_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
  21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS};
  24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  30 use crate::ln::msgs;
  31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  33 use crate::util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  38
  39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
  46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use crate::io;
  54 use crate::prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use core::iter::repeat;
  58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  60
  61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  63
  64 #[test]
  65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  66         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  67         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  68         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  69         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  70         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  71         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  72         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  73         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  74
  75         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  76         // funding satoshis
  77         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  78         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  79         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  80
  81         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  82         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  83
  84         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  85         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  86
  87         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  88         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  89         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  90                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  91                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  92                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  93                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  94                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  95                         match action {
  96                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  97                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  98                                 },
  99                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 100                         }
 101                 } else { assert!(false); }
 102         };
 103
 104         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 105
 106         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 107         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 108         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 117
 118         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 119
 120         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 121
 122         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 123 }
 124
 125 #[test]
 126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 127         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 128         // them.
 129         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 131         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 132         node_cfgs[1].features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_wumbo();
 133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 135
 136         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 137                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 138                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 139                 },
 140                 _ => panic!()
 141         }
 142 }
 143
 144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 145         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 146         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 147         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 148         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 149         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 150         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 151         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 152         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 153         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 154
 155         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 156         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 157         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 158         let opt_anchors = false;
 159         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 160         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 161
 162         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 163         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 164         if !send_from_initiator {
 165                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 166                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 167         }
 168         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
 169
 170         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 171         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 172         if send_from_initiator {
 173                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 174                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 175         }
 176         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
 177         {
 178                 let mut lock;
 179                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 180                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 181                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 182         }
 183
 184         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 185         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 186         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 187
 188         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 189         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 190         if send_from_initiator {
 191                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 192                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 193                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 194                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 195                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 196         } else {
 197                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 198         }
 199 }
 200
 201 #[test]
 202 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 203         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 204         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 205 }
 206
 207 #[test]
 208 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 211         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 212         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 213         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 214
 215         // balancing
 216         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 217
 218         // A                                        B
 219         // update_fee                            ->
 220         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 221         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 222         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 223         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 224         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 225         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 226         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 227         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 228         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 229         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 230         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 231         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 232         //                                       <- RAA
 233         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 234
 235         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 236         {
 237                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 238                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 239         }
 240         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 242
 243         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 244         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 245         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 246                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 247                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 248                 },
 249                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 250         };
 251
 252         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 253
 254         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 255         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 256         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 258
 259         let payment_event = {
 260                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 261                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 262                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 263         };
 264         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 265         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 266
 267         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 268         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 269         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 270         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 271         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 273
 274         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 275         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 276         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 277         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 278         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 279
 280         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 281         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 282         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 283         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 284         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 285         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 286         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 287         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 288
 289         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 290         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 291         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 292         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 293         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 294         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 295         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 297
 298         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 299         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 300         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 302
 303         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 304         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 306
 307         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 309
 310         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 311         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 312         match events_2[0] {
 313                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 314                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 315         }
 316
 317         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 319 }
 320
 321 #[test]
 322 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 323         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 324         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 325         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 326         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 327         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 328         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 329         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 330
 331         // balancing
 332         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 333
 334         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 335         {
 336                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 337                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 338         }
 339         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 341
 342         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 343         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 344         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 345                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 346                         update_fee.as_ref()
 347                 },
 348                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 349         };
 350
 351         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 352
 353         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 354         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 355         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 356         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 357
 358         let payment_event = {
 359                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 360                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 361                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 362         };
 363         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 364         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 365
 366         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 367         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 368         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 369         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 370         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 372
 373         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 375
 376         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 377 }
 378
 379 #[test]
 380 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 381         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 383         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 384         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 385         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 386
 387         // A                                        B
 388         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 389         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 390         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 391         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 392         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 393         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 394         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 395         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 396         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 397         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 398         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 399         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 400         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 401         //                                          B should send no response here
 402         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 403         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 404         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 405
 406         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 407         let initial_feerate;
 408         {
 409                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 410                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 411                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 412         }
 413         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 415
 416         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 417         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 418         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 419                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 420                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 421                 },
 422                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 423         };
 424
 425         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 426         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 427         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 428         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 430
 431         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 432         // transaction:
 433         {
 434                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 435                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 436         }
 437         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 438         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 439         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 440
 441         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 442         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 443                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 444                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 445         };
 446
 447         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 448
 449         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 450         // Deliver (3)
 451         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 452
 453         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 454         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 455         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 457         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 458         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 459         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 460         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 461         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 462         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 463         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 464
 465         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 466         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 467         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 469         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 470
 471         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 472         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 474
 475         // Delever (4)
 476         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 477         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 479
 480         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 481         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 483
 484         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 485         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 486         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 488
 489         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 490         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 492 }
 493
 494 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 495         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 496         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 497         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 498         // Node objects.
 499
 500         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 501         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 502         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 503         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 504
 505         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 506                 let block = Block {
 507                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 508                         txdata: vec![],
 509                 };
 510                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 511                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 512         }
 513
 514         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 515         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 516         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 517
 518         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 519         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
 520         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 521
 522         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 523         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
 524
 525         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 526
 527         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 528         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 530         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 531
 532         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 533         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 534         {
 535                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 536                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 537                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 538                 added_monitors.clear();
 539         }
 540         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 541
 542         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 543         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 544         {
 545                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 546                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 547                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 548                 added_monitors.clear();
 549         }
 550
 551         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 552         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 553
 554         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 555         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 556
 557         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 558         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 559         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 560         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 561         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 562 }
 563
 564 #[test]
 565 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 566         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 567         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 568         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 569         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 570         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 584 }
 585
 586 #[test]
 587 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 588         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 591         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 592         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 593
 594         {
 595                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 596                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 597         }
 598         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 599         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 600
 601         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 602         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 603         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 604                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 605                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 606                 },
 607                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 608         };
 609         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 610
 611         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 612         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 614
 615         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 616         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 618
 619         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 620         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 621         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 623
 624         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 625         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 627 }
 628
 629 #[test]
 630 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 631         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 632         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 633         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 634         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 635         let channel_value = 5000;
 636         let push_sats = 700;
 637         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 638         let channel_id = chan.2;
 639         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 640         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 641         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 642
 643         let opt_anchors = false;
 644
 645         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 646         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 647         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 648         // remote limit.
 649         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 650         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 651         {
 652                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 653                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 654         }
 655         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 657         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 658
 659         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 660
 661         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 662
 663         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 664         {
 665                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 666
 667                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 668                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 669                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 670                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 671                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 672                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 673         }
 674
 675         {
 676                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 677                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 678                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 679         }
 680         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 681         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 682         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 683
 684         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 685
 686         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 687         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 688         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 689                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 690                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 691                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 692                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 693                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 694                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 695         };
 696         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 697                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 698                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 699                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 700                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 701                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 702                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 703                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 704         };
 705
 706         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 707         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 708                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 709
 710         let res = {
 711                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 712                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 713                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 714                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 715                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 716                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 717                         push_sats,
 718                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 719                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 720                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 721                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 722                         &mut htlcs,
 723                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 724                 );
 725                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 726         };
 727
 728         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 729                 channel_id: chan.2,
 730                 signature: res.0,
 731                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 732         };
 733
 734         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 735                 channel_id: chan.2,
 736                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 737         };
 738
 739         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 740
 741         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 742         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 743         //Should produce and error.
 744         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 745         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 747         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 748         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 749 }
 750
 751 #[test]
 752 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 753         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 754         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 755         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 756         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 757         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 758
 759         // balancing
 760         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 761
 762         {
 763                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 764                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 765         }
 766         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 767         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 768
 769         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 770         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 771         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 772                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 773                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 774                 },
 775                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 776         };
 777         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 778         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 779         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 780         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 781
 782         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 783
 784         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 785         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 786         {
 787                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 788                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 789                 added_monitors.clear();
 790         }
 791         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 792         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 793         // node[1] has nothing to do
 794
 795         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 796         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 797         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 798
 799         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 800         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 801         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 803         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 805         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 806
 807         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 808         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 809         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 810         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 811         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 812         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 813
 814         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 815         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 817         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 818
 819         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 821         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 822
 823         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 824         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 825         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 826         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 827
 828         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 830         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 831
 832         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 833
 834         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 835         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 836         match events[0] {
 837                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 838                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 839         };
 840
 841         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 842
 843         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 844         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 845         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 846         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 847         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 848 }
 849
 850 #[test]
 851 fn test_update_fee() {
 852         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 853         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 854         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 855         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 856         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 857         let channel_id = chan.2;
 858
 859         // A                                        B
 860         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 861         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 862         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 863         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 864         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 865         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 866         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 867         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 868         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 869         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 870         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 871         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 872
 873         // Create and deliver (1)...
 874         let feerate;
 875         {
 876                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 877                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 878                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 879         }
 880         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 881         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 882
 883         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 884         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 885         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 886                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 887                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 888                 },
 889                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 890         };
 891         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 892
 893         // Generate (2) and (3):
 894         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 895         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 897
 898         // Deliver (2):
 899         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 900         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 902
 903         // Create and deliver (4)...
 904         {
 905                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 906                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 907         }
 908         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 910         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 911         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 912         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 913                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 914                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 915                 },
 916                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 917         };
 918
 919         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 920         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 922         // ... creating (5)
 923         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 924         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 925
 926         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 927         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 929         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 930         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 931
 932         // Deliver (5):
 933         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 934         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 936
 937         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 938         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 939         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 940         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 941         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 942         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 943         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 944         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 946
 947         // Deliver (7)
 948         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 950         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 951         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 952
 953         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 955         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 956
 957         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 958         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 959         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 960         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 961         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 962 }
 963
 964 #[test]
 965 fn fake_network_test() {
 966         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 967         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 968         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 969         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 970         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 971         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 972
 973         // Create some initial channels
 974         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 975         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 976         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 977
 978         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 979         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 980         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 981         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 982         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 983
 984         // Send some more payments
 985         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 986         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 987         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 988
 989         // Test failure packets
 990         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 991         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 992
 993         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 994         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 995
 996         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 997         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 998         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 999         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1002         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1003
1004         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1005         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1006         hops.push(RouteHop {
1007                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1008                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1009                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1010                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1011                 fee_msat: 0,
1012                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1013         });
1014         hops.push(RouteHop {
1015                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1016                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1017                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1018                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1019                 fee_msat: 0,
1020                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1021         });
1022         hops.push(RouteHop {
1023                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1024                 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1025                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1026                 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1027                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1028                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1029         });
1030         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1031         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1032         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1033
1034         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1035         hops.push(RouteHop {
1036                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1037                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1038                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1039                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1040                 fee_msat: 0,
1041                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1042         });
1043         hops.push(RouteHop {
1044                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1048                 fee_msat: 0,
1049                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1050         });
1051         hops.push(RouteHop {
1052                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1053                 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1054                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1055                 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1056                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1057                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1058         });
1059         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1061         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1062
1063         // Claim the rebalances...
1064         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1065         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1066
1067         // Close down the channels...
1068         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1069         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1070         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1071         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1072         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1073         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1074         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1075         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1078         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1080 }
1081
1082 #[test]
1083 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1084         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1085         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1086         // commitment dance rounds.
1087         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1088         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1089         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1090         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1091         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1092         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1093
1094         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1095         for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1096                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1097                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1098                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1099         }
1100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1101
1102         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1103         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1104         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1105         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1106
1107         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1108         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1109         // another HTLC.
1110         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111         {
1112                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1113                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1114                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1115                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1116         }
1117
1118         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1119         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1120         {
1121                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1122                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1123         }
1124
1125         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1126         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1127         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1128         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1129
1130         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1131         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1132         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1133         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1134         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1135         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1137
1138         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1139         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1140         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1141
1142         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1143
1144         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1145         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1146         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1148
1149         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1150         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1153
1154         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1156         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1157
1158         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1159                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1160         }
1161         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1165         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1166
1167         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1170         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1171         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172
1173         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1175
1176         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1177
1178         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1179         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1180         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1181                 match event {
1182                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1183                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1184                         },
1185                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1186                 };
1187         }
1188
1189         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1190                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1191         }
1192
1193         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1194 }
1195
1196 #[test]
1197 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1198         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1199         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1200         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1201         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1202         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1203         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1204
1205         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1206         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1207         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1208         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1209         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1210         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1211
1212         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1213
1214         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1215         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1216
1217         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1218         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1219
1220         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1221         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1222         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1223 }
1224
1225 #[test]
1226 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1227         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1228         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1229         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1230         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1231         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1232         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1233         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1234
1235         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1236
1237         // balancing
1238         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1239
1240         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1241
1242         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1243         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1244         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1245
1246         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1247         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1248         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1250
1251         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1252         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1253
1254         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1255         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1256         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1257                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1258                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1259                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1260                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1261                 }
1262         }
1263         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1264
1265         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1267         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1268         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1269
1270         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1271         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 5);
1272
1273         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1274         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1275         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1276
1277         check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
1278         check_spends!(claim_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
1279         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1280         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1281                 (&claim_txn[3], &claim_txn[4])
1282         } else {
1283                 (&claim_txn[4], &claim_txn[3])
1284         };
1285
1286         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1287         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1288
1289         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1290         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1291         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1292
1293         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1294         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1295         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1296         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1297
1298         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1299         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1300         for e in events {
1301                 match e {
1302                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1303                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1304                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1305                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1306                         },
1307                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1308                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1309                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1310                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1311                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1312                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1313                         },
1314                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1315                 }
1316         }
1317 }
1318
1319 #[test]
1320 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1321         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1322         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1323         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1324         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1325         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1326
1327         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1328         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1329
1330         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1331         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1332         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1333         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1334         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1335         match err {
1336                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1337                         match &fails[0] {
1338                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1339                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1340                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1341                         }
1342                 },
1343                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1344         }
1345         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1346         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1347
1348         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1349 }
1350
1351 #[test]
1352 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1353         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1354         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1355         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1356         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1357         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1358
1359         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1360         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1361         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1362         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1363
1364         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1365
1366         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1367         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1368         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1369         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1370                 channel_id: chan.2,
1371                 htlc_id: 0,
1372                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1373                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1374                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1375                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1376         };
1377
1378         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1379
1380         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1381         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1382         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1383
1384         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1385
1386         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1387
1388         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1389         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1390         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1391                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1392                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1393                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1394                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1395                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1396
1397                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1398                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1399                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1400                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1401                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1402         };
1403         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1404                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1405                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1406                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1407                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1408                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1409                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1410                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1411         };
1412
1413         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1414         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1415                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1416
1417         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1418         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1419         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1420
1421         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1422                 offered: false,
1423                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1424                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1425                 payment_hash,
1426                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1427         };
1428
1429         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1430
1431         let res = {
1432                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1433                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1434                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1435                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1436                         commitment_number,
1437                         95000,
1438                         local_chan_balance,
1439                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1440                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1441                         feerate_per_kw,
1442                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1443                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1444                 );
1445                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1446         };
1447
1448         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1449                 channel_id: chan.2,
1450                 signature: res.0,
1451                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1452         };
1453
1454         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1455         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1456         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1457
1458         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1459         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1460                 channel_id: chan.2,
1461                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1462                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1463         };
1464         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1465
1466         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1467         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1468         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1469         match events[0] {
1470                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1471                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1472                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1473                 },
1474                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1475         };
1476         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1477                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1478
1479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1480 }
1481
1482 #[test]
1483 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1484         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1485         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1486         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1487         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1488         // this situation.
1489         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1490         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1491         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1492         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1493         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1494         let opt_anchors = false;
1495
1496         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1497         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1498
1499         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1500
1501         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1502
1503         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1504         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1505                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1506         }
1507
1508         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1509         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1510         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1511                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1512         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1513         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1514 }
1515
1516 #[test]
1517 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1518         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1519         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1520         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1521         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1522         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1523         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1524         let opt_anchors = false;
1525
1526         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1527         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1528         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1529         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1530         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1531         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1532         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1533
1534         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1535         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1536                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1537         }
1538
1539         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1540         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1541         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1542         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1543         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1544         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1545         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1546         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1547         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1548                 channel_id: chan.2,
1549                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1550                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1551                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1552                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1553                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1554         };
1555
1556         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1557         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1558         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1559         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1560         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1561         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1562         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1563         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1564 }
1565
1566 #[test]
1567 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1568         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1569         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1570         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1571         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1572
1573         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1574         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1575         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1576         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1577         let opt_anchors = false;
1578
1579         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1580         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1581         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1582         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1583         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1584         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1585         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1586
1587         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1588                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1589         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1590         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1591         // commitment transaction fee.
1592         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1593
1594         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1595         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1596                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1597         }
1598
1599         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1600         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1601         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1602                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1603 }
1604
1605 #[test]
1606 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1607         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1608         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1609         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1610         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1611         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1612         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1613         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1614         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1615         let opt_anchors = false;
1616
1617         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1618         // HTLC.
1619         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1620         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1621         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1622                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1623
1624         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1625         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1626         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1627         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1628         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1629         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1630         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
1631
1632         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1633         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1634         match msg_events[0] {
1635                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1636                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1637                 },
1638                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1639         }
1640 }
1641
1642 #[test]
1643 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1644         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1645         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1646         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1647         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1648         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1649         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1650         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1651
1652         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1653         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1654         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1655         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1656         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1657         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1658
1659         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1660         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1664         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665
1666         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1667         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1668         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1669         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670 }
1671
1672 #[test]
1673 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1674         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1675         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1676         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1677         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1678         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1679         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1680
1681         let feemsat = 239;
1682         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1683         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1684         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1685         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1686
1687         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1688         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1689         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1690         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1691
1692         // Add a pending HTLC.
1693         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1694         let payment_event_1 = {
1695                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1696                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1697
1698                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1699                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1700                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1701         };
1702         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1703
1704         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1705         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1706         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1707         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1708         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1709
1710         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1711         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1712         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1713         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1714         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1715         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1716         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1717         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1718                 channel_id: chan.2,
1719                 htlc_id: 1,
1720                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1721                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1722                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1723                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1724         };
1725
1726         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1727         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1728         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1729         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1730         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1731         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1733         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1734 }
1735
1736 #[test]
1737 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1738         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1739         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1740         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1741         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1742         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1743         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1744         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1745         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1746         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1747         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1748
1749         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1750         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1751         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1752
1753         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1754         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1755 }
1756
1757 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1758         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1759 }
1760
1761 #[test]
1762 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1765         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1766         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1767         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1768         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1769         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1770         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1771         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1772         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1773
1774         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1775         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1776
1777         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1778         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1779
1780         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1781                 ($node: expr) => {{
1782                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1783                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1784                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1785                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1786                         payment_event
1787                 }}
1788         }
1789
1790         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1791         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1792         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1793         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1794
1795         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1796
1797         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1798         {
1799                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1800                         .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1801                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1802                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1803                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1804
1805                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1806                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1807                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1808                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1809         }
1810
1811         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1812         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1813         loop {
1814                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1815                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1816                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1817                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1818                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1819                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1820                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1821                         break;
1822                 }
1823
1824                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1825                         .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1826                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1827                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1828                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1829
1830                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1831                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1832                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1833                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1834                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1835                 );
1836
1837                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1838                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1839                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1840                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1841                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1842         }
1843
1844         // adding pending output.
1845         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1846         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1847         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1848         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1849         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1850         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1851         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1852         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1853         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1854         // policy.
1855         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1856         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1857         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1858
1859         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1860         let payment_event_1 = {
1861                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1862                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1863
1864                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1865                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1866                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1867         };
1868         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1869
1870         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1871         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1872         {
1873                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1874                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1875                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1876                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1877         }
1878
1879         // split the rest to test holding cell
1880         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1881         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1882         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1883         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1884         {
1885                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1886                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1887         }
1888
1889         // now see if they go through on both sides
1890         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1891         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1892         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1894         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1895         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1896
1897         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1898         {
1899                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1900                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1901                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1902                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1903                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1904         }
1905
1906         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1907         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1908         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1910         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1911         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1912
1913         // flush the pending htlc
1914         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1915         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1916         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1917
1918         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1919         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1921         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1922
1923         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1924         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1925         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1927
1928         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1929         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1930         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1931
1932         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1933
1934         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1935         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1936         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1937
1938         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1939         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1940
1941         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1942         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1943         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1944         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1945         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1946         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1947
1948         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1949         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1950         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1951         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1952
1953         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1954         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1955
1956         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1957         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1958         match events[0] {
1959                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1960                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1961                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1962                         match &purpose {
1963                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1964                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1965                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1966                                 },
1967                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1968                         }
1969                 },
1970                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1971         }
1972         match events[1] {
1973                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1974                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1975                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1976                         match &purpose {
1977                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1978                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1979                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1980                                 },
1981                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1982                         }
1983                 },
1984                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1985         }
1986
1987         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1988         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1989         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1990
1991         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1992         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1993         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1994
1995         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1996         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1997         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1998         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1999         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2000
2001         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2002         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2003 }
2004
2005 #[test]
2006 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2007         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2008         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2009         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2010         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2011         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2012         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2013         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2014         // To test this we:
2015         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2016         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2017         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2018         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2019         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2020         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2021         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2022         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2023         //    claim,
2024         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2025         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2026         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2027         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2028         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2029         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2030         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2031         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2032         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2033         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2034
2035         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2036         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2037         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2038         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2039         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2040
2041         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2042         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2043         let send_1 = {
2044                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2045                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2046                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2047                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2048                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2049         };
2050
2051         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2052         // initial fulfill/CS.
2053         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2054         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2055         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2056         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2057
2058         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2059         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2060         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2061         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2062         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2063         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2064
2065         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2066         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2068         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2069         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2070
2071         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2072         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2074         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2075         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2076
2077         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2078         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2079         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2080
2081         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2083         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2084
2085         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2087         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2088
2089         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2090         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2091         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2092         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2093         // on-chain as necessary).
2094         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2095         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2096         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2097         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2098         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2099
2100         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2101         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2102         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2103
2104         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2105         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2106
2107         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2108         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2109         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2110         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2111         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2112         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2113
2114         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2115         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2116         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2117         let send_2 = {
2118                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2119                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2120                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2121                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2122                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2123         };
2124
2125         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2126         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2128         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2129
2130         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2131
2132         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2133         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2134         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2135
2136         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2138
2139         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2141         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2142         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2143
2144         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2145         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2146         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2147
2148         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2150
2151         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2152         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2153
2154         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2155         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2156 }
2157
2158 #[test]
2159 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2160         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2161         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2162         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2163         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2164         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2165         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2166
2167         // Create some initial channels
2168         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2169         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2170         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2171         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2172
2173         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2174         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2175         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2176         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2177         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2178         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2179
2180         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2181         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2182         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2184         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2185
2186         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2187         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2189         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2190         {
2191                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2192                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2193                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2194                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2195                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2196         }
2197         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2198         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2199         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2200         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2201         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2202
2203         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2204         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2205
2206         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2207         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2208         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2209         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2211         {
2212                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2213                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2214                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2215                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2216                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2217                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2218         }
2219         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2220         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2221         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2222         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2223         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2224
2225         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2226                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2227                         {
2228                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2229                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2230                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2231
2232                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2233                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2234                                 match events[0] {
2235                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2236                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2237                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2238                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2239                                         },
2240                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2241                                 };
2242                         }
2243                 }
2244         }
2245
2246         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2247         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2248         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2250         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2251         let node2_commitment_txid;
2252         {
2253                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2254                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2255                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2256                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2257
2258                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2259                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2260                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2261                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2262                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2263         }
2264         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2265         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2266         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2267         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2268         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2269
2270         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2271         // confusing us in the following tests.
2272         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2273
2274         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2275         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2276         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2277         // buffer space).
2278
2279         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2280                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2281                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2282                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2283                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2284                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2285                                 msg.clone()
2286                         },
2287                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2288                 };
2289                 match events[1] {
2290                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2291                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2292                         },
2293                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2294                 }
2295                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2296
2297                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2298                 {
2299                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2300                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2301                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2302                                         false
2303                                 } else { true }
2304                         });
2305                 }
2306
2307                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2308
2309                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2310                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2311
2312                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2313                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2314                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2315                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2316                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2317                                 msg.clone()
2318                         },
2319                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2320                 };
2321                 match events[1] {
2322                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2323                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2324                         },
2325                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2326                 }
2327                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2328                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2329
2330                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2331                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2332                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2333         };
2334         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2335         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2336         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2337         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2338
2339         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2340                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2341         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2342         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2343 }
2344
2345 #[test]
2346 fn test_justice_tx() {
2347         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2348         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2349         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2350         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2351         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2352         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2353         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2354         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2355         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2356         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2357         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2358         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2359         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2360         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2361         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2362         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2363         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2364         // Create some new channels:
2365         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2366
2367         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2368         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2369         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2370         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2371         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2372         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2373         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2374         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2375         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2376         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2377         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2378         // Revoke the old state
2379         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2380
2381         {
2382                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2383                 {
2384                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2385                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2386                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2387
2388                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2389                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2390                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2391                 }
2392                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2393                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2394                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2395
2396                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2397                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2398                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2399                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2400                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2401                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2402                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2403                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2404                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2405         }
2406         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2407
2408         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2409         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2410
2411         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2412         // Create some new channels:
2413         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2414         {
2415                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2416                 node_txn.clear();
2417         }
2418
2419         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2420         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2421         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2422         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2423         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2424         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2425         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2426         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2427         // Revoke the old state
2428         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2429         {
2430                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2431                 {
2432                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2433                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2434                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2435
2436                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2437                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2438                 }
2439                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2440                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2441
2442                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2443                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2444                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2445                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2446                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2447                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2448                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2449         }
2450         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2451         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2452         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2453 }
2454
2455 #[test]
2456 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2457         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2458         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2459         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2460         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2461         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2462         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2463         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2464         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2465         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2466         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2467         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2468         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2469         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2470         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2471
2472         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2473         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2474         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2475         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2476         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2477         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2478
2479         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2480         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2481
2482         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2483         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2484         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2486         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2487 }
2488
2489 #[test]
2490 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2491         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2492         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2493         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2494         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2495         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2496         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2497
2498         // Create some new channel:
2499         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2500
2501         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2502         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2503         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2504         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2505         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2506
2507         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2508         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2509         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2510         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2511         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2512         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2513         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2514         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2515         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2516
2517         //Revoke the old state
2518         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2519
2520         {
2521                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2522                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2523                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2524                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2525                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2526                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2527                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2528                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2529
2530                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2531                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2532
2533                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2534                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2535
2536                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2537                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2538                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2539                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2540                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2541                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2542                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2543                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2544
2545                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2546                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2547                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2548
2549                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2550                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2551                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2552                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2553                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2554         }
2555         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2556         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2557         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2558 }
2559
2560 #[test]
2561 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2562         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2563         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2564         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2565         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2566         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2567         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2568
2569         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2570
2571         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2572         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2573         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2574         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2575         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2576         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2577
2578         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2579         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2580
2581         //Revoke the old state
2582         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2583
2584         {
2585                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2586                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2587                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2588                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2589                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2590                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2591                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2592                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2593                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2594                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2595                 }
2596
2597                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2598                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2599
2600                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2601                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2602
2603                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2604                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2605                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2606                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2607                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2608                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2609                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2610
2611                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2612                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2613                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2614                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2615
2616                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2617                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2618                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2619
2620                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2621                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2622                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2623                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2624                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2625                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2626                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2627                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2628
2629                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2630                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2631                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2632                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2633                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2634                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2635                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2636         }
2637         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2638         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2639         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2640 }
2641
2642 #[test]
2643 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2644         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2645         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2646         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2647         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2648         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2649         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2650         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2651         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2652         // towards B.
2653         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2654         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2655         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2656         // PaymentSent event).
2657
2658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2661         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2662
2663         // Create some initial channels
2664         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2665         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2666
2667         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2668         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2669         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2670         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2671         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2672
2673         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2674         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2675         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2676
2677         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2678         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2679
2680         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2681         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2682         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2683         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2684         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2685         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2686         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2687         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2688         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2689         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2690         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2691         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2692         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2693         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2694         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2695
2696         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2697         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2698         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2699         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2700         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2701         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2702         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2703         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2704         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2705         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2706         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2707         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2708         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2709         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2710         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2711         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2712         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2713
2714         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2715         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2716         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2717         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2718         {
2719                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2720                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2721                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2722                 added_monitors.clear();
2723         }
2724         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2725         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2726         match forwarded_events[0] {
2727                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2728                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2729         }
2730         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2731         match forwarded_events[1] {
2732                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2733                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2734                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2735                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2736                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2737                 },
2738                 _ => panic!()
2739         }
2740         match forwarded_events[2] {
2741                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2742                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2743                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2744                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2745                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2746                 },
2747                 _ => panic!()
2748         }
2749         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2750         {
2751                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2752                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2753                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2754                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2755                 added_monitors.clear();
2756         }
2757         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2758         match events[0] {
2759                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2760                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2761         }
2762         match events[1] {
2763                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2764                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2765         }
2766
2767         match events[2] {
2768                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2769                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2770                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2771                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2772                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2773                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2774                 },
2775                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2776         };
2777         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2778                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2779                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2780                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2781                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2782                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2783                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2784                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2785                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2786                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time.0, 0);
2787                         if $htlc_offered {
2788                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2789                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2790                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2791                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2792                         } else {
2793                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2794                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2795                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2796                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2797                         }
2798                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2799                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2800                         node_txn.clear();
2801                 } }
2802         }
2803         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2804         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2805         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2806         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2807
2808         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2809         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2810         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2811         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2812         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2813         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2814         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2815         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2816         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2817         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2818         let commitment_spend =
2819                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2820                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2821                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2822                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2823                         &node_txn[0]
2824                 } else {
2825                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2826                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2827                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2828                         &node_txn[2]
2829                 };
2830
2831         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2832         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2833         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2834         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2835         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2836         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2837         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2838         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2839         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2840         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2841         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2842         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2843
2844         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2845         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2846         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2847         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2848         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2849         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2850         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2851         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2852         let mut first_claimed = false;
2853         for event in events {
2854                 match event {
2855                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2856                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2857                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2858                                         first_claimed = true;
2859                                 } else {
2860                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2861                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2862                                 }
2863                         },
2864                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2865                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2866                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2867                 }
2868         }
2869         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2870 }
2871
2872 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2873         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2874         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2875         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2876         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2877         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2878         //            \                                  \
2879         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2880
2881         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2882         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2883         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2884         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2885         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2886         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2887         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2888
2889         // Create some intial channels
2890         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2891         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2892
2893         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2894         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2895         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2896
2897         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2898
2899         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2900         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2901         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2902         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2903         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2904         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2905         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2906
2907         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2908         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2909         match events[0] {
2910                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2911                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2912                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2913                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2914                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2915                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2916                 },
2917                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2918         };
2919         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2920         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2922         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2923         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2924         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2925         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2926         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2927
2928         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2929         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2930         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2931         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2932         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2933         let timeout_tx;
2934         {
2935                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2936                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2937                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2938                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2939
2940                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2941                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2942
2943                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2944                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2945                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2946                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2947
2948                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2949                 node_txn.clear();
2950         }
2951
2952         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2954         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2955
2956         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2957
2958         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2959         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2960         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2961         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2962         match events[0] {
2963                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2964                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2965                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2966                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2967                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2968                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2969                 },
2970                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2971         };
2972
2973         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2974         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2975         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2976
2977         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2978         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2979
2980         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2981         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2982         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2983         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2984         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2985         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2986         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2987         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2988         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2989 }
2990
2991 #[test]
2992 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2993         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2994         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2995         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2996 }
2997
2998 #[test]
2999 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3000         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3001         // and fail backward accordingly.
3002
3003         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3004         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3005         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3006         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3007
3008         // Create some initial channels
3009         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3010         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3011
3012         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3013         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3014         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3015         // Revoke the old state
3016         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3017
3018         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3019
3020         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3021         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3022         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3023         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3024         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3025
3026         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3027         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3028         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3029         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3030         match events[0] {
3031                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3032                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3033                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3034                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3035                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3036                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3037
3038                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3039                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3040                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3041                 },
3042                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3043         }
3044 }
3045
3046 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3047         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3048         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3049         // commitment transaction anymore.
3050         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3051         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3052         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3053         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3054         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3055         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3056         // transactions:
3057         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3058         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3059         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3060         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3061         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3062         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3063         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3064         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3065         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3066
3067         // Create some initial channels
3068         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3069         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3070
3071         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3072         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3073         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3074         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3075         // Revoke the old state
3076         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3077
3078         let value = if use_dust {
3079                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3080                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3081                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3082         } else { 3000000 };
3083
3084         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3085         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3086         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3087
3088         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3089         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3090         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3091         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3092         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3093         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3094         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3095         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3096         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3097         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3098         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3099         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3100
3101         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3102         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3104         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3105         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3106         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3107         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3108         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3109         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3110         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3111         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3112         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3113         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3114         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3115         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3116         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3117
3118         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3119         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3120         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3121         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3122         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3123         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3124         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3125         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3126         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3127         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3128         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3129         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3130         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3132         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3133         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3134         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3135         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3136
3137         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3138         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3139         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3140         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3141         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3142         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3144
3145         if deliver_bs_raa {
3146                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3147                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3148                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3149                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3150                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3151                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3152                 match events[0] {
3153                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3154                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3155                 };
3156                 match events[1] {
3157                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3158                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3159                 }
3160                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3161                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3162         }
3163
3164         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3165         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3166
3167         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3169         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3170         assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3171
3172         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3173         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + (nodes.len() - 1) } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3174         match events[0] {
3175                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3176                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3177         }
3178         match events[1] {
3179                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3180                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3181                 },
3182                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3183         }
3184         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3185                 match events[2] {
3186                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3187                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3188                         },
3189                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3190                 }
3191                 match events[3] {
3192                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3193                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3194                 };
3195         }
3196         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3198
3199         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3200         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3201         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3202                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3203                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3204         }
3205         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3206                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3207                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3208                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3209                 },
3210                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3211         }
3212         if deliver_bs_raa {
3213                 match events[0] {
3214                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3215                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3216                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3217                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3218                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3219                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3220                         },
3221                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3222                 }
3223         }
3224         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3225                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3226                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3227                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3228                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3229                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3230                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3231
3232                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3233                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3234                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3235
3236                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3237
3238                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3239                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3240                         match events[0] {
3241                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3242                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3243                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3244                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3245                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3246                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3247                                         }
3248                                 },
3249                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3250                         }
3251                         match events[1] {
3252                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3253                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3254                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3255                                 },
3256                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3257                         }
3258                         match events[2] {
3259                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3260                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3261                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3262                                 },
3263                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3264                         }
3265                 },
3266                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3267         }
3268
3269         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3270         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3271         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3272 }
3273
3274 #[test]
3275 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3276         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3277         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3278         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3279         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3280 }
3281
3282 #[test]
3283 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3284         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3285         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3286         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3287         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3288 }
3289
3290 #[test]
3291 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3292         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3293         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3294         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3295         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3296         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3297
3298         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3299         {
3300                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3301                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3302                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3303
3304                 let payment_event = {
3305                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3306                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3307                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3308                 };
3309                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3310                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3311         }
3312
3313         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3314         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3315         {
3316                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3317                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3318
3319                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3320         }
3321
3322         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3323         {
3324                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3325
3326                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3327                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3328                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3329                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3330                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3331                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3332
3333                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3334                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3335                         channel_id: chan.2,
3336                         htlc_id: 0,
3337                         amount_msat: 0,
3338                         payment_hash,
3339                         cltv_expiry,
3340                         onion_routing_packet,
3341                 };
3342                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3343         }
3344         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3345         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3346         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3347         match events[0] {
3348                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3349                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3350                 },
3351                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3352         }
3353         match events[1] {
3354                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3355                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3356                 },
3357                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3358         }
3359         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3360         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3361 }
3362
3363 #[test]
3364 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3365         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3366         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3367         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3368         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3369         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3370         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3371         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3372
3373         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3374         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3375         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3376         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3377         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3378         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3379
3380         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3381         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3382         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3383
3384         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3385         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3386         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3387         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3388         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3389
3390         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3391         // registering new transactions
3392         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3393         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3394 }
3395
3396 #[test]
3397 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3398         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3399         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3400         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3401         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3402         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3403         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3404         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3405
3406         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3407
3408         let mut payment_event = {
3409                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3410                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3411
3412                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3413                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3414                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3415         };
3416
3417         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3418         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3419
3420         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3421
3422         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3423         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3424         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3425         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3426
3427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3428         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3429         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3430         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3431         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3432
3433         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3434         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3435         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3436
3437         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3438         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3439         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3440         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3441         let tx = {
3442                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3443                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3444                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3445                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3446                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3447                 node_txn.remove(0)
3448         };
3449
3450         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3451
3452         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3453         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3454         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3455         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3456
3457         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3458         {
3459                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3460                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3461         }
3462         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3463         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3464         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3465         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3466         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3467         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3468         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3469
3470         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3471 }
3472
3473 #[test]
3474 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3475         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3476         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3477         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3478         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3479
3480         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3481         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3482         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3483         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3484         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3485
3486         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3487
3488         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3489         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3490         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3491         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3492         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3493         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3494
3495         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3496         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3497
3498         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3499         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3500 }
3501
3502 #[test]
3503 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3504         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3505         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3506         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3507         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3508         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3509         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3510
3511         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3512         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3513         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3514         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3515         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
3516         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3517         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
3518
3519         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3520         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3521
3522         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3523
3524         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3525         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3526
3527         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3528         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3529         // broadcasted.
3530         {
3531                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3532         }
3533
3534         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3535         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3536         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3537         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3538
3539         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3540         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3541 }
3542
3543 #[test]
3544 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3545         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3546         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3547         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3548         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3549         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3550         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3551         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3552
3553         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3554         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3555         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3556
3557         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3558         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3559         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3560         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3561
3562         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3563         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3564         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3565
3566         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3567         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3568         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3569         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3570
3571         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3572         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3573
3574         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3575         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3576
3577         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3578         {
3579                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3580                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3581                 match events[0] {
3582                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3583                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3584                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3585                         },
3586                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3587                 }
3588                 match events[1] {
3589                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3590                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3591                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3592                         },
3593                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3594                 }
3595                 match events[2] {
3596                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3597                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3598                 }
3599         }
3600
3601         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3602         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3603 }
3604
3605 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3606         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3607         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3608         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3609         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3610         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3611
3612         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3613         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3614                 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3615                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3616                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3617                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3618                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3619         } else {
3620                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3621         }
3622
3623         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3624
3625         let payment_event = {
3626                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3627                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3628
3629                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3630                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3631                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3632         };
3633         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3634
3635         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3636                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3637         } else {
3638                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3639                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3640                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3641                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3642                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3643
3644                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3645                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3646                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3647                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3648
3649                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3650                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3651                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3652                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3653                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3654
3655                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3656                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3657                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3658                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3659                                         }
3660                                 }
3661                         }
3662                 }
3663         }
3664
3665         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3666         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3667         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3668                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3669                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3670                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3671                         //
3672                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3673                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3674                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3675                         //
3676                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3677                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3678                 }
3679                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3680                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3681                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3682         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3683                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3684                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3685         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3686                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3687                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3688         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3689                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3690                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3691         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3692                 // Everything was delivered...
3693                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3694         }
3695
3696         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3697         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3698                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3699                 match events_1[0] {
3700                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3701                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3702                 };
3703                 match events_1[1] {
3704                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3705                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3706                 };
3707         } else {
3708                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3709                 match events_1[0] {
3710                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3711                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3712                 };
3713         }
3714
3715         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3716         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3717         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3718
3719         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3720
3721         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3722         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3723         match events_2[0] {
3724                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3725                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3726                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3727                         match &purpose {
3728                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3729                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3730                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3731                                 },
3732                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3733                         }
3734                 },
3735                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3736         }
3737
3738         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3739         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3740         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3741
3742         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3743         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3744         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3745                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3746                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3747                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3748                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3749                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3750                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3751                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3752                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3753                 },
3754                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3755         };
3756
3757         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3758                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3759
3760                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3761                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3762                 match events_4[0] {
3763                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3764                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3765                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3766                         },
3767                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3768                 }
3769
3770                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3771                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3772                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3773                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3774
3775                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3776                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3777                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3778                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3779
3780                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3781                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3782                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3783                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3784                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3785
3786                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3787                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3788                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3789                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3790                                         }
3791                                 }
3792                         }
3793                 }
3794         }
3795
3796         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3797         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3798         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3799                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3800                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3801                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3802                 } else {
3803                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3804                 }
3805         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3806                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3807                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3808         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3809                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3810                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3811         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3812                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3813                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3814         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3815                 // Everything was delivered...
3816                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3817         }
3818
3819         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3820                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3821         }
3822
3823         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3824         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3825         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3826
3827         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3828                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3829         }
3830
3831         // Channel should still work fine...
3832         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3833         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3834         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3835 }
3836
3837 #[test]
3838 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3839         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3840         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3841         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3842         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3843 }
3844
3845 #[test]
3846 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3847         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3848         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3849         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3850         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3851 }
3852
3853 #[test]
3854 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3855         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3856         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3857         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3858         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3859         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3860         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3861         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3862         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3863         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3864
3865         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3866         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3867
3868         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3869         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3870         assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3871
3872         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3873
3874         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3875         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3876
3877         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3878         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3879         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3880
3881         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3882         let as_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap();
3883         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3884         let bs_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
3885
3886         // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a channel_ready, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3887         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3888         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3889         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3890         let as_channel_ready = match events_3[0] {
3891                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3892                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3893                         msg.clone()
3894                 },
3895                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3896         };
3897
3898         // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s channel_ready on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3899         // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3900         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3901         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3902         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3903         let chan_id;
3904         let bs_channel_ready = match events_4[0] {
3905                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3906                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3907                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3908                         msg.clone()
3909                 },
3910                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3911         };
3912         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3913                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3914                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3915                         msg.clone()
3916                 },
3917                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3918         };
3919         match events_4[2] {
3920                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3921                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3922                 },
3923                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3924         }
3925
3926         // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s channel_ready, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3927         // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3928         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3929         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3930         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3931         match events_5[0] {
3932                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3933                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3934                 },
3935                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3936         };
3937
3938         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s channel_ready, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3939         // announcement_signatures.
3940         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_ready);
3941         let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3942         assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3943         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3944                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3945                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3946                         msg.clone()
3947                 },
3948                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3949         };
3950         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3951         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3952
3953         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3954         // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3955         // channel_update.
3956         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3957         let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3958         assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3959         let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3960                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3961                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3962                 },
3963                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3964         };
3965
3966         // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3967         // same channel_announcement.
3968         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3969         let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3970         assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3971         let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3972                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3973                         assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3974                         update_msg.clone()
3975                 },
3976                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3977         };
3978
3979         // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3980         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3981         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3982         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3983
3984         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3985         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3986         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3987
3988         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3989         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3990         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3991
3992         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3993         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3994         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3995
3996         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3997         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3998         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3999         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4000         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4001         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4002                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4003         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4004
4005         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4006         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4007                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4008                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4009                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4010                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4011                         keys_manager,
4012                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4013                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4014                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4015                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
4016                         channel_monitors,
4017                 }).unwrap()
4018         };
4019         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4020         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4021
4022         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4023                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4024         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4025         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4026
4027         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4028 }
4029
4030 #[test]
4031 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4032         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4033         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4034         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4035         // channel_ready immediately instead.
4036         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4037         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4038         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4039         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4040         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4041
4042         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4043
4044         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4045         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4046         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4047         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4048         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4049         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4050
4051         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4052         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4053         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4054 }
4055
4056 #[test]
4057 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4058         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4059         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4060         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4061         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4062         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4063         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4064         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4065
4066         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4067
4068         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4069         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4070         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4071         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4072
4073         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4074         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4075         match events_1[0] {
4076                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4077                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4078         }
4079
4080         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4081         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4083
4084         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4085         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4086         match events_2[0] {
4087                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4088                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4089                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4090                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4091                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4092                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4093                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4094
4095                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4096                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4097                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4098                         match events_3[0] {
4099                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4100                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4101                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4102                                 },
4103                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4104                         }
4105
4106                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4107                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4108                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4109                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4110                 },
4111                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4112         }
4113
4114         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4115         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4116
4117         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4118         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4119         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4120         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4121         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4122         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4123
4124         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4125         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4126         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4127         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4128
4129         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4130         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4131
4132         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4133         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4134
4135         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4136
4137         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4138         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4139         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4140         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4141         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4142         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4143         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4144         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4145         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4147
4148         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4149         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4150         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4151         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4152         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4153         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4154         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4156
4157         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4158         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4159         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4160         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4161         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4162         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4163         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4165
4166         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4167         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4168         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4170
4171         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4172         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4173         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4175
4176         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4177         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4179
4180         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4181
4182         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4183         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4184         match events_5[0] {
4185                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4186                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4187                         match &purpose {
4188                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4189                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4190                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4191                                 },
4192                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4193                         }
4194                 },
4195                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4196         }
4197
4198         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4199         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4200         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4201
4202         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4203         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4204 }
4205
4206 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4207         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4208         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4211         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4212         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4213
4214         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4215
4216         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4217                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4218                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4219                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4220                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4221                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4222                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4223                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4224                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4225                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4226                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4227                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4228                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4229                 our_payment_hash
4230         } else {
4231                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4232         };
4233
4234         let mut block = Block {
4235                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4236                 txdata: vec![],
4237         };
4238         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4239         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4240         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4241         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4242                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4243                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4244                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4245         }
4246
4247         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4248
4249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4250         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4251         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4252         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4253         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4254         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4255
4256         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4257         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4258         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4259         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4260         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4261         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4262 }
4263
4264 #[test]
4265 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4266         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4267         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4268 }
4269
4270 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4271         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4272         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4273         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4274         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4275         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4276         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4277         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4278
4279         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4280         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4281         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4282         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4283
4284         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4285         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4286         {
4287                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4288         }
4289         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4290         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4291
4292         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4293         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4294         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4295         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4296         if forwarded_htlc {
4297                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4298                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4299                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4300                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4301                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4302         }
4303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4304
4305         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4306         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4307         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4308         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4309
4310         if forwarded_htlc {
4311                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4312                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4313                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4314                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4315                 match fail_commit[0] {
4316                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4317                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4318                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4319                         },
4320                         _ => unreachable!(),
4321                 }
4322                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4323         } else {
4324                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4325                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4326                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4327                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4328                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4329                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4330                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4331                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4332         }
4333 }
4334
4335 #[test]
4336 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4337         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4338         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4339 }
4340
4341 #[test]
4342 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4343         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4344         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4345         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4346         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4347         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4348         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4349         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4350         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4351         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4352
4353         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4354
4355         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4356
4357         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4358         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4359         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4360                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4361
4362         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4363         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4364         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4365         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4366         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4367         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4368         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4369         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4370                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4371         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4372
4373         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4374         let config = UserConfig::default();
4375         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4376                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4377                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4378                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4379                         default_config: config,
4380                         keys_manager,
4381                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4382                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4383                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4384                         logger: &logger,
4385                         channel_monitors,
4386                 }).unwrap()
4387         };
4388         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4389         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4390
4391         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4392                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4393         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4394         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4395         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4396
4397         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4398         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4399         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4400         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4401
4402         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4403         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4404         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4405         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4406
4407         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4408         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4409         for node in nodes.iter() {
4410                 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4411                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4412                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4413         }
4414
4415         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4416 }
4417
4418 #[test]
4419 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4420         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4421         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4422         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4423         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4424         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4425         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4426         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4427         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4428         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4429         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4430
4431         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4432         let channel_value = 100000;
4433         let push_msat = 10001;
4434         let a_flags = channelmanager::provided_init_features();
4435         let b_flags = channelmanager::provided_init_features();
4436         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4437         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4438         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4439         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4440         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4441
4442         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4443
4444         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4445         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4446
4447         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4448         {
4449                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4450                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4451                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4452                 added_monitors.clear();
4453         }
4454
4455         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4456         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4457         {
4458                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4459                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4460                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4461                 added_monitors.clear();
4462         }
4463         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4464
4465         nodes.push(node_a);
4466         nodes.push(node_b);
4467
4468         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4469         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4470         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4471         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4472
4473         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4474         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4475         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4476         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4477         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4478         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4479         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4480         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4481                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4482         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4483
4484         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4485         let config = UserConfig::default();
4486         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4487                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4488                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4489                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4490                         default_config: config,
4491                         keys_manager,
4492                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4493                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4494                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4495                         logger: &logger,
4496                         channel_monitors,
4497                 }).unwrap()
4498         };
4499         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4500         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4501
4502         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4503
4504         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4505                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4506         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4507
4508         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4509         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4510         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4511         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4512         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4513
4514         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4515         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4516         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4517
4518         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4519         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4520         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4521         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4522
4523         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4524         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4525         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4526         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4527
4528         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4529         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4530         for node in nodes.iter() {
4531                 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4532                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4533                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4534         }
4535
4536         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4537 }
4538
4539 #[test]
4540 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4541         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4542         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4543         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4544         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4545         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4546         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4547         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4548         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4549         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4550         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4551
4552         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4553         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4554
4555         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4556
4557         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4558         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4559         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4560
4561         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4562         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4563         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4564         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4565         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4566         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4567         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4568         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4569                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4570         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4571
4572         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4573         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4574                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4575                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4576                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4577                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4578                         keys_manager,
4579                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4580                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4581                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4582                         logger: &logger,
4583                         channel_monitors,
4584                 }).unwrap()
4585         };
4586         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4587         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4588
4589         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4590                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4591         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4592         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4593
4594         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4595
4596         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4597         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4598 }
4599
4600 #[test]
4601 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4602         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4603         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4604         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4605         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4606         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4607         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4608         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4609         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4610         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4611         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4612         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4613         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4614         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4615
4616         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4617         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4618                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4619                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4620                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4621         }
4622
4623         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4624
4625         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4626         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4627
4628         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4629         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4630         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4631         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4632
4633         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4634         // nodes[3])
4635         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4636         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4637                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4638                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4639                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4640         }
4641
4642         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4643         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4644         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4645         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4646         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4647         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4648
4649
4650         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4651         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4652                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4653                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4654                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4655                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4656         }
4657
4658         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4659         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4660                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4661                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4662                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4663                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4664         }
4665
4666         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4667         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4668                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4669                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4670                 keys_manager,
4671                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4672                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4673                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4674                 logger: &logger,
4675                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4676         }) { } else {
4677                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4678         };
4679
4680         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4681         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4682                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4683                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4684                 keys_manager,
4685                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4686                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4687                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4688                 logger: &logger,
4689                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4690         }).unwrap();
4691         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4692         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4693
4694         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4695                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4696                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4697                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4698                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4699         }
4700
4701         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4702                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor),
4703                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4704                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4705         }
4706         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4707         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4708
4709         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4710         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4711         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4712         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4713         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4714
4715         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4716         let reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
4717         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4718         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4719         let mut found_err = false;
4720         for msg_event in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
4721                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_event {
4722                         match action {
4723                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4724                                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4725                                         assert!(!found_err);
4726                                         found_err = true;
4727                                 },
4728                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4729                         }
4730                 }
4731         }
4732         assert!(found_err);
4733 }
4734
4735 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4736         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4737                 {
4738                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4739                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4740                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4741                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4742                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4743                                 match event {
4744                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4745                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4746                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4747                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4748                                                 }
4749                                         },
4750                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4751                                 };
4752                         }
4753                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4754                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4755                                         txn.push(tx);
4756                                 }
4757                         }
4758                         txn
4759                 }
4760         }
4761 }
4762
4763 #[test]
4764 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4765         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4766         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4767         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4768         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4769         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4770
4771         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4772         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4773         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4774         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4775         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4776         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4777         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4778         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4779         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4780
4781         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4782         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4783
4784         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4785         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4786         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4787         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4788         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4789 }
4790
4791 #[test]
4792 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4793         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4794         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4795         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4796         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4797         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4798         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4799
4800         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4801         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4802         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4803         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4804         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4805
4806         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4807         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4808         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4809         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4810
4811         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4812         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4813         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4814         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4815         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4816
4817         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4818         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4819         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4820 }
4821
4822 #[test]
4823 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4824         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4825         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4826
4827         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4828         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4829         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4830         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4831
4832         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4833         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4834         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4835         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4836         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4837
4838         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4839         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4840         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4841         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4842         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4843
4844         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4845         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4846         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4847
4848         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4849         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4850         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4851         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4852         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4853 }
4854
4855 #[test]
4856 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4857         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4858         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4859         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4860         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4861
4862         // Create some initial channels
4863         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4864
4865         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4866
4867         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4868         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4869         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4870
4871         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4872         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4873         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4874         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4875         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4876         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4877         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4878         match events[0] {
4879                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4880                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4881         }
4882         match events[1] {
4883                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4884                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4885         }
4886
4887         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4888         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4889         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4890         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4891         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4892         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4893         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4894
4895         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4896         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4897         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4898
4899         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4900         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4901         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4902 }
4903
4904 #[test]
4905 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4906         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4907         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4908         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4909         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4910
4911         // Create some initial channels
4912         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4913
4914         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4915         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4916
4917         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4918
4919         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4920         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4921         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4922
4923         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4924         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4925         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4926         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4927         match events[0] {
4928                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4929                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4930         }
4931         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4932
4933         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4934         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4935         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4936         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4937         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4938         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4939
4940         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4941         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4942         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4943         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4944
4945         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4946         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4947         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4948         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4949         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4950 }
4951
4952 #[test]
4953 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4954         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4955         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4956         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4957         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4958
4959         // Create some initial channels
4960         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4961
4962         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4963         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4964         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4965         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4966
4967         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4968
4969         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4970         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4972         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4973
4974         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4975         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4976         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4977         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4978
4979         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4980         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4981
4982         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4983         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4984         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4985 }
4986
4987 #[test]
4988 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4989         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4990         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4991         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4992         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4993         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4994
4995         // Create some initial channels
4996         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4997
4998         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4999         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5000         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5001         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5002
5003         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5004
5005         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
5006         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5007         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5008         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5009         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5010         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5011
5012         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
5013         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5014         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5015         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5016         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5017         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5018         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5019
5020         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5021         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5022         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5023         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5025         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5026
5027         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5028         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5029         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5030         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5031         // transactions next...
5032         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5033         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5034
5035         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5036         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5037         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5038                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5039         } else {
5040                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5041                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5042         }
5043
5044         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5045         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5046
5047         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5048         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5049
5050         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5051         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5052         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5053         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5054         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5055 }
5056
5057 #[test]
5058 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5059         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5060         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5061         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5062         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5063         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5064
5065         // Create some initial channels
5066         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5067
5068         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5069         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5070         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5071         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5072
5073         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5074         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5075
5076         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5077
5078         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5079         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5080         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5081         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5082         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5083         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5084
5085         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5086         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5087         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5088         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5089
5090         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5091         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5092         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5093
5094         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5095         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5096         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5097         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5098         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5099         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5100
5101         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5102         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5103
5104         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5105         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5106         // transactions next...
5107         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5108         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5109         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5110                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5111         } else {
5112                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5113                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5114         }
5115
5116         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5117         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5118
5119         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5120
5121         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5122         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5123
5124         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5125         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5126
5127         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5128         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5129         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5130         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5131         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5132         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5133         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5134         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5135 }
5136
5137 #[test]
5138 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5139         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5140         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5141         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5142         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5143         // channel.
5144         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5145         // gets broadcast.
5146
5147         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5148         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5149         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5150         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5151
5152         // Create some initial channels
5153         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5154         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5155
5156         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5157         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5158         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5159         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5160         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5161
5162         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5163         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5164         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5165
5166         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
5167         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5168         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5169         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5170         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
5171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5172         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5173         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5174         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5175         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5176         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5177
5178         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5179         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5180         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5181         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5182
5183         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5184         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5185         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5186         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5187         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5188         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5189         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5190         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5191         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5192         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
5193
5194         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5195         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5196         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5198         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5199         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5200         match events[0] {
5201                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5202                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5203         }
5204         match events[1] {
5205                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5206                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5207                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5208                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5209                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5210                 },
5211                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5212         }
5213         {
5214                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5215                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5216                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5217                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5218                 b_txn.clear();
5219         }
5220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5221         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5222         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5223         match msg_events[0] {
5224                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5225                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5226         }
5227         match msg_events[1] {
5228                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5229                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5230         }
5231         match msg_events[2] {
5232                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5233                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5234                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5235                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5236                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5237                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5238                 },
5239                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5240         };
5241         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5242         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5243         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5244         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5245         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5246         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5247         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5248         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5249         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5250         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5251         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5252         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5253         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
5254
5255         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5256         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5257 }
5258
5259 #[test]
5260 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5261         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5262         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5263         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5264         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5265         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5266         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5267         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5268         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5269         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5270         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5271         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5272                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5273         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5274
5275         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5276         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5277         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5278
5279         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5280         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5281         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5282         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5283         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5284
5285         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5286
5287         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5288         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5289         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5290         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5291         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5292                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
5293         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5294         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5295
5296         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5297         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5298         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5299
5300         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5301         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5302         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5303         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5304         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5305
5306         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5307         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5308                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5309                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5310                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5311                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5312
5313                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5314                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5315
5316                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5317                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5318                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5319                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5320
5321                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5322                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5323                 } else {
5324                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5325                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5326                 }
5327
5328                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5329                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5330                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5331                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5332                 }
5333                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5334         }
5335
5336         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5337         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5338
5339         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5341         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5342         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5343         match events[0] {
5344                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5345                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5346         }
5347         match events[1] {
5348                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5349                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5350         }
5351         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5352         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5353         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5354         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5355         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5356         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5357         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5358         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5359         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5360         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5361         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5362         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5363         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5364
5365         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5366         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5367         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5368         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5369         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5370         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5371         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5372         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5373         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5375
5376         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5377         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5378         {
5379                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5380         }
5381         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5382
5383         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5384         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5385         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5386         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5387         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5388         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5389         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5390         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5391         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5392         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5393         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5394         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5395
5396         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5397         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5398
5399         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5400         match events[0] {
5401                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5402                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5403                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5404                 }
5405                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5406         }
5407 }
5408
5409 #[test]
5410 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5411         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5412         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5413         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5414         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5415
5416         // Create some initial channels
5417         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5418
5419         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5420         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5421         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5422         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5423         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5424
5425         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5426         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5427         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5428         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5429
5430         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5431         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5432         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5433         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5434         match events[0] {
5435                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5436                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5437         }
5438         match events[1] {
5439                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5440                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5441         }
5442         let node_tx = {
5443                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5444                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5445                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5446                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5447                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5448                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5449                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5450                 node_txn[0].clone()
5451         };
5452
5453         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5454         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5455
5456         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5457         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5458         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5459         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5460         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5461         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5462 }
5463
5464 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5465         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5466         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5467         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5468         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5469         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5470         // use the same payment hashes.
5471         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5472         //
5473         // A \         / E
5474         //    - C - D -
5475         // B /         \ F
5476         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5477         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5478         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5479         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5480         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5481         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5482         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5483         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5484                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5485         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5486
5487         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5488         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5489         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5490         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5491         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5492
5493         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5494         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5495         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5496         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5497
5498         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5499         // 0th HTLC:
5500         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5501         // 1st HTLC:
5502         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5503         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5504         // 2nd HTLC:
5505         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5506         // 3rd HTLC:
5507         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5508         // 4th HTLC:
5509         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5510         // 5th HTLC:
5511         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5512         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5513         // 6th HTLC:
5514         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5515         // 7th HTLC:
5516         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5517
5518         // 8th HTLC:
5519         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5520         // 9th HTLC:
5521         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5522         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5523
5524         // 10th HTLC:
5525         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5526         // 11th HTLC:
5527         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5528         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5529
5530         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5531         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5532         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5533         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5534         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5535
5536         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5537         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5538         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5539         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5540         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5541         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5542         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5543
5544         let failed_destinations = vec![
5545                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5546                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5547                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5548                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5549         ];
5550         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5551         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5552
5553         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5554         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5555         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5556         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5557         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5558         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5559
5560         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5561         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5562         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5563         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5564
5565         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5566                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5567                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5568         ];
5569         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5570         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5571
5572         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5573         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5574         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5575         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5576
5577         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5578
5579         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5580         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5581                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5582                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5583                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5584                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5585                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5586                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5587         ];
5588         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5589         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5590         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5591         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5592         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5593         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5594         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5595         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5596         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5597         if deliver_last_raa {
5598                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5599         } else {
5600                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5601         }
5602
5603         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5604         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5605         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5606         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5607         //
5608         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5609         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5610         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5611         //
5612         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5613         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5614         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5615
5616         if announce_latest {
5617                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5618         } else {
5619                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5620         }
5621         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5622         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5623                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5624                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5625         } else {
5626                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5627                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5628         };
5629         match close_event {
5630                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5631                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5632         }
5633
5634         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5635         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5636         if deliver_last_raa {
5637                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5638
5639                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5640                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5641         } else {
5642                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5643                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5644                 } else {
5645                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5646                 };
5647
5648                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5649         }
5650         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5651
5652         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5653         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5654         let mut a_done = false;
5655         for msg in cs_msgs {
5656                 match msg {
5657                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5658                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5659                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5660                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5661                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5662                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5663                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5664                                         }
5665                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5666                                         assert!(!a_done);
5667                                         a_done = true;
5668                                         &nodes[0]
5669                                 } else {
5670                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5671                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5672                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5673                                         }
5674                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5675                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5676                                         &nodes[1]
5677                                 };
5678                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5679                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5680                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5681                                 if announce_latest {
5682                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5683                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5684                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5685                                         }
5686                                 }
5687                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5688                         },
5689                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5690                 }
5691         }
5692
5693         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5694         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5695         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5696         let mut as_updates = 0;
5697         for event in as_events.iter() {
5698                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5699                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5700                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5701                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5702                         } else {
5703                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5704                         }
5705                         if network_update.is_some() {
5706                                 as_updates += 1;
5707                         }
5708                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5709         }
5710         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5711         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5712         if announce_latest {
5713                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5714                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5715         }
5716         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5717
5718         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5719         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5720         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5721         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5722         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5723                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5724                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5725                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5726                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5727                         } else {
5728                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5729                         }
5730                         if network_update.is_some() {
5731                                 bs_updates += 1;
5732                         }
5733                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5734         }
5735         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5736         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5737         if announce_latest {
5738                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5739         }
5740         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5741
5742         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5743         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5744         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5745         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5746         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5747         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5748 }
5749
5750 #[test]
5751 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5752         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5753 }
5754
5755 #[test]
5756 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5757         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5758 }
5759
5760 #[test]
5761 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5762         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5763         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5764         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5765 }
5766
5767 #[test]
5768 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5769         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5770         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5771         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5772         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5773
5774         // Create some initial channels
5775         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5776
5777         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5778         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5779         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5780         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5781
5782         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5783         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5784         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5786         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5787         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5788
5789         let htlc_timeout = {
5790                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5791                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5792                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5793                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5794                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5795                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5796                 node_txn[1].clone()
5797         };
5798
5799         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5800         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5801         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5802
5803         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5804         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5805         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5806         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5807         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5808         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5809         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5810         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5811         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5812         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5813                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5814 }
5815
5816 #[test]
5817 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5818         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5819         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5820         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5821
5822         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5823
5824         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5825         let seed = [42; 32];
5826         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5827         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5828         let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5829         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: channelmanager::provided_init_features() };
5830         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5831         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5832         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5833
5834         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5835         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5836
5837         // Create some initial channels
5838         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5839         // for node 0
5840         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5841         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5842         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5843
5844         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5845         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5846         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5847         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5848         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5849
5850         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5851         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5852         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5853         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5854         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5855
5856         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5857         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5858         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5859         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5860             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5861             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5862             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5863                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5864         }
5865
5866         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5867         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5868         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5869         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5870         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5871         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5872
5873         let htlc_timeout = {
5874                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5875                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5876                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5877                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5878                 node_txn[1].clone()
5879         };
5880
5881         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5882         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5883         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5884
5885         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5886         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5887         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5888         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5889         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5890         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5891         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5892         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5893         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5894         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5895         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5896                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5897 }
5898
5899 #[test]
5900 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5901         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5902         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5903         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5904         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5905
5906         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5907
5908         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5909         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5910
5911         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5912         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5913         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5914
5915         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5916         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5917         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5918
5919         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5920         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5921         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5922
5923         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5924         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5925         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5926 }
5927
5928 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5929         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5930         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5931         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5932         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5933         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5934
5935         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5936
5937         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5938         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5939         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5941         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5942
5943         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5944         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5945         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5946
5947         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5948         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5949         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5950         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5951         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5952
5953         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5954         let mut block = Block {
5955                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5956                 txdata: vec![],
5957         };
5958         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5959                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5960                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5961         }
5962         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5963         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5964         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5965         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5966 }
5967
5968 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5969         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5970         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5971         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5972         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5973         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5974
5975         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5976         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5977         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5978
5979         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5980
5981         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5982         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5983         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5984
5985         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5986         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5987
5988         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5989                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5990                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5991         }
5992         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5993         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5995         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5996 }
5997
5998 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5999         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6000         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6001         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6002         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6003         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6004
6005         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
6006         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
6007         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
6008         // actually revoked.
6009         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
6010         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
6011         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
6012         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6013         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6014
6015         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6016         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6017         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
6018         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6019         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6020         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
6021         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6022         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
6023         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6024         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6025
6026         if check_revoke_no_close {
6027                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
6028                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6029         }
6030
6031         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6032         let mut block = Block {
6033                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6034                 txdata: vec![],
6035         };
6036         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
6037                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
6038                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
6039         }
6040         if !check_revoke_no_close {
6041                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6042                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6043                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6044                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6045         } else {
6046                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6047                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6048                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
6049                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6050                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6051                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
6052                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6053                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6054         }
6055 }
6056
6057 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6058 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6059 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6060 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6061 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6062 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6063 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6064 // non-dust HTLCs.
6065 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6066 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6067 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6068 #[test]
6069 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6070         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6071         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6072
6073         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6074         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6075 }
6076
6077 #[test]
6078 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6079         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6080         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6081         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6082         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6083 }
6084
6085 #[test]
6086 #[should_panic]
6087 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6088         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6089         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6090         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6091         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6092         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6093         for node in nodes.iter() {
6094                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6095         }
6096
6097         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6098         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6099         let push_msat=10001;
6100         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6101         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6102         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6103         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6104
6105         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6106         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6107         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6108 }
6109
6110 #[test]
6111 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6112         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6113         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6114         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6115         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6116
6117         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6118         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6119         let push_msat=10001;
6120         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6121
6122         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6123         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6124         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6125         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6126         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6127
6128         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6129         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6130         let push_msat=10001;
6131         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6132         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6133         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6134
6135         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6136         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6137         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6138
6139         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6140         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6141         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6142
6143         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6144         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6145         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6146
6147         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6148         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6149         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6150         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6151         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6152         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6153 }
6154
6155 #[test]
6156 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6157         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6158         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6159         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6160         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6161
6162         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6163         let push_msat=10001;
6164         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6165         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6166         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6167         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6168
6169         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6170         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6171         let err_msg = match events[0] {
6172                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6173                         msg.clone()
6174                 },
6175                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6176         };
6177         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6178 }
6179
6180 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6181 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6182 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6183 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6184 #[test]
6185 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6186         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6187         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6188         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6189         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6190         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6191
6192         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6193         // pending_update_fee.
6194         {
6195                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6196                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6197         }
6198         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6200
6201         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6202         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6203         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6204                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6205                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6206                 },
6207                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6208         };
6209
6210         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6211
6212         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6213         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6214         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6215         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6216
6217         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6218         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6219         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6220
6221         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6222         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6223         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6224         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6225
6226         // Flush the pending fee update.
6227         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6228         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6229         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6230         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6231         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6232
6233         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6234         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6235         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6236         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6237         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6238         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6239         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6240                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6241         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6242
6243         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6244         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6245         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6246         match &events[0] {
6247                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6248                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6249                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6250                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6251                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6252                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6253                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
6254                 },
6255                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6256         }
6257 }
6258
6259 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6260 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6261 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6262 #[test]
6263 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6264         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6265         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6266         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6267         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6268         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6269
6270         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6271         // pending_update_fee.
6272         {
6273                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6274                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6275         }
6276         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6277         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6278
6279         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6280         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6281         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6282                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6283                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6284                 },
6285                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6286         };
6287
6288         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6289
6290         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6291         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6292         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6293         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6294
6295         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6296         let amt_1 = 20000;
6297         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6298         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6299         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6300
6301         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6302         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6303         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6304         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6305         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6306         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6307         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6308
6309         // Flush the pending fee update.
6310         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6311         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6312         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6313         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6314         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6316
6317         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6318         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6319         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6320         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6321         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6322         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6323         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6324                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6325         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6326
6327         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6328         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6329         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6330         match &events[0] {
6331                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6332                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6333                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6334                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6335                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6336                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6337                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
6338                 },
6339                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6340         }
6341
6342         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6343         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6344                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6345                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6346                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6347         };
6348         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6349                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6350                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6351         };
6352         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6353         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6354         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6355         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6356         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6357         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6358         match events[0] {
6359                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6360                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6361         }
6362         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6363         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6364         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6365         match events[0] {
6366                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6367                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6368         }
6369         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6370         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6371         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6372
6373         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6374         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6375         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6376         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6377 }
6378
6379 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6380 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6381 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6382 // once it's freed.
6383 #[test]
6384 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6385         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6386         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6387         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6388         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6389         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6390         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6391         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6392         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6393         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6394         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6395
6396         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6397         // pending_update_fee.
6398         {
6399                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6400                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6401         }
6402         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6403         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6404
6405         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6406         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6407         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6408                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6409                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6410                 },
6411                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6412         };
6413
6414         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6415
6416         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6417         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6418         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6419         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6420
6421         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6422         let feemsat = 239;
6423         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6424         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6425         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6426         let payment_event = {
6427                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6428                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6429
6430                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6431                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6432
6433                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6434         };
6435         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6436         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6437         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6438         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6439
6440         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6441         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6442
6443         // Flush the pending fee update.
6444         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6445         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6446         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6447         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6448         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6450
6451         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6452         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6453         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6454
6455         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6456                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6457                         msg.clone()
6458                 },
6459                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6460         };
6461
6462         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6463         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6464         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6465
6466         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6467         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6468         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6469         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6470                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6471                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6472         }
6473
6474         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6475         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6476         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6477
6478         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6479         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6480         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6481         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6482                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6483                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6484                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6485                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6486                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6487                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6488                 },
6489                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6490         };
6491
6492         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6493         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6494         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6495
6496         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6497         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6498         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6499         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6500         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6501         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6502         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6503         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6504         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6505                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6506                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6507         };
6508         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6509         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6510         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6511 }
6512
6513 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6514 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6515 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6516
6517 #[test]
6518 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6519         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6520         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6521         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6522         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6523         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6524         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6525
6526         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6527         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6528
6529         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6530                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6531         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6532         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6533 }
6534
6535 #[test]
6536 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6537         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6538         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6539         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6540         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6541         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6542         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6543
6544         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6545         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6546         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6547                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6548
6549         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6550         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6551 }
6552
6553 #[test]
6554 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6555         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6556         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6557         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6558         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6559         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6560         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6561
6562         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6563         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6564         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6565         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6566         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6567
6568         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6569         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6570         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6571         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6572         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6573 }
6574
6575 #[test]
6576 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6577         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6578         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6579         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6580         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6581         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6582         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6583         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6584
6585         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6586                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6587         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6588         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6589         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6590                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6591 }
6592
6593 #[test]
6594 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6595         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6596         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6597         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6598         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6599         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6600         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6601         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6602         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6603         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6604
6605         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6606                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6607                 let payment_event = {
6608                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6609                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6610
6611                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6612                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6613                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6614                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6615                         } else {
6616                                 assert!(false);
6617                         }
6618                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6619                 };
6620                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6621                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6622                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6623
6624                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6625                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6626         }
6627         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6628         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6629                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6630
6631         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6632         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6633 }
6634
6635 #[test]
6636 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6637         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6638         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6639         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6640         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6641         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6642         let channel_value = 100000;
6643         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6644         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6645
6646         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6647
6648         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6649         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6650         // limits us to.
6651         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6652         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6653                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6654
6655         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6656         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6657
6658         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6659 }
6660
6661 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6662 #[test]
6663 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6664         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6665         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6666         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6667         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6668         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6669         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6670         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6671         {
6672                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6673                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6674                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6675         }
6676
6677         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6678         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6679         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6680         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6681         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6682         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6683         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6684         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6685         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6686         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6687         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6688 }
6689
6690 #[test]
6691 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6692         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6693         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6694         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6695         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6696         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6697         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6698
6699         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6700         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6701         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6702         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6703         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6704         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6705
6706         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6707         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6708         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6709         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6710         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6711
6712         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6713         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6714         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6715         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6716         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6717
6718         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6719         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6720         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6721         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6722         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6723 }
6724
6725 #[test]
6726 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6727         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6728         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6729         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6730         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6731         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6732         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6733         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6734
6735         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6736         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6737         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6738         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6739         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6740         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6741
6742         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6743                 channel_id: chan.2,
6744                 htlc_id: 0,
6745                 amount_msat: 1000,
6746                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6747                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6748                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6749         };
6750
6751         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6752                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6753                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6754         }
6755         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6756         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6757
6758         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6759         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6760         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6761         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6762         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6763 }
6764
6765 #[test]
6766 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6767         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6768         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6769         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6770         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6771         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6772         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6773
6774         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6775         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6776         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6777         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6778         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6779         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6780
6781         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6782         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6783         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6784         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6785         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6786 }
6787
6788 #[test]
6789 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6790         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6791         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6792         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6793         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6794         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6795
6796         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6797         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6798         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6799         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6800         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6801         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6802         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6803
6804         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6805         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6806         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6808         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6809 }
6810
6811 #[test]
6812 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6813         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6814         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6815         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6816         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6817         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6818         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6819         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6820
6821         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6822         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6823         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6824         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6825         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6826         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6827
6828         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6829         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6830         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6831         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6832         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6833         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6834         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6835         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6836         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6837         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6838         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6839         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6840         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6841
6842         //Resend HTLC
6843         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6844         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6845         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6846         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6847         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6848
6849         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6850
6851         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6852         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6853         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6854         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6855         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6856 }
6857
6858 #[test]
6859 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6860         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6861
6862         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6863         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6864         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6865         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6866         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6867         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6868         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6869
6870         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6871         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6872         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6873
6874         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6875                 channel_id: chan.2,
6876                 htlc_id: 0,
6877                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6878         };
6879
6880         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6881
6882         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6883         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6884         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6885         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6886         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6887 }
6888
6889 #[test]
6890 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6891         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6892
6893         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6894         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6895         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6896         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6897         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6898
6899         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6900         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6902         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6903         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6904
6905         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6906                 channel_id: chan.2,
6907                 htlc_id: 0,
6908                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6909         };
6910
6911         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6912
6913         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6914         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6915         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6916         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6917         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6918 }
6919
6920 #[test]
6921 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6922         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6923
6924         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6925         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6926         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6927         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6928         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6929
6930         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6931         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6932         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6933         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6934         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6935         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6936                 channel_id: chan.2,
6937                 htlc_id: 0,
6938                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6939                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6940         };
6941
6942         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6943
6944         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6945         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6946         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6947         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6948         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6949 }
6950
6951 #[test]
6952 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6953         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6954
6955         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6956         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6957         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6958         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6959         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6960
6961         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6962
6963         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6964         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6965         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6966
6967         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6968         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6969         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6970                 match events[0] {
6971                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6972                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6973                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6974                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6975                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6976                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6977                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6978                         },
6979                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6980                 }
6981         };
6982
6983         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6984
6985         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6986
6987         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6988         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6989         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6990         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6991         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6992 }
6993
6994 #[test]
6995 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6996         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6997
6998         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6999         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7000         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7001         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7002         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7003
7004         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
7005
7006         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
7007         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7008         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
7009
7010         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7011         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7012         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
7013                 match events[0] {
7014                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7015                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7016                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7017                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7018                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7019                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7020                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7021                         },
7022                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7023                 }
7024         };
7025
7026         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
7027
7028         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7029
7030         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7031         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7032         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
7033         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7034         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7035 }
7036
7037 #[test]
7038 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
7039         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
7040
7041         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7042         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7043         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7044         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7045         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7046
7047         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7048         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7049         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7050
7051         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7052         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7053
7054         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7055         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7056         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7057
7058         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7059
7060         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7061                 match events[0] {
7062                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7063                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7064                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7065                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7066                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7067                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7068                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7069                         },
7070                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7071                 }
7072         };
7073         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7074         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7075
7076         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7077         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7078         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7079         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7080         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7081 }
7082
7083 #[test]
7084 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7085         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7086         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7087
7088         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7089         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7090         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7091         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7092         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7093         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7094
7095         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7096
7097         //First hop
7098         let mut payment_event = {
7099                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7100                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7101                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7102                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7103                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7104         };
7105         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7106         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7107         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7108         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7109         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7110         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7111         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7112         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7113         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7114
7115         //Second Hop
7116         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7117         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7118         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7119         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7120
7121         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7122         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7123         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7124                 match events_3[0] {
7125                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7126                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7127                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7128                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7129                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7130                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7131                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7132                         },
7133                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7134                 }
7135         };
7136
7137         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7138
7139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7140         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7141         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7142         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7143         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7144
7145         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7146         match events_4[0] {
7147                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7148                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7149                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7150                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7151                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7152                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7153                 },
7154                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7155         };
7156
7157         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7158 }
7159
7160 #[test]
7161 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
7162         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7163         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7164         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7165         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7166         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7167         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7168
7169         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
7170
7171         // First hop
7172         let mut payment_event = {
7173                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7174                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7175                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
7176         };
7177
7178         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7179         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7180         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7182         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
7183         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7184
7185         // Second Hop
7186         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
7187         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7189         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7190
7191         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7192         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7193         match events_3[0] {
7194                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7195                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
7196                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
7197                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
7198
7199                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7200                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7201                 },
7202                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7203         }
7204
7205         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
7206                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
7207                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7208         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7209         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7211
7212         match events_4[0] {
7213                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7214                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7215                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7216                 },
7217                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7218         }
7219
7220         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7221         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7222
7223         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
7224         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
7225         match events_5[0] {
7226                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
7227                         Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
7228                 } => {
7229                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
7230                         assert!(is_permanent);
7231                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
7232                 },
7233                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7234         }
7235
7236         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
7237 }
7238
7239 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7240         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7241         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7242         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7243
7244         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7245         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7246         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7247         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7248         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7249         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7250
7251         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7252
7253         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7254         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7255         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7256         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7257
7258         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7259         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7260
7261         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7262         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7263         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7264         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7265         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7266
7267         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7268         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7269         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7270         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7271
7272         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7273         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7274
7275         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7276         match events[0] {
7277                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7278                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7279                 },
7280                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7281         }
7282         match events[1] {
7283                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7284                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7285                 },
7286                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7287         }
7288
7289         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7290         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7291         if announce_latest {
7292                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7293         } else {
7294                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7295         }
7296
7297         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7298         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7299         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7300
7301         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7302         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7303         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7304         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7305         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7306         let mut first_failed = false;
7307         for event in events {
7308                 match event {
7309                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7310                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7311                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7312                                         first_failed = true;
7313                                 } else {
7314                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7315                                 }
7316                         }
7317                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7318                 }
7319         }
7320 }
7321
7322 #[test]
7323 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7324         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7325         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7326 }
7327
7328 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7329         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7330         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7331         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7332         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7333         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7334         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7335
7336         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7337         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7338         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7339         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7340         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7341
7342         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7343
7344         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7345         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7346
7347         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7348         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7349
7350         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7351         if revoked {
7352                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7353                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7354         }
7355
7356         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7357         if local {
7358                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7359                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7360                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7361                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7362                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7363
7364                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7365                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7366                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7367                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7368                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7369                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7370                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7371                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7372                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7373                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7374                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7375         } else {
7376                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7377                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7378                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7379                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7380                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7381                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7382
7383                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7384                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7385                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7386                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7387                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7388                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7389                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7390
7391                 if !revoked {
7392                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7393                 } else {
7394                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
7395                 }
7396                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7397                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7398                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7399                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7400                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7401         }
7402 }
7403
7404 #[test]
7405 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7406         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7407         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7408         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7409 }
7410
7411 #[test]
7412 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7413         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7414
7415         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7416         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7417         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7418         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7419         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7420         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7421         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7422         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7423         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7424
7425         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7426         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7427                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7428                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7429         {
7430                 match error {
7431                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7432                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7433                 }
7434         } else { assert!(false) }
7435
7436         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7437         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7438         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7439         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7440         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7441                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7442                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7443         {
7444                 match error {
7445                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7446                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7447                 }
7448         } else { assert!(false); }
7449
7450         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7451         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7452         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7453         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7454         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7455         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
7456         let reason_msg;
7457         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7458                 match action {
7459                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7460                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7461                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7462                         },
7463                         _ => { panic!(); }
7464                 }
7465         } else { panic!(); }
7466         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7467
7468         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7469         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7470         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7471         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7472         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7473                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7474                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7475         {
7476                 match error {
7477                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7478                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7479                 }
7480         } else { assert!(false); }
7481 }
7482
7483 fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) {
7484         // When we get a data_loss_protect proving we're behind, we immediately panic as the
7485         // chain::Watch API requirements have been violated (e.g. the user restored from a backup). The
7486         // panic message informs the user they should force-close without broadcasting, which is tested
7487         // if `reconnect_panicing` is not set.
7488         let persister;
7489         let logger;
7490         let fee_estimator;
7491         let tx_broadcaster;
7492         let chain_source;
7493         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7494         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7495         // during signing due to revoked tx
7496         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7497         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7498         let monitor;
7499         let node_state_0;
7500         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7501         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7502         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7503
7504         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7505
7506         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7507         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7508         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7509         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7510
7511         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7512         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7513
7514         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7515         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7516
7517         // Restore node A from previous state
7518         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7519         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7520         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7521         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7522         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7523         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7524         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7525         node_state_0 = {
7526                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7527                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7528                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7529                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7530                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7531                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7532                         logger: &logger,
7533                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7534                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7535                         channel_monitors,
7536                 }).unwrap().1
7537         };
7538         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7539         assert_eq!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor),
7540                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
7541         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7542         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7543
7544         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7545
7546         if reconnect_panicing {
7547                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7548                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7549
7550                 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7551
7552                 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7553                 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7554                 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7555                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7556                 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7557                 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7558
7559                 {
7560                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7561                         // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7562                         assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7563                 }
7564
7565                 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7566                 // Check A panics upon seeing proof it has fallen behind.
7567                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7568                 return; // By this point we should have panic'ed!
7569         }
7570
7571         nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7572         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7573         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7574         {
7575                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7576                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7577         }
7578
7579         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7580                 if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7581                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7582                         match action {
7583                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7584                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel force-closed");
7585                                 },
7586                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7587                         }
7588                 } else {
7589                         panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", msg)
7590                 }
7591         }
7592
7593         // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7594         // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7595         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7596         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7597         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7598         let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7599
7600         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7601         let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7602         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7603                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7604                         match action {
7605                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7606                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7607                                         err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7608                                 },
7609                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7610                         }
7611                 } else {
7612                         panic!("Unexpected event!");
7613                 }
7614         }
7615         assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7616         nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7617         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7618         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7619         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7620         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7621 }
7622
7623 #[test]
7624 #[should_panic]
7625 fn test_data_loss_protect_showing_stale_state_panics() {
7626         do_test_data_loss_protect(true);
7627 }
7628
7629 #[test]
7630 fn test_force_close_without_broadcast() {
7631         do_test_data_loss_protect(false);
7632 }
7633
7634 #[test]
7635 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7636         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7637         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7638         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7639
7640         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7641         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7642         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7643         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7644
7645         // Create some initial channels
7646         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7647
7648         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7649         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7650         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7651         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7652         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7653         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7654         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7655         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7656
7657         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7658         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7659         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7660         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7661         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7662
7663         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7664         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7665         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7666         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7667
7668         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7669         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7670         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7671
7672         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7673         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7674         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7675                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7676                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7677                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7678                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7679                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7680                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7681                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7682                 },
7683                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7684         };
7685         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7686
7687         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7688         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7689
7690         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7691         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7692         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7693         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7694 }
7695
7696 #[test]
7697 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7698         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7699         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7700
7701         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7702         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7703         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7704         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7705
7706         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7707         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7708         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7709
7710         // Disconnect peers
7711         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7712         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7713
7714         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7715         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7716         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7717         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7718         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7719         for e in msg_events {
7720                 match e {
7721                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7722                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7723                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7724                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7725                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7726                                 }
7727                         },
7728                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7729                 }
7730         }
7731         // Reconnect peers
7732         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7733         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7734         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7735         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7736         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7737         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7738
7739         // Reestablish chan_1
7740         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7741         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7742         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7743         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7744         // Reestablish chan_2
7745         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7746         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7747         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7748         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7749         // Reestablish chan_3
7750         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7751         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7752         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7753         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7754
7755         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7756         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7757         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7758         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7759         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7760         for e in msg_events {
7761                 match e {
7762                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7763                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7764                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7765                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7766                                         // the old one.
7767                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7768                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7769                                 }
7770                         },
7771                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7772                 }
7773         }
7774         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7775         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7776 }
7777
7778 #[test]
7779 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7780         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7781         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7782
7783         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7784         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7785         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7786         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7787
7788         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7789
7790         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7791         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7792                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7793         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7794         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7795
7796         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7797         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7798         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7799         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7800         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7801         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7802
7803         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7804         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7805                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7806                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7807                 }
7808         }
7809
7810         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7811         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7812
7813         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7814         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7815         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7816         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7818
7819         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7820         let penalty_1;
7821         let feerate_1;
7822         {
7823                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7824                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7825                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7826                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7827                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7828                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7829                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7830                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7831                 node_txn.clear();
7832         };
7833
7834         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7835         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7836         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7837         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7838         {
7839                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7840                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7841                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7842                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7843                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7844                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7845                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7846                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7847                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7848                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7849                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7850                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7851                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7852                         node_txn.clear();
7853                 }
7854         }
7855         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7856
7857         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7858         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7859         let penalty_3;
7860         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7861         {
7862                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7863                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7864                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7865                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7866                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7867                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7868                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7869                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7870                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7871                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7872                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7873                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7874                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7875                         node_txn.clear();
7876                 }
7877         }
7878         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7879
7880         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7881         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7882 }
7883
7884 #[test]
7885 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7886         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7887         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7888
7889         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7890         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7891         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7892         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7893         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7894
7895         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7896         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7897         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7898         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7899         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7900         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7901                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7902         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7903         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7904         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7905                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7906         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7907
7908         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7909         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7910         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7911
7912         // Revoke local commitment tx
7913         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7914
7915         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7916         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7917         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7918         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7919         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7920         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7921         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7922
7923         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7924         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7925         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7926
7927         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7928         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7929         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7930
7931         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7932         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7933         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7934         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7935
7936         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7937         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7938         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7939         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7940         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7941         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7942         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7943         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7944         match events.last().unwrap() {
7945                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7946                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7947         }
7948         let first;
7949         let feerate_1;
7950         let penalty_txn;
7951         {
7952                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7953                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7954                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7955
7956                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7957                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7958                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7959                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7960                 // future).
7961                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7962                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7963                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7964                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7965                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7966                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7967
7968                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7969                 // available, which we check here:
7970                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7971                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7972                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7973
7974                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7975                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7976
7977                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7978                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7979                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7980                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7981
7982                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7983                 // output, checked above).
7984                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7985                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7986                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7987
7988                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7989                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7990                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7991                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7992                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7993                 node_txn.clear();
7994         }
7995
7996         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7997         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7998         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7999         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8000         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
8001
8002         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
8003         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
8004         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8005         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
8006         let node_txn = {
8007                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8008                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8009
8010                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
8011                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
8012                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
8013                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
8014                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8015                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8016                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
8017                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
8018                 node_txn.clear();
8019                 txn
8020         };
8021         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
8022         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8023         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
8024         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
8025         {
8026                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8027                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
8028                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
8029                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
8030                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
8031                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
8032                 // up bumped justice generation.
8033                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
8034                 node_txn.clear();
8035         }
8036         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8037         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8038 }
8039
8040 #[test]
8041 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
8042         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
8043         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
8044
8045         // Create 2 HTLCs
8046         // Provide preimage for one
8047         // Check aggregation
8048
8049         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8050         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8051         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8052         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8053
8054         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8055         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
8056         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8057
8058         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8059         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8060         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8061         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8062         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8063
8064         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8065         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8066         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8067         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8069         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8070
8071         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8072         let timeout;
8073         let preimage;
8074         let preimage_bump;
8075         let feerate_timeout;
8076         let feerate_preimage;
8077         {
8078                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8079                 // 5 transactions including:
8080                 //   local commitment + HTLC-Success
8081                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
8082                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
8083                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8084                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
8085                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
8086                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8087                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
8088                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
8089
8090                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3); // local commitment
8091                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]); // local HTLC-Success
8092
8093                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8094                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8095                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8096                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8097
8098                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
8099                         (node_txn[3].clone(), node_txn[4].clone())
8100                 } else {
8101                         (node_txn[4].clone(), node_txn[3].clone())
8102                 };
8103
8104                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
8105                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8106                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
8107
8108                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
8109                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8110                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
8111                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
8112
8113                 node_txn.clear();
8114         };
8115         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8116         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8117
8118         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8119         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8120         {
8121                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8122                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8123                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8124                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8125                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8126                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8127
8128                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8129                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8130                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8131                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8132                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8133
8134                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8135                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8136                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8137                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8138                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8139
8140                 node_txn.clear();
8141         }
8142
8143         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8144         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8145 }
8146
8147 #[test]
8148 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8149         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8150         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8151         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8152         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8153         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8154         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8155         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8156         // implement that).
8157         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8158         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8159         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8160         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8161         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
8162
8163         let per_commitment_secret;
8164         let next_per_commitment_point;
8165         {
8166                 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8167                 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8168
8169                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8170
8171                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8172                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8173                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8174
8175                 // Must revoke without gaps
8176                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8177                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8178
8179                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8180                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8181                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8182         }
8183
8184         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8185                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8186         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8188         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8189 }
8190
8191 #[test]
8192 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8193         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8194         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8195
8196         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8197         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8198         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8199         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8200
8201         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8202         // Lock HTLC in both directions
8203         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
8204         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
8205
8206         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8207         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8208         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8209
8210         // Revoke local commitment tx
8211         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
8212
8213         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8214         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8215         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
8216         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8217
8218         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8219         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8221         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8222         let penalty_txn = {
8223                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8224                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8225                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8226                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8227                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8228                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8229                 node_txn.clear();
8230                 penalty_txn
8231         };
8232         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8233         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8234         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8235         {
8236                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8237                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8238                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8239         }
8240 }
8241
8242 #[test]
8243 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8244         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8245         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8246         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8247         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8248         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8249         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8250         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8251
8252         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
8253         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8254         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
8255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8256         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8257
8258         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8259         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8260         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8262         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8263
8264         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8265         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8266         // can get our balance.
8267
8268         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8269         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8270         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8271         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8272         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8273         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8274         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8275         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8276
8277         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8278 }
8279
8280 #[test]
8281 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8282         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8283         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8284         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8285         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8286         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8287         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8288
8289         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8290
8291         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8292         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8293         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8294         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8295         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8296
8297         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8298         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8299         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8300         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8301
8302         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8304         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8305         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8306         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8307         match close_ev[0] {
8308                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8309                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8310                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8311                 },
8312                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8313         }
8314 }
8315
8316 #[test]
8317 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8318         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8319         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8320         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8321         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8322
8323         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8324         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8325         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8326
8327         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8328
8329         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8330         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8331         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8332         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8333 }
8334
8335 #[test]
8336 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8337         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8338         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8339         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8340         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8341         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8342         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8343
8344         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8345         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8346         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8347
8348         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8349         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8350         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8351 }
8352
8353 #[test]
8354 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8355         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8356         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8357         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8358         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8359         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8360
8361         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8362         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8363         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8364         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8365         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8366         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8367         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8368         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8369         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8370         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8371         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8372         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8373
8374         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8375         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8376         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8377         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8378
8379         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8380         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8381         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8382         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8383         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8384
8385         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8386         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8387
8388         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8389         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8390         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
8391         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8392         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8393         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
8394
8395         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8396         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8397         // `channel_value`.
8398         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8399         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8400         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8401         // `channel_value`.
8402         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8403 }
8404
8405 #[test]
8406 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8407         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8408         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8409         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8410         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8411         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8412         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8413
8414         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8415         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8416
8417         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8418
8419         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8420         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8421         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8422
8423         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8424         match events[0] {
8425                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8426                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8427                 }
8428                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8429         }
8430
8431         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8432         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8433
8434         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8435                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8436                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8437                 }
8438                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8439         }
8440
8441         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8442
8443         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8444         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8445
8446         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8447         match events[0] {
8448                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8449                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8450                 }
8451                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8452         }
8453 }
8454
8455 #[test]
8456 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8457         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8458         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8459         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8460         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8461         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8462         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8463
8464         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8465         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8466
8467         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8468
8469         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8470         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8471         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8472
8473         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8474         match events[0] {
8475                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8476                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8477                 }
8478                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8479         }
8480
8481         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8482         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8483
8484         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8485                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8486                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8487                 }
8488                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8489         }
8490         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8491 }
8492
8493 #[test]
8494 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8495         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8496         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8497         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8498         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8499         // and the channel should be closed.
8500         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8501         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8502         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8503         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8504         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8505         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8506
8507         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8508         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8509         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8510
8511         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8512
8513         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8514         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8515
8516         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8517         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8518
8519         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8520         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8521         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8522         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8523         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8524         let accept_chan_msg = {
8525                 let mut lock;
8526                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8527                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
8528         };
8529         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
8530
8531         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8532
8533         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8534         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8535
8536         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8537         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8538
8539         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8540         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8541
8542         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8543         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8544                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8545                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8546                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8547                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8548                 }
8549                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8550         }
8551
8552         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8553 }
8554
8555 #[test]
8556 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8557         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8558         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8559         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8560         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8561         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8562         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8563
8564         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8565         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8566
8567         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8568
8569         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8570         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8571         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8572
8573         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8574         match events[0] {
8575                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8576                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8577                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8578                         match api_res {
8579                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8580                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8581                                 },
8582                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8583                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8584                         }
8585                 }
8586                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8587         }
8588
8589         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8590         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8591         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8592
8593         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8594                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8595                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8596                 }
8597                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8598         }
8599 }
8600
8601 #[test]
8602 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8603         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8604         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8605         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8606         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8607
8608         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8609         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8610         match api_res {
8611                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8612                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8613                 },
8614                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8615                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8616         }
8617 }
8618
8619 #[test]
8620 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8621         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8622         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8623         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8624         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8625         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8626
8627         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8628         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8629         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8630         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8631
8632         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8633         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8634         route.paths.push(path);
8635         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8636         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8637         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8638         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8639         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8640         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8641         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8642         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8643 }
8644
8645 #[test]
8646 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8647         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8648         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8649         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8650         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8651         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8652
8653         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8654
8655         {
8656                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8657                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8658                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8659                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8660                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8661                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8662                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8663                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8664         }
8665         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8666         // values from previous calls.
8667         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8668         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8669         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8670         match events[0] {
8671                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8672                         match &purpose {
8673                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8674                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8675                                 },
8676                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8677                         }
8678                 },
8679                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8680         }
8681 }
8682
8683 #[test]
8684 #[allow(deprecated)]
8685 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8686         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8687         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8688         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8689         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8690         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8691         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8692
8693         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8694
8695         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8696
8697         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8698         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8699         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8700                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8701         } else { panic!(); }
8702         let mut block = {
8703                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8704                 Block {
8705                         header: BlockHeader {
8706                                 version: 0x2000000,
8707                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8708                                 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
8709                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8710                         txdata: vec![],
8711                 }
8712         };
8713         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8714         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8715                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8716         } else { panic!(); }
8717
8718         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8719         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8720         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8721         block.header.time += 1;
8722         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8723         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8724         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8725
8726         {
8727                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8728                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8729                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8730                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8731                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8732                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8733                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8734         }
8735         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8736         // values from previous calls.
8737         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8738         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8739         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8740         match events[0] {
8741                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8742                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8743                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8744                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8745                 },
8746                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8747         }
8748 }
8749
8750 #[test]
8751 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8752         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8753         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8754         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8755         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8756         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8757
8758         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8759
8760         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8761         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8762         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8763         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8764
8765         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8766         // resulting events.
8767         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8768                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8769                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8770                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8771                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8772                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8773                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8774
8775                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8776                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8777                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8778                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8779                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8780
8781                         // We should fail the payment back
8782                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8783                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8784                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8785                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8786                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8787                                 },
8788                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8789                         }
8790                 }
8791         }
8792
8793         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8794         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8795         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8796
8797         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8798         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8799         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8800         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8801
8802         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8803         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8804         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8805         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8806
8807         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8808         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8809         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8810         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8811 }
8812
8813 #[test]
8814 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8815         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8816         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8817         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8818         // error.
8819         //
8820         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8821         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8822         // commitment at same time.
8823
8824         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8825         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8826         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8827         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8828
8829         // Create some initial channel
8830         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8831         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8832
8833         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8834         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8835
8836         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8837         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8838
8839         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8840         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8841         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8842         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8843         let watchtower = {
8844                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8845                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8846                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8847                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8848                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8849                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8850                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8851                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8852                 watchtower
8853         };
8854         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8855         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8856         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8857         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8858         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8859         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8860
8861         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8862         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8863         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8864         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8865
8866         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8867         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8868         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8869         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8870                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8871                         assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8872                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8873                 } else { assert!(false); }
8874         } else { assert!(false); };
8875         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8876         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8877         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8878         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8879 }
8880
8881 #[test]
8882 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8883         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8884         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8885         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8886         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8887
8888         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8889         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8890         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8891         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8892
8893         // Create some initial channel
8894         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8895         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8896
8897         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8898         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8899
8900         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8901         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8902
8903         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8904         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8905         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8906         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8907         let watchtower_alice = {
8908                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8909                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8910                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8911                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8912                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8913                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8914                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8915                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8916                 watchtower
8917         };
8918         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8919         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8920         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8921         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8922         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8923         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8924
8925         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8926         {
8927                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8928                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8929                 txn.clear();
8930         }
8931
8932         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8933         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8934         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8935         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8936         let watchtower_bob = {
8937                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8938                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8939                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8940                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8941                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8942                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8943                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8944                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8945                 watchtower
8946         };
8947         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8948         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8949
8950         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8951         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8952         {
8953                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8954         }
8955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8956
8957         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8958         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8959         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8960         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8961                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8962                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8963                         assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8964                         assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8965                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8966                 } else { assert!(false); }
8967         } else { assert!(false); };
8968         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8969         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8970
8971         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8972         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8973         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8974
8975         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8976         let bob_state_y;
8977         {
8978                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8979                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8980                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8981                 txn.clear();
8982         };
8983
8984         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8985         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8986         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8987         {
8988                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8989                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8990                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8991         }
8992 }
8993
8994 #[test]
8995 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8996         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8997         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8998         // message).
8999         //
9000         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
9001         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
9002         //
9003         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
9004         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
9005         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
9006         // before receiving funding_signed.
9007         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9008         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9009         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9010         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9011
9012         // Create an initial channel
9013         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9014         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9015         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9016         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9017         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
9018
9019         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9020         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9021
9022         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9023         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9024
9025         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9026         let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
9027         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
9028         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9029         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
9030 }
9031
9032 #[test]
9033 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
9034         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
9035         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
9036         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
9037         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
9038         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
9039         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
9040
9041         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9042         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9043         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9044         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9045
9046         // Create some initial channels
9047         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9048
9049         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
9050         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
9051         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
9052         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9053         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
9054         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
9055
9056         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9057         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9058         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
9059         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
9060         // this test before #653 fix.
9061         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
9062         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9064         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9065         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
9066
9067         let htlc_timeout = {
9068                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9069                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9070                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9071                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
9072                 node_txn[1].clone()
9073         };
9074
9075         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9076         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
9077         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
9078         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
9079 }
9080
9081 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
9082         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
9083         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
9084         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
9085         //
9086         // Steps of the test:
9087         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
9088         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
9089         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
9090         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
9091         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
9092         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
9093         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
9094         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
9095         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9096         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9097         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9098         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9099
9100         // Create some initial channels
9101         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9102         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9103
9104         // Steps (1) and (2):
9105         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
9106         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
9107
9108         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
9109         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
9110         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9111         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
9112         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9113         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9114         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9115
9116         // Steps (3) and (4):
9117         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9118         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9119         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9120         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9121
9122         // Bob force-closes
9123         if !broadcast_alice {
9124                 force_closing_node = 1;
9125                 counterparty_node = 0;
9126         }
9127         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9128         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9129         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9130         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9131         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9132                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9133                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
9134                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9135                 };
9136                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9137                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9138                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9139                 if broadcast_alice {
9140                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9141                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9142                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9143                 }
9144                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9145                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9146         }
9147
9148         // Step (5):
9149         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9150         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9151         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9153         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
9154
9155         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9156         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9157         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9158         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9159         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9160         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9161
9162         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9163         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9164         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9165         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9166                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9167                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9168                 match events[0] {
9169                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9170                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9171                         },
9172                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9173                 };
9174         }
9175         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9176         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9177         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9179
9180         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9181         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9182         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9183                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9184                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9185                         (*msg).clone()
9186                 },
9187                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9188         };
9189         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9190                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9191                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9192                         (*updates).clone()
9193                 },
9194                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9195         };
9196
9197         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9198         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9199         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9200         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9201
9202         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9203         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9204         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9205                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9206                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9207                         (*msg).clone()
9208                 },
9209                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9210         };
9211         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9213
9214         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9215         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9216         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9217         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9218         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9219                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9220                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9221                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9222                 if broadcast_alice {
9223                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9224                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9225                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9226                 }
9227                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9228                 if broadcast_alice {
9229                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9230                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9231                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9232                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9233                         // broadcasted.
9234                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9235                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9236                 } else {
9237                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9238                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9239                 }
9240         }
9241
9242         // Step (6):
9243         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9244         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9245         {
9246                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9247                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9248                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9249                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9250                 }
9251                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9252                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9253                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9254                 };
9255                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9256                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9257                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9258                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9259                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9260                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9261                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9262                 } else {
9263                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9264                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9265                 }
9266         }
9267 }
9268
9269 #[test]
9270 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9271         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9272         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9273         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9274         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9275 }
9276
9277 #[test]
9278 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9279         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9280         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9281         //
9282         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9283         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9284         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9285         // updating logic for the existing channel.
9286         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9287         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9288         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9289         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9290
9291         // Create an initial channel
9292         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9293         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9294         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9295         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9296
9297         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9298         // that it is rejected.
9299         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9300         {
9301                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9302                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9303                 match events[0] {
9304                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9305                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9306                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9307                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9308                                 // move forward with it.
9309                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9310                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9311                         },
9312                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9313                 }
9314         }
9315
9316         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9317         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9318
9319         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9320         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9321
9322         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9323         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9324         {
9325                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9326                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9327                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9328                 added_monitors.clear();
9329         }
9330         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9331
9332         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9333         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9334
9335         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9336         // temporary one).
9337
9338         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9339         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9340         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9341         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9342         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9343         {
9344                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9345                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9346                 match events[0] {
9347                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9348                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9349                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9350                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9351                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9352                         },
9353                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9354                 }
9355         }
9356
9357         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9358         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9359         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9360         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9361         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9362         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9363
9364         let funding_created = {
9365                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9366                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9367                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9368                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9369                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9370                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9371                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9372                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9373         };
9374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9375         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9376         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9377         // still needs to be cleared here.
9378         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9379
9380         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9381         {
9382                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9383                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9384                 match events[0] {
9385                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9386                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9387                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9388                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9389                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9390                         },
9391                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9392                 }
9393         }
9394
9395         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9396         // everything is functional.
9397         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9398         {
9399                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9400                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9401                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9402                 added_monitors.clear();
9403         }
9404
9405         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9406         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9407         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9408         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9409
9410         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9411         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9412         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9413
9414         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9415 }
9416
9417 #[test]
9418 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9419         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9420         //
9421         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9422         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9423         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9424         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9425         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9426         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9427         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9428
9429         // Create some initial channels
9430         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9431         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9432         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9433
9434         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9435         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9436         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9437
9438         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9439         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9440         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9441
9442         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9443         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9445         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9446         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9447         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9448         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9449         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9450         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9451
9452         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9453         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9454         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9455         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9456         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9457         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9458         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9459         match events[0] {
9460                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9461                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9462                 },
9463                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9464         }
9465         match events[1] {
9466                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9467                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9468                 },
9469                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9470         }
9471         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9472         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9473         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9474         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9475         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9476         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9477
9478         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9479         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9480         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9481 }
9482
9483 #[test]
9484 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9485         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9486         //
9487         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9488         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9489         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9490         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9491         //
9492         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9493         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9494         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9495         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9496         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9497         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9498         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9499
9500         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9501         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9502         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9503
9504         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9505
9506         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9507         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9508         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9509         // its length.
9510         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9511         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9512         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9513                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9514                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9515         }
9516
9517         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9518         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9519         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9520
9521         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9523
9524         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9525         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9526
9527         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9528         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9529         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9530
9531         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9532         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9533         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9534         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9535         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9536         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9537         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9538                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9539                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9540                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9541                 } else { panic!(); }
9542         } else { panic!(); }
9543         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9544
9545         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9546         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9547         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9548         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9549                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9550                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9551                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9552                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9553                                 vout: idx as u32,
9554                         },
9555                         script_sig: Script::new(),
9556                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9557                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9558                 }).collect(),
9559                 output: vec![TxOut {
9560                         value: 1000,
9561                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9562                 }]
9563         };
9564         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9565         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9566 }
9567
9568 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9569         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9570         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9571         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9572         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9573         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9574         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9575         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9576         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9577         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9578         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9579         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9580         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9581         // until we learned about an additional block.
9582         //
9583         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9584         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9585         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9586         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9587         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9588         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9589         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9590
9591         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9592         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9593         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9594         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9595         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9596
9597         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9598         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9599         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9600         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9601         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9602         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9603
9604         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9605         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9606                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9607         }
9608         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9609                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9610         if test_height_before_timelock {
9611                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9612                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9613                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9614                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9615         } else {
9616                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9617                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9618                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9619                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9620                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9621                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9622                 // timelock is up).
9623                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9624                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9625
9626                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9627                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9628                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9629                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9630                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9631                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9632                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9633
9634                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9635                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9636                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9637                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9638                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9639                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9640                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9641                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9642                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9643         }
9644 }
9645
9646 #[test]
9647 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9648         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9649         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9650 }
9651
9652 #[test]
9653 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9654         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9655         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9656         // HTLCs.
9657         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9658
9659         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9660         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9661         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9662         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9663         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9664         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9665         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9666         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
9667         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
9668
9669         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9670         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9671         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9672         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9673
9674         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9675         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9676         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9677         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9678         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9679
9680         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9681
9682         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9683         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9684         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9685         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9686
9687         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9688         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9689         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9690         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9691         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9692
9693         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9694         // generated
9695         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9696
9697         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9698         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9699         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9700
9701         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9702         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9703         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9704         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9705         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9706
9707         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9708         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9709         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9710         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9711
9712         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9713         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9714                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9715         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9716         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9717         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9718                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9719         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9720
9721         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9722         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9723                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9724                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9725                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9726                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9727                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9728                         keys_manager,
9729                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9730                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9731                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9732                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9733                         channel_monitors,
9734                 }).unwrap()
9735         };
9736         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9737         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9738
9739         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
9740                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
9741         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor),
9742                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
9743         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9744         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9745
9746         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9747         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their channel_ready here since they haven't updated
9748         // the commitment state.
9749         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9750
9751         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9752
9753         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9754         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9755         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9756
9757         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9758         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9759         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9760         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9761         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9762         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9763         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9764
9765         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9766         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9767 }
9768
9769 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9770         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9771         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9772         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9773         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9774
9775         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9776
9777         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9778                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9779         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9780
9781         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9782
9783         {
9784                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9785                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9786                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9787                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9788                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9789                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9790                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9791         }
9792         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9793         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9794
9795         {
9796                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9797                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9798                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9799                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9800                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9801                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9802                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9803                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9804                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9805                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9806                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9807         }
9808
9809         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9810         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9811
9812         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9813                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9814                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9815
9816                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9817                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9818                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9819                 ];
9820                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9821                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9822
9823                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9824                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9825                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9826
9827                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9828                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9829                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9830
9831                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9832                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9833                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9834                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9835         } else {
9836                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9837                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9838                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9839
9840                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9841                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9842                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9843                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9844
9845                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9846
9847                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9848         }
9849 }
9850
9851 #[test]
9852 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9853         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9854         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9855         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9856         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9857         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9858 }
9859
9860 #[test]
9861 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9862         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9863         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9864         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9865 }
9866
9867 #[test]
9868 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9869         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9870         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9871         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9872         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9873         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9874         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9875
9876         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9877         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9878         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9879         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9880
9881         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9882                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9883         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9884         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9885         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9886                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9887                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9888                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9889         });
9890         let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9891
9892         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9893
9894         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9895         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9896         {
9897                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9898                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9899
9900                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9901                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9902                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9903         }
9904         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9905
9906         {
9907                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9908                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9909
9910                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9911                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9912                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9913
9914                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9915                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9916
9917                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9918                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9919
9920                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9921                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9922                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9923
9924                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9925                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9926                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9927
9928                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9929                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9930                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9931         }
9932         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9933         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9934         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9935         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9936
9937         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9938
9939         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9940         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9941         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9942
9943         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9944         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9945
9946         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9947         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9948         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9949
9950         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9951
9952         nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9954
9955         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9956         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9957         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9958
9959         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9960 }
9961
9962 #[test]
9963 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9964         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9965         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9966         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9967         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9968
9969         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9970         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9971         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9972         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9973         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9974                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9975                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9976                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9977         };
9978         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9979         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9980         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9981
9982         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9983         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9985         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9986         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9987         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9988         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9989         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9990         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9991 }
9992
9993 #[test]
9994 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9995         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9996         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9997         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9998         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9999
10000         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10001         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10002         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10003         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10004
10005         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10006         let route_params = RouteParameters {
10007                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
10008                 final_value_msat: 10000,
10009                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
10010         };
10011         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
10012         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10013         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
10014         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10015         let route = find_route(
10016                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10017                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
10018         ).unwrap();
10019
10020         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10021         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
10022         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10023         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10024         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10025         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10026         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10027         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
10028         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
10029 }
10030
10031 #[test]
10032 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
10033         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
10034         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
10035         // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
10036         // amount.
10037         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10038         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10039         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10040         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10041
10042         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10043         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10044         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10045         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10046
10047         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10048         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10049         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10050                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10051                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10052                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10053         });
10054
10055         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
10056         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
10057         // amount of time to respond to.
10058
10059         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
10060         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
10061         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
10062
10063         let failed_destinations = vec![
10064                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10065                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10066         ];
10067         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
10068
10069         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
10070
10071         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
10072         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10074
10075         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10076         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10077         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10078
10079         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
10080         // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
10081         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
10083         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10084 }
10085
10086 fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) {
10087         // Test what happens if a node receives an MPP payment, claims it, but crashes before
10088         // persisting the ChannelManager. If `persist_both_monitors` is false, also crash after only
10089         // updating one of the two channels' ChannelMonitors. As a result, on startup, we'll (a) still
10090         // have the PaymentReceived event, (b) have one (or two) channel(s) that goes on chain with the
10091         // HTLC preimage in them, and (c) optionally have one channel that is live off-chain but does
10092         // not have the preimage tied to the still-pending HTLC.
10093         //
10094         // To get to the correct state, on startup we should propagate the preimage to the
10095         // still-off-chain channel, claiming the HTLC as soon as the peer connects, with the monitor
10096         // receiving the preimage without a state update.
10097         //
10098         // Further, we should generate a `PaymentClaimed` event to inform the user that the payment was
10099         // definitely claimed.
10100         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10101         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10102         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10103
10104         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
10105         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
10106         let nodes_3_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
10107
10108         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10109
10110         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10111         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10112         let chan_id_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
10113         let chan_id_not_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
10114
10115         // Create an MPP route for 15k sats, more than the default htlc-max of 10%
10116         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10117         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10118         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10119                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10120                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10121                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10122         });
10123
10124         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10125         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10126
10127         // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentReceived event
10128         let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10129         assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
10130         do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None);
10131         do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None);
10132
10133         // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s
10134         // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors.
10135         let mut original_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10136         if !persist_both_monitors {
10137                 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10138                         if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10139                                 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10140                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10141                         }
10142                 }
10143         }
10144
10145         let mut original_manager = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10146         nodes[3].node.write(&mut original_manager).unwrap();
10147
10148         expect_payment_received!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, 15_000_000);
10149
10150         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10152         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[3], payment_hash, 15_000_000);
10153
10154         // Now fetch one of the two updated ChannelMonitors from nodes[3], and restart pretending we
10155         // crashed in between the two persistence calls - using one old ChannelMonitor and one new one,
10156         // with the old ChannelManager.
10157         let mut updated_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10158         for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10159                 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_persisted {
10160                         assert!(updated_monitor.0.is_empty());
10161                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut updated_monitor).unwrap();
10162                 }
10163         }
10164         // If `persist_both_monitors` is set, get the second monitor here as well
10165         if persist_both_monitors {
10166                 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10167                         if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10168                                 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10169                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10170                         }
10171                 }
10172         }
10173
10174         // Now restart nodes[3].
10175         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
10176         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager;
10177         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[3].chain_source), nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[3].logger, node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
10178         nodes[3].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
10179         let mut monitors = Vec::new();
10180         for mut monitor_data in [original_monitor, updated_monitor].iter() {
10181                 let (_, mut deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut &monitor_data.0[..], keys_manager).unwrap();
10182                 monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
10183         }
10184
10185         let config = UserConfig::default();
10186         nodes_3_deserialized = {
10187                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
10188                 for monitor in monitors.iter_mut() {
10189                         channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
10190                 }
10191                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut &original_manager.0[..], ChannelManagerReadArgs {
10192                         default_config: config,
10193                         keys_manager,
10194                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator,
10195                         chain_monitor: nodes[3].chain_monitor,
10196                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
10197                         logger: nodes[3].logger,
10198                         channel_monitors,
10199                 }).unwrap().1
10200         };
10201         nodes[3].node = &nodes_3_deserialized;
10202
10203         for monitor in monitors {
10204                 // On startup the preimage should have been copied into the non-persisted monitor:
10205                 assert!(monitor.get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash));
10206                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.clone(), monitor),
10207                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
10208         }
10209         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10210
10211         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10212         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10213
10214         // During deserialization, we should have closed one channel and broadcast its latest
10215         // commitment transaction. We should also still have the original PaymentReceived event we
10216         // never finished processing.
10217         let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10218         assert_eq!(events.len(), if persist_both_monitors { 4 } else { 3 });
10219         if let Event::PaymentReceived { amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } = events[0] { } else { panic!(); }
10220         if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
10221         if persist_both_monitors {
10222                 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
10223         }
10224
10225         // On restart, we should also get a duplicate PaymentClaimed event as we persisted the
10226         // ChannelManager prior to handling the original one.
10227         if let Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: our_payment_hash, amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } =
10228                 events[if persist_both_monitors { 3 } else { 2 }]
10229         {
10230                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
10231         } else { panic!(); }
10232
10233         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), if persist_both_monitors { 0 } else { 1 });
10234         if !persist_both_monitors {
10235                 // If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
10236
10237                 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10238                 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
10239                 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10240                 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
10241
10242                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
10243                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
10244                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10245
10246                 nodes[3].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
10247
10248                 // Once we call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` the holding cell is cleared and the HTLC
10249                 // claim should fly.
10250                 let ds_msgs = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10251                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
10252                 assert_eq!(ds_msgs.len(), 2);
10253                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } = ds_msgs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
10254
10255                 let cs_updates = match ds_msgs[0] {
10256                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
10257                                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10258                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10259                                 let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10260                                 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[2], nodes[0], nodes[3], Some(1000), false, false);
10261                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10262                                 cs_updates
10263                         }
10264                         _ => panic!(),
10265                 };
10266
10267                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10268                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10269                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
10270         }
10271 }
10272
10273 #[test]
10274 fn test_partial_claim_before_restart() {
10275         do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
10276         do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
10277 }
10278
10279 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
10280 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
10281 enum ExposureEvent {
10282         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
10283         AtHTLCForward,
10284         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
10285         AtHTLCReception,
10286         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
10287         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
10288 }
10289
10290 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
10291         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
10292         // policy.
10293         //
10294         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
10295         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
10296         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
10297         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
10298         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
10299         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
10300         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
10301         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
10302
10303         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10304         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10305         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
10306         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10307         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
10308         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10309
10310         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10311         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10312         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
10313         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
10314         if on_holder_tx {
10315                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10316         }
10317         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
10318         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10319         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
10320
10321         let opt_anchors = false;
10322
10323         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10324
10325         if on_holder_tx {
10326                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
10327                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10328                 }
10329         }
10330
10331         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10332         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10333         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10334
10335         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10336         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10337
10338         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10339         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10340         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10341
10342         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
10343                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
10344                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10345                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
10346         };
10347         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10348         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10349
10350         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10351         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10352
10353         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
10354         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
10355
10356         if on_holder_tx {
10357                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10358                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10359                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10360                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10361                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10362                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10363                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10364                         }
10365                 } else {
10366                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10367                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10368                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10369                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10370                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10371                         }
10372                 }
10373         } else {
10374                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10375                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10376                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10377                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10378                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10379                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10380                         }
10381                 } else {
10382                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10383                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10384                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10385                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10386                         }
10387                 }
10388         }
10389
10390         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
10391         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10392                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10393                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10394                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10395                 if on_holder_tx {
10396                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10397                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10398                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10399                 } else {
10400                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10401                 }
10402         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10403                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10404                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10405                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10406                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10407                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10408                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10409                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10410                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10411                 if on_holder_tx {
10412                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10413                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10414                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10415                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10416                 } else {
10417                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10418                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10419                 }
10420         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10421                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10422                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10423                 {
10424                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10425                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10426                 }
10427                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10428                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10429                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10430         }
10431
10432         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10433         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10434         added_monitors.clear();
10435 }
10436
10437 #[test]
10438 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10439         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10440         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10441         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10442         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10443         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10444         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10445         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10446         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10447         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10448         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10449         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10450         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10451 }
10452
10453 #[test]
10454 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10455         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10456         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10457         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10458         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10459
10460         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10461         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10462         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
10463         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10464         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
10465
10466         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10467
10468         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10469         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10470         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
10471         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10472         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10473                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10474                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
10475                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10476                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10477                         }]}
10478                 },
10479                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10480         };
10481         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10482         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10483                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10484                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10485                 },
10486                 _ => panic!()
10487         }
10488
10489         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
10490         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
10491         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10492         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10493 }