_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
  22 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase};
  24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
  26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, get_route, RouteParameters};
  30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  31 use crate::ln::msgs;
  32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  33 use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils::{self, WatchtowerPersister};
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
  38 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
  39
  40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  44 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
  45 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  46 use bitcoin::{Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
  47 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  48
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  51
  52 use regex;
  53
  54 use crate::io;
  55 use crate::prelude::*;
  56 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  57 use core::default::Default;
  58 use core::iter::repeat;
  59 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  60 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
  61
  62 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  63 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  64
  65 use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS;
  66
  67 #[test]
  68 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  69         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  70         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  71         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  72         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  73         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  74         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  75         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  76         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  77
  78         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  79         // funding satoshis
  80         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  81         let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  82         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  83
  84         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  85         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
  86
  87         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  88         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  89
  90         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  91         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  92         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  93                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  94                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  95                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  96                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  97                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  98                         match action {
  99                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
 100                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
 101                                 },
 102                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 103                         }
 104                 } else { assert!(false); }
 105         };
 106
 107         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 108
 109         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 110         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 111         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 118
 119         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 120
 121         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 122
 123         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 124
 125         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 126 }
 127
 128 #[test]
 129 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 130         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 131         // them.
 132         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 133         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 134         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 135         *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
 136         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 137         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 138
 139         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None, None) {
 140                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 141                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 142                 },
 143                 _ => panic!()
 144         }
 145 }
 146
 147 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 148         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 149         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 150         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 151         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 152         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 153         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 154         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 155         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 156         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 157
 158         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 159         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 160         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 161         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 162         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 163         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 164
 165         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 166         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 167         if !send_from_initiator {
 168                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 169                 open_channel_message.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 170         }
 171         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
 172
 173         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 174         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 175         if send_from_initiator {
 176                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 177                 accept_channel_message.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 178         }
 179         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
 180         {
 181                 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
 182                 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
 183                 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
 184                 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
 185
 186                 let channel_phase = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 187                 match channel_phase {
 188                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
 189                                 let chan_context = channel_phase.context_mut();
 190                                 chan_context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 191                                 chan_context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 192                         },
 193                         _ => assert!(false),
 194                 }
 195         }
 196
 197         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 198         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 199         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 200
 201         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 202         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 203         if send_from_initiator {
 204                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 205                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 206                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 207                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 208                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
 209         } else {
 210                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 211         }
 212 }
 213
 214 #[test]
 215 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 216         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 217         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 218 }
 219
 220 #[test]
 221 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 222         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 223         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 224         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 225         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 226         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 227
 228         // balancing
 229         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 230
 231         // A                                        B
 232         // update_fee                            ->
 233         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 234         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 235         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 236         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 237         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 238         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 239         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 240         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 241         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 242         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 243         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 244         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 245         //                                       <- RAA
 246         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 247
 248         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 249         {
 250                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 251                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 252         }
 253         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 254         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 255
 256         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 257         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 258         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 259                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 260                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 261                 },
 262                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 263         };
 264
 265         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 266
 267         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 268         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 269         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 270                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 272
 273         let payment_event = {
 274                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 275                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 276                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 277         };
 278         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 279         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 280
 281         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 282         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 283         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 284         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 285         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 287
 288         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 289         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 290         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 291         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 293
 294         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 295         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 296         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 297         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 298         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 299         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 300         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 302
 303         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 304         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 305         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 306         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 307         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 308         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 309         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 310         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 311
 312         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 313         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 314         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 316
 317         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 318         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 319         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 320
 321         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 323
 324         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 325         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 326         match events_2[0] {
 327                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 328                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 329         }
 330
 331         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 332         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 333 }
 334
 335 #[test]
 336 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 337         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 338         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 339         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 340         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 341         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 342         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 343         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 344
 345         // balancing
 346         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 347
 348         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 349         {
 350                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 351                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 352         }
 353         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 354         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 355
 356         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 357         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 358         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 359                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 360                         update_fee.as_ref()
 361                 },
 362                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 363         };
 364
 365         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 366
 367         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 368         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 369         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 370                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 372
 373         let payment_event = {
 374                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 375                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 376                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 377         };
 378         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 379         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 380
 381         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 382         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 383         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 384         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 385         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 386         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 387
 388         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 389         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 390
 391         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 392 }
 393
 394 #[test]
 395 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 396         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 397         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 398         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 399         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 400         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 401
 402         // A                                        B
 403         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 404         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 405         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 406         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 407         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 408         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 409         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 410         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 411         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 412         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 413         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 414         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 415         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 416         //                                          B should send no response here
 417         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 418         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 419         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 420
 421         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 422         let initial_feerate;
 423         {
 424                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 425                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 426                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 427         }
 428         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 430
 431         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 432         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 433         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 434                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 435                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 436                 },
 437                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 438         };
 439
 440         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 441         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 442         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 443         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 445
 446         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 447         // transaction:
 448         {
 449                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 450                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 451         }
 452         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 453         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 454         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 455
 456         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 457         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 458                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 459                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 460         };
 461
 462         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 463
 464         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 465         // Deliver (3)
 466         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 467
 468         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 469         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 470         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 472         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 473         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 474         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 475         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 476         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 477         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 478         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 479
 480         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 481         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 482         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 484         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 485
 486         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 487         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 488         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 489
 490         // Delever (4)
 491         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 492         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 494
 495         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 496         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 497         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 498
 499         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 500         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 501         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 502         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 503
 504         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 505         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 507 }
 508
 509 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 510         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 511         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 512         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 513         // Node objects.
 514
 515         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 516         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 517         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 518         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 519
 520         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 521                 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
 522                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 523                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 524         }
 525
 526         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 527         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 528         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 529
 530         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 531         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
 532         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 533
 534         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 535         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
 536
 537         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 538
 539         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 540         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 542         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 543
 544         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 545         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 546         {
 547                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 548                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 549                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 550                 added_monitors.clear();
 551         }
 552         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 553
 554         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 555
 556         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 557         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 558         {
 559                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 560                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 561                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 562                 added_monitors.clear();
 563         }
 564
 565         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 566         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 567         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 568
 569         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 570         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 571
 572         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 573         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 574         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 575         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 576         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 577 }
 578
 579 #[test]
 580 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 589         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 590         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 591         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 592         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 593         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 594         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 595         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 596         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 597         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 598         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 599 }
 600
 601 #[test]
 602 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 603         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 604         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 605         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 606         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 607         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 608
 609         {
 610                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 611                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 612         }
 613         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 615
 616         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 617         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 618         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 619                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 620                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 621                 },
 622                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 623         };
 624         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 625
 626         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 627         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 628         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 629
 630         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 631         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 632         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 633
 634         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 635         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 636         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 637         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 638
 639         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 640         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 641         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 642 }
 643
 644 #[test]
 645 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 646         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 647         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 648         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 649         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 650         let channel_value = 5000;
 651         let push_sats = 700;
 652         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
 653         let channel_id = chan.2;
 654         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 655         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 656         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 657
 658         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 659
 660         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 661         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 662         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 663         // remote limit.
 664         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 665         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
 666         {
 667                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 668                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 669         }
 670         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 671         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 672         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 673
 674         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 675
 676         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 677
 678         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 679         {
 680                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 681
 682                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 683                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 684                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
 685                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 686                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 687                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 688         }
 689
 690         {
 691                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 692                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 693                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 694         }
 695         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 696         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 698
 699         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 700
 701         // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 702         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 703         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 704                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 705                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 706                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 707                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 708                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 709                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 710                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
 711                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 712                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 713         };
 714         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 715                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 716                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 717                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 718                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 719                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 720                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 721                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
 722                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 723                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 724                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 725         };
 726
 727         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 728         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 729                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 730
 731         let res = {
 732                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 733                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 734                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 735                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 736                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 737                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 738                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 739                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 740                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 741                         push_sats,
 742                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
 743                         local_funding, remote_funding,
 744                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 745                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 746                         &mut htlcs,
 747                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 748                 );
 749                 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 750         };
 751
 752         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 753                 channel_id: chan.2,
 754                 signature: res.0,
 755                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
 756                 #[cfg(taproot)]
 757                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
 758         };
 759
 760         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 761                 channel_id: chan.2,
 762                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 763         };
 764
 765         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 766
 767         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 768         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 769         //Should produce and error.
 770         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 771         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee", 3);
 772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 773         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 774         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
 775                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], channel_value);
 776 }
 777
 778 #[test]
 779 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 780         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 781         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 782         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 783         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 784         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 785
 786         // balancing
 787         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 788
 789         {
 790                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 791                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 792         }
 793         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 794         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 795
 796         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 797         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 798         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 799                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 800                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 801                 },
 802                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 803         };
 804         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 805         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 806         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 808
 809         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 810
 811         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 812         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 813                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 814         {
 815                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 816                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 817                 added_monitors.clear();
 818         }
 819         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 820         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 821         // node[1] has nothing to do
 822
 823         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 824         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 826
 827         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 828         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 829         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 831         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 832         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 833         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 834
 835         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 836         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 837         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 838         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 839         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 840         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 841
 842         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 843         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 844         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 845         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 846
 847         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 849         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 850
 851         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 852         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 853         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 854         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 855
 856         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 857         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 858         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 859
 860         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 861
 862         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 863         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 864         match events[0] {
 865                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 866                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 867         };
 868
 869         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 870
 871         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 872         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 873         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 874         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 875         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 876 }
 877
 878 #[test]
 879 fn test_update_fee() {
 880         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 881         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 882         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 883         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 884         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 885         let channel_id = chan.2;
 886
 887         // A                                        B
 888         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 889         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 890         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 891         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 892         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 893         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 894         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 895         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 896         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 897         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 898         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 899         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 900
 901         // Create and deliver (1)...
 902         let feerate;
 903         {
 904                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 905                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 906                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 907         }
 908         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 910
 911         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 912         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 913         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 914                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 915                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 916                 },
 917                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 918         };
 919         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 920
 921         // Generate (2) and (3):
 922         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 923         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 925
 926         // Deliver (2):
 927         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 928         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 930
 931         // Create and deliver (4)...
 932         {
 933                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 934                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 935         }
 936         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 937         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 938         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 939         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 940         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 941                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 942                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 943                 },
 944                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 945         };
 946
 947         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 948         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 950         // ... creating (5)
 951         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 952         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 953
 954         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 955         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 957         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 958         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 959
 960         // Deliver (5):
 961         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 962         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 964
 965         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 966         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 967         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 968         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 969         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 970         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 971         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 972         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 974
 975         // Deliver (7)
 976         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 977         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 978         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 979         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 980
 981         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 982         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 983         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 984
 985         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 986         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 987         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 988         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 989         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 990 }
 991
 992 #[test]
 993 fn fake_network_test() {
 994         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 995         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 996         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 997         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 998         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 999         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1000
1001         // Create some initial channels
1002         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1003         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1004         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1005
1006         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1007         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1009         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1011
1012         // Send some more payments
1013         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1014         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1015         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1016
1017         // Test failure packets
1018         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1019         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1020
1021         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1022         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1023
1024         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1025         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1026         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1027         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1028         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1029         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1030         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1031
1032         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1033         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1034         hops.push(RouteHop {
1035                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1039                 fee_msat: 0,
1040                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1041                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1042         });
1043         hops.push(RouteHop {
1044                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1048                 fee_msat: 0,
1049                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1050                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1051         });
1052         hops.push(RouteHop {
1053                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1054                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1055                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1056                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1057                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1058                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1059                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1060         });
1061         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1062         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1063         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1064                 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1065                         &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1066
1067         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1068         hops.push(RouteHop {
1069                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1070                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1071                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1072                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1073                 fee_msat: 0,
1074                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1075                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1076         });
1077         hops.push(RouteHop {
1078                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1079                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1080                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1081                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1082                 fee_msat: 0,
1083                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1084                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1085         });
1086         hops.push(RouteHop {
1087                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1088                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1089                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1090                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1091                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1092                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1093                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1094         });
1095         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1096         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1097         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1098                 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1099                         &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1100
1101         // Claim the rebalances...
1102         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1103         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1104
1105         // Close down the channels...
1106         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1107         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1108         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1109         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1110         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1111         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1112         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1113         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1114         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1115         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1116         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1117         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1118 }
1119
1120 #[test]
1121 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1122         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1123         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1124         // commitment dance rounds.
1125         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1126         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1127         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1128         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1129         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1130         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1131
1132         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1133         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1134
1135         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1136         for _ in 0..50 {
1137                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1138                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1139                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1140                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1141         }
1142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1143
1144         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1145         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1146         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1147         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1148
1149         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1150         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1151         // another HTLC.
1152         {
1153                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1154                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1155                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1156                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1157         }
1158
1159         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1160         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1161         {
1162                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1163                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1164                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1165         }
1166
1167         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1168         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1169         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1170         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1171
1172         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1173         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1174         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1175         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1176         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1177         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1179
1180         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1181         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1182         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1183
1184         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1185
1186         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1187         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1188         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1190
1191         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1192         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1194         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1195
1196         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1198         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1199
1200         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1201                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1202         }
1203         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1205         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1207         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1208
1209         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1211         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1213         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1214
1215         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1217
1218         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1219
1220         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1221         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1222         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1223                 match event {
1224                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1225                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1226                         },
1227                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1228                 };
1229         }
1230
1231         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1232                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1233         }
1234
1235         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1236 }
1237
1238 #[test]
1239 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1240         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1241         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1242         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1243         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1244         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1245         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1246
1247         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1248         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1249         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1250         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1251         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1252         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1253
1254         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1255
1256         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1257         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1258
1259         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1260         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1261
1262         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1263         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1264         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1265 }
1266
1267 #[test]
1268 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1269         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1270         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1271         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1272         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1273         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1274         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1275         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1276
1277         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1278
1279         // balancing
1280         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1281
1282         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1283
1284         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1285         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1286         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1287
1288         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1289         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1290         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1292
1293         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1294         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1295
1296         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1297         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1298         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1299                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1300                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1301                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1302                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1303                 }
1304         }
1305         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1306
1307         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1309         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1310         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1311
1312         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1313         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1314
1315         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1316         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1317         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1318         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1319         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1320                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1321         } else {
1322                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1323         };
1324
1325         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1326         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1327
1328         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1329         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1330         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1331
1332         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1333         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1334         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1335         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1336
1337         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1338         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1339         for e in events {
1340                 match e {
1341                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1342                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg } } => {
1343                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1344                                 assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1345                         },
1346                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1347                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1348                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1349                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1350                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1351                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1352                         },
1353                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1354                 }
1355         }
1356 }
1357
1358 #[test]
1359 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1360         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1361         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1362         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1363         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1364         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1365
1366         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1367         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1368
1369         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1370         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1371         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1372         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1373                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1374         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1375         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1376                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1377         match err {
1378                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1379                         if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
1380                         else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
1381                 },
1382                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1383         }
1384         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1385
1386         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1387 }
1388
1389 #[test]
1390 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1391         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1392         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1393         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1394         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1395         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1396
1397         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1398                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1399         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1400         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1401         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1402         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1403
1404         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1405
1406         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1407         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1408                 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1409         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1410         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1411                 channel_id: chan.2,
1412                 htlc_id: 0,
1413                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1414                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1415                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1416                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1417                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1418                 blinding_point: None,
1419         };
1420
1421         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1422
1423         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1424         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1425         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1426
1427         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1428
1429         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1430
1431         // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1432         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1433         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1434                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1435                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1436                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1437                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1438                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1439                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1440                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1441                 chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1442
1443                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1444                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1445                  chan_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1446                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1447                  chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1448         };
1449         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1450                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1451                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1452                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1453                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1454                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1455                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1456                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1457                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1458                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1459                  chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1460         };
1461
1462         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1463         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1464                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1465
1466         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1467         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1468         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1469
1470         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1471                 offered: false,
1472                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1473                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1474                 payment_hash,
1475                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1476         };
1477
1478         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1479
1480         let res = {
1481                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1482                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1483                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1484                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1485                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1486                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1487                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1488                         commitment_number,
1489                         95000,
1490                         local_chan_balance,
1491                         local_funding, remote_funding,
1492                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1493                         feerate_per_kw,
1494                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1495                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1496                 );
1497                 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1498         };
1499
1500         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1501                 channel_id: chan.2,
1502                 signature: res.0,
1503                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1504                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1505                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1506         };
1507
1508         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1509         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1510         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1511
1512         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1513         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1514                 channel_id: chan.2,
1515                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1516                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1517                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1518                 next_local_nonce: None,
1519         };
1520         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1521
1522         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1523         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1524         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1525         match events[0] {
1526                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1527                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1528                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1529                 },
1530                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1531         };
1532         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
1533                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", raa_msg.channel_id), 1);
1534
1535         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1536 }
1537
1538 #[test]
1539 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1540         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1541         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1542         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1543         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1544         // this situation.
1545         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1546         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1547         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1548         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1549         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1550         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1551
1552         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1553         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1554
1555         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1556
1557         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1558
1559         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1560         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1561         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1562         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1563                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1564         }
1565
1566         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1567         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1568                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1569                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1570         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1571 }
1572
1573 #[test]
1574 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1575         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1576         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1577         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1578         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1579         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1580         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1581         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1582
1583         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1584         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1585         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1586         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1587         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1588         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1589         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1590
1591         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1592         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1593                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1594         }
1595
1596         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1597                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1598         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1599         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1600         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1601         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1602         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1603         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1604         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1605                 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1606         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1607         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1608                 channel_id: chan.2,
1609                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1610                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1611                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1612                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1613                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1614                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1615                 blinding_point: None,
1616         };
1617
1618         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1619         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1620         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 3);
1621         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1622         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1623         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1624         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1625         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() },
1626                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1627 }
1628
1629 #[test]
1630 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1631         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1632         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1633         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1634         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1635
1636         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1637         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1638         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1639         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1640         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1641
1642         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1643         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1644         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1645         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1646         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1647         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1648         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1649
1650         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1651                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1652         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1653         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1654         // commitment transaction fee.
1655         route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1656
1657         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1658         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1659                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1660         }
1661
1662         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1663         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1664                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1665         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1666         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1667                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1668                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1669 }
1670
1671 #[test]
1672 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1673         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1674         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1675         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1676         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1677         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1678         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1679         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1680         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1681         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1682
1683         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1684         // HTLC.
1685         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1686         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1687         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None, None).unwrap_err(),
1688                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1689
1690         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1691         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1692         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1693         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None, None).unwrap();
1694         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1695         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1696         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1697
1698         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1699         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1700         match msg_events[0] {
1701                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1702                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1703                 },
1704                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1705         }
1706 }
1707
1708 #[test]
1709 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1710         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1711         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1712         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1713         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1714         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1715         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1716         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1717
1718         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1719         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1720         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1721         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1722         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1723         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1724
1725         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1726         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1727         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1728         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1729         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1730         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1731
1732         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1733         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1734         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1735         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1736 }
1737
1738 #[test]
1739 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1740         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1741         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1742         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1743         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1744         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1745         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1746
1747         let feemsat = 239;
1748         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1749         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1750         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1751         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1752
1753         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1754         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1755         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1756         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1757
1758         // Add a pending HTLC.
1759         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1760         let payment_event_1 = {
1761                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1762                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1763                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1764
1765                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1766                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1767                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1768         };
1769         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1770
1771         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1772         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
1773         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1774         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1775         let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1776         route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1777
1778         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1779         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1780         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1781         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1782         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1783         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1784                 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1785         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1786         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1787                 channel_id: chan.2,
1788                 htlc_id: 1,
1789                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1790                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1791                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1792                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1793                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1794                 blinding_point: None,
1795         };
1796
1797         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1798         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1799         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value", 3);
1800         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1801         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1802         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1803         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1804         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() },
1805                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1806 }
1807
1808 #[test]
1809 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1810         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1811         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1812         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1813         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1814         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1815         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1816         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1817         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1818         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1819         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1820
1821         let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1822         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1823         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1824
1825         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1826         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1827 }
1828
1829 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1830         (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1831 }
1832
1833 #[test]
1834 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1835         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1836         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1837         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1838         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1839         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1840         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1841         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1842         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1843         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1844         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1845
1846         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1847         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1848
1849         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1850         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1851
1852         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1853                 ($node: expr) => {{
1854                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1855                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1856                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1857                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1858                         payment_event
1859                 }}
1860         }
1861
1862         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1863         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1864         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1865         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1866
1867         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1868
1869         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1870         {
1871                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1872                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1873                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1874                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1875                 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1876
1877                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1878                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1879                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1880                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1881         }
1882
1883         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1884         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1885         loop {
1886                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1887                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1888                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1889                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1890                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1891                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1892                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1893                         break;
1894                 }
1895
1896                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1897                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1898                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1899                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1900                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1901
1902                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1903                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1904                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1905                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1906                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1907                 );
1908
1909                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1910                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1911                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1912                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1913                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1914         }
1915
1916         // adding pending output.
1917         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1918         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1919         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1920         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1921         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1922         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1923         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1924         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1925         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1926         // policy.
1927         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1928         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1929         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1930
1931         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1932         let payment_event_1 = {
1933                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1934                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1935                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1936
1937                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1938                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1939                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1940         };
1941         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1942
1943         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1944         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1945         {
1946                 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1947                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1948                 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1949                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1950                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1951                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1952                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1953         }
1954
1955         // split the rest to test holding cell
1956         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1957         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1958         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1959         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1960         {
1961                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1962                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1963         }
1964
1965         // now see if they go through on both sides
1966         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1967         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1968         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1969                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1970         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1971         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1972         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1973
1974         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1975         {
1976                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1977                         get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1978                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1979                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1980                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1981                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1982                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1983         }
1984
1985         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1986         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1987         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1988                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1990         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1991         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1992
1993         // flush the pending htlc
1994         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1995         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1996         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1997
1998         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1999         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
2000         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2001         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2002
2003         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
2004         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2005         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
2006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2007
2008         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
2009         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2010         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2011
2012         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2013
2014         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2015         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
2016         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
2017
2018         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2019         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
2020
2021         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
2022         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
2023         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
2024         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
2025         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
2026         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2027
2028         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2029         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2030         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2031         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2032
2033         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2034         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2035
2036         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2037         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2038         match events[0] {
2039                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2040                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2041                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2042                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2043                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2044                         match &purpose {
2045                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2046                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2047                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2048                                 },
2049                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2050                         }
2051                 },
2052                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2053         }
2054         match events[1] {
2055                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2056                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2057                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2058                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2059                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2060                         match &purpose {
2061                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2062                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2063                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2064                                 },
2065                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2066                         }
2067                 },
2068                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2069         }
2070
2071         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2072         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2073         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2074
2075         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
2076         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2077         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2078
2079         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
2080         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2081         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2082         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2083         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2084
2085         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2086         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2087 }
2088
2089 #[test]
2090 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2091         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2092         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2093         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2094         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2095         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2096         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2097         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2098         // To test this we:
2099         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2100         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2101         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2102         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2103         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2104         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2105         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2106         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2107         //    claim,
2108         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2109         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2110         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2111         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2112         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2113         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2114         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2115         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2116         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2117         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2118
2119         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2120         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2121         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2122         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2123         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2124
2125         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2126         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2127         let send_1 = {
2128                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2129                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2130                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2131                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2132                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2133                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2134         };
2135
2136         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2137         // initial fulfill/CS.
2138         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2139         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2141         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2142
2143         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2144         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2145         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2146         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2148         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2149
2150         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2151         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2153         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2154         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_1, None, false, false);
2155
2156         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2157         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2158         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2159         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2160         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2161
2162         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2164         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2165
2166         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2167         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2168         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2169
2170         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2172         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2173
2174         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2175         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2176         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2177         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2178         // on-chain as necessary).
2179         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2180         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2182         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2183         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, false, false);
2184
2185         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2187         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2188
2189         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2190         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2191
2192         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2193         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2194         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2195         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2196         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2197         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2198
2199         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2200         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2201         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2202         let send_2 = {
2203                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2204                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2205                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2206                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2207                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2208                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2209         };
2210
2211         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2212         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2213         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2214         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2215
2216         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2217
2218         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2219         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2220         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2221
2222         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2224
2225         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2226         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2227         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2228         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2229
2230         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2231         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2232         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2233
2234         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2235         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2236
2237         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2238         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2239
2240         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2241         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2242 }
2243
2244 #[test]
2245 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2246         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2247         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2248         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2249         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2250         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2251         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2252
2253         // Create some initial channels
2254         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2255         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2256         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2257         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2258
2259         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2260         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2261         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2262         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2263         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2264         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2265
2266         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2267         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2268         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2269         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2270         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2271
2272         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2273         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2274         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2275         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2276         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2277         {
2278                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2279                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2280                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2281                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2282                         let _ = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2283                 }
2284
2285                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2286                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2287                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2288         }
2289         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2290         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2291         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2292         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2293
2294         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2295         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2296
2297         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2298         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2299         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2300         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2302         {
2303                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2304                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2305                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2306                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2307                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2308                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2309         }
2310         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2311         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2312         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2313         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2314         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2315
2316         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2317                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2318                         {
2319                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2320                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2321                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2322
2323                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2324                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2325                                 match events[0] {
2326                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2327                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2328                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2329                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2330                                         },
2331                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2332                                 };
2333                         }
2334                 }
2335         }
2336
2337         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2338         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2339         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2341         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2342         let node2_commitment_txid;
2343         {
2344                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2345                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2346                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2347                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2348
2349                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2350                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2351                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2352                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2353                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2354         }
2355         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2356         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2357         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2358         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2359         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2360
2361         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2362         // confusing us in the following tests.
2363         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2364
2365         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2366         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2367         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2368         // buffer space).
2369
2370         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2371                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2372                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2373                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2374                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2375                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2376                                 msg.clone()
2377                         },
2378                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2379                 };
2380                 match events[1] {
2381                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2382                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2383                         },
2384                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2385                 }
2386                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2387
2388                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2389                 {
2390                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2391                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2392                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2393                                         false
2394                                 } else { true }
2395                         });
2396                 }
2397
2398                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2399
2400                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2401                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2402
2403                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2404                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2405                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2406                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2407                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2408                                 msg.clone()
2409                         },
2410                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2411                 };
2412                 match events[1] {
2413                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2414                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2415                         },
2416                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2417                 }
2418                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2419                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2420                 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2421
2422                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2423                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2424                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2425         };
2426         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2427         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2428         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2429         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2430
2431         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2432                 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
2433         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2434 }
2435
2436 #[test]
2437 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2438         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2439         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2440         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2441         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2442         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2443         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2444         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2445         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2446         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2447         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2448         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2449         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2450         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2451         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2452         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2453         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2454         // Create some new channels:
2455         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2456
2457         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2458         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2459         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2460         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2461         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2462         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2463         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2464         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2465         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2466         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2467         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2468         // Revoke the old state
2469         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2470
2471         {
2472                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2473                 {
2474                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2475                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2476                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2477                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2478                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2479                 }
2480                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2481                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2482                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2483
2484                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2485                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2486                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2487                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2488                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2489                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2490                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2491                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2492                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2493         }
2494         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2495         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2496         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2497 }
2498
2499 #[test]
2500 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2501         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2502         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2503         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2504         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2505         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2506         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2507         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2508         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2509         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2510         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2511         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2512         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2513         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2514         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2515         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2516         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2517         // Create some new channels:
2518         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2519
2520         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2521         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2522         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2523         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2524         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2525         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2526         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2527         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2528         // Revoke the old state
2529         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2530         {
2531                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2532                 {
2533                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2534                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2535                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2536
2537                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2538                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2539                 }
2540                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2541                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2542
2543                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2545                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2546                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2547                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2548                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2549                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2550         }
2551         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2552         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2553         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2554 }
2555
2556 #[test]
2557 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2558         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2559         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2560         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2561         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2562         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2563         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2564         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2565         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2566         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2567         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2568         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2569         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2570         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2571         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2572
2573         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2574         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2575         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2576         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2577         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2578         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2579
2580         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2581
2582         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2583         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2584         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2585         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2586         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2587 }
2588
2589 #[test]
2590 fn test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates() {
2591         do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(true);
2592         do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(false);
2593 }
2594
2595 fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment: bool) {
2596         // Simple test to make sure that the justice tx formed in WatchtowerPersister
2597         // is properly formed and can be broadcasted/confirmed successfully in the event
2598         // that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
2599         // (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
2600         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2601         let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2602         let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2603         let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
2604                 WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
2605         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
2606         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2607         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2608         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2609         let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
2610
2611         if !broadcast_initial_commitment {
2612                 // Send a payment to move the channel forward
2613                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2614         }
2615
2616         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output.
2617         // We'll keep this commitment transaction to broadcast once it's revoked.
2618         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel_id);
2619         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2620         let revoked_commitment_tx = &revoked_local_txn[0];
2621
2622         // Send another payment, now revoking the previous commitment tx
2623         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2624
2625         let justice_tx = persisters[1].justice_tx(funding_txo, &revoked_commitment_tx.txid()).unwrap();
2626         check_spends!(justice_tx, revoked_commitment_tx);
2627
2628         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2629         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2630
2631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2632         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2633                 &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2634         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 0);
2635
2636         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2637         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2638                 &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2639
2640         // Check that the justice tx has sent the revoked output value to nodes[1]
2641         let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel_id);
2642         let total_claimable_balance = monitor.get_claimable_balances().iter().fold(0, |sum, balance| {
2643                 match balance {
2644                         channelmonitor::Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. } => sum + amount_satoshis,
2645                         _ => panic!("Unexpected balance type"),
2646                 }
2647         });
2648         // On the first commitment, node[1]'s balance was below dust so it didn't have an output
2649         let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value };
2650         let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value;
2651         assert_eq!(total_claimable_balance, expected_claimable_balance);
2652 }
2653
2654
2655 #[test]
2656 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2657         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2658         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2659         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2660         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2661         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2662         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2663
2664         // Create some new channel:
2665         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2666
2667         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2668         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2669         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2670         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2671         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2672
2673         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2674         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2675         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2676         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2677         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2678         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2679         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2680         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2681         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2682
2683         //Revoke the old state
2684         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2685
2686         {
2687                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2688                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2689                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2690                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2691                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2692                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2693                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2694                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2695
2696                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2697                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2698
2699                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2700                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2701
2702                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2703                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2704                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2705                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2706                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2707                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2708                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2709                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2710
2711                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2712                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2713                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2714                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2715                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2716         }
2717         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2718         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2719         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2720 }
2721
2722 #[test]
2723 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2724         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2725         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2726         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2727         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2728         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2729         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2730
2731         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2732
2733         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2734         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2735         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2736         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2737         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2738         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2739
2740         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2741         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2742
2743         //Revoke the old state
2744         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2745
2746         {
2747                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2748                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2749                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2750                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2751                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2752                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2753                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2754                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2755                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2756                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2757                 }
2758
2759                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2760                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2761
2762                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2763
2764                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2765                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2766                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2767                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2768                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2769                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2770                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2771
2772                 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2773                 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2774                 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2775
2776                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2777                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2778                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2779
2780                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2781                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2782                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2783
2784                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2785                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2786                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2787                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2788                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2789                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2790                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2791                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2792
2793                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2794                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2795                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2796                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2797                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2798                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2799                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2800         }
2801         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2802         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2803         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2804 }
2805
2806 #[test]
2807 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2808         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2809         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2810         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2811         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2812         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2813         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2814         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2815         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2816         // towards B.
2817         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2818         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2819         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2820         // PaymentSent event).
2821
2822         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2823         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2824         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2825         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2826
2827         // Create some initial channels
2828         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2829         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2830
2831         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2832         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2833         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2834         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2835         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2836
2837         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2838         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2839         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2840
2841         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2842         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2843
2844         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2845         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2846         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2847         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2848         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2849         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2850         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2851         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2852         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2853         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2854         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2855         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2856         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2857         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2858         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2859
2860         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2861         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2863         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2864         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2865         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2866         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2867         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2868         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2869         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2870         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2871         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2872         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2873         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2874
2875         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2876         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2877         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2878         {
2879                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2880                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2881                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2882                 added_monitors.clear();
2883         }
2884         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2885         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2886         match forwarded_events[0] {
2887                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2888                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2889         }
2890         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2891         match forwarded_events[1] {
2892                 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
2893                         next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
2894                 } => {
2895                         assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2896                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2897                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2898                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2899                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2900                 },
2901                 _ => panic!()
2902         }
2903         match forwarded_events[2] {
2904                 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
2905                         next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
2906                 } => {
2907                         assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2908                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2909                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2910                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2911                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2912                 },
2913                 _ => panic!()
2914         }
2915         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2916         {
2917                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2918                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2919                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2920                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2921                 added_monitors.clear();
2922         }
2923         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2924
2925         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2926         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2927
2928         match nodes_2_event {
2929                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2930                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2931         }
2932
2933         match nodes_0_event {
2934                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2935                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2936                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2937                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2938                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2939                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2940                 },
2941                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2942         };
2943
2944         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2945         match events[0] {
2946                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2947                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2948         }
2949
2950         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2951                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2952                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2953                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2954                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2955                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2956                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2957                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2958                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2959                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2960                         if $htlc_offered {
2961                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2962                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2963                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2964                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2965                         } else {
2966                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2967                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2968                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2969                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2970                         }
2971                         node_txn.clear();
2972                 } }
2973         }
2974         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2975         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2976
2977         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2978         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2979         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2980         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2981         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2982         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2983         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2984         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2985         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2986         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2987         let commitment_spend =
2988                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2989                         &node_txn[0]
2990                 } else {
2991                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2992                         // FullBlockViaListen
2993                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2994                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2995                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2996                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2997                                 &node_txn[0]
2998                         } else {
2999                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3000                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3001                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
3002                                 &node_txn[2]
3003                         }
3004                 };
3005
3006         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3007         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
3008         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3009         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3010         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3011         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
3012         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
3013         // we already checked the same situation with A.
3014
3015         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
3016         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
3017         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3018         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3019         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3020         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3021         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
3022         let mut first_claimed = false;
3023         for event in events {
3024                 match event {
3025                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3026                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
3027                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
3028                                         first_claimed = true;
3029                                 } else {
3030                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
3031                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
3032                                 }
3033                         },
3034                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3035                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
3036                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3037                 }
3038         }
3039         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3040 }
3041
3042 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
3043         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
3044         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
3045         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
3046         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
3047         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
3048         //            \                                  \
3049         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
3050
3051         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3052         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3053         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3054         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3055         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3056         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3057         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3058
3059         // Create some intial channels
3060         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3061         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3062
3063         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
3064         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3065         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3066
3067         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
3068
3069         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
3070         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3071         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
3072         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
3073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
3074         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
3075         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3076
3077         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3078         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3079         match events[0] {
3080                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3081                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3082                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3083                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3084                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3085                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3086                 },
3087                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3088         };
3089         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
3090         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3092         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3093         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
3094         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3095
3096         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
3097         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
3098         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
3099         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false
3100                 , [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3101         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3102         let timeout_tx = {
3103                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3104                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
3105                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
3106                 } else {
3107                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
3108                 }
3109                 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
3110                 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3111                 txn.remove(0)
3112         };
3113
3114         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3116         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3117
3118         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3119
3120         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3122         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3123         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3124         match events[0] {
3125                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3126                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3127                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3128                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3129                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3130                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3131                 },
3132                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3133         };
3134
3135         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3136         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3137         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3138
3139         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3140         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3141
3142         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3144         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3145         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3146         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3147         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3148         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3149 }
3150
3151 #[test]
3152 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3153         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3154         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3155         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3156 }
3157
3158 #[test]
3159 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3160         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3161         // and fail backward accordingly.
3162
3163         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3164         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3165         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3166         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3167
3168         // Create some initial channels
3169         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3170         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3171
3172         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3173         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3174         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3175         // Revoke the old state
3176         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3177
3178         let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3179
3180         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3181         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3182         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3184         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3185
3186         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3188         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3189         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3190         match events[0] {
3191                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3192                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3193                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3194                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3195                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3196                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3197
3198                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3199                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3200                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3201                 },
3202                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3203         }
3204 }
3205
3206 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3207         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3208         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3209         // commitment transaction anymore.
3210         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3211         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3212         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3213         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3214         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3215         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3216         // transactions:
3217         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3218         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3219         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3220         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3221         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3222         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3223         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3224         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3225         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3226
3227         // Create some initial channels
3228         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3229         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3230
3231         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3232         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3233         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3234         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3235         // Revoke the old state
3236         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3237
3238         let value = if use_dust {
3239                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3240                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3241                 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3242                         .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3243         } else { 3000000 };
3244
3245         let (_, first_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3246         let (_, second_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3247         let (_, third_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3248
3249         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3250         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3251         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3252         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3253         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3254         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3255         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3256         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3257         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3258         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3259         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3260         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3261
3262         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3263         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3264         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3265         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3266         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3267         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3268         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3269         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3270         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3271         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3272         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3273         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3274         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3275         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3276         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3277         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3278
3279         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3280         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3281         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3282         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3283         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3284         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3285         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3286         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3287         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3288         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3289         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3290         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3291         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3293         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3294         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3295         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3297
3298         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3299         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3300         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3301         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3302                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3303         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3304         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3306
3307         if deliver_bs_raa {
3308                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3309                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3310                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3311                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3312                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3313                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3314                 match events[0] {
3315                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3316                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3317                 };
3318                 match events[1] {
3319                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3320                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3321                 }
3322                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3323                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3324         }
3325
3326         let mut failed_htlcs = new_hash_set();
3327         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3328
3329         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3330         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3331         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3332
3333         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3334         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3335         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3336                 ev,
3337                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. }
3338         )));
3339         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3340                 ev,
3341                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3342         )));
3343         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3344                 ev,
3345                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3346         )));
3347
3348         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3349         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3350
3351         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3352         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3353
3354         if deliver_bs_raa {
3355                 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3356                 match nodes_2_event {
3357                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3358                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3359                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3360                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3361                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3362                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3363                         },
3364                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3365                 }
3366         }
3367
3368         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3369         match nodes_2_event {
3370                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data }) }, node_id: _ } => {
3371                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3372                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3373                 },
3374                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3375         }
3376
3377         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3378         match nodes_0_event {
3379                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3380                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3381                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3382                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3383                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3384                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3385
3386                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3387                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3388                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3389
3390                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3391
3392                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3393                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3394                         match events[0] {
3395                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3396                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3397                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3398                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3399                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3400                                                 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3401                                         }
3402                                 },
3403                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3404                         }
3405                         match events[1] {
3406                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3407                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3408                                 },
3409                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3410                         }
3411                         match events[2] {
3412                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3413                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3414                                 },
3415                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3416                         }
3417                         match events[3] {
3418                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3419                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3420                                 },
3421                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3422                         }
3423                         match events[4] {
3424                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3425                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3426                                 },
3427                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3428                         }
3429                         match events[5] {
3430                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3431                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3432                                 },
3433                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3434                         }
3435                 },
3436                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3437         }
3438
3439         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3440         match events[0] {
3441                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3442                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3443         }
3444
3445         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3446         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3447         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3448 }
3449
3450 #[test]
3451 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3452         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3453         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3454         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3455         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3456 }
3457
3458 #[test]
3459 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3460         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3461         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3462         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3463         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3464 }
3465
3466 #[test]
3467 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3468         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3469         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3470         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3471         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3472         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3473
3474         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3475         {
3476                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3477                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3478                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3479                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3480
3481                 let payment_event = {
3482                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3483                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3484                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3485                 };
3486                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3487                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3488         }
3489
3490         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3491         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3492         {
3493                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3494                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3495                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3496
3497                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3498         }
3499
3500         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3501         {
3502                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3503
3504                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3505                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3506                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3507                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3508                         &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3509                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3510                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3511
3512                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3513                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3514                         channel_id: chan.2,
3515                         htlc_id: 0,
3516                         amount_msat: 0,
3517                         payment_hash,
3518                         cltv_expiry,
3519                         onion_routing_packet,
3520                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3521                         blinding_point: None,
3522                 };
3523                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3524         }
3525         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3526         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3527         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3528         match events[0] {
3529                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3530                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3531                 },
3532                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3533         }
3534         match events[1] {
3535                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3536                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3537                 },
3538                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3539         }
3540         match events[2] {
3541                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3542                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3543                 },
3544                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3545         }
3546         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3547         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3548 }
3549
3550 #[test]
3551 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3552         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3553         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3554         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3555         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3556         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3557         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3558         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3559                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3560                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3561                 // connect_style.
3562                 return;
3563         }
3564         let funding_tx = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).3;
3565
3566         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3567         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3568         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3569         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3570         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3571         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3572
3573         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
3574         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3575         check_spends!(node_txn[0], funding_tx);
3576         check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
3577
3578         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone()]);
3579         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3580         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3581         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3582         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3583
3584         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3585         // registering new transactions
3586         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3587 }
3588
3589 #[test]
3590 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3591         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3592         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3593         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3594         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3595         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3596         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3597         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3598
3599         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3600
3601         let mut payment_event = {
3602                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3603                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3604                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3605
3606                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3607                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3608                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3609         };
3610
3611         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3612         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3613
3614         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3615
3616         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3617         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3618         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3619         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3620
3621         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3622         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3623         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3624         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3625         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3626
3627         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3628         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3629         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3630
3631         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3632         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3633         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3634         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3635         let commitment_tx = {
3636                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3637                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3638                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3639                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3640                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3641                 node_txn.remove(0)
3642         };
3643
3644         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
3645
3646         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3647         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3648         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3649         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3650
3651         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3652         {
3653                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3654                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3655         }
3656         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx);
3657         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3658         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), if nodes[2].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 2 } else { 1 });
3659         let htlc_tx = node_txn.pop().unwrap();
3660         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input.len(), 1);
3661         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, commitment_tx.txid());
3662         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3663         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3664
3665         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx);
3666 }
3667
3668 #[test]
3669 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3670         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3671         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3672         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3673         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3674
3675         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3676         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3677         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3678         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3679         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3680
3681         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3682
3683         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3684         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3685         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3686         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3687         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3688         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
3689
3690         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3691         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3692
3693         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3694         reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3695         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3696         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3697 }
3698
3699 #[test]
3700 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3701         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3702         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted, and doesn't reconnect back within time.
3703         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3704         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3705         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3706         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3707
3708         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3709         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3710         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
3711         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3712         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3713         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3714         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3715
3716         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3717         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3718
3719         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3720
3721         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3722         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3723
3724         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3725         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3726         // broadcasted.
3727         {
3728                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3729         }
3730
3731         // The peers disconnect before the funding is broadcasted.
3732         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3733         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3734
3735         // The time for peers to reconnect expires.
3736         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS {
3737                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
3738         }
3739
3740         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed`
3741         // when the peers are disconnected and do not reconnect before the funding
3742         // transaction is broadcasted.
3743         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, true
3744                 , [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3745         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
3746                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3747 }
3748
3749 #[test]
3750 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3751         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3752         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3753         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3754         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3755         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3756         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3757         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3758
3759         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3760         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3761         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3762         reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3763         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3764
3765         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3766         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3767         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3768         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3769
3770         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3771         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3772         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3773
3774         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3775         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3776         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3777         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3778
3779         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3780         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3781
3782         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3783         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3784
3785         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3786         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 = 1;
3787         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3788         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3789         {
3790                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3791                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3792                 match events[0] {
3793                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3794                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3795                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3796                         },
3797                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3798                 }
3799                 match events[1] {
3800                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3801                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3802                 }
3803                 match events[2] {
3804                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3805                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3806                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3807                         },
3808                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3809                 }
3810                 match events[3] {
3811                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3812                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3813                         },
3814                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3815                 }
3816         }
3817         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
3818
3819         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3820         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3821 }
3822
3823 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3824         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3825         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3826         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3827         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3828         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3829
3830         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3831         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3832                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3833                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3834                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3835                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3836                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3837                 chan_id
3838         } else {
3839                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3840         };
3841
3842         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3843
3844         let payment_event = {
3845                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3846                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3847                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3848
3849                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3850                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3851                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3852         };
3853         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3854
3855         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3856                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3857         } else {
3858                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3859                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3860                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3861                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3862                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3863
3864                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3865                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3866                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3867                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3868
3869                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3870                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3871                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3872                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3873                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3874
3875                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3876                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3877                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3878                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3879                                         }
3880                                 }
3881                         }
3882                 }
3883         }
3884
3885         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3886         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3887         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3888                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3889                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3890                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3891                         //
3892                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3893                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3894                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3895                         //
3896                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3897                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3898                 }
3899                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3900                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3901                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3902                 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3903                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = 1;
3904                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3905         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3906                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3907                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3908                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3909                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
3910                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3911         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3912                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3913                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3914                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3915                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3916         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3917                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3918                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3919                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
3920                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3921         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3922                 // Everything was delivered...
3923                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3924         }
3925
3926         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3927         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3928                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3929                 match events_1[0] {
3930                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3931                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3932                 };
3933                 match events_1[1] {
3934                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3935                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3936                 };
3937         } else {
3938                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3939                 match events_1[0] {
3940                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3941                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3942                 };
3943         }
3944
3945         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3946         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3947         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3948
3949         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3950
3951         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3952         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3953         match events_2[0] {
3954                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3955                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3956                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3957                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3958                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3959                         match &purpose {
3960                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3961                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3962                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3963                                 },
3964                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3965                         }
3966                 },
3967                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3968         }
3969
3970         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3972         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3973
3974         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3975         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3976         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3977                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3978                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3979                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3980                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3981                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3982                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3983                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3984                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3985                 },
3986                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3987         };
3988
3989         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3990                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3991
3992                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3993                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3994                 match events_4[0] {
3995                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3996                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3997                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3998                         },
3999                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4000                 }
4001
4002                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
4003                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
4004                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4005                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4006
4007                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
4008                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4009                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4010                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4011
4012                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
4013                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
4014                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4015                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4016                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4017
4018                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4019                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4020                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4021                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4022                                         }
4023                                 }
4024                         }
4025                 }
4026         }
4027
4028         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4029         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4030         if messages_delivered < 2 {
4031                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4032                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
4033                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4034                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
4035                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
4036                 } else {
4037                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4038                 }
4039         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4040                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4041                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4042                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4043                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
4044                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4045         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4046                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4047                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4048                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4049                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4050         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4051                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4052                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4053                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
4054                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4055         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4056                 // Everything was delivered...
4057                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4058         }
4059
4060         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
4061                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4062         }
4063         if messages_delivered <= 5 {
4064                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4065                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4066         }
4067         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4068
4069         if messages_delivered > 2 {
4070                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4071         }
4072
4073         // Channel should still work fine...
4074         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4075         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4076         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4077 }
4078
4079 #[test]
4080 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
4081         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
4082         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
4083         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
4084         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
4085 }
4086
4087 #[test]
4088 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
4089         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
4090         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
4091         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
4092         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
4093 }
4094
4095 #[test]
4096 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4097         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4098         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4099         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4100         // channel_ready immediately instead.
4101         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4102         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4103         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4104         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4105         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4106
4107         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4108
4109         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4110         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4111         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4112         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4113         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4114         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4115
4116         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4117         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4118         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4119 }
4120
4121 #[test]
4122 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_leading() {
4123         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4124         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4125         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4126         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4127
4128         // Let channel_manager get ahead of chain_monitor by 1 block.
4129         // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4130         // in case where client calls block_connect on channel_manager first and then on chain_monitor.
4131         let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4132         let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4133
4134         nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4135         nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4136
4137         // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4138         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4139
4140         // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1,
4141         // but it's best_block is block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager
4142         // was running ahead of chain_monitor at the time of funding_created.
4143         // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4144         // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4145         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4146         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4147
4148         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4149         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4150         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4151 }
4152
4153 #[test]
4154 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_lagging() {
4155         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4156         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4157         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4158         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4159
4160         // Let chain_monitor get ahead of channel_manager by 1 block.
4161         // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4162         // in case where client calls block_connect on chain_monitor first and then on channel_manager.
4163         let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4164         let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4165
4166         nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4167         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4168
4169         // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4170         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4171
4172         // channel_manager can't really skip block_1, it should get it eventually.
4173         nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4174
4175         // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1, it's best_block is
4176         // the block before block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager was
4177         // running behind at the time of funding_created.
4178         // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4179         // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4180         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4181         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4182
4183         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4184         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4185         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4186 }
4187
4188 #[test]
4189 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4190         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4191         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4192         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4193         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4194         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4195         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4196         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4197
4198         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4199
4200         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4201         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4202         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
4203                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
4204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4205
4206         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4207         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4208         match events_1[0] {
4209                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4210                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4211         }
4212
4213         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4214         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4215         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4216
4217         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4218         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4219         match events_2[0] {
4220                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4221                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4222                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4223                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4224                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4225                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4226                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4227
4228                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4229                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4230                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4231                         match events_3[0] {
4232                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4233                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4234                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4235                                 },
4236                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4237                         }
4238
4239                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4240                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4241                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4242                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4243                 },
4244                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4245         }
4246
4247         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4248         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4249
4250         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4251                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4252         }, true).unwrap();
4253         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4254         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4255         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4256                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4257         }, false).unwrap();
4258         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4259         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4260
4261         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4262         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4263         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4264         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4265
4266         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4267         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4268
4269         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4270         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4271
4272         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4273
4274         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4275         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4276         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4277         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4278         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4279         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4280         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4281         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4282         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4284
4285         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4286         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4287         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4288         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4289         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4290         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4291         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4293
4294         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4295         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4296         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4297         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4298         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4299         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4300         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4302
4303         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4304         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4305         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4307
4308         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4309         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4310         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4312
4313         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4314         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4316
4317         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4318
4319         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4320         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4321         match events_5[0] {
4322                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4323                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4324                         match &purpose {
4325                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4326                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4327                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4328                                 },
4329                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4330                         }
4331                 },
4332                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4333         }
4334
4335         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4336         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4337         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4338
4339         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4340         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4341 }
4342
4343 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4344         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4345         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4346         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4347         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4348         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4349         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4350
4351         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4352
4353         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4354                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4355                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4356                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4357                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4358                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4359                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4360                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4361                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4362                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4363                         &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4364                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4365                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4366                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4367                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4368                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4369                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4370                 our_payment_hash
4371         } else {
4372                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4373         };
4374
4375         let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4376         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4377         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4378         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4379         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4380                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4381                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4382                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4383         }
4384
4385         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4386
4387         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4388         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4389         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4390         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4391         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4392         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4393
4394         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4395         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4396         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4397         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4398         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4399         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4400 }
4401
4402 #[test]
4403 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4404         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4405         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4406 }
4407
4408 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4409         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4410         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4411         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4412         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4413         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4414         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4415         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4416
4417         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4418         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4419         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4420         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4421
4422         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4423         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4424         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4425                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4426         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4428
4429         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4430         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4431         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4432         sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4433                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4434         if forwarded_htlc {
4435                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4436                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4437                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4438                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4439                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4440         }
4441         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4442
4443         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4444         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4445         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4446         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4447
4448         if forwarded_htlc {
4449                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4450                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4451                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4452                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4453                 match fail_commit[0] {
4454                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4455                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4456                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4457                         },
4458                         _ => unreachable!(),
4459                 }
4460                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4461         } else {
4462                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4463         }
4464 }
4465
4466 #[test]
4467 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4468         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4469         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4470 }
4471
4472 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4473         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4474                 {
4475                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4476                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4477                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4478                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4479                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4480                                 match event {
4481                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs, channel_id: _ } => {
4482                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4483                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4484                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4485                                                 }
4486                                         },
4487                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4488                                 };
4489                         }
4490                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4491                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4492                                         txn.push(tx);
4493                                 }
4494                         }
4495                         txn
4496                 }
4497         }
4498 }
4499
4500 #[test]
4501 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4502         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4503         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4504         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4505         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4506         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4507
4508         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4509         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4510         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4511         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4512         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4513         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4514         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4515         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4516         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4517
4518         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4519         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4520
4521         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4522         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4523         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4524         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4525         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4526 }
4527
4528 #[test]
4529 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4530         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4531         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4532         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4533         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4534         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4535         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4536
4537         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4538         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4539         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4540         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4541         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4542
4543         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4544         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4545         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4546         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4547
4548         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4549         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4550         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4551         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4552         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4553
4554         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4555         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4556         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4557 }
4558
4559 #[test]
4560 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4561         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4562         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4563
4564         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4565         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4566         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4567         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4568
4569         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4570         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4571         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4572         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4573         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4574
4575         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4576         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4577         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4579         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4580
4581         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4582         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4583         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4584
4585         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4586         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4587         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4588         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4589         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4590 }
4591
4592 #[test]
4593 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4594         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4595         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4596         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4597         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4598
4599         // Create some initial channels
4600         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4601
4602         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4603
4604         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4605         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4606         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4607
4608         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4609         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4610         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4611         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4612         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4614         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4615         match events[0] {
4616                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4617                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4618         }
4619         match events[1] {
4620                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4621                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4622         }
4623
4624         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4625         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4626         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4627         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4628         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4629
4630         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4631         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4632         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4633
4634         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4635         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4636         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4637 }
4638
4639 #[test]
4640 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4641         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4642         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4643         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4644         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4645
4646         // Create some initial channels
4647         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4648
4649         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4650         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4651
4652         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4653
4654         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4655         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4656         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4657
4658         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4659         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4660         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4661         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4662         match events[0] {
4663                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4664                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4665         }
4666         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4667
4668         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4669         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4670         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4671         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4672         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4673
4674         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4675         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4676         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4677         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4678
4679         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4680         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4681         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4682         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4683         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4684 }
4685
4686 #[test]
4687 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4688         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4689         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4690         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4691         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4692
4693         // Create some initial channels
4694         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4695
4696         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4697         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4698         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4699         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4700
4701         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4702
4703         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4704         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4705         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4706         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4707
4708         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4709         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4710         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4711         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4712
4713         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4714         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4715
4716         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4717         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4718         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4719 }
4720
4721 #[test]
4722 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4723         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4724         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4725         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4726         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4727         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4728
4729         // Create some initial channels
4730         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4731
4732         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4733         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4734         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4735         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4736
4737         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4738
4739         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4740         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4741         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4742         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4743         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4744         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4745
4746         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4747         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4748         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4749         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4750         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4751         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // HTLC-Timeout
4752
4753         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4754         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4755         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4756         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4757         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4758
4759         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4760         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4761         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4762         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4763         // transactions next...
4764         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4765         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4766
4767         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4768         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4769         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4770                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4771         } else {
4772                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4773                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4774         }
4775
4776         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4777         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4778
4779         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4780         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4781         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4782         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4783         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4784 }
4785
4786 #[test]
4787 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4788         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4789         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4790         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4791         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4792         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4793
4794         // Create some initial channels
4795         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4796
4797         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4798         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4799         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4800         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4801
4802         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4803         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4804
4805         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4806
4807         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4808         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4809         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4810         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4811         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4812         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4813
4814         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4815         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4816         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4817         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4818
4819         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4820         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4821         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4822
4823         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4824         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4825         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4826         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4827         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4828
4829         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4830         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4831
4832         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4833         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4834         // transactions next...
4835         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4836         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4837         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4838                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4839         } else {
4840                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4841                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4842         }
4843
4844         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4845         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4846
4847         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4848         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4849
4850         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4851         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4852
4853         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4854         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4855         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4856         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4857         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4858         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4859         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4860         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4861 }
4862
4863 #[test]
4864 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4865         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4866         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4867         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4868         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4869         // channel.
4870         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4871         // gets broadcast.
4872
4873         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4874         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4875         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4876         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4877
4878         // Create some initial channels
4879         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4880         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4881
4882         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4883         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4884         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4885         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4886         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4887
4888         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4889         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4890         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4891
4892         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4893         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4894         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4895         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4896         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4897         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4898         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4899         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4900         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4901         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4902         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4903
4904         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4905         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4907         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4908
4909         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4910         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4911         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4912         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4913         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4914         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Success tx
4915
4916         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4917         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4918         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4919         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4920         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4921         match events[0] {
4922                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4923                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4924         }
4925         match events[1] {
4926                 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
4927                         next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
4928                 } => {
4929                         assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4930                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4931                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4932                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4933                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4934                 },
4935                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4936         }
4937         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4938         let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4939         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4940         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4941         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4942
4943         match nodes_2_event {
4944                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4945                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4946         }
4947
4948         match nodes_0_event {
4949                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4950                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4951                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4952                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4953                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4954                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4955                 },
4956                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4957         };
4958
4959         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4960         match msg_events[0] {
4961                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4962                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4963         }
4964
4965         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4966         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4967         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4968         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4969         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4970         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4971         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4972         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4973         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4974         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4975         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
4976
4977         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4978         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4979 }
4980
4981 #[test]
4982 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4983         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4984         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4985         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4986         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4987         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4988         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4989         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4990         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4991         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4992         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4993         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4994                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4995         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4996
4997         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4998         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4999         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5000
5001         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5002         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5003         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5004         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5005         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5006
5007         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5008
5009         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
5010         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5011         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5012         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5013         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
5014                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
5015         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
5016         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5017
5018         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5019         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5020         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5021
5022         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5023         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5025         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5026         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5027
5028         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5029         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5030                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5031                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
5032                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5033
5034                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5035                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5036                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5037
5038                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5039                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5040                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5041                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5042                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5043
5044                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5045                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5046                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
5047                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5048                 } else {
5049                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5050                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5051                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5052                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5053                 }
5054
5055                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5056                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5057                 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
5058                 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
5059                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5060                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5061                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5062                 } else {
5063                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5064                 }
5065         }
5066
5067         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5068         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5069
5070         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5071         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5072         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5073         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5074         match events[0] {
5075                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5076                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5077         }
5078         match events[1] {
5079                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5080                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5081         }
5082         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5083         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5084         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5085         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5086         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5087         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5088         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5089         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5090         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5091         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5092
5093         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5094         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5095         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5096         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5097         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5098         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5099         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5100         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5101         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5102         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5103
5104         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5105         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5106         {
5107                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5108         }
5109         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5110
5111         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5112         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
5113         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
5114         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5115         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5116         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5117         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5118         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5119         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5120         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5121
5122         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5123         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5124         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true, true);
5125 }
5126
5127 #[test]
5128 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5129         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5130         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5131         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5132         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5133
5134         // Create some initial channels
5135         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5136
5137         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5138         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5139         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5140         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5141         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5142
5143         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5144         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5145         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5147
5148         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5150         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5151         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5152         match events[0] {
5153                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5154                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5155         }
5156         match events[1] {
5157                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5158                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5159         }
5160         let node_tx = {
5161                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5162                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5163                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5164                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5165                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5166                 node_txn[0].clone()
5167         };
5168
5169         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5170         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5171
5172         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5173         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5174         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5175         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5176         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5177         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5178 }
5179
5180 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5181         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5182         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5183         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5184         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5185         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5186         // use the same payment hashes.
5187         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5188         //
5189         // A \         / E
5190         //    - C - D -
5191         // B /         \ F
5192         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5193         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5194         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5195         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5196         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5197         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5198         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5199         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5200                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5201         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5202
5203         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5204         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5205         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5206         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5207         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5208
5209         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5210         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5211         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5212         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5213
5214         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
5215                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5216         // 0th HTLC:
5217         let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5218         // 1st HTLC:
5219         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5220         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5221         // 2nd HTLC:
5222         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5223         // 3rd HTLC:
5224         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5225         // 4th HTLC:
5226         let (_, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5227         // 5th HTLC:
5228         let (_, payment_hash_4, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5229         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5230         // 6th HTLC:
5231         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5232         // 7th HTLC:
5233         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5234
5235         // 8th HTLC:
5236         let (_, payment_hash_5, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5237         // 9th HTLC:
5238         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5239         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5240
5241         // 10th HTLC:
5242         let (_, payment_hash_6, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5243         // 11th HTLC:
5244         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5245         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5246
5247         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5248         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5249         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5250         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5251         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5252
5253         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5254         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5255         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5256         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5257         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5258         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5259         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5260
5261         let failed_destinations = vec![
5262                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5263                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5264                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5265                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5266         ];
5267         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5268         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5269
5270         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5271         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5272         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5273         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5274         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5275         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5276
5277         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5278         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5279         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5281
5282         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5283                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5284                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5285         ];
5286         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5287         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5288
5289         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5290         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5291         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5292         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5293
5294         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5295
5296         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5297         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5298                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5299                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5300                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5301                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5302                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5303                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5304         ];
5305         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5307         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5308         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5309         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5310         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5311         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5312         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5313         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5314         if deliver_last_raa {
5315                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5316         } else {
5317                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5318         }
5319
5320         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5321         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5322         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5323         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5324         //
5325         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5326         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5327         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5328         //
5329         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5330         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5331         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5332
5333         if announce_latest {
5334                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5335         } else {
5336                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5337         }
5338         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5339         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5340                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5341                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5342         } else {
5343                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5344                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5345         };
5346         match close_event {
5347                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5348                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5349         }
5350
5351         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5352         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5353         if deliver_last_raa {
5354                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5355
5356                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5357                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5358         } else {
5359                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5360                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5361                 } else {
5362                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5363                 };
5364
5365                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5366         }
5367         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5368
5369         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5370         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5371         let mut a_done = false;
5372         for msg in cs_msgs {
5373                 match msg {
5374                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5375                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5376                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5377                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5378                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5379                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5380                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5381                                         }
5382                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5383                                         assert!(!a_done);
5384                                         a_done = true;
5385                                         &nodes[0]
5386                                 } else {
5387                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5388                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5389                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5390                                         }
5391                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5392                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5393                                         &nodes[1]
5394                                 };
5395                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5396                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5397                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5398                                 if announce_latest {
5399                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5400                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5401                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5402                                         }
5403                                 }
5404                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5405                         },
5406                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5407                 }
5408         }
5409
5410         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5411         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5412         let mut as_faileds = new_hash_set();
5413         let mut as_updates = 0;
5414         for event in as_events.iter() {
5415                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5416                         assert!(as_faileds.insert(*payment_hash));
5417                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5418                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5419                         } else {
5420                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5421                         }
5422                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5423                                 as_updates += 1;
5424                         }
5425                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5426                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5427         }
5428         assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5429         assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5430         if announce_latest {
5431                 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5432                 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5433         }
5434         assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5435
5436         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5437         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5438         let mut bs_faileds = new_hash_set();
5439         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5440         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5441                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5442                         assert!(bs_faileds.insert(*payment_hash));
5443                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5444                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5445                         } else {
5446                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5447                         }
5448                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5449                                 bs_updates += 1;
5450                         }
5451                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5452                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5453         }
5454         assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5455         assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5456         if announce_latest {
5457                 assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5458         }
5459         assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5460
5461         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5462         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5463         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5464         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5465         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5466         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5467 }
5468
5469 #[test]
5470 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5471         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5472 }
5473
5474 #[test]
5475 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5476         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5477 }
5478
5479 #[test]
5480 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5481         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5482         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5483         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5484 }
5485
5486 #[test]
5487 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5488         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5489         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5490         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5491         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5492
5493         // Create some initial channels
5494         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5495
5496         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5497         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5498         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5499         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5500
5501         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5502         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5503         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5504         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5505         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5506         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5507
5508         let htlc_timeout = {
5509                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5510                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5511                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5512                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5513                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5514                 node_txn[0].clone()
5515         };
5516
5517         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5518         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5519         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5520
5521         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5522         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5523         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5524         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5525         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5526         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5527         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5528         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5529         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5530         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5531                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5532 }
5533
5534 #[test]
5535 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5536         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5537         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5538         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5539         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5540
5541         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5542
5543         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5544         let seed = [42; 32];
5545         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5546         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5547         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5548         let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5549         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &scorer);
5550         let message_router = test_utils::TestMessageRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &keys_manager);
5551         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, message_router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5552         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5553         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5554         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5555
5556         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5557         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5558
5559         // Create some initial channels
5560         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5561         // for node 0
5562         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5563         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5564         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5565
5566         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5567         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5568         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5569         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5570         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5571
5572         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5573         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5574         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5575         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5576         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5577
5578         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5579         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5580         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5581         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5582             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5583             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5584             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5585                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5586         }
5587
5588         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5589         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5590         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5591         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5592         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5593         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5594
5595         let htlc_timeout = {
5596                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5597                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5598                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5599                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5600                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5601                 node_txn[0].clone()
5602         };
5603
5604         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5605         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5606         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5607
5608         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5609         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5610         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5611         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5612         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5613         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5614         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5615         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5616         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5617         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5618         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5619                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5620 }
5621
5622 #[test]
5623 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5624         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5625         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5626         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5627         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5628
5629         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5630
5631         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5632         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5633
5634         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5635         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5636         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5637
5638         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5639         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5640         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5641
5642         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5643         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5644         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5645
5646         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5647         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5648         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5649 }
5650
5651 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5652         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5653         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5654         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5655         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5656         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5657
5658         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5659
5660         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5661         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5662         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5663         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5664         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5665
5666         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5667         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5668         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
5669
5670         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5671         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5672         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5673         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5674         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5675
5676         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5677         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5678         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5679                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5680                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5681         }
5682         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5683         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5684         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5685         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5686 }
5687
5688 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5689         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5690         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5691         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5692         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5693         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5694
5695         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5696         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5697                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5698         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5699
5700         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5701
5702         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5703         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5704         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5705
5706         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5707         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5708
5709         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5710                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5711                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5712         }
5713         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5714         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5715         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5716         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5717 }
5718
5719 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5720         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5721         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5722         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5723         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5724         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5725
5726         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5727         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5728         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5729         // actually revoked.
5730         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5731         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5732         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5733         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5734         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5735
5736         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5737         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5738         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5739         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5740         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5741         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5742         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5743         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5744         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5745         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5746
5747         if check_revoke_no_close {
5748                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5749                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5750         }
5751
5752         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5753         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5754         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5755                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5756                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5757         }
5758         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5759                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5760                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5761                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5762                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5763         } else {
5764                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5765         }
5766 }
5767
5768 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5769 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5770 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5771 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5772 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5773 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5774 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5775 // non-dust HTLCs.
5776 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5777 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5778 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5779 #[test]
5780 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5781         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5782         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5783
5784         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5785         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5786 }
5787
5788 #[test]
5789 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5790         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5791         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5792         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5793         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5794 }
5795
5796 #[test]
5797 #[should_panic]
5798 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5799         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5800         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5801         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5802         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5803         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5804         for node in nodes.iter() {
5805                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5806         }
5807
5808         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5809         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5810         let push_msat=10001;
5811         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5812         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5813         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5814         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5815
5816         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5817         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5818         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5819 }
5820
5821 #[test]
5822 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5823         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5824         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5825         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5826         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5827
5828         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5829         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5830         let push_msat=10001;
5831         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5832
5833         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5834         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5835         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5836         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5837         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5838
5839         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5840         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5841         let push_msat=10001;
5842         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5843         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5844         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
5845
5846         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5847         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5848         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.channel_flags<=1);
5849
5850         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5851         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5852         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5853
5854         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5855         let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
5856         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.chain_hash, chain_hash);
5857
5858         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5859         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5860         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5861         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5862         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5863         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5864 }
5865
5866 #[test]
5867 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5868         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5869         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5870         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5871         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5872
5873         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5874         let push_msat=10001;
5875         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5876         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5877         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5878         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5879
5880         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5881         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5882         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5883                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5884                         msg.clone()
5885                 },
5886                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5887         };
5888         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5889 }
5890
5891 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5892 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5893 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5894 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5895 #[test]
5896 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5897         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5898         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5899         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5900         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5901         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5902
5903         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5904         // pending_update_fee.
5905         {
5906                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5907                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5908         }
5909         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5911
5912         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5913         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5914         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5915                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5916                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5917                 },
5918                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5919         };
5920
5921         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5922
5923         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5924         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5925         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5926         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5927
5928         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5929         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
5930         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5931
5932         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5933         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5934                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5935         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5936         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5937
5938         // Flush the pending fee update.
5939         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5940         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5941         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5942         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5943         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5944
5945         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5946         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5947         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5948         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5949         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5950         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
5951
5952         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5953         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5954         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5955         match &events[0] {
5956                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5957                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5958                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5959                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5960                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5961                 },
5962                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5963         }
5964         match &events[1] {
5965                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5966                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5967                 },
5968                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5969         }
5970 }
5971
5972 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5973 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5974 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5975 #[test]
5976 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5977         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5978         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5979         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5980         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5981         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5982
5983         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5984         // pending_update_fee.
5985         {
5986                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5987                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5988         }
5989         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5990         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5991
5992         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5993         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5994         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5995                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5996                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5997                 },
5998                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5999         };
6000
6001         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6002
6003         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6004         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6005         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6006         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6007
6008         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6009         let amt_1 = 20000;
6010         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
6011         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6012         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6013
6014         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6015         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
6016                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
6017         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6018         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6019         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6020         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
6021                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
6022         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6023         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6024
6025         // Flush the pending fee update.
6026         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6027         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6029         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6030         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6031         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6032
6033         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6034         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6035         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6036         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6037         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6038         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
6039
6040         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6041         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6042         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6043         match &events[0] {
6044                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6045                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6046                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6047                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6048                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
6049                 },
6050                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6051         }
6052         match &events[1] {
6053                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6054                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6055                 },
6056                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6057         }
6058
6059         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6060         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6061                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6062                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6063                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6064         };
6065         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6066                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6067                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6068         };
6069         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6070         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6071         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6072         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6073         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6074         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6075         match events[0] {
6076                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6077                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6078         }
6079         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6080         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6081         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6082         match events[0] {
6083                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
6084                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6085         }
6086         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6087         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6088         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6089
6090         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6091         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6092         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6093         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6094 }
6095
6096 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6097 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6098 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6099 // once it's freed.
6100 #[test]
6101 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6102         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6103         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6104         // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
6105         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6106         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
6107         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
6108         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6109         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6110         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6111         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
6112
6113         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6114         // pending_update_fee.
6115         {
6116                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6117                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6118         }
6119         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6120         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6121
6122         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6123         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6124         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6125                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6126                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6127                 },
6128                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6129         };
6130
6131         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6132
6133         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6134         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6135         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6136         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6137
6138         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6139         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6140         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6141         let payment_event = {
6142                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6143                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6144                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6145
6146                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6147                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6148
6149                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6150         };
6151         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6153         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6154         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6155
6156         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
6157         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6158
6159         // Flush the pending fee update.
6160         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6161         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6163         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6164         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6165         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6166
6167         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6168         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6169         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6170
6171         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6172                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6173                         msg.clone()
6174                 },
6175                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6176         };
6177
6178         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6180         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6181
6182         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6183         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6184         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6185         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6186                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6187                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6188         }
6189
6190         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6191         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6193
6194         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6195         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6196         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6197         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6198                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6199                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6200                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6201                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6202                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6203                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6204                 },
6205                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6206         };
6207
6208         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6209         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6210         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6211
6212         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6213         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6214         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6215         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6216         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6217         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6218         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6219         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6220         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6221                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6222                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6223         };
6224         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6225         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6226         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6227 }
6228
6229 #[test]
6230 fn test_payment_route_reaching_same_channel_twice() {
6231         //A route should not go through the same channel twice
6232         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6233         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6234         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6235         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6236         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6237         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6238
6239         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6240                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6241         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6242
6243         // Extend the path by itself, essentially simulating route going through same channel twice
6244         let cloned_hops = route.paths[0].hops.clone();
6245         route.paths[0].hops.extend_from_slice(&cloned_hops);
6246
6247         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6248                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6249         ), false, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6250         assert_eq!(err, &"Path went through the same channel twice"));
6251 }
6252
6253 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6254 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6255 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6256
6257 #[test]
6258 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6259         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6260         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6261         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6262         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6263         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6264         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6265
6266         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6267         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6268
6269         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6270                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6271                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6272         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6273 }
6274
6275 #[test]
6276 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6277         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6278         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6279         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6280         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6281         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6282         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6283
6284         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6285         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6286         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6287                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6288                 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6289                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6290
6291         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6292         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6293 }
6294
6295 #[test]
6296 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6297         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6298         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6299         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6300         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6301         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6302         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6303
6304         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6305         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6306                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6307         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6308         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6309         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6310
6311         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6312         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC", 3);
6313         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6314         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6315         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() },
6316                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6317 }
6318
6319 #[test]
6320 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6321         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6322         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6323         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6324         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6325         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6326         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6327         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6328
6329         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6330                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6331         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6332         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6333         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6334                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6335                 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6336                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6337 }
6338
6339 #[test]
6340 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6341         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6342         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6343         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6344         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6345         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6346         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6347         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6348         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6349         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6350                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6351
6352         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6353         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6354         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6355                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6356                 let payment_event = {
6357                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6358                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6359                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6360
6361                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6362                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6363                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6364                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6365                         } else {
6366                                 assert!(false);
6367                         }
6368                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6369                 };
6370                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6371                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6372                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6373
6374                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6375                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6376         }
6377         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6378                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6379                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6380
6381         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6382 }
6383
6384 #[test]
6385 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6386         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6387         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6388         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6389         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6390         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6391         let channel_value = 100000;
6392         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6393         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6394
6395         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6396
6397         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6398         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6399         // limits us to.
6400         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6401         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6402                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6403                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6404         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6405
6406         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6407 }
6408
6409 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6410 #[test]
6411 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6412         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6413         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6414         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6415         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6416         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6417         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6418         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6419         {
6420                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6421                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6422                 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6423                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context().get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6424         }
6425
6426         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6427         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6428                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6430         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6431         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6432         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6433         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6434         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6435         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6436         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6437         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6438 }
6439
6440 #[test]
6441 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6442         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6443         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6444         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6445         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6446         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6447         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6448
6449         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6450         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6451         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6452         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6453         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6454         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6455
6456         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6457         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6458         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6459                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6460         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6461         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6462
6463         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6464         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6465         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6466         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6467         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6468
6469         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6470         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6471         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6472         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6473         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6474 }
6475
6476 #[test]
6477 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6478         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6479         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6480         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6481         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6482         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6483         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6484         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6485
6486         let send_amt = 3999999;
6487         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6488                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6489         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6490         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6491         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
6492         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6493         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6494                 &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6495         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6496
6497         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6498                 channel_id: chan.2,
6499                 htlc_id: 0,
6500                 amount_msat: 1000,
6501                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6502                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6503                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6504                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6505                 blinding_point: None,
6506         };
6507
6508         for i in 0..50 {
6509                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6510                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6511         }
6512         msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6513         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6514
6515         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6516         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6517         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6518         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6519         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6520 }
6521
6522 #[test]
6523 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6524         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6525         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6526         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6527         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6528         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6529         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6530
6531         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6532         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6533                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6534         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6535         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6536         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6537         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6538
6539         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6540         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6541         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6542         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6543         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6544 }
6545
6546 #[test]
6547 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6548         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6549         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6550         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6551         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6552         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6553
6554         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6555         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6556         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6557                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6558         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6559         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6560         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6561         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6562
6563         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6564         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6565         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6566         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6567         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6568 }
6569
6570 #[test]
6571 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6572         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6573         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6574         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6575         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6576         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6577         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6578         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6579
6580         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6581         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6582         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6583                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6584         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6585         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6586         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6587
6588         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6589         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6590         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6591         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6592                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6593         }, true).unwrap();
6594         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6595         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6596         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6597                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6598         }, false).unwrap();
6599         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6600         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6601         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6602         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6603         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6604         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6605
6606         //Resend HTLC
6607         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6608         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6609         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6610         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6611         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6612
6613         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6614
6615         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6616         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6617         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6618         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6619         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6620 }
6621
6622 #[test]
6623 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6624         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6625
6626         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6627         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6628         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6629         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6630         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6631         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6632         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6633                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6634
6635         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6636         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6637         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6638
6639         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6640                 channel_id: chan.2,
6641                 htlc_id: 0,
6642                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6643         };
6644
6645         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6646
6647         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6648         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6649         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6650         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6651         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6652 }
6653
6654 #[test]
6655 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6656         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6657
6658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6661         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6662         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6663
6664         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6665         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6666                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6667         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6668         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6669         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6670
6671         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6672                 channel_id: chan.2,
6673                 htlc_id: 0,
6674                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6675         };
6676
6677         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6678
6679         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6680         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6681         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6682         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6683         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6684 }
6685
6686 #[test]
6687 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6688         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6689
6690         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6691         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6692         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6693         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6694         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6695
6696         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6697         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6698                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6699         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6700         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6701         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6702         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6703                 channel_id: chan.2,
6704                 htlc_id: 0,
6705                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6706                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6707         };
6708
6709         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6710
6711         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6712         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6713         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6714         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6715         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6716 }
6717
6718 #[test]
6719 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6720         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6721
6722         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6723         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6724         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6725         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6726         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6727
6728         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6729
6730         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6731         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6732         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6733
6734         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6735         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6736         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6737                 match events[0] {
6738                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6739                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6740                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6741                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6742                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6743                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6744                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6745                         },
6746                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6747                 }
6748         };
6749
6750         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6751
6752         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6753
6754         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6755         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6756         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6757         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6758         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6759 }
6760
6761 #[test]
6762 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6763         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6764
6765         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6766         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6767         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6768         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6769         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6770
6771         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6772
6773         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6774         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6775         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6776
6777         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6778         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6779         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6780                 match events[0] {
6781                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6782                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6783                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6784                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6785                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6786                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6787                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6788                         },
6789                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6790                 }
6791         };
6792
6793         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6794
6795         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6796
6797         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6798         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6799         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6800         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6801         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6802 }
6803
6804 #[test]
6805 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6806         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6807
6808         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6809         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6810         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6811         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6812         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6813
6814         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6815         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6816                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6818
6819         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6820         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6821
6822         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6823         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6824         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6825
6826         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6827
6828         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6829                 match events[0] {
6830                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6831                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6832                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6833                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6834                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6835                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6836                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6837                         },
6838                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6839                 }
6840         };
6841         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6842         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6843
6844         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6845         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6846         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6847         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6848         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6849 }
6850
6851 #[test]
6852 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6853         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6854         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6855
6856         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6857         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6858         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6859         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6860         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6861         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6862
6863         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6864
6865         //First hop
6866         let mut payment_event = {
6867                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6868                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6869                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6870                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6871                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6872                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6873         };
6874         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6875         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6876         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6877         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6878         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6879         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6880         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6881         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6882         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6883
6884         //Second Hop
6885         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6886         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6887         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6888         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6889
6890         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6891         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6892         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6893                 match events_3[0] {
6894                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6895                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6896                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6897                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6898                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6899                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6900                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6901                         },
6902                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6903                 }
6904         };
6905
6906         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6907
6908         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6909         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6910         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6911         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6912         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6913
6914         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6915         match events_4[0] {
6916                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6917                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6918                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6919                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6920                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6921                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6922                 },
6923                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6924         };
6925
6926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6927 }
6928
6929 #[test]
6930 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6931         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6932         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6933         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6934         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6935         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6936         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6937
6938         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6939
6940         // First hop
6941         let mut payment_event = {
6942                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6943                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6944                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6945                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6946         };
6947
6948         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6949         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6950         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6951         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6952         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6953         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6954
6955         // Second Hop
6956         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6957         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6959         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6960
6961         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6962         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6963         match events_3[0] {
6964                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6965                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6966                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6967                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6968
6969                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6970                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6971                 },
6972                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6973         }
6974
6975         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6976                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6977                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6978         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6979         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6980         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6981
6982         match events_4[0] {
6983                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6984                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6985                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6986                 },
6987                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6988         }
6989
6990         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6991         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6992
6993         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6994         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6995         match events_5[0] {
6996                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6997                 } => {
6998                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6999                         assert!(is_permanent);
7000                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
7001                 },
7002                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7003         }
7004         match events_5[1] {
7005                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7006                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
7007                 },
7008                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7009         }
7010
7011         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
7012 }
7013
7014 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7015         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7016         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7017         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7018
7019         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7020         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7021         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7022         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7023         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7024         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7025
7026         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7027                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7028
7029         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7030         let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7031         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7032         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7033
7034         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7035         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7036
7037         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7038         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7040         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7042
7043         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7044         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7045         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7046         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7047
7048         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7049         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7050
7051         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7052         match events[0] {
7053                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7054                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7055                 },
7056                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7057         }
7058         match events[1] {
7059                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7060                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7061                 },
7062                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7063         }
7064
7065         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7066         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7067         if announce_latest {
7068                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7069         } else {
7070                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7071         }
7072
7073         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7074         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7075         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7076
7077         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7078         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7079         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7080         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7081         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
7082         let mut first_failed = false;
7083         for event in events {
7084                 match event {
7085                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7086                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7087                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7088                                         first_failed = true;
7089                                 } else {
7090                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7091                                 }
7092                         },
7093                         Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
7094                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7095                 }
7096         }
7097 }
7098
7099 #[test]
7100 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7101         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7102         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7103 }
7104
7105 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7106         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7107         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7108         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7109         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7110         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7111         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7112
7113         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7114         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7115         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7116         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7117         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7118
7119         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7120                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7121
7122         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7123         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7124
7125         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7126         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7127
7128         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7129         if revoked {
7130                 let (payment_preimage_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7131                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7132         }
7133
7134         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7135         if local {
7136                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7137                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7138                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7139                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7140                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7141
7142                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7143                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7144                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7145                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7146                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
7147                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7148                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7149                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7150                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7151                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7152                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7153         } else {
7154                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7155                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7156                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7157                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7158                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7159                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7160
7161                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7162                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7163                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7164                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7165                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7166                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7167                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7168
7169                 if !revoked {
7170                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7171                 } else {
7172                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), 11);
7173                 }
7174                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7175                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7176                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7177                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7178                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7179         }
7180 }
7181
7182 #[test]
7183 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7184         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7185         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7186         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7187 }
7188
7189 #[test]
7190 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7191         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7192
7193         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7194         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7195         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7196         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7197         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7198         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7199         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7200         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7201         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7202
7203         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
7204         if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7205                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7206                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42, None)
7207         {
7208                 match error {
7209                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7210                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7211                 }
7212         } else { assert!(false) }
7213
7214         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7215         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7216         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7217         open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7218         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7219                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7220                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7221         {
7222                 match error {
7223                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7224                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7225                 }
7226         } else { assert!(false); }
7227
7228         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7229         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7230         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7231         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7232         accept_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7233         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
7234         let reason_msg;
7235         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7236                 match action {
7237                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7238                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7239                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7240                         },
7241                         _ => { panic!(); }
7242                 }
7243         } else { panic!(); }
7244         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7245
7246         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7247         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7248         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7249         open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7250         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7251                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7252                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7253         {
7254                 match error {
7255                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7256                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7257                 }
7258         } else { assert!(false); }
7259 }
7260
7261 #[test]
7262 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7263         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7264         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7265         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7266
7267         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7268         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7269         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7270         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7271
7272         // Create some initial channels
7273         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7274
7275         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7276         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7277         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
7278                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7279         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000);
7280         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7281                 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7282         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7283         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7284         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7285                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7287
7288         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7289         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7290         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7291         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7292         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7293
7294         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7295         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7296         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7297         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7298
7299         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7300         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7301         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7302
7303         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7304         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7305         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7306                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7307                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7308                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7309                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7310                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7311                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7312                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7313                 },
7314                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7315         };
7316         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7317
7318         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7319         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7320
7321         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7322         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7323         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7324         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7325 }
7326
7327 #[test]
7328 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7329         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7330         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7331
7332         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7333         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7334         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7335         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7336
7337         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7338         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7339         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7340
7341         // Disconnect peers
7342         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7343         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7344
7345         for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7346                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7347         }
7348         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7349         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7350         let mut chans_disabled = new_hash_map();
7351         for e in msg_events {
7352                 match e {
7353                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7354                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7355                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7356                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7357                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7358                                 }
7359                         },
7360                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7361                 }
7362         }
7363         // Reconnect peers
7364         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7365                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7366         }, true).unwrap();
7367         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7368         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7369         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7370                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7371         }, false).unwrap();
7372         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7373         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7374
7375         // Reestablish chan_1
7376         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7377         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7378         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7379         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7380         // Reestablish chan_2
7381         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7382         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7383         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7384         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7385         // Reestablish chan_3
7386         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7387         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7388         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7389         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7390
7391         for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7392                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7393         }
7394         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7395         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7396         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7397         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7398         for e in msg_events {
7399                 match e {
7400                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7401                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7402                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7403                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7404                                         // the old one.
7405                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7406                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7407                                 }
7408                         },
7409                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7410                 }
7411         }
7412         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7413         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7414 }
7415
7416 #[test]
7417 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7418         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7419         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7420
7421         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7422         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7423         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7424         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7425
7426         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7427
7428         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7429         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7430                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7431         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7432         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7433
7434         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7435         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7436         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7437         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7438         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7439         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7440
7441         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7442         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7443                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7444                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7445                 }
7446         }
7447
7448         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7449         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7450
7451         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7452         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7453         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7454         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7455
7456         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7457         let penalty_1;
7458         let feerate_1;
7459         {
7460                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7461                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7462                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7463                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7464                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7465                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7466                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7467                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7468                 node_txn.clear();
7469         };
7470
7471         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7472         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7473         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7474         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7475         {
7476                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7477                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7478                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7479                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7480                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7481                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7482                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7483                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7484                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7485                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7486                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7487                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7488                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7489                         node_txn.clear();
7490                 }
7491         }
7492         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7493
7494         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7495         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7496         let penalty_3;
7497         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7498         {
7499                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7500                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7501                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7502                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7503                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7504                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7505                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7506                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7507                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7508                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7509                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7510                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7511                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7512                         node_txn.clear();
7513                 }
7514         }
7515         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7516
7517         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7518         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7519 }
7520
7521 #[test]
7522 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7523         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7524         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7525
7526         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7527         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7528         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7529         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7530         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7531
7532         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7533         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7534         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7535         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7536         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7537         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7538         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7539                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7540         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7541         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50)
7542                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7543         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7544         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7545                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7546         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7547
7548         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7549         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7550         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7551
7552         // Revoke local commitment tx
7553         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7554
7555         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7556         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7557         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7558         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7559         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7560         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7561
7562         let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7563                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7564                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7565
7566                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7567                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7568                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7569
7570                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7571                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7572                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7573                 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7574
7575                 txn
7576         };
7577
7578         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7579         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7580         let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7581         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7582         let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7583         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7584         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7585         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7586         match events.last().unwrap() {
7587                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7588                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7589         }
7590         let first;
7591         let feerate_1;
7592         let penalty_txn;
7593         {
7594                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7595                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7596                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7597
7598                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7599                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7600                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7601                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7602                 // future).
7603                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7604                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7605                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7606                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7607                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7608                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7609
7610                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7611                 // available, which we check here:
7612                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7613                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7614                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7615
7616                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7617                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7618
7619                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7620                 // output, checked above).
7621                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7622                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7623                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7624
7625                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7626                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7627                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7628                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight().to_wu();
7629                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7630                 node_txn.clear();
7631         }
7632
7633         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7634         let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7635         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7636         let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7637         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7638
7639         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7640         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7641         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7642         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7643         let node_txn = {
7644                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7645                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7646
7647                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7648                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7649                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7650                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7651                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7652                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7653                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7654                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7655                 node_txn.clear();
7656                 txn
7657         };
7658         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7659         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7660         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7661         {
7662                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7663                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7664                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7665                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7666                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7667                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7668                 // up bumped justice generation.
7669                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7670                 node_txn.clear();
7671         }
7672         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7673         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7674 }
7675
7676 #[test]
7677 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7678         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7679         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7680
7681         // Create 2 HTLCs
7682         // Provide preimage for one
7683         // Check aggregation
7684
7685         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7686         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7687         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7688         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7689
7690         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7691         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7692         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7693
7694         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7695         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7696         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7697         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7698         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7699
7700         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7701         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7702         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7703         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7704         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7705         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7706
7707         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7708         let timeout;
7709         let preimage;
7710         let preimage_bump;
7711         let feerate_timeout;
7712         let feerate_preimage;
7713         {
7714                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7715                 // 3 transactions including:
7716                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7717                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7718                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7719                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7720                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7721                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7722                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7723                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7724
7725                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7726                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7727                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7728                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7729
7730                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7731                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7732                 } else {
7733                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7734                 };
7735
7736                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7737                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7738                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7739
7740                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7741                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7742                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7743                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight().to_wu();
7744
7745                 node_txn.clear();
7746         };
7747         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7748         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7749
7750         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7751         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7752         {
7753                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7754                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7755                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7756                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7757                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7758                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7759
7760                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7761                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7762                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight().to_wu();
7763                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7764                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7765
7766                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7767                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7768                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7769                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7770                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7771
7772                 node_txn.clear();
7773         }
7774
7775         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7776         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7777 }
7778
7779 #[test]
7780 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7781         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7782         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7783         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7784         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7785         // TestChannelSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7786         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7787         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7788         // implement that).
7789         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7790         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7791         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7792         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7793         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7794
7795         let per_commitment_secret;
7796         let next_per_commitment_point;
7797         {
7798                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7799                 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7800                 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).map(
7801                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7802                 ).flatten().unwrap().get_signer();
7803
7804                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7805
7806                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7807                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7808                 per_commitment_secret = keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7809
7810                 // Must revoke without gaps
7811                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7812                 keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7813
7814                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7815                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7816                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7817         }
7818
7819         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7820                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7821                         channel_id,
7822                         per_commitment_secret,
7823                         next_per_commitment_point,
7824                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7825                         next_local_nonce: None,
7826                 });
7827         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7828         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7829         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() }
7830                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7831 }
7832
7833 #[test]
7834 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7835         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7836         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7837
7838         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7839         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7840         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7841         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7842
7843         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7844         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7845         let (payment_preimage_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7846         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7847
7848         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7849         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7850         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7851
7852         // Revoke local commitment tx
7853         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7854
7855         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7856         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7857         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7858         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7859
7860         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7861         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7863         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7864         let penalty_txn = {
7865                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7866                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7867                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7868                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7869                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7870                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7871                 node_txn.clear();
7872                 penalty_txn
7873         };
7874         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7875         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7876         {
7877                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7878                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7879                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7880         }
7881 }
7882
7883 #[test]
7884 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7885         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7886         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7887         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7888         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7889         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7890         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7891
7892         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7893
7894         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7895         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7896         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7897         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7898         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7899
7900         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7901         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7902         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7903         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7904
7905         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7907         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7908         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7909         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7910         match close_ev[0] {
7911                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7912                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7913                         assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7914                 },
7915                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7916         }
7917 }
7918
7919 #[test]
7920 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7921         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7922         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7923         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7924         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7925
7926         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7927         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7928         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7929
7930         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7931
7932         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7933         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7934         assert_eq!(res.common_fields.channel_flags, 0);
7935         assert_eq!(res.common_fields.to_self_delay, 200);
7936 }
7937
7938 #[test]
7939 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7940         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7941         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7942         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7943         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7944         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7945         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7946
7947         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7948         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7949         assert_eq!(res.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7950
7951         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7952         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7953         assert_eq!(res.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7954 }
7955
7956 #[test]
7957 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7958         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7959         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7960         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7961         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7962         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7963
7964         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7965         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7966         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7967         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7968         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7969         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7970         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7971         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7972         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7973         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7974         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7975         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7976
7977         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7978         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7979         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7980         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7981
7982         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7983         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7984         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7985         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7986         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7987
7988         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7989         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7990
7991         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7992         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7993         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7994         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7995         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7996         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7997
7998         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7999         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8000         // `channel_value`.
8001         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8002         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8003         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8004         // `channel_value`.
8005         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8006 }
8007
8008 #[test]
8009 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8010         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8011         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8012         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8013         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8014         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8015         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8016
8017         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8018         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8019
8020         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8021
8022         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8023         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8024         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8025
8026         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8027         match events[0] {
8028                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8029                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8030                 }
8031                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8032         }
8033
8034         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8035         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8036
8037         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8038                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8039                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8040                 }
8041                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8042         }
8043
8044         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8045
8046         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8047         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8048
8049         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8050         match events[0] {
8051                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8052                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8053                 }
8054                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8055         }
8056 }
8057
8058 #[test]
8059 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8060         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8061         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8062         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8063         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8064         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8065         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8066
8067         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8068         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8069
8070         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8071
8072         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8073         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8074         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8075
8076         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8077         match events[0] {
8078                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8079                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8080                 }
8081                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8082         }
8083
8084         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8085         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8086
8087         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8088                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8089                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8090                 }
8091                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8092         }
8093
8094         // There should be no more events to process, as the channel was never opened.
8095         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8096 }
8097
8098 #[test]
8099 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8100         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8101         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8102         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8103         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8104         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8105         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8106
8107         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8108         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8109
8110         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8111
8112         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8113         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8114         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8115
8116         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8117         match events[0] {
8118                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8119                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8120                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8121                         match api_res {
8122                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8123                                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8124                                 },
8125                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8126                                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error {:?}", e),
8127                         }
8128                 }
8129                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8130         }
8131
8132         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8133         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8134         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8135
8136         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8137                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8138                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8139                 }
8140                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8141         }
8142 }
8143
8144 #[test]
8145 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8146         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8147         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8148         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8149         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8150
8151         let unknown_channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
8152         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8153         match api_res {
8154                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8155                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8156                 },
8157                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8158                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error: {:?}", e),
8159         }
8160 }
8161
8162 #[test]
8163 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
8164         // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
8165         // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
8166         // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
8167         // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
8168         // a PaymentClaimable event too early
8169         let node_count = 4;
8170         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8171         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8172         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8173         let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8174
8175         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8176         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8177         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8178         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8179
8180         let total_msat = 100_000;
8181         let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
8182         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
8183         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8184
8185         let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8186         path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8187         path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8188         path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8189         path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8190         path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8191         route.paths.push(path_1);
8192
8193         let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8194         path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8195         path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8196         path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8197         path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8198         path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8199         route.paths.push(path_2);
8200
8201         // Send payment
8202         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8203         let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8204                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8205         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8206                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8207         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8208
8209         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8210         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8211
8212         // First path
8213         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8214         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8215         let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8216
8217         for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8218                 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8219
8220                 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8221                         let session_priv = [3; 32];
8222                         let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8223                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8224                         let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8225                         let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8226                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8227                         // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8228                         // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8229                         if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
8230                                 ref mut sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, ..
8231                         } = onion_payloads[1] {
8232                                 *sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat = 99_000;
8233                         } else { panic!() }
8234                         let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8235                         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8236                 }
8237
8238                 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8239                 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8240                 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8241                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8242
8243                 if idx == 0 {
8244                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8245                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8246                         check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8247                         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8248                         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8249                 } else {
8250                         let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8251                         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8252                 }
8253
8254                 prev_node = node;
8255         }
8256
8257         // Second path
8258         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8259         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8260
8261         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8262 }
8263
8264 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8265
8266         let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8267         let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8268
8269         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8270         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8271         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8272         let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8273
8274         let src_idx = 0;
8275         let dst_idx = 1;
8276
8277         // Create channels for each amount
8278         let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8279         let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8280         let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8281         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8282                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8283                 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8284                 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8285                 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8286                 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8287                 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8288                 expected_paths.push(path);
8289         }
8290         let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8291
8292         // Create a route for each amount
8293         let example_amount = 100000;
8294         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8295         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8296         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8297                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8298                 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8299                 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8300                 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8301                 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8302                 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8303                 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8304                 route.paths.push(path);
8305         }
8306
8307         // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8308         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8309         let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8310                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8311         nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8312                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8313         check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8314
8315         let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8316         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8317         let mut amount_received = 0;
8318         for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8319                 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8320
8321                 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8322                 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8323                 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8324                 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8325         }
8326
8327         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8328 }
8329
8330 #[test]
8331 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8332         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8333         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8334 }
8335
8336 #[test]
8337 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8338         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8339         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8340         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8341         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8342         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8343
8344         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8345         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8346         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8347         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8348
8349         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8350         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8351         route.paths.push(path);
8352         route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8353         route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8354         route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8355         route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8356         route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8357         route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8358         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8359         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8360 }
8361
8362 #[test]
8363 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8364         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8365         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8366         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8367         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8368         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8369
8370         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8371
8372         {
8373                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8374                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8375                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8376                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8377                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8378                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8379                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8380                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8381                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8382         }
8383         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8384         // values from previous calls.
8385         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8386         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8387         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8388         match events[0] {
8389                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8390                         match &purpose {
8391                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8392                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8393                                 },
8394                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8395                         }
8396                 },
8397                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8398         }
8399 }
8400
8401 #[test]
8402 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8403         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8404         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8405         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8406         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8407         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8408
8409         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8410
8411         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8412         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8413         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8414         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8415
8416         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8417         // resulting events.
8418         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8419                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8420                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8421                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8422                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8423                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8424                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8425
8426                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8427                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8428                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8429                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8430                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8431
8432                         // We should fail the payment back
8433                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8434                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8435                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8436                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8437                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8438                                 },
8439                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8440                         }
8441                 }
8442         }
8443
8444         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8445         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8446         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8447
8448         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8449         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8450                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8451         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8452         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8453
8454         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8455         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8456                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8457         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8458         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8459
8460         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8461         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8462                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8463         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8464         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8465 }
8466
8467 #[test]
8468 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8469         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8470         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8471         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8472         // error.
8473         //
8474         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8475         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8476         // commitment at same time.
8477
8478         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8479         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8480         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8481         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8482
8483         // Create some initial channel
8484         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8485         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8486
8487         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8488         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8489
8490         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8491         let (preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8492
8493         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8494         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8495         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8496         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8497         let watchtower = {
8498                 let new_monitor = {
8499                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8500                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8501                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8502                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8503                         new_monitor
8504                 };
8505                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8506                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8507                 watchtower
8508         };
8509         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8510         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8511         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8512         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8513         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8514
8515         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8516         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8517         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8518         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8519
8520         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8521         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8522         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8523         {
8524                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8525                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8526                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8527                         if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8528                                 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8529                                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8530                         } else { assert!(false); }
8531                 } else {
8532                         assert!(false);
8533                 }
8534         }
8535         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8536         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8537         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8538         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8539 }
8540
8541 #[test]
8542 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8543         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8544         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8545         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8546         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8547
8548         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8549         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8550         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8551         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8552
8553         // Create some initial channel
8554         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8555         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8556
8557         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8558         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8559
8560         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8561         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8562
8563         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8564         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8565         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8566         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8567         let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8568                 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8569         );
8570         let watchtower_alice = {
8571                 let new_monitor = {
8572                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8573                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8574                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8575                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8576                         new_monitor
8577                 };
8578                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8579                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8580                 watchtower
8581         };
8582         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8583         // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8584         // requirements here.
8585         const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8586         alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8587         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8588
8589         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8590         {
8591                 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8592                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8593                 check_spends!(txn[0], chan_1.3);
8594                 check_spends!(txn[1], txn[0]);
8595         };
8596
8597         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8598         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8599         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8600         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8601         let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8602         let watchtower_bob = {
8603                 let new_monitor = {
8604                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8605                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8606                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8607                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8608                         new_monitor
8609                 };
8610                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8611                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8612                 watchtower
8613         };
8614         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8615
8616         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8617         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8618         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8619                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8620         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8621
8622         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8623         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8624         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8625         {
8626                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8627                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8628                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8629                         if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8630                                 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8631                                 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8632                                 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8633                                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8634                         } else { assert!(false); }
8635                 } else {
8636                         assert!(false);
8637                 }
8638         }
8639         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8640         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8641
8642         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8643         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8644
8645         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8646         let bob_state_y;
8647         {
8648                 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8649                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8650                 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8651         };
8652
8653         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8654         let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8655         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8656         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8657         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
8658                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8659         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8660         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8661         {
8662                 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8663                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8664                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8665         }
8666 }
8667
8668 #[test]
8669 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8670         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8671         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8672         // message).
8673         //
8674         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8675         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8676         //
8677         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8678         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8679         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8680         // before receiving funding_signed.
8681         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8682         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8683         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8684         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8685
8686         // Create an initial channel
8687         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8688         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8689         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8690         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8691         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8692
8693         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8694         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8695
8696         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8698
8699         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8700         let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index });
8701         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8702         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8703         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true,
8704                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8705 }
8706
8707 #[test]
8708 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8709         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8710         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8711         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8712         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8713         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8714         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8715
8716         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8717         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8718         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8719         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8720
8721         // Create some initial channels
8722         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8723
8724         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8725         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8726         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8727         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8728         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8729         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8730
8731         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8732         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8733         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8734         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8735         // this test before #653 fix.
8736         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8737         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8738         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8739         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8740         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8741
8742         let htlc_timeout = {
8743                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8744                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8745                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8746                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8747                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8748                 node_txn[0].clone()
8749         };
8750
8751         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8752         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8753         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8754 }
8755
8756 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8757         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8758         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8759         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8760         //
8761         // Steps of the test:
8762         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8763         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8764         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8765         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8766         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8767         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8768         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8769         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8770         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8771         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8772         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8773         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8774
8775         // Create some initial channels
8776         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8777         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8778
8779         // Steps (1) and (2):
8780         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8781         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8782
8783         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8784         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8785         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8786         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8787         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8788         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8789         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8790
8791         // Steps (3) and (4):
8792         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8793         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8794         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8795         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8796
8797         // Bob force-closes
8798         if !broadcast_alice {
8799                 force_closing_node = 1;
8800                 counterparty_node = 0;
8801         }
8802         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8803         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8805         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8806         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8807                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8808                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8809                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8810                 };
8811                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8812                 if broadcast_alice {
8813                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8814                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8815                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8816                 }
8817         }
8818
8819         // Step (5):
8820         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8821         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8822         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8823         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8824         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8825
8826         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8827         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8828         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8829         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8830         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8831         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8832
8833         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8834         let went_onchain = go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1;
8835         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if went_onchain { None } else { Some(1000) }, went_onchain, false);
8836         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8837         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8838                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8839                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8840                 match events[0] {
8841                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8842                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8843                         },
8844                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8845                 };
8846         }
8847         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8848         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8849         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8850         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8851
8852         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8853         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8854         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8855                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8856                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8857                         (*msg).clone()
8858                 },
8859                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8860         };
8861         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8862                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8863                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8864                         (*updates).clone()
8865                 },
8866                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8867         };
8868
8869         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8870         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8871         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8873
8874         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8875         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8876         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8877                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8878                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8879                         (*msg).clone()
8880                 },
8881                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8882         };
8883         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8884         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8885
8886         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8887         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8888         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8889         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8890         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8891                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8892                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8893                 if broadcast_alice {
8894                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8895                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8896                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8897                 }
8898                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8899                 if broadcast_alice {
8900                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8901                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8902                 } else {
8903                         if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
8904                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8905                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].txid(), bob_txn[1].txid());
8906                         } else {
8907                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8908                         }
8909                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8910                 }
8911         }
8912
8913         // Step (6):
8914         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8915         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8916         {
8917                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8918                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8919                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8920                 };
8921                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8922                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8923                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8924                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8925                 if broadcast_alice {
8926                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8927                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8928                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8929                 } else {
8930                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
8931                         let htlc_tx = bob_txn.pop().unwrap();
8932                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8933                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8934                 }
8935         }
8936 }
8937
8938 #[test]
8939 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8940         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8941         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8942         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8943         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8944 }
8945
8946 #[test]
8947 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8948         // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8949         // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8950         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8951         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8952         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8953         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8954
8955         // Create an first channel channel
8956         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8957         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8958
8959         // Create an second channel
8960         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None, None).unwrap();
8961         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8962
8963         // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8964         // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8965         open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
8966
8967         // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8968         // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8969         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8970         {
8971                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8972                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8973                 match &events[0] {
8974                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8975                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8976                                 assert_eq!(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
8977                         },
8978                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8979                 }
8980         }
8981
8982         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8983         {
8984                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8985                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8986                 match &events[0] {
8987                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8988                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8989                                 assert_eq!(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
8990                         },
8991                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8992                 }
8993         }
8994 }
8995
8996 #[test]
8997 fn test_peer_funding_sidechannel() {
8998         // Test that if a peer somehow learns which txid we'll use for our channel funding before we
8999         // receive `funding_transaction_generated` the peer cannot cause us to crash. We'd previously
9000         // assumed that LDK would receive `funding_transaction_generated` prior to our peer learning
9001         // the txid and panicked if the peer tried to open a redundant channel to us with the same
9002         // funding outpoint.
9003         //
9004         // While this assumption is generally safe, some users may have out-of-band protocols where
9005         // they notify their LSP about a funding outpoint first, or this may be violated in the future
9006         // with collaborative transaction construction protocols, i.e. dual-funding.
9007         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9008         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9009         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9010         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9011
9012         let temp_chan_id_ab = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9013         let temp_chan_id_ca = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[2], &nodes[0], 1_000_000, 0);
9014
9015         let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9016                 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9017
9018         let cs_funding_events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9019         assert_eq!(cs_funding_events.len(), 1);
9020         match cs_funding_events[0] {
9021                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => {}
9022                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", cs_funding_events),
9023         }
9024
9025         nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temp_chan_id_ca, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), funding_output.index).unwrap();
9026         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9027         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9028         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9029         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9030         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9031
9032         let res = nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id_ab, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone());
9033         let err_msg = format!("{:?}", res.unwrap_err());
9034         assert!(err_msg.contains("An existing channel using outpoint "));
9035         assert!(err_msg.contains(" is open with peer"));
9036         // Even though the last funding_transaction_generated errored, it still generated a
9037         // SendFundingCreated. However, when the peer responds with a funding_signed it will send the
9038         // appropriate error message.
9039         let as_funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9040         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_created);
9041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9042         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9043         let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: format!("An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}", funding_output, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), };
9044         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_output), true, reason)]);
9045
9046         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9047         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9048         get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9049 }
9050
9051 #[test]
9052 fn test_duplicate_conflicting_funding_from_second_peer() {
9053         // Test that if a user tries to fund a channel with a funding outpoint they'd previously used
9054         // we don't try to remove the previous ChannelMonitor. This is largely a test to ensure we
9055         // don't regress in the fuzzer, as such funding getting passed our outpoint-matches checks
9056         // implies the user (and our counterparty) has reused cryptographic keys across channels, which
9057         // we require the user not do.
9058         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9059         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9060         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9061         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9062
9063         let temp_chan_id = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9064
9065         let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9066                 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9067
9068         // Now that we have a funding outpoint, create a dummy `ChannelMonitor` and insert it into
9069         // nodes[0]'s ChainMonitor so that the initial `ChannelMonitor` write fails.
9070         let dummy_chan_id = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[2], &nodes[3]).3;
9071         let dummy_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[2], dummy_chan_id).clone();
9072         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_output, dummy_monitor).unwrap();
9073
9074         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9075
9076         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9077         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9078         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9079         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9080         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9081
9082         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9083         // At this point, the channel should be closed, after having generated one monitor write (the
9084         // watch_channel call which failed), but zero monitor updates.
9085         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9086         get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9087         let err_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned() };
9088         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_signed_msg.channel_id, true, err_reason)]);
9089 }
9090
9091 #[test]
9092 fn test_duplicate_funding_err_in_funding() {
9093         // Test that if we have a live channel with one peer, then another peer comes along and tries
9094         // to create a second channel with the same txid we'll fail and not overwrite the
9095         // outpoint_to_peer map in `ChannelManager`.
9096         //
9097         // This was previously broken.
9098         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9099         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9100         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9101         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9102
9103         let (_, _, _, real_channel_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9104         let real_chan_funding_txo = chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9105         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(real_chan_funding_txo), real_channel_id);
9106
9107         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9108         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9109         let node_c_temp_chan_id = open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
9110         open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9111         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9112         let mut accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9113         accept_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = node_c_temp_chan_id;
9114         nodes[2].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
9115
9116         // Now that we have a second channel with the same funding txo, send a bogus funding message
9117         // and let nodes[1] remove the inbound channel.
9118         let (_, funding_tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[2], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9119
9120         nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated(&node_c_temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), funding_tx).unwrap();
9121
9122         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9123         funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9124         // Make the signature invalid by changing the funding output
9125         funding_created_msg.funding_output_index += 10;
9126         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9127         get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9128         let err = "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned();
9129         let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err };
9130         let expected_closing = ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(real_channel_id, false, reason);
9131         check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[expected_closing]);
9132
9133         assert_eq!(
9134                 *nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().get(&real_chan_funding_txo).unwrap(),
9135                 nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
9136         );
9137 }
9138
9139 #[test]
9140 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9141         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9142         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9143         //
9144         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9145         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9146         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9147         // updating logic for the existing channel.
9148         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9149         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9150         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9151         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9152
9153         // Create an initial channel
9154         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9155         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9156         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9157         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9158
9159         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9160         // that it is rejected.
9161         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9162         {
9163                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9164                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9165                 match events[0] {
9166                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9167                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9168                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9169                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9170                                 // move forward with it.
9171                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9172                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9173                         },
9174                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9175                 }
9176         }
9177
9178         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9179         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9180
9181         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9183
9184         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9185         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9186         {
9187                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9188                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9189                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9190                 added_monitors.clear();
9191         }
9192         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9193
9194         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9195
9196         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9197         let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
9198
9199         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9200         // temporary one).
9201
9202         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9203         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9204         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9205         open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9206         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9207         {
9208                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9209                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9210                 match events[0] {
9211                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9212                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9213                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9214                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9215                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9216                         },
9217                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9218                 }
9219         }
9220
9221         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9222         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9223         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9224         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9225         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9226         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9227
9228         let funding_created = {
9229                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9230                 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9231                 // Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9232                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9233                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9234                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9235                 match a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id).unwrap() {
9236                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan) => {
9237                                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9238                                 chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
9239                         },
9240                         _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9241                 }.unwrap()
9242         };
9243         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9244         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9245         // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
9246         // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
9247         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9248
9249         check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[
9250                 ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_created.temporary_channel_id, false, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9251                         err: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned()
9252                 })
9253         ]);
9254
9255         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9256         {
9257                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9258                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9259                 match events[0] {
9260                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9261                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9262                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9263                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9264                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9265                         },
9266                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9267                 }
9268         }
9269
9270         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9271         // everything is functional.
9272         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9273         {
9274                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9275                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9276                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9277                 added_monitors.clear();
9278         }
9279         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9280
9281         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9282         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9283         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9284         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9285
9286         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9287         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9288         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9289
9290         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9291 }
9292
9293 #[test]
9294 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9295         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9296         //
9297         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9298         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9299         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9300         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9301         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9302         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9303         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9304
9305         // Create some initial channels
9306         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9307         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9308         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9309
9310         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9311         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9312         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9313
9314         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9315         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9316         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9317
9318         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9319         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9320         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9321         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9322         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9323                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9324         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9325         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9326         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9327         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9328
9329         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9330         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9331         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(), data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9332         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9333         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9334                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
9335         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9336         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9337         match events[0] {
9338                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9339                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9340                 },
9341                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9342         }
9343         match events[1] {
9344                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9345                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9346                 },
9347                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9348         }
9349         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9350         // peer_disconnected.
9351         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9352         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9353
9354         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9355         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9356         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9357 }
9358
9359 #[test]
9360 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9361         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9362         //
9363         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9364         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9365         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9366         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9367         //
9368         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9369         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9370         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9371         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9372         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9373         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9374         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9375
9376         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9377         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9378         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9379
9380         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9381
9382         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9383         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9384         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9385         // its length.
9386         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9387         let wit_program_script: ScriptBuf = wit_program.into();
9388         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9389                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9390                 output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9391         }
9392
9393         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9394         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9395         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9396         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9397
9398         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9399         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9400         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9401
9402         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9403         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9404
9405         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9406         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9407         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9408
9409         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9410         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9411         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() },
9412                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9413         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9414         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9415         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9416         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9417                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9418                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } = action {
9419                         assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9420                 } else { panic!(); }
9421         } else { panic!(); }
9422         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9423
9424         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9425         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9426         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9427         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9428                 version: 2i32, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9429                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9430                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9431                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9432                                 vout: idx as u32,
9433                         },
9434                         script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
9435                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9436                         witness: Witness::from_slice(&channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9437                 }).collect(),
9438                 output: vec![TxOut {
9439                         value: 1000,
9440                         script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new(),
9441                 }]
9442         };
9443         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9444         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9445 }
9446
9447 #[test]
9448 fn test_coinbase_funding_tx() {
9449         // Miners are able to fund channels directly from coinbase transactions, however
9450         // by consensus rules, outputs of a coinbase transaction are encumbered by a 100
9451         // block maturity timelock. To ensure that a (non-0conf) channel like this is enforceable
9452         // on-chain, the minimum depth is updated to 100 blocks for coinbase funding transactions.
9453         //
9454         // Note that 0conf channels with coinbase funding transactions are unaffected and are
9455         // immediately operational after opening.
9456         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9457         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9458         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9459         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9460
9461         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9462         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9463
9464         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9465         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9466
9467         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9468
9469         // Create the coinbase funding transaction.
9470         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_coinbase_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9471
9472         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9474         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9475
9476         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9477         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9478         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9479
9480         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9481
9482         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9484
9485         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9486         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9487
9488         // Starting at height 0, we "confirm" the coinbase at height 1.
9489         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 1);
9490         // We connect 98 more blocks to have 99 confirmations for the coinbase transaction.
9491         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9492         // Check that we have no pending message events (we have not queued a `channel_ready` yet).
9493         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9494         // Now connect one more block which results in 100 confirmations of the coinbase transaction.
9495         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
9496         // There should now be a `channel_ready` which can be handled.
9497         let _ = &nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(&nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9498
9499         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9500         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9501         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9502         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
9503         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9504         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9505 }
9506
9507 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9508         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9509         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9510         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9511         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9512         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9513         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9514         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9515         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9516         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9517         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9518         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9519         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9520         // until we learned about an additional block.
9521         //
9522         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9523         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9524         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9525         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9526         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9527         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9528         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9529
9530         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9531         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9532         let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9533         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9534         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9535
9536         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9537         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9538         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9539         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9540         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9541         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9542
9543         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9544         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9545                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9546         }
9547         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9548                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9549         if test_height_before_timelock {
9550                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9551                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9552                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9553                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9554         } else {
9555                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9556                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9557                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9558                 let htlc_tx = if spending_txn[0].txid() == node_txn[0].txid() {
9559                         &spending_txn[1]
9560                 } else {
9561                         &spending_txn[0]
9562                 };
9563                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, node_txn[0]);
9564                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9565                 // timelock is up).
9566                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9567                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9568
9569                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9570                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9571                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9572                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9573                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, htlc_tx)], conf_height + 1);
9574                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9575                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9576
9577                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9578                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9579                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9580                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9581                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9582                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9583                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9584                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9585                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9586         }
9587 }
9588
9589 #[test]
9590 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9591         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9592         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9593 }
9594
9595 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9596         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9597         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9598         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9599         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9600
9601         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9602
9603         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9604                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9605         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9606
9607         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9608
9609         {
9610                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9611                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9612                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9613                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9614                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9615                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9616                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9617                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9618         }
9619         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9620         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9621
9622         {
9623                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9624                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9625                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9626                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9627                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9628                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9629                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9630                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9631                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9632                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9633                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9634                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9635                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9636         }
9637
9638         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9639         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9640
9641         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9642                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9643                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9644
9645                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9646                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9647                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9648                 ];
9649                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9650                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9651
9652                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9653                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9654                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9655
9656                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9657                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9658                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9659
9660                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9661                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9662                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9663                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9664                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9665                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9666         } else {
9667                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9668                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9669                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9670
9671                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9672                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9673                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9674                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9675
9676                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9677
9678                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9679         }
9680 }
9681
9682 #[test]
9683 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9684         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9685         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9686         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9687         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9688         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9689 }
9690
9691 #[test]
9692 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9693         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9694         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9695         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9696 }
9697
9698 #[test]
9699 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9700         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9701         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9702         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9703         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9704         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9705         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9706
9707         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9708         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9709         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9710         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9711
9712         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9713                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9714         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9715         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9716         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9717                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9718                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9719                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9720         });
9721
9722         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9723
9724         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9725         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9726
9727         let session_privs = {
9728                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9729                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9730                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9731                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9732                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9733                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9734         };
9735         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9736                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9737                 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9738         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9739
9740         {
9741                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9742                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9743                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9744         }
9745         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9746
9747         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9748                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9749         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9750
9751         {
9752                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9753                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9754                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9755
9756                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9757                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9758
9759                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9760                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9761
9762                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9763                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9764                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9765
9766                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9767                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9768                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9769
9770                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9771                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9772                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9773         }
9774         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9775         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9776         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9777         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9778
9779         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9780
9781         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9782         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9783         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9784
9785         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9786         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9787
9788         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9789         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9790         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9791
9792         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9793
9794         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9795                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9796                 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9797         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9798
9799         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9800         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9801         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9802
9803         do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9804         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true, true);
9805 }
9806
9807 #[test]
9808 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9809         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9810         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9811         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9812         // amount.
9813         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9814         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9815         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9816         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9817
9818         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9819         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9820         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9821         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9822
9823         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9824         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9825         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9826                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9827                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9828                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9829         });
9830
9831         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9832         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9833         // amount of time to respond to.
9834
9835         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9836         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9837         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9838
9839         let failed_destinations = vec![
9840                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9841                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9842         ];
9843         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9844
9845         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9846
9847         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9848         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9849                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9850         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9851
9852         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9853         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9854         let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9855         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9856
9857         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9858         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9859         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9860         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9861         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9862 }
9863
9864 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9865 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9866 enum ExposureEvent {
9867         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9868         AtHTLCForward,
9869         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9870         AtHTLCReception,
9871         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9872         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9873 }
9874
9875 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
9876         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9877         // policy.
9878         //
9879         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9880         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9881         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9882         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9883         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9884         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9885         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9886         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9887
9888         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9889         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9890         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
9891                 // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
9892                 // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
9893                 // originally written.
9894                 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253)
9895         } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000) }; // initial default setting value
9896         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9897         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9898         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9899
9900         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9901         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9902         open_channel.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9903         open_channel.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9904         if on_holder_tx {
9905                 open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9906         }
9907         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9908         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9909         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9910
9911         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9912
9913         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9914
9915         if on_holder_tx {
9916                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9917                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9918                 match get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id) {
9919                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9920                                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9921                         },
9922                         _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9923                 }
9924         }
9925
9926         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9927         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9929         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9930
9931         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9932         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9933         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9934
9935         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9936         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9937         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9938
9939         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
9940         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
9941                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
9942
9943         let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
9944                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9945                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9946                 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9947                 (chan.context().get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
9948                 chan.context().get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
9949         };
9950         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9951         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9952
9953         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9954         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9955
9956         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
9957         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9958
9959         if on_holder_tx {
9960                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9961                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9962                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9963                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9964                         for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9965                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9966                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9967                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9968                         }
9969                 } else {
9970                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9971                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9972                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9973                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9974                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9975                         }
9976                 }
9977         } else {
9978                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9979                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9980                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9981                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9982                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9983                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9984                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9985                         }
9986                 } else {
9987                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9988                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9989                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9990                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9991                         }
9992                 }
9993         }
9994
9995         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9996                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
9997                         if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
9998                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9999                 if on_holder_tx {
10000                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10001                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
10002                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
10003                 } else {
10004                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10005                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
10006                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
10007                 }
10008         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10009                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
10010                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10011                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10012                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10013                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10014                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10015                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10016                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10017                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10018                 if on_holder_tx {
10019                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10020                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10021                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10022                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10023                 } else {
10024                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10025                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
10026                                 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
10027                                         dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4,
10028                                         max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10029                 }
10030         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10031                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
10032                 // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
10033                 // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
10034                 // to cross the threshold.
10035                 for _ in 0..20 {
10036                         let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
10037                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10038                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10039                 }
10040                 {
10041                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10042                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10043                 }
10044                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10045                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10046                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
10047         }
10048
10049         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10050         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10051         added_monitors.clear();
10052 }
10053
10054 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
10055         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10056         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10057         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10058         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10059         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10060         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10061         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10062         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10063         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10064         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10065         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10066         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10067 }
10068
10069 #[test]
10070 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10071         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false);
10072         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true);
10073 }
10074
10075 #[test]
10076 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10077         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10078         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10079         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10080         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10081
10082         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10083         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10084         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10085         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10086         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10087
10088         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10089
10090         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10091         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10092         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[&[1]]) };
10093         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10094         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10095                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10096                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
10097                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10098                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10099                         }]}
10100                 },
10101                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10102         };
10103         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10104         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10105                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10106                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10107                 },
10108                 _ => panic!()
10109         }
10110         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10111         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10112         match events[0] {
10113                 Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, .. } => {
10114                         assert_eq!(channel_id, temp_channel_id);
10115                 },
10116                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10117         }
10118 }
10119
10120 #[test]
10121 fn test_non_final_funding_tx_within_headroom() {
10122         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10123         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10124         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10125         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10126
10127         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10128         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10129         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10130         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10131         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10132
10133         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10134
10135         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10136         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10137         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[[1]]) };
10138         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10139         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10140                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10141                         // Timelock the transaction within a +1 headroom from the best block.
10142                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10143                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10144                         }]}
10145                 },
10146                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10147         };
10148
10149         // Transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
10150         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10151         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10152 }
10153
10154 #[test]
10155 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
10156         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
10157         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
10158         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
10159         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10160         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10161         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10162         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10163
10164         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10165
10166         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
10167         {
10168                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10169                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
10170         }
10171
10172         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
10173         {
10174                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10175                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10176         }
10177         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10179
10180         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10181         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10182         match events[0] {
10183                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10184                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10185                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10186                 },
10187                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10188         };
10189
10190         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
10191         // it.
10192         {
10193                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10194                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
10195         }
10196         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10198
10199         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10200         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10201         match events[0] {
10202                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10203                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10204                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10205                 },
10206                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10207         };
10208
10209         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
10210         // channel.
10211         {
10212                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10213                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10214         }
10215         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10217
10218         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10219         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10220         match events[0] {
10221                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
10222                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10223                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
10224                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000".to_owned() },
10225                                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10226                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
10227                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10228                 },
10229                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10230         };
10231 }
10232
10233 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
10234         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10235         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10236         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10237         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10238         let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
10239         let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
10240                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
10241         let recv_value = 100_000;
10242
10243         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10244
10245         let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
10246         let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
10247                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
10248                         Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
10249                 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
10250         } else {
10251                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
10252                 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
10253         };
10254         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
10255         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10256                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10258         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10259         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10260         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
10261         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10262         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10263         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10264
10265         if valid_delta {
10266                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
10267                         None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10268
10269                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
10270         } else {
10271                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10272
10273                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10274
10275                 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10276                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10277                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10278
10279                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10280         }
10281 }
10282
10283 #[test]
10284 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
10285         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
10286         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
10287         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
10288         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
10289 }
10290
10291 #[test]
10292 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
10293         // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
10294         // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10295         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10296         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10297         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10298         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10299
10300         // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
10301         let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
10302                 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10303                         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
10304                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
10305                                         Some(())
10306                                 } else {
10307                                         None
10308                                 }
10309                         } else {
10310                                 None
10311                         }
10312                 );
10313                 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
10314         };
10315
10316         // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
10317         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10318         let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
10319                 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
10320                 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10321
10322                 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
10323                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
10324                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10325                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10326                 }
10327
10328                 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
10329                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10330                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10331
10332                 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
10333                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10334                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10335         };
10336
10337         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10338
10339         // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
10340         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
10341         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10342         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10343         let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10344         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10345         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
10346         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
10347
10348         // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
10349         let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10350         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
10351         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10352         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
10353         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10354
10355         // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
10356         // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
10357         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10358         let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10359         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10360
10361         // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
10362         //
10363         // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
10364         // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
10365         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10366         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10367         let bob_init = msgs::Init {
10368                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10369         };
10370         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
10371         let alice_init = msgs::Init {
10372                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10373         };
10374         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
10375
10376         // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
10377         // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
10378         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10379         let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
10380                 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
10381         );
10382         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
10383         check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
10384
10385         // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
10386         let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10387                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
10388                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10389                         Some(msg.clone())
10390                 } else {
10391                         None
10392                 }
10393         ).unwrap();
10394         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
10395
10396         // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
10397         for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10398                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10399                 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
10400         }
10401
10402         // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
10403         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10404         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10405
10406         // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
10407         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
10408         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10409
10410         // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
10411         // waiting on any messages.
10412         for node in &nodes {
10413                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10414                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10415                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10416                 }
10417         }
10418 }
10419
10420 #[test]
10421 fn test_remove_expired_outbound_unfunded_channels() {
10422         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10423         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10424         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10425         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10426
10427         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10428         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10429         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10430         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10431         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10432
10433         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10434         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10435         match events[0] {
10436                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10437                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10438         };
10439
10440         // Asserts the outbound channel has been removed from a nodes[0]'s peer state map.
10441         let check_outbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10442                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10443                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10444                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10445         };
10446
10447         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10448         check_outbound_channel_existence(true);
10449
10450         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10451         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10452                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10453                 check_outbound_channel_existence(true)
10454         }
10455
10456         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10457         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10458         check_outbound_channel_existence(false);
10459
10460         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10461         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10462         match msg_events[0] {
10463                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10464                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10465                 },
10466                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10467         }
10468         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10469 }
10470
10471 #[test]
10472 fn test_remove_expired_inbound_unfunded_channels() {
10473         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10474         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10475         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10476         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10477
10478         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10479         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10480         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10481         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10482         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10483
10484         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10485         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10486         match events[0] {
10487                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10488                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10489         };
10490
10491         // Asserts the inbound channel has been removed from a nodes[1]'s peer state map.
10492         let check_inbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10493                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10494                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10495                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10496         };
10497
10498         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10499         check_inbound_channel_existence(true);
10500
10501         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10502         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10503                 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10504                 check_inbound_channel_existence(true)
10505         }
10506
10507         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10508         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10509         check_inbound_channel_existence(false);
10510
10511         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10512         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10513         match msg_events[0] {
10514                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10515                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10516                 },
10517                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10518         }
10519         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10520 }
10521
10522 #[test]
10523 fn test_channel_close_when_not_timely_accepted() {
10524         // Create network of two nodes
10525         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10526         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10527         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10528         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10529
10530         // Simulate peer-disconnects mid-handshake
10531         // The channel is initiated from the node 0 side,
10532         // but the nodes disconnect before node 1 could send accept channel
10533         let create_chan_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10534         let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10535         assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, create_chan_id);
10536
10537         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10538         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10539
10540         // Make sure that we have not removed the OutboundV1Channel from node[0] immediately.
10541         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10542
10543         // Since channel was inbound from node[1] perspective, it should have been dropped immediately.
10544         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10545
10546         // In the meantime, some time passes.
10547         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS {
10548                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10549         }
10550
10551         // Since we disconnected from peer and did not connect back within time,
10552         // we should have forced-closed the channel by now.
10553         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10554         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10555
10556         {
10557                 // Since accept channel message was never received
10558                 // The channel should be forced close by now from node 0 side
10559                 // and the peer removed from per_peer_state
10560                 let node_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10561                 assert_eq!(node_0_per_peer_state.len(), 0);
10562         }
10563 }
10564
10565 #[test]
10566 fn test_rebroadcast_open_channel_when_reconnect_mid_handshake() {
10567         // Create network of two nodes
10568         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10569         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10570         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10571         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10572
10573         // Simulate peer-disconnects mid-handshake
10574         // The channel is initiated from the node 0 side,
10575         // but the nodes disconnect before node 1 could send accept channel
10576         let create_chan_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10577         let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10578         assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, create_chan_id);
10579
10580         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10581         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10582
10583         // Make sure that we have not removed the OutboundV1Channel from node[0] immediately.
10584         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10585
10586         // Since channel was inbound from node[1] perspective, it should have been immediately dropped.
10587         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10588
10589         // The peers now reconnect
10590         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10591                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10592         }, true).unwrap();
10593         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10594                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10595         }, false).unwrap();
10596
10597         // Make sure the SendOpenChannel message is added to node_0 pending message events
10598         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10599         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10600         match &msg_events[0] {
10601                 MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { msg, .. } => assert_eq!(msg, &open_channel_msg),
10602                 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10603         }
10604 }
10605
10606 fn do_test_multi_post_event_actions(do_reload: bool) {
10607         // Tests handling multiple post-Event actions at once.
10608         // There is specific code in ChannelManager to handle channels where multiple post-Event
10609         // `ChannelMonitorUpdates` are pending at once. This test exercises that code.
10610         //
10611         // Specifically, we test calling `get_and_clear_pending_events` while there are two
10612         // PaymentSents from different channels and one channel has two pending `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s
10613         // - one from an RAA and one from an inbound commitment_signed.
10614         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10615         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10616         let (persister, chain_monitor);
10617         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10618         let nodes_0_deserialized;
10619         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10620
10621         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
10622         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).2;
10623
10624         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10625         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10626
10627         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10628         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10629
10630         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
10631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10632         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
10633
10634         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
10635         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10636         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 1_000_000);
10637
10638         for dest in &[1, 2] {
10639                 let htlc_fulfill_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[*dest], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10640                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[*dest].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10641                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[*dest], htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false);
10642                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 0);
10643         }
10644
10645         let (route, payment_hash_3, _, payment_secret_3) =
10646                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
10647         let payment_id = PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0);
10648         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
10649                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), payment_id).unwrap();
10650         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10651
10652         let send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
10653         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
10654         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg);
10655         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10656
10657         if do_reload {
10658                 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
10659                 let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
10660                 let chan_1_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_2).encode();
10661                 reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], persister, chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
10662
10663                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10664                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10665
10666                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
10667                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[2]));
10668         }
10669
10670         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10671         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
10672         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[0] {
10673                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10674         } else { panic!(); }
10675         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] {
10676                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10677         } else { panic!(); }
10678         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
10679         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
10680
10681         // After the events are processed, the ChannelMonitorUpdates will be released and, upon their
10682         // completion, we'll respond to nodes[1] with an RAA + CS.
10683         get_revoke_commit_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10684         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 3);
10685 }
10686
10687 #[test]
10688 fn test_multi_post_event_actions() {
10689         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(true);
10690         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(false);
10691 }
10692
10693 #[test]
10694 fn test_batch_channel_open() {
10695         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10696         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10697         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10698         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10699
10700         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10701         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10702                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10703                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10704         ]);
10705
10706         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10707         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10708         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10709         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10710
10711         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10712         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10713         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10714
10715         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10716         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10717
10718         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10719         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10720         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10721         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10722
10723         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10724         chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10725         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10726         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10727
10728         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before persisting all monitors has been
10729         // completed.
10730         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10731         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
10732
10733         // Complete the persistence of the monitor.
10734         nodes[0].chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(
10735                 &ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 })
10736         );
10737         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10738
10739         // The transaction should only have been broadcast now.
10740         let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10741         assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10742         assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0], tx);
10743
10744         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10745         assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10746                 *e,
10747                 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10748                         ref counterparty_node_id,
10749                         ..
10750                 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
10751         )));
10752         assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10753                 *e,
10754                 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10755                         ref counterparty_node_id,
10756                         ..
10757                 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
10758         )));
10759 }
10760
10761 #[test]
10762 fn test_close_in_funding_batch() {
10763         // This test ensures that if one of the channels
10764         // in the batch closes, the complete batch will close.
10765         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10766         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10767         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10768         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10769
10770         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10771         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10772                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10773                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10774         ]);
10775
10776         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10777         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10778         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10779         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10780
10781         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10782         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10783         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10784
10785         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10786         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10787
10788         // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
10789         let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10790         let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
10791         let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
10792         let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
10793
10794         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10795
10796         // The monitor should become closed.
10797         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10798         {
10799                 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10800                 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10801                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10802                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10803         }
10804
10805         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10806         match msg_events[0] {
10807                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
10808                 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10809         }
10810
10811         // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
10812         {
10813                 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10814                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10815                 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
10816                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
10817                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
10818         }
10819
10820         // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
10821         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10822                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10823                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10824                         discard_funding: true,
10825                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
10826                         user_channel_id: Some(42),
10827                         ..Default::default()
10828                 },
10829                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10830                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
10831                         discard_funding: true,
10832                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
10833                         user_channel_id: Some(43),
10834                         ..Default::default()
10835                 },
10836         ]);
10837
10838         // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
10839         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10840 }
10841
10842 #[test]
10843 fn test_batch_funding_close_after_funding_signed() {
10844         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10845         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10846         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10847         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10848
10849         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10850         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10851                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10852                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10853         ]);
10854
10855         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10856         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10857         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10858         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10859
10860         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10861         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10862         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10863
10864         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10865         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10866         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10867         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10868
10869         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10870         chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10871         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10872         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10873
10874         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10875         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10876
10877         // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
10878         let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10879         let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
10880         let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
10881         let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
10882         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10883         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 2);
10884         {
10885                 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10886                 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10887                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10888                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10889                 let monitor_updates_2 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_2).unwrap();
10890                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2.len(), 1);
10891                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10892         }
10893         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10894         match msg_events[0] {
10895                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
10896                 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10897         }
10898
10899         // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
10900         {
10901                 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10902                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10903                 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
10904                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
10905                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
10906         }
10907
10908         // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
10909         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10910                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10911                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10912                         discard_funding: true,
10913                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
10914                         user_channel_id: Some(42),
10915                         ..Default::default()
10916                 },
10917                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10918                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
10919                         discard_funding: true,
10920                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
10921                         user_channel_id: Some(43),
10922                         ..Default::default()
10923                 },
10924         ]);
10925
10926         // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
10927         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10928 }
10929
10930 fn do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(confirm_remote_commitment: bool) {
10931         // Tests that a node will forget the channel (when it only requires 1 confirmation) if the
10932         // funding and commitment transaction confirm in the same block.
10933         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10934         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10935         let mut min_depth_1_block_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10936         min_depth_1_block_cfg.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10937         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg), Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg)]);
10938         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10939
10940         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
10941         let chan_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 });
10942
10943         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10944         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10945
10946         let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_remote_commitment {
10947                 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
10948         } else {
10949                 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
10950         };
10951
10952         closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10953         let mut msg_events = closing_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10954         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10955         match msg_events.pop().unwrap() {
10956                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, .. } => {},
10957                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10958         }
10959         check_added_monitors(closing_node, 1);
10960         check_closed_event(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
10961
10962         let commitment_tx = {
10963                 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10964                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
10965                 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
10966                 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
10967                 commitment_tx
10968         };
10969
10970         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
10971         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
10972
10973         check_closed_broadcast(other_node, 1, true);
10974         check_added_monitors(other_node, 1);
10975         check_closed_event(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
10976
10977         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10978         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10979 }
10980
10981 #[test]
10982 fn test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block() {
10983         do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(false);
10984         do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(true);
10985 }