_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
  27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  29 use ln::msgs;
  30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  34 use util::errors::APIError;
  35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  36 use util::config::UserConfig;
  37
  38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  44
  45 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  46 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use io;
  54 use prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  58
  59 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  60 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  61
  62 #[test]
  63 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  64         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  65         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  66         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  67         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  68         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  69
  70         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  71         // funding satoshis
  72         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  73         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  74         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  75
  76         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  77         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  78
  79         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  80         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  81
  82         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  83         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  84         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  85                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  86                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  87                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  88                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  89                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  90                         match action {
  91                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  92                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  93                                 },
  94                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  95                         }
  96                 } else { assert!(false); }
  97         };
  98
  99         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
 100         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 101
 102         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 103         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
 104
 105         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 106
 107         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 108
 109         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 110
 111         insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 118
 119         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 120 }
 121
 122 #[test]
 123 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 124         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 125         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 126         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 127         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 128         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 129
 130         // balancing
 131         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 132
 133         // A                                        B
 134         // update_fee                            ->
 135         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 136         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 137         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 138         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 139         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 140         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 141         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 142         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 143         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 144         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 145         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 146         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 147         //                                       <- RAA
 148         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 149
 150         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 151         {
 152                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 153                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 154         }
 155         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 157
 158         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 159         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 160         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 161                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 162                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 163                 },
 164                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 165         };
 166
 167         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 168
 169         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 170         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 171         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 173
 174         let payment_event = {
 175                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 176                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 177                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 178         };
 179         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 180         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 181
 182         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 183         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 184         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 185         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 186         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 188
 189         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 190         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 191         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 192         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 194
 195         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 196         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 197         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 198         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 199         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 200         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 201         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 203
 204         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 205         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 206         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 207         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 208         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 209         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 210         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 212
 213         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 214         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 215         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 217
 218         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 219         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 221
 222         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 224
 225         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 226         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 227         match events_2[0] {
 228                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 229                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 230         }
 231
 232         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 233         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 234 }
 235
 236 #[test]
 237 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 238         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 239         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 240         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 241         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 242         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 243         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 244         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 245
 246         // balancing
 247         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 248
 249         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 250         {
 251                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 252                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 253         }
 254         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 256
 257         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 258         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 259         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 260                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 261                         update_fee.as_ref()
 262                 },
 263                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 264         };
 265
 266         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 267
 268         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 269         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 270         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 272
 273         let payment_event = {
 274                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 275                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 276                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 277         };
 278         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 279         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 280
 281         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 282         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 283         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 284         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 285         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 287
 288         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 290
 291         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 292 }
 293
 294 #[test]
 295 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 296         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 298         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 299         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 300         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 301
 302         // A                                        B
 303         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 304         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 305         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 306         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 307         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 308         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 309         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 310         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 311         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 312         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 313         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 314         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 315         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 316         //                                          B should send no response here
 317         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 318         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 319         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 320
 321         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 322         let initial_feerate;
 323         {
 324                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 325                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 326                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 327         }
 328         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 329         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 330
 331         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 332         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 333         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 334                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 335                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 336                 },
 337                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 338         };
 339
 340         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 341         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 342         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 343         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 344         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 345
 346         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 347         // transaction:
 348         {
 349                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 350                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 351         }
 352         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 353         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 354         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 355
 356         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 357         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 358                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 359                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 360         };
 361
 362         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 363
 364         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 365         // Deliver (3)
 366         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 367
 368         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 369         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 370         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 372         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 373         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 374         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 375         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 376         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 377         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 378         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 379
 380         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 381         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 382         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 383         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 384         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 385
 386         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 387         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 388         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 389
 390         // Delever (4)
 391         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 392         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 393         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 394
 395         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 396         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 397         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 398
 399         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 400         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 401         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 402         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 403
 404         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 405         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 406         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 407 }
 408
 409 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
 410         // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
 411         // tests that we properly send one in that case.
 412         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
 413         alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 414         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 415         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 416         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
 417         bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 418         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 419         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 420         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 421         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 422         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
 423         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 424         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
 425
 426         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 427         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
 428         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
 429
 430         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
 431         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 432         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
 433
 434         for node in nodes {
 435                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
 436                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
 437                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
 438         }
 439 }
 440 #[test]
 441 fn test_1_conf_open() {
 442         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
 443         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
 444         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
 445 }
 446
 447 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 448         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 449         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 450         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 451         // Node objects.
 452
 453         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 454         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 455         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 456         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 457
 458         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 459                 let block = Block {
 460                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 461                         txdata: vec![],
 462                 };
 463                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 464                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 465         }
 466
 467         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 468         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 469         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 470
 471         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 472         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 473         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 474
 475         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 476         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 477
 478         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 479
 480         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 481         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 483         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 484
 485         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 486         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 487         {
 488                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 489                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 490                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 491                 added_monitors.clear();
 492         }
 493         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 494
 495         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 496         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 497         {
 498                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 499                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 500                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 501                 added_monitors.clear();
 502         }
 503
 504         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 505         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 506
 507         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 508         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 509
 510         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 511         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 512         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 513         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 514 }
 515
 516 #[test]
 517 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 518         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 519         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 520         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 521         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 522         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 523         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 524         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 525         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 526         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 527         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 528         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 529         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 530         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 531         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 532         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 533         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 534         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 535         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 536 }
 537
 538 #[test]
 539 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 540         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 541         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 542         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 543         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 544         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 545
 546         {
 547                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 548                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 549         }
 550         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 551         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 552
 553         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 554         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 555         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 556                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 557                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 558                 },
 559                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 560         };
 561         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 562
 563         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 564         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 565         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 566
 567         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 568         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 569         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 570
 571         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 572         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 573         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 574         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 575
 576         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 577         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 579 }
 580
 581 #[test]
 582 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 583         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 584         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 585         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 586         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 587         let channel_value = 5000;
 588         let push_sats = 700;
 589         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 590         let channel_id = chan.2;
 591         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 592         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 593
 594         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 595         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 596         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 597         // remote limit.
 598         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 599         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) as u32;
 600         {
 601                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 602                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 603         }
 604         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 605         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 606         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 607
 608         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 609
 610         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 611
 612         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 613         {
 614                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 615
 616                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 617                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 618                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0) / 1000;
 619                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 620                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 621                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 622         }
 623
 624         {
 625                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 626                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 627                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 628         }
 629         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 630         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 632
 633         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 634
 635         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 636         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 637         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 638                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 639                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 640                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 641                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 642                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 643                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 644         };
 645         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 646                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 647                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 648                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 649                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 650                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 651                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 652                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 653         };
 654
 655         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 656         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 657                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 658
 659         let res = {
 660                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 661                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 662                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 663                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 664                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 665                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 666                         push_sats,
 667                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0) / 1000,
 668                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
 669                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 670                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 671                         &mut htlcs,
 672                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 673                 );
 674                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 675         };
 676
 677         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 678                 channel_id: chan.2,
 679                 signature: res.0,
 680                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 681         };
 682
 683         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 684                 channel_id: chan.2,
 685                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 686         };
 687
 688         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 689
 690         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 691         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 692         //Should produce and error.
 693         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 694         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 695         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 696         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 697         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 698 }
 699
 700 #[test]
 701 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 702         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 703         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 704         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 705         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 706         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 707
 708         // balancing
 709         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 710
 711         {
 712                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 713                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 714         }
 715         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 716         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 717
 718         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 719         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 720         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 721                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 722                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 723                 },
 724                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 725         };
 726         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 727         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 728         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 729         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 730
 731         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 732
 733         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 734         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 735         {
 736                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 737                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 738                 added_monitors.clear();
 739         }
 740         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 741         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 742         // node[1] has nothing to do
 743
 744         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 745         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 747
 748         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 749         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 750         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 752         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 753         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 754         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 755
 756         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 757         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 758         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 759         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 760         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 761         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 762
 763         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 764         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 765         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 766         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 767
 768         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 769         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 770         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 771
 772         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 773         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 774         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 775         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 776
 777         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 778         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 779         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 780
 781         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 782
 783         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 784         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 785         match events[0] {
 786                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 787                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 788         };
 789
 790         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 791
 792         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 793         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 794         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 795         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 796         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 797 }
 798
 799 #[test]
 800 fn test_update_fee() {
 801         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 802         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 803         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 804         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 805         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 806         let channel_id = chan.2;
 807
 808         // A                                        B
 809         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 810         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 811         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 812         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 813         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 814         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 815         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 816         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 817         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 818         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 819         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 820         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 821
 822         // Create and deliver (1)...
 823         let feerate;
 824         {
 825                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 826                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 827                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 828         }
 829         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 831
 832         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 833         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 834         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 835                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 836                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 837                 },
 838                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 839         };
 840         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 841
 842         // Generate (2) and (3):
 843         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 844         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 845         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 846
 847         // Deliver (2):
 848         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 849         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 850         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 851
 852         // Create and deliver (4)...
 853         {
 854                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 855                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 856         }
 857         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 858         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 859         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 860         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 861         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 862                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 863                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 864                 },
 865                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 866         };
 867
 868         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 869         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 870         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 871         // ... creating (5)
 872         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 873         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 874
 875         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 876         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 877         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 878         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 879         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 880
 881         // Deliver (5):
 882         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 883         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 884         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 885
 886         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 887         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 888         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 889         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 890         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 891         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 892         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 893         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 894         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 895
 896         // Deliver (7)
 897         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 898         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 899         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 900         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 901
 902         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 903         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 904         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 905
 906         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 907         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 908         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 909         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 910         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 911 }
 912
 913 #[test]
 914 fn fake_network_test() {
 915         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 916         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 917         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 918         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 919         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 920         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 921
 922         // Create some initial channels
 923         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 924         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 925         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 926
 927         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 928         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 929         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 930         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 931         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 932
 933         // Send some more payments
 934         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 935         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 936         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 937
 938         // Test failure packets
 939         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 940         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 941
 942         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 943         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 944
 945         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 946         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 947         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 948         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 949         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 950         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 951         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 952
 953         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
 954         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 955         hops.push(RouteHop {
 956                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 957                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 958                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 959                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 960                 fee_msat: 0,
 961                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 962         });
 963         hops.push(RouteHop {
 964                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
 965                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 966                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 967                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 968                 fee_msat: 0,
 969                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 970         });
 971         hops.push(RouteHop {
 972                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
 973                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
 974                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 975                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
 976                 fee_msat: 1000000,
 977                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
 978         });
 979         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
 980         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
 981         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
 982
 983         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 984         hops.push(RouteHop {
 985                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
 986                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 987                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 988                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 989                 fee_msat: 0,
 990                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 991         });
 992         hops.push(RouteHop {
 993                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 994                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 995                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 996                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 997                 fee_msat: 0,
 998                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 999         });
1000         hops.push(RouteHop {
1001                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1002                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1003                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1004                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1005                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1006                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1007         });
1008         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1009         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1010         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1011
1012         // Claim the rebalances...
1013         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1014         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1015
1016         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1017         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1018
1019         // Send some payments across both channels
1020         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1021         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1022         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1023
1024
1025         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1026         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1027         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1028         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1029
1030         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1031
1032         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1033         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1034         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1035
1036         // Close down the channels...
1037         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1038         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1039         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1040         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1041         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1042         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1043         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1044         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1045         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1046         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1047         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1048         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1049         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1050         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1051         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1052 }
1053
1054 #[test]
1055 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1056         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1057         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1058         // commitment dance rounds.
1059         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1060         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1061         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1062         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1063         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1064         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1065
1066         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1067         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1068                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1069                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1070                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1071         }
1072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1073
1074         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1075         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1076         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1077         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1078
1079         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1080         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1081         // another HTLC.
1082         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1083         {
1084                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1085                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1086                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1087                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1088         }
1089
1090         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1091         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1092         {
1093                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1094                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1095         }
1096
1097         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1098         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1099         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1100         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1101
1102         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1103         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1104         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1105         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1106         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1107         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1109
1110         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1111         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1112         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1113
1114         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1115
1116         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1117         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1118         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1119         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1120
1121         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1122         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1123         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1124         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1125
1126         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1128         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1129
1130         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1131                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1132         }
1133         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1135         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1137         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1138
1139         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1141         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1143         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1144
1145         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1147
1148         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1149
1150         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1151         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1152         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1153                 match event {
1154                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1155                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1156                         },
1157                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1158                 };
1159         }
1160
1161         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1162                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1163         }
1164
1165         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1166 }
1167
1168 #[test]
1169 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1170         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1171         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1172         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1173         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1174         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1175         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1176
1177         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1178         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1179         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1180         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1181         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1182         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1183
1184         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1185
1186         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1187         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1188
1189         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1190         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1191
1192         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1193         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1194         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1195 }
1196
1197 #[test]
1198 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1199         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1200         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1201         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1202         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1203         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1204         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1205         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1206
1207         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1208
1209         // balancing
1210         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1211
1212         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1213
1214         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1215         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1216         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1217
1218         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1219         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1221
1222         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1223         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1224
1225         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1226         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1227         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1228                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1229                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1230                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1231                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1232                 }
1233         }
1234         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1235
1236         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1237         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1238         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1239         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1240
1241         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1242         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1243         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1244         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1245         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1246         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1247         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1248         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1249
1250         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1251         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1252         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1253
1254         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1255         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1256         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1257         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1258         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1259         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1260         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1261         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1262
1263         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1264         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1265         for e in events {
1266                 match e {
1267                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1268                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1269                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1270                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1271                         },
1272                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1273                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1274                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1275                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1276                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1277                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1278                         },
1279                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1280                 }
1281         }
1282 }
1283
1284 #[test]
1285 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1286         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1287         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1288         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1289         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1290         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1291
1292         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1293         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1294
1295         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1296         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1297         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1298         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1299         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1300         match err {
1301                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1302                         match &fails[0] {
1303                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1304                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1305                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1306                         }
1307                 },
1308                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1309         }
1310         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1311         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1312
1313         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1314 }
1315
1316 #[test]
1317 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1318         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1319         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1320         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1321         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1322         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1323
1324         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1325         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1326         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1327         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1328
1329         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1330
1331         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1332         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1333         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1334         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1335                 channel_id: chan.2,
1336                 htlc_id: 0,
1337                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1338                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1339                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1340                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1341         };
1342
1343         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1344
1345         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1346         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1347         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1348
1349         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1350
1351         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1352
1353         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1354         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1355         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1356                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1357                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1358                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1359                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1360                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1361
1362                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1363                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1364                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1365                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1366                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1367         };
1368         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1369                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1370                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1371                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1372                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1373                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1374                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1375                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1376         };
1377
1378         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1379         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1380                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1381
1382         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1383         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1384         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1385
1386         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1387                 offered: false,
1388                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1389                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1390                 payment_hash,
1391                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1392         };
1393
1394         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1395
1396         let res = {
1397                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1398                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1399                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1400                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1401                         commitment_number,
1402                         95000,
1403                         local_chan_balance,
1404                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1405                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1406                         feerate_per_kw,
1407                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1408                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1409                 );
1410                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1411         };
1412
1413         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1414                 channel_id: chan.2,
1415                 signature: res.0,
1416                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1417         };
1418
1419         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1420         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1421         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1422
1423         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1424         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1425                 channel_id: chan.2,
1426                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1427                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1428         };
1429         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1430
1431         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1432         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1433         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1434         match events[0] {
1435                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1436                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1437                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1438                 },
1439                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1440         };
1441         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1442                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1443
1444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1445 }
1446
1447 #[test]
1448 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1449         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1450         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1451         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1452         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1453         // this situation.
1454         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1455         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1456         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1457         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1458
1459         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1460         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1461         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1462
1463         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1464
1465         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1466         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1467                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1468         }
1469
1470         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1471         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1472         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1473                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1474         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1475         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1476 }
1477
1478 #[test]
1479 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1480         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1481         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1482         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1483         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1484         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1485
1486         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1487         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1488         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1489         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1490         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1491         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1492         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1493
1494         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1495         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1496                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1497         }
1498
1499         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1500         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1501         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1502         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1503         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1504         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1505         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1506         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1507         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1508                 channel_id: chan.2,
1509                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1510                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1511                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1512                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1513                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1514         };
1515
1516         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1517         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1518         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1519         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1520         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1521         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1523         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1524 }
1525
1526 #[test]
1527 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1528         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1529         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1530         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1531         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1532
1533         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1534         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1535         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1536
1537         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1538         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1539         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1540         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1541         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1542         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1543         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1544
1545         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1546                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1547         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1548         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1549         // commitment transaction fee.
1550         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1551
1552         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1553         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1554                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1555         }
1556
1557         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1558         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1559         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1560                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1561 }
1562
1563 #[test]
1564 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1565         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1566         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1567         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1568         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1569         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1570         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1571         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1572
1573         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1574         // HTLC.
1575         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1576         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1577         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1578                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1579
1580         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1581         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1582         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1583         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1584         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1585         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1586         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1587
1588         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1589         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1590         match msg_events[0] {
1591                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1592                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1593                 },
1594                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1595         }
1596 }
1597
1598 #[test]
1599 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1600         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1601         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1602         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1603         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1604         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1605         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1606         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1607
1608         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1609         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1610         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1611         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1612         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1613         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1614
1615         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1616         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1617         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1618         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1619         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1620         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1621
1622         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1623         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1624         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1625         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1626 }
1627
1628 #[test]
1629 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1630         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1631         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1632         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1633         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1634         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1635         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1636
1637         let feemsat = 239;
1638         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1639         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1640         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1641
1642         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1643         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1644         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1645         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1646
1647         // Add a pending HTLC.
1648         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1649         let payment_event_1 = {
1650                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1651                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1652
1653                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1654                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1655                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1656         };
1657         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1658
1659         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1660         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1661         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1662         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1663         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1664
1665         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1666         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1667         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1668         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1669         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1670         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1671         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1672         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1673                 channel_id: chan.2,
1674                 htlc_id: 1,
1675                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1676                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1677                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1678                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1679         };
1680
1681         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1682         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1683         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1684         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1685         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1686         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1688         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1689 }
1690
1691 #[test]
1692 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1693         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1694         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1695         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1696         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1697         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1698         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1699         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1700         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1701         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1702
1703         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1704         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1705         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1706
1707         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1708         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1709 }
1710
1711 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1712         (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1713 }
1714
1715 #[test]
1716 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1717         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1718         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1719         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1720         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1721         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1722         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1723         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1724         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1725         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1726         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1727
1728         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1729         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1730
1731         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1732         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1733
1734         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1735                 ($node: expr) => {{
1736                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1737                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1738                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1739                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1740                         payment_event
1741                 }}
1742         }
1743
1744         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1745         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1746         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1747
1748         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1749
1750         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1751         {
1752                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1753                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1754                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1755                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1756                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1757                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1758                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1759         }
1760
1761         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1762         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1763         loop {
1764                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1765                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1766                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1767                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1768                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1769                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1770                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1771                         break;
1772                 }
1773                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1774
1775                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1776                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1777                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1778                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1779                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1780                 );
1781
1782                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1783                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1784                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1785                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1786                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1787         }
1788
1789         // adding pending output.
1790         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1791         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1792         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1793         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1794         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1795         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1796         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1797         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1798         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1799         // policy.
1800         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1801         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1802         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1803
1804         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1805         let payment_event_1 = {
1806                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1807                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1808
1809                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1810                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1811                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1812         };
1813         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1814
1815         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1816         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1817         {
1818                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1819                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1820                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1821                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1822         }
1823
1824         // split the rest to test holding cell
1825         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1826         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1827         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1828         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1829         {
1830                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1831                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1832         }
1833
1834         // now see if they go through on both sides
1835         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1836         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1837         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1838         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1839         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1840         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1841
1842         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1843         {
1844                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1845                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1846                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1847                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1848                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1849         }
1850
1851         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1852         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1853         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1854         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1855         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1856         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1857
1858         // flush the pending htlc
1859         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1860         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1861         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1862
1863         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1864         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1865         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1866         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1867
1868         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1869         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1870         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1871         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1872
1873         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1874         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1875         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1876
1877         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1878
1879         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1880         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1881         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1882
1883         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1884         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1885
1886         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1887         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1888         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1889         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1890         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1891         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1892
1893         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1894         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1895         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1896         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1897
1898         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1899         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1900
1901         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1902         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1903         match events[0] {
1904                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1905                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1906                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1907                         match &purpose {
1908                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1909                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1910                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1911                                 },
1912                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1913                         }
1914                 },
1915                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1916         }
1917         match events[1] {
1918                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1919                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1920                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1921                         match &purpose {
1922                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1923                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1924                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1925                                 },
1926                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1927                         }
1928                 },
1929                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1930         }
1931
1932         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1933         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1934         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1935
1936         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1937         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1938         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1939
1940         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1941         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1942         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1943         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1944         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1945
1946         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1947         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1948 }
1949
1950 #[test]
1951 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1952         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1953         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1954         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1955         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1956         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1957         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1958         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1959         // To test this we:
1960         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1961         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1962         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1963         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1964         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1965         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1966         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
1967         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1968         //    claim,
1969         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1970         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1971         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1972         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1973         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1974         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1975         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1976         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1977         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1978         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1979
1980         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1981         // Route the first two HTLCs.
1982         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1983         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1984
1985         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1986         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
1987         let send_1 = {
1988                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1989                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1990                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1991                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1992                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1993         };
1994
1995         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1996         // initial fulfill/CS.
1997         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1998         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1999         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2000
2001         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2002         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2003         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2004         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2005         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2006
2007         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2008         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2010         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2011         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2012
2013         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2014         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2015         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2016         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2017         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2018
2019         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2020         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2021         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2022
2023         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2025         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2026
2027         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2029         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2030
2031         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2032         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2033         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2034         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2035         // on-chain as necessary).
2036         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2037         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2038         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2039         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2040         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2041
2042         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2043         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2044         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2045
2046         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2047         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2048
2049         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2050         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2051         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2052         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2053         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2054
2055         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2056         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2057         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2058         let send_2 = {
2059                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2060                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2061                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2062                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2063                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2064         };
2065
2066         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2067         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2069         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2070
2071         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2072
2073         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2074         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2075         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2076
2077         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2078         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2079
2080         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2081         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2082         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2083
2084         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2085         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2086         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2087
2088         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2090
2091         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2092         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2093
2094         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2095         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2096 }
2097
2098 #[test]
2099 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2100         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2101         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2102         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2103         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2104         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2105         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2106
2107         // Create some initial channels
2108         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2109         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2110         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2111         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2112
2113         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2114         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2115         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2116         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2117         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2118         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2119
2120         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2121         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2122         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2123         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2124         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2125
2126         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2127         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2129         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2130         {
2131                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2132                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2133                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2134                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2135                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2136         }
2137         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2138         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2139         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2140         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2141         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2142
2143         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2144         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2145
2146         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2147         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2148         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2149         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2151         {
2152                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2153                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2154                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2155                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2156                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2157                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2158         }
2159         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2160         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2161         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2162         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2163         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2164
2165         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2166                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2167                         {
2168                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2169                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2170
2171                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2172                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2173                                 match events[0] {
2174                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2175                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2176                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2177                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2178                                         },
2179                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2180                                 };
2181                         }
2182                 }
2183         }
2184
2185         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2186         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2187         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2189         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2190         let node2_commitment_txid;
2191         {
2192                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2193                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2194                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2195                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2196
2197                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2198                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2199                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2200                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2201                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2202         }
2203         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2204         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2205         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2206         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2207         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2208
2209         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2210         // confusing us in the following tests.
2211         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2212
2213         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2214         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2215         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2216         // buffer space).
2217
2218         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2219                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2220                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2221                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2222                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2223                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2224                                 msg.clone()
2225                         },
2226                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2227                 };
2228                 match events[1] {
2229                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2230                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2231                         },
2232                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2233                 }
2234                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2235
2236                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2237                 {
2238                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2239                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2240                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2241                                         false
2242                                 } else { true }
2243                         });
2244                 }
2245
2246                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2247
2248                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2249                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2250
2251                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2252                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2253                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2254                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2255                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2256                                 msg.clone()
2257                         },
2258                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2259                 };
2260                 match events[1] {
2261                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2262                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2263                         },
2264                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2265                 }
2266                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2267                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2268
2269                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2270                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2271                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2272         };
2273         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2274         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2275         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2276         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2277
2278         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2279         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2280         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2281 }
2282
2283 #[test]
2284 fn test_justice_tx() {
2285         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2286         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2287         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2288         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2289         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2290         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2291         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2292         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2293         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2294         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2295         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2296         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2297         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2298         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2299         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2300         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2301         // Create some new channels:
2302         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2303
2304         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2305         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2306         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2307         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2308         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2309         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2310         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2311         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2312         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2313         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2314         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2315         // Revoke the old state
2316         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2317
2318         {
2319                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2320                 {
2321                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2322                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2323                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2324
2325                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2326                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2327                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2328                 }
2329                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2330                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2331                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2332
2333                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2334                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2335                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2336                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2337                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2338                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2339                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2340                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2341                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2342         }
2343         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2344
2345         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2346         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2347
2348         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2349         // Create some new channels:
2350         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2351         {
2352                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2353                 node_txn.clear();
2354         }
2355
2356         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2357         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2358         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2359         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2360         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2361         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2362         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2363         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2364         // Revoke the old state
2365         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2366         {
2367                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2368                 {
2369                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2370                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2371                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2372
2373                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2374                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2375                 }
2376                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2377                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2378
2379                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2380                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2381                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2382                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2383                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2384                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2385                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2386         }
2387         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2388         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2389         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2390 }
2391
2392 #[test]
2393 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2394         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2395         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2396         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2397         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2398         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2399         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2400         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2401         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2402         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2403         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2404         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2405         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2406         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2407         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2408
2409         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2410         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2411         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2412         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2413         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2414         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2415
2416         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2417         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2418
2419         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2420         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2421         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2422         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2423         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2424 }
2425
2426 #[test]
2427 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2428         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2429         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2430         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2431         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2432         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2433         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2434
2435         // Create some new channel:
2436         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2437
2438         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2439         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2440         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2441         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2442         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2443
2444         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2445         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2446         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2447         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2448         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2449         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2450         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2451         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2452         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2453
2454         //Revoke the old state
2455         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2456
2457         {
2458                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2459                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2460                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2461                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2462                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2463                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2464                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2465                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2466
2467                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2468                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2469
2470                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2471                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2472
2473                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2474                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2475                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2476                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2477                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2478                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2479                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2480                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2481
2482                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2483                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2484                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2485         }
2486         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2487         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2488         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2489 }
2490
2491 #[test]
2492 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2493         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2494         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2495         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2496         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2497         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2498         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2499
2500         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2501
2502         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2503         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2504         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2505         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2506         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2507         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2508
2509         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2510         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2511
2512         //Revoke the old state
2513         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2514
2515         {
2516                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2517                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2518                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2519                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2520                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2521                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2522                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2523                 match events[1] {
2524                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2525                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2526                 }
2527
2528                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2529                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2530
2531                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2532                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2533                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2534                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2535                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2536                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2537
2538                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2539                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2540                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2541                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2542                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2543                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2544                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2545
2546                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2547                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2548                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2549                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2550
2551                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2552                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2553                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2554
2555                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2556                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2557                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2558                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2559                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2560                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2561                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2562                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2563         }
2564         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2565         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2566         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2567 }
2568
2569 #[test]
2570 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2571         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2572         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2573         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2574         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2575         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2576         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2577         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2578         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2579         // towards B.
2580         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2581         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2582         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2583         // PaymentSent event).
2584
2585         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2586         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2587         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2588         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2589
2590         // Create some initial channels
2591         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2592         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2593
2594         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2595         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2596         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2597         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2598         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2599
2600         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2601         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2602         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2603
2604         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2605         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2606
2607         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2608         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2609         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2610         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2611         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2612         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2613         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2615         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2616         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2617         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2618         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2619         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2620
2621         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2622         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2623         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2624         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2625         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2626         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2627         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2628         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2629         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2630         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2631         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2632         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2633         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2634         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2635         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2636         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2637         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2638
2639         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2640         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2641         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2642         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2643         {
2644                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2645                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2646                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2647                 added_monitors.clear();
2648         }
2649         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2650         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2651         match forwarded_events[0] {
2652                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2653                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2654         }
2655         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2656                 } else { panic!(); }
2657         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2658                 } else { panic!(); }
2659         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2660         {
2661                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2662                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2663                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2664                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2665                 added_monitors.clear();
2666         }
2667         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2668         match events[0] {
2669                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2670                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2671         }
2672         match events[1] {
2673                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2674                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2675         }
2676
2677         match events[2] {
2678                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2679                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2680                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2681                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2682                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2683                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2684                 },
2685                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2686         };
2687         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2688                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2689                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2690                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2691                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2692                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2693                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2694                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2695                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2696                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2697                         if $htlc_offered {
2698                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2699                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2700                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2701                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2702                         } else {
2703                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2704                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2705                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2706                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2707                         }
2708                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2709                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2710                         node_txn.clear();
2711                 } }
2712         }
2713         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2714         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2715         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2716         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2717
2718         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2719         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2720         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2721         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2722         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2723         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2724         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2725         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2726         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2727         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2728         let commitment_spend =
2729                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2730                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2731                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2732                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2733                         &node_txn[0]
2734                 } else {
2735                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2736                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2737                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2738                         &node_txn[2]
2739                 };
2740
2741         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2742         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2743         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2744         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2745         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2746         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2747         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2748         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2749         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2750         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2751         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2752         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2753
2754         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2755         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2756         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2757         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2758         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2759         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2760         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2761         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2762         let mut first_claimed = false;
2763         for event in events {
2764                 match event {
2765                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2766                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2767                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2768                                         first_claimed = true;
2769                                 } else {
2770                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2771                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2772                                 }
2773                         },
2774                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2775                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2776                 }
2777         }
2778         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2779 }
2780
2781 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2782         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2783         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2784         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2785         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2786         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2787         //            \                                  \
2788         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2789
2790         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2791         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2792         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2793         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2794         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2795         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2796         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2797
2798         // Create some intial channels
2799         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2800         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2801
2802         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2803         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2804         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2805
2806         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2807
2808         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2809         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2810         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2811         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2812         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2813         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2814         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2815
2816         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2817         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2818         match events[0] {
2819                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2820                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2821                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2822                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2823                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2824                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2825                 },
2826                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2827         };
2828         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2829         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2831         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2832         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2833         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2834         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2835         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2836
2837         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2838         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2839         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2840         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2841         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2842         let timeout_tx;
2843         {
2844                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2845                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2846                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2847                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2848
2849                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2850                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2851
2852                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2853                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2854                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2855                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2856
2857                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2858                 node_txn.clear();
2859         }
2860
2861         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2863         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2864         {
2865                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2866                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2867                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2868                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2869         }
2870
2871         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2872         {
2873                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2874                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2875                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2876                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2877                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2878                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2879                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2880                 } else {
2881                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2882                 }
2883         }
2884
2885         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2886         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2887         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2888         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2889         match events[0] {
2890                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2891                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2892                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2893                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2894                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2895                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2896                 },
2897                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2898         };
2899
2900         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2901         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2902         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2903
2904         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2905         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2906
2907         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2908         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2909         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2910         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2911         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2912         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2913         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2914         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2915         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2916 }
2917
2918 #[test]
2919 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2920         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2921         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2922         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2923 }
2924
2925 #[test]
2926 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2927         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2928         // and fail backward accordingly.
2929
2930         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2931         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2932         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2933         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2934
2935         // Create some initial channels
2936         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2937         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2938
2939         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2940         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2941         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2942         // Revoke the old state
2943         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2944
2945         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2946
2947         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2948         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2949         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2951         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2952
2953         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2955         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2956         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2957         match events[0] {
2958                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2959                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2960                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2961                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2962                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2963                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2964
2965                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2966                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2967                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2968                 },
2969                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2970         }
2971 }
2972
2973 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2974         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2975         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2976         // commitment transaction anymore.
2977         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2978         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2979         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2980         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2981         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2982         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2983         // transactions:
2984         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2985         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2986         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2987         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2988         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2989         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2990         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2991         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2992         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2993
2994         // Create some initial channels
2995         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2996         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2997
2998         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
2999         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3000         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3001         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3002         // Revoke the old state
3003         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3004
3005         let value = if use_dust {
3006                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3007                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3008                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3009         } else { 3000000 };
3010
3011         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3012         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3013         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3014
3015         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3016         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3017         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3018         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3019         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3020         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3021         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3022         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3023         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3024         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3025         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3026         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3027
3028         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3029         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3030         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3031         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3032         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3033         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3034         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3035         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3036         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3037         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3038         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3040         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3041         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3042         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3043         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3044
3045         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3046         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3047         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3048         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3049         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3050         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3051         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3052         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3053         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3054         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3055         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3056         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3057         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3058         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3059         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3060         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3061         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3062         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3063
3064         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3065         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3066         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3067         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3068         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3069         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3070         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3071
3072         if deliver_bs_raa {
3073                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3074                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3075                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3076                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3077                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3078                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3079                 match events[0] {
3080                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3081                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3082                 };
3083                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3084                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3085         }
3086
3087         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3088         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3089
3090         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3092         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3093
3094         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3095         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
3096         match events[0] {
3097                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3098                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3099         }
3100         match events[1] {
3101                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3102                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3103                 },
3104                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3105         }
3106         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3107                 match events[2] {
3108                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3109                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3110                 };
3111         }
3112         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3114
3115         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3116         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3117         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3118                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3119                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3120         }
3121         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3122                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3123                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3124                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3125                 },
3126                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3127         }
3128         if deliver_bs_raa {
3129                 match events[0] {
3130                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3131                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3132                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3133                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3134                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3135                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3136                         },
3137                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3138                 }
3139         }
3140         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3141                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3142                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3143                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3144                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3145                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3146                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3147
3148                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3149                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3150                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3151
3152                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3153
3154                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3155                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3156                         match events[0] {
3157                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3158                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3159                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3160                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3161                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3162                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3163                                         }
3164                                 },
3165                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3166                         }
3167                         match events[1] {
3168                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3169                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3170                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3171                                 },
3172                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3173                         }
3174                         match events[2] {
3175                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3176                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3177                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3178                                 },
3179                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3180                         }
3181                 },
3182                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3183         }
3184
3185         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3186         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3187         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3188 }
3189
3190 #[test]
3191 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3192         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3193         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3194         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3195         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3196 }
3197
3198 #[test]
3199 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3200         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3201         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3202         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3203         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3204 }
3205
3206 #[test]
3207 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3208         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3209         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3210         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3211         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3212         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3213
3214         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3215         {
3216                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3217                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3218                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3219
3220                 let payment_event = {
3221                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3222                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3223                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3224                 };
3225                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3226                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3227         }
3228
3229         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3230         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3231         {
3232                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3233                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3234
3235                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3236         }
3237
3238         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3239         {
3240                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3241
3242                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3243                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3244                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3245                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3246                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3247                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3248
3249                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3250                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3251                         channel_id: chan.2,
3252                         htlc_id: 0,
3253                         amount_msat: 0,
3254                         payment_hash,
3255                         cltv_expiry,
3256                         onion_routing_packet,
3257                 };
3258                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3259         }
3260         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3261         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3262         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3263         match events[0] {
3264                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3265                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3266                 },
3267                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3268         }
3269         match events[1] {
3270                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3271                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3272                 },
3273                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3274         }
3275         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3277 }
3278
3279 #[test]
3280 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3281         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3282         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3283         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3284         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3285         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3286         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3287         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3288
3289         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3290         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3291         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3292         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3293         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3294         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3295
3296         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3297         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3298         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3299
3300         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3301         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3302         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3304         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3305
3306         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3307         // registering new transactions
3308         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3309         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3310 }
3311
3312 #[test]
3313 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3314         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3315         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3316         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3317         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3318         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3319         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3320         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3321
3322         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3323
3324         let mut payment_event = {
3325                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3326                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3327
3328                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3329                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3330                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3331         };
3332
3333         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3334         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3335
3336         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3337
3338         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3339         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3340         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3341         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3342
3343         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3344         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3345         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3346         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3347         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3348
3349         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3350         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3351         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3352
3353         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3354         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3355         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3356         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3357         let tx = {
3358                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3359                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3360                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3361                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3362                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3363                 node_txn.remove(0)
3364         };
3365
3366         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3367
3368         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3369         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3370         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3371         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3372
3373         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3374         {
3375                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3376                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3377         }
3378         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3379         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3380         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3381         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3382         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3383         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3384         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3385
3386         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3387 }
3388
3389 #[test]
3390 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3391         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3392         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3393         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3394         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3395
3396         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3397         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3398         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3399         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3400         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3401
3402         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3403
3404         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3405         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3406         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3407         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3408         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3409
3410         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3411         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3412
3413         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3414         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3415 }
3416
3417 #[test]
3418 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3419         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3420         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3421         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3422         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3423         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3424         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3425         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3426
3427         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3428         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3429         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3430
3431         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3432         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3433         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3434         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3435
3436         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3437         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3438         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3439
3440         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3441         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3442         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3443         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3444
3445         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3446         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3447
3448         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3449         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3450
3451         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3452         {
3453                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3454                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3455                 match events[0] {
3456                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3457                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3458                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3459                         },
3460                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3461                 }
3462                 match events[1] {
3463                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3464                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3465                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3466                         },
3467                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3468                 }
3469         }
3470
3471         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3472         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3473 }
3474
3475 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3476         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3477         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3478         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3479         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3480         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3481
3482         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3483         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3484                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3485                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3486                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3487                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3488                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3489         } else {
3490                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3491         }
3492
3493         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3494
3495         let payment_event = {
3496                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3497                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3498
3499                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3500                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3501                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3502         };
3503         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3504
3505         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3506                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3507         } else {
3508                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3509                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3510                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3511                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3512                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3513
3514                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3515                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3516                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3517                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3518
3519                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3520                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3521                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3522                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3523                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3524
3525                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3526                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3527                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3528                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3529                                         }
3530                                 }
3531                         }
3532                 }
3533         }
3534
3535         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3536         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3537         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3538                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3539                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3540                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3541                         //
3542                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3543                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3544                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3545                         //
3546                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3547                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3548                 }
3549                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3550                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3551                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3552         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3553                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3554                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3555         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3556                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3557                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3558         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3559                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3560                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3561         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3562                 // Everything was delivered...
3563                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3564         }
3565
3566         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3567         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3568         match events_1[0] {
3569                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3570                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3571         };
3572
3573         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3574         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3575         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3576
3577         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3578
3579         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3580         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3581         match events_2[0] {
3582                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3583                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3584                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3585                         match &purpose {
3586                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3587                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3588                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3589                                 },
3590                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3591                         }
3592                 },
3593                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3594         }
3595
3596         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3597         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3598
3599         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3600         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3601         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3602                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3603                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3604                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3605                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3606                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3607                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3608                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3609                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3610                 },
3611                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3612         };
3613
3614         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3615                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3616
3617                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3618                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3619                 match events_4[0] {
3620                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3621                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3622                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3623                         },
3624                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3625                 }
3626
3627                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3628                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3629                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3630                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3631
3632                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3633                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3634                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3635                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3636
3637                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3638                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3639                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3640                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3641                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3642
3643                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3644                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3645                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3646                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3647                                         }
3648                                 }
3649                         }
3650                 }
3651         }
3652
3653         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3654         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3655         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3656                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3657                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3658                         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3659                         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3660                         match events_4[0] {
3661                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3662                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3663                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3664                                 },
3665                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3666                         }
3667                 } else {
3668                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3669                 }
3670         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3671                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3672                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3673         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3674                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3675                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3676         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3677                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3678                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3679         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3680                 // Everything was delivered...
3681                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3682         }
3683
3684         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3685         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3686         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3687
3688         // Channel should still work fine...
3689         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3690         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3691         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3692 }
3693
3694 #[test]
3695 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3696         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3697         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3698         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3699         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3700 }
3701
3702 #[test]
3703 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3704         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3705         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3706         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3707         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3708 }
3709
3710 #[test]
3711 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3712         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3713         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3714         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3715         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3716         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3717         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3718         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3719         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3720         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3721
3722         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3723         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3724
3725         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3726         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3727         let chan_id;
3728         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3729         match events_1[0] {
3730                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3731                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3732                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3733                 },
3734                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3735         }
3736
3737         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3738
3739         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3740         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3741
3742         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3743         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3744         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3745         let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3746                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3747                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3748                         msg.clone()
3749                 },
3750                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3751         };
3752         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3753                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3754                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3755                         msg.clone()
3756                 },
3757                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3758         };
3759
3760         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3761
3762         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3763         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3764         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3765         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3766         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3767                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3768                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3769                         msg.clone()
3770                 },
3771                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3772         };
3773         let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3774                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3775                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3776                 },
3777                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3778         };
3779
3780         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3781         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3782         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3783         let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3784                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3785                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3786                 },
3787                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3788         };
3789
3790         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3791         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3792         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3793
3794         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3795         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3796         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3797
3798         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3799         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3800         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3801
3802         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3803         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3804         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3805
3806         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3807         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3808         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3809         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3810         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3811         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3812                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3813         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3814
3815         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3816         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3817                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3818                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3819                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3820                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3821                         keys_manager,
3822                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3823                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3824                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3825                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3826                         channel_monitors,
3827                 }).unwrap()
3828         };
3829         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3830         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3831
3832         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3833         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3834         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3835
3836         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3837
3838         // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3839         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3840         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3841         let mut found_announcement = false;
3842         for event in msgs.iter() {
3843                 match event {
3844                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3845                                 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3846                         },
3847                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3848                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3849                 }
3850         }
3851         assert!(found_announcement);
3852 }
3853
3854 #[test]
3855 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3856         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3857         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3858         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3859         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3860         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3861         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3862         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3863
3864         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3865
3866         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3867         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3868         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3869         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3870
3871         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3872         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3873         match events_1[0] {
3874                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3875                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3876         }
3877
3878         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3879         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3880
3881         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3882         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3883         match events_2[0] {
3884                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3885                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3886                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3887                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3888                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3889                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3890                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3891
3892                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3893                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3894                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3895                         match events_3[0] {
3896                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3897                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3898                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3899                                 },
3900                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3901                         }
3902
3903                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3904                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3905                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3906                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3907                 },
3908                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3909         }
3910
3911         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3912         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3913
3914         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3915         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3916         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3917         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3918         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3919         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3920
3921         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3922         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3923         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3924         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3925
3926         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3927         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3928
3929         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3930         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3931
3932         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3933
3934         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3935         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3936         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3937         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3938         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3939         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3940         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3941         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3942         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3943         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3944
3945         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3946         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3947         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3948         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3949         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3950         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3951         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3952         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3953
3954         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3955         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3956         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3957         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3958         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3959         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3960         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3961         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3962
3963         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3964         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3965         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3966         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3967
3968         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3969         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3970         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3972
3973         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3974         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3975         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3976
3977         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3978
3979         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3980         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3981         match events_5[0] {
3982                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3983                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3984                         match &purpose {
3985                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3986                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3987                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3988                                 },
3989                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3990                         }
3991                 },
3992                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3993         }
3994
3995         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
3996         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3997         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3998
3999         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4000 }
4001
4002 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4003         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4004         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4005         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4006         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4007         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4008         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4009
4010         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4011
4012         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4013                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4014                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4015                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4016                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4017                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4018                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4019                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4020                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4021                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4022                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4023                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4024                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4025                 our_payment_hash
4026         } else {
4027                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4028         };
4029
4030         let mut block = Block {
4031                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4032                 txdata: vec![],
4033         };
4034         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4035         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4036         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4037         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4038                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4039                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4040                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4041         }
4042
4043         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4044
4045         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4046         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4047         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4048         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4049         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4050         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4051
4052         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4053         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4054         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4055         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4056         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4057         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4058 }
4059
4060 #[test]
4061 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4062         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4063         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4064 }
4065
4066 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4067         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4068         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4069         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4070         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4071         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4072         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4073         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4074
4075         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4076         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4077         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4078         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4079
4080         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4081         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4082         {
4083                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4084         }
4085         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4087
4088         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4089         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4090         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4091         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4092         if forwarded_htlc {
4093                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4094                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4095                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4096                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4097                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4098         }
4099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4100
4101         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4102         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4103         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4104         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4105
4106         if forwarded_htlc {
4107                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4108                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4109                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4110                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4111                 match fail_commit[0] {
4112                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4113                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4114                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4115                         },
4116                         _ => unreachable!(),
4117                 }
4118                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4119         } else {
4120                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4121         }
4122 }
4123
4124 #[test]
4125 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4126         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4127         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4128 }
4129
4130 #[test]
4131 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4132         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4133         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4134         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4135         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4136         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4137         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4138         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4139         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4140         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4141
4142         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4143
4144         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4145
4146         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4147         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4148         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4149                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4150
4151         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4152         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4153         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4154         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4155         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4156         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4157         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4158         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4159                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4160         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4161
4162         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4163         let config = UserConfig::default();
4164         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4165                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4166                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4167                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4168                         default_config: config,
4169                         keys_manager,
4170                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4171                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4172                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4173                         logger: &logger,
4174                         channel_monitors,
4175                 }).unwrap()
4176         };
4177         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4178         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4179
4180         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4181         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4182         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4184
4185         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4186         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4187         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4188         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4189
4190         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4191         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4192         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4193         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4194
4195         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4196         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4197         for node in nodes.iter() {
4198                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4199                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4200                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4201         }
4202
4203         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4204 }
4205
4206 #[test]
4207 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4208         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4211         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4212         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4213         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4214         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4215         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4216         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4217         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4218
4219         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4220         let channel_value = 100000;
4221         let push_msat = 10001;
4222         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4223         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4224         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4225         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4226         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4227         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4228         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4229
4230         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4231
4232         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4233         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4234
4235         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4236         {
4237                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4238                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4239                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4240                 added_monitors.clear();
4241         }
4242
4243         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4244         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4245         {
4246                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4247                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4248                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4249                 added_monitors.clear();
4250         }
4251         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4252
4253         nodes.push(node_a);
4254         nodes.push(node_b);
4255
4256         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4257         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4258         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4259         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4260
4261         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4262         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4263         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4264         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4265         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4266         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4267         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4268         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4269                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4270         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4271
4272         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4273         let config = UserConfig::default();
4274         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4275                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4276                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4277                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4278                         default_config: config,
4279                         keys_manager,
4280                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4281                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4282                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4283                         logger: &logger,
4284                         channel_monitors,
4285                 }).unwrap()
4286         };
4287         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4288         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4289
4290         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4291
4292         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4293         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4294
4295         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4296         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4297         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4298         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4299         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4300
4301         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4302         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4304
4305         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4306         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4307         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4308         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4309
4310         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4311         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4312         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4313         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4314
4315         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4316         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4317         for node in nodes.iter() {
4318                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4319                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4320                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4321         }
4322
4323         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4324 }
4325
4326 #[test]
4327 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4328         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4329         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4330         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4331         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4332         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4333         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4334         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4335         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4336         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4337         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4338
4339         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4340         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4341
4342         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4343
4344         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4345         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4346         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4347
4348         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4349         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4350         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4351         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4352         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4353         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4354         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4355         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4356                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4357         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4358
4359         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4360         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4361                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4362                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4363                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4364                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4365                         keys_manager,
4366                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4367                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4368                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4369                         logger: &logger,
4370                         channel_monitors,
4371                 }).unwrap()
4372         };
4373         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4374         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4375
4376         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4377         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4378         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4379
4380         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4381
4382         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4383         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4384 }
4385
4386 #[test]
4387 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4388         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4389         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4390         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4391         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4392         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4393         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4394         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4395         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4396         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4397         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4398         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4399         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4400         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4401
4402         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4403         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4404                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4405                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4406                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4407         }
4408
4409         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4410
4411         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4412         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4413
4414         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4415         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4416         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4417         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4418
4419         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4420         // nodes[3])
4421         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4422         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4423                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4424                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4425                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4426         }
4427
4428         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4429         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4430         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4431         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4432         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4433         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4434
4435
4436         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4437         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4438                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4439                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4440                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4441                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4442         }
4443
4444         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4445         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4446                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4447                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4448                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4449                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4450         }
4451
4452         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4453         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4454                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4455                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4456                 keys_manager,
4457                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4458                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4459                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4460                 logger: &logger,
4461                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4462         }) { } else {
4463                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4464         };
4465
4466         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4467         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4468                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4469                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4470                 keys_manager,
4471                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4472                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4473                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4474                 logger: &logger,
4475                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4476         }).unwrap();
4477         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4478         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4479
4480         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4481                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4482                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4483                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4484                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4485         }
4486
4487         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4488                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4489                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4490         }
4491         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4492         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4493
4494         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4495         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4496         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4497         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4498         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4499
4500         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4501         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4502         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4503         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4504         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4505         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4506         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4507                 match action {
4508                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4509                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4510                         },
4511                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4512                 }
4513         }
4514 }
4515
4516 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4517         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4518                 {
4519                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4520                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4521                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4522                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4523                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4524                                 match event {
4525                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4526                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4527                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4528                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4529                                                 }
4530                                         },
4531                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4532                                 };
4533                         }
4534                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4535                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4536                                         txn.push(tx);
4537                                 }
4538                         }
4539                         txn
4540                 }
4541         }
4542 }
4543
4544 #[test]
4545 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4546         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4547         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4548         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4549         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4550         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4551
4552         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4553         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4554         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4555         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4556         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4557         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4558         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4559         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4560         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4561
4562         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4563         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4564
4565         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4566         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4567         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4568         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4569         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4570 }
4571
4572 #[test]
4573 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4574         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4575         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4576         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4577         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4578         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4579         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4580
4581         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4582         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4583         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4584         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4585         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4586
4587         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4588         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4589         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4590         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4591
4592         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4593         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4594         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4595         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4596         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4597
4598         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4599         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4600         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4601 }
4602
4603 #[test]
4604 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4605         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4606         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4607
4608         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4609         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4610         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4611         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4612
4613         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4614         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4615         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4616         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4617         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4618
4619         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4620         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4621         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4623         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4624
4625         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4626         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4627         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4628
4629         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4630         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4631         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4632         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4633         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4634 }
4635
4636 #[test]
4637 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4638         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4639         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4640         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4641         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4642
4643         // Create some initial channels
4644         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4645
4646         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4647
4648         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4649         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4650         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4651
4652         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4653         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4654         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4655         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4657         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4658         match events[0] {
4659                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4660                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4661         }
4662         match events[1] {
4663                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4664                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4665         }
4666
4667         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4668         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4669         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4670         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4671         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4672         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4673         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4674
4675         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4676         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4677         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4678
4679         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4680         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4681         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4682 }
4683
4684 #[test]
4685 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4686         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4687         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4688         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4689         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4690
4691         // Create some initial channels
4692         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4693
4694         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4695         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4696
4697         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4698
4699         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4700         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4701         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4702
4703         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4704         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4705         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4706         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4707         match events[0] {
4708                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4709                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4710         }
4711         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4712
4713         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4714         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4715         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4716         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4717         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4718         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4719
4720         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4721         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4722         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4723         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4724
4725         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4726         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4727         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4728         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4729         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4730 }
4731
4732 #[test]
4733 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4734         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4735         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4736         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4737         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4738
4739         // Create some initial channels
4740         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4741
4742         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4743         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4744         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4745         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4746
4747         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4748
4749         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4750         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4752         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4753
4754         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4755         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4756         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4757         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4758
4759         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4760         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4761
4762         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4763         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4764         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4765 }
4766
4767 #[test]
4768 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4769         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4770         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4771         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4772         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4773         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4774
4775         // Create some initial channels
4776         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4777
4778         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4779         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4780         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4781         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4782
4783         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4784
4785         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4786         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4787         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4788         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4789         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4790         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4791
4792         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4793         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4794         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4795         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4796         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4797         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4798         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4799
4800         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4801         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4802         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4803         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4805         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4806
4807         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4808         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4809         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4810         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4811         // transactions next...
4812         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4813         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4814
4815         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4816         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4817         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4818                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4819         } else {
4820                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4821                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4822         }
4823
4824         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4825         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4826
4827         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4828         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4829
4830         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4831         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4832         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4833         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4834         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4835 }
4836
4837 #[test]
4838 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4839         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4840         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4841         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4842         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4843         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4844
4845         // Create some initial channels
4846         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4847
4848         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4849         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4850         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4851         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4852
4853         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4854         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4855
4856         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4857
4858         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4859         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4860         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4861         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4862         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4863         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4864
4865         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4866         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4867         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4868         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4869
4870         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4871         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4872         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4873
4874         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4875         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4876         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4877         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4878         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4879         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4880
4881         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4882         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4883
4884         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4885         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4886         // transactions next...
4887         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4888         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4889         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4890                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4891         } else {
4892                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4893                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4894         }
4895
4896         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4897         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4898
4899         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4900
4901         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4902         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4903
4904         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4905         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4906
4907         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4908         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4909         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4910         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4911         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4912         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4913         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4914         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4915 }
4916
4917 #[test]
4918 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4919         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4920         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4921         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4922         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4923         // channel.
4924         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4925         // gets broadcast.
4926
4927         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4928         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4929         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4930         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4931
4932         // Create some initial channels
4933         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4934         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4935
4936         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4937         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4938         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4939         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4940         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4941
4942         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4943         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4944         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4945
4946         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4947         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4948         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4949         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4951         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4952         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4953         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4954         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4955         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4956
4957         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4958         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4959         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4960         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4961
4962         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4963         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4964         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4965         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4966         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4967         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4968         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4969         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4970         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4971         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4972
4973         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4974         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4975         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4976         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4977         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4978         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4979         match events[0] {
4980                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4981                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4982         }
4983         match events[1] {
4984                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
4985                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4986                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4987                 },
4988                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4989         }
4990         {
4991                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4992                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4993                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4994                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
4995                 b_txn.clear();
4996         }
4997         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4998         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4999         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5000         match msg_events[0] {
5001                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5002                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5003         }
5004         match msg_events[1] {
5005                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5006                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5007         }
5008         match msg_events[2] {
5009                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5010                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5011                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5012                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5013                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5014                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5015                 },
5016                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5017         };
5018         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5019         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5020         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5021         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5022         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5023         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5024         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5025         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5026         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5027         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5028         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5029         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5030         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5031
5032         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5033         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5034 }
5035
5036 #[test]
5037 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5038         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5039         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5040         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5041         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5042         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5043         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5044         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5045         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5046         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5047         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5048         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5049                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5050         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5051
5052         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5053         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5054         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5055
5056         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5057         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5058         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5059         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5060         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5061
5062         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5063
5064         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5065         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5066         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5067         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5068         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5069         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5070
5071         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5072         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5073         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5074
5075         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5076         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5077         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5078         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5079         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5080
5081         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5082         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5083                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5084                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5085                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5086                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5087
5088                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5089                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5090                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5091                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5092                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5093                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5094                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5095
5096                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5097                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5098                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5099                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5100         }
5101
5102         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5103         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5104         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5105         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5106         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5107         match events[0] {
5108                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5109                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5110         }
5111         match events[1] {
5112                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5113                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5114         }
5115         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5116         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5117         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5118         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5119         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5120         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5121         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5122         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5123         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5124         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5125         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5126         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5127         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5128
5129         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5130         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5131         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5132         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5133         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5134         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5135         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5136         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5137         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5139
5140         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5141         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5142         {
5143                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5144         }
5145         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5146
5147         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5148         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5149         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5150         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5151         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5152         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5153         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5154         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5155         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5156         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5157         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5158         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5159
5160         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5161         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5162
5163         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5164         match events[0] {
5165                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5166                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5167                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5168                 }
5169                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5170         }
5171 }
5172
5173 #[test]
5174 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5175         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5176         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5177         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5178         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5179
5180         // Create some initial channels
5181         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5182
5183         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5184         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5185         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5186         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5187         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5188
5189         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5190         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5192         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5194         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5195         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5196         match events[0] {
5197                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5198                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5199         }
5200         match events[1] {
5201                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5202                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5203         }
5204         let node_tx = {
5205                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5206                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5207                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5208                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5209                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5210                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5211                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5212                 node_txn[0].clone()
5213         };
5214
5215         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5216         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5217
5218         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5219         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5220         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5221         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5222         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5223         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5224 }
5225
5226 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5227         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5228         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5229         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5230         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5231         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5232         // use the same payment hashes.
5233         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5234         //
5235         // A \         / E
5236         //    - C - D -
5237         // B /         \ F
5238         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5239         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5240         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5241         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5242         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5243         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5244         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5245         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5246                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5247         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5248
5249         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5250         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5251         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5252         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5253         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5254
5255         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5256         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5257         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5258         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5259
5260         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5261         // 0th HTLC:
5262         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5263         // 1st HTLC:
5264         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5265         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5266         // 2nd HTLC:
5267         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5268         // 3rd HTLC:
5269         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5270         // 4th HTLC:
5271         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5272         // 5th HTLC:
5273         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5274         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5275         // 6th HTLC:
5276         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5277         // 7th HTLC:
5278         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5279
5280         // 8th HTLC:
5281         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5282         // 9th HTLC:
5283         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5284         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5285
5286         // 10th HTLC:
5287         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5288         // 11th HTLC:
5289         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5290         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5291
5292         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5293         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5294         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5295         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5296         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5297
5298         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5299         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5300         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5301         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5302         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5303         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5304         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5305         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5307
5308         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5309         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5310         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5311         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5312         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5313         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5314
5315         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5316         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5317         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5319         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5320         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5321
5322         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5323         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5324         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5325         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5326
5327         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5328
5329         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5330         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5331         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5332         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5333         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5334         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5335         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5336         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5337         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5338         if deliver_last_raa {
5339                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5340         } else {
5341                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5342         }
5343
5344         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5345         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5346         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5347         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5348         //
5349         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5350         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5351         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5352         //
5353         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5354         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5355         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5356
5357         if announce_latest {
5358                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5359         } else {
5360                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5361         }
5362         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5363         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5364                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5365                 events[1].clone()
5366         } else {
5367                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5368                 events[0].clone()
5369         };
5370         match close_event {
5371                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5372                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5373         }
5374
5375         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5376         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5377         if deliver_last_raa {
5378                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5379         } else {
5380                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5381         }
5382         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5383
5384         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5385         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5386         let mut a_done = false;
5387         for msg in cs_msgs {
5388                 match msg {
5389                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5390                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5391                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5392                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5393                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5394                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5395                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5396                                         }
5397                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5398                                         assert!(!a_done);
5399                                         a_done = true;
5400                                         &nodes[0]
5401                                 } else {
5402                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5403                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5404                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5405                                         }
5406                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5407                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5408                                         &nodes[1]
5409                                 };
5410                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5411                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5412                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5413                                 if announce_latest {
5414                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5415                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5416                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5417                                         }
5418                                 }
5419                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5420                         },
5421                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5422                 }
5423         }
5424
5425         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5426         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5427         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5428         let mut as_updates = 0;
5429         for event in as_events.iter() {
5430                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5431                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5432                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5433                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5434                         } else {
5435                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5436                         }
5437                         if network_update.is_some() {
5438                                 as_updates += 1;
5439                         }
5440                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5441         }
5442         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5443         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5444         if announce_latest {
5445                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5446                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5447         }
5448         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5449
5450         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5451         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5452         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5453         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5454         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5455                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5456                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5457                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5458                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5459                         } else {
5460                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5461                         }
5462                         if network_update.is_some() {
5463                                 bs_updates += 1;
5464                         }
5465                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5466         }
5467         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5468         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5469         if announce_latest {
5470                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5471         }
5472         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5473
5474         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5475         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5476         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5477         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5478         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5479         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5480 }
5481
5482 #[test]
5483 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5484         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5485 }
5486
5487 #[test]
5488 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5489         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5490 }
5491
5492 #[test]
5493 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5494         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5495         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5496         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5497 }
5498
5499 #[test]
5500 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5501         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5502         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5503         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5504         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5505
5506         // Create some initial channels
5507         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5508
5509         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5510         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5511         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5512         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5513
5514         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5515         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5516         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5517         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5518         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5519         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5520
5521         let htlc_timeout = {
5522                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5523                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5524                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5525                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5526                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5527                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5528                 node_txn[1].clone()
5529         };
5530
5531         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5532         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5533         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5534
5535         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5536         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5537         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5538         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5539         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5540         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5541         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5542         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5543         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5544         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5545                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5546 }
5547
5548 #[test]
5549 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5550         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5551         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5552         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5553
5554         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5555
5556         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5557         let seed = [42; 32];
5558         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5559         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5560         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5561         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5562         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5563         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5564
5565         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5566         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5567
5568         // Create some initial channels
5569         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5570         // for node 0
5571         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5572         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5573         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5574
5575         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5576         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5577         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5578         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5579         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5580
5581         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5582         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5583         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5584         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5585         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5586
5587         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5588         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5589         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5590         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5591             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5592             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5593             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5594                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5595         }
5596
5597         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5598         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5599         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5600         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5601         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5602         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5603
5604         let htlc_timeout = {
5605                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5606                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5607                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5608                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5609                 node_txn[1].clone()
5610         };
5611
5612         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5613         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5614         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5615
5616         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5617         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5618         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5619         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5620         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5621         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5622         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5623         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5624         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5625         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5626         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5627                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5628 }
5629
5630 #[test]
5631 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5632         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5633         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5634         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5635         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5636
5637         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5638
5639         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5640         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5641
5642         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5643         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5644         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5645
5646         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5647         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5648         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5649
5650         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5651         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5652         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5653
5654         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5655         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5656         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5657 }
5658
5659 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5660         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5661         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5662         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5663         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5664         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5665
5666         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5667
5668         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5669         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5670         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5671         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5672
5673         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5674         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5675         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5676         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5677         match events[0] {
5678                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
5679                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5680                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5681                 },
5682                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5683         }
5684
5685         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5686         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5687         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5688         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5689         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5690
5691         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5692         let mut block = Block {
5693                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5694                 txdata: vec![],
5695         };
5696         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5697                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5698                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5699         }
5700         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5701         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5702         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5703         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5704 }
5705
5706 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5707         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5708         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5709         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5710         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5711         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5712
5713         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5714         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5715         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5716
5717         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5718
5719         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5720         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5721         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5722
5723         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5724         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5725
5726         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5727                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5728                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5729         }
5730         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5731         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5733         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5734 }
5735
5736 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5737         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5738         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5739         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5740         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5741         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5742
5743         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5744         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5745         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5746         // actually revoked.
5747         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5748         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5749         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5750         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5752
5753         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5754         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5755         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5756         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5757         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5758         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5759         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5760         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5761         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5762         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5763
5764         if check_revoke_no_close {
5765                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5766                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5767         }
5768
5769         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5770         let mut block = Block {
5771                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5772                 txdata: vec![],
5773         };
5774         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5775                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5776                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5777         }
5778         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5779                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5780                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5781                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5782                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5783         } else {
5784                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5785         }
5786 }
5787
5788 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5789 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5790 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5791 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5792 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5793 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5794 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5795 // non-dust HTLCs.
5796 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5797 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5798 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5799 #[test]
5800 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5801         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5802         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5803
5804         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5805         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5806 }
5807
5808 #[test]
5809 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5810         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5811         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5812         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5813         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5814 }
5815
5816 #[test]
5817 #[should_panic]
5818 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5819         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5820         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5821         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5822         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5823         //Force duplicate channel ids
5824         for node in nodes.iter() {
5825                 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5826         }
5827
5828         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5829         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5830         let push_msat=10001;
5831         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5832         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5833         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5834
5835         //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5836         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5837 }
5838
5839 #[test]
5840 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5841         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5842         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5843         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5844         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5845
5846         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5847         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5848         let push_msat=10001;
5849         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5850
5851         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5852         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5853         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5854         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5855         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5856
5857         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5858         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5859         let push_msat=10001;
5860         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5861         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5862         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5863
5864         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5865         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5866         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5867
5868         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5869         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5870         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5871
5872         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5873         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5874         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5875
5876         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5877         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5878         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5879         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5880         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5881         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5882 }
5883
5884 #[test]
5885 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5886         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5887         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5888         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5889         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5890
5891         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5892         let push_msat=10001;
5893         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5894         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5895         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5896         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5897
5898         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5899         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5900         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5901                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5902                         msg.clone()
5903                 },
5904                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5905         };
5906         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5907 }
5908
5909 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5910 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5911 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5912 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5913 #[test]
5914 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5915         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5916         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5917         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5918         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5919         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5920
5921         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5922         // pending_update_fee.
5923         {
5924                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5925                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5926         }
5927         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5929
5930         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5931         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5932         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5933                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5934                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5935                 },
5936                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5937         };
5938
5939         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5940
5941         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5942         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5943         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5944
5945         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5946         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5947         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5948
5949         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5950         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5951         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5952         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5953
5954         // Flush the pending fee update.
5955         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5956         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5957         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5958         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5959         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5960
5961         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5962         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5963         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5964         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5965         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5966         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5967         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5968                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5969         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5970
5971         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5972         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5973         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5974         match &events[0] {
5975                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
5976                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5977                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5978                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5979                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5980                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5981                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
5982                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5983                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5984                 },
5985                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5986         }
5987 }
5988
5989 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5990 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5991 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5992 #[test]
5993 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5994         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5995         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5996         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5997         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5998         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5999
6000         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6001         // pending_update_fee.
6002         {
6003                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6004                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6005         }
6006         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6007         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6008
6009         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6010         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6011         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6012                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6013                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6014                 },
6015                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6016         };
6017
6018         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6019
6020         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6021         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6022         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6023
6024         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6025         let amt_1 = 20000;
6026         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6027         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6028         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6029
6030         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6031         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6032         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6033         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6034         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6035         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6036         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6037
6038         // Flush the pending fee update.
6039         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6040         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6042         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6043         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6044         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6045
6046         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6047         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6048         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6049         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6050         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6051         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6052         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6053                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6054         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6055
6056         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6057         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6058         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6059         match &events[0] {
6060                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6061                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6062                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6063                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6064                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6065                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6066                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6067                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6068                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6069                 },
6070                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6071         }
6072
6073         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6074         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6075                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6076                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6077                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6078         };
6079         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6080                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6081                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6082         };
6083         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6085         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6086         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6087         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6088         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6089         match events[0] {
6090                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6091                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6092         }
6093         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6094         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6095         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6096         match events[0] {
6097                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6098                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6099         }
6100         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6101         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6102         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6103         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6104         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6105         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6106         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6107         match events[0] {
6108                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6109                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6110                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
6111                 }
6112                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6113         }
6114 }
6115
6116 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6117 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6118 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6119 // once it's freed.
6120 #[test]
6121 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6122         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6123         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6124         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6125         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6126         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6127         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6128         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6129         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6130         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6131         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6132
6133         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6134         // pending_update_fee.
6135         {
6136                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6137                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6138         }
6139         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6141
6142         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6143         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6144         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6145                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6146                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6147                 },
6148                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6149         };
6150
6151         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6152
6153         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6154         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6155         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6156
6157         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6158         let feemsat = 239;
6159         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6160         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6161         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6162         let payment_event = {
6163                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6164                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6165
6166                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6167                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6168
6169                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6170         };
6171         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6173         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6174         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6175
6176         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6177         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6178
6179         // Flush the pending fee update.
6180         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6181         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6183         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6184         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6185         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6186
6187         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6188         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6189         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6190
6191         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6192                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6193                         msg.clone()
6194                 },
6195                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6196         };
6197
6198         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6200         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6201
6202         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6203         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6204         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6205         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6206                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6207                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6208         }
6209
6210         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6211         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6213
6214         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6215         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6216         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6217         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6218                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6219                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6220                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6221                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6222                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6223                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6224                 },
6225                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6226         };
6227
6228         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6229         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6230         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6231
6232         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6233         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6234         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6235         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6236         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6237         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6238         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6239         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6240         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6241                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6242                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6243         };
6244         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6245         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6247 }
6248
6249 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6250 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6251 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6252
6253 #[test]
6254 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6255         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6256         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6257         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6258         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6259         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6260         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6261
6262         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6263         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6264
6265         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6266                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6267         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6268         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6269 }
6270
6271 #[test]
6272 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6273         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6274         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6275         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6276         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6277         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6278         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6279
6280         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6281         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6282         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6283                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6284
6285         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6286         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6287 }
6288
6289 #[test]
6290 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6291         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6292         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6293         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6294         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6295         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6296         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6297
6298         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6299         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6301         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6302         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6303
6304         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6305         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6306         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6307         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6308         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6309 }
6310
6311 #[test]
6312 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6313         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6314         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6315         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6316         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6317         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6318         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6319         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6320
6321         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6322         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6323                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6324 }
6325
6326 #[test]
6327 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6328         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6329         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6330         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6331         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6332         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6333         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6334         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6335         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6336         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6337
6338         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6339                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6340                 let payment_event = {
6341                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6342                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6343
6344                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6345                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6346                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6347                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6348                         } else {
6349                                 assert!(false);
6350                         }
6351                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6352                 };
6353                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6354                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6355                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6356
6357                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6358                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6359         }
6360         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6361         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6362                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6363
6364         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6365         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6366 }
6367
6368 #[test]
6369 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6370         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6371         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6372         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6373         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6374         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6375         let channel_value = 100000;
6376         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6377         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6378
6379         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6380
6381         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6382         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6383         // limits us to.
6384         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6385         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6386                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6387
6388         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6389         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6390
6391         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6392 }
6393
6394 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6395 #[test]
6396 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6397         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6398         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6399         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6400         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6401         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6402         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6403         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6404         {
6405                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6406                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6407                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6408         }
6409
6410         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6411         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6412         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6413         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6414         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6415         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6416         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6417         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6418         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6419         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6420         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6421 }
6422
6423 #[test]
6424 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6425         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6426         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6427         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6428         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6429         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6430         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6431
6432         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6433         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6434         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6435         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6436         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6437
6438         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6439         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6440         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6441         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6442         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6443
6444         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6445         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6446         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6447         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6448         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6449
6450         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6451         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6452         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6453         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6454         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6455 }
6456
6457 #[test]
6458 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6459         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6460         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6461         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6462         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6463         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6464         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6465         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6466
6467         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6468         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6469         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6470         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6471         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6472         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6473
6474         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6475                 channel_id: chan.2,
6476                 htlc_id: 0,
6477                 amount_msat: 1000,
6478                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6479                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6480                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6481         };
6482
6483         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6484                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6485                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6486         }
6487         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6488         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6489
6490         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6491         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6492         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6494         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6495 }
6496
6497 #[test]
6498 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6499         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6500         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6501         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6502         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6503         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6504         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6505
6506         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6507         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6508         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6509         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6510         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6511         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6512
6513         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6514         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6515         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6516         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6517         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6518 }
6519
6520 #[test]
6521 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6522         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6523         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6524         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6525         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6526         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6527
6528         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6529         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6530         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6531         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6532         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6533         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6534         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6535
6536         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6537         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6538         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6539         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6540         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6541 }
6542
6543 #[test]
6544 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6545         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6546         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6547         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6548         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6549         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6550         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6551         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6552
6553         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6554         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6555         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6556         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6557         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6558         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6559
6560         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6561         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6562         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6563         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6564         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6565         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6566         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6567         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6568         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6569         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6570         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6571         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6572         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6573
6574         //Resend HTLC
6575         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6576         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6577         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6579         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6580
6581         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6582
6583         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6584         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6585         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6586         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6587         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6588 }
6589
6590 #[test]
6591 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6592         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6593
6594         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6595         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6596         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6597         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6598         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6599         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6600         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6601
6602         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6603         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6604         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6605
6606         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6607                 channel_id: chan.2,
6608                 htlc_id: 0,
6609                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6610         };
6611
6612         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6613
6614         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6615         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6616         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6618         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6619 }
6620
6621 #[test]
6622 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6623         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6624
6625         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6626         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6627         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6628         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6629         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6630
6631         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6632         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6633         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6634         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6635         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6636
6637         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6638                 channel_id: chan.2,
6639                 htlc_id: 0,
6640                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6641         };
6642
6643         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6644
6645         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6646         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6647         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6648         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6649         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6650 }
6651
6652 #[test]
6653 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6654         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6655
6656         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6657         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6658         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6659         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6660         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6661
6662         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6663         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6664         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6665         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6666         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6667         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6668                 channel_id: chan.2,
6669                 htlc_id: 0,
6670                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6671                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6672         };
6673
6674         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6675
6676         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6677         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6678         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6679         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6680         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6681 }
6682
6683 #[test]
6684 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6685         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6686
6687         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6688         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6689         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6690         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6691         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6692
6693         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6694
6695         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6696         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6697
6698         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6699         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6700         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6701                 match events[0] {
6702                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6703                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6704                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6705                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6706                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6707                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6708                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6709                         },
6710                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6711                 }
6712         };
6713
6714         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6715
6716         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6717
6718         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6719         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6720         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6721         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6722         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6723 }
6724
6725 #[test]
6726 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6727         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6728
6729         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6730         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6731         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6732         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6733         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6734
6735         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6736
6737         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6738         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6739
6740         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6741         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6742         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6743                 match events[0] {
6744                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6745                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6746                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6747                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6748                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6749                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6750                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6751                         },
6752                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6753                 }
6754         };
6755
6756         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6757
6758         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6759
6760         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6761         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6762         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6763         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6764         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6765 }
6766
6767 #[test]
6768 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6769         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6770
6771         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6772         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6773         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6774         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6775         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6776
6777         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6778         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6779         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6780
6781         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6782         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6783
6784         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6786         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6787
6788         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6789
6790         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6791                 match events[0] {
6792                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6793                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6794                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6795                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6796                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6797                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6798                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6799                         },
6800                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6801                 }
6802         };
6803         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6804         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6805
6806         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6807         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6808         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6809         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6810         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6811 }
6812
6813 #[test]
6814 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6815         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6816         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6817
6818         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6819         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6820         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6821         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6822         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6823         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6824
6825         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6826
6827         //First hop
6828         let mut payment_event = {
6829                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6830                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6831                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6832                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6833                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6834         };
6835         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6836         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6837         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6838         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6839         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6840         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6841         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6842         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6843         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6844
6845         //Second Hop
6846         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6847         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6849         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6850
6851         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6852         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6853         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6854                 match events_3[0] {
6855                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6856                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6857                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6858                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6859                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6860                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6861                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6862                         },
6863                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6864                 }
6865         };
6866
6867         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6868
6869         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6870         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6871         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6872         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6873         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6874
6875         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6876         match events_4[0] {
6877                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6878                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6879                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6880                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6881                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6882                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6883                 },
6884                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6885         };
6886
6887         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6888 }
6889
6890 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6891         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6892         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6893         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6894
6895         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6896         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6897         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6898         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6899         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6900         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6901
6902         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6903
6904         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6905         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6906         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6907         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6908
6909         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6910         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6911
6912         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6913         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6915         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6916         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6917
6918         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6919         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6920         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6922
6923         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6924         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6925
6926         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6927         match events[0] {
6928                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6929                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6930                 },
6931                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6932         }
6933         match events[1] {
6934                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6935                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6936                 },
6937                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6938         }
6939
6940         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6941         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6942         if announce_latest {
6943                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6944         } else {
6945                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6946         }
6947
6948         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6950         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6951
6952         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6953         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6954         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6955         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6956         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6957         let mut first_failed = false;
6958         for event in events {
6959                 match event {
6960                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6961                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6962                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6963                                         first_failed = true;
6964                                 } else {
6965                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6966                                 }
6967                         }
6968                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6969                 }
6970         }
6971 }
6972
6973 #[test]
6974 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6975         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6976         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6977 }
6978
6979 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6980         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6981         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6982         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6983         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6984         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6985         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6986
6987         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6988         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6989         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6990         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6991         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6992
6993         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6994
6995         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6996         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6997
6998         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6999         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7000
7001         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7002         if revoked {
7003                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7004                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7005         }
7006
7007         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7008         if local {
7009                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7010                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7011                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7012                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7013                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7014
7015                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7016                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7017                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7018                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7019                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7020                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7021                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7022                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7023                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7024                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7025                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7026         } else {
7027                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7028                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7029                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7030                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7031                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7032                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7033                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7034                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7035                 if !revoked {
7036                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7037                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7038                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7039                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7040                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7041                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7042                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7043                 } else {
7044                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7045                         // commitment tx
7046                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7047                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7048                         let first;
7049                         match events[0] {
7050                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7051                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7052                                         else { first = false; }
7053                                 },
7054                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7055                         }
7056                         match events[1] {
7057                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7058                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7059                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7060                                 },
7061                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7062                         }
7063                 }
7064         }
7065 }
7066
7067 #[test]
7068 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7069         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7070         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7071         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7072 }
7073
7074 #[test]
7075 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7076         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7077
7078         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7079         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7080         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7081         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7082         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7083         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7084         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7085         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7086         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7087
7088         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7089         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7090                 match error {
7091                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7092                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7093                 }
7094         } else { assert!(false) }
7095
7096         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7097         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7098         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7099         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7100         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7101                 match error {
7102                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7103                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7104                 }
7105         } else { assert!(false); }
7106
7107         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7108         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7109         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7110         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7111         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7112         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7113         let reason_msg;
7114         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7115                 match action {
7116                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7117                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7118                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7119                         },
7120                         _ => { panic!(); }
7121                 }
7122         } else { panic!(); }
7123         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7124
7125         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7126         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7127         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7128         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7129         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0) {
7130                 match error {
7131                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7132                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7133                 }
7134         } else { assert!(false); }
7135 }
7136
7137 #[test]
7138 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7139         // We want to be sure that :
7140         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7141         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7142         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7143         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7144         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7145         let persister;
7146         let logger;
7147         let fee_estimator;
7148         let tx_broadcaster;
7149         let chain_source;
7150         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7151         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7152         // during signing due to revoked tx
7153         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7154         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7155         let monitor;
7156         let node_state_0;
7157         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7158         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7159         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7160
7161         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7162
7163         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7164         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7165         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7166         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7167
7168         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7169         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7170
7171         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7172         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7173
7174         // Restore node A from previous state
7175         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7176         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7177         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7178         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7179         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7180         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7181         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7182         node_state_0 = {
7183                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7184                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7185                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7186                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7187                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7188                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7189                         logger: &logger,
7190                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7191                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7192                         channel_monitors,
7193                 }).unwrap().1
7194         };
7195         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7196         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7197         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7198         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7199
7200         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7201
7202         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7203         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7204
7205         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7206
7207         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7208         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7209         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7210
7211         {
7212                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7213                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7214         }
7215
7216         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7217         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7218                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7219                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7220                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7221                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7222                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7223                         match action {
7224                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7225                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7226                                 },
7227                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7228                         }
7229                 } else {
7230                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7231                 }
7232         }
7233
7234         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7235         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7236         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7237         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7238         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7239
7240         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7241         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7242         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7243         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7244         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7245         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7246         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7247         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7248         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7249         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7250         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7251 }
7252
7253 #[test]
7254 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7255         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7256         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7257         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7258
7259         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7260         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7261         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7262         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7263
7264         // Create some initial channels
7265         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7266
7267         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7268         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7269         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7270         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7271         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7272         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7273         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7274
7275         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7276         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7277         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7278         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7279         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7280
7281         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7282         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7283         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7284         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7285
7286         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7287         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7288         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7289
7290         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7291         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7292         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7293                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7294                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7295                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7296                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7297                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7298                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7299                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7300                 },
7301                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7302         };
7303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7304
7305         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7306         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7307
7308         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7309         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7310         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7311         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7312 }
7313
7314 #[test]
7315 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7316         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7317         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7318
7319         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7320         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7321         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7322         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7323
7324         let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7325         let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7326         let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7327
7328         // Disconnect peers
7329         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7330         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7331
7332         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7333         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7334         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7335         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7336         let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7337         for e in msg_events {
7338                 match e {
7339                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7340                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7341                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7342                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7343                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7344                                 }
7345                         },
7346                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7347                 }
7348         }
7349         // Reconnect peers
7350         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7351         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7352         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7353         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7354         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7355         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7356
7357         // Reestablish chan_1
7358         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7359         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7360         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7361         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7362         // Reestablish chan_2
7363         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7364         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7365         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7366         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7367         // Reestablish chan_3
7368         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7369         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7370         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7371         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7372
7373         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7374         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7375         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7376         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7377         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7378         chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7379         for e in msg_events {
7380                 match e {
7381                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7382                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7383                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7384                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7385                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7386                                 }
7387                         },
7388                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7389                 }
7390         }
7391 }
7392
7393 #[test]
7394 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7395         // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7396         // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7397         // to forward through that channel.
7398         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7399         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7400         let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7401         no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7402         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7403         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7404         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7405         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7406         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7407         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7408
7409         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7410
7411         // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7412         // not send for private channels.
7413         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7414         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7415         nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7416         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7417         nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7418
7419         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7420         nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7421         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7422         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7423
7424         let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7425         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7426         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7427
7428         let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7429         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7430         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7431         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7432         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7433         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7434         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7435         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7436         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7437         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7438
7439         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7440         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7441         assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7442
7443         // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7444         // channel:
7445         send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7446
7447         // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7448         // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7449         let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7450                 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7451                 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7452                 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7453                 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7454                 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7455                 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7456         }]);
7457         let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7458         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7459
7460         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7461         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7462         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7463         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7464         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7465
7466         let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7467         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7468         assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7469         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7470         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7471
7472         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7473         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7474         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7475
7476         // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7477         // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7478
7479         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7480         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7481
7482         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7483         let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7484         let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7485         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7486         get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7487
7488         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7489         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7490         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7491         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7492
7493         let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7494         let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7495         let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7496         let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7497         assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7498         assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7499
7500         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7501
7502         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7503         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7504                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7505                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7506                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7507                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7508                         default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7509                         keys_manager,
7510                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7511                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7512                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7513                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
7514                         channel_monitors,
7515                 }).unwrap()
7516         };
7517         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7518         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7519
7520         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7521         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7523         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7524
7525         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7526         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7527         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7528         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7529         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7530         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7531         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7532         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7533
7534         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7535         nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7536         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7537         let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7538         nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7539         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7540         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7541         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7542
7543         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7544         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7545         pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7546         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7547 }
7548
7549 #[test]
7550 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7551         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7552         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7553
7554         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7555         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7556         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7557         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7558
7559         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7560
7561         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7562         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7563         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7564
7565         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7566         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7567         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7568         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7569         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7570         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7571
7572         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7573         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7574                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7575                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7576                 }
7577         }
7578
7579         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7580         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7581
7582         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7583         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7584         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7585         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7586         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7587
7588         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7589         let penalty_1;
7590         let feerate_1;
7591         {
7592                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7593                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7594                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7595                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7596                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7597                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7598                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7599                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7600                 node_txn.clear();
7601         };
7602
7603         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7604         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7605         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7606         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7607         {
7608                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7609                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7610                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7611                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7612                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7613                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7614                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7615                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7616                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7617                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7618                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7619                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7620                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7621                         node_txn.clear();
7622                 }
7623         }
7624         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7625
7626         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7627         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7628         let penalty_3;
7629         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7630         {
7631                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7632                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7633                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7634                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7635                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7636                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7637                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7638                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7639                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7640                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7641                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7642                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7643                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7644                         node_txn.clear();
7645                 }
7646         }
7647         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7648
7649         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7650         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7651 }
7652
7653 #[test]
7654 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7655         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7656         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7657
7658         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7659         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7660         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7661         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7662         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7663
7664         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7665         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7666         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7667         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7668         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7669                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7670         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7671         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7672         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7673                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7674         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7675
7676         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7677         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7678         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7679
7680         // Revoke local commitment tx
7681         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7682
7683         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7684         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7685         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7686         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7688         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7689         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7690
7691         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7692         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7693         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7694
7695         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7696         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7697         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7698
7699         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7700         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7701         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7702         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7703
7704         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7705         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7706         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7707         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7708         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7709         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7710         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7711         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7712         match events[1] {
7713                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7714                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7715         }
7716         let first;
7717         let feerate_1;
7718         let penalty_txn;
7719         {
7720                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7721                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7722                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7723
7724                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7725                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7726                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7727                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7728                 // future).
7729                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7730                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7731                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7732                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7733                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7734                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7735
7736                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7737                 // available, which we check here:
7738                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7739                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7740                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7741
7742                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7743                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7744
7745                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7746                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7747                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7748                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7749
7750                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7751                 // output, checked above).
7752                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7753                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7754                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7755
7756                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7757                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7758                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7759                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7760                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7761                 node_txn.clear();
7762         }
7763
7764         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7765         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7766         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7767         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7768         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7769         {
7770                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7771                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7772
7773                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7774                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7775                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7776                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7777                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7778                 } else {
7779                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7780                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7781                 }
7782
7783                 node_txn.clear();
7784         };
7785
7786         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7787         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7788         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7789         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7790         let node_txn = {
7791                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7792                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7793
7794                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7795                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7796                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7797                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7798                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7799                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7800                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7801                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7802                 node_txn.clear();
7803                 txn
7804         };
7805         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7806         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7807         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7808         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7809         {
7810                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7811                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7812                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7813                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7814                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7815                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7816                 // up bumped justice generation.
7817                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7818                 node_txn.clear();
7819         }
7820         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7822 }
7823
7824 #[test]
7825 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7826         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7827         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7828
7829         // Create 2 HTLCs
7830         // Provide preimage for one
7831         // Check aggregation
7832
7833         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7834         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7835         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7836         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7837
7838         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7839         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7840         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7841
7842         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7843         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7844         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7845         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7846         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7847
7848         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7849         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7850         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7851         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7852         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7853
7854         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7855         let timeout;
7856         let preimage;
7857         let preimage_bump;
7858         let feerate_timeout;
7859         let feerate_preimage;
7860         {
7861                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7862                 // 9 transactions including:
7863                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7864                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7865                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7866                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
7867                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7868                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7869                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7870                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7871                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7872                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7873                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7874
7875                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7876                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7877                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7878                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7879
7880                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7881                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7882                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7883                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7884
7885                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7886                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7887                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7888                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7889
7890                 node_txn.clear();
7891         };
7892         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7893         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7894
7895         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7896         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7897         {
7898                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7899                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7900                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7901                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7902                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7903                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7904
7905                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7906                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7907                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7908                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7909                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7910
7911                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7912                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7913                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7914                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7915                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7916
7917                 node_txn.clear();
7918         }
7919
7920         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7921         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7922 }
7923
7924 #[test]
7925 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7926         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7927         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7928         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7929         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7930         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7931         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7932         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7933         // implement that).
7934         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7935         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7936         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7937         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7938         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7939
7940         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7941         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7942
7943         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7944
7945         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7946         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7947         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7948
7949         // Must revoke without gaps
7950         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7951         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7952
7953         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7954         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7955                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7956
7957         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7958                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7959         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7961         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7962 }
7963
7964 #[test]
7965 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7966         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7967         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7968
7969         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7970         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7971         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7972         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7973
7974         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7975         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7976         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7977         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7978
7979         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7980         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7981         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7982
7983         // Revoke local commitment tx
7984         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7985
7986         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7987         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7988         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7989         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7990
7991         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7992         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7993         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7994         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7995         let penalty_txn = {
7996                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7997                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7998                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7999                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8000                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8001                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8002                 node_txn.clear();
8003                 penalty_txn
8004         };
8005         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8006         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8007         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8008         {
8009                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8010                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8011                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8012         }
8013 }
8014
8015 #[test]
8016 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8017         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8018         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8019         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8020         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8021         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8022         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8023
8024         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8025
8026         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8027         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8028         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8029         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8030         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8031
8032         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8033         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8034         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8035         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8036
8037         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8038         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8039         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8040         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8041         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8042         match close_ev[0] {
8043                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8044                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8045                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8046                 },
8047                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8048         }
8049 }
8050
8051 #[test]
8052 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8053         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8054         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8055         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8056         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8057
8058         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8059         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8060         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8061
8062         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8063
8064         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8065         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8066         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8067         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8068 }
8069
8070 #[test]
8071 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8072         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8073         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8074         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8075         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8076         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8077         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8078
8079         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8080         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8081         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8082
8083         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8084         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8085         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8086 }
8087
8088 #[test]
8089 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8090         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8091         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8092         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8093         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8094         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8095
8096         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8097         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8098         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8099         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8100
8101         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8102         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8103         route.paths.push(path);
8104         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8105         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8106         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8107         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8108         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8109         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8110         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8111         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8112 }
8113
8114 #[test]
8115 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8116         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8117         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8118         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8119         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8120         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8121
8122         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8123
8124         {
8125                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200);
8126                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8127                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8128                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8129                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8130                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8131                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8132                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8133         }
8134         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8135         // values from previous calls.
8136         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8137         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8138         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8139         match events[0] {
8140                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8141                         match &purpose {
8142                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8143                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8144                                 },
8145                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8146                         }
8147                 },
8148                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8149         }
8150 }
8151
8152 #[test]
8153 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8154         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8155         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8156         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8157         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8158         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8159
8160         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8161
8162         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8163
8164         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8165         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8166         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8167                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8168         } else { panic!(); }
8169         let mut block = {
8170                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8171                 Block {
8172                         header: BlockHeader {
8173                                 version: 0x2000000,
8174                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8175                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8176                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8177                         txdata: vec![],
8178                 }
8179         };
8180         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8181         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8182                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8183         } else { panic!(); }
8184
8185         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8186         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8187         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8188         block.header.time += 1;
8189         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8190         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8191         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8192
8193         {
8194                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8195                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8196                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8197                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8198                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8199                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8200                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8201         }
8202         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8203         // values from previous calls.
8204         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8205         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8206         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8207         match events[0] {
8208                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8209                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8210                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8211                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8212                 },
8213                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8214         }
8215 }
8216
8217 #[test]
8218 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8219         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8220         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8221         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8222         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8223         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8224
8225         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8226
8227         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8228         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8229         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8230         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8231
8232         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8233         // resulting events.
8234         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8235                 () => {
8236                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8237                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8238                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8239                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8240                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8241
8242                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8243                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8244                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8245                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8246                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8247
8248                         // We should fail the payment back
8249                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8250                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8251                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8252                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8253                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8254                                 },
8255                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8256                         }
8257                 }
8258         }
8259
8260         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8261         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8262         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8263
8264         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8265         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8266         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8267         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8268
8269         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8270         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8271         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8272         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8273
8274         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8275         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8276         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8277         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8278 }
8279
8280 #[test]
8281 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8282         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8283         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8284         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8285         //
8286         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8287         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8288         // commitment at same time.
8289
8290         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8291         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8292         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8293         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8294
8295         // Create some initial channel
8296         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8297         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8298
8299         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8300         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8301
8302         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8303         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8304
8305         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8306         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8307         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8308         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8309         let watchtower = {
8310                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8311                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8312                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8313                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8314                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8315                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8316                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8317                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8318                 watchtower
8319         };
8320         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8321         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8322         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8323         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8324         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8325
8326         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8327         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8328         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8329         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8330         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8331         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8332         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8333                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8334                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8335                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8336                 } else { assert!(false); }
8337         } else { assert!(false); };
8338         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8339         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8340         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8341         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8342 }
8343
8344 #[test]
8345 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8346         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8347         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8348         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8349         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8350
8351         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8352         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8353         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8354         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8355
8356         // Create some initial channel
8357         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8358         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8359
8360         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8361         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8362
8363         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8364         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8365
8366         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8367         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8368         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8369         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8370         let watchtower_alice = {
8371                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8372                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8373                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8374                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8375                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8376                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8377                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8378                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8379                 watchtower
8380         };
8381         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8382         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8383         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8384         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8385         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8386
8387         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8388         {
8389                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8390                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8391                 txn.clear();
8392         }
8393
8394         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8395         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8396         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8397         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8398         let watchtower_bob = {
8399                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8400                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8401                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8402                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8403                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8404                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8405                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8406                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8407                 watchtower
8408         };
8409         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8410         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8411
8412         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8413         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8414         {
8415                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8416         }
8417         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8418
8419         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8420         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8421         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8422         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8423                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8424                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8425                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8426                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8427                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8428                 } else { assert!(false); }
8429         } else { assert!(false); };
8430         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8431         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8432
8433         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8434         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8435         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8436
8437         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8438         let bob_state_y;
8439         {
8440                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8441                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8442                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8443                 txn.clear();
8444         };
8445
8446         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8447         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8448         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8449         {
8450                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8451                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8452                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8453                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8454                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8455                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8456         }
8457 }
8458
8459 #[test]
8460 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8461         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8462         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8463         // message).
8464         //
8465         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8466         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8467         //
8468         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8469         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8470         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8471         // before receiving funding_signed.
8472         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8473         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8474         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8475         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8476
8477         // Create an initial channel
8478         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8479         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8480         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8481         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8482         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8483
8484         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8485         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8486
8487         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8488         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8489
8490         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8491         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8492         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8493         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8494         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8495 }
8496
8497 #[test]
8498 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8499         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8500         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8501         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8502         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8503         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8504         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8505
8506         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8507         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8508         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8509         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8510
8511         // Create some initial channels
8512         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8513
8514         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8515         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8516         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8517         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8518         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8519         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8520
8521         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8522         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8523         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8524         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8525         // this test before #653 fix.
8526         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8527         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8528         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8529         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8530         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8531
8532         let htlc_timeout = {
8533                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8534                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8535                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8536                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8537                 node_txn[1].clone()
8538         };
8539
8540         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8541         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8542         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8543         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8544 }
8545
8546 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8547         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8548         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8549         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8550         //
8551         // Steps of the test:
8552         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8553         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8554         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8555         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8556         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8557         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8558         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8559         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8560         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8561         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8562         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8563         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8564
8565         // Create some initial channels
8566         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8567         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8568
8569         // Steps (1) and (2):
8570         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8571         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8572
8573         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8574         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8575         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8576         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8577         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8578         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8579         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8580
8581         // Steps (3) and (4):
8582         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8583         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8584         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8585         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8586         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8587         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8588         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8589         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8590         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8591                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8592                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8593                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8594                 };
8595                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8596                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8597                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8598                 if broadcast_alice {
8599                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8600                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8601                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8602                 }
8603                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8604                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8605         }
8606
8607         // Step (5):
8608         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8609         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8610         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8611         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8612         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8613         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8614         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8615         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8616         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8617         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8618
8619         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8620         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8621         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8622         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8623                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8624                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8625                 match events[0] {
8626                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8627                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8628                         },
8629                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8630                 };
8631         }
8632         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8633         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8634         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8635         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8636
8637         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8638         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8639         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8640                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8641                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8642                         (*msg).clone()
8643                 },
8644                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8645         };
8646         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8647                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8648                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8649                         (*updates).clone()
8650                 },
8651                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8652         };
8653
8654         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8655         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8656         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8657         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8658
8659         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8660         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8661         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8662                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8663                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8664                         (*msg).clone()
8665                 },
8666                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8667         };
8668         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8669         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8670
8671         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8672         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8673         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8674         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8675         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8676                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8677                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8678                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8679                 if broadcast_alice {
8680                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8681                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8682                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8683                 }
8684                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8685                 if broadcast_alice {
8686                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8687                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8688                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8689                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8690                         // broadcasted.
8691                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8692                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8693                 } else {
8694                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8695                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8696                 }
8697         }
8698
8699         // Step (6):
8700         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8701         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8702         {
8703                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8704                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8705                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8706                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8707                 }
8708                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8709                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8710                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8711                 };
8712                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8713                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8714                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8715                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8716                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8717                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8718                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8719                 } else {
8720                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8721                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8722                 }
8723         }
8724 }
8725
8726 #[test]
8727 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8728         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8729         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8730         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8731         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8732 }
8733
8734 #[test]
8735 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8736         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8737         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8738         //
8739         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8740         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8741         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8742         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8743         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8744         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8745         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8746         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8747
8748         // Create an initial channel
8749         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8750         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8751         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8752         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8753
8754         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8755         // that it is rejected.
8756         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8757         {
8758                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8759                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8760                 match events[0] {
8761                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8762                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8763                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8764                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8765                                 // move forward with it.
8766                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8767                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8768                         },
8769                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8770                 }
8771         }
8772
8773         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8774         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8775
8776         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8777         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8778
8779         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8780         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8781         {
8782                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8783                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8784                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8785                 added_monitors.clear();
8786         }
8787         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8788
8789         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8790         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8791
8792         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8793         // temporary one).
8794
8795         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8796         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8797         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8798         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8799         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8800         {
8801                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8802                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8803                 match events[0] {
8804                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8805                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8806                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8807                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8808                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8809                         },
8810                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8811                 }
8812         }
8813
8814         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8815         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8816         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8817         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8818         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8819         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8820
8821         let funding_created = {
8822                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8823                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8824                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8825                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8826         };
8827         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8828         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8829         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8830         // still needs to be cleared here.
8831         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8832
8833         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8834         {
8835                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8836                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8837                 match events[0] {
8838                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8839                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8840                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8841                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8842                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8843                         },
8844                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8845                 }
8846         }
8847
8848         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8849         // everything is functional.
8850         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8851         {
8852                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8853                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8854                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8855                 added_monitors.clear();
8856         }
8857
8858         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8859         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8860         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8861         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8862
8863         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8864         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8865         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8866         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8867 }
8868
8869 #[test]
8870 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8871         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8872         //
8873         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8874         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8875         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8876         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8877         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8878         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8879         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8880
8881         // Create some initial channels
8882         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8883         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8884         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8885
8886         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8887         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8888         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8889
8890         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8891         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8892         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8893
8894         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8895         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8897         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8898         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8899         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8900         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8901         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8902         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8903
8904         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8905         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8906         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8907         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8908         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8909         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8910         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8911         match events[0] {
8912                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8913                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8914                 },
8915                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8916         }
8917         match events[1] {
8918                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8919                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8920                 },
8921                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8922         }
8923         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8924         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8925         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8926         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8927         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8928         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8929
8930         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8931         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8932         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8933 }
8934
8935 #[test]
8936 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8937         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8938         //
8939         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8940         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8941         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8942         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8943         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8944         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8945         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8946         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8947
8948         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8949         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8950         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8951
8952         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8953         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8954                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8955                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8956         }
8957
8958         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8959         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8961
8962         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8964
8965         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8966         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8967
8968         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8969         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8970         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8971
8972         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8973         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8974         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8975         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8976         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8977         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8978         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8979                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8980                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8981                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8982                 } else { panic!(); }
8983         } else { panic!(); }
8984         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8985 }
8986
8987 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8988         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8989         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8990         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8991         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8992         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8993         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8994         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8995         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8996         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8997         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8998         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8999         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9000         // until we learned about an additional block.
9001         //
9002         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9003         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9004         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9005         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9006         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9007         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9008         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9009
9010         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9011         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9012         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9013         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9014         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9015
9016         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9017         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9018         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9019         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9020         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9021         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9022
9023         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9024         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9025                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9026         }
9027         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9028                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9029         if test_height_before_timelock {
9030                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9031                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9032                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9033                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9034         } else {
9035                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9036                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9037                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9038                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9039                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9040                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9041                 // timelock is up).
9042                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9043                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9044
9045                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9046                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9047                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9048                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9049                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9050                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9051                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9052
9053                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9054                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9055                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9056                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9057                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9058                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9059                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9060                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9061                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9062         }
9063 }
9064
9065 #[test]
9066 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9067         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9068         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9069 }
9070
9071 #[test]
9072 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9073         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9074         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9075         // HTLCs.
9076         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9077
9078         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9079         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9080         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9081         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9082         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9083         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9084         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9085         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9086         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9087
9088         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9089         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9090         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9092
9093         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9094         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9095         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9096         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9097         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9098
9099         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9100
9101         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9102         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9103         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9104         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9105
9106         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9107         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9108         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9109         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9110         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9111
9112         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9113         // generated
9114         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9115
9116         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9117         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9118         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9119
9120         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9121         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9122         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9123         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9124         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9125
9126         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9127         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9128         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9129         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9130
9131         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9132         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9133                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9134         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9135         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9136         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9137                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9138         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9139
9140         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9141         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9142                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9143                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9144                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9145                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9146                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9147                         keys_manager,
9148                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9149                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9150                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9151                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9152                         channel_monitors,
9153                 }).unwrap()
9154         };
9155         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9156         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9157
9158         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9159         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9160         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9162
9163         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9164         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9165         // the commitment state.
9166         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9167
9168         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9169
9170         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9171         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9173
9174         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9175         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9176         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9177         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9178         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9179         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9180         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9181
9182         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9183         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9184 }
9185
9186 #[test]
9187 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9188         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9189         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9190         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9191         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9192
9193         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9194         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9195         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9196         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9197         let params = RouteParameters {
9198                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9199                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9200                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9201         };
9202         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9203         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9204
9205         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9206         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9207         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9208         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9209         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9210         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9211         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9212         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9213         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9214 }
9215
9216 #[test]
9217 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9218         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9219         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9220         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9221         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9222
9223         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9224         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9225         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9226         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9227
9228         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9229         let params = RouteParameters {
9230                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9231                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9232                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9233         };
9234         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9235         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9236         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9237         let route = find_route(
9238                 &payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9239                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9240         ).unwrap();
9241
9242         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9243         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9244         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9245         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9246         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9247         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9248         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9249         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9250         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9251 }
9252
9253 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9254 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9255 enum ExposureEvent {
9256         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9257         AtHTLCForward,
9258         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9259         AtHTLCReception,
9260         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9261         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9262 }
9263
9264 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9265         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9266         // policy.
9267         //
9268         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9269         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9270         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9271         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9272         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9273         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9274         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9275         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9276
9277         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9278         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9279         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9280         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9281         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9282         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9283
9284         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9285         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9286         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9287         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9288         if on_holder_tx {
9289                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9290         }
9291         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9292         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9293         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9294
9295         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9296
9297         if on_holder_tx {
9298                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9299                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9300                 }
9301         }
9302
9303         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9304         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9306
9307         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9309
9310         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9311         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9312         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9313
9314         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9315                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9316                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9317                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9318         };
9319         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9320         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9321
9322         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9323         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9324
9325         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9326         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9327
9328         if on_holder_tx {
9329                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9330                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9331                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9332                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9333                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9334                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9335                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9336                         }
9337                 } else {
9338                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9339                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9340                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9341                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9342                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9343                         }
9344                 }
9345         } else {
9346                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9347                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9348                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9349                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9350                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9351                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9352                         }
9353                 } else {
9354                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9355                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9356                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9357                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9358                         }
9359                 }
9360         }
9361
9362         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9363         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9364                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9365                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9366                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9367                 if on_holder_tx {
9368                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9369                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9370                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9371                 } else {
9372                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9373                 }
9374         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9375                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9376                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9377                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9378                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9379                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9380                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9381                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9382                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9383                 if on_holder_tx {
9384                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9385                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9386                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9387                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9388                 } else {
9389                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9390                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9391                 }
9392         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9393                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9394                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9395                 {
9396                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9397                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9398                 }
9399                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9400                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9401                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9402         }
9403
9404         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9405         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9406         added_monitors.clear();
9407 }
9408
9409 #[test]
9410 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9411         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9412         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9413         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9414         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9415         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9416         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9417         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9418         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9419         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9420         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9421         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9422         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9423 }