1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
27 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField, ErrorAction};
30 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
31 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
32 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
33 use util::errors::APIError;
34 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
35 use util::config::UserConfig;
37 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
38 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
42 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
44 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
51 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
52 use core::default::Default;
53 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
55 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
56 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
59 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
60 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
61 use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
62 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
63 cfg.peer_channel_config_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
64 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
65 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
66 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
67 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
69 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
71 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
72 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
73 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
75 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
76 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
78 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
79 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
81 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
82 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
83 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
84 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
85 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
86 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
87 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
88 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
90 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
91 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
93 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
95 } else { assert!(false); }
98 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
100 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
101 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
102 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
104 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
106 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
108 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
110 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
112 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
116 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
120 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
121 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
123 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
124 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
125 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
126 node_cfgs[1].features = InitFeatures::known().clear_wumbo();
127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
128 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
130 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
131 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
132 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
138 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
139 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
140 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
141 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
142 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
143 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
144 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
145 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
146 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
148 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
149 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
150 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
151 let opt_anchors = false;
152 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
153 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
155 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
156 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
157 if !send_from_initiator {
158 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
159 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
161 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
163 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
164 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
165 if send_from_initiator {
166 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
167 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
169 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
172 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
173 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
177 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
178 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
179 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
181 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
182 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
183 if send_from_initiator {
184 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
185 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
186 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
187 // well as an additional HTLC.
188 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
190 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
195 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
196 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
197 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
201 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
202 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
203 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
204 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
205 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
206 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
209 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
213 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
214 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
215 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
216 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
217 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
218 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
219 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
220 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
221 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
222 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
224 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
226 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
228 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
230 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
233 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
236 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
237 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
238 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
239 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
240 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
242 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
245 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
247 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
248 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
249 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
252 let payment_event = {
253 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
254 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
255 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
257 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
258 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
260 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
261 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
262 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
263 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
264 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
267 // deliver(1), generate (3):
268 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
269 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
270 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
273 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
274 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
275 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
276 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
277 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
278 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
279 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
282 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
283 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
284 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
285 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
286 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
287 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
288 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
291 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
292 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
293 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
296 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
297 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
300 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
303 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
304 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
306 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
307 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
310 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
315 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
316 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
317 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
321 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
322 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
325 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
327 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
329 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
332 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
335 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
336 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
337 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
338 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
344 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
346 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
347 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
348 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
351 let payment_event = {
352 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
353 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
354 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
356 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
357 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
359 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
360 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
361 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
362 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
363 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
366 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
369 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
373 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
374 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
375 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
376 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
377 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
378 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
381 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
382 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
383 // update_fee (never committed) ->
385 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
386 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
387 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
388 // <- (1) RAA delivered
389 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
390 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
391 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
392 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
394 // B should send no response here
395 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
396 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
399 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
402 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
403 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
404 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
406 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
409 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
410 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
411 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
412 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
413 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
415 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
418 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
419 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
420 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
421 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
424 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
427 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
428 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
430 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
431 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
432 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
434 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
435 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
436 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
437 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
440 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
442 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
444 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
446 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
447 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
448 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
450 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
451 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
452 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
453 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
454 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
455 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
456 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
458 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
459 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
460 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
462 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
464 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
465 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
469 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
470 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
473 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
474 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
477 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
478 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
479 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
482 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
483 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
487 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
488 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
489 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
490 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
493 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
494 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
495 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
496 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
498 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
500 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
503 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
504 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
507 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
508 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
509 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
511 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
512 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
513 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
515 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
516 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
518 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
520 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
521 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
523 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
525 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
526 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
528 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
529 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
530 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
531 added_monitors.clear();
533 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
535 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
536 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
538 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
539 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
540 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
541 added_monitors.clear();
544 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
545 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
547 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
548 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
550 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
551 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
552 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
553 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
557 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
558 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
559 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
560 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
561 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
562 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
563 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
564 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
565 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
566 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
567 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
568 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
579 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
580 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
581 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
582 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
583 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
584 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
587 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
590 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
593 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
594 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
595 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
596 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
597 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
601 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
603 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
604 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
607 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
608 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
611 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
612 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
613 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
616 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
617 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
622 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
623 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
624 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
625 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
626 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
627 let channel_value = 5000;
629 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
630 let channel_id = chan.2;
631 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
632 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
634 let opt_anchors = false;
636 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
637 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
638 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
640 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
641 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
643 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
644 *feerate_lock = feerate;
646 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
648 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
650 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
652 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
654 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
656 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
658 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
659 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
660 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
661 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
662 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
663 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
667 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
668 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
671 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
672 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
675 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
677 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
678 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
679 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
680 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
681 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
682 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
683 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
684 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
685 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
687 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
688 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
689 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
690 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
691 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
692 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
693 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
694 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
697 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
698 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
699 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
702 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
703 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
704 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
705 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
706 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
707 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
709 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
710 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
711 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
712 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
714 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
716 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
719 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
722 htlc_signatures: res.1
725 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
727 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
730 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
732 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
733 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
734 //Should produce and error.
735 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
736 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
738 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
739 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
743 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
744 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
745 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
747 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
748 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
751 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
754 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
757 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
760 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
761 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
762 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
763 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
764 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
766 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
768 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
769 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
770 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
773 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
775 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
776 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
778 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
779 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
780 added_monitors.clear();
782 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
783 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
784 // node[1] has nothing to do
786 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
787 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
790 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
791 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
792 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
794 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
796 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
798 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
799 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
800 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
801 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
802 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
803 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
805 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
806 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
808 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
810 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
812 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
814 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
816 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
817 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
819 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
821 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
823 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
825 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
826 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
828 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
829 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
832 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
834 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
835 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
836 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
837 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
838 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
842 fn test_update_fee() {
843 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
844 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
845 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
846 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
847 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
848 let channel_id = chan.2;
851 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
852 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
853 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
854 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
855 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
856 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
857 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
858 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
859 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
860 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
861 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
864 // Create and deliver (1)...
867 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
868 feerate = *feerate_lock;
869 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
871 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
874 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
875 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
876 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
877 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
878 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
880 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
882 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
884 // Generate (2) and (3):
885 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
886 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
890 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
891 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
894 // Create and deliver (4)...
896 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
897 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
899 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
901 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
902 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
903 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
904 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
905 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
907 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
910 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
911 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
914 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
915 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
917 // Handle (3), creating (6):
918 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
920 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
921 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
924 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
925 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
928 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
929 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
930 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
931 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
932 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
933 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
934 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
935 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
939 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
941 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
942 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
944 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
946 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
948 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
949 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
950 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
951 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
952 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
956 fn fake_network_test() {
957 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
958 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
959 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
960 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
961 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
962 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
964 // Create some initial channels
965 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
966 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
967 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
969 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
970 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
971 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
972 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
973 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
975 // Send some more payments
976 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
977 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
978 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
980 // Test failure packets
981 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
982 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
984 // Add a new channel that skips 3
985 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
987 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
988 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
989 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
990 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
991 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
992 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
993 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
995 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
996 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
998 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
999 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1000 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1001 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1003 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1005 hops.push(RouteHop {
1006 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1007 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1008 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1009 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1011 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1013 hops.push(RouteHop {
1014 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1015 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1016 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1017 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1019 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1021 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1022 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1023 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1025 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1026 hops.push(RouteHop {
1027 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1028 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1029 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1030 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1032 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1034 hops.push(RouteHop {
1035 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1040 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1042 hops.push(RouteHop {
1043 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1044 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1045 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1046 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1048 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1050 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1051 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1052 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1054 // Claim the rebalances...
1055 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1056 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1058 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1059 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1061 // Send some payments across both channels
1062 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1063 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1064 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1067 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1068 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1070 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1072 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1074 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1075 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1076 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1078 // Close down the channels...
1079 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1080 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1081 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1083 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1084 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1086 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1087 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1089 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1090 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1092 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1093 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1097 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1098 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1099 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1100 // commitment dance rounds.
1101 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1104 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1105 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1106 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1108 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1109 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1110 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1112 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1116 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1117 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1118 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1119 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1121 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1122 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1124 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1126 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1127 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1128 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1129 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1132 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1133 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1135 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1139 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1140 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1141 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1142 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1144 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1145 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1146 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1147 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1148 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1149 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1153 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1154 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1156 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1158 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1159 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1160 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1164 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1166 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1168 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1170 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1173 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1175 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1177 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1179 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1181 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1183 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1185 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1187 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1190 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1192 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1193 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1194 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1196 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1197 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1203 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1204 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1207 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1211 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1212 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1213 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1214 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1215 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1216 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1217 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1219 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1220 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1221 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1222 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1223 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1224 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1226 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1228 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1229 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1231 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1232 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1234 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1235 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1236 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1240 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1241 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1242 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1243 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1244 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1245 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1246 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1247 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1249 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1252 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1254 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1256 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1257 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1258 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1260 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1261 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1264 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1265 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1267 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1268 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1269 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1270 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1271 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1272 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1273 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1276 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1278 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1280 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1281 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1283 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1284 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1286 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1288 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1289 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1291 let bump_tx = if claim_txn[1] == claim_txn[4] {
1292 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1293 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1295 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1297 check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1300 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[3]);
1301 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[4]);
1303 check_spends!(claim_txn[5], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1305 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1310 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1311 assert_eq!(bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1312 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, bump_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1314 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1315 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1316 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1318 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1319 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1320 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1321 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1323 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1327 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1328 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1329 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1330 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1332 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1333 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1334 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1335 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1336 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1337 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1339 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1345 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1346 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1347 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1348 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1349 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1350 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1352 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1353 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1355 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1356 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1357 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1358 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1359 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1361 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1363 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1364 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1365 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1368 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1370 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1371 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1373 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1377 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1378 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1379 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1380 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1381 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1382 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1384 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1385 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1386 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1387 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1389 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1391 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1392 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1393 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1394 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1397 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1398 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1399 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1400 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1403 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1405 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1406 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1407 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1409 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1411 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1413 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1414 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1415 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1416 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1417 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1418 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1419 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1420 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1422 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1423 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1424 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1425 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1426 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1428 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1429 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1430 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1431 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1432 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1433 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1434 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1435 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1438 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1439 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1440 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1442 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1443 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1444 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1446 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1448 amount_msat: 3460001,
1449 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1451 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1454 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1457 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1458 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1459 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1460 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1464 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1465 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1467 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1468 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1470 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1473 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1476 htlc_signatures: res.1
1479 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1480 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1481 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1483 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1484 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1486 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1487 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1489 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1491 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1492 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1493 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1495 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1496 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1497 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1499 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1501 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1502 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1508 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1509 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1510 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1511 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1512 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1514 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1515 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1516 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1517 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1519 let opt_anchors = false;
1521 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1522 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1523 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1525 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1527 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1528 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1529 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1532 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1533 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1534 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1535 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1536 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1537 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1541 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1542 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1543 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1544 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1545 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1546 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1548 let opt_anchors = false;
1550 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1551 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1552 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1553 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1554 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1555 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1556 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1558 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1559 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1560 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1563 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1564 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1565 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1566 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1567 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1568 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1569 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1570 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1571 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1573 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1574 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1575 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1576 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1577 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1580 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1581 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1582 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1583 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1584 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1585 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1587 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1591 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1592 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1593 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1594 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1595 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1597 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1598 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1599 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1601 let opt_anchors = false;
1603 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1604 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1605 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1606 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1607 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1608 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1609 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1611 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1612 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1613 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1614 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1615 // commitment transaction fee.
1616 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1618 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1619 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1620 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1623 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1624 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1625 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1626 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1630 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1631 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1632 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1633 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1634 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1637 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1639 let opt_anchors = false;
1641 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1643 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1644 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1645 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1646 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1648 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1649 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1650 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1651 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1652 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1653 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1654 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1656 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1657 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1658 match msg_events[0] {
1659 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1660 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1662 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1667 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1668 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1669 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1670 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1671 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1672 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1673 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1674 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1676 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1677 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1678 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1679 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1680 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1681 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1683 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1684 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1685 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1686 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1687 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1688 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1690 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1691 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1692 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1693 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1697 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1698 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1699 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1700 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1701 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1702 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1703 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1706 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1707 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1708 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1709 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1711 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1712 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1713 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1714 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1716 // Add a pending HTLC.
1717 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1718 let payment_event_1 = {
1719 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1722 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1723 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1724 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1726 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1728 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1729 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1730 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1731 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1732 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1734 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1735 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1736 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1737 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1738 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1739 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1740 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1741 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1744 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1745 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1746 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1747 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1750 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1751 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1752 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1753 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1754 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1755 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1757 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1761 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1762 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1763 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1764 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1765 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1766 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1767 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1768 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1769 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1770 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1772 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1773 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1774 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1776 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1777 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1780 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1781 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1785 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1786 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1787 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1788 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1789 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1790 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1791 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1792 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1793 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1794 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1795 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1797 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1798 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1800 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1801 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1803 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1805 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1806 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1807 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1808 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1813 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1814 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1815 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1816 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1818 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1820 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1822 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1823 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1824 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1825 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1826 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1827 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1828 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1831 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1832 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1834 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1835 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1836 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1837 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1838 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1839 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1840 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1843 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1845 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1846 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1847 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1848 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1849 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1852 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1853 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1854 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1855 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1856 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1859 // adding pending output.
1860 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1861 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1862 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1863 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1864 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1865 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1866 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1867 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1868 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1870 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1871 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1872 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1874 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1875 let payment_event_1 = {
1876 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1879 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1880 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1881 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1883 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1885 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1886 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1888 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1889 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1890 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1891 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1894 // split the rest to test holding cell
1895 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1896 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1897 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1898 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1900 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1901 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1904 // now see if they go through on both sides
1905 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1906 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1907 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1909 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1910 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1912 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1914 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1915 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1916 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1917 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1918 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1921 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1922 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1923 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1925 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1926 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1928 // flush the pending htlc
1929 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1930 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1933 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1934 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1936 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1938 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1939 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1940 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1943 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1944 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1947 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1949 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1950 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1951 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1953 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1954 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1956 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1957 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1958 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1959 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1960 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1961 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1963 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1964 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1965 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1966 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1968 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1969 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1971 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1972 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1974 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1975 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1976 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1978 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1979 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1980 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1982 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1985 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1988 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1989 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1990 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1992 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1993 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1994 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1996 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1999 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2002 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2003 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2004 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2006 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2007 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2008 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2010 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2011 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2012 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2013 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2014 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2016 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2017 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2021 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2022 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2023 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2024 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2025 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2026 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2027 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2028 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2030 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2031 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2032 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2033 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2034 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2035 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2036 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2037 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2039 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2040 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2041 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2042 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2043 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2044 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2045 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2046 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2047 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2048 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2050 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2051 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2052 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2053 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2055 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2056 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2058 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2060 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2061 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2062 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2065 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2066 // initial fulfill/CS.
2067 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2069 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2071 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2072 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2073 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2075 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2077 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2078 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2080 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2081 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2083 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2084 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2086 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2087 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2089 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2091 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2093 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2095 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2097 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2099 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2101 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2102 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2103 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2104 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2105 // on-chain as necessary).
2106 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2107 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2109 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2110 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2112 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2114 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2116 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2117 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2119 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2120 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2121 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2123 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2124 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2126 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2127 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2128 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2130 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2132 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2133 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2134 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2137 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2138 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2140 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2142 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2144 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2146 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2148 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2151 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2153 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2154 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2156 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2158 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2160 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2163 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2164 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2166 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2167 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2171 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2172 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2173 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2174 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2175 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2176 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2177 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2179 // Create some initial channels
2180 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2181 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2182 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2183 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2185 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2186 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2187 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2188 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2189 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2190 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2192 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2193 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2194 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2195 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2196 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2198 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2199 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2201 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2203 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2204 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2205 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2207 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2209 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2210 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2211 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2212 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2213 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2215 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2216 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2218 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2219 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2220 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2221 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2224 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2225 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2226 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2227 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2229 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2231 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2232 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2233 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2234 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2235 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2237 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2238 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2240 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2241 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2243 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2244 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2246 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2247 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2248 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2249 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2251 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2257 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2258 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2259 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2261 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2262 let node2_commitment_txid;
2264 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2265 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2266 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2267 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2269 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2270 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2271 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2273 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2275 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2276 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2277 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2278 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2279 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2281 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2282 // confusing us in the following tests.
2283 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2285 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2286 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2287 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2290 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2291 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2292 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2293 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2294 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2295 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2298 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2301 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2302 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2304 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2308 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2310 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2311 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2312 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2318 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2320 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2321 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2323 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2324 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2325 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2326 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2327 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2330 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2333 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2334 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2336 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2339 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2341 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2342 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2343 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2345 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2346 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2347 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2348 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2350 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2351 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2352 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2356 fn test_justice_tx() {
2357 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2358 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2359 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2360 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2361 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2362 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2363 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2364 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2365 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2366 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2367 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2368 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2369 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2370 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2371 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2372 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2373 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2374 // Create some new channels:
2375 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2377 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2378 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2379 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2380 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2381 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2382 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2383 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2384 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2385 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2386 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2387 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2388 // Revoke the old state
2389 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2392 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2394 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2395 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2396 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2398 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2399 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2400 node_txn.truncate(1);
2402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2403 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2404 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2406 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2407 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2408 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2409 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2411 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2412 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2413 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2414 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2416 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2418 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2419 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2421 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2422 // Create some new channels:
2423 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2425 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2429 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2430 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2431 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2432 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2433 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2434 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2435 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2436 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2437 // Revoke the old state
2438 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2440 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2442 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2443 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2444 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2446 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2447 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2450 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2452 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2453 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2454 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2456 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2457 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2458 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2460 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2461 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2462 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2466 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2467 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2468 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2469 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2470 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2471 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2472 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2473 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2474 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2475 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2476 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2477 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2478 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2479 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2480 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2482 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2483 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2485 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2486 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2487 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2489 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2490 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2492 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2493 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2494 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2496 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2500 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2501 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2502 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2503 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2504 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2505 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2506 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2508 // Create some new channel:
2509 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2511 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2512 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2513 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2514 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2515 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2517 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2518 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2519 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2520 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2521 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2522 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2523 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2524 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2525 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2527 //Revoke the old state
2528 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2531 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2533 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2534 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2536 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2537 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2538 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2540 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2541 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2543 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2544 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2546 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2547 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2548 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2549 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2550 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2551 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2552 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2553 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2555 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2556 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2557 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2559 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2560 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2561 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2565 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2566 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2567 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2568 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2569 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2571 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2573 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2575 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2576 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2577 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2578 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2579 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2580 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2582 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2583 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2585 //Revoke the old state
2586 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2589 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2591 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2593 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2594 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2595 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2597 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2601 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2602 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2604 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2605 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2607 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2608 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2609 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2610 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2611 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2612 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2613 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2615 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2616 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2617 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2618 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2620 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2621 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2622 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2624 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2625 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2626 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2627 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2628 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2629 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2630 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2631 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2633 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2634 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2635 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2639 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2640 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2641 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2642 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2643 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2644 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2645 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2646 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2647 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2649 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2650 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2651 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2652 // PaymentSent event).
2654 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2655 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2656 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2657 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2659 // Create some initial channels
2660 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2661 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2663 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2664 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2665 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2666 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2667 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2669 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2670 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2671 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2673 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2674 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2676 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2677 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2678 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2679 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2680 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2681 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2682 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2684 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2685 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2686 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2687 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2688 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2690 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2691 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2693 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2694 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2695 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2696 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2697 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2698 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2699 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2700 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2701 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2702 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2703 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2704 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2705 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2706 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2708 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2709 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2710 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2711 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2713 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2714 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2715 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2716 added_monitors.clear();
2718 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2719 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2720 match forwarded_events[0] {
2721 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2722 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2724 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2725 match forwarded_events[1] {
2726 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2727 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2728 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2729 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2730 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2734 match forwarded_events[2] {
2735 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2736 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2737 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2738 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2739 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2743 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2745 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2746 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2747 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2748 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2749 added_monitors.clear();
2751 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2753 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2754 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2757 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2762 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2763 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2764 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2765 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2766 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2767 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2769 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2771 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2772 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2773 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2774 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2775 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2776 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2777 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2778 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2779 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2780 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2782 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2783 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2784 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2785 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2787 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2788 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2789 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2790 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2792 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2793 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2797 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2798 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2799 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2800 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2802 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2803 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2804 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2805 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2806 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2807 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2809 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2810 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2811 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2812 let commitment_spend =
2813 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2814 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2815 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2816 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2819 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2820 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2821 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2825 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2826 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2827 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2828 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2829 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2830 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2831 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2832 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2833 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2834 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2835 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2836 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2838 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2839 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2840 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2841 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2842 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2844 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2845 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2846 let mut first_claimed = false;
2847 for event in events {
2849 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2850 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2851 assert!(!first_claimed);
2852 first_claimed = true;
2854 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2855 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2858 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2859 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2860 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2863 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2866 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2867 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2868 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2869 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2870 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2871 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2873 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2875 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2876 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2877 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2878 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2879 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2880 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2881 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2883 // Create some intial channels
2884 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2885 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2887 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2888 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2889 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2891 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2893 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2894 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2895 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2896 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2898 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2901 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2902 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2904 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2905 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2906 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2907 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2908 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2909 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2911 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2913 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2914 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2916 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2917 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2918 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2919 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2920 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2922 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2923 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2924 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2925 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2926 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2929 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2930 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2931 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2932 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2934 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2935 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2937 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2938 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2939 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2940 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2942 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2946 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2948 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2950 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2951 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2952 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2953 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2956 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2958 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2959 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2960 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2961 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2962 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2963 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2964 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2966 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2970 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2972 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2973 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2975 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2976 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2977 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2978 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2979 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2980 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2982 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2985 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2986 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2987 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2989 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2990 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2992 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2994 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2995 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2996 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2997 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2998 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2999 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3000 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3004 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3005 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3006 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3007 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3011 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3012 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3013 // and fail backward accordingly.
3015 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3016 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3017 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3018 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3020 // Create some initial channels
3021 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3022 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3024 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3025 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3026 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3027 // Revoke the old state
3028 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3030 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3032 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3033 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3034 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3036 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3038 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3040 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3041 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3043 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3044 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3045 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3046 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3047 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3048 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3050 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3051 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3052 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3054 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3058 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3059 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3060 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3061 // commitment transaction anymore.
3062 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3063 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3064 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3065 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3066 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3067 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3069 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3070 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3071 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3072 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3073 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3074 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3075 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3076 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3077 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3079 // Create some initial channels
3080 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3081 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3083 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3084 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3085 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3086 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3087 // Revoke the old state
3088 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3090 let value = if use_dust {
3091 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3092 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3093 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3096 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3097 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3098 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3100 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3101 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3103 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3104 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3105 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3106 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3107 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3108 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3109 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3110 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3111 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3113 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3114 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3116 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3117 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3118 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3119 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3120 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3121 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3122 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3123 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3125 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3126 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3127 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3130 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3131 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3133 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3134 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3135 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3136 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3137 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3138 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3139 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3140 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3141 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3142 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3144 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3145 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3146 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3149 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3150 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3151 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3152 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3153 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3154 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3158 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3159 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3160 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3162 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3163 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3165 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3166 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3168 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3169 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3172 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3173 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3175 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3177 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3178 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3180 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3181 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3183 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3184 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3187 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3188 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3190 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3192 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3194 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3195 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3197 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3200 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3201 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3204 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3207 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3208 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3209 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3210 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3211 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3213 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3214 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3215 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3216 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3218 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3222 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3223 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3224 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3225 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3226 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3227 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3232 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3233 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3234 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3235 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3236 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3237 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3238 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3240 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3241 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3242 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3244 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3246 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3247 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3249 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3250 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3251 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3252 // that we should update our routing table for.
3253 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3254 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3257 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3260 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3261 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3262 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3267 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3268 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3269 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3271 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3274 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3277 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3278 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3279 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3283 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3284 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3285 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3286 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3287 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3291 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3292 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3293 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3294 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3295 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3299 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3300 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3301 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3302 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3303 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3304 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3306 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3308 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3309 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3312 let payment_event = {
3313 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3314 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3315 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3317 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3318 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3321 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3322 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3324 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3327 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3330 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3332 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3334 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3335 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3336 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3337 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3338 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3339 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3341 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3342 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3348 onion_routing_packet,
3350 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3352 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3353 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3354 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3356 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3357 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3359 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3362 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3363 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3365 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3367 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3372 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3373 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3374 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3375 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3376 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3377 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3378 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3379 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3381 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3382 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3383 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3384 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3386 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3388 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3389 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3390 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3392 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3393 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3394 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3396 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3398 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3399 // registering new transactions
3400 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3401 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3405 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3406 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3407 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3408 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3409 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3410 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3411 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3412 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3414 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3416 let mut payment_event = {
3417 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3420 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3421 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3422 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3425 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3426 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3428 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3430 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3431 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3432 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3433 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3436 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3437 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3439 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3441 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3442 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3443 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3445 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3446 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3448 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3450 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3451 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3452 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3453 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3454 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3458 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3460 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3461 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3463 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3465 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3467 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3468 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3470 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3471 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3472 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3473 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3474 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3475 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3476 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3478 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3482 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3483 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3484 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3485 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3486 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3488 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3489 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3490 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3491 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3492 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3494 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3496 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3498 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3499 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3500 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3502 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3503 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3505 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3506 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3510 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3511 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3512 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3513 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3516 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3518 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3519 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3520 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3521 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3522 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
3523 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3524 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
3526 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3527 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3529 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3531 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3532 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3534 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3535 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3538 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3541 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3542 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3543 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3544 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3546 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3547 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3551 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3552 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3553 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3554 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3555 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3556 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3557 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3558 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3560 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3561 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3562 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3564 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3565 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3566 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3567 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3569 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3570 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3571 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3573 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3574 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3575 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3576 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3578 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3579 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3581 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3582 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3584 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3586 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3587 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3589 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3590 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3591 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3593 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3596 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3597 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3598 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3600 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3603 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3604 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3608 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3609 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3612 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3613 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3614 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3615 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3616 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3617 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3619 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3620 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3621 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3622 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3623 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3624 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3625 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3627 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3630 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3632 let payment_event = {
3633 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3636 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3637 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3638 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3640 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3642 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3643 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3645 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3646 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3647 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3649 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3651 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3652 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3653 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3656 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3657 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3658 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3659 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3662 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3663 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3664 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3672 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3673 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3674 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3675 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3676 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3677 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3679 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3680 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3681 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3683 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3684 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3686 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3687 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3688 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3689 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3690 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3691 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3692 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3693 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3694 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3695 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3696 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3697 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3698 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3699 // Everything was delivered...
3700 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3703 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3704 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3706 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3707 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3710 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3711 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3712 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3714 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3716 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3717 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3719 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3720 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3721 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3723 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3724 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3725 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3727 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3730 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3733 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3736 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3737 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3738 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3739 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3740 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3741 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3742 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3743 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3744 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3745 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3746 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3748 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3751 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3752 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3754 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3755 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3757 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3758 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3759 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3764 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3765 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3767 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3769 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3770 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3771 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3774 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3775 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3776 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3777 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3780 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3781 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3782 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3790 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3791 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3792 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3793 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3794 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3795 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3797 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3799 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3800 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3801 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3802 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3803 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3804 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3805 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3806 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3807 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3808 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3809 // Everything was delivered...
3810 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3813 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3814 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3817 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3818 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3819 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3821 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3822 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3825 // Channel should still work fine...
3826 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3827 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3828 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3832 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3833 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3834 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3835 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3836 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3840 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3841 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3842 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3843 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3844 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3848 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3849 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3850 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3851 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3852 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3853 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3854 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3855 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3856 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3857 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3859 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3860 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3862 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3863 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3864 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3866 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3868 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3869 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3871 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3872 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3873 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3875 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3876 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3877 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3878 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3880 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a funding_locked, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3881 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3882 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3883 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3884 let as_funding_locked = match events_3[0] {
3885 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3886 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3889 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3892 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s funding_locked on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3893 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3894 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3895 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3896 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3898 let bs_funding_locked = match events_4[0] {
3899 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3900 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3901 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3904 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3906 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3907 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3908 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3911 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3914 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3915 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3917 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3920 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s funding_locked, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3921 // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3922 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3923 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3924 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3926 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3927 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3929 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3932 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s funding_locked, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3933 // announcement_signatures.
3934 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_locked);
3935 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3936 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3937 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3938 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3939 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3942 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3945 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3946 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3948 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3949 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3950 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3951 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3952 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3953 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3955 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3958 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3959 // same channel_announcement.
3960 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3961 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3962 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3963 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3964 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3965 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3968 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3971 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3972 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3973 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3974 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3976 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3977 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3978 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3980 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3981 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3982 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3984 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3985 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3986 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3988 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3989 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3990 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3991 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3992 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3993 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3994 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3995 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3997 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3998 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3999 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4000 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4001 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4002 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4004 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4005 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4006 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4007 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4011 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4012 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4014 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4015 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4018 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4020 // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
4021 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
4022 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4023 let mut found_announcement = false;
4024 for event in msgs.iter() {
4026 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4027 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4029 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4030 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4033 assert!(found_announcement);
4037 fn test_funding_locked_without_best_block_updated() {
4038 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4039 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4040 // generate a funding_locked until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4041 // funding_locked immediately instead.
4042 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4043 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4044 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4045 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4046 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4048 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4050 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4051 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4052 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4053 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4054 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4055 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4057 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a funding_locked after the transactions_confirmed
4058 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4059 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
4063 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4064 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4065 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4066 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4067 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4068 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4069 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4070 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4072 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4074 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4075 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4076 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4079 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4080 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4082 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4083 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4086 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
4087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4089 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4090 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4092 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4093 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4094 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4095 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4096 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4097 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4098 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4100 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4101 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4102 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4104 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4105 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4106 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4108 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4111 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4112 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4113 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4116 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4119 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4120 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4122 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4123 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4124 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4125 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4126 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4127 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4129 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4130 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4131 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4132 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4134 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4135 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4137 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4138 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4140 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4142 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4143 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4144 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4145 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4146 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4147 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4148 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4149 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4150 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4153 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4154 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4155 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4156 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4157 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4158 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4159 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4162 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4163 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4164 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4165 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4166 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4167 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4168 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4171 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4172 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4173 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4176 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4177 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4178 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4181 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4182 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4185 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4187 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4188 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4190 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4191 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4193 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4194 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4195 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4197 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4200 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4203 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4204 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4207 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4208 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4211 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4212 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4213 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4214 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4215 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4216 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4217 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4219 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4221 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4222 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4223 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4224 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4225 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4226 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4227 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4229 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4230 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4231 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4232 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4233 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4236 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4239 let mut block = Block {
4240 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4243 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4244 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4245 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4246 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4247 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4248 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4249 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4252 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4255 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4256 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4257 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4258 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4259 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4261 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4262 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4263 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4264 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4265 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4266 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4270 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4271 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4272 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4275 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4276 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4277 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4278 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4279 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4280 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4281 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4282 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4284 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4285 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4286 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4287 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4289 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4290 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4292 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4294 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4297 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4298 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4299 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4300 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4303 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4304 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4305 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4306 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4310 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4311 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4312 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4313 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4316 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4318 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4319 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4320 match fail_commit[0] {
4321 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4322 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4323 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4325 _ => unreachable!(),
4327 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4329 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4330 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4331 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4332 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4333 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4334 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4335 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4336 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4341 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4342 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4343 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4347 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4348 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4349 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4350 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4351 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4352 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4353 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4354 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4355 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4356 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4358 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4360 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4362 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4363 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4364 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4365 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4367 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4368 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4369 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4370 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4371 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4372 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4373 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4374 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4375 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4376 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4378 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4379 let config = UserConfig::default();
4380 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4381 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4382 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4383 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4384 default_config: config,
4386 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4387 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4388 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4393 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4394 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4396 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4397 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4398 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4401 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4402 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4403 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4404 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4406 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4407 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4408 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4409 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4411 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4412 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4413 for node in nodes.iter() {
4414 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4415 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4416 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4419 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4423 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4424 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4425 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4426 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4427 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4428 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4429 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4430 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4431 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4432 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4433 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4435 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4436 let channel_value = 100000;
4437 let push_msat = 10001;
4438 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4439 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4440 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4441 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4442 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4443 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4444 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4446 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4448 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4449 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4451 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4453 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4454 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4455 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4456 added_monitors.clear();
4459 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4460 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4462 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4463 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4464 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4465 added_monitors.clear();
4467 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4472 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4473 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4474 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4475 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4477 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4478 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4479 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4480 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4481 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4482 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4483 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4484 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4485 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4486 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4488 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4489 let config = UserConfig::default();
4490 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4491 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4492 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4493 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4494 default_config: config,
4496 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4497 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4498 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4503 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4504 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4506 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4508 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4509 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4511 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4512 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4513 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4514 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4515 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4517 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4518 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4521 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4522 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4523 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4524 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4526 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4527 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4528 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4529 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4531 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4532 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4533 for node in nodes.iter() {
4534 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4535 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4536 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4539 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4543 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4544 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4545 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4546 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4547 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4548 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4549 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4550 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4551 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4552 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4553 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4555 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4556 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4558 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4560 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4561 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4562 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4564 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4565 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4566 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4567 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4568 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4569 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4570 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4571 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4572 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4573 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4575 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4576 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4577 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4578 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4579 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4580 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4582 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4583 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4584 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4589 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4590 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4592 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4593 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4596 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4598 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4599 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4603 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4604 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4605 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4606 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4607 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4608 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4609 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4610 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4611 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4612 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4613 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4614 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4615 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4616 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4618 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4619 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4620 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4621 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4622 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4625 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4627 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4628 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4630 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4631 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4632 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4633 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4635 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4637 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4638 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4639 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4640 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4641 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4644 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4645 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4646 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4647 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4648 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4649 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4652 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4653 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4654 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4655 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4656 assert!(read.is_empty());
4657 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4660 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4661 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4662 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4663 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4664 assert!(read.is_empty());
4665 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4668 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4669 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4670 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4671 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4673 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4674 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4675 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4677 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4679 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4682 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4683 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4684 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4685 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4687 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4688 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4689 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4691 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4693 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4694 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4696 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4697 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4698 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4699 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4700 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4703 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4704 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4707 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4708 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4710 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4711 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4712 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4713 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4714 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4716 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4717 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4718 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4719 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4720 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4721 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4722 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4724 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4725 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4727 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4732 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4733 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4735 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4736 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4737 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4738 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4739 for event in events.drain(..) {
4741 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4742 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4743 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4744 all_outputs.push(outp);
4747 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4750 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4751 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4761 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4762 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4763 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4764 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4765 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4766 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4768 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4769 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4770 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4772 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4773 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4774 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4775 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4776 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4778 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4779 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4781 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4782 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4783 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4784 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4785 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4789 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4790 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4791 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4792 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4793 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4794 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4795 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4797 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4798 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4799 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4800 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4801 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4803 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4804 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4805 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4806 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4808 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4809 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4811 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4812 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4814 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4815 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4816 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4820 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4821 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4822 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4824 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4825 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4826 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4827 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4829 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4830 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4831 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4832 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4833 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4835 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4836 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4837 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4839 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4841 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4842 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4843 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4845 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4846 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4847 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4848 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4849 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4853 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4854 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4855 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4856 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4857 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4859 // Create some initial channels
4860 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4862 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4864 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4865 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4866 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4868 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4869 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4871 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4873 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4875 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4876 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4879 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4880 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4883 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4884 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4885 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4886 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4887 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4888 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4889 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4891 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4892 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4893 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4895 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4896 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4897 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4901 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4902 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4903 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4904 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4905 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4907 // Create some initial channels
4908 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4910 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4911 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4913 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4915 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4916 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4917 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4919 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4920 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4922 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4924 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4925 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4927 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4929 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4930 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4931 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4932 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4933 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4934 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4936 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4937 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4938 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4939 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4941 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4942 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4943 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4944 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4945 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4949 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4950 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4951 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4952 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4953 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4955 // Create some initial channels
4956 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4958 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4959 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4960 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4961 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4963 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4965 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4966 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4968 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4970 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4971 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4972 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4973 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4975 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4976 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4978 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4979 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4980 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4984 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4985 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4986 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4987 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4988 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4989 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4991 // Create some initial channels
4992 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4994 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4995 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4996 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4997 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4999 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5001 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
5002 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5003 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5005 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5006 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5008 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5009 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5010 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5011 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5012 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5013 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5014 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5016 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5017 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5018 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5019 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5021 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5023 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5024 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5025 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5026 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5027 // transactions next...
5028 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5029 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5031 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5032 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5033 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5034 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5036 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5037 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5040 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5041 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5043 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5044 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5046 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5047 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5048 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5049 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5050 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5054 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5055 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5056 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5057 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5058 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5059 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5061 // Create some initial channels
5062 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5064 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5065 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5066 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5067 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5069 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5070 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5072 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5074 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5075 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5076 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5078 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5079 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5081 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5082 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5083 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5084 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5086 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5087 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5088 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5090 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5091 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5092 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5093 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5095 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5097 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5098 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5100 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5101 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5102 // transactions next...
5103 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5104 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5105 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5106 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5108 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5109 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5112 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5113 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5115 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5117 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5118 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5120 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5121 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5123 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5124 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5125 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5126 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5127 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5128 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5129 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5130 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5134 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5135 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5136 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5137 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5138 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5140 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5143 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5144 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5145 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5146 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5148 // Create some initial channels
5149 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5150 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5152 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5153 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5154 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5155 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5156 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5158 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5159 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5160 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5162 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5163 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5164 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5165 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5167 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5168 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5169 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5170 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5171 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5173 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5174 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5176 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5178 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5179 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5180 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5181 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5182 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5183 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5184 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5185 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5186 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5187 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5189 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5190 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5191 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5193 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5194 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5196 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5197 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5200 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5201 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5202 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5203 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5204 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5206 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5209 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5210 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5211 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5212 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5216 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5217 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5218 match msg_events[0] {
5219 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5222 match msg_events[1] {
5223 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5224 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5226 match msg_events[2] {
5227 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5228 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5229 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5230 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5231 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5232 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5234 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5236 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5237 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5238 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5239 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5240 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5241 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5242 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5243 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5244 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5245 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5246 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5247 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5248 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5250 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5255 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5256 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5257 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5258 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5259 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5260 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5261 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5262 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5263 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5264 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5265 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5266 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5267 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5268 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5270 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5271 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5272 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5274 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5275 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5276 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5277 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5278 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5280 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5282 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5283 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5284 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5285 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5286 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5287 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
5288 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5289 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5291 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5292 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5293 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5295 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5296 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5298 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5299 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5301 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5302 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5303 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5304 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5305 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5306 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5308 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5309 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5311 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5312 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5313 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5314 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5316 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5317 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5319 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5320 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5323 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5324 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5325 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5326 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5328 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5331 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5332 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5334 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5335 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5337 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5338 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5341 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5342 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5344 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5345 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5346 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5347 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5348 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5349 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5350 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5351 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5352 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5353 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5354 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5355 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5356 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5358 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5359 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5360 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5361 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5362 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5363 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5364 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5365 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5366 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5369 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5370 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5372 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5374 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5376 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5377 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5378 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5379 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5380 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5381 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5382 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5383 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5384 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5385 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5386 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5389 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5390 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5392 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5394 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5395 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5396 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5398 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5403 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5404 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5405 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5406 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5407 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5409 // Create some initial channels
5410 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5412 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5413 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5414 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5415 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5416 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5418 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5419 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5421 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5423 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5424 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5426 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5427 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5430 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5431 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5434 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5435 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5436 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5437 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5438 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5439 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5440 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5444 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5445 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5447 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5448 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5449 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5450 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5451 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5452 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5455 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5456 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5457 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5458 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5459 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5460 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5461 // use the same payment hashes.
5462 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5467 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5468 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5470 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5471 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5472 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5473 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5474 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5475 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5476 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5478 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5479 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5480 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5481 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5482 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5484 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5485 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5486 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5487 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5489 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5491 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5493 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5494 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5496 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5498 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5500 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5502 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5503 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5505 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5507 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5510 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5512 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5513 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5516 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5518 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5519 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5521 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5522 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5523 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5524 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5525 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5527 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5528 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5529 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5530 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5531 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5532 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5534 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5537 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5538 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5539 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5540 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5541 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5542 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5544 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5545 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5546 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5548 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5551 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5552 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5553 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5554 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5556 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5558 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5560 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5561 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5562 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5563 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5564 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5565 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5566 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5567 if deliver_last_raa {
5568 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5570 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5573 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5574 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5575 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5576 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5578 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5579 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5580 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5582 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5583 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5584 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5586 if announce_latest {
5587 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5589 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5591 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5592 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5593 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5596 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5600 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5601 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5604 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5605 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5606 if deliver_last_raa {
5607 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5609 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5613 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5614 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5615 let mut a_done = false;
5616 for msg in cs_msgs {
5618 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5619 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5620 // should be failed-backwards here.
5621 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5622 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5623 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5624 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5626 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5631 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5632 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5633 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5635 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5636 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5639 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5640 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5641 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5642 if announce_latest {
5643 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5644 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5645 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5648 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5654 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5655 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5656 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5657 let mut as_updates = 0;
5658 for event in as_events.iter() {
5659 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5660 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5661 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5662 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5664 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5666 if network_update.is_some() {
5669 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5671 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5672 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5673 if announce_latest {
5674 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5675 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5677 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5679 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5680 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5681 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5682 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5683 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5684 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5685 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5686 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5687 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5689 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5691 if network_update.is_some() {
5694 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5696 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5697 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5698 if announce_latest {
5699 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5701 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5703 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5704 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5705 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5706 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5707 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5708 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5712 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5713 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5717 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5718 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5722 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5723 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5724 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5725 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5729 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5730 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5731 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5732 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5733 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5735 // Create some initial channels
5736 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5738 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5739 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5740 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5741 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5743 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5744 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5745 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5747 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5748 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5750 let htlc_timeout = {
5751 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5752 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5753 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5754 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5755 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5756 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5760 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5761 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5762 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5764 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5765 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5766 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5767 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5768 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5769 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5770 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5771 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5772 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5773 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5774 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5778 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5779 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5780 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5781 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5783 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5785 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5786 let seed = [42; 32];
5787 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5788 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5789 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5790 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5791 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5792 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5794 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5795 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5797 // Create some initial channels
5798 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5800 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5801 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5802 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5804 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5805 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5806 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5807 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5808 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5810 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5811 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5812 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5813 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5814 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5816 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5817 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5818 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5819 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5820 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5821 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5822 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5823 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5826 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5827 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5828 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5829 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5831 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5833 let htlc_timeout = {
5834 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5835 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5836 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5837 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5841 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5842 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5843 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5845 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5846 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5847 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5848 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5849 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5850 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5851 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5852 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5853 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5854 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5855 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5856 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5860 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5861 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5862 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5863 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5864 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5866 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5868 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5869 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5871 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5872 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5873 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5875 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5876 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5877 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5879 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5880 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5881 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5883 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5884 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5885 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5888 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5889 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5890 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5891 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5892 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5893 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5895 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5897 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5898 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5899 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5902 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5903 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5904 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5906 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5908 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5909 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5912 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5913 let mut block = Block {
5914 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5917 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5918 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5919 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5921 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5922 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5924 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5927 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5928 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5929 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5930 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5931 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5932 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5934 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5935 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5938 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5940 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5941 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5942 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5944 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5945 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5947 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5948 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5949 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5951 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5952 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5954 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5957 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5958 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5959 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5960 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5961 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5962 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5964 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5965 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5966 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5967 // actually revoked.
5968 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5969 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5970 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5971 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5974 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5975 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5976 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5978 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5979 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5981 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5983 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5985 if check_revoke_no_close {
5986 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5990 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5991 let mut block = Block {
5992 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5995 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5996 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5997 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5999 if !check_revoke_no_close {
6000 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6001 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6003 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6005 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6006 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6007 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
6008 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6009 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6010 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
6011 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6012 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6016 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6017 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6018 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6019 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6020 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6021 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6022 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6024 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6025 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6026 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6028 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6029 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6030 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6032 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6033 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6037 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6038 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6039 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6040 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6041 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6046 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6047 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6048 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6049 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6050 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6051 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6052 for node in nodes.iter() {
6053 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6056 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6057 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6058 let push_msat=10001;
6059 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6060 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6061 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6062 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6064 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6065 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6066 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6070 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6071 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6072 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6073 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6074 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6076 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6077 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6078 let push_msat=10001;
6079 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6081 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6082 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6083 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6084 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6085 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6087 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6088 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6089 let push_msat=10001;
6090 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6091 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6092 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6094 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6095 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6096 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6098 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6099 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6100 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6102 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6103 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6104 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6106 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6107 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6108 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6109 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6110 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6111 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6115 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6116 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6117 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6118 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6119 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6121 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6122 let push_msat=10001;
6123 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6124 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6125 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6126 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6128 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6129 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6130 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6131 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6134 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6136 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6139 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6140 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6141 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6142 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6144 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6145 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6146 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6147 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6148 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6149 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6151 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6152 // pending_update_fee.
6154 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6155 *feerate_lock += 20;
6157 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6160 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6161 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6162 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6163 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6164 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6166 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6169 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6171 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6172 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6173 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6174 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6176 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6177 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6178 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6180 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6181 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6182 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6183 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6185 // Flush the pending fee update.
6186 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6187 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6189 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6192 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6193 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6194 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6195 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6196 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6197 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6198 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6199 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6200 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6202 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6203 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6206 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6207 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6208 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6209 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6210 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6211 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6212 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6213 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6214 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6220 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6221 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6222 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6224 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6225 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6226 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6227 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6228 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6229 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6231 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6232 // pending_update_fee.
6234 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6235 *feerate_lock += 200;
6237 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6240 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6241 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6242 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6243 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6244 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6249 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6251 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6252 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6253 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6254 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6256 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6258 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6259 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6260 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6262 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6263 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6264 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6265 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6266 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6267 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6268 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6270 // Flush the pending fee update.
6271 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6272 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6274 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6275 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6278 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6279 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6280 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6281 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6282 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6283 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6284 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6285 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6286 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6288 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6289 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6290 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6292 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6293 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6294 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6295 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6296 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6297 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6298 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6299 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6300 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6302 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6305 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6306 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6307 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6308 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6309 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6311 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6312 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6313 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6315 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6317 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6318 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6319 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6320 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6322 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6323 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6325 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6326 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6327 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6329 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6330 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6332 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6334 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6335 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6336 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6337 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6340 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6341 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6342 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6345 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6346 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6347 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6348 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6349 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6350 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6351 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6352 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6353 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6354 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6355 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6357 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6358 // pending_update_fee.
6360 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6361 *feerate_lock += 20;
6363 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6366 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6367 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6368 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6369 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6370 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6375 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6377 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6378 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6379 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6380 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6382 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6384 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6385 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6386 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6387 let payment_event = {
6388 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6391 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6392 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6394 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6396 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6398 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6399 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6401 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6402 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6404 // Flush the pending fee update.
6405 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6406 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6408 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6409 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6412 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6413 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6414 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6416 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6417 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6420 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6423 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6425 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6427 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6428 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6429 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6430 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6431 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6432 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6435 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6436 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6439 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6440 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6441 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6442 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6443 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6444 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6445 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6446 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6447 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6448 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6450 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6453 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6454 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6455 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6457 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6458 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6460 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6461 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6463 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6464 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6465 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6466 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6467 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6469 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6470 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6474 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6475 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6476 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6479 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6480 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6481 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6482 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6483 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6484 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6485 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6487 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6488 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6490 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6491 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6492 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6493 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6497 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6498 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6499 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6500 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6501 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6502 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6503 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6505 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6506 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6507 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6508 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6510 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6511 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6515 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6516 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6517 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6518 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6519 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6520 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6521 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6523 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6524 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6526 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6527 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6529 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6530 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6531 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6533 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6537 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6538 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6539 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6540 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6541 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6542 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6543 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6544 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6546 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6547 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6548 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6549 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6550 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6551 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6555 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6556 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6557 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6558 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6559 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6560 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6561 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6562 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6563 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6564 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6566 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6567 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6568 let payment_event = {
6569 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6572 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6573 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6574 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6575 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6579 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6581 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6583 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6585 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6586 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6588 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6589 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6590 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6592 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6593 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6597 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6598 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6599 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6600 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6601 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6602 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6603 let channel_value = 100000;
6604 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6605 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6607 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6609 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6610 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6612 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6613 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6614 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6616 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6617 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6619 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6622 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6624 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6625 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6626 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6627 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6628 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6629 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6630 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6631 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6633 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6634 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6635 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6638 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6639 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6641 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6642 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6643 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6644 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6645 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6646 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6648 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6652 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6653 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6654 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6655 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6656 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6657 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6658 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6660 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6661 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6662 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6663 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6664 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6665 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6667 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6668 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6669 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6671 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6673 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6674 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6675 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6676 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6677 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6679 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6680 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6681 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6683 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6687 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6688 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6689 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6690 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6691 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6692 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6693 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6694 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6696 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6697 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6698 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6699 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6700 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6701 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6703 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6707 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6708 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6709 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6712 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6713 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6714 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6716 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6717 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6719 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6720 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6721 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6723 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6727 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6728 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6729 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6730 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6731 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6732 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6733 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6735 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6736 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6738 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6739 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6740 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6742 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6743 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6744 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6746 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6750 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6751 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6752 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6753 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6754 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6755 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6757 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6758 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6759 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6761 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6762 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6763 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6765 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6766 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6767 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6769 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6773 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6774 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6775 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6776 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6777 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6778 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6779 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6780 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6782 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6783 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6784 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6786 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6787 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6789 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6790 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6791 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6792 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6793 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6794 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6795 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6796 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6797 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6798 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6799 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6800 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6801 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6804 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6805 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6806 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6808 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6810 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6812 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6813 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6814 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6816 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6820 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6821 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6823 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6824 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6825 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6826 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6827 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6828 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6829 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6832 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6833 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6835 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6838 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6841 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6843 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6844 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6845 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6847 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6851 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6852 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6854 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6855 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6856 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6857 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6858 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6860 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6861 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6863 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6864 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6866 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6869 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6872 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6874 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6875 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6876 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6878 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6882 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6883 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6885 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6886 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6887 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6888 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6889 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6891 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6892 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6894 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6895 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6896 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6899 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6900 failure_code: 0x8000,
6903 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6905 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6906 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6907 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6909 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6913 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6914 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6916 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6917 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6918 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6919 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6920 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6922 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6924 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6927 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6928 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6929 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6931 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6932 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6933 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6934 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6935 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6936 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6937 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6939 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6943 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6945 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6947 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6948 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6949 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6951 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6955 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6956 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6958 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6959 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6960 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6961 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6962 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6964 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6966 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6969 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6970 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6971 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6973 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6974 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6975 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6976 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6977 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6978 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6979 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6981 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6985 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6987 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6989 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6990 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6991 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6993 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6997 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6998 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
7000 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7001 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7002 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7003 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7004 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7006 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7007 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7010 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7011 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7013 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7015 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7017 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7019 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7021 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7022 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7023 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7024 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7025 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7026 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7027 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7029 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7032 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7033 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7035 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7036 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7037 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7039 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7043 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7044 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7045 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7047 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7048 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7049 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7050 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7051 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7052 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7054 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7057 let mut payment_event = {
7058 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7060 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7061 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7062 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7064 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7066 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7067 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7068 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7069 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7071 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7072 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7075 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7076 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7078 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7080 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7081 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7082 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7084 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7085 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7086 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7087 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7088 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7089 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7090 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7092 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7096 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7099 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7100 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7101 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7102 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7104 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7106 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7107 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7108 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7109 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7110 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7111 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7113 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7119 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7120 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7121 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7122 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7124 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7125 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7126 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7128 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7129 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7131 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7133 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7134 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7135 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7136 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7138 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7139 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7141 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7142 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7144 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7147 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7148 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7149 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7152 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7153 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7155 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7157 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7158 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7160 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7163 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7164 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7166 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7169 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7170 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7171 if announce_latest {
7172 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7174 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7177 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7179 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7181 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7182 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7183 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7184 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7185 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7186 let mut first_failed = false;
7187 for event in events {
7189 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7190 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7191 assert!(!first_failed);
7192 first_failed = true;
7194 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7197 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7203 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7204 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7205 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7208 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7209 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7210 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7211 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7212 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7213 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7214 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7216 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7217 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7218 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7219 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7220 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7222 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7224 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7225 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7227 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7228 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7230 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7232 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7233 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7236 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7238 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7239 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7240 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7241 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7242 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7244 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7245 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7247 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7248 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7249 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7250 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7251 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7252 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7253 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7254 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7256 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7257 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7258 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7260 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7261 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7262 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7263 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7265 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7266 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7267 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7268 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7269 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7270 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7271 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7273 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7275 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7276 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7279 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7280 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7281 else { first = false; }
7283 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7286 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7287 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7288 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7290 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7297 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7298 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7299 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7300 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7304 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7305 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7307 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7308 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7309 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7310 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7311 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7312 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7313 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7314 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7315 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7317 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7318 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7319 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7320 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7323 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7324 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7326 } else { assert!(false) }
7328 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7329 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7330 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7331 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7332 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7333 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7334 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7337 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7338 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7340 } else { assert!(false); }
7342 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7343 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7344 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7345 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7346 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7347 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7349 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7351 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7352 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7353 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7357 } else { panic!(); }
7358 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7360 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7361 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7362 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7363 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7364 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7365 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7366 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7369 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7370 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7372 } else { assert!(false); }
7376 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7377 // We want to be sure that :
7378 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7379 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7380 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7381 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7382 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7388 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7389 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7390 // during signing due to revoked tx
7391 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7392 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7395 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7396 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7397 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7399 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7401 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7402 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7403 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7404 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7406 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7407 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7409 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7410 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7412 // Restore node A from previous state
7413 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7414 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7415 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7416 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7417 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7418 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7419 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7421 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7422 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7423 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7424 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7425 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7426 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7428 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7429 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7433 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7434 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7435 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7436 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7440 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7441 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7443 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7445 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7446 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7450 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7451 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7454 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7455 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7456 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7457 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7458 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7459 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7460 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7462 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7463 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7465 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7468 panic!("Unexpected event")
7472 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7473 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7474 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7475 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7476 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7477 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7479 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7480 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7481 // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7482 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7483 // B should now detect that there is something wrong and should force close the channel.
7484 let exp_err = "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting";
7485 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: exp_err.to_string() });
7487 // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7488 // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7489 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7490 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7491 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7492 let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7494 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7495 let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7496 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7497 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7499 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7500 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7501 err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7503 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7506 panic!("Unexpected event!");
7509 assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7510 nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7511 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7513 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7514 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7518 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7519 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7520 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7521 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7523 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7526 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7528 // Create some initial channels
7529 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7531 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7532 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7533 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7534 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7535 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7536 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7537 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7540 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7541 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7542 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7543 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7544 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7546 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7547 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7548 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7549 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7551 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7552 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7553 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7555 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7556 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7557 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7558 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7559 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7560 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7561 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7562 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7563 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7564 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7566 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7570 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7571 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7573 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7574 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7575 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7576 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7580 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7581 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7582 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7584 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7585 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7586 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7587 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7589 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7590 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7591 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7594 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7595 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7597 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7598 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7599 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7600 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7601 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7602 for e in msg_events {
7604 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7605 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7606 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7607 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7608 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7611 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7615 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7616 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7617 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7618 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7619 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7620 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7622 // Reestablish chan_1
7623 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7624 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7625 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7626 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7627 // Reestablish chan_2
7628 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7629 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7630 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7631 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7632 // Reestablish chan_3
7633 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7634 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7635 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7636 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7638 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7639 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7640 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7641 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7642 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7643 for e in msg_events {
7645 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7646 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7647 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7648 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7650 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7651 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7657 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7658 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7662 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7663 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7664 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7666 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7667 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7668 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7669 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7671 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7673 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7674 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7675 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7676 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7677 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7679 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7680 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7681 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7682 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7683 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7684 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7686 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7687 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7688 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7689 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7693 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7694 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7696 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7697 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7698 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7699 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7702 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7706 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7707 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7708 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7709 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7710 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7711 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7712 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7713 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7717 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7718 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7719 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7720 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7722 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7723 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7724 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7725 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7726 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7727 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7728 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7729 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7730 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7731 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7732 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7733 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7734 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7738 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7740 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7741 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7743 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7745 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7746 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7747 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7748 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7749 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7750 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7751 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7752 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7753 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7754 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7755 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7756 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7757 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7761 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7763 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7764 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7768 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7769 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7770 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7772 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7773 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7774 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7775 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7776 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7778 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7779 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7780 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7781 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7782 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7783 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7784 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7785 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7786 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7787 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7788 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7789 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7791 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7792 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7793 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7795 // Revoke local commitment tx
7796 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7798 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7799 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7800 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7801 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7803 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7804 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7806 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7807 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7808 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7810 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7811 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7812 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7814 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7815 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7816 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7817 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7819 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7820 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7821 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7822 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7823 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7824 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7825 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7826 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7828 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7829 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7835 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7836 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7837 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7839 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7840 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7841 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7842 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7844 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7845 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7846 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7847 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7848 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7849 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7851 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7852 // available, which we check here:
7853 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7854 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7855 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7857 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7858 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7860 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7861 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7862 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7863 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7865 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7866 // output, checked above).
7867 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7868 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7869 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7871 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7872 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7873 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7874 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7875 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7879 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7880 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7881 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7882 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7883 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7885 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7886 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7888 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7889 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7890 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7891 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7892 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7894 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7895 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7901 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7902 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7903 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7904 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7906 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7907 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7909 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7910 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7911 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7912 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7913 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7914 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7915 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7916 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7920 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7921 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7922 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7923 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7925 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7926 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7927 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7928 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7929 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7930 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7931 // up bumped justice generation.
7932 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7935 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7940 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7941 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7942 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7945 // Provide preimage for one
7946 // Check aggregation
7948 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7949 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7950 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7951 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7953 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7954 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7955 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7957 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7958 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7959 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7960 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7961 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7963 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7964 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7965 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7967 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7969 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7973 let feerate_timeout;
7974 let feerate_preimage;
7976 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7977 // 9 transactions including:
7978 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7979 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7980 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7982 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7983 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7984 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7985 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7986 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7988 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7989 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7991 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output {
7992 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7993 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
7995 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7996 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7998 preimage_bump = node_txn[7].clone();
7999 check_spends!(node_txn[7], remote_txn[0]);
8000 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[7].input[0].previous_output);
8002 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[3]);
8003 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[4]);
8006 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
8007 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8008 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
8009 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].weight() as u64;
8011 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8012 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8013 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8014 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8018 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8019 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8021 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8022 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8024 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8025 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8026 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8027 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8028 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8029 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8031 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8032 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8033 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8034 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8035 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8037 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8038 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8039 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8040 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8041 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8046 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8047 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8051 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8052 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8053 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8054 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8055 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8056 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8057 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8058 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8060 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8061 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8062 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8063 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8064 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8066 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8067 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8069 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8071 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8072 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8073 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8075 // Must revoke without gaps
8076 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8077 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8079 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8080 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8081 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8083 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8084 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8085 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8087 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8091 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8092 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8093 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8095 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8096 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8097 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8098 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8100 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8101 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8102 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8103 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8105 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8106 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8107 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8109 // Revoke local commitment tx
8110 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8112 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8113 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8114 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8115 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8117 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8118 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8120 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8122 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8123 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8124 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8125 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8126 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8127 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8131 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8132 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8133 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8135 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8136 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8137 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8142 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8143 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8144 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8145 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8146 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8147 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8148 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8149 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8151 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000).0;
8152 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8154 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8156 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8157 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8158 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8160 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8162 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8163 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8164 // can get our balance.
8166 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8167 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8168 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8169 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8170 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8171 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8172 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8173 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8175 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8179 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8180 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8181 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8182 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8183 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8184 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8185 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8187 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8189 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8190 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8191 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8192 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8193 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8195 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8196 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8198 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8200 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8202 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8203 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8204 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8206 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8207 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8208 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8215 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8216 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8217 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8218 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8219 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8221 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8222 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8223 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8225 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8227 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8228 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8229 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8230 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8234 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8235 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8236 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8237 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8238 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8239 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8240 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8242 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8243 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8244 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8246 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8247 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8248 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8252 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8253 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8254 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8255 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8256 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8257 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8259 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8260 config_30_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8261 config_30_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8262 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8263 config_50_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8264 config_50_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8265 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8266 config_95_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8267 config_95_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8268 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8269 config_100_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8270 config_100_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8272 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8273 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8274 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8275 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8277 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8278 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8279 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8280 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8281 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8283 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8284 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8286 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8287 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8288 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_50_percent_msat));
8289 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8290 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8291 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_30_percent_msat));
8293 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8294 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8296 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8297 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8298 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8300 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8304 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8305 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8306 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8307 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8308 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8309 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8310 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8312 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8313 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8315 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8317 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8318 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8319 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8321 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8323 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8324 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8326 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8329 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8330 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8332 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8333 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8334 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8336 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8339 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8341 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8342 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8344 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8346 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8347 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8349 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8354 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8355 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8356 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8357 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8358 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8359 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8360 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8362 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8363 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8365 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8367 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8368 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8369 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8371 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8373 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8374 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8376 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8379 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8380 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8382 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8383 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8384 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8386 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8388 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8392 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8393 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8394 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8395 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8396 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8397 // and the channel should be closed.
8398 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8399 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8400 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8401 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8402 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8403 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8405 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8406 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8407 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8409 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8411 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8412 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8414 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8415 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8417 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8418 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8419 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8420 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8421 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8424 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8425 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8426 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8429 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8431 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8432 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8434 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8435 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8437 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8438 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8440 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8441 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8442 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8443 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8444 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8445 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8447 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8450 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8454 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8455 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8456 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8457 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8458 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8459 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8460 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8462 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8463 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8465 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8467 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8468 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8469 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8471 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8473 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8474 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8475 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8477 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8478 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8480 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8481 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8484 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8487 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8488 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8489 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8491 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8492 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8493 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8495 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8500 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8501 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8502 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8503 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8504 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8506 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8507 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8509 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8510 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8512 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8513 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8518 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8519 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8520 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8521 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8522 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8523 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8525 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8526 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8527 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8528 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8530 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8531 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8532 route.paths.push(path);
8533 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8534 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8535 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8536 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8537 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8538 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8539 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8540 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8544 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8545 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8546 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8547 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8548 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8549 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8551 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8554 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8555 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8556 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8558 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8559 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8560 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8561 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8563 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8564 // values from previous calls.
8565 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8566 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8567 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8569 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8571 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8572 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8574 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8577 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8582 #[allow(deprecated)]
8583 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8584 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8585 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8586 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8587 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8588 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8589 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8591 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8593 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8595 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8596 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8597 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8598 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8599 } else { panic!(); }
8601 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8603 header: BlockHeader {
8605 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8606 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8607 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8611 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8612 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8613 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8614 } else { panic!(); }
8616 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8617 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8618 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8619 block.header.time += 1;
8620 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8621 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8622 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8625 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8626 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8628 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8629 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8630 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8631 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8633 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8634 // values from previous calls.
8635 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8636 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8637 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8639 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8640 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8641 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8642 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8644 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8649 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8650 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8651 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8652 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8653 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8654 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8656 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8658 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8659 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8660 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8661 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8663 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8664 // resulting events.
8665 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8668 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8669 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8670 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8671 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8673 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8674 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8675 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8676 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8677 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8679 // We should fail the payment back
8680 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8681 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8682 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8683 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8684 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8686 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8691 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8692 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8693 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8695 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8696 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8697 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8698 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8700 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8701 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8702 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8703 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8705 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8706 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8707 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8708 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8712 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8713 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8714 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8715 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8717 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8718 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8719 // commitment at same time.
8721 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8722 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8723 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8724 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8726 // Create some initial channel
8727 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8728 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8730 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8731 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8733 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8734 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8736 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8737 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8738 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8739 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8741 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8742 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8743 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8744 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8745 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8746 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8747 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8748 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8751 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8752 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8753 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8754 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8755 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8756 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8758 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8759 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8761 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8762 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8763 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8764 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8765 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8766 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8767 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8768 } else { assert!(false); }
8769 } else { assert!(false); };
8770 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8772 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8773 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8777 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8778 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8779 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8780 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8781 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8783 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8784 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8785 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8786 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8788 // Create some initial channel
8789 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8790 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8792 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8793 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8795 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8796 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8798 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8799 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8800 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8801 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8802 let watchtower_alice = {
8803 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8804 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8805 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8806 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8807 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8808 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8809 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8810 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8813 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8814 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8815 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8816 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8817 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8818 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8820 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8822 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8823 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8827 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8828 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8829 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8830 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8831 let watchtower_bob = {
8832 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8833 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8834 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8835 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8836 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8837 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8838 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8839 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8842 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8843 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8845 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8846 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8848 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8852 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8853 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8854 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8855 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8856 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8857 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8858 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8859 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8860 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8861 } else { assert!(false); }
8862 } else { assert!(false); };
8863 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8864 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8866 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8867 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8868 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8870 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8873 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8874 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8875 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8879 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8880 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8881 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8883 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8884 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8885 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8886 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8887 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8888 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8893 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8894 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8895 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8898 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8899 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8901 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8902 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8903 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8904 // before receiving funding_signed.
8905 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8906 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8907 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8908 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8910 // Create an initial channel
8911 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8912 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8913 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8914 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8915 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8917 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8918 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8920 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8923 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8924 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8925 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8926 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8927 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8931 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8932 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8933 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8934 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8935 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8936 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8937 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8939 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8940 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8941 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8942 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8944 // Create some initial channels
8945 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8947 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8948 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8949 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8950 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8951 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8952 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8954 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8955 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8956 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8957 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8958 // this test before #653 fix.
8959 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8960 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8962 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8963 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8965 let htlc_timeout = {
8966 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8967 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8968 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8969 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8973 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8974 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8975 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8976 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8979 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8980 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8981 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8982 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8984 // Steps of the test:
8985 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8986 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8987 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8988 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8989 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8990 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8991 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8992 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8993 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8994 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8995 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8996 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8998 // Create some initial channels
8999 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9000 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9002 // Steps (1) and (2):
9003 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
9004 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
9006 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
9007 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
9008 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9009 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
9010 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9011 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9012 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9014 // Steps (3) and (4):
9015 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9016 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9017 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9018 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9021 if !broadcast_alice {
9022 force_closing_node = 1;
9023 counterparty_node = 0;
9025 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9026 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9028 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9029 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9030 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9031 true => alice_txn.clone(),
9032 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9034 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9035 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9036 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9037 if broadcast_alice {
9038 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9040 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9042 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9043 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9047 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9048 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9049 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
9050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9051 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9052 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9053 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9054 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9055 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9056 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9058 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9059 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9060 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9061 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9062 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9063 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9065 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9066 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9071 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9072 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9073 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9076 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9077 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9078 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9079 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9080 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9083 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9085 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9086 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9087 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9090 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9093 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9095 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9098 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9099 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9100 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9101 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9102 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9105 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9107 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9110 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9111 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9112 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9113 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9114 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9115 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9116 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9117 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9118 if broadcast_alice {
9119 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9121 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9123 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9124 if broadcast_alice {
9125 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9126 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9127 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9128 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9130 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9131 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9133 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9134 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9139 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9140 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9142 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9143 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9144 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9145 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9147 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9148 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9149 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9151 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9152 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9153 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9154 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9155 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9156 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9157 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9159 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9160 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9166 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9167 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9168 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9169 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9170 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9174 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9175 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9176 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9178 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9179 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9180 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9181 // updating logic for the existing channel.
9182 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9183 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9184 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9185 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9187 // Create an initial channel
9188 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9189 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9190 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9191 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9193 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9194 // that it is rejected.
9195 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9197 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9198 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9200 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9201 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9202 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9203 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9204 // move forward with it.
9205 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9206 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9212 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9213 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9215 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9218 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9219 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9221 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9222 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9223 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9224 added_monitors.clear();
9226 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9228 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9229 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9231 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9234 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9235 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9236 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9237 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9238 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9240 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9241 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9243 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9244 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9245 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9246 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9247 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9253 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9254 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9255 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9256 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9257 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9258 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9260 let funding_created = {
9261 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9262 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9263 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9264 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9267 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9268 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9269 // still needs to be cleared here.
9270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9272 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9274 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9275 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9277 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9278 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9279 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9280 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9281 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9283 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9287 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9288 // everything is functional.
9289 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9291 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9292 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9293 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9294 added_monitors.clear();
9297 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9298 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9299 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9300 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
9302 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9303 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9304 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9305 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9309 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9310 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9312 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9313 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9314 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9315 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9316 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9317 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9318 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9320 // Create some initial channels
9321 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9322 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9323 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9325 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9326 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9327 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9329 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9330 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9331 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9333 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9334 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9336 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9337 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9338 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9339 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9340 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9341 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9343 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9344 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9345 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9347 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9348 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9349 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9351 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9352 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9354 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9357 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9358 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9360 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9362 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9363 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9364 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9365 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9366 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9367 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9369 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9370 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9371 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9375 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9376 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9378 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9379 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9380 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9381 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9382 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9383 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9384 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9385 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9387 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9388 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9389 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9391 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9392 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9393 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9394 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9397 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9398 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9401 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9404 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9405 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9407 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9408 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9409 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9411 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9412 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9413 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9415 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9416 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9417 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9418 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9419 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9420 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9421 } else { panic!(); }
9422 } else { panic!(); }
9423 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9426 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9427 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9428 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9429 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9430 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9431 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9432 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9433 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9434 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9435 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9436 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9437 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9438 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9439 // until we learned about an additional block.
9441 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9442 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9443 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9444 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9445 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9446 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9447 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9449 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9450 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9451 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9452 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9453 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9455 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9456 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9457 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9459 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9460 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9462 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9463 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9464 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9466 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9467 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9468 if test_height_before_timelock {
9469 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9470 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9471 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9472 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9474 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9475 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9476 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9477 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9478 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9479 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9481 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9482 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9484 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9485 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9486 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9487 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9488 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9489 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9492 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9493 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9494 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9495 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9496 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9497 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9498 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9499 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9500 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9505 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9506 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9507 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9511 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9512 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9513 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9515 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9517 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9518 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9519 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9520 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9521 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9522 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9523 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9524 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9525 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9527 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9528 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9529 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9532 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9533 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9534 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9535 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9536 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9538 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9540 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9541 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9542 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9545 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9546 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9547 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9548 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9549 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9551 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9553 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9555 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9556 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9557 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9559 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9560 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9561 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9562 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9563 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9565 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9566 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9567 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9568 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9570 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9571 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9572 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9573 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9574 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9575 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9576 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9577 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9579 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9580 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9581 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9582 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9583 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9584 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9585 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9587 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9588 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9589 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9590 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9594 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9595 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9597 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9598 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9599 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9602 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9603 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9604 // the commitment state.
9605 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9607 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9609 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9610 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9613 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9614 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9615 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9616 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9617 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9618 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9619 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9621 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9622 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9625 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9626 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9627 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9628 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9629 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9631 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9633 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9634 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9635 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9637 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9640 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9642 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9643 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9644 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9645 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9646 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9648 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9649 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9652 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9654 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9655 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9656 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9657 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9658 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9659 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9660 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9661 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9662 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9665 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9666 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9668 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9669 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9670 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9672 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9673 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9676 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9677 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9679 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9680 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9681 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9683 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9684 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9685 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9686 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9688 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9689 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9690 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9693 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9694 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9695 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9697 expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9699 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9704 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9705 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9706 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9707 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9708 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9709 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9713 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9714 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9715 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9716 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9720 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9721 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9722 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9723 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9724 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9725 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9726 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9728 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9729 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9730 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9731 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9733 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9734 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9735 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9736 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9737 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9738 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9739 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9740 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9742 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9744 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9746 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9747 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9749 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9752 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9753 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9754 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9756 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9759 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9762 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9763 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9764 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9766 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9767 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9769 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9770 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9772 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9773 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9774 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9776 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9777 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9778 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9780 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9781 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9782 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9784 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9785 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9786 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9787 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9791 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9792 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9793 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9795 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9798 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9799 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9800 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9802 expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9804 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9807 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9808 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9809 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9811 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9815 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9816 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9817 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9818 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9819 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9821 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9822 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9823 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9824 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9825 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9826 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9827 final_value_msat: 10000,
9828 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9830 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9831 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9832 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9834 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9835 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9837 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9838 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9839 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9840 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9841 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9842 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9846 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9847 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9848 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9849 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9850 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9852 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9853 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9854 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9855 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9857 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9858 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9859 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9860 final_value_msat: 10000,
9861 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9863 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9864 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9865 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9866 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9867 let route = find_route(
9868 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9869 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9872 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9873 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9875 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9876 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9877 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9878 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9879 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9880 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9883 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9884 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9885 enum ExposureEvent {
9886 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9888 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9890 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9891 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9894 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9895 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9898 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9899 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9900 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9901 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9902 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9903 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9904 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9905 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9907 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9908 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9909 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9910 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9911 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9912 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9914 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9915 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9916 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9917 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9919 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9921 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9922 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9923 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9925 let opt_anchors = false;
9927 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9930 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9931 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9935 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9936 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9939 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9942 let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9943 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9944 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9946 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9947 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9948 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9949 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9951 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9952 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9954 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9955 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9957 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9958 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9961 if dust_outbound_balance {
9962 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9963 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9964 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9965 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9966 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9967 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9970 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9971 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9972 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9973 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9974 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9978 if dust_outbound_balance {
9979 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9980 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9981 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9982 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9983 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9986 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9987 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9988 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9989 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9994 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9995 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9996 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9997 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9998 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10000 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10001 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10002 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10004 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10006 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10007 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10008 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10010 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10011 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10012 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10013 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10014 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10016 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10017 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10018 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10019 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10021 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10022 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10024 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10025 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10026 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10028 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10029 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10031 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10033 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10036 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10037 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10038 added_monitors.clear();
10042 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10043 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10044 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10045 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10046 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10047 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10048 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10049 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10050 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10051 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10052 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10053 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10054 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);