_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
  27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  29 use ln::msgs;
  30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  34 use util::errors::APIError;
  35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  36 use util::config::UserConfig;
  37
  38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  44
  45 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  46 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use io;
  54 use prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  58
  59 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  60 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  61
  62 #[test]
  63 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  64         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  65         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  66         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  67         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  68         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  69
  70         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  71         // funding satoshis
  72         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  73         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  74         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  75
  76         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  77         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  78
  79         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  80         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  81
  82         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  83         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  84         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  85                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  86                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  87                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  88                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  89                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  90                         match action {
  91                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  92                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  93                                 },
  94                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  95                         }
  96                 } else { assert!(false); }
  97         };
  98
  99         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
 100         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 101
 102         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 103         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
 104
 105         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 106
 107         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 108
 109         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 110
 111         insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 118
 119         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 120 }
 121
 122 #[test]
 123 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 124         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 125         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 126         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 127         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 128         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 129
 130         // balancing
 131         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 132
 133         // A                                        B
 134         // update_fee                            ->
 135         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 136         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 137         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 138         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 139         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 140         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 141         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 142         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 143         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 144         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 145         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 146         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 147         //                                       <- RAA
 148         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 149
 150         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 151         {
 152                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 153                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 154         }
 155         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 157
 158         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 159         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 160         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 161                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 162                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 163                 },
 164                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 165         };
 166
 167         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 168
 169         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 170         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 171         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 173
 174         let payment_event = {
 175                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 176                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 177                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 178         };
 179         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 180         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 181
 182         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 183         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 184         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 185         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 186         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 188
 189         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 190         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 191         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 192         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 194
 195         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 196         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 197         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 198         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 199         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 200         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 201         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 203
 204         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 205         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 206         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 207         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 208         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 209         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 210         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 212
 213         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 214         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 215         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 217
 218         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 219         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 221
 222         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 224
 225         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 226         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 227         match events_2[0] {
 228                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 229                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 230         }
 231
 232         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 233         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 234 }
 235
 236 #[test]
 237 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 238         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 239         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 240         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 241         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 242         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 243         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 244         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 245
 246         // balancing
 247         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 248
 249         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 250         {
 251                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 252                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 253         }
 254         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 256
 257         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 258         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 259         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 260                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 261                         update_fee.as_ref()
 262                 },
 263                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 264         };
 265
 266         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 267
 268         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 269         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 270         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 272
 273         let payment_event = {
 274                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 275                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 276                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 277         };
 278         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 279         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 280
 281         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 282         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 283         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 284         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 285         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 287
 288         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 290
 291         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 292 }
 293
 294 #[test]
 295 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 296         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 298         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 299         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 300         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 301
 302         // A                                        B
 303         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 304         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 305         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 306         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 307         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 308         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 309         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 310         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 311         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 312         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 313         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 314         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 315         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 316         //                                          B should send no response here
 317         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 318         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 319         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 320
 321         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 322         let initial_feerate;
 323         {
 324                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 325                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 326                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 327         }
 328         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 329         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 330
 331         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 332         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 333         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 334                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 335                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 336                 },
 337                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 338         };
 339
 340         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 341         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 342         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 343         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 344         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 345
 346         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 347         // transaction:
 348         {
 349                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 350                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 351         }
 352         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 353         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 354         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 355
 356         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 357         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 358                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 359                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 360         };
 361
 362         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 363
 364         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 365         // Deliver (3)
 366         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 367
 368         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 369         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 370         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 372         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 373         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 374         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 375         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 376         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 377         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 378         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 379
 380         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 381         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 382         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 383         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 384         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 385
 386         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 387         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 388         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 389
 390         // Delever (4)
 391         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 392         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 393         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 394
 395         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 396         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 397         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 398
 399         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 400         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 401         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 402         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 403
 404         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 405         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 406         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 407 }
 408
 409 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
 410         // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
 411         // tests that we properly send one in that case.
 412         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
 413         alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 414         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 415         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 416         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
 417         bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 418         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 419         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 420         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 421         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 422         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
 423         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 424         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
 425
 426         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 427         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
 428         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
 429
 430         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
 431         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 432         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
 433
 434         for node in nodes {
 435                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
 436                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
 437                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
 438         }
 439 }
 440 #[test]
 441 fn test_1_conf_open() {
 442         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
 443         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
 444         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
 445 }
 446
 447 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 448         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 449         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 450         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 451         // Node objects.
 452
 453         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 454         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 455         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 456         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 457
 458         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 459                 let block = Block {
 460                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 461                         txdata: vec![],
 462                 };
 463                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 464                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 465         }
 466
 467         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 468         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 469         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 470
 471         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 472         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 473         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 474
 475         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 476         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 477
 478         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 479
 480         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 481         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 483         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 484
 485         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 486         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 487         {
 488                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 489                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 490                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 491                 added_monitors.clear();
 492         }
 493         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 494
 495         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 496         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 497         {
 498                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 499                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 500                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 501                 added_monitors.clear();
 502         }
 503
 504         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 505         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 506
 507         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 508         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 509
 510         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 511         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 512         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 513         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 514 }
 515
 516 #[test]
 517 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 518         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 519         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 520         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 521         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 522         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 523         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 524         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 525         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 526         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 527         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 528         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 529         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 530         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 531         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 532         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 533         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 534         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 535         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 536 }
 537
 538 #[test]
 539 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 540         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 541         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 542         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 543         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 544         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 545
 546         {
 547                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 548                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 549         }
 550         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 551         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 552
 553         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 554         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 555         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 556                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 557                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 558                 },
 559                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 560         };
 561         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 562
 563         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 564         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 565         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 566
 567         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 568         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 569         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 570
 571         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 572         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 573         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 574         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 575
 576         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 577         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 579 }
 580
 581 #[test]
 582 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 583         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 584         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 585         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 586         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 587         let channel_value = 5000;
 588         let push_sats = 700;
 589         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 590         let channel_id = chan.2;
 591         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 592         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 593
 594         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 595         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 596         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 597         // remote limit.
 598         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 599         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) as u32;
 600         {
 601                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 602                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 603         }
 604         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 605         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 606         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 607
 608         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 609
 610         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 611
 612         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 613         {
 614                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 615
 616                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 617                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 618                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0) / 1000;
 619                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 620                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 621                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 622         }
 623
 624         {
 625                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 626                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 627                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 628         }
 629         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 630         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 632
 633         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 634
 635         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 636         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 637         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 638                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 639                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 640                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 641                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 642                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 643                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 644         };
 645         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 646                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 647                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 648                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 649                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 650                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 651                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 652                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 653         };
 654
 655         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 656         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 657                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 658
 659         let res = {
 660                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 661                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 662                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 663                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 664                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 665                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 666                         push_sats,
 667                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0) / 1000,
 668                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
 669                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 670                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 671                         &mut htlcs,
 672                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 673                 );
 674                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 675         };
 676
 677         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 678                 channel_id: chan.2,
 679                 signature: res.0,
 680                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 681         };
 682
 683         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 684                 channel_id: chan.2,
 685                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 686         };
 687
 688         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 689
 690         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 691         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 692         //Should produce and error.
 693         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 694         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 695         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 696         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 697         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 698 }
 699
 700 #[test]
 701 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 702         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 703         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 704         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 705         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 706         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 707
 708         // balancing
 709         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 710
 711         {
 712                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 713                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 714         }
 715         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 716         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 717
 718         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 719         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 720         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 721                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 722                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 723                 },
 724                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 725         };
 726         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 727         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 728         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 729         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 730
 731         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 732
 733         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 734         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 735         {
 736                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 737                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 738                 added_monitors.clear();
 739         }
 740         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 741         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 742         // node[1] has nothing to do
 743
 744         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 745         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 747
 748         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 749         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 750         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 752         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 753         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 754         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 755
 756         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 757         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 758         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 759         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 760         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 761         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 762
 763         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 764         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 765         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 766         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 767
 768         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 769         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 770         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 771
 772         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 773         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 774         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 775         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 776
 777         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 778         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 779         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 780
 781         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 782
 783         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 784         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 785         match events[0] {
 786                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 787                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 788         };
 789
 790         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 791
 792         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 793         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 794         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 795         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 796         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 797 }
 798
 799 #[test]
 800 fn test_update_fee() {
 801         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 802         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 803         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 804         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 805         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 806         let channel_id = chan.2;
 807
 808         // A                                        B
 809         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 810         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 811         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 812         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 813         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 814         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 815         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 816         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 817         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 818         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 819         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 820         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 821
 822         // Create and deliver (1)...
 823         let feerate;
 824         {
 825                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 826                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 827                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 828         }
 829         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 831
 832         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 833         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 834         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 835                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 836                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 837                 },
 838                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 839         };
 840         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 841
 842         // Generate (2) and (3):
 843         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 844         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 845         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 846
 847         // Deliver (2):
 848         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 849         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 850         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 851
 852         // Create and deliver (4)...
 853         {
 854                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 855                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 856         }
 857         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 858         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 859         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 860         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 861         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 862                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 863                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 864                 },
 865                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 866         };
 867
 868         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 869         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 870         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 871         // ... creating (5)
 872         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 873         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 874
 875         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 876         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 877         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 878         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 879         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 880
 881         // Deliver (5):
 882         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 883         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 884         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 885
 886         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 887         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 888         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 889         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 890         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 891         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 892         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 893         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 894         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 895
 896         // Deliver (7)
 897         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 898         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 899         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 900         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 901
 902         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 903         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 904         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 905
 906         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 907         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 908         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 909         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 910         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 911 }
 912
 913 #[test]
 914 fn fake_network_test() {
 915         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 916         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 917         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 918         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 919         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 920         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 921
 922         // Create some initial channels
 923         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 924         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 925         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 926
 927         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 928         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 929         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 930         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 931         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 932
 933         // Send some more payments
 934         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 935         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 936         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 937
 938         // Test failure packets
 939         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 940         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 941
 942         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 943         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 944
 945         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 946         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 947         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 948         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 949         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 950         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 951         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 952
 953         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
 954         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 955         hops.push(RouteHop {
 956                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 957                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 958                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 959                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 960                 fee_msat: 0,
 961                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 962         });
 963         hops.push(RouteHop {
 964                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
 965                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 966                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 967                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 968                 fee_msat: 0,
 969                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 970         });
 971         hops.push(RouteHop {
 972                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
 973                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
 974                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 975                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
 976                 fee_msat: 1000000,
 977                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
 978         });
 979         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
 980         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
 981         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
 982
 983         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 984         hops.push(RouteHop {
 985                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
 986                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 987                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 988                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 989                 fee_msat: 0,
 990                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 991         });
 992         hops.push(RouteHop {
 993                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 994                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 995                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 996                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 997                 fee_msat: 0,
 998                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 999         });
1000         hops.push(RouteHop {
1001                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1002                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1003                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1004                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1005                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1006                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1007         });
1008         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1009         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1010         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1011
1012         // Claim the rebalances...
1013         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1014         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1015
1016         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1017         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1018
1019         // Send some payments across both channels
1020         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1021         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1022         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1023
1024
1025         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1026         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1027         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1028         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1029
1030         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1031
1032         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1033         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1034         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1035
1036         // Close down the channels...
1037         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1038         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1039         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1040         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1041         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1042         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1043         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1044         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1045         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1046         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1047         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1048         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1049         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1050         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1051         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1052 }
1053
1054 #[test]
1055 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1056         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1057         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1058         // commitment dance rounds.
1059         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1060         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1061         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1062         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1063         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1064         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1065
1066         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1067         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1068                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1069                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1070                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1071         }
1072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1073
1074         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1075         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1076         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1077         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1078
1079         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1080         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1081         // another HTLC.
1082         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1083         {
1084                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1085                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1086                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1087                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1088         }
1089
1090         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1091         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1092         {
1093                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1094                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1095         }
1096
1097         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1098         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1099         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1100         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1101
1102         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1103         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1104         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1105         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1106         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1107         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1109
1110         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1111         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1112         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1113
1114         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1115
1116         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1117         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1118         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1119         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1120
1121         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1122         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1123         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1124         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1125
1126         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1128         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1129
1130         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1131                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1132         }
1133         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1135         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1137         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1138
1139         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1141         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1143         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1144
1145         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1147
1148         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1149
1150         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1151         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1152         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1153                 match event {
1154                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1155                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1156                         },
1157                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1158                 };
1159         }
1160
1161         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1162                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1163         }
1164
1165         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1166 }
1167
1168 #[test]
1169 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1170         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1171         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1172         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1173         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1174         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1175         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1176
1177         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1178         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1179         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1180         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1181         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1182         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1183
1184         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1185
1186         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1187         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1188
1189         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1190         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1191
1192         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1193         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1194         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1195 }
1196
1197 #[test]
1198 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1199         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1200         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1201         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1202         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1203         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1204         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1205         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1206
1207         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1208
1209         // balancing
1210         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1211
1212         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1213
1214         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1215         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1216         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1217
1218         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1219         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1221
1222         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1223         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1224
1225         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1226         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1227         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1228                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1229                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1230                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1231                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1232                 }
1233         }
1234         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1235
1236         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1237         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1238         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1239         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1240
1241         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1242         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1243         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1244         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1245         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1246         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1247         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1248         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1249
1250         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1251         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1252         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1253
1254         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1255         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1256         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1257         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1258         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1259         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1260         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1261         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1262
1263         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1264         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1265         for e in events {
1266                 match e {
1267                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1268                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1269                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1270                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1271                         },
1272                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1273                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1274                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1275                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1276                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1277                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1278                         },
1279                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1280                 }
1281         }
1282 }
1283
1284 #[test]
1285 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1286         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1287         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1288         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1289         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1290         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1291
1292         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1293         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1294
1295         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1296         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1297         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1298         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1299         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1300         match err {
1301                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1302                         match &fails[0] {
1303                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1304                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1305                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1306                         }
1307                 },
1308                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1309         }
1310         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1311         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1312
1313         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1314 }
1315
1316 #[test]
1317 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1318         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1319         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1320         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1321         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1322         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1323
1324         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1325         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1326         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1327         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1328
1329         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1330
1331         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1332         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1333         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1334         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1335                 channel_id: chan.2,
1336                 htlc_id: 0,
1337                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1338                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1339                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1340                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1341         };
1342
1343         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1344
1345         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1346         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1347         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1348
1349         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1350
1351         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1352
1353         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1354         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1355         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1356                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1357                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1358                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1359                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1360                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1361
1362                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1363                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1364                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1365                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1366                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1367         };
1368         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1369                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1370                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1371                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1372                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1373                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1374                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1375                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1376         };
1377
1378         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1379         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1380                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1381
1382         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1383         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1384         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1385
1386         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1387                 offered: false,
1388                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1389                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1390                 payment_hash,
1391                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1392         };
1393
1394         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1395
1396         let res = {
1397                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1398                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1399                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1400                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1401                         commitment_number,
1402                         95000,
1403                         local_chan_balance,
1404                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1405                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1406                         feerate_per_kw,
1407                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1408                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1409                 );
1410                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1411         };
1412
1413         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1414                 channel_id: chan.2,
1415                 signature: res.0,
1416                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1417         };
1418
1419         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1420         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1421         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1422
1423         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1424         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1425                 channel_id: chan.2,
1426                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1427                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1428         };
1429         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1430
1431         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1432         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1433         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1434         match events[0] {
1435                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1436                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1437                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1438                 },
1439                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1440         };
1441         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1442                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1443
1444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1445 }
1446
1447 #[test]
1448 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1449         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1450         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1451         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1452         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1453         // this situation.
1454         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1455         chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1456         chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1457         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1458         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1459         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1460
1461         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1462         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
1463         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1464
1465         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1466
1467         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1468         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1469
1470         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1471         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1472         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1473                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1474         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1475         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1476 }
1477
1478 #[test]
1479 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1480         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1481         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the funder
1482         // receiving 1 update_add_htlc would result in them closing the channel due
1483         // to channel reserve violation. This close could also happen if the fee went
1484         // up a more realistic amount, but many HTLCs were outstanding at the time of
1485         // the update_add_htlc.
1486         chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1487         chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1488         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1489         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1490         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1491         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1492
1493         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1494         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1495         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1496         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1497         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1498         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1499         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 1000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1500         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1501         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1502                 channel_id: chan.2,
1503                 htlc_id: 1,
1504                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1505                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1506                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1507                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1508         };
1509
1510         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1511         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1512         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1513         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1514         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1515         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1516         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1517         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1518 }
1519
1520 #[test]
1521 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1522         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1523         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1524         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1525         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1526         chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1527         chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1528
1529         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1530         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1531         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1532
1533         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1534         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1535         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1536         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1537         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) / 1000 * 1000;
1538         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1539         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1540
1541         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1542                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1543         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1544         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1545         // commitment transaction fee.
1546         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1547
1548         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1549         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1550         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1551                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1552 }
1553
1554 #[test]
1555 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1556         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1557         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1558         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1559         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1560         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1561         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1562         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1563
1564         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1565         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1566         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1567         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1568         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1569         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1570
1571         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1572         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1573         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1574         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1575         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1576         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1577
1578         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1579         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1580         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1581         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1582 }
1583
1584 #[test]
1585 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1586         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1587         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1588         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1589         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1590         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1591         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1592
1593         let feemsat = 239;
1594         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1595         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1596         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1597
1598         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1599         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1600         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1601         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1602
1603         // Add a pending HTLC.
1604         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1605         let payment_event_1 = {
1606                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1607                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1608
1609                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1610                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1611                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1612         };
1613         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1614
1615         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1616         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1617         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1618         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1619         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1620
1621         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1622         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1623         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1624         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1625         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1626         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1627         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1628         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1629                 channel_id: chan.2,
1630                 htlc_id: 1,
1631                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1632                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1633                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1634                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1635         };
1636
1637         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1638         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1639         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1640         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1641         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1642         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1643         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1644         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1645 }
1646
1647 #[test]
1648 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1649         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1650         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1651         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1652         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1653         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1654         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1655         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1656         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1657         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1658
1659         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1660         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1661         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1662
1663         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1664         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1665 }
1666
1667 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1668         (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1669 }
1670
1671 #[test]
1672 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1673         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1674         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1675         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1676         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1677         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1678         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1679         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1680         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1681         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1682         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1683
1684         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1685         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1686
1687         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1688         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1689
1690         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1691                 ($node: expr) => {{
1692                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1693                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1694                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1695                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1696                         payment_event
1697                 }}
1698         }
1699
1700         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1701         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1702         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1703
1704         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1705
1706         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1707         {
1708                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1709                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1710                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1711                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1712                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1713                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1714                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1715         }
1716
1717         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1718         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1719         loop {
1720                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1721                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1722                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1723                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1724                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1725                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1726                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1727                         break;
1728                 }
1729                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1730
1731                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1732                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1733                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1734                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1735                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1736                 );
1737
1738                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1739                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1740                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1741                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1742                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1743         }
1744
1745         // adding pending output.
1746         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1747         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1748         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1749         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1750         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1751         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1752         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1753         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1754         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1755         // policy.
1756         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1757         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1758         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1759
1760         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1761         let payment_event_1 = {
1762                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1763                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1764
1765                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1766                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1767                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1768         };
1769         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1770
1771         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1772         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1773         {
1774                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1775                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1776                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1777                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1778         }
1779
1780         // split the rest to test holding cell
1781         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1782         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1783         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1784         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1785         {
1786                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1787                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1788         }
1789
1790         // now see if they go through on both sides
1791         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1792         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1793         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1794         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1795         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1796         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1797
1798         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1799         {
1800                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1801                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1802                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1803                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1804                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1805         }
1806
1807         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1808         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1809         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1810         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1811         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1812         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1813
1814         // flush the pending htlc
1815         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1816         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1818
1819         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1820         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1822         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1823
1824         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1825         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1826         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1827         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1828
1829         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1830         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1831         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1832
1833         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1834
1835         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1836         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1837         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1838
1839         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1840         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1841
1842         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1843         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1844         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1845         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1846         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1847         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1848
1849         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1850         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1851         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1852         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1853
1854         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1855         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1856
1857         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1858         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1859         match events[0] {
1860                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1861                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1862                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1863                         match &purpose {
1864                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1865                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1866                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1867                                 },
1868                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1869                         }
1870                 },
1871                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1872         }
1873         match events[1] {
1874                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1875                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1876                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1877                         match &purpose {
1878                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1879                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1880                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1881                                 },
1882                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1883                         }
1884                 },
1885                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1886         }
1887
1888         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1889         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1890         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1891
1892         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1893         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1894         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1895
1896         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1897         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1898         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1899         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1900         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1901
1902         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1903         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1904 }
1905
1906 #[test]
1907 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1908         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1909         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1910         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1911         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1912         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1913         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1914         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1915         // To test this we:
1916         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1917         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1918         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1919         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1920         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1921         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1922         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
1923         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1924         //    claim,
1925         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1926         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1927         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1928         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1929         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1930         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1931         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1932         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1933         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1934         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1935
1936         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1937         // Route the first two HTLCs.
1938         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1939         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1940
1941         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1942         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
1943         let send_1 = {
1944                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1945                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1946                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1947                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1948                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1949         };
1950
1951         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1952         // initial fulfill/CS.
1953         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1955         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1956
1957         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
1958         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
1959         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
1960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1961         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1962
1963         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1964         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
1965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1966         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1967         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
1968
1969         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
1970         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
1971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1972         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
1973         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1974
1975         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1976         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1977         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1978
1979         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1980         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1981         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1982
1983         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1985         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1986
1987         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
1988         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1989         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
1990         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
1991         // on-chain as necessary).
1992         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1993         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
1994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1995         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1996         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
1997
1998         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1999         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2000         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2001
2002         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2003         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2004
2005         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2006         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2007         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2008         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2009         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2010
2011         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2012         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2013         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2014         let send_2 = {
2015                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2016                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2017                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2018                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2019                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2020         };
2021
2022         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2023         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2025         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2026
2027         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2028
2029         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2030         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2031         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2032
2033         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2034         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2035
2036         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2037         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2038         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2039
2040         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2042         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2043
2044         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2045         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2046
2047         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2048         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2049
2050         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2051         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2052 }
2053
2054 #[test]
2055 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2056         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2057         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2058         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2059         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2060         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2061         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2062
2063         // Create some initial channels
2064         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2065         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2066         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2067         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2068
2069         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2070         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2071         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2072         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2073         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2074         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2075
2076         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2077         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2078         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2079         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2080         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2081
2082         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2083         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2085         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2086         {
2087                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2088                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2089                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2090                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2091                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2092         }
2093         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2094         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2095         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2096         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2097         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2098
2099         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2100         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2101
2102         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2103         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2104         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2105         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2106         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2107         {
2108                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2109                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2110                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2111                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2112                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2113                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2114         }
2115         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2116         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2117         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2118         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2119         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2120
2121         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2122                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2123                         {
2124                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2125                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2126
2127                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2128                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2129                                 match events[0] {
2130                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2131                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2132                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2133                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2134                                         },
2135                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2136                                 };
2137                         }
2138                 }
2139         }
2140
2141         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2142         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2143         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2145         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2146         let node2_commitment_txid;
2147         {
2148                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2149                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2150                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2151                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2152
2153                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2154                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2155                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2156                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2157                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2158         }
2159         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2160         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2161         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2162         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2163         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2164
2165         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2166         // confusing us in the following tests.
2167         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2168
2169         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2170         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2171         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2172         // buffer space).
2173
2174         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2175                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2176                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2177                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2178                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2179                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2180                                 msg.clone()
2181                         },
2182                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2183                 };
2184                 match events[1] {
2185                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2186                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2187                         },
2188                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2189                 }
2190                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2191
2192                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2193                 {
2194                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2195                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2196                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2197                                         false
2198                                 } else { true }
2199                         });
2200                 }
2201
2202                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2203
2204                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2205                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2206
2207                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2208                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2209                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2210                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2211                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2212                                 msg.clone()
2213                         },
2214                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2215                 };
2216                 match events[1] {
2217                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2218                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2219                         },
2220                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2221                 }
2222                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2223                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2224
2225                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2226                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2227                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2228         };
2229         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2230         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2231         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2232         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2233
2234         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2235         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2236         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2237 }
2238
2239 #[test]
2240 fn test_justice_tx() {
2241         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2242         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2243         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2244         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2245         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2246         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2247         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2248         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2249         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2250         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2251         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2252         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2253         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2254         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2255         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2256         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2257         // Create some new channels:
2258         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2259
2260         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2261         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2262         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2263         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2264         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2265         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2266         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2267         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2268         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2269         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2270         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2271         // Revoke the old state
2272         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2273
2274         {
2275                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2276                 {
2277                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2278                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2279                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2280
2281                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2282                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2283                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2284                 }
2285                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2286                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2287                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2288
2289                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2290                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2291                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2292                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2293                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2294                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2295                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2296                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2297                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2298         }
2299         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2300
2301         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2302         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2303
2304         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2305         // Create some new channels:
2306         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2307         {
2308                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2309                 node_txn.clear();
2310         }
2311
2312         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2313         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2314         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2315         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2316         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2317         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2318         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2319         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2320         // Revoke the old state
2321         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2322         {
2323                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2324                 {
2325                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2326                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2327                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2328
2329                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2330                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2331                 }
2332                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2333                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2334
2335                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2336                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2337                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2338                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2339                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2340                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2341                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2342         }
2343         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2344         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2345         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2346 }
2347
2348 #[test]
2349 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2350         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2351         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2352         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2353         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2354         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2355         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2356         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2357         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2358         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2359         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2360         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2361         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2362         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2363         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2364
2365         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2366         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2367         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2368         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2369         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2370         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2371
2372         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2373         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2374
2375         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2376         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2377         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2378         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2379         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2380 }
2381
2382 #[test]
2383 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2384         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2385         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2386         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2387         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2388         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2389         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2390
2391         // Create some new channel:
2392         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2393
2394         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2395         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2396         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2397         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2398         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2399
2400         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2401         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2402         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2403         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2404         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2405         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2406         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2407         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2408         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2409
2410         //Revoke the old state
2411         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2412
2413         {
2414                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2415                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2416                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2417                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2418                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2419                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2420                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2421                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2422
2423                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2424                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2425
2426                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2427                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2428
2429                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2430                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2431                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2432                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2433                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2434                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2435                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2436                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2437
2438                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2439                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2440                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2441         }
2442         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2443         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2444         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2445 }
2446
2447 #[test]
2448 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2449         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2450         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2451         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2452         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2453         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2454         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2455
2456         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2457
2458         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2459         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2460         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2461         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2462         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2463         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2464
2465         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2466         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2467
2468         //Revoke the old state
2469         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2470
2471         {
2472                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2473                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2474                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2475                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2476                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2477                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2478                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2479                 match events[1] {
2480                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2481                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2482                 }
2483
2484                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2485                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2486
2487                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2488                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2489                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2490                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2491                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2492                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2493
2494                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2495                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2496                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2497                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2498                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2499                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2500                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2501
2502                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2503                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2504                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2505                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2506
2507                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2508                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2509                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2510
2511                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2512                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2513                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2514                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2515                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2516                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2517                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2518                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2519         }
2520         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2521         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2522         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2523 }
2524
2525 #[test]
2526 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2527         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2528         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2529         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2530         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2531         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2532         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2533         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2534         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2535         // towards B.
2536         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2537         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2538         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2539         // PaymentSent event).
2540
2541         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2542         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2543         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2544         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2545
2546         // Create some initial channels
2547         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2548         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2549
2550         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2551         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2552         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2553         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2554         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2555
2556         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2557         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2558         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2559
2560         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2561         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2562
2563         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2564         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2565         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2566         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2567         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2568         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2569         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2570         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2571         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2572         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2573         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2574         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2575         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2576
2577         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2578         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2579         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2580         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2581         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2582         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2583         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2584         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2585         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2586         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2587         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2588         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2589         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2590         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2591         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2592         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2593         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2594
2595         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2596         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2597         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2598         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2599         {
2600                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2601                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2602                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2603                 added_monitors.clear();
2604         }
2605         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2606         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2607         match forwarded_events[0] {
2608                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2609                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2610         }
2611         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2612                 } else { panic!(); }
2613         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2614                 } else { panic!(); }
2615         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2616         {
2617                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2618                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2619                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2620                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2621                 added_monitors.clear();
2622         }
2623         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2624         match events[0] {
2625                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2626                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2627         }
2628         match events[1] {
2629                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2630                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2631         }
2632
2633         match events[2] {
2634                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2635                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2636                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2637                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2638                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2639                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2640                 },
2641                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2642         };
2643         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2644                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2645                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2646                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2647                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2648                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2649                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2650                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2651                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2652                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2653                         if $htlc_offered {
2654                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2655                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2656                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2657                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2658                         } else {
2659                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2660                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2661                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2662                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2663                         }
2664                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2665                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2666                         node_txn.clear();
2667                 } }
2668         }
2669         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2670         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2671         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2672         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2673
2674         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2675         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2676         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2677         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2678         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2679         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2680         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2681         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2682         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2683         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2684         let commitment_spend =
2685                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2686                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2687                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2688                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2689                         &node_txn[0]
2690                 } else {
2691                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2692                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2693                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2694                         &node_txn[2]
2695                 };
2696
2697         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2698         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2699         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2700         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2701         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2702         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2703         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2704         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2705         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2706         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2707         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2708         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2709
2710         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2711         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2712         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2713         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2714         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2715         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2716         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2717         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2718         let mut first_claimed = false;
2719         for event in events {
2720                 match event {
2721                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2722                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2723                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2724                                         first_claimed = true;
2725                                 } else {
2726                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2727                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2728                                 }
2729                         },
2730                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2731                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2732                 }
2733         }
2734         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2735 }
2736
2737 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2738         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2739         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2740         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2741         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2742         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2743         //            \                                  \
2744         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2745
2746         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2747         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2748         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2749         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2750         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2751         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2752         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2753
2754         // Create some intial channels
2755         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2756         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2757
2758         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2759         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2760         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2761
2762         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2763
2764         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2765         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2766         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2767         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2768         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2769         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2770         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2771
2772         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2773         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2774         match events[0] {
2775                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2776                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2777                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2778                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2779                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2780                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2781                 },
2782                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2783         };
2784         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2785         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2786         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2787         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2788         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2789         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2790         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2791         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2792
2793         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2794         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2795         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2796         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2797         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2798         let timeout_tx;
2799         {
2800                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2801                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2802                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2803                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2804
2805                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2806                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2807
2808                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2809                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2810                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2811                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2812
2813                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2814                 node_txn.clear();
2815         }
2816
2817         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2818         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2819         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2820         {
2821                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2822                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2823                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2824                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2825         }
2826
2827         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2828         {
2829                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2830                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2831                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2832                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2833                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2834                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2835                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2836                 } else {
2837                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2838                 }
2839         }
2840
2841         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2842         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2843         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2844         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2845         match events[0] {
2846                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2847                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2848                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2849                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2850                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2851                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2852                 },
2853                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2854         };
2855
2856         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2857         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2858         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2859
2860         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2861         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2862
2863         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2864         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2865         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2866         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2867         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2868         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2869         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2870         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2871         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2872 }
2873
2874 #[test]
2875 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2876         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2877         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2878         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2879 }
2880
2881 #[test]
2882 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2883         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2884         // and fail backward accordingly.
2885
2886         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2887         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2888         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2889         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2890
2891         // Create some initial channels
2892         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2893         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2894
2895         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2896         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2897         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2898         // Revoke the old state
2899         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2900
2901         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2902
2903         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2904         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2905         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2907         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2908
2909         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2911         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2912         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2913         match events[0] {
2914                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2915                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2916                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2917                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2918                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2919                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2920
2921                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2922                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2923                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2924                 },
2925                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2926         }
2927 }
2928
2929 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2930         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2931         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2932         // commitment transaction anymore.
2933         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2934         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2935         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2936         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2937         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2938         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2939         // transactions:
2940         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2941         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2942         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2943         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2944         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2945         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2946         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2947         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2948         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2949
2950         // Create some initial channels
2951         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2952         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2953
2954         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
2955         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2956         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2957         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
2958         // Revoke the old state
2959         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2960
2961         let value = if use_dust {
2962                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
2963                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
2964                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
2965         } else { 3000000 };
2966
2967         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2968         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2969         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2970
2971         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
2972         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2974         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2975         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2976         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2977         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2978         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2979         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2980         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2981         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
2982         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
2983
2984         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
2985         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2986         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2987         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2988         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2989         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2990         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2991         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2992         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2993         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2994         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2995         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2996         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2997         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2998         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2999         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3000
3001         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3002         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3003         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3004         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3005         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3006         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3007         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3008         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3009         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3010         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3011         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3012         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3013         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3014         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3015         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3016         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3017         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3018         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3019
3020         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3021         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3022         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3023         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3024         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3025         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3027
3028         if deliver_bs_raa {
3029                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3030                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3031                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3032                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3033                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3034                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3035                 match events[0] {
3036                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3037                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3038                 };
3039                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3040                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3041         }
3042
3043         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3044         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3045
3046         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3047         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3048         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3049
3050         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3051         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
3052         match events[0] {
3053                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3054                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3055         }
3056         match events[1] {
3057                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3058                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3059                 },
3060                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3061         }
3062         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3063                 match events[2] {
3064                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3065                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3066                 };
3067         }
3068         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3069         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3070
3071         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3072         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3073         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3074                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3075                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3076         }
3077         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3078                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3079                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3080                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3081                 },
3082                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3083         }
3084         if deliver_bs_raa {
3085                 match events[0] {
3086                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3087                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3088                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3089                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3090                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3091                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3092                         },
3093                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3094                 }
3095         }
3096         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3097                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3098                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3099                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3100                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3101                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3102                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3103
3104                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3105                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3106                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3107
3108                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3109
3110                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3111                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3112                         match events[0] {
3113                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3114                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3115                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3116                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3117                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3118                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3119                                         }
3120                                 },
3121                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3122                         }
3123                         match events[1] {
3124                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3125                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3126                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3127                                 },
3128                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3129                         }
3130                         match events[2] {
3131                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3132                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3133                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3134                                 },
3135                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3136                         }
3137                 },
3138                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3139         }
3140
3141         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3142         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3143         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3144 }
3145
3146 #[test]
3147 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3148         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3149         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3150         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3151         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3152 }
3153
3154 #[test]
3155 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3156         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3157         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3158         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3159         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3160 }
3161
3162 #[test]
3163 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3164         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3165         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3166         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3167         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3168         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3169
3170         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3171         {
3172                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3173                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3174                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3175
3176                 let payment_event = {
3177                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3178                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3179                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3180                 };
3181                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3182                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3183         }
3184
3185         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3186         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3187         {
3188                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3189                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3190
3191                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3192         }
3193
3194         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3195         {
3196                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3197
3198                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3199                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3200                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3201                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3202                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3203                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3204
3205                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3206                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3207                         channel_id: chan.2,
3208                         htlc_id: 0,
3209                         amount_msat: 0,
3210                         payment_hash,
3211                         cltv_expiry,
3212                         onion_routing_packet,
3213                 };
3214                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3215         }
3216         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3217         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3218         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3219         match events[0] {
3220                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3221                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3222                 },
3223                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3224         }
3225         match events[1] {
3226                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3227                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3228                 },
3229                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3230         }
3231         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3232         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3233 }
3234
3235 #[test]
3236 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3237         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3238         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3239         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3240         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3241         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3242         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3243         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3244
3245         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3246         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3247         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3248         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3250         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3251
3252         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3253         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3254         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3255
3256         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3257         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3258         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3259         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3260         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3261
3262         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3263         // registering new transactions
3264         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3265         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3266 }
3267
3268 #[test]
3269 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3270         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3271         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3272         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3273         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3274         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3275         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3276         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3277
3278         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3279
3280         let mut payment_event = {
3281                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3282                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3283
3284                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3285                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3286                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3287         };
3288
3289         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3290         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3291
3292         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3293
3294         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3295         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3296         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3297         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3298
3299         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3300         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3301         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3302         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3303         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3304
3305         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3306         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3307         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3308
3309         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3310         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3312         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3313         let tx = {
3314                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3315                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3316                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3317                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3318                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3319                 node_txn.remove(0)
3320         };
3321
3322         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3323
3324         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3325         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3326         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3327         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3328
3329         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3330         {
3331                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3332                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3333         }
3334         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3335         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3336         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3337         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3338         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3339         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3340         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3341
3342         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3343 }
3344
3345 #[test]
3346 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3347         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3348         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3349         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3350         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3351
3352         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3353         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3354         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3355         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3356         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3357
3358         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3359
3360         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3361         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3362         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3363         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3364         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3365
3366         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3367         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3368
3369         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3370         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3371 }
3372
3373 #[test]
3374 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3375         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3376         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3377         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3378         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3379         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3380         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3381         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3382
3383         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3384         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3385         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3386
3387         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3388         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3389         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3390         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3391
3392         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3393         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3394         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3395
3396         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3397         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3398         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3399         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3400
3401         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3402         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3403
3404         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3405         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3406
3407         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3408         {
3409                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3410                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3411                 match events[0] {
3412                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3413                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3414                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3415                         },
3416                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3417                 }
3418                 match events[1] {
3419                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3420                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3421                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3422                         },
3423                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3424                 }
3425         }
3426
3427         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3428         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3429 }
3430
3431 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3432         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3433         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3434         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3435         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3436         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3437
3438         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3439         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3440                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3441                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3442                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3443                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3444                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3445         } else {
3446                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3447         }
3448
3449         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3450
3451         let payment_event = {
3452                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3453                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3454
3455                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3456                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3457                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3458         };
3459         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3460
3461         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3462                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3463         } else {
3464                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3465                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3466                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3467                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3468                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3469
3470                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3471                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3472                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3473                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3474
3475                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3476                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3477                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3478                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3479                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3480
3481                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3482                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3483                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3484                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3485                                         }
3486                                 }
3487                         }
3488                 }
3489         }
3490
3491         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3492         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3493         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3494                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3495                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3496                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3497                         //
3498                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3499                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3500                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3501                         //
3502                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3503                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3504                 }
3505                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3506                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3507                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3508         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3509                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3510                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3511         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3512                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3513                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3514         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3515                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3516                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3517         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3518                 // Everything was delivered...
3519                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3520         }
3521
3522         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3523         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3524         match events_1[0] {
3525                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3526                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3527         };
3528
3529         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3530         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3531         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3532
3533         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3534
3535         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3536         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3537         match events_2[0] {
3538                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3539                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3540                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3541                         match &purpose {
3542                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3543                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3544                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3545                                 },
3546                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3547                         }
3548                 },
3549                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3550         }
3551
3552         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3553         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3554
3555         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3556         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3557         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3558                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3559                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3560                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3561                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3562                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3563                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3564                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3565                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3566                 },
3567                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3568         };
3569
3570         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3571                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3572
3573                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3574                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3575                 match events_4[0] {
3576                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3577                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3578                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3579                         },
3580                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3581                 }
3582
3583                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3584                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3585                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3586                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3587
3588                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3589                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3590                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3591                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3592
3593                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3594                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3595                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3596                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3597                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3598
3599                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3600                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3601                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3602                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3603                                         }
3604                                 }
3605                         }
3606                 }
3607         }
3608
3609         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3610         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3611         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3612                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3613                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3614                         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3615                         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3616                         match events_4[0] {
3617                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3618                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3619                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3620                                 },
3621                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3622                         }
3623                 } else {
3624                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3625                 }
3626         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3627                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3628                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3629         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3630                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3631                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3632         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3633                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3634                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3635         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3636                 // Everything was delivered...
3637                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3638         }
3639
3640         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3641         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3642         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3643
3644         // Channel should still work fine...
3645         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3646         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3647         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3648 }
3649
3650 #[test]
3651 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3652         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3653         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3654         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3655         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3656 }
3657
3658 #[test]
3659 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3660         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3661         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3662         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3663         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3664 }
3665
3666 #[test]
3667 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3668         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3669         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3670         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3671         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3672         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3673         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3674         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3675         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3676         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3677
3678         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3679         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3680
3681         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3682         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3683         let chan_id;
3684         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3685         match events_1[0] {
3686                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3687                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3688                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3689                 },
3690                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3691         }
3692
3693         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3694
3695         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3696         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3697
3698         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3699         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3700         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3701         let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3702                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3703                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3704                         msg.clone()
3705                 },
3706                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3707         };
3708         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3709                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3710                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3711                         msg.clone()
3712                 },
3713                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3714         };
3715
3716         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3717
3718         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3719         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3720         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3721         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3722         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3723                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3724                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3725                         msg.clone()
3726                 },
3727                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3728         };
3729         let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3730                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3731                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3732                 },
3733                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3734         };
3735
3736         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3737         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3738         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3739         let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3740                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3741                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3742                 },
3743                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3744         };
3745
3746         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3747         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3748         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3749
3750         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3751         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3752         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3753
3754         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3755         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3756         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3757
3758         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3759         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3760         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3761
3762         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3763         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3764         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3765         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3766         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3767         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3768                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3769         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3770
3771         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3772         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3773                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3774                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3775                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3776                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3777                         keys_manager,
3778                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3779                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3780                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3781                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3782                         channel_monitors,
3783                 }).unwrap()
3784         };
3785         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3786         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3787
3788         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3789         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3790         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3791
3792         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3793
3794         // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3795         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3796         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3797         let mut found_announcement = false;
3798         for event in msgs.iter() {
3799                 match event {
3800                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3801                                 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3802                         },
3803                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3804                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3805                 }
3806         }
3807         assert!(found_announcement);
3808 }
3809
3810 #[test]
3811 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3812         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3813         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3814         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3815         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3816         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3817         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3818         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3819
3820         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3821
3822         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3823         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3824         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3826
3827         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3828         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3829         match events_1[0] {
3830                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3831                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3832         }
3833
3834         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3835         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3836
3837         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3838         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3839         match events_2[0] {
3840                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3841                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3842                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3843                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3844                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3845                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3846                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3847
3848                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3849                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3850                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3851                         match events_3[0] {
3852                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3853                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3854                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3855                                 },
3856                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3857                         }
3858
3859                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3860                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3861                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3862                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3863                 },
3864                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3865         }
3866
3867         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3868         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3869
3870         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3871         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3872         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3873         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3874         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3875         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3876
3877         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3878         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3879         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3880         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3881
3882         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3883         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3884
3885         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3886         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3887
3888         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3889
3890         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3891         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3892         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3893         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3894         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3895         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3896         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3897         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3898         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3899         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3900
3901         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3902         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3903         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3904         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3905         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3906         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3907         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3908         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3909
3910         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3911         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3912         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3913         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3914         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3915         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3916         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3918
3919         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3920         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3921         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3922         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3923
3924         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3925         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3926         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3928
3929         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3930         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3932
3933         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3934
3935         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3936         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3937         match events_5[0] {
3938                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3939                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3940                         match &purpose {
3941                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3942                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3943                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3944                                 },
3945                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3946                         }
3947                 },
3948                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3949         }
3950
3951         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
3952         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3954
3955         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3956 }
3957
3958 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
3959         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
3960         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
3961         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3962         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3963         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3964         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3965
3966         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3967
3968         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
3969                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
3970                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
3971                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
3972                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
3973                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
3974                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
3975                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3976                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3977                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3978                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
3979                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
3980                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
3981                 our_payment_hash
3982         } else {
3983                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
3984         };
3985
3986         let mut block = Block {
3987                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
3988                 txdata: vec![],
3989         };
3990         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3991         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3992         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
3993         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
3994                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
3995                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3996                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3997         }
3998
3999         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4000
4001         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4002         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4003         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4004         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4005         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4006         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4007
4008         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4009         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4010         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4011         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4012         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4013         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4014 }
4015
4016 #[test]
4017 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4018         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4019         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4020 }
4021
4022 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4023         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4024         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4025         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4026         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4027         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4028         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4029         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4030
4031         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4032         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4033         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4034         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4035
4036         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4037         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4038         {
4039                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4040         }
4041         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4042         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4043
4044         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4045         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4046         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4047         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4048         if forwarded_htlc {
4049                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4050                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4051                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4052                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4053                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4054         }
4055         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4056
4057         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4058         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4059         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4060         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4061
4062         if forwarded_htlc {
4063                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4064                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4065                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4066                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4067                 match fail_commit[0] {
4068                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4069                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4070                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4071                         },
4072                         _ => unreachable!(),
4073                 }
4074                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4075         } else {
4076                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4077         }
4078 }
4079
4080 #[test]
4081 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4082         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4083         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4084 }
4085
4086 #[test]
4087 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4088         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4089         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4090         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4091         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4092         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4093         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4094         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4095         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4096         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4097
4098         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4099
4100         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4101
4102         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4103         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4104         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4105                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4106
4107         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4108         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4109         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4110         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4111         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4112         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4113         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4114         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4115                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4116         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4117
4118         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4119         let config = UserConfig::default();
4120         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4121                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4122                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4123                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4124                         default_config: config,
4125                         keys_manager,
4126                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4127                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4128                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4129                         logger: &logger,
4130                         channel_monitors,
4131                 }).unwrap()
4132         };
4133         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4134         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4135
4136         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4137         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4138         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4140
4141         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4142         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4143         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4144         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4145
4146         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4147         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4148         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4149         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4150
4151         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4152         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4153         for node in nodes.iter() {
4154                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4155                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4156                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4157         }
4158
4159         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4160 }
4161
4162 #[test]
4163 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4164         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4165         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4166         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4167         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4168         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4169         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4170         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4171         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4172         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4173         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4174
4175         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4176         let channel_value = 100000;
4177         let push_msat = 10001;
4178         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4179         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4180         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4181         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4182         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4183         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4184         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4185
4186         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4187
4188         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4189         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4190
4191         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4192         {
4193                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4194                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4195                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4196                 added_monitors.clear();
4197         }
4198
4199         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4200         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4201         {
4202                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4203                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4204                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4205                 added_monitors.clear();
4206         }
4207         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4208
4209         nodes.push(node_a);
4210         nodes.push(node_b);
4211
4212         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4213         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4214         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4215         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4216
4217         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4218         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4219         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4220         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4221         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4222         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4223         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4224         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4225                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4226         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4227
4228         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4229         let config = UserConfig::default();
4230         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4231                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4232                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4233                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4234                         default_config: config,
4235                         keys_manager,
4236                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4237                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4238                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4239                         logger: &logger,
4240                         channel_monitors,
4241                 }).unwrap()
4242         };
4243         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4244         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4245
4246         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4247
4248         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4249         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4250
4251         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4252         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4253         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4254         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4255         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4256
4257         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4258         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4259         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4260
4261         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4262         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4263         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4264         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4265
4266         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4267         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4268         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4269         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4270
4271         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4272         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4273         for node in nodes.iter() {
4274                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4275                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4276                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4277         }
4278
4279         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4280 }
4281
4282 #[test]
4283 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4284         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4285         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4286         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4287         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4288         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4289         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4290         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4291         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4292         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4293         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4294
4295         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4296         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4297
4298         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4299
4300         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4301         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4302         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4303
4304         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4305         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4306         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4307         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4308         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4309         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4310         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4311         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4312                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4313         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4314
4315         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4316         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4317                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4318                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4319                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4320                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4321                         keys_manager,
4322                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4323                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4324                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4325                         logger: &logger,
4326                         channel_monitors,
4327                 }).unwrap()
4328         };
4329         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4330         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4331
4332         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4333         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4334         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4335
4336         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4337
4338         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4339         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4340 }
4341
4342 #[test]
4343 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4344         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4345         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4346         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4347         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4348         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4349         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4350         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4351         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4352         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4353         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4354         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4355         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4356         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4357
4358         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4359         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4360                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4361                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4362                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4363         }
4364
4365         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4366
4367         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4368         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4369
4370         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4371         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4372         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4373         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4374
4375         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4376         // nodes[3])
4377         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4378         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4379                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4380                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4381                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4382         }
4383
4384         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4385         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4386         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4387         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4388         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4389         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4390
4391
4392         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4393         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4394                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4395                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4396                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4397                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4398         }
4399
4400         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4401         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4402                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4403                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4404                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4405                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4406         }
4407
4408         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4409         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4410                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4411                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4412                 keys_manager,
4413                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4414                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4415                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4416                 logger: &logger,
4417                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4418         }) { } else {
4419                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4420         };
4421
4422         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4423         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4424                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4425                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4426                 keys_manager,
4427                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4428                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4429                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4430                 logger: &logger,
4431                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4432         }).unwrap();
4433         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4434         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4435
4436         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4437                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4438                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4439                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4440                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4441         }
4442
4443         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4444                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4445                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4446         }
4447         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4448         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4449
4450         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4451         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4452         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4453         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4454         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4455
4456         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4457         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4458         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4459         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4460         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4461         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4462         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4463                 match action {
4464                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4465                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4466                         },
4467                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4468                 }
4469         }
4470 }
4471
4472 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4473         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4474                 {
4475                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4476                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4477                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4478                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4479                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4480                                 match event {
4481                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4482                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4483                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4484                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4485                                                 }
4486                                         },
4487                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4488                                 };
4489                         }
4490                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4491                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4492                                         txn.push(tx);
4493                                 }
4494                         }
4495                         txn
4496                 }
4497         }
4498 }
4499
4500 #[test]
4501 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4502         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4503         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4504         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4505         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4506         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4507
4508         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4509         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4510         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4511         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4512         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4513         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4514         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4515         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4516         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4517
4518         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4519         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4520
4521         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4522         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4523         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4524         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4525         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4526 }
4527
4528 #[test]
4529 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4530         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4531         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4532         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4533         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4534         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4535         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4536
4537         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4538         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4539         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4540         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4541         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4542
4543         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4544         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4545         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4546         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4547
4548         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4549         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4550         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4551         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4552         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4553
4554         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4555         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4556         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4557 }
4558
4559 #[test]
4560 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4561         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4562         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4563
4564         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4565         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4566         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4567         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4568
4569         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4570         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4571         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4572         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4573         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4574
4575         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4576         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4577         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4579         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4580
4581         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4582         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4583         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4584
4585         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4586         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4587         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4588         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4589         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4590 }
4591
4592 #[test]
4593 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4594         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4595         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4596         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4597         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4598
4599         // Create some initial channels
4600         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4601
4602         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4603
4604         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4605         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4606         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4607
4608         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4609         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4610         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4611         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4612         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4613         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4614         match events[0] {
4615                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4616                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4617         }
4618         match events[1] {
4619                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4620                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4621         }
4622
4623         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4624         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4625         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4626         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4627         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4628         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4629         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4630
4631         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4632         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4633         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4634
4635         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4636         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4637         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4638 }
4639
4640 #[test]
4641 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4642         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4643         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4644         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4645         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4646
4647         // Create some initial channels
4648         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4649
4650         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4651         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4652
4653         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4654
4655         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4656         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4657         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4658
4659         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4660         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4662         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4663         match events[0] {
4664                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4665                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4666         }
4667         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4668
4669         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4670         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4671         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4672         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4673         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4674         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4675
4676         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4677         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4678         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4679         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4680
4681         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4682         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4683         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4684         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4685         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4686 }
4687
4688 #[test]
4689 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4690         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4691         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4692         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4693         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4694
4695         // Create some initial channels
4696         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4697
4698         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4699         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4700         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4701         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4702
4703         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4704
4705         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4706         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4707         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4708         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4709
4710         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4711         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4712         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4713         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4714
4715         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4716         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4717
4718         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4719         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4720         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4721 }
4722
4723 #[test]
4724 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4725         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4726         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4727         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4728         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4729         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4730
4731         // Create some initial channels
4732         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4733
4734         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4735         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4736         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4737         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4738
4739         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4740
4741         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4742         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4743         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4744         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4745         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4746         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4747
4748         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4749         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4750         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4751         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4752         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4753         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4754         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4755
4756         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4757         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4758         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4759         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4760         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4761         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4762
4763         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4764         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4765         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4766         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4767         // transactions next...
4768         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4769         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4770
4771         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4772         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4773         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4774                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4775         } else {
4776                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4777                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4778         }
4779
4780         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4781         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4782
4783         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4784         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4785
4786         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4787         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4788         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4789         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4790         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4791 }
4792
4793 #[test]
4794 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4795         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4796         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4797         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4798         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4799         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4800
4801         // Create some initial channels
4802         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4803
4804         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4805         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4806         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4807         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4808
4809         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4810         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4811
4812         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4813
4814         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4815         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4816         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4818         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4819         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4820
4821         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4822         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4823         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4824         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4825
4826         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4827         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4828         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4829
4830         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4831         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4832         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4833         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4834         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4835         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4836
4837         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4838         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4839
4840         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4841         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4842         // transactions next...
4843         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4844         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4845         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4846                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4847         } else {
4848                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4849                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4850         }
4851
4852         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4853         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4854
4855         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4856
4857         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4858         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4859
4860         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4861         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4862
4863         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4864         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4865         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4866         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4867         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4868         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4869         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4870         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4871 }
4872
4873 #[test]
4874 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4875         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4876         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4877         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4878         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4879         // channel.
4880         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4881         // gets broadcast.
4882
4883         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4884         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4885         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4886         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4887
4888         // Create some initial channels
4889         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4890         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4891
4892         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4893         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4894         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4895         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4896         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4897
4898         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4899         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4900         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4901
4902         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4903         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4904         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4905         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4907         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4908         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4909         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4910         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4911         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4912
4913         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4914         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4915         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4916         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4917
4918         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4919         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4920         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4921         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4922         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4923         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4924         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4925         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4926         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4927         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4928
4929         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4930         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4931         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4932         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4933         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4934         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4935         match events[0] {
4936                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4937                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4938         }
4939         match events[1] {
4940                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
4941                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4942                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4943                 },
4944                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4945         }
4946         {
4947                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4948                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4949                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4950                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
4951                 b_txn.clear();
4952         }
4953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4954         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4955         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4956         match msg_events[0] {
4957                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4958                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4959         }
4960         match msg_events[1] {
4961                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4962                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4963         }
4964         match msg_events[2] {
4965                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4966                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4967                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4968                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4969                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4970                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4971                 },
4972                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4973         };
4974         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4975         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4976         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4977         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4978         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4979         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
4980         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
4981         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4982         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
4983         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4984         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4985         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4986         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4987
4988         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4990 }
4991
4992 #[test]
4993 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4994         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4995         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4996         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4997         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4998         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4999         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5000         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5001         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5002         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5003         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5004         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5005                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5006         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5007
5008         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5009         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5010         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5011
5012         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5013         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5014         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5015         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5016         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5017
5018         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5019
5020         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5021         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5022         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5023         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5024         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5025         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5026
5027         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5028         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5029         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5030
5031         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5032         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5033         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5034         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5035         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5036
5037         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5038         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5039                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5040                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5041                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5042                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5043
5044                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5045                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5046                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5047                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5048                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5049                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5050                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5051
5052                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5053                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5054                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5055                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5056         }
5057
5058         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5059         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5060         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5061         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5062         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5063         match events[0] {
5064                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5065                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5066         }
5067         match events[1] {
5068                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5069                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5070         }
5071         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5072         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5073         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5074         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5075         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5076         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5077         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5078         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5079         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5080         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5081         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5082         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5083         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5084
5085         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5086         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5087         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5088         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5089         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5090         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5091         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5092         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5093         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5094         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5095
5096         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5097         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5098         {
5099                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5100         }
5101         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5102
5103         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5104         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5105         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5106         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5107         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5108         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5109         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5110         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5111         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5112         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5113         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5114         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5115
5116         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5117         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5118
5119         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5120         match events[0] {
5121                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5122                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5123                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5124                 }
5125                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5126         }
5127 }
5128
5129 #[test]
5130 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5131         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5132         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5135
5136         // Create some initial channels
5137         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5138
5139         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5140         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5141         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5142         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5143         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5144
5145         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5146         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5148         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5150         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5151         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5152         match events[0] {
5153                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5154                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5155         }
5156         match events[1] {
5157                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5158                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5159         }
5160         let node_tx = {
5161                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5162                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5163                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5164                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5165                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5166                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5167                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5168                 node_txn[0].clone()
5169         };
5170
5171         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5172         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5173
5174         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5175         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5176         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5177         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5178         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5179         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5180 }
5181
5182 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5183         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5184         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5185         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5186         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5187         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5188         // use the same payment hashes.
5189         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5190         //
5191         // A \         / E
5192         //    - C - D -
5193         // B /         \ F
5194         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5195         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5196         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5197         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5198         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5199         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5200         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5201         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5202                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5203         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5204
5205         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5206         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5207         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5208         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5209         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5210
5211         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5212         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5213         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5214         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5215
5216         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5217         // 0th HTLC:
5218         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5219         // 1st HTLC:
5220         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5221         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5222         // 2nd HTLC:
5223         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5224         // 3rd HTLC:
5225         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5226         // 4th HTLC:
5227         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5228         // 5th HTLC:
5229         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5230         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5231         // 6th HTLC:
5232         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5233         // 7th HTLC:
5234         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5235
5236         // 8th HTLC:
5237         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5238         // 9th HTLC:
5239         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5240         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5241
5242         // 10th HTLC:
5243         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5244         // 11th HTLC:
5245         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5246         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5247
5248         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5249         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5250         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5251         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5252         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5253
5254         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5255         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5256         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5257         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5258         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5259         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5260         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5261         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5262         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5263
5264         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5265         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5266         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5267         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5268         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5269         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5270
5271         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5272         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5273         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5274         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5275         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5277
5278         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5279         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5280         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5281         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5282
5283         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5284
5285         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5287         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5288         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5289         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5290         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5291         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5292         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5293         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5294         if deliver_last_raa {
5295                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5296         } else {
5297                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5298         }
5299
5300         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5301         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5302         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5303         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5304         //
5305         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5306         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5307         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5308         //
5309         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5310         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5311         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5312
5313         if announce_latest {
5314                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5315         } else {
5316                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5317         }
5318         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5319         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5320                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5321                 events[1].clone()
5322         } else {
5323                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5324                 events[0].clone()
5325         };
5326         match close_event {
5327                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5328                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5329         }
5330
5331         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5332         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5333         if deliver_last_raa {
5334                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5335         } else {
5336                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5337         }
5338         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5339
5340         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5341         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5342         let mut a_done = false;
5343         for msg in cs_msgs {
5344                 match msg {
5345                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5346                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5347                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5348                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5349                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5350                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5351                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5352                                         }
5353                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5354                                         assert!(!a_done);
5355                                         a_done = true;
5356                                         &nodes[0]
5357                                 } else {
5358                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5359                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5360                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5361                                         }
5362                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5363                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5364                                         &nodes[1]
5365                                 };
5366                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5367                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5368                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5369                                 if announce_latest {
5370                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5371                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5372                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5373                                         }
5374                                 }
5375                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5376                         },
5377                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5378                 }
5379         }
5380
5381         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5382         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5383         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5384         let mut as_updates = 0;
5385         for event in as_events.iter() {
5386                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5387                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5388                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5389                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5390                         } else {
5391                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5392                         }
5393                         if network_update.is_some() {
5394                                 as_updates += 1;
5395                         }
5396                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5397         }
5398         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5399         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5400         if announce_latest {
5401                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5402                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5403         }
5404         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5405
5406         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5407         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5408         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5409         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5410         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5411                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5412                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5413                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5414                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5415                         } else {
5416                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5417                         }
5418                         if network_update.is_some() {
5419                                 bs_updates += 1;
5420                         }
5421                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5422         }
5423         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5424         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5425         if announce_latest {
5426                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5427         }
5428         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5429
5430         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5431         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5432         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5433         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5434         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5435         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5436 }
5437
5438 #[test]
5439 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5440         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5441 }
5442
5443 #[test]
5444 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5445         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5446 }
5447
5448 #[test]
5449 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5450         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5451         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5452         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5453 }
5454
5455 #[test]
5456 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5457         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5458         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5459         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5460         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5461
5462         // Create some initial channels
5463         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5464
5465         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5466         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5467         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5468         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5469
5470         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5471         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5472         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5474         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5475         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5476
5477         let htlc_timeout = {
5478                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5479                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5480                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5481                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5482                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5483                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5484                 node_txn[1].clone()
5485         };
5486
5487         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5488         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5489         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5490
5491         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5492         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5493         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5494         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5495         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5496         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5497         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5498         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5499         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5500         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5501                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5502 }
5503
5504 #[test]
5505 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5506         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5507         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5508         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5509
5510         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5511
5512         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5513         let seed = [42; 32];
5514         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5515         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5516         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5517         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5518         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5519         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5520
5521         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5522         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5523
5524         // Create some initial channels
5525         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5526         // for node 0
5527         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5528         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5529         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5530
5531         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5532         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5533         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5534         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5535         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5536
5537         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5538         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5539         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5540         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5541         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5542
5543         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5544         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5545         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5546         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5547             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5548             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5549             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5550                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5551         }
5552
5553         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5554         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5555         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5556         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5557         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5558         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5559
5560         let htlc_timeout = {
5561                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5562                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5563                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5564                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5565                 node_txn[1].clone()
5566         };
5567
5568         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5569         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5570         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5571
5572         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5573         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5574         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5575         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5576         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5577         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5578         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5579         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5580         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5581         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5582         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5583                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5584 }
5585
5586 #[test]
5587 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5588         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5591         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5592
5593         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5594
5595         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5596         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5597
5598         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5599         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5600         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5601
5602         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5603         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5604         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5605
5606         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5607         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5608         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5609
5610         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5611         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5612         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5613 }
5614
5615 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5616         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5617         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5618         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5619         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5620         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5621
5622         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5623
5624         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5625         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5626         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5627         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5628
5629         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5630         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5631         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5632         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5633         match events[0] {
5634                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
5635                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5636                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5637                 },
5638                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5639         }
5640
5641         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5642         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5643         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5644         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5645         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5646
5647         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5648         let mut block = Block {
5649                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5650                 txdata: vec![],
5651         };
5652         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5653                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5654                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5655         }
5656         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5657         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5658         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5659         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5660 }
5661
5662 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5663         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5664         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5665         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5666         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5667         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5668
5669         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5670         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5671         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5672
5673         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5674
5675         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5676         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5677         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5678
5679         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5680         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5681
5682         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5683                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5684                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5685         }
5686         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5687         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5688         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5689         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5690 }
5691
5692 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5693         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5694         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5695         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5696         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5697         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5698
5699         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5700         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5701         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5702         // actually revoked.
5703         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5704         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5705         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5706         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5707         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5708
5709         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5710         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5711         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5712         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5713         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5714         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5715         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5716         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5717         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5718         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5719
5720         if check_revoke_no_close {
5721                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5722                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5723         }
5724
5725         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5726         let mut block = Block {
5727                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5728                 txdata: vec![],
5729         };
5730         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5731                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5732                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5733         }
5734         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5735                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5736                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5737                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5738                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5739         } else {
5740                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5741         }
5742 }
5743
5744 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5745 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5746 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5747 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5748 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5749 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5750 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5751 // non-dust HTLCs.
5752 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5753 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5754 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5755 #[test]
5756 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5757         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5758         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5759
5760         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5761         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5762 }
5763
5764 #[test]
5765 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5766         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5767         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5768         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5769         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5770 }
5771
5772 #[test]
5773 #[should_panic]
5774 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5775         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5776         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5777         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5778         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5779         //Force duplicate channel ids
5780         for node in nodes.iter() {
5781                 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5782         }
5783
5784         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5785         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5786         let push_msat=10001;
5787         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5788         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5789         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5790
5791         //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5792         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5793 }
5794
5795 #[test]
5796 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5797         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5798         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5799         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5800         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5801
5802         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5803         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5804         let push_msat=10001;
5805         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5806
5807         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5808         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5809         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5810         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5811         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5812
5813         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5814         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5815         let push_msat=10001;
5816         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5817         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5818         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5819
5820         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5821         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5822         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5823
5824         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5825         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5826         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5827
5828         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5829         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5830         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5831
5832         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5833         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5834         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5835         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5836         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5837         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5838 }
5839
5840 #[test]
5841 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5842         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5843         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5844         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5845         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5846
5847         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5848         let push_msat=10001;
5849         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5850         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5851         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5852         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5853
5854         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5855         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5856         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5857                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5858                         msg.clone()
5859                 },
5860                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5861         };
5862         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5863 }
5864
5865 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5866 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5867 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5868 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5869 #[test]
5870 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5871         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5872         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5873         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5874         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5875         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5876
5877         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5878         // pending_update_fee.
5879         {
5880                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5881                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5882         }
5883         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5884         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5885
5886         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5887         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5888         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5889                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5890                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5891                 },
5892                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5893         };
5894
5895         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5896
5897         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5898         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5899         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5900
5901         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5902         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5903         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5904
5905         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5906         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5907         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5908         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5909
5910         // Flush the pending fee update.
5911         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5912         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5913         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5914         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5915         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5916
5917         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5918         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5919         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5920         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5921         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5922         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5923         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5924                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5925         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5926
5927         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5928         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5929         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5930         match &events[0] {
5931                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
5932                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5933                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5934                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5935                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5936                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5937                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
5938                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5939                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5940                 },
5941                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5942         }
5943 }
5944
5945 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5946 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5947 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5948 #[test]
5949 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5950         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5951         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5952         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5953         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5954         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5955
5956         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5957         // pending_update_fee.
5958         {
5959                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5960                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5961         }
5962         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5964
5965         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5966         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5967         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5968                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5969                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5970                 },
5971                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5972         };
5973
5974         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5975
5976         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5977         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5978         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5979
5980         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5981         let amt_1 = 20000;
5982         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
5983         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5984         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5985
5986         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5987         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
5988         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5989         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5990         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
5991         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5992         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5993
5994         // Flush the pending fee update.
5995         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5996         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5997         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5998         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5999         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6000         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6001
6002         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6003         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6004         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6005         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6006         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6007         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6008         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6009                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6010         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6011
6012         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6013         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6014         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6015         match &events[0] {
6016                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6017                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6018                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6019                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6020                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6021                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6022                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6023                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6024                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6025                 },
6026                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6027         }
6028
6029         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6030         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6031                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6032                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6033                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6034         };
6035         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6036                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6037                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6038         };
6039         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6040         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6041         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6042         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6043         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6044         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6045         match events[0] {
6046                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6047                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6048         }
6049         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6050         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6051         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6052         match events[0] {
6053                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6054                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6055         }
6056         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6057         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6058         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6059         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6060         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6061         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6062         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6063         match events[0] {
6064                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6065                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6066                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
6067                 }
6068                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6069         }
6070 }
6071
6072 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6073 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6074 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6075 // once it's freed.
6076 #[test]
6077 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6078         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6079         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6080         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6081         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6082         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6083         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6084         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6085         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6086         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6087         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6088
6089         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6090         // pending_update_fee.
6091         {
6092                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6093                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6094         }
6095         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6096         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6097
6098         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6099         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6100         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6101                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6102                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6103                 },
6104                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6105         };
6106
6107         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6108
6109         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6110         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6111         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6112
6113         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6114         let feemsat = 239;
6115         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6116         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6117         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6118         let payment_event = {
6119                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6120                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6121
6122                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6123                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6124
6125                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6126         };
6127         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6129         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6130         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6131
6132         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6133         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6134
6135         // Flush the pending fee update.
6136         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6137         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6139         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6140         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6142
6143         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6144         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6145         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6146
6147         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6148                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6149                         msg.clone()
6150                 },
6151                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6152         };
6153
6154         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6156         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6157
6158         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6159         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6160         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6161         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6162                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6163                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6164         }
6165
6166         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6167         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6169
6170         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6171         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6172         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6173         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6174                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6175                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6176                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6177                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6178                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6179                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6180                 },
6181                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6182         };
6183
6184         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6185         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6186         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6187
6188         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6189         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6190         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6191         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6192         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6194         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6195         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6196         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6197                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6198                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6199         };
6200         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6201         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6203 }
6204
6205 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6206 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6207 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6208
6209 #[test]
6210 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6211         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6212         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6213         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6214         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6215         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6216         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6217
6218         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6219         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6220
6221         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6222                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6223         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6224         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6225 }
6226
6227 #[test]
6228 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6229         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6230         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6231         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6232         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6233         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6234         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6235
6236         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6237         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6238         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6239                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6240
6241         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6242         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6243 }
6244
6245 #[test]
6246 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6247         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6248         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6249         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6250         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6251         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6252         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6253
6254         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6255         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6256         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6257         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6258         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6259
6260         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6261         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6262         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6263         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6264         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6265 }
6266
6267 #[test]
6268 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6269         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6270         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6271         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6272         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6273         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6274         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6275         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6276
6277         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6278         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6279                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6280 }
6281
6282 #[test]
6283 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6284         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6285         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6286         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6287         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6288         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6289         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6290         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6291         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6292         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6293
6294         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6295                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6296                 let payment_event = {
6297                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6298                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6299
6300                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6301                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6302                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6303                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6304                         } else {
6305                                 assert!(false);
6306                         }
6307                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6308                 };
6309                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6310                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6311                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6312
6313                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6314                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6315         }
6316         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6317         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6318                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6319
6320         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6321         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6322 }
6323
6324 #[test]
6325 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6326         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6327         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6328         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6329         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6330         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6331         let channel_value = 100000;
6332         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6333         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6334
6335         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6336
6337         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6338         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6339         // limits us to.
6340         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6341         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6342                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6343
6344         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6345         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6346
6347         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6348 }
6349
6350 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6351 #[test]
6352 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6353         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6354         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6355         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6356         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6357         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6358         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6359         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6360         {
6361                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6362                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6363                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6364         }
6365
6366         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6367         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6368         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6369         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6370         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6371         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6372         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6373         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6374         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6375         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6376         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6377 }
6378
6379 #[test]
6380 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6381         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6382         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6383         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6384         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6385         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6386         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6387
6388         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6389         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6390         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6391         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6392         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6393
6394         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6395         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6396         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6397         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6398         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6399
6400         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6401         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6402         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6403         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6404         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6405
6406         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6407         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6408         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6409         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6410         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6411 }
6412
6413 #[test]
6414 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6415         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6416         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6417         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6418         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6419         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6420         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6421         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6422
6423         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6424         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6425         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6426         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6427         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6428         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6429
6430         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6431                 channel_id: chan.2,
6432                 htlc_id: 0,
6433                 amount_msat: 1000,
6434                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6435                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6436                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6437         };
6438
6439         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6440                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6441                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6442         }
6443         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6444         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6445
6446         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6447         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6448         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6450         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6451 }
6452
6453 #[test]
6454 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6455         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6456         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6457         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6458         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6459         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6460         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6461
6462         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6463         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6464         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6465         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6466         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6467         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6468
6469         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6470         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6471         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6472         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6473         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6474 }
6475
6476 #[test]
6477 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6478         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6479         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6480         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6481         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6482         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6483
6484         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6485         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6486         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6488         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6489         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6490         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6491
6492         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6493         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6494         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6496         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6497 }
6498
6499 #[test]
6500 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6501         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6502         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6503         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6504         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6505         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6506         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6507         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6508
6509         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6510         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6511         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6512         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6513         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6514         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6515
6516         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6517         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6518         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6519         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6520         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6521         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6522         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6523         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6524         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6525         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6526         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6527         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6528         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6529
6530         //Resend HTLC
6531         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6532         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6533         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6534         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6535         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6536
6537         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6538
6539         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6540         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6541         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6542         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6543         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6544 }
6545
6546 #[test]
6547 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6548         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6549
6550         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6551         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6552         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6553         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6554         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6555         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6556         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6557
6558         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6559         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6560         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6561
6562         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6563                 channel_id: chan.2,
6564                 htlc_id: 0,
6565                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6566         };
6567
6568         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6569
6570         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6571         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6572         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6573         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6574         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6575 }
6576
6577 #[test]
6578 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6579         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6580
6581         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6582         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6583         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6584         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6585         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6586
6587         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6588         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6589         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6590         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6591         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6592
6593         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6594                 channel_id: chan.2,
6595                 htlc_id: 0,
6596                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6597         };
6598
6599         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6600
6601         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6602         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6603         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6604         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6605         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6606 }
6607
6608 #[test]
6609 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6610         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6611
6612         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6613         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6614         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6615         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6616         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6617
6618         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6619         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6620         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6621         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6622         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6623         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6624                 channel_id: chan.2,
6625                 htlc_id: 0,
6626                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6627                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6628         };
6629
6630         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6631
6632         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6633         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6634         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6635         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6636         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6637 }
6638
6639 #[test]
6640 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6641         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6642
6643         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6646         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6647         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6648
6649         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6650
6651         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6652         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6653
6654         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6655         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6656         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6657                 match events[0] {
6658                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6659                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6660                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6661                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6662                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6663                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6664                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6665                         },
6666                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6667                 }
6668         };
6669
6670         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6671
6672         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6673
6674         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6675         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6676         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6677         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6678         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6679 }
6680
6681 #[test]
6682 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6683         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6684
6685         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6686         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6687         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6688         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6689         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6690
6691         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6692
6693         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6694         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6695
6696         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6697         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6698         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6699                 match events[0] {
6700                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6701                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6702                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6703                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6704                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6705                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6706                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6707                         },
6708                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6709                 }
6710         };
6711
6712         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6713
6714         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6715
6716         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6717         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6718         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6719         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6720         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6721 }
6722
6723 #[test]
6724 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6725         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6726
6727         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6728         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6729         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6730         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6731         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6732
6733         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6734         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6735         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6736
6737         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6738         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6739
6740         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6741         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6742         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6743
6744         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6745
6746         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6747                 match events[0] {
6748                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6749                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6750                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6751                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6752                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6753                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6754                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6755                         },
6756                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6757                 }
6758         };
6759         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6760         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6761
6762         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6763         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6764         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6765         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6766         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6767 }
6768
6769 #[test]
6770 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6771         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6772         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6773
6774         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6775         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6776         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6777         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6778         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6779         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6780
6781         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6782
6783         //First hop
6784         let mut payment_event = {
6785                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6786                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6787                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6788                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6789                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6790         };
6791         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6792         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6793         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6794         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6795         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6796         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6797         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6798         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6799         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6800
6801         //Second Hop
6802         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6803         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6805         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6806
6807         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6808         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6809         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6810                 match events_3[0] {
6811                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6812                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6813                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6814                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6815                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6816                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6817                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6818                         },
6819                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6820                 }
6821         };
6822
6823         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6824
6825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6826         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6827         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6828         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6829         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6830
6831         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6832         match events_4[0] {
6833                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6834                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6835                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6836                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6837                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6838                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6839                 },
6840                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6841         };
6842
6843         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6844 }
6845
6846 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6847         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6848         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6849         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6850
6851         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6852         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6853         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6854         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6855         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6856         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6857
6858         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6859
6860         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6861         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6862         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6863         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6864
6865         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6866         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6867
6868         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6869         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6870         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6871         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6873
6874         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6875         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6876         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6877         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6878
6879         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6880         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6881
6882         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6883         match events[0] {
6884                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6885                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6886                 },
6887                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6888         }
6889         match events[1] {
6890                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6891                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6892                 },
6893                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6894         }
6895
6896         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6897         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6898         if announce_latest {
6899                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6900         } else {
6901                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6902         }
6903
6904         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6905         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6906         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6907
6908         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6909         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6910         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6911         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6912         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6913         let mut first_failed = false;
6914         for event in events {
6915                 match event {
6916                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6917                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6918                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6919                                         first_failed = true;
6920                                 } else {
6921                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6922                                 }
6923                         }
6924                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6925                 }
6926         }
6927 }
6928
6929 #[test]
6930 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6931         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6932         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6933 }
6934
6935 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6936         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6937         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6938         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6939         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6940         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6941         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6942
6943         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6944         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6945         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6946         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6947         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6948
6949         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6950
6951         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6952         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6953
6954         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6955         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6956
6957         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6958         if revoked {
6959                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6960                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6961         }
6962
6963         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6964         if local {
6965                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6966                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6967                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6968                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6969                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
6970
6971                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6972                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6973                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6974                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6975                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6976                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6977                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6978                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6979                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6980                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6981                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
6982         } else {
6983                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6984                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6985                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6986                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6987                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6988                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6989                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6990                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6991                 if !revoked {
6992                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
6993                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6994                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
6995                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6996                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6997                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6998                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
6999                 } else {
7000                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7001                         // commitment tx
7002                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7003                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7004                         let first;
7005                         match events[0] {
7006                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7007                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7008                                         else { first = false; }
7009                                 },
7010                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7011                         }
7012                         match events[1] {
7013                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7014                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7015                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7016                                 },
7017                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7018                         }
7019                 }
7020         }
7021 }
7022
7023 #[test]
7024 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7025         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7026         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7027         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7028 }
7029
7030 #[test]
7031 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7032         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7033
7034         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7035         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7036         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7037         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7038         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7039         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7040         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7041         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7042         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7043
7044         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7045         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7046                 match error {
7047                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7048                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7049                 }
7050         } else { assert!(false) }
7051
7052         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7053         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7054         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7055         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7056         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7057                 match error {
7058                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7059                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7060                 }
7061         } else { assert!(false); }
7062
7063         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7064         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7065         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7066         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7067         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7068         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7069         let reason_msg;
7070         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7071                 match action {
7072                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7073                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7074                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7075                         },
7076                         _ => { panic!(); }
7077                 }
7078         } else { panic!(); }
7079         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7080
7081         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7082         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7083         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7084         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7085         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0) {
7086                 match error {
7087                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7088                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7089                 }
7090         } else { assert!(false); }
7091 }
7092
7093 #[test]
7094 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7095         // We want to be sure that :
7096         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7097         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7098         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7099         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7100         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7101         let persister;
7102         let logger;
7103         let fee_estimator;
7104         let tx_broadcaster;
7105         let chain_source;
7106         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7107         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7108         // during signing due to revoked tx
7109         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7110         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7111         let monitor;
7112         let node_state_0;
7113         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7114         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7115         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7116
7117         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7118
7119         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7120         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7121         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7122         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7123
7124         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7125         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7126
7127         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7128         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7129
7130         // Restore node A from previous state
7131         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7132         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7133         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7134         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7135         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7136         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7137         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7138         node_state_0 = {
7139                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7140                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7141                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7142                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7143                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7144                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7145                         logger: &logger,
7146                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7147                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7148                         channel_monitors,
7149                 }).unwrap().1
7150         };
7151         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7152         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7153         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7154         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7155
7156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7157
7158         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7159         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7160
7161         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7162
7163         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7164         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7165         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7166
7167         {
7168                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7169                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7170         }
7171
7172         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7173         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7174                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7175                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7176                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7177                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7178                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7179                         match action {
7180                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7181                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7182                                 },
7183                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7184                         }
7185                 } else {
7186                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7187                 }
7188         }
7189
7190         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7191         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7192         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7193         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7194         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7195
7196         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7197         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7198         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7199         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7200         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7201         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7202         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7203         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7204         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7205         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7206         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7207 }
7208
7209 #[test]
7210 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7211         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7212         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7213         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7214
7215         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7216         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7217         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7218         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7219
7220         // Create some initial channels
7221         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7222
7223         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7224         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7225         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7226         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7227         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7228         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7229         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7230
7231         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7232         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7233         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7234         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7235         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7236
7237         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7238         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7239         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7240         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7241
7242         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7243         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7244         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7245
7246         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7247         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7248         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7249                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7250                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7251                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7252                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7253                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7254                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7255                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7256                 },
7257                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7258         };
7259         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7260
7261         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7262         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7263
7264         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7265         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7266         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7267         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7268 }
7269
7270 #[test]
7271 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7272         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7273         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7274
7275         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7276         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7277         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7278         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7279
7280         let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7281         let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7282         let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7283
7284         // Disconnect peers
7285         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7286         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7287
7288         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7289         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7290         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7291         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7292         let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7293         for e in msg_events {
7294                 match e {
7295                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7296                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7297                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7298                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7299                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7300                                 }
7301                         },
7302                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7303                 }
7304         }
7305         // Reconnect peers
7306         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7307         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7308         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7309         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7310         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7311         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7312
7313         // Reestablish chan_1
7314         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7315         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7316         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7317         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7318         // Reestablish chan_2
7319         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7320         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7321         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7322         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7323         // Reestablish chan_3
7324         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7325         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7326         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7327         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7328
7329         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7330         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7331         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7332         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7333         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7334         chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7335         for e in msg_events {
7336                 match e {
7337                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7338                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7339                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7340                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7341                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7342                                 }
7343                         },
7344                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7345                 }
7346         }
7347 }
7348
7349 #[test]
7350 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7351         // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7352         // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7353         // to forward through that channel.
7354         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7355         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7356         let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7357         no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7358         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7359         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7360         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7361         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7362         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7363         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7364
7365         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7366
7367         // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7368         // not send for private channels.
7369         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7370         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7371         nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7372         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7373         nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7374
7375         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7376         nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7377         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7378         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7379
7380         let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7381         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7382         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7383
7384         let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7385         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7386         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7387         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7388         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7389         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7390         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7391         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7392         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7393         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7394
7395         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7396         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7397         assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7398
7399         // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7400         // channel:
7401         send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7402
7403         // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7404         // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7405         let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7406                 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7407                 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7408                 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7409                 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7410                 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7411                 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7412         }]);
7413         let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7414         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7415
7416         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7417         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7418         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7419         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7420         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7421
7422         let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7423         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7424         assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7425         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7426         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7427
7428         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7429         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7430         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7431
7432         // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7433         // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7434
7435         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7436         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7437
7438         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7439         let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7440         let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7441         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7442         get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7443
7444         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7445         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7446         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7447         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7448
7449         let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7450         let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7451         let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7452         let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7453         assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7454         assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7455
7456         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7457
7458         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7459         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7460                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7461                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7462                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7463                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7464                         default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7465                         keys_manager,
7466                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7467                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7468                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7469                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
7470                         channel_monitors,
7471                 }).unwrap()
7472         };
7473         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7474         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7475
7476         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7477         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7479         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7480
7481         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7482         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7483         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7484         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7485         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7486         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7487         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7488         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7489
7490         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7491         nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7492         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7493         let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7494         nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7495         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7496         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7497         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7498
7499         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7501         pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7502         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7503 }
7504
7505 #[test]
7506 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7507         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7508         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7509
7510         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7511         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7512         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7513         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7514
7515         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7516
7517         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7518         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7519         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7520
7521         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7522         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7523         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7524         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7525         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7526         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7527
7528         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7529         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7530                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7531                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7532                 }
7533         }
7534
7535         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7536         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7537
7538         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7539         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7540         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7541         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7542         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7543
7544         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7545         let penalty_1;
7546         let feerate_1;
7547         {
7548                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7549                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7550                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7551                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7552                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7553                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7554                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7555                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7556                 node_txn.clear();
7557         };
7558
7559         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7560         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7561         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7562         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7563         {
7564                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7565                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7566                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7567                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7568                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7569                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7570                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7571                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7572                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7573                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7574                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7575                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7576                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7577                         node_txn.clear();
7578                 }
7579         }
7580         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7581
7582         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7583         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7584         let penalty_3;
7585         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7586         {
7587                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7588                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7589                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7590                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7591                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7592                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7593                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7594                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7595                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7596                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7597                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7598                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7599                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7600                         node_txn.clear();
7601                 }
7602         }
7603         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7604
7605         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7606         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7607 }
7608
7609 #[test]
7610 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7611         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7612         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7613
7614         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7615         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7616         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7617         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7618         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7619
7620         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7621         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7622         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7623         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7624         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7625                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7626         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7627         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7628         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7629                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7630         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7631
7632         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7633         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7634         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7635
7636         // Revoke local commitment tx
7637         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7638
7639         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7640         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7641         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7642         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7643         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7644         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7645         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7646
7647         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7648         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7649         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7650
7651         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7652         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7653         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7654
7655         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7656         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7657         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7658         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7659
7660         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7661         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7662         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7663         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7664         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7665         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7666         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7667         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7668         match events[1] {
7669                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7670                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7671         }
7672         let first;
7673         let feerate_1;
7674         let penalty_txn;
7675         {
7676                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7677                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7678                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7679
7680                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7681                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7682                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7683                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7684                 // future).
7685                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7686                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7687                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7688                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7689                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7690                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7691
7692                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7693                 // available, which we check here:
7694                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7695                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7696                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7697
7698                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7699                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7700
7701                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7702                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7703                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7704                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7705
7706                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7707                 // output, checked above).
7708                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7709                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7710                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7711
7712                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7713                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7714                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7715                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7716                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7717                 node_txn.clear();
7718         }
7719
7720         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7721         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7722         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7723         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7724         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7725         {
7726                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7727                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7728
7729                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7730                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7731                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7732                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7733                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7734                 } else {
7735                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7736                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7737                 }
7738
7739                 node_txn.clear();
7740         };
7741
7742         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7743         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7744         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7745         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7746         let node_txn = {
7747                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7748                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7749
7750                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7751                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7752                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7753                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7754                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7755                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7756                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7757                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7758                 node_txn.clear();
7759                 txn
7760         };
7761         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7762         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7763         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7764         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7765         {
7766                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7767                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7768                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7769                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7770                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7771                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7772                 // up bumped justice generation.
7773                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7774                 node_txn.clear();
7775         }
7776         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7777         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7778 }
7779
7780 #[test]
7781 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7782         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7783         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7784
7785         // Create 2 HTLCs
7786         // Provide preimage for one
7787         // Check aggregation
7788
7789         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7790         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7791         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7792         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7793
7794         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7795         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7796         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7797
7798         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7799         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7800         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7801         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7802         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7803
7804         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7805         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7806         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7808         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7809
7810         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7811         let timeout;
7812         let preimage;
7813         let preimage_bump;
7814         let feerate_timeout;
7815         let feerate_preimage;
7816         {
7817                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7818                 // 9 transactions including:
7819                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7820                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7821                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7822                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
7823                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7824                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7825                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7826                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7827                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7828                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7829                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7830
7831                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7832                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7833                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7834                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7835
7836                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7837                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7838                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7839                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7840
7841                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7842                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7843                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7844                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7845
7846                 node_txn.clear();
7847         };
7848         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7849         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7850
7851         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7852         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7853         {
7854                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7855                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7856                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7857                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7858                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7859                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7860
7861                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7862                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7863                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7864                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7865                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7866
7867                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7868                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7869                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7870                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7871                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7872
7873                 node_txn.clear();
7874         }
7875
7876         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7877         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7878 }
7879
7880 #[test]
7881 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7882         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7883         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7884         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7885         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7886         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7887         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7888         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7889         // implement that).
7890         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7891         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7892         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7893         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7894         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7895
7896         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7897         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7898
7899         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7900
7901         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7902         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7903         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7904
7905         // Must revoke without gaps
7906         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7907         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7908
7909         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7910         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7911                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7912
7913         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7914                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7915         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7916         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7917         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7918 }
7919
7920 #[test]
7921 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7922         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7923         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7924
7925         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7926         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7927         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7928         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7929
7930         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7931         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7932         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7933         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7934
7935         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7936         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7937         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7938
7939         // Revoke local commitment tx
7940         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7941
7942         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7943         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7944         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7945         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7946
7947         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7948         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7950         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7951         let penalty_txn = {
7952                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7953                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7954                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7955                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7956                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7957                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7958                 node_txn.clear();
7959                 penalty_txn
7960         };
7961         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7962         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7963         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7964         {
7965                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7966                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7967                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7968         }
7969 }
7970
7971 #[test]
7972 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7973         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7974         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7975         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7976         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7977         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7978         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7979
7980         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7981
7982         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7983         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7984         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7985         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7986         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7987
7988         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7989         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7990         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7991         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7992
7993         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7995         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7996         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7997         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7998         match close_ev[0] {
7999                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8000                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8001                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8002                 },
8003                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8004         }
8005 }
8006
8007 #[test]
8008 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8009         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8010         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8011         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8012         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8013
8014         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8015         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8016         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8017
8018         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8019
8020         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8021         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8022         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8023         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8024 }
8025
8026 #[test]
8027 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8028         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8029         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8030         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8031         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8032         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8033         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8034
8035         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8036         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8037         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8038
8039         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8040         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8041         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8042 }
8043
8044 #[test]
8045 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8046         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8047         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8048         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8049         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8050         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8051
8052         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8053         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8054         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8055         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8056
8057         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8058         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8059         route.paths.push(path);
8060         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8061         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8062         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8063         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8064         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8065         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8066         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8067         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8068 }
8069
8070 #[test]
8071 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8072         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8073         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8074         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8075         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8076         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8077
8078         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8079
8080         {
8081                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200);
8082                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8083                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8084                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8085                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8086                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8087                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8088                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8089         }
8090         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8091         // values from previous calls.
8092         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8093         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8094         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8095         match events[0] {
8096                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8097                         match &purpose {
8098                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8099                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8100                                 },
8101                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8102                         }
8103                 },
8104                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8105         }
8106 }
8107
8108 #[test]
8109 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8110         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8111         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8112         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8113         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8114         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8115
8116         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8117
8118         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8119
8120         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8121         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8122         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8123                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8124         } else { panic!(); }
8125         let mut block = {
8126                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8127                 Block {
8128                         header: BlockHeader {
8129                                 version: 0x2000000,
8130                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8131                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8132                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8133                         txdata: vec![],
8134                 }
8135         };
8136         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8137         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8138                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8139         } else { panic!(); }
8140
8141         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8142         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8143         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8144         block.header.time += 1;
8145         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8146         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8147         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8148
8149         {
8150                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8151                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8152                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8153                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8154                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8155                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8156                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8157         }
8158         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8159         // values from previous calls.
8160         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8161         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8162         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8163         match events[0] {
8164                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8165                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8166                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8167                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8168                 },
8169                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8170         }
8171 }
8172
8173 #[test]
8174 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8175         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8176         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8177         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8178         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8179         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8180
8181         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8182
8183         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8184         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8185         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8186         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8187
8188         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8189         // resulting events.
8190         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8191                 () => {
8192                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8193                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8194                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8195                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8196                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8197
8198                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8199                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8200                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8201                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8202                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8203
8204                         // We should fail the payment back
8205                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8206                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8207                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8208                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8209                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8210                                 },
8211                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8212                         }
8213                 }
8214         }
8215
8216         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8217         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8218         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8219
8220         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8221         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8222         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8223         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8224
8225         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8226         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8227         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8228         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8229
8230         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8231         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8232         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8233         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8234 }
8235
8236 #[test]
8237 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8238         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8239         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8240         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8241         //
8242         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8243         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8244         // commitment at same time.
8245
8246         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8247         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8248         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8249         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8250
8251         // Create some initial channel
8252         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8253         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8254
8255         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8256         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8257
8258         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8259         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8260
8261         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8262         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8263         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8264         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8265         let watchtower = {
8266                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8267                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8268                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8269                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8270                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8271                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8272                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8273                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8274                 watchtower
8275         };
8276         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8277         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8278         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8279         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8280         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8281
8282         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8283         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8284         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8285         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8286         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8287         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8288         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8289                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8290                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8291                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8292                 } else { assert!(false); }
8293         } else { assert!(false); };
8294         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8295         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8296         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8297         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8298 }
8299
8300 #[test]
8301 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8302         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8303         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8304         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8305         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8306
8307         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8308         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8309         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8310         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8311
8312         // Create some initial channel
8313         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8314         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8315
8316         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8317         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8318
8319         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8320         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8321
8322         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8323         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8324         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8325         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8326         let watchtower_alice = {
8327                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8328                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8329                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8330                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8331                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8332                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8333                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8334                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8335                 watchtower
8336         };
8337         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8338         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8339         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8340         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8341         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8342
8343         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8344         {
8345                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8346                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8347                 txn.clear();
8348         }
8349
8350         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8351         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8352         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8353         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8354         let watchtower_bob = {
8355                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8356                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8357                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8358                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8359                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8360                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8361                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8362                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8363                 watchtower
8364         };
8365         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8366         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8367
8368         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8369         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8370         {
8371                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8372         }
8373         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8374
8375         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8376         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8377         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8378         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8379                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8380                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8381                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8382                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8383                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8384                 } else { assert!(false); }
8385         } else { assert!(false); };
8386         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8387         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8388
8389         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8390         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8391         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8392
8393         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8394         let bob_state_y;
8395         {
8396                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8397                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8398                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8399                 txn.clear();
8400         };
8401
8402         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8403         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8404         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8405         {
8406                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8407                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8408                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8409                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8410                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8411                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8412         }
8413 }
8414
8415 #[test]
8416 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8417         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8418         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8419         // message).
8420         //
8421         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8422         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8423         //
8424         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8425         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8426         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8427         // before receiving funding_signed.
8428         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8429         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8430         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8431         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8432
8433         // Create an initial channel
8434         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8435         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8436         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8437         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8438         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8439
8440         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8441         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8442
8443         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8445
8446         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8447         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8448         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8449         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8450         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8451 }
8452
8453 #[test]
8454 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8455         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8456         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8457         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8458         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8459         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8460         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8461
8462         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8463         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8464         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8465         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8466
8467         // Create some initial channels
8468         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8469
8470         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8471         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8472         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8473         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8474         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8475         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8476
8477         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8478         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8479         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8480         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8481         // this test before #653 fix.
8482         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8483         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8484         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8485         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8486         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8487
8488         let htlc_timeout = {
8489                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8490                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8491                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8492                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8493                 node_txn[1].clone()
8494         };
8495
8496         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8497         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8498         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8499         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8500 }
8501
8502 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8503         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8504         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8505         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8506         //
8507         // Steps of the test:
8508         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8509         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8510         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8511         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8512         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8513         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8514         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8515         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8516         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8517         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8518         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8519         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8520
8521         // Create some initial channels
8522         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8523         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8524
8525         // Steps (1) and (2):
8526         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8527         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8528
8529         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8530         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8531         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8532         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8533         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8534         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8535         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8536
8537         // Steps (3) and (4):
8538         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8539         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8540         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8541         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8542         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8543         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8544         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8545         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8546         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8547                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8548                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8549                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8550                 };
8551                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8552                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8553                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8554                 if broadcast_alice {
8555                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8556                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8557                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8558                 }
8559                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8560                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8561         }
8562
8563         // Step (5):
8564         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8565         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8566         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8567         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8568         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8569         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8570         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8571         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8572         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8573         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8574
8575         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8576         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8577         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8578         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8579                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8580                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8581                 match events[0] {
8582                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8583                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8584                         },
8585                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8586                 };
8587         }
8588         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8589         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8590         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8591         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8592
8593         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8594         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8595         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8596                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8597                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8598                         (*msg).clone()
8599                 },
8600                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8601         };
8602         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8603                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8604                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8605                         (*updates).clone()
8606                 },
8607                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8608         };
8609
8610         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8611         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8612         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8614
8615         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8616         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8617         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8618                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8619                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8620                         (*msg).clone()
8621                 },
8622                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8623         };
8624         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8625         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8626
8627         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8628         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8629         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8630         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8631         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8632                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8633                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8634                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8635                 if broadcast_alice {
8636                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8637                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8638                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8639                 }
8640                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8641                 if broadcast_alice {
8642                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8643                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8644                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8645                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8646                         // broadcasted.
8647                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8648                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8649                 } else {
8650                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8651                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8652                 }
8653         }
8654
8655         // Step (6):
8656         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8657         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8658         {
8659                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8660                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8661                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8662                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8663                 }
8664                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8665                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8666                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8667                 };
8668                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8669                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8670                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8671                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8672                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8673                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8674                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8675                 } else {
8676                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8677                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8678                 }
8679         }
8680 }
8681
8682 #[test]
8683 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8684         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8685         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8686         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8687         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8688 }
8689
8690 #[test]
8691 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8692         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8693         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8694         //
8695         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8696         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8697         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8698         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8699         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8700         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8701         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8702         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8703
8704         // Create an initial channel
8705         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8706         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8707         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8708         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8709
8710         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8711         // that it is rejected.
8712         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8713         {
8714                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8715                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8716                 match events[0] {
8717                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8718                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8719                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8720                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8721                                 // move forward with it.
8722                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8723                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8724                         },
8725                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8726                 }
8727         }
8728
8729         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8730         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8731
8732         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8733         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8734
8735         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8736         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8737         {
8738                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8739                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8740                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8741                 added_monitors.clear();
8742         }
8743         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8744
8745         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8746         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8747
8748         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8749         // temporary one).
8750
8751         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8752         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8753         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8754         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8755         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8756         {
8757                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8758                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8759                 match events[0] {
8760                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8761                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8762                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8763                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8764                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8765                         },
8766                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8767                 }
8768         }
8769
8770         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8771         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8772         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8773         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8774         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8775         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8776
8777         let funding_created = {
8778                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8779                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8780                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8781                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8782         };
8783         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8784         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8785         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8786         // still needs to be cleared here.
8787         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8788
8789         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8790         {
8791                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8792                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8793                 match events[0] {
8794                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8795                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8796                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8797                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8798                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8799                         },
8800                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8801                 }
8802         }
8803
8804         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8805         // everything is functional.
8806         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8807         {
8808                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8809                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8810                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8811                 added_monitors.clear();
8812         }
8813
8814         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8815         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8816         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8817         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8818
8819         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8820         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8821         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8822         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8823 }
8824
8825 #[test]
8826 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8827         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8828         //
8829         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8830         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8831         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8832         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8833         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8834         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8835         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8836
8837         // Create some initial channels
8838         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8839         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8840         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8841
8842         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8843         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8844         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8845
8846         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8847         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8848         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8849
8850         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8851         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8852         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8853         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8854         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8855         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8856         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8857         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8858         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8859
8860         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8861         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8862         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8863         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8864         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8865         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8866         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8867         match events[0] {
8868                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8869                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8870                 },
8871                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8872         }
8873         match events[1] {
8874                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8875                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8876                 },
8877                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8878         }
8879         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8880         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8881         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8882         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8883         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8884         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8885
8886         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8887         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8888         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8889 }
8890
8891 #[test]
8892 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8893         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8894         //
8895         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8896         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8897         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8898         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8899         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8900         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8901         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8902         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8903
8904         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8905         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8906         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8907
8908         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8909         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8910                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8911                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8912         }
8913
8914         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8915         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8916         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8917
8918         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8919         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8920
8921         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8922         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8923
8924         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8925         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8926         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8927
8928         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8929         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8930         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8932         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8933         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8934         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8935                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8936                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8937                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8938                 } else { panic!(); }
8939         } else { panic!(); }
8940         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8941 }
8942
8943 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8944         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8945         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8946         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8947         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8948         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8949         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8950         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8951         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8952         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8953         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8954         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8955         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8956         // until we learned about an additional block.
8957         //
8958         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8959         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8960         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8961         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8962         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8963         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8964         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8965
8966         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8967         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8968         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8969         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8970         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8971
8972         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
8973         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8974         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8975         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8976         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8977         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8978
8979         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8980         if !test_height_before_timelock {
8981                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8982         }
8983         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8984                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8985         if test_height_before_timelock {
8986                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8987                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8988                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8989                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8990         } else {
8991                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8992                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8993                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8994                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8995                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8996                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8997                 // timelock is up).
8998                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8999                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9000
9001                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9002                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9003                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9004                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9005                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9006                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9007                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9008
9009                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9010                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9011                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9012                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9013                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9014                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9015                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9016                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9017                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9018         }
9019 }
9020
9021 #[test]
9022 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9023         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9024         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9025 }
9026
9027 #[test]
9028 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9029         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9030         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9031         // HTLCs.
9032         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9033
9034         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9035         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9036         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9037         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9038         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9039         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9040         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9041         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9042         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9043
9044         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9045         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9046         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9047         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9048
9049         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9050         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9051         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9052         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9053         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9054
9055         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9056
9057         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9058         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9059         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9060         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9061
9062         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9063         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9064         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9065         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9066         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9067
9068         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9069         // generated
9070         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9071
9072         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9073         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9074         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9075
9076         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9077         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9078         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9079         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9080         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9081
9082         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9083         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9084         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9085         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9086
9087         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9088         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9089                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9090         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9091         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9092         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9093                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9094         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9095
9096         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9097         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9098                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9099                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9100                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9101                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9102                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9103                         keys_manager,
9104                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9105                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9106                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9107                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9108                         channel_monitors,
9109                 }).unwrap()
9110         };
9111         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9112         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9113
9114         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9115         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9116         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9117         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9118
9119         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9120         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9121         // the commitment state.
9122         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9123
9124         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9125
9126         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9127         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9129
9130         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9131         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9132         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9133         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9134         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9135         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9136         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9137
9138         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9139         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9140 }
9141
9142 #[test]
9143 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9144         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9145         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9146         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9147         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9148
9149         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9150         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9151         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9152         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9153         let params = RouteParameters {
9154                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9155                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9156                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9157         };
9158         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9159         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9160
9161         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9162         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9164         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9165         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9166         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9167         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9168         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9169         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9170 }
9171
9172 #[test]
9173 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9174         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9175         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9176         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9177         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9178
9179         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9180         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9181         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9182         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9183
9184         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9185         let params = RouteParameters {
9186                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9187                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9188                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9189         };
9190         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9191         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9192         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9193         let route = find_route(
9194                 &payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9195                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9196         ).unwrap();
9197
9198         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9199         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9200         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9201         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9202         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9203         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9204         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9205         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9206         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9207 }
9208
9209 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9210 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9211 enum ExposureEvent {
9212         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9213         AtHTLCForward,
9214         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9215         AtHTLCReception,
9216         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9217         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9218 }
9219
9220 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9221         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9222         // policy.
9223         //
9224         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9225         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9226         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9227         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9228         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9229         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9230         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9231         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9232
9233         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9234         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9235         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9236         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9237         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9238         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9239
9240         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9241         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9242         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9243         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9244         if on_holder_tx {
9245                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9246         }
9247         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9248         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9249         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9250
9251         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9252
9253         if on_holder_tx {
9254                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9255                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9256                 }
9257         }
9258
9259         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9260         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9262
9263         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9264         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9265
9266         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9267         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9268         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9269
9270         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9271                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9272                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9273                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9274         };
9275         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9276         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9277
9278         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9279         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9280
9281         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9282         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9283
9284         if on_holder_tx {
9285                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9286                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9287                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9288                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9289                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9290                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9291                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9292                         }
9293                 } else {
9294                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9295                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9296                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9297                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9298                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9299                         }
9300                 }
9301         } else {
9302                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9303                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9304                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9305                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9306                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9307                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9308                         }
9309                 } else {
9310                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9311                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9312                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9313                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9314                         }
9315                 }
9316         }
9317
9318         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9319         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9320                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9321                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9322                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9323                 if on_holder_tx {
9324                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9325                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9326                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9327                 } else {
9328                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9329                 }
9330         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9331                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9332                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9333                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9334                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9335                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9336                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9337                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9338                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9339                 if on_holder_tx {
9340                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9341                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9342                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9343                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9344                 } else {
9345                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9346                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9347                 }
9348         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9349                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9350                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9351                 {
9352                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9353                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9354                 }
9355                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9356                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9357                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9358         }
9359
9360         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9361         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9362         added_monitors.clear();
9363 }
9364
9365 #[test]
9366 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9367         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9368         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9369         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9370         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9371         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9372         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9373         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9374         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9375         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9376         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9377         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9378         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9379 }