 },
7112                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7113                         }
7114                 }
7115         }
7116 }
7117
7118 #[test]
7119 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7120         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7121         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7122         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7123 }
7124
7125 #[test]
7126 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7127         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7128
7129         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7130         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7131         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7132         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7133         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7134         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7135         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7136         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7137         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7138
7139         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7140         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7141                 match error {
7142                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7143                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7144                 }
7145         } else { assert!(false) }
7146
7147         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7148         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7149         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7150         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7151         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7152                 match error {
7153                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7154                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7155                 }
7156         } else { assert!(false); }
7157
7158         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7159         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7160         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7161         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7162         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7163         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7164         let reason_msg;
7165         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7166                 match action {
7167                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7168                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7169                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7170                         },
7171                         _ => { panic!(); }
7172                 }
7173         } else { panic!(); }
7174         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7175
7176         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7177         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7178         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7179         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7180         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7181                 match error {
7182                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7183                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7184                 }
7185         } else { assert!(false); }
7186 }
7187
7188 #[test]
7189 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7190         // We want to be sure that :
7191         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7192         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7193         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7194         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7195         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7196         let persister;
7197         let logger;
7198         let fee_estimator;
7199         let tx_broadcaster;
7200         let chain_source;
7201         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7202         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7203         // during signing due to revoked tx
7204         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7205         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7206         let monitor;
7207         let node_state_0;
7208         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7209         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7210         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7211
7212         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7213
7214         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7215         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7216         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7217         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7218
7219         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7220         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7221
7222         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7223         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7224
7225         // Restore node A from previous state
7226         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7227         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7228         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7229         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7230         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7231         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7232         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7233         node_state_0 = {
7234                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7235                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7236                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7237                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7238                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7239                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7240                         logger: &logger,
7241                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7242                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7243                         channel_monitors,
7244                 }).unwrap().1
7245         };
7246         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7247         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7248         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7249         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7250
7251         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7252
7253         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7254         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7255
7256         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7257
7258         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7259         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7260         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7261
7262         {
7263                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7264                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7265         }
7266
7267         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7268         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7269                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7270                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7271                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7272                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7273                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7274                         match action {
7275                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7276                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7277                                 },
7278                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7279                         }
7280                 } else {
7281                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7282                 }
7283         }
7284
7285         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7286         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7287         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7288         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7290
7291         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7292         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7293         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7294         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7295         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7296         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7297         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7298         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7299         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7300         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7301         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7302 }
7303
7304 #[test]
7305 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7306         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7307         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7308         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7309
7310         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7311         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7312         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7313         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7314
7315         // Create some initial channels
7316         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7317
7318         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7319         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7320         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7321         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7322         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7323         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7324         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7325
7326         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7327         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7328         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7329         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7330         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7331
7332         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7333         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7334         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7335         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7336
7337         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7338         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7339         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7340
7341         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7342         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7343         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7344                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7345                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7346                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7347                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7348                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7349                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7350                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7351                 },
7352                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7353         };
7354         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7355
7356         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7357         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7358
7359         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7360         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7361         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7362         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7363 }
7364
7365 #[test]
7366 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7367         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7368         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7369
7370         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7371         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7372         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7373         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7374
7375         let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7376         let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7377         let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7378
7379         // Disconnect peers
7380         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7381         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7382
7383         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7384         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7385         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7386         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7387         let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7388         for e in msg_events {
7389                 match e {
7390                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7391                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7392                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7393                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7394                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7395                                 }
7396                         },
7397                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7398                 }
7399         }
7400         // Reconnect peers
7401         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7402         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7403         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7404         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7405         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7406         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7407
7408         // Reestablish chan_1
7409         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7410         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7411         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7412         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7413         // Reestablish chan_2
7414         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7415         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7416         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7417         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7418         // Reestablish chan_3
7419         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7420         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7421         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7422         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7423
7424         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7425         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7426         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7427         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7428         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7429         chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7430         for e in msg_events {
7431                 match e {
7432                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7433                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7434                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7435                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7436                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7437                                 }
7438                         },
7439                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7440                 }
7441         }
7442 }
7443
7444 #[test]
7445 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7446         // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7447         // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7448         // to forward through that channel.
7449         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7450         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7451         let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7452         no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7453         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7454         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7455         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7456         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7457         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7458         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7459
7460         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7461
7462         // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7463         // not send for private channels.
7464         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7465         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7466         nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7467         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7468         nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7469
7470         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7471         nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7472         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7474
7475         let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7476         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7477         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7478
7479         let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7480         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7481         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7482         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7483         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7484         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7485         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7486         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7487         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7488         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7489
7490         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7491         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7492         assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7493
7494         // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7495         // channel:
7496         send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7497
7498         // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7499         // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7500         let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7501                 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7502                 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7503                 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7504                 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7505                 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7506                 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7507         }]);
7508         let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7509         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7510
7511         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7512         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7513         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7514         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7515         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7516
7517         let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7518         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7519         assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7520         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7521         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7522
7523         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7524         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7525         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7526
7527         // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7528         // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7529
7530         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7531         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7532
7533         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7534         let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7535         let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7536         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7537         get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7538
7539         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7540         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7541         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7542         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7543
7544         let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7545         let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7546         let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7547         let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7548         assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7549         assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7550
7551         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7552
7553         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7554         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7555                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7556                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7557                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7558                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7559                         default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7560                         keys_manager,
7561                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7562                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7563                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7564                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
7565                         channel_monitors,
7566                 }).unwrap()
7567         };
7568         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7569         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7570
7571         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7572         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7573         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7574         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7575
7576         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7577         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7578         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7579         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7580         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7581         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7582         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7583         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7584
7585         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7586         nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7587         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7588         let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7589         nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7590         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7591         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7592         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7593
7594         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7595         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7596         pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7597         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7598 }
7599
7600 #[test]
7601 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7602         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7603         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7604
7605         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7606         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7607         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7608         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7609
7610         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7611
7612         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7613         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7614         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7615
7616         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7617         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7618         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7619         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7620         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7621         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7622
7623         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7624         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7625                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7626                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7627                 }
7628         }
7629
7630         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7631         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7632
7633         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7634         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7635         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7636         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7637         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7638
7639         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7640         let penalty_1;
7641         let feerate_1;
7642         {
7643                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7644                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7645                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7646                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7647                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7648                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7649                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7650                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7651                 node_txn.clear();
7652         };
7653
7654         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7655         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7656         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7657         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7658         {
7659                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7660                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7661                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7662                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7663                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7664                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7665                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7666                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7667                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7668                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7669                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7670                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7671                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7672                         node_txn.clear();
7673                 }
7674         }
7675         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7676
7677         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7678         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7679         let penalty_3;
7680         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7681         {
7682                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7683                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7684                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7685                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7686                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7687                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7688                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7689                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7690                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7691                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7692                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7693                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7694                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7695                         node_txn.clear();
7696                 }
7697         }
7698         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7699
7700         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7701         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7702 }
7703
7704 #[test]
7705 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7706         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7707         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7708
7709         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7710         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7711         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7712         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7713         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7714
7715         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7716         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7717         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7718         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7719         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7720                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7721         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7722         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7723         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7724                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7725         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7726
7727         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7728         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7729         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7730
7731         // Revoke local commitment tx
7732         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7733
7734         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7735         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7736         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7737         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7738         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7739         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7740         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7741
7742         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7743         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7744         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7745
7746         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7747         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7748         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7749
7750         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7751         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7752         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7753         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7754
7755         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7756         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7757         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7758         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7759         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7760         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7761         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7762         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7763         match events[1] {
7764                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7765                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7766         }
7767         let first;
7768         let feerate_1;
7769         let penalty_txn;
7770         {
7771                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7772                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7773                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7774
7775                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7776                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7777                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7778                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7779                 // future).
7780                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7781                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7782                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7783                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7784                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7785                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7786
7787                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7788                 // available, which we check here:
7789                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7790                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7791                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7792
7793                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7794                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7795
7796                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7797                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7798                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7799                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7800
7801                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7802                 // output, checked above).
7803                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7804                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7805                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7806
7807                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7808                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7809                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7810                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7811                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7812                 node_txn.clear();
7813         }
7814
7815         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7816         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7817         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7818         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7819         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7820         {
7821                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7822                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7823
7824                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7825                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7826                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7827                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7828                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7829                 } else {
7830                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7831                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7832                 }
7833
7834                 node_txn.clear();
7835         };
7836
7837         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7838         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7839         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7840         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7841         let node_txn = {
7842                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7843                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7844
7845                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7846                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7847                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7848                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7849                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7850                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7851                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7852                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7853                 node_txn.clear();
7854                 txn
7855         };
7856         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7857         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7858         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7859         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7860         {
7861                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7862                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7863                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7864                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7865                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7866                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7867                 // up bumped justice generation.
7868                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7869                 node_txn.clear();
7870         }
7871         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7873 }
7874
7875 #[test]
7876 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7877         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7878         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7879
7880         // Create 2 HTLCs
7881         // Provide preimage for one
7882         // Check aggregation
7883
7884         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7885         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7886         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7887         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7888
7889         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7890         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7891         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7892
7893         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7894         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7895         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7896         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7897         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7898
7899         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7900         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7901         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7902         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7903         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7904
7905         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7906         let timeout;
7907         let preimage;
7908         let preimage_bump;
7909         let feerate_timeout;
7910         let feerate_preimage;
7911         {
7912                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7913                 // 9 transactions including:
7914                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7915                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7916                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7917                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
7918                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7919                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7920                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7921                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7922                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7923                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7924                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7925
7926                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7927                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7928                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7929                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7930
7931                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7932                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7933                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7934                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7935
7936                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7937                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7938                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7939                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7940
7941                 node_txn.clear();
7942         };
7943         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7944         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7945
7946         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7947         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7948         {
7949                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7950                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7951                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7952                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7953                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7954                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7955
7956                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7957                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7958                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7959                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7960                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7961
7962                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7963                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7964                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7965                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7966                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7967
7968                 node_txn.clear();
7969         }
7970
7971         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7972         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7973 }
7974
7975 #[test]
7976 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7977         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7978         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7979         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7980         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7981         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7982         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7983         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7984         // implement that).
7985         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7986         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7987         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7988         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7989         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7990
7991         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7992         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7993
7994         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7995
7996         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7997         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7998         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7999
8000         // Must revoke without gaps
8001         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8002         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8003
8004         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8005         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8006                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8007
8008         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8009                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8010         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8011         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8012         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8013 }
8014
8015 #[test]
8016 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8017         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8018         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8019
8020         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8021         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8022         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8023         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8024
8025         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8026         // Lock HTLC in both directions
8027         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8028         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8029
8030         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8031         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8032         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8033
8034         // Revoke local commitment tx
8035         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8036
8037         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8038         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8039         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8040         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8041
8042         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8043         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8044         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8045         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8046         let penalty_txn = {
8047                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8048                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8049                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8050                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8051                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8052                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8053                 node_txn.clear();
8054                 penalty_txn
8055         };
8056         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8057         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8058         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8059         {
8060                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8061                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8062                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8063         }
8064 }
8065
8066 #[test]
8067 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8068         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8069         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8070         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8071         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8072         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8073         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8074
8075         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8076
8077         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8078         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8079         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8080         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8081         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8082
8083         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8084         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8085         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8086         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8087
8088         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8090         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8091         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8092         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8093         match close_ev[0] {
8094                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8095                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8096                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8097                 },
8098                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8099         }
8100 }
8101
8102 #[test]
8103 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8104         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8105         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8106         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8107         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8108
8109         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8110         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8111         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8112
8113         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8114
8115         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8116         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8117         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8118         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8119 }
8120
8121 #[test]
8122 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8123         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8124         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8125         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8126         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8127         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8128         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8129
8130         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8131         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8132         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8133
8134         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8135         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8136         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8137 }
8138
8139 #[test]
8140 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8141         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8142         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8143         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8144         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8145         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8146
8147         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8148         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8149         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8150         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8151
8152         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8153         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8154         route.paths.push(path);
8155         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8156         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8157         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8158         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8159         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8160         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8161         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8162         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8163 }
8164
8165 #[test]
8166 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8167         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8168         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8169         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8170         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8171         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8172
8173         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8174
8175         {
8176                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200);
8177                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8178                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8179                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8180                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8181                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8182                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8183                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8184         }
8185         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8186         // values from previous calls.
8187         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8188         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8189         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8190         match events[0] {
8191                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8192                         match &purpose {
8193                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8194                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8195                                 },
8196                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8197                         }
8198                 },
8199                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8200         }
8201 }
8202
8203 #[test]
8204 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8205         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8206         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8207         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8208         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8209         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8210
8211         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8212
8213         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8214
8215         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8216         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8217         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8218                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8219         } else { panic!(); }
8220         let mut block = {
8221                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8222                 Block {
8223                         header: BlockHeader {
8224                                 version: 0x2000000,
8225                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8226                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8227                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8228                         txdata: vec![],
8229                 }
8230         };
8231         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8232         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8233                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8234         } else { panic!(); }
8235
8236         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8237         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8238         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8239         block.header.time += 1;
8240         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8241         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8242         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8243
8244         {
8245                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8246                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8247                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8248                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8249                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8250                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8251                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8252         }
8253         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8254         // values from previous calls.
8255         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8256         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8257         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8258         match events[0] {
8259                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8260                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8261                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8262                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8263                 },
8264                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8265         }
8266 }
8267
8268 #[test]
8269 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8270         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8271         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8272         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8273         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8274         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8275
8276         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8277
8278         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8279         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8280         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8281         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8282
8283         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8284         // resulting events.
8285         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8286                 () => {
8287                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8288                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8289                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8290                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8291                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8292
8293                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8294                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8295                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8296                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8297                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8298
8299                         // We should fail the payment back
8300                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8301                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8302                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8303                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8304                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8305                                 },
8306                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8307                         }
8308                 }
8309         }
8310
8311         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8312         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8313         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8314
8315         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8316         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8317         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8318         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8319
8320         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8321         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8322         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8323         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8324
8325         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8326         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8327         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8328         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8329 }
8330
8331 #[test]
8332 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8333         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8334         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8335         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8336         //
8337         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8338         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8339         // commitment at same time.
8340
8341         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8342         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8343         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8344         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8345
8346         // Create some initial channel
8347         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8348         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8349
8350         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8351         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8352
8353         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8354         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8355
8356         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8357         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8358         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8359         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8360         let watchtower = {
8361                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8362                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8363                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8364                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8365                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8366                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8367                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8368                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8369                 watchtower
8370         };
8371         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8372         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8373         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8374         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8375         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8376
8377         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8378         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8379         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8380         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8381         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8382         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8383         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8384                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8385                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8386                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8387                 } else { assert!(false); }
8388         } else { assert!(false); };
8389         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8390         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8391         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8392         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8393 }
8394
8395 #[test]
8396 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8397         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8398         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8399         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8400         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8401
8402         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8403         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8404         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8405         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8406
8407         // Create some initial channel
8408         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8409         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8410
8411         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8412         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8413
8414         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8415         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8416
8417         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8418         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8419         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8420         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8421         let watchtower_alice = {
8422                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8423                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8424                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8425                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8426                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8427                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8428                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8429                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8430                 watchtower
8431         };
8432         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8433         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8434         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8435         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8436         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8437
8438         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8439         {
8440                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8441                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8442                 txn.clear();
8443         }
8444
8445         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8446         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8447         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8448         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8449         let watchtower_bob = {
8450                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8451                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8452                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8453                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8454                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8455                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8456                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8457                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8458                 watchtower
8459         };
8460         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8461         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8462
8463         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8464         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8465         {
8466                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8467         }
8468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8469
8470         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8471         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8472         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8473         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8474                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8475                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8476                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8477                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8478                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8479                 } else { assert!(false); }
8480         } else { assert!(false); };
8481         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8483
8484         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8485         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8486         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8487
8488         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8489         let bob_state_y;
8490         {
8491                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8492                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8493                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8494                 txn.clear();
8495         };
8496
8497         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8498         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8499         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8500         {
8501                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8502                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8503                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8504                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8505                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8506                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8507         }
8508 }
8509
8510 #[test]
8511 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8512         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8513         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8514         // message).
8515         //
8516         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8517         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8518         //
8519         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8520         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8521         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8522         // before receiving funding_signed.
8523         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8524         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8525         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8526         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8527
8528         // Create an initial channel
8529         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8530         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8531         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8532         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8533         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8534
8535         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8536         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8537
8538         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8539         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8540
8541         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8542         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8543         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8544         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8545         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8546 }
8547
8548 #[test]
8549 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8550         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8551         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8552         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8553         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8554         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8555         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8556
8557         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8558         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8559         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8560         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8561
8562         // Create some initial channels
8563         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8564
8565         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8566         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8567         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8568         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8569         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8570         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8571
8572         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8573         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8574         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8575         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8576         // this test before #653 fix.
8577         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8578         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8579         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8580         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8581         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8582
8583         let htlc_timeout = {
8584                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8585                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8586                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8587                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8588                 node_txn[1].clone()
8589         };
8590
8591         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8592         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8593         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8594         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8595 }
8596
8597 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8598         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8599         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8600         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8601         //
8602         // Steps of the test:
8603         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8604         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8605         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8606         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8607         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8608         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8609         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8610         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8611         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8612         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8613         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8614         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8615
8616         // Create some initial channels
8617         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8618         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8619
8620         // Steps (1) and (2):
8621         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8622         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8623
8624         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8625         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8626         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8627         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8628         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8629         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8630         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8631
8632         // Steps (3) and (4):
8633         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8634         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8635         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8636         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8637         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8638         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8639         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8640         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8641         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8642                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8643                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8644                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8645                 };
8646                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8647                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8648                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8649                 if broadcast_alice {
8650                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8651                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8652                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8653                 }
8654                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8655                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8656         }
8657
8658         // Step (5):
8659         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8660         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8661         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8662         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8663         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8664         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8665         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8666         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8667         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8668         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8669
8670         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8671         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8672         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8673         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8674                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8675                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8676                 match events[0] {
8677                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8678                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8679                         },
8680                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8681                 };
8682         }
8683         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8684         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8685         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8686         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8687
8688         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8689         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8690         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8691                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8692                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8693                         (*msg).clone()
8694                 },
8695                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8696         };
8697         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8698                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8699                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8700                         (*updates).clone()
8701                 },
8702                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8703         };
8704
8705         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8706         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8707         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8708         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8709
8710         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8711         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8712         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8713                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8714                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8715                         (*msg).clone()
8716                 },
8717                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8718         };
8719         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8720         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8721
8722         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8723         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8724         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8725         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8726         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8727                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8728                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8729                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8730                 if broadcast_alice {
8731                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8732                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8733                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8734                 }
8735                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8736                 if broadcast_alice {
8737                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8738                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8739                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8740                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8741                         // broadcasted.
8742                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8743                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8744                 } else {
8745                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8746                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8747                 }
8748         }
8749
8750         // Step (6):
8751         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8752         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8753         {
8754                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8755                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8756                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8757                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8758                 }
8759                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8760                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8761                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8762                 };
8763                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8764                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8765                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8766                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8767                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8768                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8769                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8770                 } else {
8771                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8772                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8773                 }
8774         }
8775 }
8776
8777 #[test]
8778 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8779         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8780         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8781         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8782         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8783 }
8784
8785 #[test]
8786 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8787         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8788         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8789         //
8790         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8791         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8792         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8793         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8794         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8795         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8796         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8797         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8798
8799         // Create an initial channel
8800         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8801         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8802         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8803         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8804
8805         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8806         // that it is rejected.
8807         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8808         {
8809                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8810                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8811                 match events[0] {
8812                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8813                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8814                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8815                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8816                                 // move forward with it.
8817                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8818                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8819                         },
8820                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8821                 }
8822         }
8823
8824         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8825         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8826
8827         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8828         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8829
8830         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8831         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8832         {
8833                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8834                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8835                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8836                 added_monitors.clear();
8837         }
8838         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8839
8840         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8841         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8842
8843         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8844         // temporary one).
8845
8846         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8847         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8848         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8849         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8850         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8851         {
8852                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8853                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8854                 match events[0] {
8855                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8856                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8857                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8858                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8859                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8860                         },
8861                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8862                 }
8863         }
8864
8865         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8866         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8867         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8868         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8869         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8870         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8871
8872         let funding_created = {
8873                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8874                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8875                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8876                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8877         };
8878         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8879         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8880         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8881         // still needs to be cleared here.
8882         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8883
8884         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8885         {
8886                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8887                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8888                 match events[0] {
8889                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8890                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8891                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8892                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8893                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8894                         },
8895                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8896                 }
8897         }
8898
8899         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8900         // everything is functional.
8901         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8902         {
8903                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8904                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8905                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8906                 added_monitors.clear();
8907         }
8908
8909         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8910         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8911         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8912         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8913
8914         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8915         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8916         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8917         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8918 }
8919
8920 #[test]
8921 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8922         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8923         //
8924         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8925         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8926         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8927         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8928         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8929         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8930         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8931
8932         // Create some initial channels
8933         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8934         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8935         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8936
8937         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8938         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8939         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8940
8941         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8942         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8943         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8944
8945         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8946         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8947         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8948         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8949         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8950         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8951         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8952         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8953         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8954
8955         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8956         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8957         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8959         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8960         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8961         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8962         match events[0] {
8963                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8964                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8965                 },
8966                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8967         }
8968         match events[1] {
8969                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8970                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8971                 },
8972                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8973         }
8974         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8975         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8976         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8977         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8978         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8979         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8980
8981         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8982         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8983         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8984 }
8985
8986 #[test]
8987 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8988         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8989         //
8990         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8991         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8992         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8993         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8994         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8995         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8996         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8997         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8998
8999         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9000         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9001         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9002
9003         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9004         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9005                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9006                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9007         }
9008
9009         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9010         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9011         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9012
9013         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9014         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9015
9016         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9017         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9018
9019         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9020         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9021         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9022
9023         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9024         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9025         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9027         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9028         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9029         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9030                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9031                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9032                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9033                 } else { panic!(); }
9034         } else { panic!(); }
9035         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9036 }
9037
9038 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9039         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9040         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9041         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9042         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9043         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9044         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9045         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9046         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9047         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9048         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9049         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9050         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9051         // until we learned about an additional block.
9052         //
9053         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9054         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9055         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9056         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9057         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9058         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9059         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9060
9061         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9062         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9063         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9064         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9065         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9066
9067         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9068         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9069         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9070         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9071         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9072         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9073
9074         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9075         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9076                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9077         }
9078         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9079                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9080         if test_height_before_timelock {
9081                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9082                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9083                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9084                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9085         } else {
9086                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9087                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9088                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9089                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9090                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9091                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9092                 // timelock is up).
9093                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9094                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9095
9096                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9097                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9098                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9099                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9100                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9101                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9102                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9103
9104                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9105                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9106                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9107                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9108                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9109                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9110                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9111                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9112                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9113         }
9114 }
9115
9116 #[test]
9117 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9118         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9119         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9120 }
9121
9122 #[test]
9123 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9124         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9125         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9126         // HTLCs.
9127         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9128
9129         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9130         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9131         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9132         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9133         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9134         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9135         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9136         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9137         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9138
9139         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9140         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9141         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9143
9144         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9145         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9146         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9147         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9148         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9149
9150         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9151
9152         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9153         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9154         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9156
9157         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9158         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9159         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9160         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9161         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9162
9163         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9164         // generated
9165         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9166
9167         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9168         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9169         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9170
9171         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9172         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9173         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9174         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9175         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9176
9177         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9178         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9179         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9180         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9181
9182         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9183         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9184                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9185         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9186         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9187         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9188                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9189         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9190
9191         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9192         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9193                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9194                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9195                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9196                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9197                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9198                         keys_manager,
9199                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9200                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9201                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9202                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9203                         channel_monitors,
9204                 }).unwrap()
9205         };
9206         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9207         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9208
9209         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9210         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9211         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9213
9214         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9215         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9216         // the commitment state.
9217         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9218
9219         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9220
9221         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9222         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9224
9225         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9226         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9227         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9228         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9229         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9230         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9231         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9232
9233         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9234         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9235 }
9236
9237 #[test]
9238 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9239         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9240         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9241         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9242         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9243
9244         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9245         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9246         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9247         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9248         let params = RouteParameters {
9249                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9250                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9251                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9252         };
9253         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9254         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9255
9256         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9257         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9259         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9260         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9261         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9262         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9263         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9264         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9265 }
9266
9267 #[test]
9268 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9269         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9270         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9271         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9272         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9273
9274         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9275         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9276         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9277         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9278
9279         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9280         let params = RouteParameters {
9281                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9282                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9283                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9284         };
9285         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9286         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9287         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9288         let route = find_route(
9289                 &payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9290                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9291         ).unwrap();
9292
9293         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9294         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9295         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9296         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9297         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9298         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9299         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9300         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9301         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9302 }
9303
9304 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9305 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9306 enum ExposureEvent {
9307         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9308         AtHTLCForward,
9309         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9310         AtHTLCReception,
9311         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9312         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9313 }
9314
9315 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9316         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9317         // policy.
9318         //
9319         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9320         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9321         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9322         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9323         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9324         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9325         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9326         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9327
9328         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9329         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9330         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9331         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9332         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9333         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9334
9335         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9336         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9337         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9338         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9339         if on_holder_tx {
9340                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9341         }
9342         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9343         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9344         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9345
9346         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9347
9348         if on_holder_tx {
9349                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9350                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9351                 }
9352         }
9353
9354         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9355         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9356         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9357
9358         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9359         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9360
9361         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9362         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9363         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9364
9365         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9366                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9367                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9368                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9369         };
9370         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9371         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9372
9373         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9374         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9375
9376         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9377         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9378
9379         if on_holder_tx {
9380                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9381                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9382                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9383                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9384                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9385                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9386                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9387                         }
9388                 } else {
9389                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9390                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9391                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9392                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9393                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9394                         }
9395                 }
9396         } else {
9397                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9398                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9399                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9400                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9401                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9402                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9403                         }
9404                 } else {
9405                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9406                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9407                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9408                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9409                         }
9410                 }
9411         }
9412
9413         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9414         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9415                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9416                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9417                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9418                 if on_holder_tx {
9419                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9420                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9421                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9422                 } else {
9423                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9424                 }
9425         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9426                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9427                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9428                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9429                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9430                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9431                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9432                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9433                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9434                 if on_holder_tx {
9435                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9436                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9437                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9438                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9439                 } else {
9440                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9441                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9442                 }
9443         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9444                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9445                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9446                 {
9447                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9448                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9449                 }
9450                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9451                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9452                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9453         }
9454
9455         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9456         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9457         added_monitors.clear();
9458 }
9459
9460 #[test]
9461 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9462         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9463         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9464         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9465         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9466         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9467         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9468         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9469         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9470         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9471         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9472         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9473         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9474 }