1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
27 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
30 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
31 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
32 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
33 use util::errors::APIError;
34 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
35 use util::config::UserConfig;
37 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
38 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
42 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
44 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
51 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
52 use core::default::Default;
53 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
55 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
56 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
59 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
60 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
61 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
62 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
63 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
64 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
66 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
68 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
69 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
70 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
72 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
73 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
75 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
76 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
78 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
79 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
80 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
81 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
82 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
83 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
84 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
85 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
87 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
88 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
90 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
92 } else { assert!(false); }
95 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
96 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
98 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
99 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
101 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
103 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
105 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
107 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
109 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
111 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
113 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
116 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
117 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
118 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
119 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
120 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
121 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
122 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
123 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
124 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
126 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
127 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
128 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
129 let opt_anchors = false;
130 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
131 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
133 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
134 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
135 if !send_from_initiator {
136 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
137 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
139 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
141 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
142 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
143 if send_from_initiator {
144 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
145 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
147 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
150 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
151 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
152 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
155 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
156 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
157 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
159 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
160 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
161 if send_from_initiator {
162 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
163 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
164 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
165 // well as an additional HTLC.
166 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
168 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
173 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
174 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
175 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
179 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
183 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
184 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
187 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
191 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
192 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
193 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
194 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
195 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
196 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
197 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
198 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
199 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
200 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
202 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
204 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
206 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
208 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
211 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
214 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
215 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
216 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
217 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
218 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
223 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
225 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
226 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
227 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
230 let payment_event = {
231 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
232 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
233 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
235 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
236 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
238 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
239 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
240 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
241 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
242 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
245 // deliver(1), generate (3):
246 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
247 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
248 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
251 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
252 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
253 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
254 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
255 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
256 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
257 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
260 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
261 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
262 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
263 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
264 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
265 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
266 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
269 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
270 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
271 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
274 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
275 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
278 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
281 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
282 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
284 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
285 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
288 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
293 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
294 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
295 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
299 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
300 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
303 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
305 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
307 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
310 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
313 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
314 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
315 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
316 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
319 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
322 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
324 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
325 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
326 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
329 let payment_event = {
330 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
331 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
332 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
334 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
335 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
337 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
338 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
339 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
340 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
341 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
344 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
347 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
351 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
352 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
353 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
354 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
355 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
356 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
359 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
360 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
361 // update_fee (never committed) ->
363 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
364 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
365 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
366 // <- (1) RAA delivered
367 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
368 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
369 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
370 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
372 // B should send no response here
373 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
374 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
377 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
380 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
381 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
382 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
384 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
387 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
388 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
389 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
390 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
391 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
393 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
396 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
397 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
398 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
399 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
402 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
405 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
406 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
408 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
409 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
410 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
412 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
413 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
414 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
415 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
418 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
420 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
422 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
424 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
425 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
426 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
428 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
429 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
430 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
431 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
432 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
433 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
434 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
436 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
437 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
438 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
440 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
442 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
443 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
447 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
448 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
451 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
452 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
455 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
456 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
457 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
460 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
461 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
465 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
466 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
467 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
468 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
471 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
472 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
473 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
474 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
476 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
478 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
481 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
482 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
485 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
486 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
487 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
489 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
490 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
491 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
493 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
494 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
496 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
498 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
499 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
501 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
503 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
504 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
506 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
507 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
508 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
509 added_monitors.clear();
511 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
513 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
514 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
516 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
517 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
518 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
519 added_monitors.clear();
522 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
523 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
525 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
526 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
528 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
529 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
530 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
531 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
535 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
536 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
537 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
538 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
539 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
540 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
541 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
542 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
543 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
544 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
545 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
546 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
547 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
548 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
549 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
550 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
551 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
552 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
553 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
557 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
558 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
559 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
560 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
561 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
562 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
565 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
568 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
571 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
572 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
573 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
574 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
575 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
577 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
579 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
581 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
582 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
585 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
586 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
589 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
590 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
591 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
594 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
595 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
600 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
601 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
602 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
603 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
604 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
605 let channel_value = 5000;
607 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
608 let channel_id = chan.2;
609 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
610 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
612 let opt_anchors = false;
614 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
615 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
616 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
618 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
619 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
621 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
622 *feerate_lock = feerate;
624 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
626 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
628 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
630 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
632 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
634 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
636 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
637 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
638 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
639 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
640 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
641 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
645 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
646 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
649 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
650 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
653 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
655 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
656 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
657 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
658 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
659 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
660 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
661 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
662 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
663 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
665 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
666 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
667 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
668 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
669 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
670 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
671 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
672 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
675 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
676 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
677 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
680 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
681 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
682 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
683 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
684 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
685 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
687 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
688 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
689 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
690 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
692 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
694 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
697 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
700 htlc_signatures: res.1
703 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
705 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
708 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
710 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
711 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
712 //Should produce and error.
713 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
714 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
716 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
717 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
721 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
722 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
723 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
724 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
725 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
726 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
729 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
732 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
735 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
738 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
739 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
740 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
741 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
742 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
746 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
747 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
748 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
751 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
753 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
754 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
756 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
757 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
758 added_monitors.clear();
760 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
761 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
762 // node[1] has nothing to do
764 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
765 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
768 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
769 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
770 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
772 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
774 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
776 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
777 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
778 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
779 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
780 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
781 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
783 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
784 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
786 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
788 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
790 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
792 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
794 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
795 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
797 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
799 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
801 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
803 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
804 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
806 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
807 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
810 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
812 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
813 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
814 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
815 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
816 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
820 fn test_update_fee() {
821 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
822 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
823 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
824 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
825 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
826 let channel_id = chan.2;
829 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
830 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
831 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
832 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
833 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
834 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
835 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
836 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
837 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
838 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
839 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
842 // Create and deliver (1)...
845 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
846 feerate = *feerate_lock;
847 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
849 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
852 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
853 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
854 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
855 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
856 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
858 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
860 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
862 // Generate (2) and (3):
863 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
864 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
868 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
869 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
872 // Create and deliver (4)...
874 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
875 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
877 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
879 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
880 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
881 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
882 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
883 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
885 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
888 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
889 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
892 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
893 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
895 // Handle (3), creating (6):
896 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
898 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
899 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
902 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
903 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
906 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
907 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
908 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
909 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
910 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
911 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
912 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
913 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
917 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
919 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
920 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
922 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
924 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
926 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
927 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
928 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
929 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
930 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
934 fn fake_network_test() {
935 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
936 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
937 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
938 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
939 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
940 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
942 // Create some initial channels
943 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
944 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
945 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
947 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
948 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
949 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
950 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
951 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
953 // Send some more payments
954 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
955 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
956 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
958 // Test failure packets
959 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
960 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
962 // Add a new channel that skips 3
963 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
965 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
966 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
967 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
968 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
969 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
970 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
971 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
973 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
974 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
976 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
977 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
978 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
979 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
981 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
984 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
985 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
986 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
987 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
989 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
992 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
993 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
994 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
995 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
997 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
999 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1000 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1001 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1003 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1004 hops.push(RouteHop {
1005 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1006 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1007 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1008 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1010 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1012 hops.push(RouteHop {
1013 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1014 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1015 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1016 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1018 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1020 hops.push(RouteHop {
1021 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1022 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1023 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1024 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1026 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1028 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1029 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1030 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1032 // Claim the rebalances...
1033 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1034 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1036 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1037 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1039 // Send some payments across both channels
1040 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1041 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1042 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1045 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1046 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1047 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1048 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1050 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1052 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1053 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1054 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1056 // Close down the channels...
1057 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1058 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1059 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1060 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1061 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1062 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1063 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1064 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1065 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1066 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1067 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1068 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1069 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1070 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1071 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1075 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1076 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1077 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1078 // commitment dance rounds.
1079 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1080 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1081 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1082 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1083 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1084 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1086 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1087 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1088 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1089 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1090 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1094 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1095 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1096 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1097 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1099 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1100 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1102 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1104 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1105 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1106 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1107 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1110 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1111 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1113 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1117 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1118 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1119 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1120 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1122 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1123 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1124 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1125 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1126 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1127 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1130 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1131 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1132 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1134 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1136 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1137 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1138 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1141 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1142 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1144 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1146 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1148 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1150 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1151 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1153 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1155 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1157 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1159 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1161 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1163 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1165 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1168 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1170 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1171 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1172 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1174 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1175 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1177 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1181 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1182 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1185 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1189 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1190 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1191 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1192 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1193 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1194 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1195 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1197 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1198 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1199 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1200 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1201 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1202 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1204 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1206 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1207 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1209 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1210 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1212 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1213 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1214 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1218 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1219 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1220 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1221 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1222 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1223 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1224 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1225 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1227 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1230 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1232 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1234 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1235 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1236 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1238 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1239 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1242 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1243 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1245 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1246 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1247 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1248 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1249 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1250 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1251 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1254 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1256 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1258 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1259 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1261 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1262 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1263 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1264 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1265 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1266 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1267 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1268 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1270 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1271 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1272 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1274 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1275 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1276 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1277 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1278 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1279 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1280 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1281 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1283 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1284 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1287 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1288 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1289 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1290 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1292 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1293 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1294 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1295 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1296 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1297 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1299 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1305 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1306 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1307 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1308 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1309 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1310 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1312 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1313 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1315 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1316 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1317 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1318 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1319 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1321 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1323 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1324 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1325 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1328 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1330 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1331 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1333 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1337 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1338 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1339 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1340 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1341 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1342 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1344 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1345 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1346 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1347 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1349 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1351 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1352 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1353 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1354 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1357 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1358 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1359 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1360 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1363 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1365 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1366 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1367 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1369 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1371 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1373 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1374 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1375 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1376 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1377 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1378 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1379 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1380 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1382 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1383 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1384 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1385 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1386 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1388 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1389 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1390 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1391 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1392 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1393 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1394 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1395 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1398 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1399 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1400 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1402 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1403 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1404 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1406 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1408 amount_msat: 3460001,
1409 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1411 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1414 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1417 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1418 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1419 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1420 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1424 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1425 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1427 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1428 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1430 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1433 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1436 htlc_signatures: res.1
1439 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1440 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1441 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1443 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1444 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1446 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1447 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1449 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1451 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1452 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1453 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1455 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1456 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1457 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1459 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1461 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1462 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1468 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1469 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1470 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1471 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1472 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1474 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1475 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1476 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1477 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1479 let opt_anchors = false;
1481 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1482 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1483 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1485 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1487 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1488 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1489 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1492 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1493 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1494 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1495 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1496 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1497 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1501 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1502 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1503 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1504 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1505 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1506 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1508 let opt_anchors = false;
1510 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1511 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1512 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1513 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1514 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1515 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1516 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1518 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1519 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1520 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1523 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1524 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1525 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1526 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1527 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1528 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1529 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1530 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1531 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1533 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1534 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1535 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1536 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1537 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1540 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1541 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1542 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1543 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1544 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1545 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1547 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1551 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1552 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1553 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1554 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1555 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1557 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1558 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1559 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1561 let opt_anchors = false;
1563 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1564 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1565 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1566 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1567 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1568 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1569 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1571 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1572 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1573 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1574 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1575 // commitment transaction fee.
1576 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1578 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1579 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1580 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1583 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1584 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1585 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1586 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1590 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1591 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1592 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1593 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1594 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1595 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1596 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1597 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1599 let opt_anchors = false;
1601 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1603 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1604 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1605 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1606 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1608 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1609 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1610 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1611 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1612 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1613 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1614 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1616 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1617 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1618 match msg_events[0] {
1619 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1620 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1627 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1628 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1629 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1630 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1631 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1632 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1633 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1634 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1636 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1637 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1638 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1639 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1640 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1641 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1643 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1644 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1645 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1646 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1647 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1648 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1650 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1651 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1652 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1653 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1657 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1658 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1659 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1660 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1661 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1662 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1663 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1666 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1667 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1668 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1669 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1671 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1672 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1673 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1674 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1676 // Add a pending HTLC.
1677 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1678 let payment_event_1 = {
1679 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1682 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1683 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1684 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1686 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1688 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1689 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1690 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1691 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1692 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1694 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1695 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1696 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1697 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1698 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1699 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1700 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1701 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1704 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1705 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1706 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1707 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1710 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1711 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1712 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1713 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1714 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1715 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1717 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1721 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1722 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1723 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1724 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1725 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1726 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1727 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1728 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1729 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1730 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1732 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1733 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1734 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1736 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1737 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1740 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1741 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1745 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1746 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1747 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1748 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1749 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1750 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1751 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1752 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1753 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1754 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1755 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1757 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1758 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1760 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1761 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1763 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1765 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1766 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1767 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1768 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1773 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1774 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1775 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1776 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1778 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1780 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1782 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1783 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1784 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1785 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1786 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1787 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1788 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1791 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1792 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1794 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1795 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1796 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1797 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1798 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1799 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1800 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1803 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1805 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1806 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1807 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1808 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1809 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1812 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1813 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1814 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1815 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1816 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1819 // adding pending output.
1820 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1821 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1822 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1823 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1824 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1825 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1826 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1827 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1828 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1830 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1831 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1832 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1834 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1835 let payment_event_1 = {
1836 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1839 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1840 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1841 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1843 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1845 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1846 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1848 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1849 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1850 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1851 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1854 // split the rest to test holding cell
1855 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1856 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1857 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1858 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1860 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1861 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1864 // now see if they go through on both sides
1865 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1866 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1867 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1869 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1870 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1872 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1874 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1875 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1876 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1877 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1878 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1881 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1882 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1883 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1885 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1886 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1888 // flush the pending htlc
1889 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1890 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1893 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1894 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1896 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1898 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1899 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1900 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1903 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1904 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1907 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1909 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1910 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1911 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1913 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1914 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1916 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1917 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1918 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1919 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1920 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1921 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1923 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1924 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1925 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1926 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1928 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1929 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1931 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1932 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1934 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1935 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1936 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1938 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1939 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1940 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1942 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1948 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1949 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1950 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1952 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1953 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1954 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1956 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1959 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1962 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1963 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1964 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1966 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1967 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1968 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1970 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1971 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1972 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1973 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1974 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1976 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1977 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1981 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1982 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1983 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1984 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1985 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1986 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1987 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1988 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1990 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1991 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1992 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1993 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1994 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1995 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1996 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
1997 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1999 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2000 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2001 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2002 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2003 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2004 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2005 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2006 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2007 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2008 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2010 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2011 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2012 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2013 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2015 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2016 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2018 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2020 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2021 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2022 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2025 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2026 // initial fulfill/CS.
2027 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2029 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2031 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2032 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2033 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2035 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2037 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2038 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2040 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2041 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2043 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2044 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2046 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2047 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2049 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2051 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2053 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2055 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2057 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2059 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2061 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2062 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2063 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2064 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2065 // on-chain as necessary).
2066 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2067 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2069 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2070 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2072 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2074 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2076 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2077 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2079 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2080 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2081 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2083 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2084 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2086 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2087 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2088 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2090 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2092 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2093 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2094 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2097 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2098 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2100 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2102 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2104 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2106 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2108 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2111 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2113 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2114 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2116 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2118 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2120 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2123 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2124 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2126 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2127 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2131 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2132 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2133 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2134 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2135 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2136 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2137 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2139 // Create some initial channels
2140 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2141 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2142 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2143 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2145 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2146 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2147 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2148 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2149 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2150 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2152 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2153 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2154 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2155 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2156 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2158 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2159 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2161 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2163 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2164 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2165 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2167 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2169 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2170 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2171 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2172 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2173 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2175 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2176 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2178 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2179 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2180 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2181 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2184 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2185 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2186 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2187 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2189 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2191 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2192 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2193 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2194 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2195 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2197 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2198 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2200 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2201 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2203 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2206 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2207 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2208 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2209 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2211 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2217 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2218 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2219 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2221 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2222 let node2_commitment_txid;
2224 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2225 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2226 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2227 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2229 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2230 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2231 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2233 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2235 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2236 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2237 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2238 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2239 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2241 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2242 // confusing us in the following tests.
2243 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2245 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2246 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2247 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2250 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2251 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2252 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2253 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2254 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2255 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2261 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2262 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2268 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2270 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2271 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2272 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2278 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2280 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2281 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2283 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2284 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2285 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2286 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2287 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2290 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2293 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2294 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2296 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2299 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2301 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2302 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2303 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2305 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2306 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2307 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2308 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2310 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2311 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2312 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2316 fn test_justice_tx() {
2317 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2318 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2319 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2320 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2321 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2322 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2323 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2324 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2325 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2326 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2327 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2328 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2329 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2330 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2331 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2332 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2333 // Create some new channels:
2334 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2336 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2337 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2338 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2339 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2340 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2341 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2342 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2343 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2344 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2345 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2346 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2347 // Revoke the old state
2348 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2351 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2353 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2354 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2355 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2357 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2358 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2359 node_txn.truncate(1);
2361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2362 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2363 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2365 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2366 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2367 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2368 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2370 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2371 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2372 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2373 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2375 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2377 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2378 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2380 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2381 // Create some new channels:
2382 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2384 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2388 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2389 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2390 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2391 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2392 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2393 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2394 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2395 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2396 // Revoke the old state
2397 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2399 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2401 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2402 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2403 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2405 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2406 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2409 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2411 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2412 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2413 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2415 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2416 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2417 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2419 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2420 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2421 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2425 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2426 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2427 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2428 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2429 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2430 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2431 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2432 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2433 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2434 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2435 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2436 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2437 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2438 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2439 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2441 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2442 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2444 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2445 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2446 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2448 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2449 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2451 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2452 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2453 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2455 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2459 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2460 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2461 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2462 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2463 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2464 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2465 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2467 // Create some new channel:
2468 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2470 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2471 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2472 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2473 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2474 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2476 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2477 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2478 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2479 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2480 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2481 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2482 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2483 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2484 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2486 //Revoke the old state
2487 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2490 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2492 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2493 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2495 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2496 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2497 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2499 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2500 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2502 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2503 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2505 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2506 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2507 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2508 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2509 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2510 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2511 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2512 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2514 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2515 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2516 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2518 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2519 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2520 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2524 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2525 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2526 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2527 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2528 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2529 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2530 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2532 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2534 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2535 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2536 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2537 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2538 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2539 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2541 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2542 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2544 //Revoke the old state
2545 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2548 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2550 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2552 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2553 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2554 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2556 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2557 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2560 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2561 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2563 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2564 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2565 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2566 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2567 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2568 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2570 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2571 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2572 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2573 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2574 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2575 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2576 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2578 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2579 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2580 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2581 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2583 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2584 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2585 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2587 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2588 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2589 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2590 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2591 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2592 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2593 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2594 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2596 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2597 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2598 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2602 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2603 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2604 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2605 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2606 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2607 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2608 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2609 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2610 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2612 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2613 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2614 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2615 // PaymentSent event).
2617 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2618 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2619 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2620 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2622 // Create some initial channels
2623 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2624 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2626 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2627 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2628 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2629 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2630 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2632 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2633 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2634 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2636 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2637 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2639 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2640 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2641 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2642 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2643 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2644 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2645 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2646 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2647 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2648 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2649 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2650 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2651 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2653 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2654 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2656 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2657 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2658 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2659 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2660 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2661 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2662 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2663 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2664 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2665 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2666 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2667 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2668 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2669 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2671 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2672 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2673 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2674 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2676 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2677 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2678 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2679 added_monitors.clear();
2681 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2682 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2683 match forwarded_events[0] {
2684 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2685 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2687 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2688 match forwarded_events[1] {
2689 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2690 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2691 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2692 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2693 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2697 match forwarded_events[2] {
2698 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2699 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2700 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2701 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2702 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2706 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2708 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2709 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2710 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2711 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2712 added_monitors.clear();
2714 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2716 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2717 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2720 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2721 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2725 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2726 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2727 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2728 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2729 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2730 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2732 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2734 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2735 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2736 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2737 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2738 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2739 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2740 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2741 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2742 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2743 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2745 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2746 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2747 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2748 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2750 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2751 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2752 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2753 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2755 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2756 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2760 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2761 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2762 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2763 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2765 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2766 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2767 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2768 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2769 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2770 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2772 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2773 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2774 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2775 let commitment_spend =
2776 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2777 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2778 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2779 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2782 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2783 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2784 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2788 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2789 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2790 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2791 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2792 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2793 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2794 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2795 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2796 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2797 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2798 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2799 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2801 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2802 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2803 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2804 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2805 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2807 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2808 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2809 let mut first_claimed = false;
2810 for event in events {
2812 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2813 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2814 assert!(!first_claimed);
2815 first_claimed = true;
2817 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2818 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2821 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2822 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2823 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2826 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2829 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2830 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2831 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2832 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2833 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2834 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2836 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2838 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2839 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2840 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2841 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2842 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2843 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2844 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2846 // Create some intial channels
2847 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2848 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2850 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2851 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2852 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2854 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2856 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2857 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2858 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2859 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2861 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2864 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2865 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2867 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2868 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2869 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2870 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2871 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2872 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2874 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2876 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2877 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2879 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2880 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2881 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2882 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2883 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2885 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2886 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2887 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2888 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2889 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2892 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2893 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2894 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2895 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2897 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2898 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2900 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2901 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2902 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2903 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2905 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2909 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2911 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2913 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2914 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2915 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2916 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2919 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2921 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2922 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2923 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2924 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2925 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2926 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2927 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2929 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2933 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2935 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2936 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2938 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2939 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2940 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2941 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2942 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2943 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2948 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2949 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2950 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2952 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2953 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2955 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2957 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2958 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2959 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2960 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2961 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2962 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2963 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2967 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2968 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2969 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2970 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2974 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2975 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2976 // and fail backward accordingly.
2978 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2979 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2980 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2981 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2983 // Create some initial channels
2984 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2985 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2987 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2988 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2989 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2990 // Revoke the old state
2991 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2993 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2995 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2996 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2997 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2999 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3001 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3003 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3004 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3006 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3007 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3008 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3009 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3010 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3011 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3013 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3014 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3015 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3017 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3021 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3022 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3023 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3024 // commitment transaction anymore.
3025 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3026 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3027 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3028 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3029 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3030 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3032 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3033 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3034 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3035 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3036 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3037 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3038 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3039 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3040 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3042 // Create some initial channels
3043 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3044 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3046 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3047 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3048 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3049 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3050 // Revoke the old state
3051 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3053 let value = if use_dust {
3054 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3055 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3056 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3059 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3060 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3061 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3063 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3064 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3066 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3067 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3068 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3069 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3070 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3071 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3072 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3073 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3074 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3076 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3077 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3079 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3080 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3081 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3082 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3083 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3084 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3085 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3086 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3088 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3089 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3090 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3093 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3094 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3096 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3097 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3098 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3099 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3100 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3101 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3102 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3103 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3104 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3105 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3107 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3108 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3109 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3112 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3113 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3114 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3115 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3116 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3117 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3121 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3122 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3123 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3125 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3126 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3128 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3129 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3131 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3132 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3135 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3136 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3138 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3140 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3141 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3143 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3144 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3146 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3147 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3150 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3151 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3153 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3155 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3157 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3158 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3160 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3163 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3167 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3170 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3171 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3172 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3173 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3174 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3176 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3177 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3178 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3179 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3181 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3185 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3186 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3187 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3188 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3189 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3190 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3192 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3195 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3196 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3197 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3198 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3199 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3200 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3201 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3203 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3204 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3205 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3207 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3209 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3210 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3212 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3213 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3214 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3215 // that we should update our routing table for.
3216 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3217 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3223 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3224 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3225 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3227 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3230 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3231 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3232 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3234 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3237 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3240 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3241 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3242 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3246 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3247 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3248 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3249 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3250 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3254 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3255 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3256 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3257 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3258 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3262 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3263 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3264 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3265 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3266 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3267 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3269 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3271 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3272 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3275 let payment_event = {
3276 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3277 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3278 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3280 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3281 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3284 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3285 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3287 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3290 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3293 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3295 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3297 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3298 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3299 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3300 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3301 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3302 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3304 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3305 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3311 onion_routing_packet,
3313 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3315 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3316 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3317 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3319 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3320 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3322 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3325 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3326 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3328 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3330 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3335 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3336 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3337 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3338 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3339 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3340 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3341 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3342 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3344 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3345 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3346 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3347 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3349 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3351 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3352 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3353 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3355 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3356 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3357 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3359 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3361 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3362 // registering new transactions
3363 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3364 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3368 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3369 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3370 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3371 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3372 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3373 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3374 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3375 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3377 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3379 let mut payment_event = {
3380 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3383 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3384 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3385 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3388 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3389 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3391 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3393 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3394 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3395 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3396 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3399 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3400 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3402 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3404 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3405 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3406 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3408 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3409 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3411 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3413 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3414 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3415 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3416 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3417 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3421 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3423 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3424 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3426 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3428 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3430 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3431 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3433 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3434 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3435 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3436 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3437 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3438 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3439 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3441 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3445 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3446 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3447 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3448 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3449 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3451 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3452 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3453 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3454 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3455 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3457 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3459 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3461 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3462 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3463 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3465 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3466 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3468 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3469 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3473 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3474 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3475 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3476 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3477 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3478 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3479 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3480 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3482 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3483 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3484 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3486 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3487 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3488 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3489 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3491 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3492 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3493 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3495 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3496 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3497 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3498 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3500 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3501 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3503 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3504 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3506 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3508 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3509 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3511 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3512 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3513 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3515 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3518 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3519 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3520 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3522 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3525 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3526 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3530 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3531 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3534 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3535 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3536 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3537 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3538 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3539 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3541 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3542 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3543 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3544 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3545 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3546 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3547 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3549 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3552 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3554 let payment_event = {
3555 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3558 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3559 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3560 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3562 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3564 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3565 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3567 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3568 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3569 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3571 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3573 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3574 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3575 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3578 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3579 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3580 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3581 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3584 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3585 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3586 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3594 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3595 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3596 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3597 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3598 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3599 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3601 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3602 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3603 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3605 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3606 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3608 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3609 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3610 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3611 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3612 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3613 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3614 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3615 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3616 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3617 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3618 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3619 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3620 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3621 // Everything was delivered...
3622 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3625 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3626 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3628 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3629 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3632 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3633 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3634 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3636 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3638 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3639 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3641 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3642 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3643 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3645 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3646 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3647 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3649 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3652 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3655 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3658 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3659 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3660 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3661 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3662 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3663 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3664 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3665 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3666 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3667 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3668 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3670 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3673 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3674 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3676 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3677 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3679 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3680 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3681 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3683 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3686 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3687 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3689 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3691 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3692 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3693 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3696 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3697 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3698 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3699 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3702 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3703 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3704 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3712 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3713 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3714 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3715 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3716 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3717 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3719 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3721 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3722 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3723 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3724 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3725 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3726 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3727 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3728 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3729 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3730 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3731 // Everything was delivered...
3732 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3735 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3736 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3739 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3740 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3741 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3743 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3744 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3747 // Channel should still work fine...
3748 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3749 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3750 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3754 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3755 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3756 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3757 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3758 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3762 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3763 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3764 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3765 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3766 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3770 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3771 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3772 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3773 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3774 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3775 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3776 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3777 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3778 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3779 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3781 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3782 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3784 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3785 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3786 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3788 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3790 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3791 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3793 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3794 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3795 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3797 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3798 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3799 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3800 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3802 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a funding_locked, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3803 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3804 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3805 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3806 let as_funding_locked = match events_3[0] {
3807 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3808 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3811 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3814 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s funding_locked on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3815 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3816 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3817 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3818 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3820 let bs_funding_locked = match events_4[0] {
3821 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3822 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3823 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3828 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3829 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3830 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3836 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3837 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3839 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3842 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s funding_locked, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3843 // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3844 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3845 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3846 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3848 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3849 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3851 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3854 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s funding_locked, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3855 // announcement_signatures.
3856 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_locked);
3857 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3858 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3859 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3860 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3861 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3864 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3867 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3868 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3870 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3871 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3872 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3873 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3874 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3875 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3877 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3880 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3881 // same channel_announcement.
3882 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3883 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3884 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3885 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3886 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3887 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3890 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3893 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3894 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3895 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3896 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3898 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3899 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3900 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3902 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3903 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3904 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3906 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3907 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3908 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3910 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3911 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3912 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3913 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3914 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3915 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3916 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3917 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3919 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3920 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3921 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3922 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3923 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3924 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3926 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3927 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3928 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3929 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3933 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3934 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3936 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3937 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3940 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3942 // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3943 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3944 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3945 let mut found_announcement = false;
3946 for event in msgs.iter() {
3948 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3949 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3951 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3952 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3955 assert!(found_announcement);
3959 fn test_funding_locked_without_best_block_updated() {
3960 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3961 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3962 // generate a funding_locked until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3963 // funding_locked immediately instead.
3964 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3965 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3966 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3967 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3968 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3970 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3972 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3973 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3974 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3975 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3976 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3977 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3979 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a funding_locked after the transactions_confirmed
3980 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3981 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3985 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3986 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3987 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3988 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3989 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3990 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3991 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3992 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3994 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3996 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3997 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3998 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4001 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4002 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4004 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4005 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4008 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
4009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4011 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4012 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4014 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4015 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4016 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4017 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4018 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4019 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4020 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4022 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4023 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4024 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4026 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4027 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4028 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4030 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4033 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4034 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4035 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4038 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4041 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4042 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4044 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4045 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4046 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4047 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4048 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4049 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4051 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4052 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4053 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4054 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4056 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4057 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4059 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4060 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4062 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4064 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4065 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4066 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4067 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4068 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4069 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4070 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4071 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4072 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4075 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4076 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4077 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4078 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4079 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4080 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4081 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4084 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4085 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4086 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4087 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4088 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4089 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4090 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4093 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4094 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4095 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4098 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4099 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4100 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4103 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4104 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4107 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4109 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4110 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4112 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4113 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4115 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4116 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4117 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4119 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4122 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4125 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4126 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4129 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4130 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4133 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4134 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4135 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4136 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4137 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4138 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4139 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4141 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4143 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4144 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4145 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4146 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4147 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4148 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4149 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4151 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4152 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4153 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4154 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4155 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4158 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4161 let mut block = Block {
4162 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4165 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4166 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4167 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4168 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4169 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4170 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4171 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4174 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4177 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4178 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4179 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4180 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4181 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4183 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4184 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4185 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4186 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4187 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4188 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4192 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4193 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4194 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4197 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4198 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4199 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4200 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4201 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4202 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4203 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4204 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4206 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4207 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4208 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4209 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4211 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4212 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4214 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4216 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4219 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4220 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4221 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4222 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4225 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4226 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4227 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4228 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4232 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4233 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4234 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4235 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4238 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4240 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4241 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4242 match fail_commit[0] {
4243 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4244 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4245 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4247 _ => unreachable!(),
4249 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4251 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4252 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4253 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4254 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4255 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4256 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4257 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4258 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4263 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4264 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4265 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4269 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4270 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4271 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4272 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4273 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4274 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4275 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4276 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4277 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4278 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4280 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4282 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4284 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4285 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4286 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4287 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4289 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4290 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4291 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4292 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4293 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4294 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4295 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4296 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4297 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4298 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4300 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4301 let config = UserConfig::default();
4302 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4303 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4304 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4305 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4306 default_config: config,
4308 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4309 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4310 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4315 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4316 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4318 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4319 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4320 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4323 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4324 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4325 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4326 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4328 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4329 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4330 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4331 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4333 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4334 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4335 for node in nodes.iter() {
4336 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4337 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4338 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4341 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4345 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4346 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4347 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4348 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4349 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4350 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4351 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4352 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4353 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4354 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4355 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4357 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4358 let channel_value = 100000;
4359 let push_msat = 10001;
4360 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4361 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4362 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4363 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4364 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4365 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4366 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4368 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4370 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4371 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4373 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4375 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4376 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4377 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4378 added_monitors.clear();
4381 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4382 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4384 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4385 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4386 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4387 added_monitors.clear();
4389 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4394 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4395 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4396 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4397 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4399 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4400 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4401 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4402 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4403 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4404 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4405 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4406 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4407 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4408 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4410 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4411 let config = UserConfig::default();
4412 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4413 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4414 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4415 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4416 default_config: config,
4418 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4419 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4420 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4425 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4426 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4428 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4430 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4431 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4433 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4434 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4435 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4436 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4437 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4439 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4440 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4443 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4444 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4445 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4446 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4448 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4449 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4450 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4451 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4453 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4454 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4455 for node in nodes.iter() {
4456 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4457 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4458 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4461 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4465 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4466 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4467 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4468 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4469 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4470 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4471 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4472 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4473 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4474 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4475 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4477 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4478 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4480 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4482 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4483 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4484 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4486 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4487 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4488 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4489 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4490 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4491 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4492 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4493 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4494 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4495 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4497 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4498 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4499 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4500 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4501 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4502 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4504 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4505 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4506 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4511 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4512 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4514 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4515 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4518 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4520 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4521 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4525 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4526 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4527 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4528 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4529 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4530 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4531 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4532 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4533 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4534 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4535 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4536 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4537 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4538 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4540 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4541 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4542 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4543 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4544 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4547 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4549 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4550 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4552 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4553 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4554 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4555 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4557 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4559 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4560 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4561 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4562 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4563 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4566 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4567 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4568 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4569 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4570 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4571 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4574 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4575 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4576 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4577 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4578 assert!(read.is_empty());
4579 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4582 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4583 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4584 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4585 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4586 assert!(read.is_empty());
4587 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4590 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4591 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4592 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4593 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4595 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4596 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4597 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4599 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4601 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4604 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4605 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4606 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4607 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4609 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4610 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4611 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4613 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4615 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4616 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4618 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4619 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4620 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4621 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4622 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4625 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4626 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4629 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4630 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4632 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4633 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4634 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4635 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4636 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4638 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4639 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4640 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4641 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4642 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4643 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4644 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4646 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4647 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4649 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4654 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4655 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4657 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4658 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4659 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4660 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4661 for event in events.drain(..) {
4663 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4664 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4665 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4666 all_outputs.push(outp);
4669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4672 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4673 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4683 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4684 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4685 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4686 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4687 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4688 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4690 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4691 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4692 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4694 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4695 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4696 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4697 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4698 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4700 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4701 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4703 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4704 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4705 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4706 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4707 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4711 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4712 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4713 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4714 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4715 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4716 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4717 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4719 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4720 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4721 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4723 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4725 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4726 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4727 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4728 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4730 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4731 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4733 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4734 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4736 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4737 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4738 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4742 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4743 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4744 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4746 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4747 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4748 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4749 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4751 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4752 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4753 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4754 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4755 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4757 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4758 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4759 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4761 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4763 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4764 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4765 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4767 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4768 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4769 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4770 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4771 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4775 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4776 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4777 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4778 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4779 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4781 // Create some initial channels
4782 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4784 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4786 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4787 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4788 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4790 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4791 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4793 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4795 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4797 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4798 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4801 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4802 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4805 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4806 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4807 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4808 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4809 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4810 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4811 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4813 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4814 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4815 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4817 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4818 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4819 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4823 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4824 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4825 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4826 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4827 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4829 // Create some initial channels
4830 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4832 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4833 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4835 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4837 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4838 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4839 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4841 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4842 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4844 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4846 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4847 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4849 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4851 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4852 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4853 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4854 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4855 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4856 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4858 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4859 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4860 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4861 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4863 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4864 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4865 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4866 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4867 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4871 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4872 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4873 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4874 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4875 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4877 // Create some initial channels
4878 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4880 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4881 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4882 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4883 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4885 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4887 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4888 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4890 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4892 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4893 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4894 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4895 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4897 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4898 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4900 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4901 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4902 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4906 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4907 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4908 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4909 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4910 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4911 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4913 // Create some initial channels
4914 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4916 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4917 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4918 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4919 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4921 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4923 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4924 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4925 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4927 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4928 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4930 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4931 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4932 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4933 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4934 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4935 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4936 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4938 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4939 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4940 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4941 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4943 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4945 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4946 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4947 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4948 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4949 // transactions next...
4950 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4951 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4953 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4954 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4955 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4956 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4958 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4959 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4962 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4963 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4965 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4966 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4968 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4969 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4970 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4971 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4972 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4976 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4977 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4978 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4979 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4980 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4981 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4983 // Create some initial channels
4984 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4986 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4987 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4988 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4989 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4991 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4992 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4994 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4996 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4997 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4998 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5000 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5001 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5003 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5004 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5005 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5006 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5008 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5009 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5010 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5012 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5013 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5014 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5015 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5017 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5019 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5020 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5022 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5023 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5024 // transactions next...
5025 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5026 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5027 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5028 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5030 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5031 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5034 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5035 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5037 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5039 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5040 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5042 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5043 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5045 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5046 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5047 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5048 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5049 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5050 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5051 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5052 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5056 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5057 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5058 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5059 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5060 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5062 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5065 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5066 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5067 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5068 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5070 // Create some initial channels
5071 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5072 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5074 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5075 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5076 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5077 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5078 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5080 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5081 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5082 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5084 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5085 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5086 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5087 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5089 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5090 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5091 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5092 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5093 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5095 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5096 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5098 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5100 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5101 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5102 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5103 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5104 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5105 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5106 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5107 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5108 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5109 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5111 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5112 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5113 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5115 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5116 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5118 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5119 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5122 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5123 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5124 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5125 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5126 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5131 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5132 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5133 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5134 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5138 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5139 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5140 match msg_events[0] {
5141 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5142 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5144 match msg_events[1] {
5145 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5146 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5148 match msg_events[2] {
5149 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5150 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5151 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5152 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5153 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5154 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5156 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5158 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5159 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5160 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5161 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5162 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5163 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5164 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5165 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5166 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5167 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5168 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5169 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5170 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5172 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5177 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5178 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5179 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5180 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5181 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5182 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5183 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5184 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5185 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5186 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5187 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5188 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5189 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5190 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5192 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5193 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5194 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5196 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5197 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5198 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5199 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5200 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5202 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5204 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5205 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5206 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5207 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5208 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5209 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
5210 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5211 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5213 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5214 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5215 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5217 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5218 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5220 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5221 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5223 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5224 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5225 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5226 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5227 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5228 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5230 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5231 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5232 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5233 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5234 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5235 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5236 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5238 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5239 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5240 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5241 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5244 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5245 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5247 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5248 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5250 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5251 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5254 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5255 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5257 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5258 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5259 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5260 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5261 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5262 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5263 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5264 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5265 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5266 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5267 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5268 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5269 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5271 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5272 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5273 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5274 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5275 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5276 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5277 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5278 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5279 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5282 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5283 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5285 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5287 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5289 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5290 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5291 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5292 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5293 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5294 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5295 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5296 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5297 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5298 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5299 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5302 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5303 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5305 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5307 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5308 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5309 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5311 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5316 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5317 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5318 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5319 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5320 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5322 // Create some initial channels
5323 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5325 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5326 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5327 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5328 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5329 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5331 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5332 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5334 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5336 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5337 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5339 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5340 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5343 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5344 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5347 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5348 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5349 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5350 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5351 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5352 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5353 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5357 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5358 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5360 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5361 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5362 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5363 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5364 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5365 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5368 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5369 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5370 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5371 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5372 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5373 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5374 // use the same payment hashes.
5375 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5380 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5381 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5383 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5384 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5385 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5386 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5387 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5388 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5389 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5391 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5392 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5393 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5394 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5395 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5397 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5398 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5399 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5400 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5402 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5404 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5406 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5407 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5409 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5411 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5413 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5415 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5416 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5418 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5420 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5423 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5425 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5426 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5429 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5431 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5432 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5434 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5435 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5436 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5437 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5438 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5440 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5441 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5442 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5443 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5444 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5445 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5447 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5450 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5451 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5452 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5453 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5454 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5455 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5457 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5458 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5459 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5461 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5464 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5465 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5466 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5467 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5469 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5471 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5473 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5474 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5475 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5476 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5477 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5478 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5479 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5480 if deliver_last_raa {
5481 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5483 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5486 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5487 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5488 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5489 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5491 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5492 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5493 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5495 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5496 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5497 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5499 if announce_latest {
5500 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5502 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5504 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5505 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5506 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5509 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5513 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5514 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5517 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5518 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5519 if deliver_last_raa {
5520 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5522 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5526 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5527 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5528 let mut a_done = false;
5529 for msg in cs_msgs {
5531 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5532 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5533 // should be failed-backwards here.
5534 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5535 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5536 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5537 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5539 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5544 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5545 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5546 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5548 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5549 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5552 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5553 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5554 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5555 if announce_latest {
5556 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5557 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5558 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5561 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5563 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5567 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5568 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5569 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5570 let mut as_updates = 0;
5571 for event in as_events.iter() {
5572 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5573 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5574 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5575 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5577 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5579 if network_update.is_some() {
5582 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5584 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5585 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5586 if announce_latest {
5587 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5588 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5590 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5592 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5593 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5594 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5595 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5596 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5597 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5598 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5599 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5600 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5602 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5604 if network_update.is_some() {
5607 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5609 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5610 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5611 if announce_latest {
5612 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5614 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5616 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5617 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5618 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5619 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5620 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5621 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5625 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5626 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5630 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5631 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5635 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5636 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5637 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5638 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5642 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5646 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5648 // Create some initial channels
5649 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5651 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5652 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5653 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5654 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5656 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5657 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5658 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5660 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5661 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5663 let htlc_timeout = {
5664 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5665 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5666 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5667 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5668 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5669 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5673 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5674 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5675 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5677 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5678 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5679 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5680 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5681 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5682 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5683 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5684 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5685 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5686 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5687 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5691 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5692 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5693 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5694 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5696 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5698 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5699 let seed = [42; 32];
5700 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5701 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5702 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5703 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5704 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5705 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5707 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5708 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5710 // Create some initial channels
5711 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5713 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5714 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5715 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5717 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5718 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5719 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5720 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5721 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5723 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5724 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5725 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5726 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5727 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5729 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5730 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5731 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5732 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5733 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5734 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5735 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5736 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5739 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5740 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5741 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5742 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5744 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5746 let htlc_timeout = {
5747 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5748 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5749 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5750 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5754 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5755 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5756 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5758 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5759 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5760 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5761 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5762 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5763 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5764 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5765 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5766 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5767 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5768 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5769 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5773 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5774 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5775 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5776 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5777 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5779 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5781 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5782 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5784 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5785 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5786 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5788 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5789 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5790 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5792 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5793 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5794 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5796 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5797 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5798 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5801 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5802 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5803 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5804 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5805 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5806 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5808 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5810 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5811 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5812 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5815 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5816 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5817 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5819 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5821 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5822 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5825 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5826 let mut block = Block {
5827 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5830 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5831 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5832 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5834 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5835 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5837 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5840 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5841 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5842 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5843 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5844 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5845 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5847 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5848 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5851 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5853 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5854 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5855 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5857 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5858 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5860 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5861 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5862 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5864 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5865 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5867 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5870 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5871 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5872 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5873 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5874 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5875 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5877 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5878 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5879 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5880 // actually revoked.
5881 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5882 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5883 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5884 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5887 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5888 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5889 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5891 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5892 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5894 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5896 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5898 if check_revoke_no_close {
5899 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5903 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5904 let mut block = Block {
5905 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5908 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5909 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5910 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5912 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5913 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5914 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5916 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5918 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5919 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5920 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5921 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5922 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5923 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5924 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5925 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5929 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5930 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5931 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5932 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5933 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5934 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5935 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5937 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5938 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5939 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5941 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5942 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5943 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5945 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5946 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5950 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5951 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5952 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5953 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5954 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5959 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5960 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5961 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5962 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5963 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5964 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5965 for node in nodes.iter() {
5966 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5969 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5970 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5971 let push_msat=10001;
5972 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5973 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5974 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5975 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5977 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5978 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5979 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5983 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5984 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5985 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5986 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5987 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5989 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5990 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5991 let push_msat=10001;
5992 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5994 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5995 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5996 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5997 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5998 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6000 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6001 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6002 let push_msat=10001;
6003 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6004 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6005 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6007 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6008 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6009 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6011 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6012 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6013 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6015 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6016 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6017 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6019 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6020 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6021 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6022 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6023 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6024 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6028 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6029 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6030 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6031 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6032 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6034 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6035 let push_msat=10001;
6036 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6037 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6038 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6039 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6041 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6042 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6043 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6044 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6047 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6049 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6052 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6053 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6054 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6055 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6057 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6058 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6059 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6060 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6061 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6062 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6064 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6065 // pending_update_fee.
6067 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6068 *feerate_lock += 20;
6070 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6073 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6074 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6075 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6076 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6077 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6082 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6084 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6085 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6086 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6087 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6089 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6090 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6091 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6093 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6094 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6095 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6096 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6098 // Flush the pending fee update.
6099 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6100 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6102 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6105 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6106 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6107 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6108 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6109 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6110 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6111 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6112 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6113 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6115 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6116 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6117 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6119 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6120 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6121 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6122 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6123 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6124 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6125 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6126 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6127 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6129 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6133 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6134 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6135 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6137 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6138 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6139 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6140 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6141 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6142 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6144 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6145 // pending_update_fee.
6147 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6148 *feerate_lock += 200;
6150 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6153 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6154 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6155 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6156 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6157 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6159 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6162 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6164 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6165 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6166 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6167 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6169 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6171 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6172 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6173 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6175 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6176 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6177 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6178 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6179 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6180 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6181 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6183 // Flush the pending fee update.
6184 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6185 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6187 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6188 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6191 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6192 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6193 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6194 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6195 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6196 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6197 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6198 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6199 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6201 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6202 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6203 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6205 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6206 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6207 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6208 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6209 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6210 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6211 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6212 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6213 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6215 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6218 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6219 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6220 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6221 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6222 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6224 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6225 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6226 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6228 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6230 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6231 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6232 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6233 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6235 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6238 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6239 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6240 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6242 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6243 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6245 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6247 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6248 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6249 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6250 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6253 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6254 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6255 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6258 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6259 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6260 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6261 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6262 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6263 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6264 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6265 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6266 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6267 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6268 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6270 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6271 // pending_update_fee.
6273 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6274 *feerate_lock += 20;
6276 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6279 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6280 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6281 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6282 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6283 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6285 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6288 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6290 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6291 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6292 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6293 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6295 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6297 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6298 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6299 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6300 let payment_event = {
6301 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6304 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6305 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6307 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6309 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6311 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6312 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6314 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6315 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6317 // Flush the pending fee update.
6318 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6319 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6321 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6322 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6325 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6326 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6327 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6329 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6330 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6333 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6336 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6338 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6340 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6341 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6342 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6343 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6344 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6345 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6348 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6349 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6352 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6353 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6354 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6355 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6356 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6357 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6358 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6359 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6360 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6361 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6363 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6366 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6367 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6368 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6370 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6371 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6373 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6374 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6376 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6377 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6378 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6379 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6380 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6382 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6383 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6387 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6388 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6389 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6392 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6393 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6394 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6395 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6396 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6397 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6398 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6400 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6401 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6403 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6404 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6405 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6406 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6410 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6411 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6412 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6413 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6414 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6415 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6416 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6418 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6419 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6420 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6421 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6423 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6424 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6428 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6429 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6430 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6431 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6432 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6433 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6434 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6436 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6437 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6439 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6440 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6442 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6443 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6444 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6446 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6450 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6451 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6452 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6453 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6454 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6455 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6456 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6457 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6459 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6460 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6461 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6462 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6463 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6464 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6468 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6469 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6470 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6471 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6472 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6473 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6474 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6475 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6476 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6477 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6479 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6480 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6481 let payment_event = {
6482 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6485 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6486 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6487 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6488 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6492 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6494 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6496 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6498 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6499 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6501 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6502 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6503 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6505 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6506 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6510 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6511 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6512 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6513 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6514 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6515 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6516 let channel_value = 100000;
6517 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6518 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6520 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6522 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6523 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6525 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6526 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6527 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6529 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6530 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6532 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6535 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6537 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6538 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6539 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6540 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6541 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6542 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6543 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6544 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6546 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6547 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6548 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6551 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6552 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6554 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6555 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6556 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6557 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6558 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6559 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6561 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6565 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6566 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6567 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6568 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6569 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6570 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6571 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6573 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6574 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6575 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6576 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6577 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6578 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6580 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6581 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6582 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6584 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6586 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6587 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6588 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6589 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6590 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6592 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6593 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6594 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6596 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6600 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6601 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6602 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6603 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6604 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6605 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6606 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6607 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6609 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6610 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6611 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6612 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6613 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6614 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6616 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6620 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6621 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6622 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6625 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6626 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6627 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6629 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6630 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6632 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6633 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6634 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6636 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6640 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6641 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6644 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6645 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6646 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6648 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6649 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6651 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6652 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6653 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6655 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6656 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6657 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6659 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6663 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6664 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6665 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6666 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6667 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6668 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6670 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6671 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6672 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6674 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6675 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6676 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6678 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6679 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6680 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6682 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6686 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6687 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6688 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6689 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6690 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6691 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6692 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6693 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6695 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6696 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6697 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6699 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6700 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6702 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6703 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6704 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6705 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6706 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6707 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6708 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6709 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6710 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6711 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6712 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6713 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6714 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6717 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6718 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6719 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6721 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6723 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6725 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6726 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6727 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6729 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6733 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6734 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6736 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6737 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6738 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6739 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6740 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6741 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6742 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6745 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6746 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6748 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6751 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6754 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6756 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6757 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6758 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6760 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6764 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6765 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6767 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6768 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6769 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6770 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6771 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6773 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6774 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6776 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6777 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6779 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6782 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6785 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6787 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6788 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6789 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6790 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6791 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6795 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6796 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6798 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6799 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6800 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6801 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6802 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6804 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6805 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6807 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6808 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6809 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6812 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6813 failure_code: 0x8000,
6816 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6818 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6819 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6820 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6822 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6826 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6827 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6829 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6830 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6831 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6832 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6833 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6835 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6837 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6840 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6841 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6842 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6844 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6845 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6846 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6847 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6848 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6849 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6850 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6852 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6856 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6858 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6860 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6861 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6862 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6863 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6864 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6868 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6869 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6871 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6872 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6873 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6874 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6875 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6877 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6879 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6882 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6883 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6884 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6886 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6887 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6888 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6889 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6890 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6891 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6892 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6894 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6898 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6900 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6902 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6903 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6904 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6906 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6910 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6911 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6913 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6914 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6915 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6916 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6917 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6919 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6920 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6923 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6924 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6926 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6928 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6930 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6932 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6934 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6935 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6936 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6937 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6938 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6939 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6940 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6942 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6945 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6946 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6948 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6949 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6950 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6952 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6956 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6957 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6958 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6960 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6961 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6962 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6963 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6964 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6965 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6967 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6970 let mut payment_event = {
6971 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6973 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6974 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6975 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6977 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6979 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6980 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6981 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6982 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6984 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6985 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6988 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6989 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6991 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6993 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6994 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6995 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6997 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6998 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6999 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7000 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7001 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7002 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7003 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7005 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7009 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7012 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7013 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7014 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7015 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7017 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7019 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7020 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7021 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7022 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7023 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7024 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7026 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7032 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7033 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7034 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7035 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7037 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7038 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7039 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7040 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7041 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7042 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7044 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7046 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7047 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7048 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7049 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7051 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7052 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7054 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7055 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7057 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7060 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7061 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7062 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7065 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7066 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7068 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7070 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7071 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7073 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7076 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7077 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7082 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7083 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7084 if announce_latest {
7085 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7087 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7090 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7092 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7094 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7095 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7096 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7097 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7098 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7099 let mut first_failed = false;
7100 for event in events {
7102 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7103 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7104 assert!(!first_failed);
7105 first_failed = true;
7107 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7110 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7116 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7117 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7118 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7121 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7122 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7123 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7124 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7125 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7126 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7127 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7129 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7130 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7131 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7132 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7133 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7135 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7137 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7138 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7140 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7141 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7143 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7145 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7146 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7149 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7151 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7152 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7153 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7154 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7155 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7157 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7158 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7160 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7161 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7162 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7163 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7164 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7165 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7166 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7167 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7169 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7170 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7171 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7173 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7174 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7175 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7176 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7178 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7179 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7180 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7181 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7182 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7183 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7184 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7186 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7188 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7189 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7192 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7193 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7194 else { first = false; }
7196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7199 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7200 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7201 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7203 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7210 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7211 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7212 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7213 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7217 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7218 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7220 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7221 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7222 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7223 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7224 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7225 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7226 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7227 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7228 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7230 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7231 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7232 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7233 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7236 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7237 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7239 } else { assert!(false) }
7241 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7242 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7243 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7244 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7245 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7246 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7247 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7250 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7251 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7253 } else { assert!(false); }
7255 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7256 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7257 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7258 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7259 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7260 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7262 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7264 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7265 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7266 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7270 } else { panic!(); }
7271 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7273 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7274 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7275 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7276 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7277 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7278 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7279 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7282 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7283 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7285 } else { assert!(false); }
7289 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7290 // We want to be sure that :
7291 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7292 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7293 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7294 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7295 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7301 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7302 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7303 // during signing due to revoked tx
7304 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7305 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7308 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7309 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7310 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7312 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7314 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7315 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7316 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7317 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7319 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7320 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7322 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7323 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7325 // Restore node A from previous state
7326 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7327 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7328 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7329 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7330 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7331 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7332 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7334 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7335 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7336 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7337 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7338 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7339 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7341 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7342 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7346 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7347 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7348 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7349 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7353 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7354 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7356 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7358 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7359 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7363 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7364 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7367 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7368 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7369 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7370 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7371 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7372 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7373 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7375 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7376 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7378 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7381 panic!("Unexpected event")
7385 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7386 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7387 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7388 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7391 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7392 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7393 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7394 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7395 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7396 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7397 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7398 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7399 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7400 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7401 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7405 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7406 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7407 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7408 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7410 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7411 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7412 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7413 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7415 // Create some initial channels
7416 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7418 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7419 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7420 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7421 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7422 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7423 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7424 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7427 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7428 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7429 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7430 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7431 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7433 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7434 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7435 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7436 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7438 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7439 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7440 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7442 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7443 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7444 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7445 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7446 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7447 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7448 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7449 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7450 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7451 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7453 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7457 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7458 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7460 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7461 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7462 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7463 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7467 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7468 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7469 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7471 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7472 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7473 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7474 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7476 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7477 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7478 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7481 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7482 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7484 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7485 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7486 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7487 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7488 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7489 for e in msg_events {
7491 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7492 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7493 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7494 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7495 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7498 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7502 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7503 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7504 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7505 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7506 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7507 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7509 // Reestablish chan_1
7510 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7511 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7512 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7513 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7514 // Reestablish chan_2
7515 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7516 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7517 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7518 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7519 // Reestablish chan_3
7520 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7521 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7522 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7523 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7525 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7526 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7527 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7528 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7529 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7530 for e in msg_events {
7532 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7533 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7534 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7535 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7537 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7538 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7541 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7544 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7545 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7549 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7550 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7551 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7553 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7554 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7555 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7556 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7558 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7560 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7561 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7562 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7563 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7564 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7566 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7567 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7568 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7569 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7570 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7571 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7573 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7574 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7575 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7576 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7580 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7581 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7583 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7584 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7585 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7586 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7589 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7593 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7594 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7595 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7596 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7597 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7598 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7599 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7600 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7604 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7605 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7606 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7607 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7609 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7610 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7611 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7612 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7613 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7614 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7615 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7616 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7617 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7618 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7619 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7620 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7621 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7625 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7627 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7628 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7630 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7632 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7633 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7634 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7635 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7636 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7637 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7638 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7639 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7640 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7641 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7642 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7643 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7644 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7648 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7650 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7651 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7655 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7656 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7657 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7659 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7660 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7661 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7662 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7663 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7665 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7666 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7667 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7668 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7669 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7670 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7671 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7672 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7673 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7674 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7675 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7676 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7678 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7679 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7680 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7682 // Revoke local commitment tx
7683 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7685 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7686 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7687 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7688 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7690 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7691 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7693 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7694 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7695 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7697 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7698 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7699 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7701 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7702 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7703 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7704 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7706 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7707 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7708 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7709 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7710 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7711 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7712 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7713 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7715 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7716 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7722 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7723 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7724 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7726 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7727 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7728 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7729 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7731 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7732 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7733 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7734 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7735 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7736 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7738 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7739 // available, which we check here:
7740 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7741 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7742 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7744 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7745 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7747 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7748 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7749 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7750 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7752 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7753 // output, checked above).
7754 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7755 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7756 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7758 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7759 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7760 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7761 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7762 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7766 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7767 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7768 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7769 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7770 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7772 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7773 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7775 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7776 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7777 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7778 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7779 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7781 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7782 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7788 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7789 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7790 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7791 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7793 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7794 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7796 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7797 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7798 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7799 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7800 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7801 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7802 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7803 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7807 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7808 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7809 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7810 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7812 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7813 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7814 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7815 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7816 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7817 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7818 // up bumped justice generation.
7819 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7822 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7827 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7828 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7829 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7832 // Provide preimage for one
7833 // Check aggregation
7835 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7836 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7837 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7838 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7840 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7841 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7842 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7844 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7845 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7846 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7847 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7848 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7850 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7851 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7852 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7854 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7856 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7860 let feerate_timeout;
7861 let feerate_preimage;
7863 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7864 // 9 transactions including:
7865 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7866 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7867 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7869 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7870 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7871 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7872 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7873 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7874 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7875 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7877 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7878 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7879 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7880 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7882 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7883 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7884 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7885 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7887 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7888 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7889 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7890 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7894 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7895 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7897 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7898 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7900 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7901 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7902 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7903 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7904 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7905 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7907 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7908 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7909 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7910 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7911 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7913 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7914 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7915 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7916 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7917 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7922 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7923 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7927 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7928 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7929 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7930 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7931 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7932 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7933 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7934 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7936 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7937 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7938 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7939 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7940 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7942 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7943 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7945 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7947 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7948 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7949 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7951 // Must revoke without gaps
7952 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7953 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7955 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7956 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7957 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7959 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7960 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7961 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7963 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7967 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7968 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7969 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7971 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7972 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7973 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7974 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7976 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7977 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7978 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7979 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7981 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7982 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7983 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7985 // Revoke local commitment tx
7986 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7988 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7989 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7990 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7991 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7993 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7994 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7996 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7998 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7999 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8000 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8001 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8002 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8003 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8007 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8008 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8009 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8011 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8012 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8013 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8018 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8019 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8020 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8021 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8022 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8023 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8024 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8025 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8027 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000).0;
8028 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8030 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8032 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8033 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8034 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8036 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8038 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8039 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8040 // can get our balance.
8042 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8043 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8044 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8045 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8046 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8047 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8048 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8049 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8051 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8055 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8056 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8057 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8058 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8059 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8060 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8061 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8063 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8065 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8066 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8067 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8068 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8069 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8071 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8072 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8074 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8076 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8078 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8079 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8080 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8082 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8083 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8084 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8086 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8091 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8092 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8093 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8094 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8095 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8097 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8098 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8099 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8101 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8103 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8104 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8105 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8106 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8110 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8111 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8112 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8113 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8114 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8115 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8116 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8118 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8119 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8120 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8122 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8123 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8124 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8128 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8129 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8130 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8131 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8132 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8136 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8137 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8139 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8141 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8142 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8143 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8145 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8147 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8148 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 23).unwrap();
8150 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8153 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8154 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8156 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8157 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8158 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8160 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8163 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temp_channel_id).unwrap();
8165 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8166 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8168 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8170 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8171 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8178 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8179 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8180 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8181 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8182 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8183 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8184 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8186 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8187 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8189 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8191 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8192 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8193 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8195 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8197 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8198 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8200 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8203 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8204 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8206 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8207 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8208 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8212 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8216 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8217 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8218 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8219 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8220 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8221 // and the channel should be closed.
8222 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8223 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8224 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8225 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8226 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8227 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8229 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8230 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8231 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8233 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8235 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8236 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8238 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8239 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8241 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8242 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8243 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8244 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8245 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8248 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8249 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8250 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8253 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8255 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8256 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8258 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8259 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8261 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8262 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8264 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8265 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8266 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8267 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8268 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8269 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8271 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8274 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8278 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8279 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8280 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8281 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8282 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8283 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8284 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8286 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8287 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8289 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8291 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8292 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8293 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8295 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8297 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8298 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 0).unwrap();
8299 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 0);
8301 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8302 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8304 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8305 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8308 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8311 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8312 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8313 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8315 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8316 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8317 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8319 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8324 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8325 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
8326 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
8327 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
8328 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr)[0].node;
8330 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8331 let api_res = node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, 0);
8333 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8334 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8336 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8337 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8342 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8343 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8344 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8345 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8346 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8347 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8349 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8350 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8351 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8352 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8354 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8355 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8356 route.paths.push(path);
8357 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8358 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8359 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8360 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8361 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8362 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8363 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8364 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8368 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8369 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8370 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8371 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8372 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8373 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8375 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8378 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8379 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8380 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8382 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8383 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8384 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8385 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8387 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8388 // values from previous calls.
8389 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8390 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8391 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8393 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8395 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8396 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8398 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8401 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8406 #[allow(deprecated)]
8407 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8408 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8409 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8410 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8411 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8412 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8413 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8415 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8417 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8419 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8420 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8421 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8422 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8423 } else { panic!(); }
8425 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8427 header: BlockHeader {
8429 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8430 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8431 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8435 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8436 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8437 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8438 } else { panic!(); }
8440 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8441 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8442 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8443 block.header.time += 1;
8444 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8445 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8446 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8449 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8450 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8452 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8453 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8454 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8455 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8457 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8458 // values from previous calls.
8459 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8460 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8461 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8463 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8464 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8465 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8466 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8468 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8473 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8474 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8475 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8476 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8477 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8478 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8480 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8482 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8483 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8484 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8485 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8487 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8488 // resulting events.
8489 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8492 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8493 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8494 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8495 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8497 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8498 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8499 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8500 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8503 // We should fail the payment back
8504 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8505 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8506 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8507 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8508 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8510 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8515 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8516 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8517 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8519 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8520 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8521 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8522 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8524 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8525 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8526 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8527 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8529 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8530 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8531 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8532 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8536 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8537 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8538 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8539 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8541 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8542 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8543 // commitment at same time.
8545 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8546 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8547 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8548 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8550 // Create some initial channel
8551 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8552 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8554 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8555 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8557 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8558 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8560 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8561 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8562 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8563 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8565 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8566 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8567 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8568 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8569 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8570 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8571 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8572 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8575 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8576 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8577 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8578 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8579 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8581 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8582 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8584 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8585 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8586 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8587 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8588 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8589 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8590 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8591 } else { assert!(false); }
8592 } else { assert!(false); };
8593 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8595 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8596 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8600 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8601 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8602 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8603 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8604 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8606 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8607 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8608 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8609 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8611 // Create some initial channel
8612 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8613 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8615 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8616 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8618 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8619 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8621 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8622 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8623 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8624 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8625 let watchtower_alice = {
8626 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8627 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8628 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8629 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8630 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8631 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8632 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8633 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8636 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8637 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8638 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8639 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8640 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8642 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8644 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8645 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8649 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8650 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8651 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8652 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8653 let watchtower_bob = {
8654 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8655 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8656 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8657 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8658 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8659 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8660 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8661 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8664 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8665 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8667 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8668 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8670 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8674 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8675 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8676 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8677 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8678 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8679 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8680 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8681 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8682 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8683 } else { assert!(false); }
8684 } else { assert!(false); };
8685 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8688 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8689 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8690 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8692 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8695 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8696 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8697 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8701 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8702 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8703 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8705 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8706 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8707 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8708 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8709 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8710 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8715 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8716 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8717 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8720 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8721 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8723 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8724 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8725 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8726 // before receiving funding_signed.
8727 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8728 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8729 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8730 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8732 // Create an initial channel
8733 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8734 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8735 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8736 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8737 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8739 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8740 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8742 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8745 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8746 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8747 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8748 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8749 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8753 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8754 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8755 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8756 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8757 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8758 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8759 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8761 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8762 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8763 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8764 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8766 // Create some initial channels
8767 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8769 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8770 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8771 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8772 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8773 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8774 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8776 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8777 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8778 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8779 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8780 // this test before #653 fix.
8781 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8782 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8784 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8785 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8787 let htlc_timeout = {
8788 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8789 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8790 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8791 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8795 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8796 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8797 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8798 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8801 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8802 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8803 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8804 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8806 // Steps of the test:
8807 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8808 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8809 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8810 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8811 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8812 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8813 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8814 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8815 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8816 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8817 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8818 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8820 // Create some initial channels
8821 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8822 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8824 // Steps (1) and (2):
8825 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8826 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8828 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8829 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8830 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8831 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8832 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8833 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8834 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8836 // Steps (3) and (4):
8837 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8838 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8839 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8840 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8841 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8842 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8844 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8845 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8846 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8847 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8848 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8850 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8851 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8852 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8853 if broadcast_alice {
8854 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8856 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8858 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8859 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8863 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8864 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8865 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8867 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8868 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8869 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8870 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8871 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8872 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8874 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8875 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8876 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8877 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8878 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8879 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8881 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8882 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8884 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8887 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8888 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8889 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8892 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8893 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8894 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8895 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8896 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8899 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8901 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8902 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8903 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8906 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8909 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8911 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8914 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8915 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8916 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8917 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8918 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8921 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8923 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8926 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8927 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8928 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8929 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8930 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8931 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8932 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8933 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8934 if broadcast_alice {
8935 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8937 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8939 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8940 if broadcast_alice {
8941 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8942 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8943 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8944 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8946 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8947 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8949 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8950 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8955 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8956 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8958 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8959 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8960 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8961 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8963 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8964 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8965 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8967 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8968 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8969 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8970 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8971 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8972 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8973 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8975 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8976 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8982 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8983 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8984 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8985 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8986 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8990 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8991 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8992 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8994 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8995 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8996 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8997 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8998 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8999 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9000 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9001 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9003 // Create an initial channel
9004 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9005 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9006 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9007 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9009 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9010 // that it is rejected.
9011 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9013 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9014 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9016 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9017 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9018 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9019 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9020 // move forward with it.
9021 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9022 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9024 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9028 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9029 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
9031 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9034 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9035 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9037 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9038 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9039 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9040 added_monitors.clear();
9042 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9044 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9045 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9047 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9050 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9051 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9052 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9053 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9054 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9056 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9057 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9059 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9060 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9061 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9062 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9063 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9065 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9069 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9070 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9071 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9072 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9073 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9074 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9076 let funding_created = {
9077 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9078 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9079 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9080 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9083 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9084 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9085 // still needs to be cleared here.
9086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9088 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9090 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9091 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9093 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9094 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9095 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9096 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9097 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9099 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9103 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9104 // everything is functional.
9105 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9107 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9108 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9109 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9110 added_monitors.clear();
9113 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9114 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9115 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9116 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
9118 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9119 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9120 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9121 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9125 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9126 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9128 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9129 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9130 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9131 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9132 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9134 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9136 // Create some initial channels
9137 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9138 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9139 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9141 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9142 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9143 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9145 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9146 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9147 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9149 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9150 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9152 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9153 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9154 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9155 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9156 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9157 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9159 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9160 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9161 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9163 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9164 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9165 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9167 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9168 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9170 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9173 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9174 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9176 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9178 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9179 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9180 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9181 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9182 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9183 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9185 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9186 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9187 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9191 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9192 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9194 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9195 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9196 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9197 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9198 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9199 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9200 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9201 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9203 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9204 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9205 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9207 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9208 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9209 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9210 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9213 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9214 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9217 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9220 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9221 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9223 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9224 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9225 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9227 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9228 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9229 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9231 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9232 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9233 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9234 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9235 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9236 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9237 } else { panic!(); }
9238 } else { panic!(); }
9239 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9242 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9243 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9244 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9245 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9246 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9247 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9248 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9249 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9250 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9251 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9252 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9253 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9254 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9255 // until we learned about an additional block.
9257 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9258 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9259 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9260 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9261 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9262 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9263 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9265 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9266 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9267 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9268 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9269 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9271 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9272 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9273 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9275 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9276 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9278 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9279 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9280 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9282 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9283 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9284 if test_height_before_timelock {
9285 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9286 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9287 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9288 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9290 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9291 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9292 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9293 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9294 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9295 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9297 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9298 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9300 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9301 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9302 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9303 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9304 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9305 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9308 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9309 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9310 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9311 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9312 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9313 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9314 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9315 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9316 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9321 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9322 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9323 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9327 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9328 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9329 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9331 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9333 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9334 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9335 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9336 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9337 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9338 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9339 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9340 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9341 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9343 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9344 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9345 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9348 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9349 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9350 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9351 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9352 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9354 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9356 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9357 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9358 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9361 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9362 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9363 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9364 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9365 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9367 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9369 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9371 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9372 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9373 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9375 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9376 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9377 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9378 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9379 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9381 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9382 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9383 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9384 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9386 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9387 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9388 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9389 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9390 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9391 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9392 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9393 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9395 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9396 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9397 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9398 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9399 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9400 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9401 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9403 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9404 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9405 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9406 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9410 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9411 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9413 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9414 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9415 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9418 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9419 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9420 // the commitment state.
9421 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9423 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9425 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9426 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9429 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9430 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9431 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9432 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9433 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9434 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9435 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9437 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9438 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9442 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9443 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9444 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9445 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9446 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9447 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9448 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9449 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9450 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9452 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9454 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9455 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9456 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9457 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9458 let route = get_route(
9459 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
9460 Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9461 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9463 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9466 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9468 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9469 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9470 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9471 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9472 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9474 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9475 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9478 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9480 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9481 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9482 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9483 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9484 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9485 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9486 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9487 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9488 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9491 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9492 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9493 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9494 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9496 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9497 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9500 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9501 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9503 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9504 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9505 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9507 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9508 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9509 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9510 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9514 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9515 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9516 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9517 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9518 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9520 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9521 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9522 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9523 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9524 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9525 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9526 final_value_msat: 10000,
9527 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9529 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9530 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9531 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9533 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9534 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9536 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9537 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9538 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9539 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9540 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9541 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9545 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9546 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9547 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9548 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9549 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9551 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9552 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9553 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9554 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9556 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9557 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9558 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9559 final_value_msat: 10000,
9560 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9562 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9563 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9564 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9565 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9566 let route = find_route(
9567 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9568 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9571 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9572 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9574 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9575 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9576 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9577 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9578 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9579 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9582 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9583 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9584 enum ExposureEvent {
9585 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9587 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9589 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9590 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9593 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9594 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9597 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9598 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9599 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9600 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9601 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9602 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9603 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9604 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9606 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9607 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9608 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9609 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9610 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9611 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9613 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9614 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9615 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9616 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9618 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9620 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9621 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9622 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9624 let opt_anchors = false;
9626 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9629 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9630 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9634 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9635 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9638 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9641 let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9642 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9643 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9645 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9646 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9647 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9648 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9650 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9651 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9653 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9654 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9656 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9657 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9660 if dust_outbound_balance {
9661 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9662 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9663 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9664 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9665 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9666 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9669 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9670 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9671 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9672 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9673 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9677 if dust_outbound_balance {
9678 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9679 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9680 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9681 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9682 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9685 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9686 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9687 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9688 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9693 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9694 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9695 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9696 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9697 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9699 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9700 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9701 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9703 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9705 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9706 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9707 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9709 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9710 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9711 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9712 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9713 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9715 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9716 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9717 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9718 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9720 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9721 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9723 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9724 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9725 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9727 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9728 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9730 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9732 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9735 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9736 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9737 added_monitors.clear();
9741 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9742 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9743 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9744 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9745 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9746 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9747 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9748 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9749 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9750 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9751 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9752 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9753 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);