_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
  27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  29 use ln::msgs;
  30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  34 use util::errors::APIError;
  35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  36 use util::config::UserConfig;
  37
  38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  44
  45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  46 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  47
  48 use regex;
  49
  50 use io;
  51 use prelude::*;
  52 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  53 use core::default::Default;
  54 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  55
  56 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  57 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  58
  59 #[test]
  60 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  61         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  62         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  63         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  64         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  65         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  66
  67         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  68         // funding satoshis
  69         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  70         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  71         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  72
  73         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  74         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  75
  76         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  77         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  78
  79         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  80         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  81         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  82                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  83                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  84                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  85                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  86                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  87                         match action {
  88                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  89                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  90                                 },
  91                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  92                         }
  93                 } else { assert!(false); }
  94         };
  95
  96         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
  97         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  98
  99         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 100         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
 101
 102         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 103
 104         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 105
 106         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 107
 108         insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 117 }
 118
 119 #[test]
 120 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 121         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 122         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 123         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 124         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 125         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 126
 127         // balancing
 128         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 129
 130         // A                                        B
 131         // update_fee                            ->
 132         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 133         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 134         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 135         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 136         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 137         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 138         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 139         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 140         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 141         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 142         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 143         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 144         //                                       <- RAA
 145         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 146
 147         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 148         {
 149                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 150                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 151         }
 152         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 154
 155         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 156         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 157         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 158                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 159                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 160                 },
 161                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 162         };
 163
 164         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 165
 166         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 167         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 168         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 170
 171         let payment_event = {
 172                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 173                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 174                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 175         };
 176         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 177         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 178
 179         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 180         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 181         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 182         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 183         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 184         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 185
 186         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 187         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 188         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 189         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 190         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 191
 192         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 193         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 194         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 195         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 196         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 197         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 198         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 200
 201         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 202         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 203         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 204         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 205         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 206         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 207         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 208         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 209
 210         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 211         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 212         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 213         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 214
 215         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 216         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 217         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 218
 219         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 221
 222         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 223         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 224         match events_2[0] {
 225                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 226                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 227         }
 228
 229         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 230         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 231 }
 232
 233 #[test]
 234 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 235         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 236         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 237         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 238         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 239         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 240         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 241         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 242
 243         // balancing
 244         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 245
 246         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 247         {
 248                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 249                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 250         }
 251         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 252         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 253
 254         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 255         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 256         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 257                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 258                         update_fee.as_ref()
 259                 },
 260                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 261         };
 262
 263         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 264
 265         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 266         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 267         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 268         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 269
 270         let payment_event = {
 271                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 272                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 273                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 274         };
 275         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 276         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 277
 278         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 279         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 280         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 281         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 282         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 284
 285         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 287
 288         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 289 }
 290
 291 #[test]
 292 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 293         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 294         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 295         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 296         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 297         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 298
 299         // A                                        B
 300         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 301         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 302         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 303         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 304         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 305         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 306         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 307         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 308         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 309         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 310         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 311         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 312         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 313         //                                          B should send no response here
 314         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 315         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 316         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 317
 318         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 319         let initial_feerate;
 320         {
 321                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 322                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 323                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 324         }
 325         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 326         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 327
 328         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 329         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 330         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 331                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 332                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 333                 },
 334                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 335         };
 336
 337         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 338         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 339         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 340         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 341         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 342
 343         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 344         // transaction:
 345         {
 346                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 347                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 348         }
 349         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 350         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 351         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 352
 353         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 354         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 355                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 356                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 357         };
 358
 359         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 360
 361         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 362         // Deliver (3)
 363         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 364
 365         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 366         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 367         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 368         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 369         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 370         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 371         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 372         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 373         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 374         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 375         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 376
 377         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 378         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 379         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 380         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 381         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 382
 383         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 384         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 385         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 386
 387         // Delever (4)
 388         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 389         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 390         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 391
 392         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 393         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 394         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 395
 396         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 397         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 398         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 399         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 400
 401         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 402         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 403         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 404 }
 405
 406 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
 407         // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
 408         // tests that we properly send one in that case.
 409         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
 410         alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 411         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 412         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 413         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
 414         bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 415         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 416         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 417         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 418         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 419         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
 420         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 421         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
 422
 423         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 424         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
 425         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
 426
 427         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
 428         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 429         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
 430
 431         for node in nodes {
 432                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
 433                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
 434                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
 435         }
 436 }
 437 #[test]
 438 fn test_1_conf_open() {
 439         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
 440         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
 441         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
 442 }
 443
 444 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 445         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 446         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 447         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 448         // Node objects.
 449
 450         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 451         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 452         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 453         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 454
 455         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 456                 let block = Block {
 457                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 458                         txdata: vec![],
 459                 };
 460                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 461                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 462         }
 463
 464         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 465         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 466         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 467
 468         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 469         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 470         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 471
 472         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 473         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 474
 475         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 476
 477         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 478         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 480         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 481
 482         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 483         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 484         {
 485                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 486                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 487                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 488                 added_monitors.clear();
 489         }
 490         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 491
 492         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 493         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 494         {
 495                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 496                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 497                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 498                 added_monitors.clear();
 499         }
 500
 501         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 502         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 503
 504         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 505         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 506
 507         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 508         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 509         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 510         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 511 }
 512
 513 #[test]
 514 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 515         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 516         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 517         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 518         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 519         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 520         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 521         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 522         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 523         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 524         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 525         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 526         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 527         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 528         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 529         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 530         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 531         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 532         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 533 }
 534
 535 #[test]
 536 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 537         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 538         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 539         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 540         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 541         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 542
 543         {
 544                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 545                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 546         }
 547         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 548         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 549
 550         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 551         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 552         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 553                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 554                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 555                 },
 556                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 557         };
 558         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 559
 560         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 561         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 562         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 563
 564         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 565         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 566         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 567
 568         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 569         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 570         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 571         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 572
 573         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 574         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 575         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 576 }
 577
 578 #[test]
 579 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 580         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 581         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 582         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 583         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 584         let channel_value = 5000;
 585         let push_sats = 700;
 586         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 587         let channel_id = chan.2;
 588         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 589         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 590
 591         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 592         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 593         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 594         // remote limit.
 595         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 596         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) as u32;
 597         {
 598                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 599                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 600         }
 601         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 602         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 603         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 604
 605         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 606
 607         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 608
 609         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 610         {
 611                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 612
 613                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 614                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 615                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0) / 1000;
 616                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 617                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 618                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 619         }
 620
 621         {
 622                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 623                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 624                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 625         }
 626         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 627         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 628         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 629
 630         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 631
 632         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 633         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 634         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 635                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 636                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 637                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 638                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 639                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 640                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 641         };
 642         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 643                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 644                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 645                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 646                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 647                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 648                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 649                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 650         };
 651
 652         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 653         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 654                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 655
 656         let res = {
 657                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 658                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 659                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 660                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 661                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 662                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 663                         push_sats,
 664                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0) / 1000,
 665                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
 666                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 667                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 668                         &mut htlcs,
 669                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 670                 );
 671                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 672         };
 673
 674         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 675                 channel_id: chan.2,
 676                 signature: res.0,
 677                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 678         };
 679
 680         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 681                 channel_id: chan.2,
 682                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 683         };
 684
 685         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 686
 687         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 688         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 689         //Should produce and error.
 690         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 691         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 692         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 693         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 694         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 695 }
 696
 697 #[test]
 698 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 699         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 700         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 701         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 702         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 703         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 704
 705         // balancing
 706         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 707
 708         {
 709                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 710                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 711         }
 712         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 713         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 714
 715         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 716         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 717         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 718                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 719                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 720                 },
 721                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 722         };
 723         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 724         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 725         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 726         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 727
 728         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 729
 730         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 731         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 732         {
 733                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 734                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 735                 added_monitors.clear();
 736         }
 737         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 738         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 739         // node[1] has nothing to do
 740
 741         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 742         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 743         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 744
 745         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 746         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 747         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 748         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 749         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 750         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 751         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 752
 753         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 754         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 755         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 756         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 757         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 758         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 759
 760         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 761         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 762         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 763         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 764
 765         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 766         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 767         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 768
 769         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 770         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 771         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 772         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 773
 774         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 775         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 776         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 777
 778         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 779
 780         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 781         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 782         match events[0] {
 783                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 784                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 785         };
 786
 787         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 788
 789         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 790         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 791         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 792         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 793         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 794 }
 795
 796 #[test]
 797 fn test_update_fee() {
 798         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 799         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 800         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 801         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 802         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 803         let channel_id = chan.2;
 804
 805         // A                                        B
 806         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 807         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 808         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 809         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 810         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 811         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 812         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 813         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 814         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 815         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 816         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 817         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 818
 819         // Create and deliver (1)...
 820         let feerate;
 821         {
 822                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 823                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 824                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 825         }
 826         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 827         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 828
 829         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 830         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 831         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 832                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 833                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 834                 },
 835                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 836         };
 837         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 838
 839         // Generate (2) and (3):
 840         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 841         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 842         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 843
 844         // Deliver (2):
 845         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 846         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 847         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 848
 849         // Create and deliver (4)...
 850         {
 851                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 852                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 853         }
 854         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 855         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 856         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 857         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 858         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 859                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 860                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 861                 },
 862                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 863         };
 864
 865         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 866         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 867         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 868         // ... creating (5)
 869         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 870         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 871
 872         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 873         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 874         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 875         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 876         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 877
 878         // Deliver (5):
 879         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 880         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 881         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 882
 883         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 884         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 885         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 886         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 887         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 888         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 889         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 890         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 891         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 892
 893         // Deliver (7)
 894         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 896         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 897         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 898
 899         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 900         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 901         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 902
 903         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 904         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 905         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 906         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 907         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 908 }
 909
 910 #[test]
 911 fn fake_network_test() {
 912         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 913         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 914         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 915         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 916         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 917         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 918
 919         // Create some initial channels
 920         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 921         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 922         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 923
 924         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 925         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 926         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 927         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 928         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 929
 930         // Send some more payments
 931         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 932         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 933         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 934
 935         // Test failure packets
 936         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 937         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 938
 939         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 940         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 941
 942         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 943         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 944         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 945         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 946         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 947         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 948         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 949
 950         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
 951         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 952         hops.push(RouteHop {
 953                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 954                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 955                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 956                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 957                 fee_msat: 0,
 958                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 959         });
 960         hops.push(RouteHop {
 961                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
 962                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 963                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 964                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 965                 fee_msat: 0,
 966                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 967         });
 968         hops.push(RouteHop {
 969                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
 970                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
 971                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 972                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
 973                 fee_msat: 1000000,
 974                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
 975         });
 976         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
 977         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
 978         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
 979
 980         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 981         hops.push(RouteHop {
 982                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
 983                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 984                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 985                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 986                 fee_msat: 0,
 987                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 988         });
 989         hops.push(RouteHop {
 990                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 991                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 992                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 993                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 994                 fee_msat: 0,
 995                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 996         });
 997         hops.push(RouteHop {
 998                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
 999                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1000                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1001                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1002                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1003                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1004         });
1005         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1006         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1007         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1008
1009         // Claim the rebalances...
1010         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1011         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1012
1013         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1014         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1015
1016         // Send some payments across both channels
1017         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1018         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1019         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1020
1021
1022         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1023         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1024         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1025         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1026
1027         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1028
1029         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1030         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1031         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1032
1033         // Close down the channels...
1034         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1035         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1036         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1037         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1038         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1039         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1040         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1041         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1042         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1043         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1044         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1045         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1046         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1047         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1048         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1049 }
1050
1051 #[test]
1052 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1053         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1054         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1055         // commitment dance rounds.
1056         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1057         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1058         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1059         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1060         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1061         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1062
1063         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1064         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1065                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1066                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1067                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1068         }
1069         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1070
1071         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1072         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1073         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1074         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1075
1076         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1077         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1078         // another HTLC.
1079         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1080         {
1081                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1082                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1083                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1084                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1085         }
1086
1087         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1088         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1089         {
1090                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1091                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1092         }
1093
1094         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1095         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1096         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1097         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1098
1099         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1100         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1101         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1102         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1103         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1104         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1105         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1106
1107         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1108         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1109         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1110
1111         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1112
1113         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1114         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1115         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1116         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1117
1118         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1119         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1120         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1121         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1122
1123         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1124         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1125         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1126
1127         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1128                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1129         }
1130         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1132         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1133         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1134         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1135
1136         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1138         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1140         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1141
1142         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1144
1145         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1146
1147         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1148         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1149         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1150                 match event {
1151                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1152                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1153                         },
1154                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1155                 };
1156         }
1157
1158         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1159                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1160         }
1161
1162         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1163 }
1164
1165 #[test]
1166 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1167         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1168         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1169         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1170         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1171         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1172         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1173
1174         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1175         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1176         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1177         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1178         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1179         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1180
1181         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1182
1183         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1184         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1185
1186         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1187         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1188
1189         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1190         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1191         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1192 }
1193
1194 #[test]
1195 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1196         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1197         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1198         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1199         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1200         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1201         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1202         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1203
1204         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1205
1206         // balancing
1207         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1208
1209         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1210
1211         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1212         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1213         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1214
1215         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1216         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1217         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1218
1219         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1220         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1221
1222         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1223         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1224         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1225                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1226                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1227                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1228                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1229                 }
1230         }
1231         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1232
1233         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1234         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1235         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1236         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1237
1238         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1239         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1240         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1241         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1242         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1243         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1244         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1245         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1246
1247         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1248         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1249         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1250
1251         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1252         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1253         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1254         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1255         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1256         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1257         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1258         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1259
1260         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1261         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1262         for e in events {
1263                 match e {
1264                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1265                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1266                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1267                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1268                         },
1269                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1270                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1271                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1272                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1273                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1274                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1275                         },
1276                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1277                 }
1278         }
1279 }
1280
1281 #[test]
1282 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1283         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1284         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1285         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1286         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1287         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1288
1289         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1290         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1291
1292         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1293         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1294         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1295         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1296         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1297         match err {
1298                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1299                         match &fails[0] {
1300                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1301                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1302                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1303                         }
1304                 },
1305                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1306         }
1307         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1308         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1309
1310         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1311 }
1312
1313 #[test]
1314 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1315         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1316         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1317         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1318         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1319         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1320
1321         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1322         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1323         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1324         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1325
1326         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1327
1328         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1329         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1330         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1331         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1332                 channel_id: chan.2,
1333                 htlc_id: 0,
1334                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1335                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1336                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1337                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1338         };
1339
1340         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1341
1342         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1343         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1344         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1345
1346         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1347
1348         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1349
1350         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1351         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1352         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1353                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1354                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1355                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1356                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1357                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1358
1359                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1360                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1361                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1362                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1363                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1364         };
1365         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1366                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1367                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1368                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1369                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1370                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1371                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1372                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1373         };
1374
1375         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1376         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1377                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1378
1379         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1380         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1381         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1382
1383         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1384                 offered: false,
1385                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1386                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1387                 payment_hash,
1388                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1389         };
1390
1391         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1392
1393         let res = {
1394                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1395                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1396                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1397                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1398                         commitment_number,
1399                         95000,
1400                         local_chan_balance,
1401                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1402                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1403                         feerate_per_kw,
1404                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1405                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1406                 );
1407                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1408         };
1409
1410         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1411                 channel_id: chan.2,
1412                 signature: res.0,
1413                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1414         };
1415
1416         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1417         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1418         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1419
1420         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1421         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1422                 channel_id: chan.2,
1423                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1424                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1425         };
1426         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1427
1428         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1429         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1430         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1431         match events[0] {
1432                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1433                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1434                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1435                 },
1436                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1437         };
1438         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1439                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1440
1441         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1442 }
1443
1444 #[test]
1445 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1446         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1447         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1448         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1449         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1450         // this situation.
1451         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1452         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1453         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1454         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1455
1456         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1457         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1458         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1459
1460         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1461
1462         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1463         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1464                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1465         }
1466
1467         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1468         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1469         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1470                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1471         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1472         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1473 }
1474
1475 #[test]
1476 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1477         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1478         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1479         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1480         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1481         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1482
1483         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1484         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1485         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1486         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1487         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1488         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1489         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1490
1491         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1492         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1493                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1494         }
1495
1496         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1497         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1498         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1499         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1500         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1501         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1502         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1503         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1504         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1505                 channel_id: chan.2,
1506                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1507                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1508                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1509                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1510                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1511         };
1512
1513         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1514         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1515         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1516         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1517         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1518         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1519         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1520         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1521 }
1522
1523 #[test]
1524 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1525         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1526         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1527         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1528         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1529
1530         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1531         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1532         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1533
1534         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1535         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1536         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1537         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1538         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1539         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1540         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1541
1542         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1543                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1544         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1545         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1546         // commitment transaction fee.
1547         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1548
1549         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1550         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1551                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1552         }
1553
1554         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1555         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1556         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1557                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1558 }
1559
1560 #[test]
1561 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1562         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1563         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1564         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1565         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1566         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1567         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1568         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1569
1570         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1571         // HTLC.
1572         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1573         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1574         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1575                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1576
1577         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1578         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1579         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1580         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1581         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1582         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1583         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1584
1585         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1586         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1587         match msg_events[0] {
1588                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1589                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1590                 },
1591                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1592         }
1593 }
1594
1595 #[test]
1596 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1597         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1598         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1599         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1600         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1601         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1602         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1603         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1604
1605         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1606         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1607         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1608         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1609         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1610         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1611
1612         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1613         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1614         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1615         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1616         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1617         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1618
1619         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1620         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1621         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1622         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1623 }
1624
1625 #[test]
1626 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1627         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1628         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1629         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1630         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1631         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1632         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1633
1634         let feemsat = 239;
1635         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1636         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1637         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1638
1639         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1640         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1641         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1642         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1643
1644         // Add a pending HTLC.
1645         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1646         let payment_event_1 = {
1647                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1648                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1649
1650                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1651                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1652                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1653         };
1654         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1655
1656         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1657         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1658         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1659         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1660         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1661
1662         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1663         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1664         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1665         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1666         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1667         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1668         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1669         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1670                 channel_id: chan.2,
1671                 htlc_id: 1,
1672                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1673                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1674                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1675                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1676         };
1677
1678         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1679         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1680         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1681         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1682         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1683         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1684         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1685         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1686 }
1687
1688 #[test]
1689 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1690         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1691         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1692         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1693         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1694         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1695         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1696         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1697         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1698         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1699
1700         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1701         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1702         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1703
1704         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1705         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1706 }
1707
1708 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1709         (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1710 }
1711
1712 #[test]
1713 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1714         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1715         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1716         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1717         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1718         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1719         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1720         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1721         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1722         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1723         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1724
1725         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1726         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1727
1728         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1729         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1730
1731         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1732                 ($node: expr) => {{
1733                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1734                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1735                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1736                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1737                         payment_event
1738                 }}
1739         }
1740
1741         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1742         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1743         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1744
1745         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1746
1747         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1748         {
1749                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1750                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1751                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1752                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1753                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1754                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1755                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1756         }
1757
1758         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1759         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1760         loop {
1761                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1762                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1763                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1764                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1765                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1766                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1767                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1768                         break;
1769                 }
1770                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1771
1772                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1773                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1774                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1775                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1776                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1777                 );
1778
1779                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1780                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1781                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1782                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1783                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1784         }
1785
1786         // adding pending output.
1787         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1788         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1789         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1790         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1791         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1792         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1793         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1794         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1795         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1796         // policy.
1797         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1798         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1799         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1800
1801         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1802         let payment_event_1 = {
1803                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1804                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1805
1806                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1807                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1808                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1809         };
1810         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1811
1812         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1813         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1814         {
1815                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1816                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1817                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1818                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1819         }
1820
1821         // split the rest to test holding cell
1822         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1823         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1824         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1825         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1826         {
1827                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1828                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1829         }
1830
1831         // now see if they go through on both sides
1832         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1833         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1834         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1835         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1836         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1837         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1838
1839         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1840         {
1841                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1842                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1843                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1844                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1845                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1846         }
1847
1848         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1849         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1850         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1851         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1852         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1853         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1854
1855         // flush the pending htlc
1856         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1857         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1858         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1859
1860         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1861         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1863         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1864
1865         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1866         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1867         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1868         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1869
1870         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1871         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1873
1874         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1875
1876         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1877         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1878         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1879
1880         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1881         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1882
1883         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1884         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1885         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1886         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1887         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1888         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1889
1890         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1891         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1892         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1893         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1894
1895         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1896         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1897
1898         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1899         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1900         match events[0] {
1901                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1902                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1903                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1904                         match &purpose {
1905                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1906                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1907                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1908                                 },
1909                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1910                         }
1911                 },
1912                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1913         }
1914         match events[1] {
1915                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1916                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1917                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1918                         match &purpose {
1919                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1920                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1921                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1922                                 },
1923                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1924                         }
1925                 },
1926                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1927         }
1928
1929         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1930         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1931         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1932
1933         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1934         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1935         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1936
1937         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1938         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1939         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1940         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1941         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1942
1943         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1944         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1945 }
1946
1947 #[test]
1948 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1949         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1950         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1951         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1952         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1953         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1954         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1955         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1956         // To test this we:
1957         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1958         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1959         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1960         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1961         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1962         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1963         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
1964         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1965         //    claim,
1966         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1967         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1968         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1969         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1970         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1971         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1972         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1973         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1974         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1975         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1976
1977         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1978         // Route the first two HTLCs.
1979         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1980         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1981
1982         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1983         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
1984         let send_1 = {
1985                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1986                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1987                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1988                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1989                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1990         };
1991
1992         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1993         // initial fulfill/CS.
1994         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1995         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1996         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1997
1998         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
1999         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2000         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2001         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2002         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2003
2004         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2005         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2007         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2008         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2009
2010         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2011         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2012         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2013         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2014         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2015
2016         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2017         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2018         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2019
2020         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2021         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2022         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2023
2024         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2025         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2026         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2027
2028         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2029         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2030         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2031         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2032         // on-chain as necessary).
2033         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2034         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2035         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2036         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2037         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2038
2039         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2040         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2041         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2042
2043         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2044         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2045
2046         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2047         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2048         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2049         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2050         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2051         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2052
2053         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2054         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2055         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2056         let send_2 = {
2057                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2058                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2059                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2060                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2061                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2062         };
2063
2064         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2065         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2066         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2067         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2068
2069         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2070
2071         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2074
2075         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2077
2078         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2079         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2080         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2081         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2082
2083         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2085         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2086
2087         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2088         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2089
2090         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2091         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2092
2093         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2094         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2095 }
2096
2097 #[test]
2098 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2099         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2100         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2101         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2102         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2103         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2104         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2105
2106         // Create some initial channels
2107         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2108         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2109         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2110         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2111
2112         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2113         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2114         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2115         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2116         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2117         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2118
2119         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2120         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2121         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2122         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2123         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2124
2125         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2126         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2128         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2129         {
2130                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2131                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2132                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2133                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2134                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2135         }
2136         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2137         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2138         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2139         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2140         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2141
2142         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2143         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2144
2145         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2146         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2147         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2148         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2150         {
2151                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2152                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2153                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2154                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2155                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2156                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2157         }
2158         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2159         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2160         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2161         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2162         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2163
2164         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2165                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2166                         {
2167                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2168                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2169
2170                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2171                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2172                                 match events[0] {
2173                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2174                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2175                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2176                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2177                                         },
2178                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2179                                 };
2180                         }
2181                 }
2182         }
2183
2184         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2185         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2186         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2188         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2189         let node2_commitment_txid;
2190         {
2191                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2192                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2193                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2194                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2195
2196                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2197                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2198                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2199                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2200                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2201         }
2202         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2203         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2204         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2205         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2206         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2207
2208         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2209         // confusing us in the following tests.
2210         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2211
2212         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2213         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2214         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2215         // buffer space).
2216
2217         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2218                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2219                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2220                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2221                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2222                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2223                                 msg.clone()
2224                         },
2225                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2226                 };
2227                 match events[1] {
2228                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2229                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2230                         },
2231                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2232                 }
2233                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2234
2235                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2236                 {
2237                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2238                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2239                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2240                                         false
2241                                 } else { true }
2242                         });
2243                 }
2244
2245                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2246
2247                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2248                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2249
2250                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2251                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2252                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2253                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2254                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2255                                 msg.clone()
2256                         },
2257                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2258                 };
2259                 match events[1] {
2260                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2261                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2262                         },
2263                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2264                 }
2265                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2266                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2267
2268                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2269                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2270                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2271         };
2272         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2273         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2274         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2275         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2276
2277         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2278         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2279         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2280 }
2281
2282 #[test]
2283 fn test_justice_tx() {
2284         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2285         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2286         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2287         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2288         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2289         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2290         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2291         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2292         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2293         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2294         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2295         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2296         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2298         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2299         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2300         // Create some new channels:
2301         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2302
2303         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2304         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2305         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2306         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2307         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2308         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2309         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2310         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2311         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2312         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2313         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2314         // Revoke the old state
2315         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2316
2317         {
2318                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2319                 {
2320                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2321                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2322                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2323
2324                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2325                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2326                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2327                 }
2328                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2329                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2330                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2331
2332                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2333                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2334                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2335                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2336                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2337                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2338                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2339                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2340                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2341         }
2342         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2343
2344         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2345         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2346
2347         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2348         // Create some new channels:
2349         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2350         {
2351                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2352                 node_txn.clear();
2353         }
2354
2355         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2356         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2357         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2358         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2359         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2360         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2361         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2362         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2363         // Revoke the old state
2364         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2365         {
2366                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2367                 {
2368                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2369                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2370                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2371
2372                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2373                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2374                 }
2375                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2376                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2377
2378                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2379                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2380                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2381                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2382                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2383                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2384                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2385         }
2386         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2387         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2388         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2389 }
2390
2391 #[test]
2392 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2393         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2394         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2395         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2396         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2397         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2398         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2399         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2400         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2401         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2402         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2403         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2404         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2405         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2406         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2407
2408         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2409         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2410         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2411         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2412         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2413         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2414
2415         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2416         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2417
2418         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2419         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2420         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2421         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2422         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2423 }
2424
2425 #[test]
2426 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2427         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2428         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2429         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2430         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2431         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2432         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2433
2434         // Create some new channel:
2435         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2436
2437         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2438         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2439         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2440         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2441         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2442
2443         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2444         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2445         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2446         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2447         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2448         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2449         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2450         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2451         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2452
2453         //Revoke the old state
2454         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2455
2456         {
2457                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2458                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2459                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2460                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2461                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2462                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2463                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2464                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2465
2466                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2467                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2468
2469                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2470                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2471
2472                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2473                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2474                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2475                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2476                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2477                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2478                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2479                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2480
2481                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2482                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2483                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2484         }
2485         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2486         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2487         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2488 }
2489
2490 #[test]
2491 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2492         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2493         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2494         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2495         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2496         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2497         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2498
2499         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2500
2501         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2502         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2503         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2504         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2505         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2506         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2507
2508         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2509         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2510
2511         //Revoke the old state
2512         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2513
2514         {
2515                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2516                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2517                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2518                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2519                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2520                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2521                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2522                 match events[1] {
2523                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2524                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2525                 }
2526
2527                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2528                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2529
2530                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2531                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2532                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2533                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2534                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2535                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2536
2537                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2538                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2539                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2540                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2541                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2542                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2543                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2544
2545                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2546                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2547                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2548                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2549
2550                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2551                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2552                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2553
2554                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2555                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2556                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2557                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2558                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2559                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2560                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2561                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2562         }
2563         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2564         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2565         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2566 }
2567
2568 #[test]
2569 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2570         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2571         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2572         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2573         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2574         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2575         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2576         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2577         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2578         // towards B.
2579         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2580         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2581         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2582         // PaymentSent event).
2583
2584         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2585         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2586         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2587         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2588
2589         // Create some initial channels
2590         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2591         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2592
2593         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2594         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2595         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2596         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2597         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2598
2599         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2600         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2601         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2602
2603         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2604         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2605
2606         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2607         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2608         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2609         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2610         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2611         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2612         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2614         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2615         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2616         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2617         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2618         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2619
2620         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2621         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2623         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2624         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2625         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2626         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2627         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2628         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2629         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2630         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2631         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2632         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2633         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2634         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2635         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2636         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2637
2638         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2639         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2640         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2641         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2642         {
2643                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2644                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2645                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2646                 added_monitors.clear();
2647         }
2648         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2649         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2650         match forwarded_events[0] {
2651                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2652                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2653         }
2654         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2655                 } else { panic!(); }
2656         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2657                 } else { panic!(); }
2658         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2659         {
2660                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2661                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2662                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2663                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2664                 added_monitors.clear();
2665         }
2666         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2667         match events[0] {
2668                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2669                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2670         }
2671         match events[1] {
2672                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2673                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2674         }
2675
2676         match events[2] {
2677                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2678                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2679                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2680                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2681                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2682                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2683                 },
2684                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2685         };
2686         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2687                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2688                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2689                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2690                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2691                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2692                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2693                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2694                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2695                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2696                         if $htlc_offered {
2697                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2698                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2699                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2700                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2701                         } else {
2702                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2703                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2704                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2705                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2706                         }
2707                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2708                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2709                         node_txn.clear();
2710                 } }
2711         }
2712         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2713         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2714         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2715         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2716
2717         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2718         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2719         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2720         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2721         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2722         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2723         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2724         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2725         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2726         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2727         let commitment_spend =
2728                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2729                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2730                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2731                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2732                         &node_txn[0]
2733                 } else {
2734                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2735                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2736                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2737                         &node_txn[2]
2738                 };
2739
2740         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2741         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2742         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2743         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2744         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2745         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2746         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2747         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2748         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2749         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2750         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2751         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2752
2753         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2754         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2755         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2756         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2757         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2759         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2760         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2761         let mut first_claimed = false;
2762         for event in events {
2763                 match event {
2764                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2765                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2766                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2767                                         first_claimed = true;
2768                                 } else {
2769                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2770                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2771                                 }
2772                         },
2773                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2774                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2775                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2776                 }
2777         }
2778         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2779 }
2780
2781 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2782         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2783         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2784         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2785         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2786         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2787         //            \                                  \
2788         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2789
2790         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2791         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2792         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2793         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2794         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2795         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2796         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2797
2798         // Create some intial channels
2799         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2800         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2801
2802         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2803         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2804         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2805
2806         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2807
2808         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2809         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2810         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2811         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2812         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2813         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2814         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2815
2816         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2817         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2818         match events[0] {
2819                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2820                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2821                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2822                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2823                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2824                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2825                 },
2826                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2827         };
2828         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2829         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2831         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2832         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2833         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2834         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2835         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2836
2837         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2838         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2839         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2840         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2841         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2842         let timeout_tx;
2843         {
2844                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2845                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2846                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2847                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2848
2849                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2850                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2851
2852                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2853                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2854                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2855                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2856
2857                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2858                 node_txn.clear();
2859         }
2860
2861         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2863         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2864         {
2865                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2866                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2867                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2868                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2869         }
2870
2871         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2872         {
2873                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2874                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2875                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2876                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2877                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2878                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2879                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2880                 } else {
2881                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2882                 }
2883         }
2884
2885         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2886         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2887         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2888         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2889         match events[0] {
2890                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2891                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2892                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2893                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2894                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2895                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2896                 },
2897                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2898         };
2899
2900         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2901         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2902         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2903
2904         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2905         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2906
2907         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2908         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2909         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2910         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2911         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2912         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2913         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2914         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2915         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2916 }
2917
2918 #[test]
2919 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2920         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2921         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2922         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2923 }
2924
2925 #[test]
2926 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2927         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2928         // and fail backward accordingly.
2929
2930         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2931         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2932         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2933         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2934
2935         // Create some initial channels
2936         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2937         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2938
2939         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2940         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2941         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2942         // Revoke the old state
2943         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2944
2945         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2946
2947         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2948         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2949         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2951         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2952
2953         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2955         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2956         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2957         match events[0] {
2958                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2959                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2960                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2961                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2962                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2963                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2964
2965                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2966                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2967                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2968                 },
2969                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2970         }
2971 }
2972
2973 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2974         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2975         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2976         // commitment transaction anymore.
2977         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2978         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2979         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2980         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2981         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2982         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2983         // transactions:
2984         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2985         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2986         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2987         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2988         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2989         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2990         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2991         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2992         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2993
2994         // Create some initial channels
2995         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2996         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2997
2998         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
2999         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3000         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3001         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3002         // Revoke the old state
3003         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3004
3005         let value = if use_dust {
3006                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3007                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3008                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3009         } else { 3000000 };
3010
3011         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3012         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3013         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3014
3015         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3016         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3017         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3018         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3019         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3020         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3021         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3022         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3023         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3024         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3025         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3026         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3027
3028         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3029         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3030         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3031         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3032         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3033         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3034         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3035         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3036         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3037         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3038         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3040         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3041         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3042         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3043         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3044
3045         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3046         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3047         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3048         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3049         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3050         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3051         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3052         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3053         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3054         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3055         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3056         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3057         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3058         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3059         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3060         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3061         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3062         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3063
3064         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3065         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3066         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3067         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3068         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3069         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3070         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3071
3072         if deliver_bs_raa {
3073                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3074                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3075                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3076                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3077                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3078                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3079                 match events[0] {
3080                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3081                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3082                 };
3083                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3084                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3085         }
3086
3087         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3088         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3089
3090         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3092         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3093
3094         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3095         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
3096         match events[0] {
3097                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3098                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3099         }
3100         match events[1] {
3101                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3102                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3103                 },
3104                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3105         }
3106         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3107                 match events[2] {
3108                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3109                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3110                 };
3111         }
3112         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3114
3115         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3116         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3117         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3118                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3119                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3120         }
3121         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3122                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3123                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3124                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3125                 },
3126                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3127         }
3128         if deliver_bs_raa {
3129                 match events[0] {
3130                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3131                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3132                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3133                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3134                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3135                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3136                         },
3137                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3138                 }
3139         }
3140         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3141                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3142                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3143                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3144                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3145                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3146                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3147
3148                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3149                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3150                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3151
3152                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3153
3154                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3155                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3156                         match events[0] {
3157                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3158                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3159                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3160                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3161                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3162                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3163                                         }
3164                                 },
3165                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3166                         }
3167                         match events[1] {
3168                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3169                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3170                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3171                                 },
3172                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3173                         }
3174                         match events[2] {
3175                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3176                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3177                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3178                                 },
3179                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3180                         }
3181                 },
3182                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3183         }
3184
3185         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3186         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3187         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3188 }
3189
3190 #[test]
3191 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3192         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3193         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3194         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3195         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3196 }
3197
3198 #[test]
3199 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3200         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3201         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3202         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3203         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3204 }
3205
3206 #[test]
3207 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3208         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3209         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3210         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3211         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3212         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3213
3214         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3215         {
3216                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3217                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3218                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3219
3220                 let payment_event = {
3221                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3222                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3223                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3224                 };
3225                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3226                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3227         }
3228
3229         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3230         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3231         {
3232                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3233                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3234
3235                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3236         }
3237
3238         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3239         {
3240                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3241
3242                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3243                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3244                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3245                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3246                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3247                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3248
3249                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3250                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3251                         channel_id: chan.2,
3252                         htlc_id: 0,
3253                         amount_msat: 0,
3254                         payment_hash,
3255                         cltv_expiry,
3256                         onion_routing_packet,
3257                 };
3258                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3259         }
3260         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3261         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3262         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3263         match events[0] {
3264                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3265                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3266                 },
3267                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3268         }
3269         match events[1] {
3270                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3271                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3272                 },
3273                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3274         }
3275         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3277 }
3278
3279 #[test]
3280 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3281         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3282         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3283         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3284         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3285         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3286         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3287         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3288
3289         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3290         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3291         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3292         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3293         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3294         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3295
3296         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3297         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3298         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3299
3300         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3301         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3302         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3304         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3305
3306         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3307         // registering new transactions
3308         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3309         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3310 }
3311
3312 #[test]
3313 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3314         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3315         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3316         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3317         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3318         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3319         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3320         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3321
3322         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3323
3324         let mut payment_event = {
3325                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3326                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3327
3328                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3329                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3330                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3331         };
3332
3333         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3334         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3335
3336         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3337
3338         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3339         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3340         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3341         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3342
3343         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3344         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3345         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3346         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3347         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3348
3349         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3350         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3351         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3352
3353         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3354         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3355         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3356         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3357         let tx = {
3358                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3359                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3360                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3361                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3362                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3363                 node_txn.remove(0)
3364         };
3365
3366         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3367
3368         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3369         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3370         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3371         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3372
3373         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3374         {
3375                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3376                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3377         }
3378         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3379         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3380         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3381         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3382         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3383         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3384         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3385
3386         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3387 }
3388
3389 #[test]
3390 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3391         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3392         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3393         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3394         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3395
3396         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3397         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3398         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3399         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3400         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3401
3402         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3403
3404         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3405         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3406         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3407         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3408         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3409
3410         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3411         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3412
3413         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3414         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3415 }
3416
3417 #[test]
3418 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3419         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3420         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3421         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3422         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3423         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3424         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3425         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3426
3427         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3428         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3429         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3430
3431         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3432         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3433         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3434         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3435
3436         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3437         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3438         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3439
3440         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3441         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3442         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3443         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3444
3445         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3446         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3447
3448         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3449         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3450
3451         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3452         {
3453                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3454                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3455                 match events[0] {
3456                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3457                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3458                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3459                         },
3460                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3461                 }
3462                 match events[1] {
3463                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3464                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3465                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3466                         },
3467                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3468                 }
3469                 match events[2] {
3470                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3471                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3472                 }
3473         }
3474
3475         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3476         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3477 }
3478
3479 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3480         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3481         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3482         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3483         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3484         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3485
3486         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3487         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3488                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3489                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3490                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3491                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3492                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3493         } else {
3494                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3495         }
3496
3497         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3498
3499         let payment_event = {
3500                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3501                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3502
3503                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3504                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3505                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3506         };
3507         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3508
3509         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3510                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3511         } else {
3512                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3513                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3514                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3515                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3516                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3517
3518                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3519                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3520                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3521                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3522
3523                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3524                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3525                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3526                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3527                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3528
3529                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3530                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3531                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3532                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3533                                         }
3534                                 }
3535                         }
3536                 }
3537         }
3538
3539         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3540         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3541         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3542                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3543                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3544                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3545                         //
3546                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3547                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3548                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3549                         //
3550                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3551                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3552                 }
3553                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3554                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3555                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3556         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3557                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3558                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3559         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3560                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3561                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3562         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3563                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3564                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3565         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3566                 // Everything was delivered...
3567                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3568         }
3569
3570         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3571         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3572         match events_1[0] {
3573                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3574                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3575         };
3576
3577         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3578         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3579         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3580
3581         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3582
3583         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3584         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3585         match events_2[0] {
3586                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3587                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3588                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3589                         match &purpose {
3590                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3591                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3592                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3593                                 },
3594                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3595                         }
3596                 },
3597                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3598         }
3599
3600         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3601         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3602
3603         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3604         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3605         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3606                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3607                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3608                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3609                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3610                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3611                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3612                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3613                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3614                 },
3615                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3616         };
3617
3618         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3619                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3620
3621                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3622                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3623                 match events_4[0] {
3624                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3625                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3626                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3627                         },
3628                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3629                 }
3630
3631                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3632                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3633                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3634                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3635
3636                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3637                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3638                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3639                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3640
3641                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3642                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3643                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3644                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3645                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3646
3647                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3648                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3649                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3650                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3651                                         }
3652                                 }
3653                         }
3654                 }
3655         }
3656
3657         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3658         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3659         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3660                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3661                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3662                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3663                 } else {
3664                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3665                 }
3666         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3667                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3668                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3669         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3670                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3671                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3672         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3673                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3674                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3675         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3676                 // Everything was delivered...
3677                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3678         }
3679
3680         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3681                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3682         }
3683
3684         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3685         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3686         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3687
3688         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3689                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3690         }
3691
3692         // Channel should still work fine...
3693         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3694         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3695         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3696 }
3697
3698 #[test]
3699 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3700         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3701         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3702         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3703         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3704 }
3705
3706 #[test]
3707 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3708         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3709         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3710         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3711         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3712 }
3713
3714 #[test]
3715 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3716         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3717         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3718         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3719         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3720         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3721         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3722         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3723         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3724         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3725
3726         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3727         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3728
3729         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3730         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3731         let chan_id;
3732         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3733         match events_1[0] {
3734                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3735                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3736                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3737                 },
3738                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3739         }
3740
3741         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3742
3743         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3744         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3745
3746         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3747         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3748         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3749         let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3750                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3751                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3752                         msg.clone()
3753                 },
3754                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3755         };
3756         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3757                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3758                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3759                         msg.clone()
3760                 },
3761                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3762         };
3763
3764         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3765
3766         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3767         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3768         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3769         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3770         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3771                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3772                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3773                         msg.clone()
3774                 },
3775                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3776         };
3777         let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3778                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3779                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3780                 },
3781                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3782         };
3783
3784         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3785         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3786         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3787         let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3788                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3789                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3790                 },
3791                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3792         };
3793
3794         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3795         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3796         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3797
3798         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3799         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3800         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3801
3802         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3803         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3804         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3805
3806         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3807         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3808         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3809
3810         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3811         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3812         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3813         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3814         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3815         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3816                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3817         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3818
3819         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3820         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3821                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3822                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3823                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3824                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3825                         keys_manager,
3826                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3827                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3828                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3829                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3830                         channel_monitors,
3831                 }).unwrap()
3832         };
3833         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3834         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3835
3836         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3837         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3838         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3839
3840         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3841
3842         // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3843         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3844         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3845         let mut found_announcement = false;
3846         for event in msgs.iter() {
3847                 match event {
3848                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3849                                 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3850                         },
3851                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3852                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3853                 }
3854         }
3855         assert!(found_announcement);
3856 }
3857
3858 #[test]
3859 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3860         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3861         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3862         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3863         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3864         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3865         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3866         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3867
3868         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3869
3870         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3871         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3872         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3873         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3874
3875         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3876         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3877         match events_1[0] {
3878                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3879                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3880         }
3881
3882         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3883         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3884
3885         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3886         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3887         match events_2[0] {
3888                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3889                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3890                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3891                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3892                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3893                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3894                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3895
3896                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3897                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3898                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3899                         match events_3[0] {
3900                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3901                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3902                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3903                                 },
3904                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3905                         }
3906
3907                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3908                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3909                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3910                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3911                 },
3912                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3913         }
3914
3915         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3916         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3917
3918         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3919         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3920         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3921         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3922         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3923         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3924
3925         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3926         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3927         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3928         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3929
3930         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3931         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3932
3933         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3934         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3935
3936         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3937
3938         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3939         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3940         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3941         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3942         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3943         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3944         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3945         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3946         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3947         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3948
3949         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3950         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3951         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3952         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3953         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3954         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3955         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3957
3958         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3959         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3960         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3961         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3962         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3963         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3964         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3966
3967         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3968         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3969         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3970         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3971
3972         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3973         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3974         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3975         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3976
3977         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3978         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3979         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3980
3981         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3982
3983         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3984         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3985         match events_5[0] {
3986                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3987                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3988                         match &purpose {
3989                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3990                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3991                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3992                                 },
3993                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3994                         }
3995                 },
3996                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3997         }
3998
3999         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4000         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4001         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4002
4003         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4004         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4005 }
4006
4007 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4008         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4009         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4010         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4011         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4012         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4013         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4014
4015         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4016
4017         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4018                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4019                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4020                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4021                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4022                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4023                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4024                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4025                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4026                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4027                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4028                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4029                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4030                 our_payment_hash
4031         } else {
4032                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4033         };
4034
4035         let mut block = Block {
4036                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4037                 txdata: vec![],
4038         };
4039         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4040         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4041         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4042         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4043                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4044                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4045                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4046         }
4047
4048         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4049
4050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4051         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4052         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4053         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4054         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4055         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4056
4057         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4058         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4059         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4060         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4061         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4062         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4063 }
4064
4065 #[test]
4066 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4067         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4068         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4069 }
4070
4071 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4072         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4073         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4074         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4075         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4076         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4077         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4078         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4079
4080         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4081         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4082         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4083         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4084
4085         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4086         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4087         {
4088                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4089         }
4090         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4092
4093         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4094         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4095         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4096         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4097         if forwarded_htlc {
4098                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4099                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4100                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4101                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4102                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4103         }
4104         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4105
4106         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4107         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4108         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4109         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4110
4111         if forwarded_htlc {
4112                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4113                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4114                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4115                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4116                 match fail_commit[0] {
4117                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4118                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4119                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4120                         },
4121                         _ => unreachable!(),
4122                 }
4123                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4124         } else {
4125                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4126         }
4127 }
4128
4129 #[test]
4130 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4131         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4132         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4133 }
4134
4135 #[test]
4136 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4137         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4138         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4139         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4140         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4141         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4142         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4143         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4144         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4145         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4146
4147         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4148
4149         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4150
4151         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4152         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4153         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4154                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4155
4156         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4157         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4158         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4159         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4160         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4161         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4162         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4163         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4164                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4165         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4166
4167         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4168         let config = UserConfig::default();
4169         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4170                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4171                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4172                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4173                         default_config: config,
4174                         keys_manager,
4175                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4176                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4177                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4178                         logger: &logger,
4179                         channel_monitors,
4180                 }).unwrap()
4181         };
4182         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4183         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4184
4185         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4186         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4187         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4189
4190         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4191         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4192         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4193         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4194
4195         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4196         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4197         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4198         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4199
4200         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4201         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4202         for node in nodes.iter() {
4203                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4204                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4205                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4206         }
4207
4208         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4209 }
4210
4211 #[test]
4212 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4213         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4214         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4215         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4216         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4217         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4218         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4219         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4220         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4221         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4222         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4223
4224         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4225         let channel_value = 100000;
4226         let push_msat = 10001;
4227         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4228         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4229         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4230         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4231         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4232         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4233         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4234
4235         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4236
4237         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4238         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4239
4240         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4241         {
4242                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4243                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4244                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4245                 added_monitors.clear();
4246         }
4247
4248         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4249         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4250         {
4251                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4252                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4253                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4254                 added_monitors.clear();
4255         }
4256         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4257
4258         nodes.push(node_a);
4259         nodes.push(node_b);
4260
4261         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4262         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4263         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4264         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4265
4266         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4267         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4268         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4269         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4270         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4271         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4272         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4273         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4274                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4275         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4276
4277         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4278         let config = UserConfig::default();
4279         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4280                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4281                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4282                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4283                         default_config: config,
4284                         keys_manager,
4285                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4286                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4287                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4288                         logger: &logger,
4289                         channel_monitors,
4290                 }).unwrap()
4291         };
4292         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4293         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4294
4295         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4296
4297         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4298         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4299
4300         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4301         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4302         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4303         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4304         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4305
4306         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4307         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4309
4310         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4311         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4312         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4313         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4314
4315         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4316         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4317         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4318         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4319
4320         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4321         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4322         for node in nodes.iter() {
4323                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4324                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4325                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4326         }
4327
4328         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4329 }
4330
4331 #[test]
4332 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4333         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4334         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4335         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4336         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4337         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4338         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4339         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4340         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4341         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4342         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4343
4344         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4345         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4346
4347         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4348
4349         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4350         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4351         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4352
4353         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4354         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4355         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4356         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4357         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4358         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4359         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4360         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4361                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4362         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4363
4364         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4365         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4366                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4367                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4368                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4369                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4370                         keys_manager,
4371                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4372                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4373                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4374                         logger: &logger,
4375                         channel_monitors,
4376                 }).unwrap()
4377         };
4378         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4379         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4380
4381         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4382         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4383         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4384
4385         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4386
4387         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4388         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4389 }
4390
4391 #[test]
4392 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4393         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4394         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4395         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4396         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4397         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4398         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4399         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4400         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4401         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4402         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4403         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4404         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4405         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4406
4407         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4408         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4409                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4410                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4411                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4412         }
4413
4414         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4415
4416         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4417         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4418
4419         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4420         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4421         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4422         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4423
4424         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4425         // nodes[3])
4426         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4427         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4428                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4429                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4430                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4431         }
4432
4433         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4434         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4435         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4436         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4437         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4438         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4439
4440
4441         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4442         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4443                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4444                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4445                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4446                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4447         }
4448
4449         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4450         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4451                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4452                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4453                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4454                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4455         }
4456
4457         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4458         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4459                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4460                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4461                 keys_manager,
4462                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4463                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4464                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4465                 logger: &logger,
4466                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4467         }) { } else {
4468                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4469         };
4470
4471         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4472         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4473                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4474                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4475                 keys_manager,
4476                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4477                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4478                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4479                 logger: &logger,
4480                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4481         }).unwrap();
4482         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4483         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4484
4485         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4486                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4487                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4488                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4489                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4490         }
4491
4492         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4493                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4494                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4495         }
4496         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4497         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4498
4499         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4500         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4501         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4502         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4503         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4504
4505         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4506         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4507         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4508         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4509         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4510         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4511         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4512                 match action {
4513                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4514                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4515                         },
4516                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4517                 }
4518         }
4519 }
4520
4521 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4522         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4523                 {
4524                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4525                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4526                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4527                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4528                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4529                                 match event {
4530                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4531                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4532                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4533                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4534                                                 }
4535                                         },
4536                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4537                                 };
4538                         }
4539                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4540                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4541                                         txn.push(tx);
4542                                 }
4543                         }
4544                         txn
4545                 }
4546         }
4547 }
4548
4549 #[test]
4550 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4551         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4552         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4553         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4554         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4555         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4556
4557         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4558         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4559         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4560         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4561         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4562         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4563         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4564         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4565         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4566
4567         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4568         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4569
4570         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4571         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4572         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4573         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4574         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4575 }
4576
4577 #[test]
4578 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4579         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4580         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4581         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4582         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4583         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4584         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4585
4586         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4587         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4588         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4589         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4590         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4591
4592         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4593         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4594         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4595         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4596
4597         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4598         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4599         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4600         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4601         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4602
4603         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4604         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4605         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4606 }
4607
4608 #[test]
4609 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4610         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4611         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4612
4613         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4614         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4615         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4616         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4617
4618         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4619         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4620         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4621         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4622         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4623
4624         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4625         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4626         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4627         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4628         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4629
4630         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4631         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4632         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4633
4634         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4635         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4636         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4637         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4638         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4639 }
4640
4641 #[test]
4642 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4643         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4646         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4647
4648         // Create some initial channels
4649         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4650
4651         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4652
4653         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4654         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4655         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4656
4657         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4658         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4659         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4660         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4662         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4663         match events[0] {
4664                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4665                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4666         }
4667         match events[1] {
4668                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4669                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4670         }
4671
4672         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4673         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4674         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4675         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4676         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4677         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4678         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4679
4680         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4681         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4682         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4683
4684         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4685         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4686         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4687 }
4688
4689 #[test]
4690 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4691         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4692         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4693         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4694         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4695
4696         // Create some initial channels
4697         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4698
4699         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4700         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4701
4702         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4703
4704         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4705         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4706         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4707
4708         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4709         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4710         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4711         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4712         match events[0] {
4713                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4714                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4715         }
4716         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4717
4718         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4719         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4720         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4721         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4722         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4723         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4724
4725         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4726         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4727         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4728         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4729
4730         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4731         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4732         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4733         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4734         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4735 }
4736
4737 #[test]
4738 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4739         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4740         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4741         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4742         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4743
4744         // Create some initial channels
4745         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4746
4747         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4748         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4749         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4750         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4751
4752         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4753
4754         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4755         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4756         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4757         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4758
4759         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4760         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4761         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4762         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4763
4764         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4765         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4766
4767         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4768         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4769         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4770 }
4771
4772 #[test]
4773 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4774         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4775         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4776         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4777         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4778         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4779
4780         // Create some initial channels
4781         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4782
4783         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4784         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4785         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4786         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4787
4788         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4789
4790         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4791         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4792         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4793         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4794         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4795         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4796
4797         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4798         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4799         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4800         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4801         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4802         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4803         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4804
4805         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4806         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4807         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4808         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4809         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4810         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4811
4812         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4813         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4814         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4815         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4816         // transactions next...
4817         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4818         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4819
4820         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4821         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4822         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4823                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4824         } else {
4825                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4826                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4827         }
4828
4829         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4830         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4831
4832         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4833         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4834
4835         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4836         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4837         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4838         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4839         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4840 }
4841
4842 #[test]
4843 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4844         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4845         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4846         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4847         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4848         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4849
4850         // Create some initial channels
4851         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4852
4853         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4854         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4855         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4856         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4857
4858         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4859         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4860
4861         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4862
4863         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4864         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4865         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4866         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4867         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4868         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4869
4870         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4871         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4872         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4873         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4874
4875         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4876         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4877         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4878
4879         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4880         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4881         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4882         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4883         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4884         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4885
4886         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4887         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4888
4889         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4890         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4891         // transactions next...
4892         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4893         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4894         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4895                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4896         } else {
4897                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4898                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4899         }
4900
4901         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4902         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4903
4904         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4905
4906         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4907         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4908
4909         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4910         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4911
4912         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4913         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4914         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4915         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4916         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4917         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4918         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4919         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4920 }
4921
4922 #[test]
4923 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4924         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4925         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4926         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4927         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4928         // channel.
4929         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4930         // gets broadcast.
4931
4932         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4933         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4934         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4935         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4936
4937         // Create some initial channels
4938         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4939         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4940
4941         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4942         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4943         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4944         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4945         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4946
4947         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4948         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4949         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4950
4951         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4952         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4953         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4954         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4956         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4957         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4958         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4959         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4960         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4961
4962         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4963         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4964         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4965         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4966
4967         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4968         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4969         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4970         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4971         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4972         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4973         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4974         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4975         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4976         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4977
4978         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4979         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4980         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4981         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4982         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4983         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4984         match events[0] {
4985                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4986                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4987         }
4988         match events[1] {
4989                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
4990                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4991                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4992                 },
4993                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4994         }
4995         {
4996                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4997                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4998                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4999                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5000                 b_txn.clear();
5001         }
5002         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5003         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5004         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5005         match msg_events[0] {
5006                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5007                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5008         }
5009         match msg_events[1] {
5010                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5011                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5012         }
5013         match msg_events[2] {
5014                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5015                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5016                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5017                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5018                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5019                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5020                 },
5021                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5022         };
5023         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5024         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5025         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5026         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5027         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5028         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5029         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5030         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5031         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5032         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5033         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5034         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5035         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5036
5037         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5038         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5039 }
5040
5041 #[test]
5042 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5043         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5044         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5045         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5046         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5047         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5048         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5049         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5050         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5051         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5052         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5053         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5054                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5055         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5056
5057         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5058         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5059         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5060
5061         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5062         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5063         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5064         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5065         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5066
5067         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5068
5069         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5070         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5071         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5072         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5073         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5074         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5075
5076         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5077         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5078         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5079
5080         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5081         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5083         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5084         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5085
5086         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5087         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5088                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5089                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5090                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5091                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5092
5093                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5094                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5095                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5096                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5097                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5098                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5099                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5100
5101                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5102                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5103                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5104                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5105         }
5106
5107         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5108         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5109         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5110         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5111         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5112         match events[0] {
5113                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5114                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5115         }
5116         match events[1] {
5117                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5118                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5119         }
5120         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5121         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5122         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5123         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5124         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5125         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5126         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5127         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5128         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5129         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5130         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5131         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5132         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5133
5134         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5135         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5136         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5137         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5138         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5139         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5140         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5141         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5142         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5144
5145         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5146         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5147         {
5148                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5149         }
5150         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5151
5152         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5153         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5154         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5155         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5156         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5157         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5158         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5159         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5160         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5161         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5162         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5164
5165         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5166         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5167
5168         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5169         match events[0] {
5170                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5171                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5172                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5173                 }
5174                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5175         }
5176 }
5177
5178 #[test]
5179 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5180         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5181         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5182         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5183         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5184
5185         // Create some initial channels
5186         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5187
5188         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5189         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5190         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5191         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5192         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5193
5194         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5195         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5196         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5197         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5198         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5199         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5200         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5201         match events[0] {
5202                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5203                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5204         }
5205         match events[1] {
5206                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5207                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5208         }
5209         let node_tx = {
5210                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5211                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5212                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5213                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5214                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5215                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5216                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5217                 node_txn[0].clone()
5218         };
5219
5220         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5221         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5222
5223         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5224         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5225         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5226         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5227         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5228         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5229 }
5230
5231 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5232         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5233         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5234         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5235         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5236         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5237         // use the same payment hashes.
5238         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5239         //
5240         // A \         / E
5241         //    - C - D -
5242         // B /         \ F
5243         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5244         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5245         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5246         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5247         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5248         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5249         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5250         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5251                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5252         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5253
5254         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5255         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5256         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5257         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5258         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5259
5260         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5261         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5262         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5263         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5264
5265         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5266         // 0th HTLC:
5267         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5268         // 1st HTLC:
5269         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5270         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5271         // 2nd HTLC:
5272         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5273         // 3rd HTLC:
5274         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5275         // 4th HTLC:
5276         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5277         // 5th HTLC:
5278         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5279         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5280         // 6th HTLC:
5281         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5282         // 7th HTLC:
5283         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5284
5285         // 8th HTLC:
5286         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5287         // 9th HTLC:
5288         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5289         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5290
5291         // 10th HTLC:
5292         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5293         // 11th HTLC:
5294         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5295         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5296
5297         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5298         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5299         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5300         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5301         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5302
5303         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5304         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5305         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5306         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5307         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5308         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5309         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5310         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5312
5313         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5314         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5315         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5316         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5317         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5318         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5319
5320         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5321         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5322         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5323         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5324         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5325         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5326
5327         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5328         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5329         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5330         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5331
5332         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5333
5334         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5335         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5336         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5337         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5338         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5339         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5340         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5341         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5342         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5343         if deliver_last_raa {
5344                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5345         } else {
5346                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5347         }
5348
5349         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5350         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5351         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5352         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5353         //
5354         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5355         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5356         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5357         //
5358         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5359         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5360         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5361
5362         if announce_latest {
5363                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5364         } else {
5365                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5366         }
5367         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5368         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5369                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5370                 events[1].clone()
5371         } else {
5372                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5373                 events[0].clone()
5374         };
5375         match close_event {
5376                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5377                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5378         }
5379
5380         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5381         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5382         if deliver_last_raa {
5383                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5384         } else {
5385                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5386         }
5387         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5388
5389         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5390         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5391         let mut a_done = false;
5392         for msg in cs_msgs {
5393                 match msg {
5394                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5395                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5396                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5397                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5398                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5399                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5400                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5401                                         }
5402                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5403                                         assert!(!a_done);
5404                                         a_done = true;
5405                                         &nodes[0]
5406                                 } else {
5407                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5408                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5409                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5410                                         }
5411                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5412                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5413                                         &nodes[1]
5414                                 };
5415                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5416                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5417                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5418                                 if announce_latest {
5419                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5420                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5421                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5422                                         }
5423                                 }
5424                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5425                         },
5426                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5427                 }
5428         }
5429
5430         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5431         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5432         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5433         let mut as_updates = 0;
5434         for event in as_events.iter() {
5435                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5436                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5437                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5438                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5439                         } else {
5440                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5441                         }
5442                         if network_update.is_some() {
5443                                 as_updates += 1;
5444                         }
5445                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5446         }
5447         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5448         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5449         if announce_latest {
5450                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5451                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5452         }
5453         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5454
5455         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5456         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5457         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5458         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5459         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5460                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5461                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5462                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5463                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5464                         } else {
5465                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5466                         }
5467                         if network_update.is_some() {
5468                                 bs_updates += 1;
5469                         }
5470                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5471         }
5472         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5473         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5474         if announce_latest {
5475                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5476         }
5477         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5478
5479         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5480         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5481         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5482         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5483         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5484         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5485 }
5486
5487 #[test]
5488 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5489         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5490 }
5491
5492 #[test]
5493 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5494         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5495 }
5496
5497 #[test]
5498 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5499         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5500         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5501         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5502 }
5503
5504 #[test]
5505 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5506         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5507         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5508         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5509         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5510
5511         // Create some initial channels
5512         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5513
5514         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5515         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5516         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5517         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5518
5519         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5520         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5521         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5523         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5524         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5525
5526         let htlc_timeout = {
5527                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5528                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5529                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5530                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5531                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5532                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5533                 node_txn[1].clone()
5534         };
5535
5536         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5537         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5538         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5539
5540         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5541         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5542         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5543         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5544         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5545         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5546         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5547         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5548         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5549         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5550                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5551 }
5552
5553 #[test]
5554 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5555         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5556         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5557         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5558
5559         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5560
5561         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5562         let seed = [42; 32];
5563         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5564         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5565         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5566         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5567         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5568         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5569
5570         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5571         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5572
5573         // Create some initial channels
5574         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5575         // for node 0
5576         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5577         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5578         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5579
5580         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5581         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5582         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5583         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5584         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5585
5586         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5587         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5588         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5589         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5590         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5591
5592         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5593         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5594         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5595         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5596             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5597             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5598             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5599                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5600         }
5601
5602         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5603         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5604         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5605         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5606         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5607         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5608
5609         let htlc_timeout = {
5610                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5611                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5612                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5613                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5614                 node_txn[1].clone()
5615         };
5616
5617         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5618         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5619         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5620
5621         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5622         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5623         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5624         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5625         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5626         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5627         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5628         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5629         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5630         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5631         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5632                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5633 }
5634
5635 #[test]
5636 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5637         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5638         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5639         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5640         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5641
5642         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5643
5644         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5645         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5646
5647         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5648         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5649         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5650
5651         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5652         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5653         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5654
5655         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5656         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5657         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5658
5659         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5660         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5661         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5662 }
5663
5664 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5665         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5666         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5667         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5668         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5669         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5670
5671         let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5672
5673         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5674         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5675         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5676         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5677
5678         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5679         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5680         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5681
5682         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5683         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5684         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5685         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5686         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5687
5688         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5689         let mut block = Block {
5690                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5691                 txdata: vec![],
5692         };
5693         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5694                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5695                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5696         }
5697         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5698         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5699         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5700         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5701 }
5702
5703 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5704         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5705         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5706         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5707         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5708         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5709
5710         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5711         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5712         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5713
5714         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5715
5716         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5717         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5718         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5719
5720         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5721         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5722
5723         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5724                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5725                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5726         }
5727         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5728         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5729         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5730         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5731 }
5732
5733 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5734         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5735         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5736         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5737         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5738         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5739
5740         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5741         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5742         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5743         // actually revoked.
5744         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5745         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5746         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5747         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5748         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5749
5750         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5751         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5752         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5753         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5754         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5755         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5756         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5757         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5759         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5760
5761         if check_revoke_no_close {
5762                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5763                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5764         }
5765
5766         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5767         let mut block = Block {
5768                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5769                 txdata: vec![],
5770         };
5771         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5772                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5773                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5774         }
5775         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5776                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5777                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5778                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5779                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5780         } else {
5781                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5782         }
5783 }
5784
5785 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5786 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5787 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5788 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5789 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5790 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5791 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5792 // non-dust HTLCs.
5793 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5794 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5795 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5796 #[test]
5797 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5798         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5799         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5800
5801         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5802         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5803 }
5804
5805 #[test]
5806 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5807         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5808         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5809         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5810         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5811 }
5812
5813 #[test]
5814 #[should_panic]
5815 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5816         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5817         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5818         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5819         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5820         //Force duplicate channel ids
5821         for node in nodes.iter() {
5822                 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5823         }
5824
5825         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5826         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5827         let push_msat=10001;
5828         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5829         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5830         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5831
5832         //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5833         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5834 }
5835
5836 #[test]
5837 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5838         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5839         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5840         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5841         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5842
5843         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5844         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5845         let push_msat=10001;
5846         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5847
5848         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5849         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5850         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5851         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5852         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5853
5854         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5855         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5856         let push_msat=10001;
5857         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5858         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5859         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5860
5861         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5862         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5863         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5864
5865         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5866         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5867         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5868
5869         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5870         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5871         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5872
5873         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5874         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5875         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5876         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5877         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5878         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5879 }
5880
5881 #[test]
5882 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5883         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5884         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5885         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5886         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5887
5888         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5889         let push_msat=10001;
5890         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5891         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5892         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5893         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5894
5895         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5896         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5897         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5898                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5899                         msg.clone()
5900                 },
5901                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5902         };
5903         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5904 }
5905
5906 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5907 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5908 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5909 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5910 #[test]
5911 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5912         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5913         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5914         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5915         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5916         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5917
5918         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5919         // pending_update_fee.
5920         {
5921                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5922                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5923         }
5924         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5925         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5926
5927         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5928         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5929         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5930                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5931                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5932                 },
5933                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5934         };
5935
5936         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5937
5938         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5939         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5940         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5941
5942         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5943         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5944         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5945
5946         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5947         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5948         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5949         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5950
5951         // Flush the pending fee update.
5952         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5953         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5955         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5957
5958         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5959         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5960         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5961         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5962         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5963         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5964         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5965                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5966         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5967
5968         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5969         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5970         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5971         match &events[0] {
5972                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
5973                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5974                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5975                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5976                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5977                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5978                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
5979                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5980                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5981                 },
5982                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5983         }
5984 }
5985
5986 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5987 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5988 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5989 #[test]
5990 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5991         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5992         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5993         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5994         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5995         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5996
5997         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5998         // pending_update_fee.
5999         {
6000                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6001                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6002         }
6003         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6004         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6005
6006         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6007         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6008         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6009                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6010                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6011                 },
6012                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6013         };
6014
6015         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6016
6017         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6018         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6019         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6020
6021         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6022         let amt_1 = 20000;
6023         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6024         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6025         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6026
6027         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6028         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6029         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6030         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6031         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6032         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6033         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6034
6035         // Flush the pending fee update.
6036         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6037         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6038         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6039         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6040         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6042
6043         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6044         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6045         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6046         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6047         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6048         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6049         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6050                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6051         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6052
6053         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6054         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6055         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6056         match &events[0] {
6057                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6058                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6059                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6060                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6061                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6062                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6063                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6064                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6065                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6066                 },
6067                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6068         }
6069
6070         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6071         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6072                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6073                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6074                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6075         };
6076         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6077                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6078                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6079         };
6080         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6081         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6082         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6083         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6084         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6085         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6086         match events[0] {
6087                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6088                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6089         }
6090         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6091         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6092         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6093         match events[0] {
6094                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6095                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6096         }
6097         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6098         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6099         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6100         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6101         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6102         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6103 }
6104
6105 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6106 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6107 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6108 // once it's freed.
6109 #[test]
6110 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6111         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6112         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6113         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6114         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6115         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6116         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6117         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6118         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6119         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6120         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6121
6122         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6123         // pending_update_fee.
6124         {
6125                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6126                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6127         }
6128         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6129         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6130
6131         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6132         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6133         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6134                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6135                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6136                 },
6137                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6138         };
6139
6140         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6141
6142         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6143         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6144         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6145
6146         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6147         let feemsat = 239;
6148         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6149         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6150         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6151         let payment_event = {
6152                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6153                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6154
6155                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6156                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6157
6158                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6159         };
6160         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6162         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6163         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6164
6165         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6166         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6167
6168         // Flush the pending fee update.
6169         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6170         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6172         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6173         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6175
6176         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6177         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6178         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6179
6180         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6181                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6182                         msg.clone()
6183                 },
6184                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6185         };
6186
6187         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6189         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6190
6191         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6192         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6193         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6194         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6195                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6196                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6197         }
6198
6199         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6200         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6201         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6202
6203         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6204         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6205         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6206         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6207                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6208                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6209                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6210                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6211                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6212                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6213                 },
6214                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6215         };
6216
6217         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6218         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6219         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6220
6221         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6222         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6224         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6225         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6226         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6227         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6228         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6229         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6230                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6231                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6232         };
6233         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6234         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6235         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6236 }
6237
6238 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6239 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6240 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6241
6242 #[test]
6243 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6244         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6245         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6246         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6247         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6248         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6249         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6250
6251         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6252         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6253
6254         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6255                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6256         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6257         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6258 }
6259
6260 #[test]
6261 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6262         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6263         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6264         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6265         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6266         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6267         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6268
6269         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6270         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6271         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6272                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6273
6274         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6275         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6276 }
6277
6278 #[test]
6279 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6280         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6281         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6282         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6283         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6284         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6285         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6286
6287         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6288         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6290         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6291         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6292
6293         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6294         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6295         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6297         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6298 }
6299
6300 #[test]
6301 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6302         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6303         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6304         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6305         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6306         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6307         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6308         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6309
6310         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6311         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6312                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6313 }
6314
6315 #[test]
6316 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6317         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6318         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6319         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6320         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6321         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6322         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6323         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6324         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6325         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6326
6327         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6328                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6329                 let payment_event = {
6330                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6331                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6332
6333                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6334                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6335                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6336                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6337                         } else {
6338                                 assert!(false);
6339                         }
6340                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6341                 };
6342                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6343                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6344                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6345
6346                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6347                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6348         }
6349         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6350         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6351                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6352
6353         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6354         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6355 }
6356
6357 #[test]
6358 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6359         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6360         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6361         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6362         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6363         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6364         let channel_value = 100000;
6365         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6366         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6367
6368         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6369
6370         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6371         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6372         // limits us to.
6373         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6374         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6375                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6376
6377         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6378         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6379
6380         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6381 }
6382
6383 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6384 #[test]
6385 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6386         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6387         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6388         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6389         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6390         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6391         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6392         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6393         {
6394                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6395                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6396                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6397         }
6398
6399         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6400         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6401         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6402         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6403         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6404         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6405         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6406         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6407         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6408         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6409         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6410 }
6411
6412 #[test]
6413 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6414         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6415         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6416         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6417         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6418         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6419         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6420
6421         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6422         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6423         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6424         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6425         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6426
6427         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6428         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6429         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6430         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6431         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6432
6433         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6434         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6435         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6436         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6437         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6438
6439         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6440         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6441         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6442         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6443         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6444 }
6445
6446 #[test]
6447 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6448         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6449         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6450         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6451         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6452         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6453         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6454         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6455
6456         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6457         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6458         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6459         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6460         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6461         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6462
6463         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6464                 channel_id: chan.2,
6465                 htlc_id: 0,
6466                 amount_msat: 1000,
6467                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6468                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6469                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6470         };
6471
6472         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6473                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6474                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6475         }
6476         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6477         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6478
6479         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6480         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6481         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6483         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6484 }
6485
6486 #[test]
6487 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6488         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6489         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6490         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6491         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6492         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6493         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6494
6495         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6496         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6497         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6498         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6499         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6500         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6501
6502         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6503         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6504         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6505         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6506         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6507 }
6508
6509 #[test]
6510 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6511         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6512         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6513         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6514         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6515         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6516
6517         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6518         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6519         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6520         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6521         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6522         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6523         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6524
6525         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6526         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6527         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6528         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6529         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6530 }
6531
6532 #[test]
6533 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6534         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6535         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6536         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6537         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6538         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6539         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6540         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6541
6542         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6543         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6544         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6545         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6546         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6547         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6548
6549         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6550         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6551         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6552         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6553         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6554         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6555         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6556         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6557         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6558         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6559         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6560         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6561         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6562
6563         //Resend HTLC
6564         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6565         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6566         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6567         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6568         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6569
6570         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6571
6572         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6573         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6574         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6575         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6576         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6577 }
6578
6579 #[test]
6580 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6581         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6582
6583         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6584         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6585         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6586         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6587         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6588         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6589         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6590
6591         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6592         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6593         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6594
6595         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6596                 channel_id: chan.2,
6597                 htlc_id: 0,
6598                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6599         };
6600
6601         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6602
6603         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6604         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6605         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6606         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6607         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6608 }
6609
6610 #[test]
6611 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6612         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6613
6614         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6615         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6616         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6617         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6618         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6619
6620         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6621         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6623         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6624         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6625
6626         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6627                 channel_id: chan.2,
6628                 htlc_id: 0,
6629                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6630         };
6631
6632         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6633
6634         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6635         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6636         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6637         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6638         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6639 }
6640
6641 #[test]
6642 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6643         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6644
6645         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6646         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6647         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6648         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6649         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6650
6651         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6652         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6653         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6654         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6655         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6656         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6657                 channel_id: chan.2,
6658                 htlc_id: 0,
6659                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6660                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6661         };
6662
6663         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6664
6665         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6666         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6667         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6668         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6669         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6670 }
6671
6672 #[test]
6673 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6674         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6675
6676         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6677         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6678         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6679         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6680         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6681
6682         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6683
6684         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6685         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6686
6687         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6688         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6689         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6690                 match events[0] {
6691                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6692                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6693                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6694                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6695                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6696                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6697                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6698                         },
6699                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6700                 }
6701         };
6702
6703         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6704
6705         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6706
6707         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6708         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6709         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6710         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6711         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6712 }
6713
6714 #[test]
6715 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6716         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6717
6718         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6719         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6720         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6721         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6722         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6723
6724         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6725
6726         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6727         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6728
6729         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6730         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6731         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6732                 match events[0] {
6733                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6734                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6735                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6736                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6737                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6738                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6739                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6740                         },
6741                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6742                 }
6743         };
6744
6745         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6746
6747         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6748
6749         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6750         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6751         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6752         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6753         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6754 }
6755
6756 #[test]
6757 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6758         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6759
6760         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6761         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6762         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6763         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6764         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6765
6766         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6767         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6768         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6769
6770         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6771         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6772
6773         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6774         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6775         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6776
6777         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6778
6779         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6780                 match events[0] {
6781                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6782                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6783                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6784                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6785                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6786                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6787                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6788                         },
6789                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6790                 }
6791         };
6792         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6793         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6794
6795         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6796         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6797         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6798         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6799         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6800 }
6801
6802 #[test]
6803 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6804         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6805         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6806
6807         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6808         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6809         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6810         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6811         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6812         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6813
6814         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6815
6816         //First hop
6817         let mut payment_event = {
6818                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6819                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6820                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6821                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6822                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6823         };
6824         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6826         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6827         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6828         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6829         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6831         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6832         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6833
6834         //Second Hop
6835         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6836         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6837         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6838         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6839
6840         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6841         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6842         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6843                 match events_3[0] {
6844                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6845                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6846                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6847                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6848                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6849                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6850                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6851                         },
6852                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6853                 }
6854         };
6855
6856         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6857
6858         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6859         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6860         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6861         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6862         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6863
6864         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6865         match events_4[0] {
6866                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6867                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6868                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6869                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6870                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6871                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6872                 },
6873                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6874         };
6875
6876         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6877 }
6878
6879 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6880         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6881         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6882         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6883
6884         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6885         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6886         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6887         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6888         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6889         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6890
6891         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6892
6893         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6894         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6895         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6896         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6897
6898         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6899         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6900
6901         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6902         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6903         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6904         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6905         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6906
6907         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6908         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6909         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6911
6912         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6913         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6914
6915         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6916         match events[0] {
6917                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6918                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6919                 },
6920                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6921         }
6922         match events[1] {
6923                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6924                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6925                 },
6926                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6927         }
6928
6929         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6930         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6931         if announce_latest {
6932                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6933         } else {
6934                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6935         }
6936
6937         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6938         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6939         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6940
6941         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6942         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6943         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6944         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6945         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6946         let mut first_failed = false;
6947         for event in events {
6948                 match event {
6949                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6950                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6951                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6952                                         first_failed = true;
6953                                 } else {
6954                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6955                                 }
6956                         }
6957                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6958                 }
6959         }
6960 }
6961
6962 #[test]
6963 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6964         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6965         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6966 }
6967
6968 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6969         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6970         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6971         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6972         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6973         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6974         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6975
6976         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6977         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6978         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6979         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6980         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6981
6982         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6983
6984         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6985         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6986
6987         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6988         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6989
6990         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6991         if revoked {
6992                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6993                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6994         }
6995
6996         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6997         if local {
6998                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6999                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7000                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7001                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7002                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7003
7004                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7005                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7006                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7007                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7008                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7009                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7010                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7011                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7012                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7013                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7014                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7015         } else {
7016                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7017                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7018                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7019                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7020                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7021                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7022                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7023                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7024                 if !revoked {
7025                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7026                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7027                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7028                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7029                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7030                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7031                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7032                 } else {
7033                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7034                         // commitment tx
7035                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7036                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7037                         let first;
7038                         match events[0] {
7039                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7040                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7041                                         else { first = false; }
7042                                 },
7043                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7044                         }
7045                         match events[1] {
7046                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7047                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7048                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7049                                 },
7050                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7051                         }
7052                 }
7053         }
7054 }
7055
7056 #[test]
7057 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7058         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7059         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7060         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7061 }
7062
7063 #[test]
7064 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7065         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7066
7067         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7068         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7069         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7070         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7071         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7072         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7073         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7074         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7075         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7076
7077         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7078         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7079                 match error {
7080                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7081                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7082                 }
7083         } else { assert!(false) }
7084
7085         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7086         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7087         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7088         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7089         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7090                 match error {
7091                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7092                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7093                 }
7094         } else { assert!(false); }
7095
7096         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7097         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7098         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7099         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7100         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7101         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7102         let reason_msg;
7103         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7104                 match action {
7105                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7106                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7107                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7108                         },
7109                         _ => { panic!(); }
7110                 }
7111         } else { panic!(); }
7112         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7113
7114         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7115         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7116         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7117         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7118         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0) {
7119                 match error {
7120                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7121                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7122                 }
7123         } else { assert!(false); }
7124 }
7125
7126 #[test]
7127 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7128         // We want to be sure that :
7129         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7130         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7131         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7132         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7133         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7134         let persister;
7135         let logger;
7136         let fee_estimator;
7137         let tx_broadcaster;
7138         let chain_source;
7139         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7140         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7141         // during signing due to revoked tx
7142         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7143         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7144         let monitor;
7145         let node_state_0;
7146         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7147         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7148         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7149
7150         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7151
7152         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7153         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7154         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7155         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7156
7157         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7158         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7159
7160         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7161         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7162
7163         // Restore node A from previous state
7164         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7165         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7166         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7167         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7168         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7169         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7170         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7171         node_state_0 = {
7172                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7173                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7174                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7175                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7176                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7177                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7178                         logger: &logger,
7179                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7180                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7181                         channel_monitors,
7182                 }).unwrap().1
7183         };
7184         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7185         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7186         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7187         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7188
7189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7190
7191         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7192         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7193
7194         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7195
7196         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7197         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7198         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7199
7200         {
7201                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7202                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7203         }
7204
7205         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7206         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7207                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7208                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7209                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7210                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7211                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7212                         match action {
7213                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7214                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7215                                 },
7216                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7217                         }
7218                 } else {
7219                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7220                 }
7221         }
7222
7223         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7224         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7225         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7226         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7227         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7228
7229         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7230         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7231         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7232         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7233         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7234         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7235         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7236         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7237         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7238         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7239         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7240 }
7241
7242 #[test]
7243 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7244         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7245         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7246         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7247
7248         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7249         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7250         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7251         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7252
7253         // Create some initial channels
7254         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7255
7256         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7257         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7258         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7259         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7260         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7261         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7262         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7263
7264         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7265         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7266         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7267         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7268         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7269
7270         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7271         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7272         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7273         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7274
7275         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7276         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7277         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7278
7279         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7280         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7281         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7282                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7283                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7284                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7285                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7286                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7287                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7288                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7289                 },
7290                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7291         };
7292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7293
7294         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7295         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7296
7297         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7298         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7299         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7300         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7301 }
7302
7303 #[test]
7304 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7305         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7306         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7307
7308         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7309         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7310         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7311         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7312
7313         let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7314         let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7315         let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7316
7317         // Disconnect peers
7318         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7319         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7320
7321         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7322         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7323         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7324         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7325         let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7326         for e in msg_events {
7327                 match e {
7328                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7329                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7330                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7331                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7332                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7333                                 }
7334                         },
7335                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7336                 }
7337         }
7338         // Reconnect peers
7339         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7340         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7341         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7342         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7343         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7344         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7345
7346         // Reestablish chan_1
7347         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7348         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7349         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7350         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7351         // Reestablish chan_2
7352         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7353         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7354         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7355         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7356         // Reestablish chan_3
7357         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7358         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7359         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7360         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7361
7362         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7363         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7364         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7365         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7366         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7367         chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7368         for e in msg_events {
7369                 match e {
7370                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7371                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7372                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7373                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7374                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7375                                 }
7376                         },
7377                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7378                 }
7379         }
7380 }
7381
7382 #[test]
7383 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7384         // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7385         // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7386         // to forward through that channel.
7387         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7388         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7389         let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7390         no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7391         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7392         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7393         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7394         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7395         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7396         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7397
7398         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7399
7400         // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7401         // not send for private channels.
7402         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7403         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7404         nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7405         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7406         nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7407
7408         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7409         nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7410         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7411         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7412
7413         let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7414         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7415         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7416
7417         let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7418         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7419         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7420         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7421         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7422         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7423         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7424         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7425         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7426         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7427
7428         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7429         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7430         assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7431
7432         // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7433         // channel:
7434         send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7435
7436         // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7437         // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7438         let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7439                 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7440                 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7441                 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7442                 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7443                 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7444                 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7445         }]);
7446         let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7447         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7448
7449         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7450         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7451         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7452         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7453         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7454
7455         let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7456         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7457         assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7458         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7459         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7460
7461         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7462         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7463         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7464
7465         // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7466         // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7467
7468         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7469         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7470
7471         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7472         let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7473         let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7474         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7475         get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7476
7477         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7478         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7479         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7480         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7481
7482         let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7483         let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7484         let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7485         let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7486         assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7487         assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7488
7489         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7490
7491         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7492         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7493                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7494                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7495                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7496                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7497                         default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7498                         keys_manager,
7499                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7500                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7501                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7502                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
7503                         channel_monitors,
7504                 }).unwrap()
7505         };
7506         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7507         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7508
7509         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7510         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7511         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7512         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7513
7514         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7515         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7516         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7517         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7518         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7519         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7520         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7521         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7522
7523         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7524         nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7525         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7526         let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7527         nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7528         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7529         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7530         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7531
7532         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7533         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7534         pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7535         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7536 }
7537
7538 #[test]
7539 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7540         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7541         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7542
7543         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7544         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7545         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7546         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7547
7548         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7549
7550         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7551         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7552         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7553
7554         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7555         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7556         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7557         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7558         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7559         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7560
7561         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7562         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7563                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7564                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7565                 }
7566         }
7567
7568         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7569         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7570
7571         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7572         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7573         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7574         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7575         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7576
7577         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7578         let penalty_1;
7579         let feerate_1;
7580         {
7581                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7582                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7583                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7584                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7585                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7586                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7587                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7588                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7589                 node_txn.clear();
7590         };
7591
7592         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7593         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7594         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7595         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7596         {
7597                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7598                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7599                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7600                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7601                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7602                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7603                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7604                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7605                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7606                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7607                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7608                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7609                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7610                         node_txn.clear();
7611                 }
7612         }
7613         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7614
7615         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7616         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7617         let penalty_3;
7618         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7619         {
7620                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7621                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7622                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7623                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7624                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7625                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7626                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7627                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7628                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7629                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7630                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7631                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7632                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7633                         node_txn.clear();
7634                 }
7635         }
7636         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7637
7638         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7639         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7640 }
7641
7642 #[test]
7643 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7644         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7645         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7646
7647         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7648         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7649         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7650         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7651         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7652
7653         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7654         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7655         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7656         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7657         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7658                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7659         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7660         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7661         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7662                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7663         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7664
7665         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7666         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7667         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7668
7669         // Revoke local commitment tx
7670         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7671
7672         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7673         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7674         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7675         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7676         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7677         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7678         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7679
7680         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7681         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7682         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7683
7684         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7685         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7686         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7687
7688         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7689         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7690         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7691         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7692
7693         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7694         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7695         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7696         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7697         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7698         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7699         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7700         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7701         match events[1] {
7702                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7703                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7704         }
7705         let first;
7706         let feerate_1;
7707         let penalty_txn;
7708         {
7709                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7710                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7711                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7712
7713                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7714                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7715                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7716                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7717                 // future).
7718                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7719                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7720                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7721                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7722                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7723                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7724
7725                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7726                 // available, which we check here:
7727                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7728                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7729                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7730
7731                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7732                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7733
7734                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7735                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7736                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7737                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7738
7739                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7740                 // output, checked above).
7741                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7742                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7743                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7744
7745                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7746                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7747                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7748                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7749                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7750                 node_txn.clear();
7751         }
7752
7753         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7754         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7755         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7756         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7757         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7758         {
7759                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7760                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7761
7762                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7763                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7764                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7765                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7766                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7767                 } else {
7768                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7769                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7770                 }
7771
7772                 node_txn.clear();
7773         };
7774
7775         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7776         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7777         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7778         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7779         let node_txn = {
7780                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7781                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7782
7783                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7784                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7785                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7786                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7787                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7788                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7789                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7790                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7791                 node_txn.clear();
7792                 txn
7793         };
7794         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7795         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7796         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7797         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7798         {
7799                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7800                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7801                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7802                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7803                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7804                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7805                 // up bumped justice generation.
7806                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7807                 node_txn.clear();
7808         }
7809         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7810         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7811 }
7812
7813 #[test]
7814 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7815         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7816         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7817
7818         // Create 2 HTLCs
7819         // Provide preimage for one
7820         // Check aggregation
7821
7822         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7823         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7824         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7825         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7826
7827         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7828         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7829         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7830
7831         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7832         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7833         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7834         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7835         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7836
7837         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7838         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7839         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7841         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7842
7843         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7844         let timeout;
7845         let preimage;
7846         let preimage_bump;
7847         let feerate_timeout;
7848         let feerate_preimage;
7849         {
7850                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7851                 // 9 transactions including:
7852                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7853                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7854                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7855                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
7856                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7857                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7858                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7859                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7860                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7861                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7862                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7863
7864                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7865                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7866                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7867                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7868
7869                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7870                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7871                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7872                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7873
7874                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7875                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7876                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7877                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7878
7879                 node_txn.clear();
7880         };
7881         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7882         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7883
7884         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7885         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7886         {
7887                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7888                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7889                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7890                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7891                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7892                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7893
7894                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7895                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7896                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7897                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7898                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7899
7900                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7901                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7902                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7903                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7904                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7905
7906                 node_txn.clear();
7907         }
7908
7909         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7910         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7911 }
7912
7913 #[test]
7914 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7915         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7916         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7917         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7918         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7919         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7920         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7921         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7922         // implement that).
7923         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7924         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7925         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7926         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7927         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7928
7929         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7930         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7931
7932         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7933
7934         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7935         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7936         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7937
7938         // Must revoke without gaps
7939         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7940         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7941
7942         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7943         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7944                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7945
7946         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7947                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7948         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7950         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7951 }
7952
7953 #[test]
7954 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7955         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7956         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7957
7958         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7959         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7960         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7961         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7962
7963         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7964         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7965         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7966         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7967
7968         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7969         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7970         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7971
7972         // Revoke local commitment tx
7973         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7974
7975         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7976         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7977         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7978         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7979
7980         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7981         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7982         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7983         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7984         let penalty_txn = {
7985                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7986                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7987                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7988                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7989                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7990                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7991                 node_txn.clear();
7992                 penalty_txn
7993         };
7994         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7995         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7996         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7997         {
7998                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7999                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8000                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8001         }
8002 }
8003
8004 #[test]
8005 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8006         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8007         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8008         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8009         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8010         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8011         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8012
8013         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8014
8015         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8016         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8017         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8018         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8019         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8020
8021         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8022         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8023         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8024         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8025
8026         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8027         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8028         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8029         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8030         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8031         match close_ev[0] {
8032                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8033                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8034                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8035                 },
8036                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8037         }
8038 }
8039
8040 #[test]
8041 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8042         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8043         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8044         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8045         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8046
8047         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8048         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8049         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8050
8051         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8052
8053         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8054         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8055         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8056         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8057 }
8058
8059 #[test]
8060 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8061         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8062         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8063         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8064         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8065         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8066         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8067
8068         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8069         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8070         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8071
8072         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8073         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8074         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8075 }
8076
8077 #[test]
8078 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8079         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8080         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8081         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8082         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8083         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8084
8085         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8086         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8087         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8088         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8089
8090         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8091         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8092         route.paths.push(path);
8093         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8094         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8095         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8096         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8097         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8098         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8099         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8100         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8101 }
8102
8103 #[test]
8104 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8105         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8106         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8107         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8108         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8109         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8110
8111         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8112
8113         {
8114                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200);
8115                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8116                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8117                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8118                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8119                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8120                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8121                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8122         }
8123         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8124         // values from previous calls.
8125         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8126         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8127         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8128         match events[0] {
8129                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8130                         match &purpose {
8131                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8132                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8133                                 },
8134                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8135                         }
8136                 },
8137                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8138         }
8139 }
8140
8141 #[test]
8142 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8143         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8144         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8145         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8146         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8147         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8148
8149         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8150
8151         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8152
8153         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8154         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8155         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8156                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8157         } else { panic!(); }
8158         let mut block = {
8159                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8160                 Block {
8161                         header: BlockHeader {
8162                                 version: 0x2000000,
8163                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8164                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8165                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8166                         txdata: vec![],
8167                 }
8168         };
8169         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8170         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8171                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8172         } else { panic!(); }
8173
8174         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8175         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8176         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8177         block.header.time += 1;
8178         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8179         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8180         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8181
8182         {
8183                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8184                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8185                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8186                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8187                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8188                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8189                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8190         }
8191         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8192         // values from previous calls.
8193         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8194         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8195         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8196         match events[0] {
8197                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8198                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8199                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8200                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8201                 },
8202                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8203         }
8204 }
8205
8206 #[test]
8207 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8208         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8211         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8212         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8213
8214         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8215
8216         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8217         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8218         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8219         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8220
8221         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8222         // resulting events.
8223         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8224                 () => {
8225                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8226                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8227                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8228                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8229                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8230
8231                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8232                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8233                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8234                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8235                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8236
8237                         // We should fail the payment back
8238                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8239                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8240                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8241                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8242                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8243                                 },
8244                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8245                         }
8246                 }
8247         }
8248
8249         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8250         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8251         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8252
8253         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8254         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8255         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8256         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8257
8258         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8259         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8260         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8261         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8262
8263         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8264         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8265         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8266         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8267 }
8268
8269 #[test]
8270 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8271         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8272         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8273         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8274         //
8275         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8276         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8277         // commitment at same time.
8278
8279         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8280         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8281         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8282         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8283
8284         // Create some initial channel
8285         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8286         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8287
8288         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8289         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8290
8291         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8292         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8293
8294         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8295         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8296         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8297         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8298         let watchtower = {
8299                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8300                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8301                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8302                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8303                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8304                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8305                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8306                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8307                 watchtower
8308         };
8309         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8310         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8311         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8312         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8313         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8314
8315         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8316         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8317         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8318         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8319         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8320         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8321         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8322                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8323                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8324                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8325                 } else { assert!(false); }
8326         } else { assert!(false); };
8327         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8328         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8329         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8330         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8331 }
8332
8333 #[test]
8334 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8335         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8336         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8337         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8338         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8339
8340         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8341         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8342         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8343         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8344
8345         // Create some initial channel
8346         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8347         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8348
8349         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8350         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8351
8352         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8353         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8354
8355         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8356         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8357         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8358         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8359         let watchtower_alice = {
8360                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8361                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8362                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8363                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8364                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8365                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8366                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8367                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8368                 watchtower
8369         };
8370         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8371         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8372         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8373         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8374         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8375
8376         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8377         {
8378                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8379                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8380                 txn.clear();
8381         }
8382
8383         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8384         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8385         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8386         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8387         let watchtower_bob = {
8388                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8389                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8390                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8391                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8392                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8393                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8394                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8395                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8396                 watchtower
8397         };
8398         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8399         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8400
8401         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8402         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8403         {
8404                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8405         }
8406         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8407
8408         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8409         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8410         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8411         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8412                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8413                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8414                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8415                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8416                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8417                 } else { assert!(false); }
8418         } else { assert!(false); };
8419         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8420         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8421
8422         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8423         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8424         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8425
8426         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8427         let bob_state_y;
8428         {
8429                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8430                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8431                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8432                 txn.clear();
8433         };
8434
8435         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8436         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8437         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8438         {
8439                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8440                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8441                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8442                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8443                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8444                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8445         }
8446 }
8447
8448 #[test]
8449 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8450         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8451         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8452         // message).
8453         //
8454         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8455         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8456         //
8457         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8458         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8459         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8460         // before receiving funding_signed.
8461         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8462         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8463         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8464         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8465
8466         // Create an initial channel
8467         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8468         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8469         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8470         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8471         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8472
8473         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8474         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8475
8476         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8477         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8478
8479         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8480         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8481         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8482         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8483         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8484 }
8485
8486 #[test]
8487 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8488         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8489         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8490         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8491         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8492         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8493         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8494
8495         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8496         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8497         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8498         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8499
8500         // Create some initial channels
8501         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8502
8503         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8504         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8505         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8506         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8507         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8508         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8509
8510         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8511         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8512         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8513         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8514         // this test before #653 fix.
8515         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8516         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8517         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8518         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8519         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8520
8521         let htlc_timeout = {
8522                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8523                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8524                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8525                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8526                 node_txn[1].clone()
8527         };
8528
8529         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8530         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8531         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8532         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8533 }
8534
8535 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8536         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8537         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8538         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8539         //
8540         // Steps of the test:
8541         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8542         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8543         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8544         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8545         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8546         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8547         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8548         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8549         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8550         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8551         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8552         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8553
8554         // Create some initial channels
8555         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8556         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8557
8558         // Steps (1) and (2):
8559         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8560         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8561
8562         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8563         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8564         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8565         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8566         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8567         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8568         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8569
8570         // Steps (3) and (4):
8571         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8572         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8573         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8574         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8575         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8576         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8577         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8578         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8579         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8580                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8581                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8582                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8583                 };
8584                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8585                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8586                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8587                 if broadcast_alice {
8588                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8589                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8590                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8591                 }
8592                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8593                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8594         }
8595
8596         // Step (5):
8597         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8598         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8599         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8600         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8601         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8602         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8603         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8604         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8605         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8606         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8607
8608         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8609         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8610         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8611         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8612                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8613                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8614                 match events[0] {
8615                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8616                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8617                         },
8618                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8619                 };
8620         }
8621         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8622         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8623         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8624         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8625
8626         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8627         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8628         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8629                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8630                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8631                         (*msg).clone()
8632                 },
8633                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8634         };
8635         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8636                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8637                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8638                         (*updates).clone()
8639                 },
8640                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8641         };
8642
8643         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8644         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8645         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8646         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8647
8648         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8649         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8650         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8651                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8652                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8653                         (*msg).clone()
8654                 },
8655                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8656         };
8657         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8658         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8659
8660         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8661         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8662         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8663         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8664         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8665                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8666                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8667                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8668                 if broadcast_alice {
8669                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8670                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8671                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8672                 }
8673                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8674                 if broadcast_alice {
8675                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8676                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8677                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8678                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8679                         // broadcasted.
8680                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8681                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8682                 } else {
8683                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8684                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8685                 }
8686         }
8687
8688         // Step (6):
8689         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8690         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8691         {
8692                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8693                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8694                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8695                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8696                 }
8697                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8698                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8699                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8700                 };
8701                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8702                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8703                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8704                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8705                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8706                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8707                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8708                 } else {
8709                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8710                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8711                 }
8712         }
8713 }
8714
8715 #[test]
8716 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8717         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8718         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8719         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8720         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8721 }
8722
8723 #[test]
8724 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8725         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8726         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8727         //
8728         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8729         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8730         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8731         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8732         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8733         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8734         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8735         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8736
8737         // Create an initial channel
8738         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8739         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8740         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8741         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8742
8743         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8744         // that it is rejected.
8745         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8746         {
8747                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8748                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8749                 match events[0] {
8750                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8751                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8752                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8753                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8754                                 // move forward with it.
8755                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8756                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8757                         },
8758                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8759                 }
8760         }
8761
8762         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8763         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8764
8765         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8766         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8767
8768         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8769         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8770         {
8771                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8772                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8773                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8774                 added_monitors.clear();
8775         }
8776         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8777
8778         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8779         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8780
8781         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8782         // temporary one).
8783
8784         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8785         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8786         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8787         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8788         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8789         {
8790                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8791                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8792                 match events[0] {
8793                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8794                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8795                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8796                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8797                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8798                         },
8799                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8800                 }
8801         }
8802
8803         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8804         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8805         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8806         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8807         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8808         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8809
8810         let funding_created = {
8811                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8812                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8813                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8814                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8815         };
8816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8817         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8818         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8819         // still needs to be cleared here.
8820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8821
8822         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8823         {
8824                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8825                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8826                 match events[0] {
8827                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8828                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8829                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8830                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8831                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8832                         },
8833                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8834                 }
8835         }
8836
8837         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8838         // everything is functional.
8839         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8840         {
8841                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8842                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8843                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8844                 added_monitors.clear();
8845         }
8846
8847         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8848         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8849         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8850         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8851
8852         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8853         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8854         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8855         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8856 }
8857
8858 #[test]
8859 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8860         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8861         //
8862         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8863         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8864         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8865         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8866         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8867         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8868         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8869
8870         // Create some initial channels
8871         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8872         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8873         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8874
8875         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8876         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8877         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8878
8879         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8880         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8881         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8882
8883         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8884         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8885         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8886         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8887         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8888         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8889         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8890         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8891         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8892
8893         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8894         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8895         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8897         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8898         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8899         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8900         match events[0] {
8901                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8902                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8903                 },
8904                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8905         }
8906         match events[1] {
8907                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8908                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8909                 },
8910                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8911         }
8912         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8913         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8914         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8915         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8916         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8917         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8918
8919         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8920         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8921         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8922 }
8923
8924 #[test]
8925 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8926         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8927         //
8928         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8929         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8930         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8931         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8932         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8933         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8934         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8935         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8936
8937         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8938         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8939         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8940
8941         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8942         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8943                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8944                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8945         }
8946
8947         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8948         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8950
8951         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8952         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8953
8954         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8955         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8956
8957         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8958         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8959         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8960
8961         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8962         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8963         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8964         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8965         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8966         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8967         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8968                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8969                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8970                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8971                 } else { panic!(); }
8972         } else { panic!(); }
8973         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8974 }
8975
8976 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8977         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8978         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8979         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8980         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8981         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8982         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8983         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8984         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8985         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8986         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8987         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8988         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8989         // until we learned about an additional block.
8990         //
8991         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8992         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8993         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8994         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8995         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8996         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8997         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8998
8999         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9000         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9001         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9002         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9003         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9004
9005         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9006         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9007         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9008         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9009         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9010         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9011
9012         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9013         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9014                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9015         }
9016         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9017                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9018         if test_height_before_timelock {
9019                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9020                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9021                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9022                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9023         } else {
9024                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9025                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9026                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9027                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9028                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9029                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9030                 // timelock is up).
9031                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9032                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9033
9034                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9035                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9036                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9037                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9038                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9039                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9040                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9041
9042                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9043                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9044                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9045                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9046                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9047                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9048                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9049                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9050                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9051         }
9052 }
9053
9054 #[test]
9055 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9056         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9057         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9058 }
9059
9060 #[test]
9061 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9062         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9063         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9064         // HTLCs.
9065         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9066
9067         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9068         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9069         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9070         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9071         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9072         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9073         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9074         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9075         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9076
9077         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9078         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9079         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9080         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9081
9082         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9083         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9084         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9085         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9086         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9087
9088         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9089
9090         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9091         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9092         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9093         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9094
9095         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9096         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9097         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9098         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9099         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9100
9101         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9102         // generated
9103         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9104
9105         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9106         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9107         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9108
9109         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9110         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9111         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9112         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9113         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9114
9115         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9116         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9117         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9118         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9119
9120         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9121         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9122                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9123         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9124         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9125         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9126                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9127         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9128
9129         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9130         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9131                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9132                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9133                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9134                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9135                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9136                         keys_manager,
9137                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9138                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9139                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9140                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9141                         channel_monitors,
9142                 }).unwrap()
9143         };
9144         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9145         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9146
9147         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9148         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9149         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9151
9152         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9153         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9154         // the commitment state.
9155         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9156
9157         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9158
9159         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9160         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9162
9163         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9164         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9165         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9166         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9167         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9168         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9169         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9170
9171         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9172         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9173 }
9174
9175 #[test]
9176 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9177         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9178         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9179         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9180         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9181
9182         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9183         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9184         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9185         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9186         let params = RouteParameters {
9187                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9188                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9189                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9190         };
9191         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9192         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9193
9194         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9195         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9196         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9197         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9198         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9199         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9200         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9201         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9202         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9203 }
9204
9205 #[test]
9206 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9207         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9208         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9209         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9210         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9211
9212         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9213         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9214         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9215         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9216
9217         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9218         let params = RouteParameters {
9219                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9220                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9221                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9222         };
9223         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9224         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9225         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9226         let route = find_route(
9227                 &payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9228                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9229         ).unwrap();
9230
9231         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9232         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9233         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9234         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9235         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9236         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9237         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9238         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9239         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9240 }
9241
9242 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9243 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9244 enum ExposureEvent {
9245         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9246         AtHTLCForward,
9247         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9248         AtHTLCReception,
9249         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9250         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9251 }
9252
9253 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9254         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9255         // policy.
9256         //
9257         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9258         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9259         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9260         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9261         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9262         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9263         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9264         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9265
9266         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9267         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9268         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9269         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9270         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9271         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9272
9273         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9274         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9275         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9276         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9277         if on_holder_tx {
9278                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9279         }
9280         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9281         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9282         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9283
9284         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9285
9286         if on_holder_tx {
9287                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9288                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9289                 }
9290         }
9291
9292         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9293         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9294         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9295
9296         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9297         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9298
9299         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9300         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9301         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9302
9303         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9304                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9305                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9306                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9307         };
9308         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9309         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9310
9311         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9312         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9313
9314         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9315         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9316
9317         if on_holder_tx {
9318                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9319                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9320                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9321                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9322                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9323                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9324                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9325                         }
9326                 } else {
9327                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9328                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9329                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9330                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9331                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9332                         }
9333                 }
9334         } else {
9335                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9336                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9337                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9338                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9339                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9340                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9341                         }
9342                 } else {
9343                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9344                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9345                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9346                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9347                         }
9348                 }
9349         }
9350
9351         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9352         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9353                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9354                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9355                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9356                 if on_holder_tx {
9357                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9358                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9359                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9360                 } else {
9361                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9362                 }
9363         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9364                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9365                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9366                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9367                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9368                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9369                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9370                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9371                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9372                 if on_holder_tx {
9373                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9374                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9375                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9376                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9377                 } else {
9378                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9379                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9380                 }
9381         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9382                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9383                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9384                 {
9385                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9386                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9387                 }
9388                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9389                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9390                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9391         }
9392
9393         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9394         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9395         added_monitors.clear();
9396 }
9397
9398 #[test]
9399 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9400         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9401         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9402         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9403         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9404         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9405         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9406         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9407         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9408         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9409         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9410         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9411         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9412 }