1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use chain::channelmonitor;
18 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
21 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
22 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
23 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
26 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
27 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
28 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
29 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField, ErrorAction};
32 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
34 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
35 use util::errors::APIError;
36 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
59 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
60 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
63 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
64 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
65 use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
66 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
67 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
68 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
69 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
70 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
71 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
73 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
75 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
76 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
77 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
79 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
80 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
82 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
83 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
85 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
86 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
87 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
88 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
89 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
90 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
91 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
92 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
94 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
95 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
97 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
99 } else { assert!(false); }
102 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
104 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
105 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
106 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
108 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
110 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
114 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
116 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
124 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
125 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
127 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
128 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
129 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
130 node_cfgs[1].features = InitFeatures::known().clear_wumbo();
131 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
132 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
134 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
135 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
136 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
142 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
143 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
144 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
145 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
146 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
147 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
148 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
149 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
150 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
152 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
153 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
154 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
155 let opt_anchors = false;
156 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
157 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
159 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
160 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
161 if !send_from_initiator {
162 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
163 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
165 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
167 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
168 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
169 if send_from_initiator {
170 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
171 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
173 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
176 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
177 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
178 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
181 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
182 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
183 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
185 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
186 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
187 if send_from_initiator {
188 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
189 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
190 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
191 // well as an additional HTLC.
192 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
194 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
199 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
200 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
201 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
205 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
206 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
207 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
208 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
209 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
210 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
213 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
217 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
218 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
219 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
220 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
221 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
222 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
223 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
224 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
225 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
226 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
228 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
230 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
232 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
234 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
237 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
240 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
241 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
242 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
243 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
244 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
249 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
251 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
252 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
253 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
256 let payment_event = {
257 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
258 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
259 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
261 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
262 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
264 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
265 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
266 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
267 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
268 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
271 // deliver(1), generate (3):
272 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
273 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
274 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
277 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
278 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
279 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
280 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
281 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
282 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
283 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
286 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
287 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
288 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
289 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
290 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
291 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
292 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
295 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
296 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
297 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
300 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
301 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
304 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
307 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
308 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
310 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
311 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
314 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
319 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
320 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
321 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
322 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
323 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
324 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
325 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
326 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
329 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
331 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
333 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
336 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
339 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
340 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
341 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
342 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
345 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
348 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
350 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
351 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
352 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
355 let payment_event = {
356 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
357 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
358 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
360 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
361 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
363 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
364 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
365 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
366 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
367 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
370 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
373 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
377 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
378 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
379 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
380 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
381 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
382 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
385 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
386 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
387 // update_fee (never committed) ->
389 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
390 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
391 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
392 // <- (1) RAA delivered
393 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
394 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
395 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
396 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
398 // B should send no response here
399 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
400 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
403 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
406 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
407 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
408 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
410 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
413 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
414 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
415 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
416 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
417 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
419 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
422 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
423 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
424 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
425 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
428 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
431 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
432 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
434 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
435 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
436 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
438 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
439 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
440 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
441 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
444 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
446 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
448 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
450 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
451 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
452 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
454 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
455 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
456 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
457 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
458 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
459 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
460 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
462 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
463 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
464 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
466 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
468 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
469 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
473 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
474 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
477 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
478 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
481 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
482 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
483 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
486 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
487 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
491 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
492 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
493 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
494 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
497 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
498 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
499 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
500 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
502 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
504 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
507 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
508 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
511 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
512 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
513 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
515 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
516 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
517 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
519 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
520 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
522 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
524 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
525 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
527 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
529 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
530 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
532 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
533 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
534 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
535 added_monitors.clear();
537 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
539 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
540 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
542 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
543 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
544 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
545 added_monitors.clear();
548 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
549 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
551 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
552 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
554 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
555 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
556 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
557 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
561 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
562 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
563 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
564 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
565 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
566 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
567 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
568 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
583 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
584 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
585 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
586 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
587 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
588 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
591 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
594 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
597 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
598 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
599 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
600 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
601 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
603 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
605 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
607 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
608 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
611 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
612 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
615 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
616 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
617 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
620 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
621 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
626 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
627 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
628 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
629 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
630 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
631 let channel_value = 5000;
633 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
634 let channel_id = chan.2;
635 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
636 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
638 let opt_anchors = false;
640 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
641 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
642 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
644 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
645 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
647 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
648 *feerate_lock = feerate;
650 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
652 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
654 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
656 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
658 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
660 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
662 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
663 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
664 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
665 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
666 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
667 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
671 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
672 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
675 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
676 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
677 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
679 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
681 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
682 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
683 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
684 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
685 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
686 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
687 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
688 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
689 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
691 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
692 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
693 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
694 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
695 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
696 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
697 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
698 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
701 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
702 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
703 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
706 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
707 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
708 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
709 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
710 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
711 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
713 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
714 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
715 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
716 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
718 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
720 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
723 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
726 htlc_signatures: res.1
729 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
731 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
734 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
736 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
737 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
738 //Should produce and error.
739 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
740 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
742 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
743 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
747 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
748 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
749 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
750 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
751 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
752 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
755 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
758 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
761 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
764 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
765 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
766 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
767 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
768 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
770 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
772 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
773 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
774 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
777 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
779 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
780 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
782 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
783 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
784 added_monitors.clear();
786 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
787 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
788 // node[1] has nothing to do
790 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
791 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
794 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
795 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
796 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
797 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
798 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
800 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
802 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
803 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
804 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
805 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
806 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
807 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
809 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
810 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
812 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
814 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
816 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
818 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
820 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
821 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
823 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
825 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
827 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
829 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
830 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
832 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
836 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
838 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
839 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
840 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
841 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
842 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
846 fn test_update_fee() {
847 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
848 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
849 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
850 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
851 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
852 let channel_id = chan.2;
855 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
856 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
857 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
858 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
859 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
860 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
861 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
862 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
863 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
864 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
865 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
868 // Create and deliver (1)...
871 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
872 feerate = *feerate_lock;
873 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
875 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
878 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
879 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
880 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
881 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
882 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
884 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
886 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
888 // Generate (2) and (3):
889 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
890 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
894 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
895 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
898 // Create and deliver (4)...
900 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
901 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
903 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
905 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
906 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
907 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
908 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
909 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
911 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
914 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
915 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
918 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
919 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
921 // Handle (3), creating (6):
922 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
924 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
925 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
928 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
929 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
932 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
933 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
934 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
935 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
936 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
937 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
938 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
939 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
943 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
945 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
946 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
948 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
950 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
952 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
953 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
954 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
955 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
956 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
960 fn fake_network_test() {
961 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
962 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
963 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
964 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
965 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
966 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
968 // Create some initial channels
969 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
970 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
971 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
973 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
974 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
975 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
976 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
977 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
979 // Send some more payments
980 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
981 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
982 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
984 // Test failure packets
985 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
986 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
988 // Add a new channel that skips 3
989 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
991 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
992 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
993 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
994 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
995 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
996 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
997 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
999 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1000 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1001 hops.push(RouteHop {
1002 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1003 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1004 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1005 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1007 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1009 hops.push(RouteHop {
1010 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1011 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1012 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1013 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1015 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1017 hops.push(RouteHop {
1018 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1019 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1020 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1021 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1023 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1025 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1026 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1027 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1029 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1030 hops.push(RouteHop {
1031 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1032 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1033 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1034 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1036 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1038 hops.push(RouteHop {
1039 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1040 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1041 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1042 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1044 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1046 hops.push(RouteHop {
1047 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1048 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1049 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1050 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1052 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1054 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1055 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1056 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1058 // Claim the rebalances...
1059 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1060 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1062 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1063 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1065 // Send some payments across both channels
1066 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1067 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1068 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1071 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1072 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1073 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1074 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1076 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1078 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1079 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1080 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1082 // Close down the channels...
1083 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1084 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1086 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1087 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1089 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1090 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1092 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1093 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1094 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1095 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1096 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1097 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1101 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1102 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1103 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1104 // commitment dance rounds.
1105 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1106 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1107 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1108 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1109 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1110 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1112 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1113 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1114 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1115 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1116 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1120 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1121 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1122 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1123 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1125 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1126 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1128 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1130 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1131 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1132 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1133 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1136 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1137 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1139 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1143 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1144 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1145 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1146 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1148 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1149 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1150 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1151 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1152 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1153 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1156 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1157 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1158 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1160 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1162 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1163 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1164 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1167 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1168 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1170 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1174 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1176 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1177 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1179 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1181 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1183 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1185 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1187 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1189 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1191 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1194 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1196 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1197 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1198 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1200 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1201 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1203 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1207 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1208 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1211 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1215 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1216 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1217 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1218 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1219 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1220 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1221 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1223 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1224 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1225 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1226 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1227 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1228 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1230 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1232 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1233 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1235 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1236 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1238 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1239 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1240 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1244 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1245 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1246 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1247 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1248 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1249 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1250 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1251 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1253 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1256 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1258 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1260 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1261 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1262 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1264 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1265 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1266 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1269 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1270 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1272 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1273 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1274 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1275 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1276 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1277 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1278 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1281 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1283 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1285 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1286 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1288 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1289 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1291 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1293 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1294 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1296 let bump_tx = if claim_txn[1] == claim_txn[4] {
1297 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1298 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1300 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1302 check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1305 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[3]);
1306 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[4]);
1308 check_spends!(claim_txn[5], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1310 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1315 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1316 assert_eq!(bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1317 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, bump_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1319 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1320 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1321 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1323 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1324 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1325 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1326 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1328 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1329 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1332 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1333 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1334 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1335 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1337 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1338 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1339 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1340 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1341 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1342 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1344 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1350 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1351 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1352 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1353 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1354 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1355 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1357 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1358 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1360 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1361 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1362 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1363 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1364 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1366 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1368 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1369 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1370 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1373 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1375 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1376 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1378 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1382 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1383 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1384 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1385 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1386 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1387 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1389 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1390 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1391 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1392 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1394 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1396 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1397 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1398 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1399 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1402 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1403 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1404 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1405 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1408 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1410 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1411 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1412 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1414 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1416 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1418 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1419 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1420 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1421 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1422 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1423 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1424 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1425 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1427 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1428 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1429 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1430 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1431 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1433 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1434 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1435 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1436 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1437 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1438 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1439 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1440 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1443 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1444 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1445 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1447 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1448 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1449 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1451 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1453 amount_msat: 3460001,
1454 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1456 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1459 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1462 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1463 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1464 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1465 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1469 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1470 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1472 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1473 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1475 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1478 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1481 htlc_signatures: res.1
1484 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1485 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1486 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1488 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1489 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1491 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1492 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1494 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1496 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1497 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1498 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1500 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1501 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1502 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1504 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1506 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1507 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1513 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1514 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1515 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1516 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1517 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1519 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1520 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1521 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1522 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1524 let opt_anchors = false;
1526 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1527 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1528 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1530 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1532 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1533 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1534 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1537 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1538 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1539 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1540 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1541 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1542 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1546 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1547 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1548 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1549 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1550 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1551 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1553 let opt_anchors = false;
1555 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1556 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1557 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1558 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1559 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1560 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1561 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1563 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1564 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1565 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1568 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1569 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1570 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1571 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1572 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1573 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1574 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1575 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1576 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1578 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1579 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1580 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1581 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1582 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1585 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1586 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1587 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1588 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1589 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1590 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1592 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1596 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1597 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1598 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1599 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1600 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1602 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1603 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1604 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1606 let opt_anchors = false;
1608 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1609 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1610 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1611 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1612 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1613 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1614 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1616 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1617 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1618 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1619 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1620 // commitment transaction fee.
1621 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1623 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1624 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1625 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1628 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1629 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1630 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1631 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1635 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1636 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1637 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1638 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1639 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1640 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1641 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1642 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1644 let opt_anchors = false;
1646 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1648 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1649 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1650 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1651 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1653 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1654 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1655 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1656 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1657 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1658 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1659 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1661 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1662 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1663 match msg_events[0] {
1664 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1665 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1667 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1672 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1673 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1674 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1675 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1676 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1677 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1678 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1679 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1681 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1682 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1683 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1684 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1685 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1686 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1688 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1689 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1690 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1691 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1692 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1693 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1695 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1696 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1697 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1698 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1702 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1703 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1704 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1705 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1706 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1707 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1708 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1711 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1712 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1713 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1714 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1716 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1717 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1718 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1719 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1721 // Add a pending HTLC.
1722 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1723 let payment_event_1 = {
1724 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1727 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1728 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1729 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1731 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1733 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1734 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1735 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1736 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1737 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1739 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1740 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1741 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1742 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1743 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1744 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1745 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1746 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1749 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1750 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1751 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1752 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1755 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1756 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1757 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1758 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1759 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1760 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1762 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1766 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1767 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1768 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1769 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1770 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1771 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1772 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1773 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1774 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1775 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1777 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1778 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1779 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1781 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1782 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1785 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1786 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1790 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1791 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1792 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1793 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1794 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1795 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1796 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1797 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1798 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1799 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1800 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1802 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1803 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1805 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1806 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1808 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1810 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1811 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1812 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1813 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1818 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1819 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1820 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1821 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1823 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1825 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1827 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1828 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1829 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1830 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1831 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1832 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1833 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1836 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1837 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1839 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1840 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1841 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1842 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1843 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1844 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1845 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1848 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1850 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1851 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1852 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1853 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1854 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1857 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1858 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1859 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1860 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1861 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1864 // adding pending output.
1865 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1866 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1867 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1868 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1869 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1870 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1871 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1872 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1873 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1875 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1876 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1877 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1879 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1880 let payment_event_1 = {
1881 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1884 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1885 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1886 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1888 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1890 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1891 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1893 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1894 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1895 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1896 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1899 // split the rest to test holding cell
1900 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1901 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1902 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1903 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1905 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1906 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1909 // now see if they go through on both sides
1910 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1911 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1912 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1914 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1915 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1917 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1919 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1920 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1921 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1922 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1923 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1926 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1927 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1928 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1930 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1931 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1933 // flush the pending htlc
1934 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1935 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1938 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1939 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1941 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1943 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1944 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1945 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1948 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1949 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1952 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1954 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1955 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1956 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1958 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1959 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1961 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1962 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1963 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1964 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1965 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1966 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1968 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1969 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1970 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1971 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1973 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1974 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1976 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1977 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1979 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1980 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1981 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1983 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1984 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1985 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1987 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1990 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1993 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1994 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1995 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1997 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1998 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1999 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2001 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2004 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2007 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2008 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2009 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2011 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2012 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2013 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2015 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2016 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2017 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2018 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2019 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2021 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2022 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2026 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2027 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2028 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2029 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2030 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2031 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2032 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2033 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2035 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2036 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2037 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2038 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2039 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2040 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2041 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2042 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2044 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2045 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2046 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2047 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2048 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2049 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2050 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2051 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2052 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2053 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2055 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2056 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2057 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2058 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2059 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2061 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2062 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2064 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2066 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2067 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2068 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2071 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2072 // initial fulfill/CS.
2073 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2074 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2076 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2078 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2079 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2080 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2081 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2083 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2085 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2086 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2088 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2089 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2091 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2092 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2094 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2095 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2097 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2099 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2101 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2103 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2105 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2107 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2109 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2110 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2111 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2112 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2113 // on-chain as necessary).
2114 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2115 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2117 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2118 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2120 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2122 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2124 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2125 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2127 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2128 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2129 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2131 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2132 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2134 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2135 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2136 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2138 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2140 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2141 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2142 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2145 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2146 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2148 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2150 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2152 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2154 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2156 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2159 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2161 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2162 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2164 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2166 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2168 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2171 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2172 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2174 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2175 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2179 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2180 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2181 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2182 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2183 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2184 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2185 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2187 // Create some initial channels
2188 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2189 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2190 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2191 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2193 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2194 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2195 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2196 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2197 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2198 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2200 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2201 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2202 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2203 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2204 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2206 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2207 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2209 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2211 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2212 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2213 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2215 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2217 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2218 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2219 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2220 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2221 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2223 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2224 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2226 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2227 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2228 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2229 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2232 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2233 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2234 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2235 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2237 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2239 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2240 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2241 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2242 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2243 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2245 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2246 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2248 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2249 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2250 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2252 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2253 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2255 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2256 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2257 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2258 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2266 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2267 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2268 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2270 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2271 let node2_commitment_txid;
2273 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2274 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2275 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2276 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2278 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2279 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2280 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2282 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2284 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2285 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2286 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2287 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2288 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2290 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2291 // confusing us in the following tests.
2292 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2294 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2295 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2296 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2299 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2300 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2301 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2302 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2303 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2304 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2307 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2310 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2311 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2313 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2317 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2319 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2320 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2321 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2327 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2329 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2330 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2332 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2333 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2334 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2335 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2336 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2339 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2342 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2343 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2345 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2347 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2348 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2350 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2351 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2352 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2354 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2355 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2356 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2357 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2359 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2360 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2361 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2365 fn test_justice_tx() {
2366 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2367 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2368 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2369 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2370 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2371 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2372 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2373 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2374 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2375 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2376 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2377 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2378 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2379 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2380 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2381 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2382 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2383 // Create some new channels:
2384 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2386 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2387 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2388 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2389 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2390 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2391 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2392 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2393 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2394 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2395 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2396 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2397 // Revoke the old state
2398 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2401 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2403 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2404 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2405 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2407 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2408 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2409 node_txn.truncate(1);
2411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2412 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2413 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2415 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2416 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2417 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2418 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2420 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2421 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2422 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2423 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2425 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2427 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2428 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2430 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2431 // Create some new channels:
2432 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2434 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2438 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2439 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2440 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2441 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2442 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2443 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2444 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2445 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2446 // Revoke the old state
2447 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2449 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2451 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2452 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2453 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2455 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2456 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2459 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2461 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2462 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2463 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2465 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2466 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2467 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2469 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2470 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2471 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2475 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2476 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2477 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2478 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2479 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2480 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2481 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2482 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2483 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2484 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2485 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2486 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2487 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2488 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2489 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2491 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2492 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2494 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2495 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2496 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2498 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2499 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2501 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2502 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2503 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2505 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2509 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2510 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2511 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2512 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2513 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2514 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2515 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2517 // Create some new channel:
2518 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2520 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2521 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2522 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2523 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2524 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2526 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2527 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2528 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2529 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2530 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2531 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2532 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2533 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2534 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2536 //Revoke the old state
2537 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2540 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2542 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2543 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2545 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2546 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2547 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2549 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2550 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2552 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2553 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2555 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2556 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2557 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2558 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2559 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2560 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2561 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2562 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2564 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2565 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2566 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2568 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2569 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2570 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2571 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2572 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2574 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2575 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2576 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2580 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2581 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2582 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2583 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2586 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2588 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2590 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2591 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2592 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2593 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2594 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2595 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2597 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2598 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2600 //Revoke the old state
2601 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2604 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2606 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2608 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2609 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2610 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2612 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2613 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2616 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2617 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2619 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2620 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2622 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2623 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2624 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2625 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2626 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2627 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2628 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2630 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2631 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2632 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2633 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2635 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2636 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2637 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2639 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2640 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2641 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2642 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2643 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2644 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2645 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2646 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2648 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2649 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2650 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2651 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2652 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2653 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2654 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2656 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2657 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2658 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2662 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2663 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2664 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2665 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2666 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2667 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2668 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2669 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2670 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2672 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2673 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2674 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2675 // PaymentSent event).
2677 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2678 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2679 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2680 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2682 // Create some initial channels
2683 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2684 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2686 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2687 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2688 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2689 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2690 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2692 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2693 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2694 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2696 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2697 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2699 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2700 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2701 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2702 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2703 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2704 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2705 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2706 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2707 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2709 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2710 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2711 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2712 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2713 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2715 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2716 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2718 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2719 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2720 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2721 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2722 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2723 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2724 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2725 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2726 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2727 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2728 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2729 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2730 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2731 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2733 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2734 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2735 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2736 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2738 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2739 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2740 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2741 added_monitors.clear();
2743 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2744 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2745 match forwarded_events[0] {
2746 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2747 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2749 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2750 match forwarded_events[1] {
2751 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2752 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2753 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2754 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2755 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2759 match forwarded_events[2] {
2760 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2761 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2762 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2763 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2764 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2768 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2770 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2771 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2772 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2773 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2774 added_monitors.clear();
2776 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2778 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2779 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2782 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2783 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2787 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2788 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2789 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2790 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2791 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2792 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2794 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2796 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2797 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2798 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2799 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2800 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2801 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2802 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2803 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2804 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2805 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2807 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2808 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2809 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2810 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2812 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2813 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2814 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2815 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2817 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2818 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2822 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2823 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2824 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2825 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2827 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2828 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2829 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2830 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2831 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2832 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2834 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2835 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2836 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2837 let commitment_spend =
2838 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2839 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2840 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2841 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2844 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2845 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2846 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2850 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2851 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2852 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2853 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2854 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2855 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2856 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2857 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2858 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2859 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2860 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2861 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2863 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2864 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2865 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2866 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2867 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2869 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2870 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2871 let mut first_claimed = false;
2872 for event in events {
2874 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2875 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2876 assert!(!first_claimed);
2877 first_claimed = true;
2879 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2880 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2883 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2884 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2885 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2888 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2891 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2892 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2893 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2894 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2895 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2896 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2898 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2900 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2901 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2902 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2903 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2904 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2905 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2906 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2908 // Create some intial channels
2909 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2910 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2912 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2913 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2914 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2916 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2918 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2919 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2920 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2921 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2923 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2926 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2927 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2929 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2930 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2931 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2932 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2933 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2934 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2936 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2938 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2939 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2941 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2942 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2943 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2944 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2945 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2947 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2948 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2949 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2950 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2951 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2954 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2955 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2956 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2957 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2959 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2960 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2962 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2963 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2964 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2965 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2967 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2971 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2973 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2975 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2976 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2977 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2978 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2981 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2983 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2984 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2985 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2986 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2987 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2988 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2989 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2991 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2995 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2997 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2998 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3000 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3001 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3002 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3003 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3004 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3005 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3007 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3010 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3011 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3012 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3014 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3015 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3017 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3019 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3020 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3021 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3022 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3023 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3024 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3025 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3029 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3030 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3031 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3032 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3036 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3037 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3038 // and fail backward accordingly.
3040 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3041 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3042 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3043 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3045 // Create some initial channels
3046 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3047 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3049 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3050 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3051 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3052 // Revoke the old state
3053 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3055 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3057 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3058 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3059 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3061 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3063 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3065 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3066 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3068 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3069 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3070 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3071 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3072 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3073 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3075 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3076 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3077 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3083 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3084 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3085 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3086 // commitment transaction anymore.
3087 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3088 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3089 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3090 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3091 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3092 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3094 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3095 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3096 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3097 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3098 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3099 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3100 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3101 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3102 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3104 // Create some initial channels
3105 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3106 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3108 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3109 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3110 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3111 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3112 // Revoke the old state
3113 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3115 let value = if use_dust {
3116 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3117 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3118 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3121 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3122 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3123 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3125 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3126 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3128 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3129 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3130 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3131 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3132 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3133 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3134 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3135 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3136 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3138 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3139 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3141 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3142 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3143 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3144 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3145 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3146 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3147 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3148 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3150 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3151 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3152 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3155 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3156 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3158 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3159 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3160 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3161 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3162 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3163 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3164 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3165 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3166 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3167 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3169 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3170 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3171 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3174 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3175 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3176 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3177 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3178 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3179 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3183 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3184 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3185 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3187 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3188 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3190 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3193 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3194 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3197 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3198 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3200 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3202 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3203 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3205 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3206 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3208 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3209 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3212 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3213 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3215 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3217 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3219 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3220 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3222 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3225 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3226 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3229 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3232 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3233 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3234 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3235 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3238 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3239 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3240 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3241 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3243 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3247 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3248 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3249 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3250 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3251 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3252 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3254 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3257 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3258 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3259 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3260 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3261 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3262 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3263 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3265 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3266 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3267 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3269 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3271 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3272 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3274 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3275 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3276 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3277 // that we should update our routing table for.
3278 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3279 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3282 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3285 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3286 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3287 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3292 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3293 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3294 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3296 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3299 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3302 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3303 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3304 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3308 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3309 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3310 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3311 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3312 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3316 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3317 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3318 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3319 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3320 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3324 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3326 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3327 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3328 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3329 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3331 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3333 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3334 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3337 let payment_event = {
3338 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3339 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3340 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3342 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3343 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3346 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3347 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3349 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3352 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3355 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3357 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3359 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3360 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3361 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3362 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3363 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3364 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3366 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3367 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3373 onion_routing_packet,
3375 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3377 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3378 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3379 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3381 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3382 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3384 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3387 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3388 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3390 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3392 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3397 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3398 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3399 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3400 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3401 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3402 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3403 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3404 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3406 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3407 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3408 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3409 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3411 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3413 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3414 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3415 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3417 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3418 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3419 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3421 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3423 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3424 // registering new transactions
3425 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3426 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3430 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3431 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3432 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3433 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3434 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3435 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3436 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3437 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3439 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3441 let mut payment_event = {
3442 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3445 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3446 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3447 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3450 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3451 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3453 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3455 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3456 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3457 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3458 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3461 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3462 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3464 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3466 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3467 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3468 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3470 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3471 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3473 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3475 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3476 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3477 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3478 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3479 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3483 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3485 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3486 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3488 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3490 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3492 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3493 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3495 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3496 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3497 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3498 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3499 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3500 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3501 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3503 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3507 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3508 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3509 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3510 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3511 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3513 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3516 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3517 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3519 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3521 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3522 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3524 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3525 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3526 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3528 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3529 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3531 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3532 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3536 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3537 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3538 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3539 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3540 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3541 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3542 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3544 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3545 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3546 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3547 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3548 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
3549 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3550 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
3552 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3553 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3555 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3557 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3558 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3560 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3561 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3564 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3567 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3568 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3569 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3570 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3572 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3573 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3577 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3578 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3579 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3580 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3581 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3582 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3583 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3584 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3586 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3587 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3588 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3590 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3591 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3592 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3593 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3595 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3596 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3597 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3599 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3600 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3601 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3602 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3604 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3605 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3607 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3608 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3610 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3612 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3613 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3615 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3616 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3617 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3619 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3622 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3623 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3624 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3626 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3629 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3630 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3634 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3635 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3638 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3639 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3640 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3641 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3642 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3643 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3645 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3646 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3647 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3648 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3649 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3650 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3651 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3653 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3656 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3658 let payment_event = {
3659 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3662 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3663 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3664 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3666 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3668 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3669 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3671 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3672 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3673 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3675 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3677 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3678 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3679 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3682 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3683 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3684 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3685 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3688 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3689 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3690 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3698 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3699 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3700 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3701 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3702 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3703 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3705 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3706 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3707 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3709 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3710 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3712 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3713 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3714 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3715 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3716 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3717 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3718 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3719 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3720 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3721 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3722 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3723 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3724 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3725 // Everything was delivered...
3726 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3729 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3730 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3732 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3733 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3736 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3737 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3738 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3740 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3742 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3743 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3745 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3746 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3747 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3749 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3750 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3751 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3753 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3756 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3759 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3761 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3763 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3764 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3765 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3766 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3767 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3768 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3769 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3770 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3771 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3772 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3773 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3778 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3779 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3781 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3782 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3784 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3785 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3786 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3791 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3792 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3794 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3796 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3797 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3798 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3801 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3802 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3803 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3804 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3807 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3808 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3809 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3817 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3818 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3819 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3820 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3821 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3822 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3824 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3826 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3827 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3828 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3829 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3830 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3831 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3832 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3833 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3834 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3835 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3836 // Everything was delivered...
3837 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3840 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3841 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3844 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3845 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3846 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3848 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3849 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3852 // Channel should still work fine...
3853 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3854 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3855 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3859 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3860 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3861 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3862 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3863 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3867 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3868 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3869 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3870 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3871 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3875 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3876 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3877 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3878 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3879 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3880 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3881 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3882 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3883 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3884 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3886 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3887 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3889 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3890 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3891 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3893 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3895 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3896 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3898 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3899 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3900 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3902 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3903 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3904 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3905 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3907 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a channel_ready, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3908 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3909 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3910 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3911 let as_channel_ready = match events_3[0] {
3912 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3913 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3916 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3919 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s channel_ready on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3920 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3921 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3922 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3923 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3925 let bs_channel_ready = match events_4[0] {
3926 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3927 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3928 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3931 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3933 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3934 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3935 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3941 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3942 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3944 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3947 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s channel_ready, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3948 // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3949 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3950 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3951 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3953 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3954 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3956 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3959 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s channel_ready, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3960 // announcement_signatures.
3961 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_ready);
3962 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3963 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3964 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3965 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3966 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3972 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3973 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3975 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3976 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3977 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3978 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3979 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3980 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3982 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3985 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3986 // same channel_announcement.
3987 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3988 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3989 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3990 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3991 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3992 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3995 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3998 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3999 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
4000 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4001 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4003 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4004 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4005 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
4007 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
4008 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
4009 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4011 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4012 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4013 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4015 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4016 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4017 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4018 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4019 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4020 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4021 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4022 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4024 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4025 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4026 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4027 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4028 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4029 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4031 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4032 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4033 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4034 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4038 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4039 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4041 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4042 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4045 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4047 // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
4048 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
4049 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4050 let mut found_announcement = false;
4051 for event in msgs.iter() {
4053 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4054 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4056 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4057 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4060 assert!(found_announcement);
4064 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4065 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4066 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4067 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4068 // channel_ready immediately instead.
4069 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4070 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4071 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4072 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4073 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4075 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4077 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4078 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4079 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4080 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4081 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4082 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4084 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4085 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4086 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4090 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4091 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4092 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4093 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4094 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4095 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4096 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4097 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4099 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4101 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4102 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4103 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4106 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4107 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4109 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4110 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4113 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4114 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4117 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4118 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4120 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4121 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4122 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4123 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4124 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4125 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4126 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4128 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4129 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4130 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4132 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4133 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4134 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4136 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4139 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4140 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4141 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4144 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4147 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4148 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4150 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4151 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4152 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4153 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4154 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4155 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4157 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4158 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4159 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4160 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4162 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4163 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4165 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4166 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4168 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4170 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4171 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4172 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4173 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4174 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4175 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4176 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4177 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4178 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4181 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4182 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4183 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4184 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4185 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4186 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4187 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4190 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4191 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4192 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4193 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4194 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4195 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4196 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4199 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4200 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4201 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4204 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4205 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4206 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4209 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4210 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4213 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4215 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4216 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4218 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4219 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4221 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4222 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4223 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4225 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4231 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4232 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4235 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4236 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4239 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4240 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4241 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4242 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4243 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4244 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4245 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4247 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4249 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4250 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4251 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4252 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4253 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4254 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4255 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4257 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4258 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4259 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4260 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4261 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4264 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4267 let mut block = Block {
4268 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4271 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4272 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4273 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4274 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4275 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4276 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4277 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4280 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4283 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4284 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4285 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4286 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4287 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4289 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4290 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4291 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4292 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4293 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4294 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4298 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4299 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4300 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4303 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4304 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4305 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4306 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4307 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4308 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4309 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4310 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4312 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4313 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4314 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4315 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4317 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4318 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4320 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4322 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4325 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4326 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4327 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4328 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4331 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4332 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4333 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4334 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4338 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4339 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4340 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4341 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4344 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4346 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4347 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4348 match fail_commit[0] {
4349 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4350 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4351 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4353 _ => unreachable!(),
4355 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4357 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4358 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4359 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4360 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4361 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4362 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4363 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4364 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4369 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4370 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4371 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4375 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4376 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4377 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4378 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4379 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4380 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4381 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4382 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4383 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4384 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4386 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4388 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4390 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4391 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4392 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4393 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4395 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4396 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4397 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4398 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4399 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4400 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4401 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4402 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4403 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4404 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4406 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4407 let config = UserConfig::default();
4408 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4409 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4410 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4411 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4412 default_config: config,
4414 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4415 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4416 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4421 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4422 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4424 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4425 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4426 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4429 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4430 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4431 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4432 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4434 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4435 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4436 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4437 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4439 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4440 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4441 for node in nodes.iter() {
4442 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4443 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4444 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4447 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4451 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4452 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4453 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4454 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4455 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4456 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4457 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4458 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4459 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4460 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4461 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4463 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4464 let channel_value = 100000;
4465 let push_msat = 10001;
4466 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4467 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4468 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4469 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4470 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4471 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4472 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4474 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4476 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4477 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4479 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4481 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4482 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4483 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4484 added_monitors.clear();
4487 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4488 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4490 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4491 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4492 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4493 added_monitors.clear();
4495 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4500 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4501 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4502 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4503 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4505 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4506 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4507 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4508 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4509 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4510 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4511 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4512 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4513 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4514 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4516 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4517 let config = UserConfig::default();
4518 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4519 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4520 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4521 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4522 default_config: config,
4524 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4525 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4526 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4531 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4532 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4534 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4536 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4537 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4539 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4540 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4541 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4542 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4543 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4545 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4546 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4549 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4550 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4551 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4552 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4554 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4555 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4556 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4557 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4559 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4560 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4561 for node in nodes.iter() {
4562 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4563 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4564 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4567 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4571 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4572 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4573 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4574 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4575 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4576 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4577 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4578 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4579 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4580 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4581 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4583 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4584 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4586 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4588 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4589 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4590 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4592 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4593 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4594 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4595 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4596 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4597 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4598 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4599 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4600 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4601 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4603 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4604 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4605 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4606 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4607 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4608 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4610 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4611 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4612 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4617 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4618 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4620 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4621 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4624 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4626 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4627 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4631 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4632 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4633 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4634 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4635 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4636 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4637 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4638 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4639 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4640 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4641 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4642 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4643 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4644 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4646 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4647 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4648 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4649 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4650 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4653 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4655 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4656 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4658 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4659 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4660 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4661 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4663 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4665 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4666 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4667 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4668 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4669 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4672 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4673 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4674 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4675 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4676 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4677 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4680 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4681 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4682 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4683 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4684 assert!(read.is_empty());
4685 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4688 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4689 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4690 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4691 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4692 assert!(read.is_empty());
4693 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4696 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4697 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4698 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4699 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4701 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4702 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4703 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4705 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4707 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4710 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4711 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4712 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4713 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4715 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4716 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4717 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4719 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4721 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4722 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4724 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4725 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4726 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4727 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4728 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4731 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4732 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4735 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4736 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4738 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4739 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4740 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4741 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4742 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4744 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4745 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4746 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4747 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4748 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4749 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4750 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4752 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4753 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4755 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4760 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4761 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4763 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4764 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4765 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4766 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4767 for event in events.drain(..) {
4769 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4770 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4771 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4772 all_outputs.push(outp);
4775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4778 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4779 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4789 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4790 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4791 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4792 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4793 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4794 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4796 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4797 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4798 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4800 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4801 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4802 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4803 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4804 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4806 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4807 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4809 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4810 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4811 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4812 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4813 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4817 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4818 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4819 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4820 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4821 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4822 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4823 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4825 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4826 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4827 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4829 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4831 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4832 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4833 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4834 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4836 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4837 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4839 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4840 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4842 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4843 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4844 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4848 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4849 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4850 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4855 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4857 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4858 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4859 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4860 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4861 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4863 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4864 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4865 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4867 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4869 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4870 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4871 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4873 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4874 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4875 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4876 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4877 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4881 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4882 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4883 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4884 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4885 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4887 // Create some initial channels
4888 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4890 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4892 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4893 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4894 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4896 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4897 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4898 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4900 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4902 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4904 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4905 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4908 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4909 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4912 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4913 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4914 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4915 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4916 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4917 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4918 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4920 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4921 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4922 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4924 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4925 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4926 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4930 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4931 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4932 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4933 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4934 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4936 // Create some initial channels
4937 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4939 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4940 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4942 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4944 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4945 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4946 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4948 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4949 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4951 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4953 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4954 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4956 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4958 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4959 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4960 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4961 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4962 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4963 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4965 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4966 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4967 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4968 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4970 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4971 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4972 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4973 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4974 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4978 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4979 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4980 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4981 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4982 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4984 // Create some initial channels
4985 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4987 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4988 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4989 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4990 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4992 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4994 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4995 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4997 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4999 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5000 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5001 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5002 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5004 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
5005 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5007 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5008 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5009 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
5013 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5014 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5015 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5016 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5017 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5018 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5020 // Create some initial channels
5021 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5023 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5024 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5025 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5026 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5028 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5030 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
5031 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5032 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5034 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5035 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5037 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5038 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5039 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5040 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5041 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5042 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5043 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5045 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5046 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5047 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5048 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5050 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5052 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5053 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5054 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5055 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5056 // transactions next...
5057 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5058 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5060 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5061 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5062 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5063 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5065 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5066 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5069 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5070 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5072 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5073 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5075 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5076 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5077 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5078 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5079 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5083 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5084 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5085 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5086 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5087 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5088 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5090 // Create some initial channels
5091 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5093 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5094 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5095 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5096 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5098 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5099 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5101 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5103 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5104 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5105 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5107 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5108 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5110 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5111 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5112 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5113 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5115 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5116 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5117 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5119 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5120 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5121 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5122 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5124 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5126 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5127 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5129 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5130 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5131 // transactions next...
5132 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5133 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5134 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5135 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5137 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5138 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5141 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5142 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5144 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5146 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5147 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5149 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5150 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5152 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5153 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5154 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5155 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5156 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5157 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5158 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5159 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5163 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5164 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5165 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5166 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5167 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5169 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5172 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5173 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5174 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5175 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5177 // Create some initial channels
5178 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5179 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5181 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5182 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5183 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5184 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5185 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5187 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5188 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5189 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5191 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
5192 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5193 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5194 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5195 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
5196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5197 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5198 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5199 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5200 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5201 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5203 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5204 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5206 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5208 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5209 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5210 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5211 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5212 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5213 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5214 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5215 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5216 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5217 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5219 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5220 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5221 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5223 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5224 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5226 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5227 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5230 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5231 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5232 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5233 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5234 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5239 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5240 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5241 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5242 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5246 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5247 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5248 match msg_events[0] {
5249 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5250 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5252 match msg_events[1] {
5253 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5254 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5256 match msg_events[2] {
5257 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5258 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5259 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5260 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5261 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5262 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5266 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5267 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5268 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5269 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5270 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5271 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5272 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5273 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5274 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5275 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5276 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5277 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5278 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5280 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5285 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5286 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5287 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5288 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5289 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5290 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5291 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5292 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5293 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5294 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5295 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5296 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5297 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5298 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5300 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5301 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5302 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5304 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5305 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5306 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5307 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5308 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5310 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5312 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5313 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5314 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5315 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5316 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5317 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
5318 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5319 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5321 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5322 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5323 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5325 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5326 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5328 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5329 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5331 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5332 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5333 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5334 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5335 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5336 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5338 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5339 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5341 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5342 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5343 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5344 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5346 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5347 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5349 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5350 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5353 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5354 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5355 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5356 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5358 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5361 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5362 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5364 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5366 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5367 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5369 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5370 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5373 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5374 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5376 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5377 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5378 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5379 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5380 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5381 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5382 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5383 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5384 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5385 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5386 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5387 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5388 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5390 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5391 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5392 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5393 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5394 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5395 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5396 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5397 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5398 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5401 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5402 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5404 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5406 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5408 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5409 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5410 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5411 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5412 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5413 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5414 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5415 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5416 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5417 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5418 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5421 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5422 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5424 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5426 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5427 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5428 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5430 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5435 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5436 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5437 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5438 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5439 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5441 // Create some initial channels
5442 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5444 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5445 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5446 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5447 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5448 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5450 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5451 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5452 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5455 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5457 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5458 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5460 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5461 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5464 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5465 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5468 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5469 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5470 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5471 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5472 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5473 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5474 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5478 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5479 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5481 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5482 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5483 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5484 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5485 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5486 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5489 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5490 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5491 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5492 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5493 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5494 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5495 // use the same payment hashes.
5496 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5501 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5502 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5503 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5504 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5505 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5506 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5507 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5508 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5509 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5510 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5512 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5513 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5514 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5515 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5516 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5518 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5519 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5520 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5521 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5523 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5525 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5527 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5528 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5530 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5532 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5534 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5536 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5537 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5539 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5541 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5544 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5546 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5547 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5550 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5552 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5553 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5555 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5556 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5557 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5558 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5559 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5561 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5562 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5563 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5564 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5565 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5566 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5568 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5571 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5572 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5573 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5574 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5575 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5576 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5578 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5579 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5580 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5582 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5585 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5586 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5587 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5588 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5590 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5592 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5594 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5595 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5596 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5597 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5598 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5599 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5600 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5601 if deliver_last_raa {
5602 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5604 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5607 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5608 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5609 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5610 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5612 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5613 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5614 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5616 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5617 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5618 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5620 if announce_latest {
5621 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5623 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5625 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5626 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5627 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5630 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5634 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5635 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5638 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5639 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5640 if deliver_last_raa {
5641 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5643 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5647 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5648 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5649 let mut a_done = false;
5650 for msg in cs_msgs {
5652 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5653 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5654 // should be failed-backwards here.
5655 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5656 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5657 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5658 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5660 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5665 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5666 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5667 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5669 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5670 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5673 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5674 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5675 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5676 if announce_latest {
5677 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5678 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5679 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5682 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5684 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5688 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5689 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5690 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5691 let mut as_updates = 0;
5692 for event in as_events.iter() {
5693 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5694 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5695 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5696 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5698 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5700 if network_update.is_some() {
5703 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5705 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5706 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5707 if announce_latest {
5708 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5709 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5711 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5713 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5714 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5715 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5716 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5717 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5718 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5719 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5720 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5721 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5723 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5725 if network_update.is_some() {
5728 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5730 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5731 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5732 if announce_latest {
5733 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5735 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5737 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5738 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5739 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5740 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5741 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5742 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5746 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5747 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5751 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5752 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5756 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5757 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5758 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5759 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5763 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5764 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5765 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5766 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5767 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5769 // Create some initial channels
5770 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5772 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5773 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5774 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5775 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5777 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5778 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5779 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5781 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5782 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5784 let htlc_timeout = {
5785 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5786 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5787 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5788 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5789 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5790 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5794 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5795 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5796 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5798 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5799 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5800 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5801 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5802 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5803 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5804 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5805 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5806 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5807 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5808 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5812 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5813 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5814 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5815 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5817 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5819 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5820 let seed = [42; 32];
5821 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5822 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5823 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5824 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5825 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5826 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5827 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5829 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5830 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5832 // Create some initial channels
5833 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5835 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5836 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5837 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5839 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5840 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5841 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5842 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5843 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5845 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5846 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5847 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5848 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5849 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5851 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5852 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5853 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5854 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5855 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5856 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5857 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5858 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5861 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5862 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5863 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5864 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5866 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5868 let htlc_timeout = {
5869 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5870 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5871 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5872 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5876 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5877 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5878 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5880 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5881 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5882 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5883 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5884 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5885 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5886 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5887 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5888 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5889 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5890 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5891 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5895 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5896 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5897 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5898 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5899 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5901 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5903 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5904 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5906 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5907 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5908 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5910 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5911 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5912 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5914 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5915 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5916 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5918 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5919 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5920 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5923 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5924 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5925 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5926 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5927 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5928 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5930 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5932 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5933 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5934 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5936 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5938 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5939 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5940 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5942 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5944 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5945 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5948 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5949 let mut block = Block {
5950 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5953 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5954 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5955 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5957 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5958 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5960 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5963 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5964 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5965 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5966 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5967 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5968 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5970 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5971 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5974 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5976 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5977 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5978 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5980 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5981 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5983 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5984 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5985 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5987 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5988 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5990 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5993 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5994 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5995 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5996 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5997 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5998 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6000 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
6001 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
6002 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
6003 // actually revoked.
6004 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
6005 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
6006 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
6007 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6010 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6011 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6012 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
6013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6014 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6015 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
6016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6017 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
6018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6019 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6021 if check_revoke_no_close {
6022 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
6023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6026 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6027 let mut block = Block {
6028 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6031 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
6032 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
6033 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
6035 if !check_revoke_no_close {
6036 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6037 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6039 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6041 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6042 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6043 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
6044 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6045 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6046 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
6047 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6048 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6052 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6053 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6054 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6055 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6056 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6057 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6058 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6060 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6061 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6062 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6064 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6065 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6066 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6068 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6069 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6073 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6074 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6075 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6076 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6077 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6082 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6083 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6084 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6085 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6086 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6087 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6088 for node in nodes.iter() {
6089 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6092 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6093 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6094 let push_msat=10001;
6095 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6096 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6097 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6098 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6100 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6101 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6102 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6106 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6107 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6108 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6109 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6110 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6112 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6113 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6114 let push_msat=10001;
6115 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6117 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6118 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6119 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6120 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6121 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6123 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6124 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6125 let push_msat=10001;
6126 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6127 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6128 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6130 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6131 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6132 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6134 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6135 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6136 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6138 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6139 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6140 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6142 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6143 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6144 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6145 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6146 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6147 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6151 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6152 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6153 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6154 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6155 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6157 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6158 let push_msat=10001;
6159 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6160 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6161 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6162 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6164 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6165 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6166 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6167 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6170 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6172 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6175 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6176 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6177 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6178 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6180 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6181 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6182 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6183 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6184 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6185 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6187 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6188 // pending_update_fee.
6190 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6191 *feerate_lock += 20;
6193 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6196 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6197 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6198 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6199 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6200 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6202 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6205 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6207 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6208 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6209 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6210 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6212 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6213 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6214 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6216 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6217 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6218 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6219 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6221 // Flush the pending fee update.
6222 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6223 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6225 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6228 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6229 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6230 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6231 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6232 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6233 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6234 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6235 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6236 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6238 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6239 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6240 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6242 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6243 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6244 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6245 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6246 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6247 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6248 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6249 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6250 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6256 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6257 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6258 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6260 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6261 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6262 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6263 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6264 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6265 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6267 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6268 // pending_update_fee.
6270 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6271 *feerate_lock += 200;
6273 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6276 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6277 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6278 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6279 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6280 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6282 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6285 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6287 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6288 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6289 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6290 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6292 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6294 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6295 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6296 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6298 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6299 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6300 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6301 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6302 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6303 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6304 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6306 // Flush the pending fee update.
6307 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6308 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6310 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6311 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6314 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6315 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6316 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6317 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6318 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6319 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6320 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6321 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6322 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6324 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6325 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6326 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6328 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6329 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6330 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6331 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6332 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6333 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6334 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6335 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6336 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6338 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6341 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6342 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6343 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6344 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6345 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6347 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6348 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6349 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6351 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6353 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6354 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6355 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6356 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6358 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6359 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6361 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6362 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6363 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6365 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6366 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6368 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6370 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6372 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6373 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6374 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6375 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6378 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6379 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6380 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6383 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6384 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6385 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6386 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6387 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6388 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6389 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6390 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6391 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6392 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6393 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6395 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6396 // pending_update_fee.
6398 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6399 *feerate_lock += 20;
6401 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6404 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6405 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6406 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6407 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6408 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6410 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6413 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6415 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6416 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6417 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6418 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6420 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6422 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6423 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6424 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6425 let payment_event = {
6426 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6429 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6430 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6432 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6434 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6436 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6437 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6439 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6440 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6442 // Flush the pending fee update.
6443 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6444 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6446 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6447 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6450 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6451 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6452 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6454 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6455 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6458 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6461 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6463 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6465 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6466 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6467 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6468 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6469 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6470 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6473 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6474 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6477 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6478 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6479 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6480 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6481 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6482 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6483 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6484 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6485 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6486 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6488 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6491 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6492 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6493 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6495 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6496 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6498 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6499 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6501 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6502 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6503 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6504 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6505 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6507 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6508 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6512 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6513 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6514 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6517 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6518 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6519 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6520 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6521 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6522 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6523 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6525 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6526 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6528 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6529 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6530 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6531 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6535 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6536 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6537 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6538 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6539 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6540 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6541 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6543 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6544 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6545 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6546 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6548 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6549 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6553 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6554 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6555 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6556 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6557 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6558 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6559 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6561 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6562 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6564 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6565 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6567 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6568 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6569 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6571 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6575 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6576 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6577 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6578 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6579 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6580 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6581 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6582 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6584 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6585 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6586 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6587 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6588 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6589 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6593 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6594 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6595 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6596 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6597 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6598 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6599 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6600 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6601 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6602 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6604 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6605 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6606 let payment_event = {
6607 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6610 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6611 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6612 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6613 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6617 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6619 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6621 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6623 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6624 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6626 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6627 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6628 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6630 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6631 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6635 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6636 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6637 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6638 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6639 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6640 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6641 let channel_value = 100000;
6642 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6643 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6645 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6647 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6648 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6650 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6651 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6652 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6654 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6655 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6657 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6660 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6662 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6663 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6664 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6665 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6666 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6667 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6668 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6669 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6671 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6672 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6673 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6676 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6677 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6679 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6680 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6681 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6682 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6683 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6684 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6686 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6690 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6691 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6692 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6693 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6694 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6695 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6696 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6698 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6699 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6700 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6701 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6702 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6703 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6705 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6706 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6707 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6709 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6711 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6712 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6713 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6714 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6715 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6717 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6718 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6719 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6721 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6725 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6726 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6727 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6728 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6729 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6730 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6731 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6732 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6734 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6735 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6736 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6737 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6738 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6739 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6741 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6745 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6746 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6747 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6750 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6751 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6752 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6754 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6755 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6757 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6758 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6759 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6761 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6765 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6766 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6767 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6768 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6769 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6770 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6771 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6773 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6774 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6776 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6777 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6778 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6780 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6781 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6782 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6784 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6788 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6789 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6790 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6791 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6792 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6793 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6795 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6796 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6797 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6799 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6800 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6801 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6803 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6804 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6805 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6807 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6811 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6812 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6813 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6814 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6815 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6816 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6817 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6818 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6820 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6821 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6822 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6824 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6825 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6827 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6828 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6829 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6830 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6831 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6832 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6833 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6834 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6835 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6836 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6837 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6838 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6839 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6842 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6843 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6844 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6846 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6848 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6850 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6851 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6852 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6854 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6858 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6859 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6861 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6862 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6863 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6864 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6865 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6866 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6867 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6870 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6871 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6873 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6876 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6879 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6881 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6882 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6883 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6885 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6889 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6890 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6892 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6893 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6894 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6895 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6896 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6898 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6899 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6901 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6902 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6904 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6907 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6910 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6912 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6913 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6914 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6916 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6920 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6921 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6923 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6924 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6925 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6926 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6927 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6929 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6930 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6932 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6933 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6934 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6937 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6938 failure_code: 0x8000,
6941 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6943 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6944 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6945 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6947 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6951 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6952 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6954 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6955 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6956 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6957 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6958 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6960 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6962 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6964 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6966 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6967 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6968 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6970 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6971 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6972 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6973 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6974 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6975 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6976 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6982 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6984 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6986 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6987 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6988 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6990 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6994 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6995 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6997 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6998 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6999 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7000 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7001 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7003 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
7005 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
7006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7007 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
7009 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7010 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7011 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
7013 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7014 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7015 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7016 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7017 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7018 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7019 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7021 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7025 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
7027 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7029 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7030 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7031 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
7032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7033 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7037 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
7038 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
7040 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7041 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7042 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7043 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7044 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7046 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7047 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7050 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7051 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7053 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7055 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7057 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7059 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7061 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7062 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7063 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7064 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7065 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7066 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7067 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7069 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7072 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7073 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7075 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7076 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7077 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7079 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7083 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7084 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7085 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7087 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7088 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7089 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7090 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7091 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7092 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7094 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7097 let mut payment_event = {
7098 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7100 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7101 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7102 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7104 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7106 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7107 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7108 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7109 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7111 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7112 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7115 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7116 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7118 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7120 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7121 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7122 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7124 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7125 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7126 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7127 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7128 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7129 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7130 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7132 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7136 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7139 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7140 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7141 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7142 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7144 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7146 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7147 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7148 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7149 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7150 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7151 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7153 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7159 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7160 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7161 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7162 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7164 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7165 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7166 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7167 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7168 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7169 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7171 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7173 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7174 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7175 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7176 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7178 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7179 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7181 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7182 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7184 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7187 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7188 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7189 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7192 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7193 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7195 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7197 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7198 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7200 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7203 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7204 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7206 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7209 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7210 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7211 if announce_latest {
7212 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7214 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7217 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7219 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7221 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7222 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7223 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7224 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7225 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7226 let mut first_failed = false;
7227 for event in events {
7229 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7230 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7231 assert!(!first_failed);
7232 first_failed = true;
7234 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7237 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7243 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7244 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7245 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7248 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7249 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7250 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7251 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7252 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7253 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7254 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7256 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7257 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7258 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7259 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7260 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7262 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7264 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7265 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7267 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7268 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7270 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7272 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7273 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7276 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7278 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7279 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7280 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7281 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7282 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7284 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7285 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7287 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7288 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7289 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7290 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7291 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7292 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7293 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7294 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7296 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7297 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7298 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7300 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7301 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7303 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7304 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7305 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7306 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7307 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7308 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7309 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7312 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7314 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time, 0);
7316 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7317 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7318 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7319 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7320 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7325 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7326 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7327 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7328 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7332 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7333 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7335 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7336 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7337 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7338 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7339 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7340 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7341 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7342 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7343 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7345 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7346 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7347 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7348 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7351 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7352 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7354 } else { assert!(false) }
7356 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7357 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7358 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7359 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7360 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7361 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7362 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7365 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7366 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7368 } else { assert!(false); }
7370 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7371 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7372 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7373 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7374 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7375 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7377 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7379 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7380 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7381 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7385 } else { panic!(); }
7386 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7388 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7389 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7390 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7391 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7392 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7393 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7394 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7397 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7398 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7400 } else { assert!(false); }
7403 fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) {
7404 // When we get a data_loss_protect proving we're behind, we immediately panic as the
7405 // chain::Watch API requirements have been violated (e.g. the user restored from a backup). The
7406 // panic message informs the user they should force-close without broadcasting, which is tested
7407 // if `reconnect_panicing` is not set.
7413 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7414 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7415 // during signing due to revoked tx
7416 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7417 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7420 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7421 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7422 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7424 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7426 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7427 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7428 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7429 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7431 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7432 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7434 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7435 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7437 // Restore node A from previous state
7438 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7439 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7440 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7441 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7442 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7443 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7444 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7446 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7447 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7448 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7449 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7450 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7451 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7453 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7454 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7458 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7459 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7460 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7461 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7465 if reconnect_panicing {
7466 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7467 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7469 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7471 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7472 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7473 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7474 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7475 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7476 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7479 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7480 // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7481 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7484 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7485 // Check A panics upon seeing proof it has fallen behind.
7486 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7487 return; // By this point we should have panic'ed!
7490 nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7492 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7494 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7495 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7498 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7499 if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7500 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7502 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7503 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel force-closed");
7505 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7508 panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", msg)
7512 // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7513 // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7514 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7515 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7516 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7517 let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7519 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7520 let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7521 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7522 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7524 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7525 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7526 err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7528 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7531 panic!("Unexpected event!");
7534 assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7535 nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7536 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7538 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7539 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7544 fn test_data_loss_protect_showing_stale_state_panics() {
7545 do_test_data_loss_protect(true);
7549 fn test_force_close_without_broadcast() {
7550 do_test_data_loss_protect(false);
7554 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7555 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7556 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7557 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7559 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7560 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7561 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7562 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7564 // Create some initial channels
7565 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7567 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7568 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7569 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7570 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7571 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7572 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7573 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7576 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7577 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7578 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7579 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7580 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7582 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7583 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7584 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7585 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7587 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7588 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7589 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7591 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7592 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7593 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7594 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7595 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7596 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7597 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7598 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7599 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7600 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7602 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7606 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7607 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7609 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7610 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7611 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7612 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7616 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7617 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7618 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7620 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7621 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7622 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7623 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7625 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7626 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7627 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7630 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7631 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7633 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7634 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7635 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7636 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7637 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7638 for e in msg_events {
7640 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7641 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7642 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7643 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7644 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7647 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7651 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7652 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7653 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7654 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7655 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7656 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7658 // Reestablish chan_1
7659 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7660 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7661 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7662 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7663 // Reestablish chan_2
7664 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7665 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7666 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7667 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7668 // Reestablish chan_3
7669 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7670 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7671 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7672 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7674 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7675 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7676 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7677 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7678 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7679 for e in msg_events {
7681 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7682 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7683 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7684 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7686 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7687 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7693 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7694 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7698 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7699 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7700 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7702 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7703 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7704 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7705 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7707 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7709 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7710 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7711 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7712 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7713 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7715 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7716 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7717 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7718 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7719 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7720 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7722 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7723 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7724 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7725 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7729 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7730 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7732 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7733 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7734 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7735 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7738 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7742 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7743 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7744 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7745 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7746 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7747 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7748 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7749 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7753 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7754 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7755 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7756 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7758 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7759 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7760 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7761 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7762 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7763 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7764 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7765 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7766 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7767 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7768 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7769 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7770 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7774 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7776 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7777 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7779 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7781 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7782 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7783 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7784 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7785 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7786 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7787 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7788 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7789 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7790 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7791 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7792 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7793 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7797 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7799 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7800 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7804 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7805 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7806 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7808 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7809 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7810 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7811 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7812 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7814 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7815 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7816 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7817 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7818 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7819 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7820 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7821 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7822 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7823 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7824 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7825 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7827 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7828 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7829 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7831 // Revoke local commitment tx
7832 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7834 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7835 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7836 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7837 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7839 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7840 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7842 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7843 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7844 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7846 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7847 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7848 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7850 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7851 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7852 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7853 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7855 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7856 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7857 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7858 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7859 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7860 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7861 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7862 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7864 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7871 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7872 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7873 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7875 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7876 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7877 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7878 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7880 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7881 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7882 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7883 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7884 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7885 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7887 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7888 // available, which we check here:
7889 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7890 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7891 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7893 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7894 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7896 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7897 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7898 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7899 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7901 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7902 // output, checked above).
7903 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7904 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7905 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7907 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7908 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7909 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7910 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7911 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7915 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7916 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7917 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7918 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7919 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7921 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7922 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7924 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7925 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7926 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7927 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7928 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7930 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7931 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7937 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7938 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7939 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7940 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7942 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7943 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7945 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7946 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7947 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7948 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7949 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7950 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7951 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7952 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7956 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7957 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7958 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7959 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7961 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7962 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7963 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7964 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7965 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7966 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7967 // up bumped justice generation.
7968 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7971 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7976 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7977 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7978 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7981 // Provide preimage for one
7982 // Check aggregation
7984 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7985 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7986 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7987 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7989 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7990 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7991 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7993 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7994 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7995 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7996 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7997 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7999 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8000 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8001 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8002 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8004 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8006 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8010 let feerate_timeout;
8011 let feerate_preimage;
8013 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8014 // 9 transactions including:
8015 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
8016 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
8017 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
8019 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
8020 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8021 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
8022 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8023 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
8025 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
8026 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
8028 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output {
8029 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
8030 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
8032 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
8033 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
8035 preimage_bump = node_txn[7].clone();
8036 check_spends!(node_txn[7], remote_txn[0]);
8037 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[7].input[0].previous_output);
8039 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[3]);
8040 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[4]);
8043 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
8044 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8045 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
8046 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].weight() as u64;
8048 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8049 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8050 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8051 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8055 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8056 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8058 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8059 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8061 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8062 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8063 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8064 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8065 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8066 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8068 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8069 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8070 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8071 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8072 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8074 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8075 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8076 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8077 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8078 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8083 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8084 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8088 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8089 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8090 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8091 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8092 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8093 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8094 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8095 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8097 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8098 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8099 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8100 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8101 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8103 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8104 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8106 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8108 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8109 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8110 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8112 // Must revoke without gaps
8113 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8114 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8116 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8117 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8118 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8120 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8121 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8122 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8124 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8128 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8129 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8130 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8132 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8133 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8134 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8135 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8137 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8138 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8139 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8140 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8142 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8143 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8144 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8146 // Revoke local commitment tx
8147 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8149 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8150 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8151 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8152 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8154 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8155 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8157 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8159 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8160 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8161 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8162 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8163 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8164 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8168 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8169 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8170 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8172 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8173 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8174 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8179 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8180 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8181 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8182 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8183 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8184 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8185 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8186 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8188 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
8189 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8190 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
8191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8192 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8194 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8195 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8196 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8198 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8200 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8201 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8202 // can get our balance.
8204 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8205 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8206 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8207 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8208 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8209 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8210 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8211 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8213 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8217 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8218 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8219 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8220 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8221 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8222 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8223 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8225 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8227 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8228 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8229 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8230 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8231 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8233 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8234 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8236 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8238 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8240 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8241 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8242 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8244 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8245 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8246 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8248 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8253 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8254 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8255 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8256 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8257 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8259 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8260 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8261 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8263 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8265 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8266 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8267 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8268 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8272 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8273 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8274 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8275 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8276 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8277 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8278 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8280 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8281 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8282 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8284 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8285 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8286 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8290 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8291 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8292 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8293 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8294 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8295 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8297 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8298 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8299 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8300 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8301 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8302 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8303 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8304 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8305 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8306 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8307 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8308 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8310 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8311 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8312 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8313 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8315 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8316 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8317 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8318 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8319 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8321 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8322 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8324 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8325 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8326 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_50_percent_msat));
8327 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8328 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8329 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_30_percent_msat));
8331 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8332 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8334 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8335 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8336 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8338 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8342 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8343 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8344 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8345 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8346 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8347 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8348 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8350 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8351 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8353 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8355 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8356 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8357 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8359 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8361 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8362 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8364 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8367 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8368 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8370 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8371 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8372 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8374 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8377 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8379 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8380 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8382 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8384 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8385 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8387 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8392 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8393 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8394 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8395 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8396 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8397 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8398 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8400 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8401 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8403 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8405 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8406 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8407 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8409 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8411 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8412 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8414 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8417 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8418 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8420 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8421 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8422 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8424 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8426 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8430 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8431 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8432 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8433 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8434 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8435 // and the channel should be closed.
8436 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8437 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8438 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8439 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8440 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8441 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8443 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8444 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8445 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8447 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8449 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8450 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8452 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8453 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8455 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8456 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8457 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8458 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8459 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8462 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8463 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8464 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8467 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8469 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8470 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8472 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8473 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8475 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8476 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8478 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8479 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8480 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8481 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8482 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8483 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8485 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8488 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8492 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8493 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8494 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8495 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8496 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8497 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8498 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8500 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8501 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8503 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8505 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8506 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8507 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8509 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8511 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8512 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8513 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8515 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8516 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8518 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8519 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8522 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8525 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8526 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8527 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8529 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8530 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8531 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8533 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8538 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8539 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8540 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8541 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8542 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8544 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8545 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8547 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8548 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8550 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8551 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8556 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8557 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8558 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8559 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8560 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8561 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8563 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8564 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8565 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8566 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8568 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8569 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8570 route.paths.push(path);
8571 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8572 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8573 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8574 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8575 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8576 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8577 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8578 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8582 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8583 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8584 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8585 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8586 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8587 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8589 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8592 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8593 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8594 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8596 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8597 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8598 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8599 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8601 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8602 // values from previous calls.
8603 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8604 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8605 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8607 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8609 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8610 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8612 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8615 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8620 #[allow(deprecated)]
8621 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8622 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8623 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8624 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8625 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8626 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8627 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8629 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8631 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8633 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8634 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8635 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8636 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8637 } else { panic!(); }
8639 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8641 header: BlockHeader {
8643 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8644 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8645 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8649 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8650 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8651 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8652 } else { panic!(); }
8654 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8655 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8656 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8657 block.header.time += 1;
8658 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8659 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8660 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8663 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8664 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8666 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8667 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8668 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8669 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8671 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8672 // values from previous calls.
8673 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8674 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8675 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8677 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8678 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8679 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8680 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8682 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8687 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8688 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8689 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8690 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8691 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8692 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8694 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8696 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8697 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8698 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8699 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8701 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8702 // resulting events.
8703 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8706 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8707 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8708 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8709 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8711 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8712 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8713 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8714 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8717 // We should fail the payment back
8718 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8719 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8720 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8721 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8722 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8724 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8729 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8730 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8731 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8733 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8734 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8735 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8736 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8738 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8739 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8740 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8741 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8743 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8744 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8745 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8746 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8750 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8751 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8752 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8753 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8755 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8756 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8757 // commitment at same time.
8759 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8760 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8761 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8762 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8764 // Create some initial channel
8765 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8766 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8768 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8769 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8771 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8772 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8774 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8775 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8776 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8777 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8779 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8780 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8781 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8782 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8783 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8784 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8785 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8786 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8789 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8790 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8791 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8792 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8793 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8794 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8796 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8797 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8799 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8801 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8802 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8803 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8804 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8805 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8806 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8807 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8808 } else { assert!(false); }
8809 } else { assert!(false); };
8810 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8812 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8813 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8817 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8818 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8819 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8820 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8821 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8823 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8824 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8825 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8826 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8828 // Create some initial channel
8829 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8830 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8832 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8833 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8835 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8836 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8838 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8839 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8840 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8841 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8842 let watchtower_alice = {
8843 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8844 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8845 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8846 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8847 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8848 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8849 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8850 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8853 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8854 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8855 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8856 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8857 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8858 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8860 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8862 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8863 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8867 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8868 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8869 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8870 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8871 let watchtower_bob = {
8872 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8873 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8874 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8875 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8876 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8877 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8878 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8879 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8882 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8883 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8885 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8886 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8888 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8892 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8893 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8894 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8895 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8896 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8897 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8898 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8899 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8900 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8901 } else { assert!(false); }
8902 } else { assert!(false); };
8903 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8906 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8907 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8908 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8910 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8913 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8914 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8915 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8919 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8920 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8921 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8923 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8924 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8925 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8926 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8927 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8928 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8933 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8934 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8935 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8938 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8939 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8941 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8942 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8943 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8944 // before receiving funding_signed.
8945 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8946 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8947 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8948 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8950 // Create an initial channel
8951 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8952 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8953 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8954 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8955 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8957 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8958 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8960 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8963 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8964 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8965 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8966 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8967 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8971 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8972 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8973 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8974 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8975 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8976 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8977 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8979 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8980 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8981 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8982 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8984 // Create some initial channels
8985 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8987 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8988 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8989 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8990 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8991 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8992 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8994 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8995 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8996 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8997 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8998 // this test before #653 fix.
8999 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
9000 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9002 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9003 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
9005 let htlc_timeout = {
9006 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9007 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9008 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9009 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
9013 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9014 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
9015 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
9016 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9019 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
9020 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
9021 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
9022 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
9024 // Steps of the test:
9025 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
9026 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
9027 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
9028 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
9029 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
9030 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
9031 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
9032 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
9033 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9034 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9035 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9036 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9038 // Create some initial channels
9039 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9040 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9042 // Steps (1) and (2):
9043 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
9044 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
9046 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
9047 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
9048 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9049 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
9050 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9051 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9052 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9054 // Steps (3) and (4):
9055 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9056 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9057 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9058 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9061 if !broadcast_alice {
9062 force_closing_node = 1;
9063 counterparty_node = 0;
9065 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9066 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9068 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9069 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9070 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9071 true => alice_txn.clone(),
9072 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9074 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9075 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9076 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9077 if broadcast_alice {
9078 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9080 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9082 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9083 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9087 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9088 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9089 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9091 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
9093 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9094 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9095 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9096 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9097 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9098 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9100 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9101 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9102 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9103 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9104 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9105 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9107 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9108 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9110 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9113 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9114 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9115 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9118 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9119 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9120 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9121 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9122 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9125 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9127 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9128 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9129 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9132 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9135 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9137 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9140 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9141 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9142 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9143 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9144 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9147 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9149 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9152 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9153 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9154 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9155 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9156 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9157 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9158 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9159 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9160 if broadcast_alice {
9161 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9163 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9165 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9166 if broadcast_alice {
9167 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9168 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9169 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9170 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9172 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9173 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9175 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9176 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9181 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9182 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9184 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9185 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9186 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9187 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9189 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9190 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9191 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9193 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9194 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9195 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9196 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9197 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9198 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9199 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9201 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9202 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9208 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9209 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9210 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9211 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9212 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9216 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9217 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9218 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9220 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9221 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9222 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9223 // updating logic for the existing channel.
9224 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9225 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9226 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9227 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9229 // Create an initial channel
9230 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9231 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9232 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9233 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9235 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9236 // that it is rejected.
9237 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9239 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9240 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9242 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9243 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9244 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9245 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9246 // move forward with it.
9247 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9248 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9250 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9254 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9255 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9257 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9260 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9261 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9263 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9264 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9265 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9266 added_monitors.clear();
9268 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9270 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9271 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9273 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9276 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9277 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9278 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9279 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9280 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9282 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9283 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9285 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9286 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9287 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9288 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9289 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9291 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9295 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9296 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9297 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9298 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9299 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9300 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9302 let funding_created = {
9303 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9304 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9305 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9306 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9307 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9308 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9309 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9310 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9313 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9314 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9315 // still needs to be cleared here.
9316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9318 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9320 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9321 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9323 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9324 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9325 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9326 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9327 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9333 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9334 // everything is functional.
9335 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9337 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9338 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9339 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9340 added_monitors.clear();
9343 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9344 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9345 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9346 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9348 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9349 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9350 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9351 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9355 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9356 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9358 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9359 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9360 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9361 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9362 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9363 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9364 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9366 // Create some initial channels
9367 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9368 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9369 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9371 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9372 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9373 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9375 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9376 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9377 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9379 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9380 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9382 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9383 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9384 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9385 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9386 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9387 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9389 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9390 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9391 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9393 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9394 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9395 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9397 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9398 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9400 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9403 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9404 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9406 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9408 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9409 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9410 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9411 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9412 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9413 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9415 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9416 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9417 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9421 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9422 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9424 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9425 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9426 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9427 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9429 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9430 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9431 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9432 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9433 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9434 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9435 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9437 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9438 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9439 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9441 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9443 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9444 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9445 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9447 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9448 assert!(chan_utils::HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(wit_program.len()).unwrap() ==
9449 chan_utils::HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
9451 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.clone().into();
9452 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9453 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9454 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9457 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9458 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9461 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9464 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9465 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9467 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9468 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9469 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9471 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9472 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9473 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9475 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9476 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9477 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9478 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9479 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9480 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9481 } else { panic!(); }
9482 } else { panic!(); }
9483 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9485 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9486 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9487 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9488 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9489 version: 2i32, lock_time: 0,
9490 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9491 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9495 script_sig: Script::new(),
9496 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
9497 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9499 output: vec![TxOut {
9501 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9504 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9505 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9508 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9509 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9510 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9511 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9512 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9513 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9514 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9515 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9516 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9517 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9518 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9519 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9520 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9521 // until we learned about an additional block.
9523 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9524 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9525 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9526 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9527 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9528 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9529 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9531 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9532 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9533 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9534 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9535 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9537 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9538 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9539 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9541 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9542 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9544 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9545 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9546 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9548 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9549 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9550 if test_height_before_timelock {
9551 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9552 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9553 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9554 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9556 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9557 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9558 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9559 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9560 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9561 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9563 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9564 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9566 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9567 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9568 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9569 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9570 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9571 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9574 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9575 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9576 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9577 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9578 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9579 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9580 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9581 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9582 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9587 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9588 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9589 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9593 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9594 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9595 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9597 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9599 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9600 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9601 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9602 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9603 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9604 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9605 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9606 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9607 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9609 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9610 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9611 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9614 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9615 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9616 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9617 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9618 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9620 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9622 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9623 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9624 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9627 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9628 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9629 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9630 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9631 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9633 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9635 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9637 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9638 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9639 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9641 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9642 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9643 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9644 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9645 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9647 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9648 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9649 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9650 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9652 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9653 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9654 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9655 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9656 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9657 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9658 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9659 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9661 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9662 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9663 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9664 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9665 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9666 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9667 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9669 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9670 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9671 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9672 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9676 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9677 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9679 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9680 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9681 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9684 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9685 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their channel_ready here since they haven't updated
9686 // the commitment state.
9687 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9689 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9691 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9692 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9695 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9696 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9697 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9698 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9699 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9700 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9701 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9703 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9704 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9707 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9708 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9709 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9710 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9711 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9713 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9715 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9716 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9717 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9719 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9722 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9724 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9725 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9726 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9727 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9728 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9730 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9731 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9734 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9736 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9737 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9738 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9739 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9740 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9741 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9742 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9743 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9744 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9747 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9748 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9750 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9751 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9752 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9754 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9755 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9758 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9759 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9761 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9762 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9763 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9765 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9766 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9767 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9768 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9770 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9771 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9772 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9775 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9776 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9777 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9779 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9781 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9786 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9787 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9788 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9789 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9790 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9791 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9795 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9796 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9797 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9798 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9802 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9803 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9804 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9805 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9806 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9807 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9808 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9810 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9811 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9812 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9813 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9815 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9816 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9817 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9818 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9819 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9820 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9821 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9822 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9824 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9826 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9828 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9829 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9831 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9834 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9835 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9836 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9838 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9841 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9844 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9845 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9846 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9848 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9849 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9851 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9854 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9855 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9856 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9858 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9860 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9862 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9863 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9864 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9866 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9867 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9868 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9869 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9873 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9874 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9875 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9877 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9880 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9881 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9882 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9884 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9886 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9889 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9890 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9891 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9893 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9897 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9898 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9899 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9900 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9901 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9903 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9904 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9905 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9906 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9907 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9908 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9909 final_value_msat: 10000,
9910 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9912 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9913 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9914 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9916 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9917 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9919 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9920 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9921 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9922 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9923 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9924 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9928 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9929 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9930 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9931 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9932 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9934 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9935 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9936 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9937 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9939 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9940 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9941 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9942 final_value_msat: 10000,
9943 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9945 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9946 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9947 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9948 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9949 let route = find_route(
9950 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9951 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9954 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9955 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9957 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9958 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9959 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9960 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9961 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9962 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9966 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9967 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
9968 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9969 // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9971 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9972 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9973 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9974 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9976 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9977 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9978 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9979 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9981 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9982 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9983 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9984 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9985 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9986 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9989 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9990 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9991 // amount of time to respond to.
9993 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9994 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9995 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9997 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
9999 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
10001 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
10002 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10005 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10006 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10007 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10009 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
10010 // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
10011 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
10013 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10016 fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) {
10017 // Test what happens if a node receives an MPP payment, claims it, but crashes before
10018 // persisting the ChannelManager. If `persist_both_monitors` is false, also crash after only
10019 // updating one of the two channels' ChannelMonitors. As a result, on startup, we'll (a) still
10020 // have the PaymentReceived event, (b) have one (or two) channel(s) that goes on chain with the
10021 // HTLC preimage in them, and (c) optionally have one channel that is live off-chain but does
10022 // not have the preimage tied to the still-pending HTLC.
10024 // To get to the correct state, on startup we should propagate the preimage to the
10025 // still-off-chain channel, claiming the HTLC as soon as the peer connects, with the monitor
10026 // receiving the preimage without a state update.
10028 // Further, we should generate a `PaymentClaimed` event to inform the user that the payment was
10029 // definitely claimed.
10030 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10031 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10032 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10034 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
10035 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
10036 let nodes_3_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
10038 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10040 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10041 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10042 let chan_id_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
10043 let chan_id_not_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
10045 // Create an MPP route for 15k sats, more than the default htlc-max of 10%
10046 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10047 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10048 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10049 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10050 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10051 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10054 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10057 // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentReceived event
10058 let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10059 assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
10060 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None);
10061 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None);
10063 // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s
10064 // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors.
10065 let mut original_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10066 if !persist_both_monitors {
10067 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10068 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10069 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10070 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10075 let mut original_manager = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10076 nodes[3].node.write(&mut original_manager).unwrap();
10078 expect_payment_received!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, 15_000_000);
10080 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10082 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[3], payment_hash, 15_000_000);
10084 // Now fetch one of the two updated ChannelMonitors from nodes[3], and restart pretending we
10085 // crashed in between the two persistence calls - using one old ChannelMonitor and one new one,
10086 // with the old ChannelManager.
10087 let mut updated_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10088 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10089 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_persisted {
10090 assert!(updated_monitor.0.is_empty());
10091 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut updated_monitor).unwrap();
10094 // If `persist_both_monitors` is set, get the second monitor here as well
10095 if persist_both_monitors {
10096 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10097 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10098 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10099 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10104 // Now restart nodes[3].
10105 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
10106 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager;
10107 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[3].chain_source), nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[3].logger, node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
10108 nodes[3].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
10109 let mut monitors = Vec::new();
10110 for mut monitor_data in [original_monitor, updated_monitor].iter() {
10111 let (_, mut deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut &monitor_data.0[..], keys_manager).unwrap();
10112 monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
10115 let config = UserConfig::default();
10116 nodes_3_deserialized = {
10117 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
10118 for monitor in monitors.iter_mut() {
10119 channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
10121 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut &original_manager.0[..], ChannelManagerReadArgs {
10122 default_config: config,
10124 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator,
10125 chain_monitor: nodes[3].chain_monitor,
10126 tx_broadcaster: nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
10127 logger: nodes[3].logger,
10131 nodes[3].node = &nodes_3_deserialized;
10133 for monitor in monitors {
10134 // On startup the preimage should have been copied into the non-persisted monitor:
10135 assert!(monitor.get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash));
10136 nodes[3].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.clone(), monitor).unwrap();
10138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10140 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10141 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10143 // During deserialization, we should have closed one channel and broadcast its latest
10144 // commitment transaction. We should also still have the original PaymentReceived event we
10145 // never finished processing.
10146 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10147 assert_eq!(events.len(), if persist_both_monitors { 4 } else { 3 });
10148 if let Event::PaymentReceived { amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } = events[0] { } else { panic!(); }
10149 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
10150 if persist_both_monitors {
10151 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
10154 // On restart, we should also get a duplicate PaymentClaimed event as we persisted the
10155 // ChannelManager prior to handling the original one.
10156 if let Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: our_payment_hash, amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } =
10157 events[if persist_both_monitors { 3 } else { 2 }]
10159 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
10160 } else { panic!(); }
10162 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), if persist_both_monitors { 0 } else { 1 });
10163 if !persist_both_monitors {
10164 // If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
10166 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10167 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
10168 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10169 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
10171 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
10172 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
10173 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10175 nodes[3].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
10177 // Once we call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` the holding cell is cleared and the HTLC
10178 // claim should fly.
10179 let ds_msgs = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
10181 assert_eq!(ds_msgs.len(), 2);
10182 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } = ds_msgs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
10184 let cs_updates = match ds_msgs[0] {
10185 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
10186 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10188 let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10189 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[2], nodes[0], nodes[3], Some(1000), false, false);
10190 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10196 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10197 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10198 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
10203 fn test_partial_claim_before_restart() {
10204 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
10205 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
10208 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
10209 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
10210 enum ExposureEvent {
10211 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
10213 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
10215 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
10216 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
10219 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
10220 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
10223 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
10224 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
10225 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
10226 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
10227 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
10228 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
10229 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
10230 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
10232 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10233 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10234 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
10235 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10236 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
10237 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10239 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10240 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10241 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
10242 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
10244 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10246 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
10247 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10248 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
10250 let opt_anchors = false;
10252 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10255 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
10256 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10260 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10261 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10264 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10267 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10268 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10269 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10271 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
10272 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
10273 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10274 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
10276 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10277 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10279 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10280 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10282 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
10283 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
10286 if dust_outbound_balance {
10287 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10288 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10289 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10290 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10291 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10292 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10295 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10296 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10297 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10298 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10299 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10303 if dust_outbound_balance {
10304 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10305 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10306 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10307 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10308 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10311 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10312 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10313 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10314 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10319 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
10320 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10321 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10322 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10323 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10325 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10326 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10327 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10329 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10331 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10332 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10333 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10335 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10336 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10337 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10338 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10339 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10341 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10342 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10343 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10344 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10346 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10347 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10349 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10350 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10351 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10353 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10354 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10356 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10358 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10361 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10362 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10363 added_monitors.clear();
10367 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10368 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10369 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10370 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10371 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10372 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10373 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10374 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10375 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10376 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10377 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10378 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10379 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10383 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10384 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10385 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10386 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10387 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10389 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10390 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10391 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
10392 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10393 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
10395 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10397 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10398 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10399 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: 0x1, witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
10400 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10401 let mut tx = match events[0] {
10402 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10403 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
10404 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: best_height + 3, input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10405 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10408 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10410 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10411 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10412 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10413 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10418 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
10420 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10421 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());