_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
  27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  29 use ln::msgs;
  30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  34 use util::errors::APIError;
  35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  36 use util::config::UserConfig;
  37
  38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  44
  45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  46 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  47
  48 use regex;
  49
  50 use io;
  51 use prelude::*;
  52 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  53 use core::default::Default;
  54 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  55
  56 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  57 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  58
  59 #[test]
  60 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  61         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  62         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  63         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  64         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  65         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  66
  67         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  68         // funding satoshis
  69         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  70         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  71         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  72
  73         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  74         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  75
  76         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  77         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  78
  79         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  80         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  81         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  82                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  83                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  84                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  85                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  86                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  87                         match action {
  88                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  89                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  90                                 },
  91                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  92                         }
  93                 } else { assert!(false); }
  94         };
  95
  96         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
  97         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  98
  99         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 100         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
 101
 102         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 103
 104         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 105
 106         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 107
 108         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 115 }
 116
 117 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 118         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 119         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 120         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 121         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 122         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 123         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 124         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 125         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 126
 127         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 128         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 129         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 130         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 131         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
 132
 133         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 134         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 135         if !send_from_initiator {
 136                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 137                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 138         }
 139         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
 140
 141         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 142         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 143         if send_from_initiator {
 144                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 145                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 146         }
 147         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
 148         {
 149                 let mut lock;
 150                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 151                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 152                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 153         }
 154
 155         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 156         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 157         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 158
 159         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 160         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 161         if send_from_initiator {
 162                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 163                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 164                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 165                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 166                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2));
 167         } else {
 168                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 169         }
 170 }
 171
 172 #[test]
 173 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 174         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 175         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 176 }
 177
 178 #[test]
 179 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 180         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 181         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 182         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 183         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 184         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 185
 186         // balancing
 187         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 188
 189         // A                                        B
 190         // update_fee                            ->
 191         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 192         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 193         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 194         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 195         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 196         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 197         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 198         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 199         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 200         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 201         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 202         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 203         //                                       <- RAA
 204         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 205
 206         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 207         {
 208                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 209                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 210         }
 211         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 213
 214         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 215         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 216         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 217                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 218                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 219                 },
 220                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 221         };
 222
 223         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 224
 225         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 226         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 227         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 229
 230         let payment_event = {
 231                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 232                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 233                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 234         };
 235         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 236         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 237
 238         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 239         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 240         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 241         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 242         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 243         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 244
 245         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 246         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 247         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 248         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 250
 251         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 252         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 253         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 254         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 255         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 256         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 257         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 259
 260         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 261         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 262         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 263         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 264         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 265         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 266         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 267         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 268
 269         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 270         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 271         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 273
 274         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 275         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 277
 278         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 279         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 280
 281         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 282         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 283         match events_2[0] {
 284                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 285                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 286         }
 287
 288         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 290 }
 291
 292 #[test]
 293 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 294         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 295         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 296         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 298         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 299         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 300         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 301
 302         // balancing
 303         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 304
 305         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 306         {
 307                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 308                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 309         }
 310         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 312
 313         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 314         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 315         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 316                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 317                         update_fee.as_ref()
 318                 },
 319                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 320         };
 321
 322         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 323
 324         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 325         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 326         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 327         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 328
 329         let payment_event = {
 330                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 331                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 332                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 333         };
 334         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 335         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 336
 337         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 338         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 339         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 340         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 341         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 342         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 343
 344         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 345         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 346
 347         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 348 }
 349
 350 #[test]
 351 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 352         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 353         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 354         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 355         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 356         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 357
 358         // A                                        B
 359         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 360         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 361         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 362         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 363         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 364         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 365         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 366         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 367         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 368         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 369         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 370         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 371         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 372         //                                          B should send no response here
 373         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 374         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 375         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 376
 377         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 378         let initial_feerate;
 379         {
 380                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 381                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 382                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 383         }
 384         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 385         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 386
 387         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 388         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 389         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 390                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 391                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 392                 },
 393                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 394         };
 395
 396         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 397         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 398         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 399         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 400         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 401
 402         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 403         // transaction:
 404         {
 405                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 406                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 407         }
 408         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 409         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 410         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 411
 412         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 413         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 414                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 415                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 416         };
 417
 418         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 419
 420         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 421         // Deliver (3)
 422         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 423
 424         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 425         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 426         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 428         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 429         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 430         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 431         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 432         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 433         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 434         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 435
 436         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 437         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 438         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 439         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 440         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 441
 442         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 443         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 445
 446         // Delever (4)
 447         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 448         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 450
 451         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 452         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 453         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 454
 455         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 456         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 457         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 458         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 459
 460         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 461         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 462         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 463 }
 464
 465 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
 466         // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
 467         // tests that we properly send one in that case.
 468         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
 469         alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 470         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 471         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 472         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
 473         bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 474         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 475         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 476         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 477         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 478         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
 479         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 480         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
 481
 482         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 483         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
 484         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
 485
 486         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
 487         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 488         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
 489
 490         for node in nodes {
 491                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
 492                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
 493                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
 494         }
 495 }
 496 #[test]
 497 fn test_1_conf_open() {
 498         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
 499         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
 500         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
 501 }
 502
 503 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 504         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 505         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 506         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 507         // Node objects.
 508
 509         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 510         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 511         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 512         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 513
 514         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 515                 let block = Block {
 516                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 517                         txdata: vec![],
 518                 };
 519                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 520                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 521         }
 522
 523         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 524         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 525         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 526
 527         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 528         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 529         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 530
 531         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 532         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 533
 534         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 535
 536         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 537         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 538         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 539         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 540
 541         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 542         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 543         {
 544                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 545                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 546                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 547                 added_monitors.clear();
 548         }
 549         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 550
 551         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 552         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 553         {
 554                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 555                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 556                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 557                 added_monitors.clear();
 558         }
 559
 560         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 561         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 562
 563         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 564         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 565
 566         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 567         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 568         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 569         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 570 }
 571
 572 #[test]
 573 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 589         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 590         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 591         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 592 }
 593
 594 #[test]
 595 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 596         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 597         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 598         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 599         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 600         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 601
 602         {
 603                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 604                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 605         }
 606         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 607         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 608
 609         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 610         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 611         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 612                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 613                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 614                 },
 615                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 616         };
 617         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 618
 619         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 620         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 621         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 622
 623         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 624         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 625         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 626
 627         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 628         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 629         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 630         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 631
 632         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 633         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 634         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 635 }
 636
 637 #[test]
 638 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 639         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 640         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 641         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 642         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 643         let channel_value = 5000;
 644         let push_sats = 700;
 645         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 646         let channel_id = chan.2;
 647         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 648         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 649
 650         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 651         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 652         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 653         // remote limit.
 654         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 655         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) as u32;
 656         {
 657                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 658                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 659         }
 660         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 662         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 663
 664         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 665
 666         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 667
 668         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 669         {
 670                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 671
 672                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 673                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 674                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0) / 1000;
 675                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 676                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 677                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 678         }
 679
 680         {
 681                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 682                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 683                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 684         }
 685         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 686         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 688
 689         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 690
 691         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 692         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 693         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 694                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 695                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 696                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 697                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 698                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 699                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 700         };
 701         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 702                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 703                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 704                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 705                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 706                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 707                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 708                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 709         };
 710
 711         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 712         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 713                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 714
 715         let res = {
 716                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 717                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 718                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 719                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 720                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 721                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 722                         push_sats,
 723                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0) / 1000,
 724                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
 725                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 726                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 727                         &mut htlcs,
 728                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 729                 );
 730                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 731         };
 732
 733         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 734                 channel_id: chan.2,
 735                 signature: res.0,
 736                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 737         };
 738
 739         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 740                 channel_id: chan.2,
 741                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 742         };
 743
 744         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 745
 746         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 747         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 748         //Should produce and error.
 749         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 750         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 752         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 753         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 754 }
 755
 756 #[test]
 757 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 758         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 759         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 760         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 761         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 762         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 763
 764         // balancing
 765         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 766
 767         {
 768                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 769                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 770         }
 771         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 773
 774         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 775         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 776         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 777                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 778                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 779                 },
 780                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 781         };
 782         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 783         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 784         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 786
 787         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 788
 789         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 790         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 791         {
 792                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 793                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 794                 added_monitors.clear();
 795         }
 796         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 797         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 798         // node[1] has nothing to do
 799
 800         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 801         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 803
 804         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 805         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 806         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 808         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 809         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 810         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 811
 812         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 813         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 814         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 815         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 816         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 817         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 818
 819         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 820         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 822         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 823
 824         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 826         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 827
 828         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 830         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 831         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 832
 833         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 834         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 835         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 836
 837         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 838
 839         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 840         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 841         match events[0] {
 842                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 843                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 844         };
 845
 846         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 847
 848         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 849         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 850         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 851         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 852         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 853 }
 854
 855 #[test]
 856 fn test_update_fee() {
 857         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 858         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 859         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 860         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 861         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 862         let channel_id = chan.2;
 863
 864         // A                                        B
 865         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 866         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 867         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 868         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 869         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 870         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 871         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 872         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 873         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 874         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 875         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 876         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 877
 878         // Create and deliver (1)...
 879         let feerate;
 880         {
 881                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 882                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 883                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 884         }
 885         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 886         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 887
 888         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 889         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 890         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 891                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 892                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 893                 },
 894                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 895         };
 896         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 897
 898         // Generate (2) and (3):
 899         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 900         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 902
 903         // Deliver (2):
 904         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 905         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 907
 908         // Create and deliver (4)...
 909         {
 910                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 911                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 912         }
 913         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 915         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 916         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 917         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 918                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 919                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 920                 },
 921                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 922         };
 923
 924         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 925         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 927         // ... creating (5)
 928         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 929         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 930
 931         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 932         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 933         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 934         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 935         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 936
 937         // Deliver (5):
 938         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 939         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 941
 942         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 943         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 944         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 945         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 946         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 947         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 948         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 949         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 951
 952         // Deliver (7)
 953         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 955         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 956         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 957
 958         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 959         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 960         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 961
 962         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 963         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 964         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 965         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 966         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 967 }
 968
 969 #[test]
 970 fn fake_network_test() {
 971         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 972         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 973         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 974         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 975         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 976         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 977
 978         // Create some initial channels
 979         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 980         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 981         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 982
 983         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 984         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 985         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 986         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 987         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 988
 989         // Send some more payments
 990         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 991         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 992         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 993
 994         // Test failure packets
 995         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 996         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 997
 998         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 999         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1000
1001         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1002         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1003         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1004         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1005         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1006         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008
1009         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1010         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1011         hops.push(RouteHop {
1012                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1013                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1014                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1015                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1016                 fee_msat: 0,
1017                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1018         });
1019         hops.push(RouteHop {
1020                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1021                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1022                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1023                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1024                 fee_msat: 0,
1025                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1026         });
1027         hops.push(RouteHop {
1028                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1029                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1030                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1031                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1032                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1033                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1034         });
1035         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1036         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1037         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1038
1039         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1040         hops.push(RouteHop {
1041                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1042                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1043                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1044                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1045                 fee_msat: 0,
1046                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1047         });
1048         hops.push(RouteHop {
1049                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1050                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1051                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1052                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1053                 fee_msat: 0,
1054                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1055         });
1056         hops.push(RouteHop {
1057                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1058                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1059                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1060                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1061                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1062                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1063         });
1064         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1065         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1066         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1067
1068         // Claim the rebalances...
1069         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1070         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1071
1072         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1073         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1074
1075         // Send some payments across both channels
1076         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1077         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1078         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1079
1080
1081         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1082         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1083         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1084         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1085
1086         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1087
1088         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1089         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1090         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1091
1092         // Close down the channels...
1093         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1094         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1095         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1096         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1097         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1098         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1099         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1100         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1101         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1102         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1103         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1104         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1105         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1106         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1107         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1108 }
1109
1110 #[test]
1111 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1112         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1113         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1114         // commitment dance rounds.
1115         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1116         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1117         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1118         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1119         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1120         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1121
1122         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1123         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1124                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1125                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1126                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1127         }
1128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1129
1130         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1131         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1132         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1133         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1134
1135         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1136         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1137         // another HTLC.
1138         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1139         {
1140                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1141                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1142                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1143                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1144         }
1145
1146         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1147         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1148         {
1149                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1150                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1151         }
1152
1153         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1154         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1155         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1156         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1157
1158         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1159         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1160         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1161         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1162         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1163         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1165
1166         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1167         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1168         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1169
1170         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1171
1172         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1173         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1174         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1176
1177         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1178         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1180         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1181
1182         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1184         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1185
1186         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1187                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1188         }
1189         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1190         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1191         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1193         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1194
1195         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1196         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1197         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1198         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1199         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1200
1201         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1203
1204         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1205
1206         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1207         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1208         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1209                 match event {
1210                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1211                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1212                         },
1213                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1214                 };
1215         }
1216
1217         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1218                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1219         }
1220
1221         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1222 }
1223
1224 #[test]
1225 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1226         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1227         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1228         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1229         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1230         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1231         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1232
1233         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1234         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1235         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1236         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1237         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1238         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1239
1240         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1241
1242         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1243         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1244
1245         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1246         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1247
1248         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1249         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1250         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1251 }
1252
1253 #[test]
1254 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1255         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1256         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1257         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1258         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1259         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1260         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1261         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1262
1263         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1264
1265         // balancing
1266         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1267
1268         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1269
1270         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1271         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1272         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1273
1274         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1275         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1277
1278         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1279         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1280
1281         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1282         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1283         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1284                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1285                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1286                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1287                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1288                 }
1289         }
1290         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1291
1292         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1293         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1294         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1295         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1296
1297         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1298         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1299         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1300         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1301         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1302         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1303         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1304         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1305
1306         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1307         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1308         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1309
1310         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1311         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1312         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1313         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1314         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1315         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1316         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1317         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1318
1319         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1320         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1321         for e in events {
1322                 match e {
1323                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1324                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1325                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1326                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1327                         },
1328                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1329                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1330                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1331                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1332                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1333                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1334                         },
1335                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1336                 }
1337         }
1338 }
1339
1340 #[test]
1341 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1342         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1343         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1344         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1345         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1346         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1347
1348         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1349         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1350
1351         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1352         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1353         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1354         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1355         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1356         match err {
1357                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1358                         match &fails[0] {
1359                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1360                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1361                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1362                         }
1363                 },
1364                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1365         }
1366         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1367         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1368
1369         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1370 }
1371
1372 #[test]
1373 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1374         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1375         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1376         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1377         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1378         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1379
1380         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1381         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1382         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1383         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1384
1385         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1386
1387         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1388         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1389         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1390         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1391                 channel_id: chan.2,
1392                 htlc_id: 0,
1393                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1394                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1395                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1396                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1397         };
1398
1399         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1400
1401         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1402         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1403         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1404
1405         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1406
1407         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1408
1409         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1410         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1411         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1412                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1413                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1414                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1415                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1416                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1417
1418                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1419                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1420                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1421                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1422                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1423         };
1424         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1425                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1426                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1427                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1428                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1429                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1430                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1431                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1432         };
1433
1434         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1435         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1436                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1437
1438         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1439         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1440         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1441
1442         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1443                 offered: false,
1444                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1445                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1446                 payment_hash,
1447                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1448         };
1449
1450         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1451
1452         let res = {
1453                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1454                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1455                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1456                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1457                         commitment_number,
1458                         95000,
1459                         local_chan_balance,
1460                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1461                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1462                         feerate_per_kw,
1463                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1464                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1465                 );
1466                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1467         };
1468
1469         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1470                 channel_id: chan.2,
1471                 signature: res.0,
1472                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1473         };
1474
1475         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1476         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1477         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1478
1479         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1480         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1481                 channel_id: chan.2,
1482                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1483                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1484         };
1485         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1486
1487         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1488         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1489         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1490         match events[0] {
1491                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1492                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1493                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1494                 },
1495                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1496         };
1497         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1498                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1499
1500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1501 }
1502
1503 #[test]
1504 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1505         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1506         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1507         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1508         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1509         // this situation.
1510         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1511         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1512         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1513         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1514
1515         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1516         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1517         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1518
1519         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1520
1521         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1522         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1523                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1524         }
1525
1526         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1527         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1528         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1529                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1530         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1531         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1532 }
1533
1534 #[test]
1535 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1536         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1537         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1538         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1539         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1540         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1541
1542         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1543         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1544         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1545         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1546         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1547         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1548         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1549
1550         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1551         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1552                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1553         }
1554
1555         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1556         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1557         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1558         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1559         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1560         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1561         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1562         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1563         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1564                 channel_id: chan.2,
1565                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1566                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1567                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1568                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1569                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1570         };
1571
1572         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1573         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1574         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1575         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1576         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1577         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1579         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1580 }
1581
1582 #[test]
1583 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1584         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1585         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1586         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1587         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1588
1589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1591         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1592
1593         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1594         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1595         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1596         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1597         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1598         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1599         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1600
1601         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1602                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1603         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1604         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1605         // commitment transaction fee.
1606         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1607
1608         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1609         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1610                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1611         }
1612
1613         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1614         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1615         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1616                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1617 }
1618
1619 #[test]
1620 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1621         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1622         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1623         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1624         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1625         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1626         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1627         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1628
1629         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1630         // HTLC.
1631         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1632         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1633         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1634                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1635
1636         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1637         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1638         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1639         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1640         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1641         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1642         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1643
1644         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1645         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1646         match msg_events[0] {
1647                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1648                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1649                 },
1650                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1651         }
1652 }
1653
1654 #[test]
1655 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1656         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1657         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1661         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1662         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1663
1664         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1665         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1666         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670
1671         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1672         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1673         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1674         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1675         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1676         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1677
1678         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1679         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1680         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1681         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1682 }
1683
1684 #[test]
1685 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1686         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1687         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1688         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1689         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1690         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1691         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1692
1693         let feemsat = 239;
1694         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1695         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1696         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1697
1698         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1699         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1700         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1701         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1702
1703         // Add a pending HTLC.
1704         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1705         let payment_event_1 = {
1706                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1707                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1708
1709                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1710                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1711                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1712         };
1713         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1714
1715         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1716         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1717         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1718         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1719         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1720
1721         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1722         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1723         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1724         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1725         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1726         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1727         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1728         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1729                 channel_id: chan.2,
1730                 htlc_id: 1,
1731                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1732                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1733                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1734                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1735         };
1736
1737         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1738         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1739         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1740         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1741         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1742         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1743         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1744         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1745 }
1746
1747 #[test]
1748 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1749         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1750         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1751         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1752         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1753         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1754         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1755         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1756         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1757         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1758
1759         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1760         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1761         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1762
1763         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1764         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1765 }
1766
1767 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1768         (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1769 }
1770
1771 #[test]
1772 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1773         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1774         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1775         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1776         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1777         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1778         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1779         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1780         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1781         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1782         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1783
1784         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1785         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1786
1787         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1788         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1789
1790         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1791                 ($node: expr) => {{
1792                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1793                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1794                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1795                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1796                         payment_event
1797                 }}
1798         }
1799
1800         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1801         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1802         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1803
1804         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1805
1806         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1807         {
1808                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1809                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1810                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1811                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1812                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1813                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1814                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1815         }
1816
1817         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1818         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1819         loop {
1820                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1821                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1822                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1823                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1824                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1825                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1826                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1827                         break;
1828                 }
1829                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1830
1831                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1832                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1833                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1834                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1835                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1836                 );
1837
1838                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1839                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1840                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1841                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1842                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1843         }
1844
1845         // adding pending output.
1846         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1847         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1848         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1849         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1850         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1851         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1852         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1853         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1854         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1855         // policy.
1856         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1857         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1858         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1859
1860         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1861         let payment_event_1 = {
1862                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1863                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1864
1865                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1866                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1867                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1868         };
1869         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1870
1871         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1872         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1873         {
1874                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1875                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1876                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1877                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1878         }
1879
1880         // split the rest to test holding cell
1881         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1882         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1883         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1884         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1885         {
1886                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1887                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1888         }
1889
1890         // now see if they go through on both sides
1891         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1892         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1893         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1894         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1895         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1896         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1897
1898         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1899         {
1900                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1901                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1902                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1903                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1904                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1905         }
1906
1907         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1908         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1909         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1911         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1912         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1913
1914         // flush the pending htlc
1915         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1916         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1918
1919         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1920         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1922         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1923
1924         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1925         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1926         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1928
1929         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1930         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1932
1933         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1934
1935         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1936         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1937         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1938
1939         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1940         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1941
1942         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1943         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1944         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1945         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1946         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1947         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1948
1949         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1950         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1951         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1952         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1953
1954         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1955         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1956
1957         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1958         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1959         match events[0] {
1960                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1961                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1962                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1963                         match &purpose {
1964                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1965                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1966                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1967                                 },
1968                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1969                         }
1970                 },
1971                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1972         }
1973         match events[1] {
1974                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1975                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1976                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1977                         match &purpose {
1978                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1979                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1980                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1981                                 },
1982                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1983                         }
1984                 },
1985                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1986         }
1987
1988         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1989         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1990         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1991
1992         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1993         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1994         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1995
1996         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1997         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1998         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1999         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2000         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2001
2002         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2003         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2004 }
2005
2006 #[test]
2007 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2008         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2009         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2010         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2011         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2012         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2013         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2014         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2015         // To test this we:
2016         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2017         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2018         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2019         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2020         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2021         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2022         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2023         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2024         //    claim,
2025         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2026         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2027         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2028         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2029         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2030         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2031         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2032         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2033         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2034         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2035
2036         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2037         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2038         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2039         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2040
2041         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2042         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2043         let send_1 = {
2044                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2045                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2046                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2047                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2048                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2049         };
2050
2051         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2052         // initial fulfill/CS.
2053         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2054         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2055         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2056
2057         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2058         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2059         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2060         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2061         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2062
2063         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2064         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2065         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2066         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2067         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2068
2069         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2070         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2071         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2072         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2073         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2074
2075         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2077         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2078
2079         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2080         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2081         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2082
2083         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2085         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2086
2087         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2088         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2089         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2090         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2091         // on-chain as necessary).
2092         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2093         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2094         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2095         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2096         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2097
2098         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2100         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2101
2102         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2103         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2104
2105         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2106         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2107         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2109         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2110         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2111
2112         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2113         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2114         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2115         let send_2 = {
2116                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2117                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2118                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2119                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2120                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2121         };
2122
2123         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2124         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2125         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2126         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2127
2128         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2129
2130         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2132         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2133
2134         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2135         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2136
2137         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2139         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2140         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2141
2142         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2144         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2145
2146         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2148
2149         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2150         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2151
2152         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2153         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2154 }
2155
2156 #[test]
2157 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2158         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2159         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2160         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2161         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2162         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2163         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2164
2165         // Create some initial channels
2166         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2167         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2168         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2169         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2170
2171         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2172         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2173         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2174         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2175         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2176         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2177
2178         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2179         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2180         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2181         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2182         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183
2184         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2185         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2187         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2188         {
2189                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2190                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2191                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2192                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2193                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2194         }
2195         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2196         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2197         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2198         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2199         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2200
2201         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2202         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2203
2204         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2205         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2206         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2207         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2208         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2209         {
2210                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2211                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2212                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2213                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2214                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2215                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2216         }
2217         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2218         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2219         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2220         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2221         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2222
2223         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2224                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2225                         {
2226                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2227                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2228
2229                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2230                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2231                                 match events[0] {
2232                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2233                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2234                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2235                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2236                                         },
2237                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2238                                 };
2239                         }
2240                 }
2241         }
2242
2243         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2244         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2245         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2247         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2248         let node2_commitment_txid;
2249         {
2250                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2251                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2252                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2253                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2254
2255                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2256                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2257                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2258                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2259                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2260         }
2261         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2262         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2263         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2264         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2265         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2266
2267         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2268         // confusing us in the following tests.
2269         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2270
2271         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2272         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2273         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2274         // buffer space).
2275
2276         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2277                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2278                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2279                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2280                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2281                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2282                                 msg.clone()
2283                         },
2284                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2285                 };
2286                 match events[1] {
2287                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2288                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2289                         },
2290                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2291                 }
2292                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2293
2294                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2295                 {
2296                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2297                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2298                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2299                                         false
2300                                 } else { true }
2301                         });
2302                 }
2303
2304                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2305
2306                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2307                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2308
2309                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2310                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2311                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2312                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2313                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2314                                 msg.clone()
2315                         },
2316                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2317                 };
2318                 match events[1] {
2319                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2320                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2321                         },
2322                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2323                 }
2324                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2325                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2326
2327                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2328                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2329                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2330         };
2331         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2332         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2333         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2334         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2335
2336         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2337         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2338         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2339 }
2340
2341 #[test]
2342 fn test_justice_tx() {
2343         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2344         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2345         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2346         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2347         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2348         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2349         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2350         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2351         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2352         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2353         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2354         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2355         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2356         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2357         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2358         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2359         // Create some new channels:
2360         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2361
2362         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2363         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2364         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2365         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2366         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2367         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2368         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2369         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2370         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2371         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2372         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2373         // Revoke the old state
2374         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2375
2376         {
2377                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2378                 {
2379                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2380                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2381                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2382
2383                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2384                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2385                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2386                 }
2387                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2388                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2389                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2390
2391                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2392                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2393                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2394                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2395                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2396                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2397                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2398                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2399                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2400         }
2401         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2402
2403         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2404         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2405
2406         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2407         // Create some new channels:
2408         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2409         {
2410                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2411                 node_txn.clear();
2412         }
2413
2414         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2415         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2416         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2417         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2418         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2419         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2420         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2421         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2422         // Revoke the old state
2423         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2424         {
2425                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2426                 {
2427                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2428                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2429                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2430
2431                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2432                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2433                 }
2434                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2435                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2436
2437                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2438                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2439                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2440                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2441                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2442                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2443                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2444         }
2445         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2446         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2447         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2448 }
2449
2450 #[test]
2451 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2452         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2453         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2454         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2455         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2456         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2457         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2458         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2459         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2460         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2461         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2462         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2463         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2464         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2465         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2466
2467         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2468         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2469         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2470         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2471         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2472         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2473
2474         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2475         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2476
2477         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2478         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2479         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2481         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2482 }
2483
2484 #[test]
2485 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2486         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2487         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2488         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2489         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2490         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2491         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2492
2493         // Create some new channel:
2494         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2495
2496         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2497         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2498         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2499         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2500         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2501
2502         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2503         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2504         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2505         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2506         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2507         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2508         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2509         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2510         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2511
2512         //Revoke the old state
2513         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2514
2515         {
2516                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2517                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2518                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2519                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2520                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2521                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2522                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2523                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2524
2525                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2526                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2527
2528                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2529                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2530
2531                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2532                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2533                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2534                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2535                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2536                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2537                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2538                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2539
2540                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2541                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2542                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2543         }
2544         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2545         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2546         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2547 }
2548
2549 #[test]
2550 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2551         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2552         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2553         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2554         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2555         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2556         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2557
2558         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2559
2560         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2561         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2562         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2563         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2564         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2565         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2566
2567         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2568         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2569
2570         //Revoke the old state
2571         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2572
2573         {
2574                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2575                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2576                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2577                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2578                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2579                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2580                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2581                 match events[1] {
2582                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2583                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2584                 }
2585
2586                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2587                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2588
2589                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2590                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2591                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2592                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2593                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2594                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2595
2596                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2597                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2598                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2599                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2600                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2601                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2602                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2603
2604                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2605                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2606                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2607                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2608
2609                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2610                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2611                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2612
2613                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2614                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2615                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2616                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2617                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2618                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2619                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2620                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2621         }
2622         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2623         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2624         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2625 }
2626
2627 #[test]
2628 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2629         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2630         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2631         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2632         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2633         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2634         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2635         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2636         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2637         // towards B.
2638         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2639         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2640         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2641         // PaymentSent event).
2642
2643         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2646         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2647
2648         // Create some initial channels
2649         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2650         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2651
2652         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2653         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2654         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2655         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2656         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2657
2658         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2659         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2660         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2661
2662         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2663         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2664
2665         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2666         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2667         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2668         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2669         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2670         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2671         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2672         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2673         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2674         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2675         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2676         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2677         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2678
2679         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2680         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2681         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2682         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2683         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2684         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2685         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2686         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2687         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2688         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2689         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2690         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2691         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2692         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2693         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2694         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2695         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2696
2697         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2698         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2699         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2700         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2701         {
2702                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2703                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2704                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2705                 added_monitors.clear();
2706         }
2707         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2708         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2709         match forwarded_events[0] {
2710                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2711                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2712         }
2713         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2714                 } else { panic!(); }
2715         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2716                 } else { panic!(); }
2717         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2718         {
2719                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2720                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2721                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2722                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2723                 added_monitors.clear();
2724         }
2725         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2726         match events[0] {
2727                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2728                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2729         }
2730         match events[1] {
2731                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2732                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2733         }
2734
2735         match events[2] {
2736                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2737                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2738                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2739                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2740                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2741                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2742                 },
2743                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2744         };
2745         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2746                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2747                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2748                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2749                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2750                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2751                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2752                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2753                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2754                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2755                         if $htlc_offered {
2756                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2757                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2758                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2759                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2760                         } else {
2761                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2762                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2763                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2764                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2765                         }
2766                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2767                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2768                         node_txn.clear();
2769                 } }
2770         }
2771         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2772         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2773         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2774         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2775
2776         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2777         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2778         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2779         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2780         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2781         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2782         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2783         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2784         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2785         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2786         let commitment_spend =
2787                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2788                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2789                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2790                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2791                         &node_txn[0]
2792                 } else {
2793                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2794                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2795                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2796                         &node_txn[2]
2797                 };
2798
2799         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2800         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2801         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2802         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2803         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2804         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2805         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2806         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2807         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2808         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2809         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2810         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2811
2812         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2813         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2814         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2815         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2816         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2818         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2819         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2820         let mut first_claimed = false;
2821         for event in events {
2822                 match event {
2823                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2824                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2825                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2826                                         first_claimed = true;
2827                                 } else {
2828                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2829                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2830                                 }
2831                         },
2832                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2833                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2834                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2835                 }
2836         }
2837         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2838 }
2839
2840 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2841         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2842         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2843         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2844         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2845         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2846         //            \                                  \
2847         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2848
2849         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2850         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2851         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2852         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2853         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2854         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2855         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2856
2857         // Create some intial channels
2858         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2859         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2860
2861         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2862         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2863         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2864
2865         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2866
2867         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2868         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2869         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2870         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2871         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2872         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2873         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2874
2875         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2876         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2877         match events[0] {
2878                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2879                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2880                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2881                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2882                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2883                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2884                 },
2885                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2886         };
2887         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2888         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2889         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2890         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2891         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2892         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2893         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2894         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2895
2896         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2897         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2898         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2899         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2900         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2901         let timeout_tx;
2902         {
2903                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2904                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2905                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2906                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2907
2908                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2909                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2910
2911                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2912                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2913                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2914                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2915
2916                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2917                 node_txn.clear();
2918         }
2919
2920         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2922         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2923         {
2924                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2925                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2926                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2927                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2928         }
2929
2930         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2931         {
2932                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2933                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2934                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2935                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2936                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2937                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2938                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2939                 } else {
2940                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2941                 }
2942         }
2943
2944         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2946         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2947         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2948         match events[0] {
2949                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2950                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2951                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2952                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2953                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2954                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2955                 },
2956                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2957         };
2958
2959         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2960         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2961         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2962
2963         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2964         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2965
2966         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2968         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2969         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2970         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2971         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2972         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2973         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2974         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2975 }
2976
2977 #[test]
2978 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2979         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2980         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2981         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2982 }
2983
2984 #[test]
2985 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2986         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2987         // and fail backward accordingly.
2988
2989         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2990         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2991         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2992         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2993
2994         // Create some initial channels
2995         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2996         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2997
2998         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2999         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3000         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3001         // Revoke the old state
3002         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3003
3004         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3005
3006         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3007         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3008         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3010         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3011
3012         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3013         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3014         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3015         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3016         match events[0] {
3017                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3018                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3019                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3020                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3021                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3022                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3023
3024                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3025                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3026                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3027                 },
3028                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3029         }
3030 }
3031
3032 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3033         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3034         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3035         // commitment transaction anymore.
3036         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3037         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3038         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3039         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3040         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3041         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3042         // transactions:
3043         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3044         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3045         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3046         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3047         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3048         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3049         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3050         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3051         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3052
3053         // Create some initial channels
3054         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3055         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3056
3057         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3058         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3059         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3060         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3061         // Revoke the old state
3062         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3063
3064         let value = if use_dust {
3065                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3066                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3067                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3068         } else { 3000000 };
3069
3070         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3071         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3072         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3073
3074         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3075         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3077         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3078         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3079         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3080         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3081         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3082         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3083         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3084         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3085         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3086
3087         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3088         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3090         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3091         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3092         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3093         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3094         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3095         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3096         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3097         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3098         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3099         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3100         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3101         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3102         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3103
3104         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3105         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3106         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3107         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3108         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3109         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3110         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3111         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3112         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3113         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3114         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3115         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3116         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3117         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3118         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3119         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3120         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3122
3123         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3124         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3125         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3126         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3127         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3128         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3129         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3130
3131         if deliver_bs_raa {
3132                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3133                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3134                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3135                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3136                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3137                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3138                 match events[0] {
3139                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3140                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3141                 };
3142                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3143                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3144         }
3145
3146         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3147         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3148
3149         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3151         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3152
3153         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3154         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
3155         match events[0] {
3156                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3157                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3158         }
3159         match events[1] {
3160                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3161                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3162                 },
3163                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3164         }
3165         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3166                 match events[2] {
3167                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3168                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3169                 };
3170         }
3171         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3173
3174         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3175         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3176         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3177                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3178                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3179         }
3180         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3181                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3182                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3183                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3184                 },
3185                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3186         }
3187         if deliver_bs_raa {
3188                 match events[0] {
3189                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3190                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3191                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3192                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3193                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3194                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3195                         },
3196                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3197                 }
3198         }
3199         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3200                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3201                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3202                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3203                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3204                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3205                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3206
3207                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3208                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3209                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3210
3211                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3212
3213                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3214                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3215                         match events[0] {
3216                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3217                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3218                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3219                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3220                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3221                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3222                                         }
3223                                 },
3224                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3225                         }
3226                         match events[1] {
3227                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3228                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3229                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3230                                 },
3231                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3232                         }
3233                         match events[2] {
3234                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3235                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3236                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3237                                 },
3238                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3239                         }
3240                 },
3241                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3242         }
3243
3244         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3245         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3246         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3247 }
3248
3249 #[test]
3250 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3251         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3252         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3253         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3254         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3255 }
3256
3257 #[test]
3258 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3259         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3260         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3261         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3262         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3263 }
3264
3265 #[test]
3266 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3267         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3268         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3269         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3270         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3271         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3272
3273         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3274         {
3275                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3276                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3277                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3278
3279                 let payment_event = {
3280                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3281                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3282                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3283                 };
3284                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3285                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3286         }
3287
3288         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3289         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3290         {
3291                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3292                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3293
3294                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3295         }
3296
3297         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3298         {
3299                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3300
3301                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3302                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3303                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3304                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3305                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3306                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3307
3308                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3309                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3310                         channel_id: chan.2,
3311                         htlc_id: 0,
3312                         amount_msat: 0,
3313                         payment_hash,
3314                         cltv_expiry,
3315                         onion_routing_packet,
3316                 };
3317                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3318         }
3319         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3320         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3321         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3322         match events[0] {
3323                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3324                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3325                 },
3326                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3327         }
3328         match events[1] {
3329                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3330                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3331                 },
3332                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3333         }
3334         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3335         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3336 }
3337
3338 #[test]
3339 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3340         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3341         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3342         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3343         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3344         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3345         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3346         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3347
3348         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3349         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3350         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3351         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3352         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3353         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3354
3355         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3356         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3357         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3358
3359         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3360         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3361         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3362         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3363         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3364
3365         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3366         // registering new transactions
3367         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3368         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3369 }
3370
3371 #[test]
3372 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3373         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3374         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3375         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3376         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3377         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3378         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3379         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3380
3381         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3382
3383         let mut payment_event = {
3384                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3385                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3386
3387                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3388                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3389                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3390         };
3391
3392         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3393         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3394
3395         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3396
3397         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3398         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3399         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3400         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3401
3402         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3403         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3404         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3405         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3406         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3407
3408         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3409         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3410         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3411
3412         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3413         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3415         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3416         let tx = {
3417                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3418                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3419                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3420                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3421                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3422                 node_txn.remove(0)
3423         };
3424
3425         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3426
3427         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3428         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3430         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3431
3432         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3433         {
3434                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3435                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3436         }
3437         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3438         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3439         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3440         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3441         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3442         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3443         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3444
3445         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3446 }
3447
3448 #[test]
3449 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3450         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3451         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3452         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3453         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3454
3455         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3456         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3457         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3458         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3459         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3460
3461         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3462
3463         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3464         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3465         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3466         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3467         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3468
3469         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3470         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3471
3472         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3473         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3474 }
3475
3476 #[test]
3477 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3478         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3479         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3480         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3481         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3482         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3483         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3484         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3485
3486         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3487         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3488         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3489
3490         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3491         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3492         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3493         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3494
3495         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3496         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3497         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3498
3499         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3500         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3501         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3502         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3503
3504         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3505         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3506
3507         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3508         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3509
3510         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3511         {
3512                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3513                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3514                 match events[0] {
3515                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3516                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3517                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3518                         },
3519                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3520                 }
3521                 match events[1] {
3522                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3523                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3524                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3525                         },
3526                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3527                 }
3528                 match events[2] {
3529                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3530                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3531                 }
3532         }
3533
3534         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3535         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3536 }
3537
3538 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3539         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3540         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3541         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3542         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3543         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3544
3545         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3546         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3547                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3548                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3549                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3550                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3551                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3552         } else {
3553                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3554         }
3555
3556         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3557
3558         let payment_event = {
3559                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3560                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3561
3562                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3563                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3564                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3565         };
3566         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3567
3568         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3569                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3570         } else {
3571                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3572                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3573                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3574                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3575                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3576
3577                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3578                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3579                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3580                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3581
3582                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3583                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3584                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3585                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3586                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3587
3588                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3589                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3590                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3591                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3592                                         }
3593                                 }
3594                         }
3595                 }
3596         }
3597
3598         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3599         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3600         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3601                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3602                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3603                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3604                         //
3605                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3606                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3607                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3608                         //
3609                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3610                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3611                 }
3612                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3613                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3614                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3615         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3616                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3617                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3618         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3619                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3620                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3621         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3622                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3623                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3624         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3625                 // Everything was delivered...
3626                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3627         }
3628
3629         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3630         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3631         match events_1[0] {
3632                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3633                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3634         };
3635
3636         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3637         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3638         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3639
3640         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3641
3642         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3643         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3644         match events_2[0] {
3645                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3646                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3647                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3648                         match &purpose {
3649                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3650                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3651                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3652                                 },
3653                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3654                         }
3655                 },
3656                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3657         }
3658
3659         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3660         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3661
3662         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3663         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3664         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3665                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3666                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3667                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3668                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3669                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3670                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3671                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3672                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3673                 },
3674                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3675         };
3676
3677         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3678                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3679
3680                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3681                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3682                 match events_4[0] {
3683                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3684                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3685                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3686                         },
3687                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3688                 }
3689
3690                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3691                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3692                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3693                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3694
3695                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3696                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3697                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3698                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3699
3700                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3701                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3702                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3703                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3704                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3705
3706                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3707                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3708                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3709                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3710                                         }
3711                                 }
3712                         }
3713                 }
3714         }
3715
3716         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3717         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3718         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3719                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3720                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3721                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3722                 } else {
3723                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3724                 }
3725         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3726                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3727                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3728         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3729                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3730                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3731         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3732                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3733                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3734         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3735                 // Everything was delivered...
3736                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3737         }
3738
3739         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3740                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3741         }
3742
3743         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3744         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3745         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3746
3747         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3748                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3749         }
3750
3751         // Channel should still work fine...
3752         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3753         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3754         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3755 }
3756
3757 #[test]
3758 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3759         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3760         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3761         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3762         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3763 }
3764
3765 #[test]
3766 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3767         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3768         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3769         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3770         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3771 }
3772
3773 #[test]
3774 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3775         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3776         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3777         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3778         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3779         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3780         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3781         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3782         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3783         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3784
3785         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3786         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3787
3788         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3789         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3790         let chan_id;
3791         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3792         match events_1[0] {
3793                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3794                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3795                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3796                 },
3797                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3798         }
3799
3800         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3801
3802         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3803         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3804
3805         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3806         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3807         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3808         let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3809                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3810                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3811                         msg.clone()
3812                 },
3813                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3814         };
3815         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3816                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3817                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3818                         msg.clone()
3819                 },
3820                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3821         };
3822
3823         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3824
3825         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3826         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3827         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3828         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3829         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3830                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3831                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3832                         msg.clone()
3833                 },
3834                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3835         };
3836         let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3837                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3838                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3839                 },
3840                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3841         };
3842
3843         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3844         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3845         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3846         let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3847                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3848                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3849                 },
3850                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3851         };
3852
3853         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3854         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3855         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3856
3857         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3858         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3859         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3860
3861         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3862         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3863         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3864
3865         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3866         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3867         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3868
3869         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3870         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3871         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3872         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3873         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3874         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3875                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3876         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3877
3878         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3879         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3880                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3881                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3882                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3883                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3884                         keys_manager,
3885                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3886                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3887                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3888                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3889                         channel_monitors,
3890                 }).unwrap()
3891         };
3892         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3893         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3894
3895         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3896         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3897         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3898
3899         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3900
3901         // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3902         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3903         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3904         let mut found_announcement = false;
3905         for event in msgs.iter() {
3906                 match event {
3907                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3908                                 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3909                         },
3910                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3911                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3912                 }
3913         }
3914         assert!(found_announcement);
3915 }
3916
3917 #[test]
3918 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3919         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3920         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3921         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3922         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3923         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3924         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3925         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3926
3927         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3928
3929         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3930         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3931         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3932         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3933
3934         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3935         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3936         match events_1[0] {
3937                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3938                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3939         }
3940
3941         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3942         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3943
3944         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3945         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3946         match events_2[0] {
3947                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3948                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3949                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3950                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3951                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3952                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3953                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3954
3955                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3956                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3957                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3958                         match events_3[0] {
3959                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3960                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3961                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3962                                 },
3963                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3964                         }
3965
3966                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3967                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3968                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3969                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3970                 },
3971                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3972         }
3973
3974         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3975         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3976
3977         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3978         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3979         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3980         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3981         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3982         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3983
3984         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3985         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3986         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3987         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3988
3989         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3990         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3991
3992         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3993         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3994
3995         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3996
3997         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3998         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3999         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4000         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4001         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4002         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4003         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4004         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4005         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4007
4008         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4009         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4010         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4011         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4012         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4013         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4014         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4015         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4016
4017         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4018         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4019         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4020         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4021         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4022         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4023         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4025
4026         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4027         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4028         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4029         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4030
4031         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4032         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4033         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4034         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4035
4036         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4037         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4038         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4039
4040         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4041
4042         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4043         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4044         match events_5[0] {
4045                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4046                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4047                         match &purpose {
4048                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4049                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4050                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4051                                 },
4052                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4053                         }
4054                 },
4055                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4056         }
4057
4058         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4059         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4060         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4061
4062         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4063         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4064 }
4065
4066 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4067         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4068         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4069         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4070         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4071         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4072         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4073
4074         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4075
4076         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4077                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4078                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4079                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4080                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4081                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4082                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4083                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4084                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4085                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4086                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4087                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4088                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4089                 our_payment_hash
4090         } else {
4091                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4092         };
4093
4094         let mut block = Block {
4095                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4096                 txdata: vec![],
4097         };
4098         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4099         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4100         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4101         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4102                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4103                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4104                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4105         }
4106
4107         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4108
4109         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4110         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4111         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4112         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4113         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4114         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4115
4116         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4117         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4118         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4119         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4120         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4121         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4122 }
4123
4124 #[test]
4125 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4126         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4127         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4128 }
4129
4130 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4131         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4132         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4133         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4134         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4135         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4136         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4137         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4138
4139         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4140         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4141         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4142         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4143
4144         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4145         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4146         {
4147                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4148         }
4149         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4151
4152         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4153         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4154         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4155         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4156         if forwarded_htlc {
4157                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4158                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4159                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4160                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4161                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4162         }
4163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4164
4165         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4166         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4167         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4168         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4169
4170         if forwarded_htlc {
4171                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4172                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4173                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4174                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4175                 match fail_commit[0] {
4176                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4177                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4178                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4179                         },
4180                         _ => unreachable!(),
4181                 }
4182                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4183         } else {
4184                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4185         }
4186 }
4187
4188 #[test]
4189 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4190         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4191         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4192 }
4193
4194 #[test]
4195 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4196         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4197         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4198         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4199         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4200         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4201         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4202         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4203         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4204         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4205
4206         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4207
4208         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4209
4210         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4211         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4212         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4213                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4214
4215         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4216         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4217         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4218         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4219         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4220         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4221         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4222         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4223                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4224         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4225
4226         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4227         let config = UserConfig::default();
4228         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4229                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4230                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4231                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4232                         default_config: config,
4233                         keys_manager,
4234                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4235                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4236                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4237                         logger: &logger,
4238                         channel_monitors,
4239                 }).unwrap()
4240         };
4241         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4242         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4243
4244         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4245         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4246         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4247         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4248
4249         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4250         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4251         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4252         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4253
4254         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4255         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4256         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4257         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4258
4259         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4260         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4261         for node in nodes.iter() {
4262                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4263                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4264                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4265         }
4266
4267         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4268 }
4269
4270 #[test]
4271 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4272         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4273         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4274         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4275         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4276         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4277         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4278         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4279         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4280         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4281         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4282
4283         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4284         let channel_value = 100000;
4285         let push_msat = 10001;
4286         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4287         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4288         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4289         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4290         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4291         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4292         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4293
4294         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4295
4296         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4297         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4298
4299         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4300         {
4301                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4302                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4303                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4304                 added_monitors.clear();
4305         }
4306
4307         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4308         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4309         {
4310                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4311                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4312                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4313                 added_monitors.clear();
4314         }
4315         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4316
4317         nodes.push(node_a);
4318         nodes.push(node_b);
4319
4320         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4321         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4322         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4323         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4324
4325         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4326         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4327         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4328         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4329         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4330         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4331         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4332         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4333                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4334         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4335
4336         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4337         let config = UserConfig::default();
4338         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4339                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4340                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4341                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4342                         default_config: config,
4343                         keys_manager,
4344                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4345                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4346                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4347                         logger: &logger,
4348                         channel_monitors,
4349                 }).unwrap()
4350         };
4351         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4352         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4353
4354         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4355
4356         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4357         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4358
4359         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4360         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4361         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4362         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4363         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4364
4365         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4366         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4367         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4368
4369         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4370         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4371         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4372         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4373
4374         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4375         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4376         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4377         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4378
4379         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4380         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4381         for node in nodes.iter() {
4382                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4383                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4384                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4385         }
4386
4387         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4388 }
4389
4390 #[test]
4391 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4392         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4393         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4394         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4395         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4396         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4397         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4398         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4399         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4400         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4401         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4402
4403         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4404         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4405
4406         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4407
4408         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4409         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4410         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4411
4412         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4413         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4414         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4415         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4416         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4417         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4418         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4419         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4420                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4421         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4422
4423         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4424         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4425                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4426                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4427                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4428                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4429                         keys_manager,
4430                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4431                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4432                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4433                         logger: &logger,
4434                         channel_monitors,
4435                 }).unwrap()
4436         };
4437         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4438         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4439
4440         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4441         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4442         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4443
4444         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4445
4446         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4447         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4448 }
4449
4450 #[test]
4451 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4452         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4453         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4454         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4455         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4456         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4457         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4458         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4459         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4460         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4461         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4462         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4463         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4464         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4465
4466         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4467         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4468                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4469                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4470                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4471         }
4472
4473         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4474
4475         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4476         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4477
4478         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4479         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4480         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4481         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4482
4483         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4484         // nodes[3])
4485         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4486         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4487                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4488                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4489                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4490         }
4491
4492         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4493         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4494         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4495         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4496         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4497         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4498
4499
4500         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4501         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4502                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4503                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4504                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4505                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4506         }
4507
4508         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4509         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4510                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4511                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4512                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4513                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4514         }
4515
4516         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4517         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4518                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4519                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4520                 keys_manager,
4521                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4522                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4523                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4524                 logger: &logger,
4525                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4526         }) { } else {
4527                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4528         };
4529
4530         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4531         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4532                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4533                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4534                 keys_manager,
4535                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4536                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4537                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4538                 logger: &logger,
4539                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4540         }).unwrap();
4541         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4542         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4543
4544         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4545                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4546                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4547                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4548                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4549         }
4550
4551         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4552                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4553                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4554         }
4555         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4556         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4557
4558         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4559         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4560         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4561         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4562         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4563
4564         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4565         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4566         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4567         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4568         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4569         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4570         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4571                 match action {
4572                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4573                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4574                         },
4575                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4576                 }
4577         }
4578 }
4579
4580 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4581         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4582                 {
4583                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4584                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4585                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4586                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4587                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4588                                 match event {
4589                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4590                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4591                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4592                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4593                                                 }
4594                                         },
4595                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4596                                 };
4597                         }
4598                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4599                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4600                                         txn.push(tx);
4601                                 }
4602                         }
4603                         txn
4604                 }
4605         }
4606 }
4607
4608 #[test]
4609 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4610         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4611         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4612         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4613         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4614         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4615
4616         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4617         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4618         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4619         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4620         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4621         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4622         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4623         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4624         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4625
4626         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4627         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4628
4629         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4630         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4631         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4632         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4633         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4634 }
4635
4636 #[test]
4637 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4638         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4639         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4640         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4641         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4642         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4643         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4644
4645         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4646         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4647         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4648         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4649         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4650
4651         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4652         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4653         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4654         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4655
4656         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4657         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4658         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4659         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4660         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4661
4662         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4663         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4664         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4665 }
4666
4667 #[test]
4668 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4669         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4670         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4671
4672         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4673         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4674         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4675         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4676
4677         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4678         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4679         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4680         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4681         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4682
4683         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4684         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4685         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4686         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4687         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4688
4689         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4690         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4691         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4692
4693         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4694         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4695         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4696         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4697         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4698 }
4699
4700 #[test]
4701 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4702         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4703         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4704         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4705         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4706
4707         // Create some initial channels
4708         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4709
4710         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4711
4712         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4713         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4714         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4715
4716         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4717         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4718         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4719         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4720         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4721         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4722         match events[0] {
4723                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4724                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4725         }
4726         match events[1] {
4727                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4728                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4729         }
4730
4731         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4732         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4733         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4734         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4735         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4736         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4737         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4738
4739         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4740         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4741         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4742
4743         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4744         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4745         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4746 }
4747
4748 #[test]
4749 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4750         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4751         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4752         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4753         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4754
4755         // Create some initial channels
4756         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4757
4758         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4759         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4760
4761         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4762
4763         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4764         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4765         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4766
4767         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4768         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4769         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4770         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4771         match events[0] {
4772                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4773                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4774         }
4775         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4776
4777         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4778         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4779         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4780         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4781         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4782         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4783
4784         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4785         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4786         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4787         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4788
4789         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4790         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4791         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4792         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4793         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4794 }
4795
4796 #[test]
4797 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4798         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4799         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4800         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4801         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4802
4803         // Create some initial channels
4804         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4805
4806         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4807         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4808         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4809         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4810
4811         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4812
4813         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4814         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4816         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4817
4818         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4819         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4820         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4821         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4822
4823         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4824         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4825
4826         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4827         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4828         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4829 }
4830
4831 #[test]
4832 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4833         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4834         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4835         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4836         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4837         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4838
4839         // Create some initial channels
4840         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4841
4842         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4843         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4844         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4845         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4846
4847         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4848
4849         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4850         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4851         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4852         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4853         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4854         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4855
4856         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4857         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4858         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4859         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4860         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4861         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4862         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4863
4864         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4865         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4866         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4867         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4868         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4869         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4870
4871         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4872         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4873         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4874         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4875         // transactions next...
4876         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4877         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4878
4879         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4880         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4881         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4882                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4883         } else {
4884                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4885                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4886         }
4887
4888         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4889         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4890
4891         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4892         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4893
4894         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4895         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4896         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4897         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4898         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4899 }
4900
4901 #[test]
4902 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4903         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4904         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4905         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4906         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4907         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4908
4909         // Create some initial channels
4910         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4911
4912         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4913         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4914         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4915         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4916
4917         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4918         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4919
4920         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4921
4922         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4923         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4924         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4925         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4926         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4927         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4928
4929         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4930         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4931         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4932         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4933
4934         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4935         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4936         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4937
4938         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4939         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4940         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4941         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4942         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4943         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4944
4945         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4946         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4947
4948         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4949         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4950         // transactions next...
4951         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4952         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4953         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4954                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4955         } else {
4956                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4957                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4958         }
4959
4960         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4961         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4962
4963         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4964
4965         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4966         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4967
4968         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4969         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4970
4971         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4972         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4973         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4974         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4975         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4976         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4977         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4978         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4979 }
4980
4981 #[test]
4982 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4983         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4984         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4985         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4986         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4987         // channel.
4988         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4989         // gets broadcast.
4990
4991         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4992         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4993         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4994         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4995
4996         // Create some initial channels
4997         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4998         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4999
5000         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5001         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5002         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5003         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5004         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5005
5006         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5007         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5008         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5009
5010         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5011         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5012         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5013         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5014         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5015         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5016         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5017         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5018         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5019         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5020
5021         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5022         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5023         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5024         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5025
5026         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5027         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5028         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5029         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5030         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5031         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5032         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5033         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5034         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5035         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5036
5037         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5038         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5039         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5040         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5041         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5042         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5043         match events[0] {
5044                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5045                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5046         }
5047         match events[1] {
5048                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5049                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5050                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5051                 },
5052                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5053         }
5054         {
5055                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5056                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5057                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5058                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5059                 b_txn.clear();
5060         }
5061         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5062         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5063         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5064         match msg_events[0] {
5065                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5066                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5067         }
5068         match msg_events[1] {
5069                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5070                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5071         }
5072         match msg_events[2] {
5073                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5074                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5075                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5076                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5077                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5078                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5079                 },
5080                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5081         };
5082         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5083         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5084         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5085         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5086         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5087         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5088         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5089         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5090         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5091         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5092         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5093         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5094         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5095
5096         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5097         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5098 }
5099
5100 #[test]
5101 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5102         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5103         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5104         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5105         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5106         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5107         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5108         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5109         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5110         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5111         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5112         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5113                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5114         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5115
5116         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5117         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5118         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5119
5120         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5121         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5122         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5123         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5124         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5125
5126         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5127
5128         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5129         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5130         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5131         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5132         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5133         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5134
5135         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5136         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5137         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5138
5139         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5140         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5142         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5143         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5144
5145         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5146         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5147                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5148                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5149                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5150                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5151
5152                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5153                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5154                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5155                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5156                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5157                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5158                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5159
5160                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5161                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5162                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5163                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5164         }
5165
5166         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5167         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5169         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5170         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5171         match events[0] {
5172                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5173                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5174         }
5175         match events[1] {
5176                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5177                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5178         }
5179         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5180         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5181         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5182         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5183         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5184         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5185         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5186         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5187         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5188         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5189         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5190         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5191         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5192
5193         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5194         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5195         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5196         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5197         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5198         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5199         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5200         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5201         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5203
5204         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5205         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5206         {
5207                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5208         }
5209         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5210
5211         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5212         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5213         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5214         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5215         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5216         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5217         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5218         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5219         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5220         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5221         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5222         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5223
5224         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5225         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5226
5227         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5228         match events[0] {
5229                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5230                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5231                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5232                 }
5233                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5234         }
5235 }
5236
5237 #[test]
5238 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5239         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5240         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5241         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5242         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5243
5244         // Create some initial channels
5245         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5246
5247         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5248         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5249         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5250         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5251         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5252
5253         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5254         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5256         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5258         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5259         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5260         match events[0] {
5261                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5262                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5263         }
5264         match events[1] {
5265                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5266                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5267         }
5268         let node_tx = {
5269                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5270                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5271                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5272                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5273                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5274                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5275                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5276                 node_txn[0].clone()
5277         };
5278
5279         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5280         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5281
5282         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5283         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5284         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5285         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5286         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5287         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5288 }
5289
5290 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5291         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5292         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5293         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5294         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5295         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5296         // use the same payment hashes.
5297         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5298         //
5299         // A \         / E
5300         //    - C - D -
5301         // B /         \ F
5302         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5303         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5304         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5305         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5306         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5307         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5308         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5309         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5310                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5311         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5312
5313         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5314         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5315         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5316         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5317         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5318
5319         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5320         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5321         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5322         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5323
5324         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5325         // 0th HTLC:
5326         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5327         // 1st HTLC:
5328         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5329         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5330         // 2nd HTLC:
5331         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5332         // 3rd HTLC:
5333         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5334         // 4th HTLC:
5335         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5336         // 5th HTLC:
5337         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5338         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5339         // 6th HTLC:
5340         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5341         // 7th HTLC:
5342         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5343
5344         // 8th HTLC:
5345         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5346         // 9th HTLC:
5347         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5348         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5349
5350         // 10th HTLC:
5351         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5352         // 11th HTLC:
5353         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5354         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5355
5356         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5357         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5358         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5359         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5360         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5361
5362         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5363         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5364         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5365         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5366         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5367         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5368         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5369         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5370         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5371
5372         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5373         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5374         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5375         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5376         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5377         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5378
5379         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5380         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5381         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5382         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5383         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5384         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5385
5386         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5387         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5388         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5389         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5390
5391         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5392
5393         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5394         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5395         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5396         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5397         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5398         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5399         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5400         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5401         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5402         if deliver_last_raa {
5403                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5404         } else {
5405                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5406         }
5407
5408         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5409         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5410         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5411         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5412         //
5413         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5414         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5415         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5416         //
5417         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5418         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5419         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5420
5421         if announce_latest {
5422                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5423         } else {
5424                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5425         }
5426         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5427         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5428                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5429                 events[1].clone()
5430         } else {
5431                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5432                 events[0].clone()
5433         };
5434         match close_event {
5435                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5436                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5437         }
5438
5439         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5440         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5441         if deliver_last_raa {
5442                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5443         } else {
5444                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5445         }
5446         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5447
5448         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5449         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5450         let mut a_done = false;
5451         for msg in cs_msgs {
5452                 match msg {
5453                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5454                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5455                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5456                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5457                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5458                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5459                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5460                                         }
5461                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5462                                         assert!(!a_done);
5463                                         a_done = true;
5464                                         &nodes[0]
5465                                 } else {
5466                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5467                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5468                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5469                                         }
5470                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5471                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5472                                         &nodes[1]
5473                                 };
5474                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5475                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5476                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5477                                 if announce_latest {
5478                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5479                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5480                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5481                                         }
5482                                 }
5483                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5484                         },
5485                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5486                 }
5487         }
5488
5489         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5490         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5491         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5492         let mut as_updates = 0;
5493         for event in as_events.iter() {
5494                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5495                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5496                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5497                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5498                         } else {
5499                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5500                         }
5501                         if network_update.is_some() {
5502                                 as_updates += 1;
5503                         }
5504                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5505         }
5506         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5507         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5508         if announce_latest {
5509                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5510                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5511         }
5512         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5513
5514         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5515         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5516         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5517         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5518         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5519                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5520                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5521                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5522                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5523                         } else {
5524                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5525                         }
5526                         if network_update.is_some() {
5527                                 bs_updates += 1;
5528                         }
5529                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5530         }
5531         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5532         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5533         if announce_latest {
5534                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5535         }
5536         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5537
5538         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5539         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5540         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5541         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5542         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5543         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5544 }
5545
5546 #[test]
5547 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5548         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5549 }
5550
5551 #[test]
5552 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5553         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5554 }
5555
5556 #[test]
5557 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5558         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5559         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5560         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5561 }
5562
5563 #[test]
5564 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5565         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5566         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5567         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5568         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5569
5570         // Create some initial channels
5571         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5572
5573         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5574         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5575         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5576         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5577
5578         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5579         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5580         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5581         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5582         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5583         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5584
5585         let htlc_timeout = {
5586                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5587                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5588                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5589                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5590                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5591                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5592                 node_txn[1].clone()
5593         };
5594
5595         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5596         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5597         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5598
5599         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5600         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5601         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5602         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5603         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5604         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5605         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5606         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5607         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5608         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5609                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5610 }
5611
5612 #[test]
5613 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5614         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5615         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5616         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5617
5618         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5619
5620         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5621         let seed = [42; 32];
5622         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5623         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5624         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5625         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5626         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5627         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5628
5629         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5630         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5631
5632         // Create some initial channels
5633         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5634         // for node 0
5635         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5636         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5637         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5638
5639         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5640         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5641         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5642         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5643         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5644
5645         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5646         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5647         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5648         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5649         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5650
5651         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5652         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5653         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5654         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5655             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5656             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5657             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5658                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5659         }
5660
5661         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5662         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5663         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5664         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5665         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5666         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5667
5668         let htlc_timeout = {
5669                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5670                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5671                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5672                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5673                 node_txn[1].clone()
5674         };
5675
5676         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5677         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5678         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5679
5680         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5681         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5682         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5683         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5684         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5685         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5686         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5687         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5688         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5689         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5690         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5691                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5692 }
5693
5694 #[test]
5695 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5696         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5697         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5698         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5699         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5700
5701         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5702
5703         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5704         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5705
5706         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5707         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5708         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5709
5710         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5711         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5712         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5713
5714         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5715         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5716         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5717
5718         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5719         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5720         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5721 }
5722
5723 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5724         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5725         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5726         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5727         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5728         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5729
5730         let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5731
5732         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5733         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5734         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5735         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5736
5737         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5738         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5739         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5740
5741         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5742         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5743         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5744         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5745         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5746
5747         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5748         let mut block = Block {
5749                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5750                 txdata: vec![],
5751         };
5752         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5753                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5754                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5755         }
5756         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5757         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5759         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5760 }
5761
5762 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5765         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5766         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5767         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5768
5769         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5770         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5771         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5772
5773         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5774
5775         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5776         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5777         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5778
5779         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5780         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5781
5782         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5783                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5784                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5785         }
5786         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5787         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5788         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5789         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5790 }
5791
5792 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5793         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5794         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5795         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5796         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5797         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5798
5799         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5800         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5801         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5802         // actually revoked.
5803         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5804         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5805         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5806         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5808
5809         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5810         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5811         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5812         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5813         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5814         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5816         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5818         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5819
5820         if check_revoke_no_close {
5821                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5822                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5823         }
5824
5825         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5826         let mut block = Block {
5827                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5828                 txdata: vec![],
5829         };
5830         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5831                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5832                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5833         }
5834         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5835                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5836                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5837                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5838                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5839         } else {
5840                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5841         }
5842 }
5843
5844 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5845 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5846 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5847 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5848 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5849 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5850 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5851 // non-dust HTLCs.
5852 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5853 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5854 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5855 #[test]
5856 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5857         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5858         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5859
5860         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5861         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5862 }
5863
5864 #[test]
5865 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5866         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5867         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5868         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5869         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5870 }
5871
5872 #[test]
5873 #[should_panic]
5874 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5875         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5876         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5877         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5878         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5879         //Force duplicate channel ids
5880         for node in nodes.iter() {
5881                 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5882         }
5883
5884         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5885         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5886         let push_msat=10001;
5887         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5888         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5889         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5890
5891         //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5892         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5893 }
5894
5895 #[test]
5896 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5897         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5898         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5899         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5900         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5901
5902         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5903         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5904         let push_msat=10001;
5905         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5906
5907         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5908         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5909         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5910         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5911         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5912
5913         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5914         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5915         let push_msat=10001;
5916         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5917         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5918         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5919
5920         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5921         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5922         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5923
5924         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5925         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5926         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5927
5928         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5929         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5930         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5931
5932         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5933         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5934         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5935         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5936         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5937         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5938 }
5939
5940 #[test]
5941 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5942         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5943         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5944         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5945         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5946
5947         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5948         let push_msat=10001;
5949         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5950         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5951         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5952         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5953
5954         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5955         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5956         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5957                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5958                         msg.clone()
5959                 },
5960                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5961         };
5962         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5963 }
5964
5965 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5966 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5967 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5968 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5969 #[test]
5970 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5971         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5972         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5973         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5974         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5975         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5976
5977         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5978         // pending_update_fee.
5979         {
5980                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5981                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5982         }
5983         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5985
5986         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5987         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5988         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5989                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5990                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5991                 },
5992                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5993         };
5994
5995         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5996
5997         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5998         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5999         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6000
6001         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6002         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6003         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6004
6005         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6006         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6007         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6008         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6009
6010         // Flush the pending fee update.
6011         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6012         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6013         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6014         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6015         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6016
6017         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6018         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6019         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6020         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6021         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6022         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6023         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6024                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6025         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6026
6027         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6028         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6029         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6030         match &events[0] {
6031                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6032                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6033                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6034                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6035                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6036                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6037                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6038                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6039                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6040                 },
6041                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6042         }
6043 }
6044
6045 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6046 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6047 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6048 #[test]
6049 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6050         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6051         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6052         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6053         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6054         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6055
6056         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6057         // pending_update_fee.
6058         {
6059                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6060                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6061         }
6062         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6064
6065         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6066         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6067         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6068                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6069                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6070                 },
6071                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6072         };
6073
6074         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6075
6076         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6077         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6078         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6079
6080         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6081         let amt_1 = 20000;
6082         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6083         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6084         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6085
6086         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6087         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6088         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6089         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6090         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6091         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6092         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6093
6094         // Flush the pending fee update.
6095         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6096         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6097         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6098         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6099         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6101
6102         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6103         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6104         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6105         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6106         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6107         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6108         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6109                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6110         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6111
6112         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6113         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6114         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6115         match &events[0] {
6116                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6117                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6118                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6119                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6120                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6121                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6122                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6123                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6124                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6125                 },
6126                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6127         }
6128
6129         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6130         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6131                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6132                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6133                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6134         };
6135         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6136                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6137                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6138         };
6139         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6141         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6142         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6143         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6144         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6145         match events[0] {
6146                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6147                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6148         }
6149         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6150         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6151         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6152         match events[0] {
6153                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6154                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6155         }
6156         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6157         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6158         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6159         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6160         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6161         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6162 }
6163
6164 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6165 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6166 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6167 // once it's freed.
6168 #[test]
6169 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6170         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6171         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6172         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6173         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6174         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6175         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6176         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6177         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6178         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6179         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6180
6181         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6182         // pending_update_fee.
6183         {
6184                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6185                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6186         }
6187         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6189
6190         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6191         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6192         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6193                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6194                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6195                 },
6196                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6197         };
6198
6199         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6200
6201         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6202         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6203         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6204
6205         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6206         let feemsat = 239;
6207         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6208         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6209         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6210         let payment_event = {
6211                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6212                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6213
6214                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6215                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6216
6217                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6218         };
6219         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6221         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6222         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6223
6224         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6225         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6226
6227         // Flush the pending fee update.
6228         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6229         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6230         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6231         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6232         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6233         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6234
6235         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6236         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6237         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6238
6239         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6240                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6241                         msg.clone()
6242                 },
6243                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6244         };
6245
6246         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6247         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6248         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6249
6250         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6251         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6252         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6253         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6254                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6255                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6256         }
6257
6258         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6259         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6260         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6261
6262         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6263         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6264         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6265         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6266                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6267                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6268                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6269                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6270                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6271                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6272                 },
6273                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6274         };
6275
6276         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6277         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6278         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6279
6280         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6281         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6282         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6283         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6284         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6285         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6286         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6287         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6288         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6289                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6290                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6291         };
6292         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6293         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6294         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6295 }
6296
6297 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6298 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6299 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6300
6301 #[test]
6302 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6303         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6304         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6305         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6306         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6307         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6308         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6309
6310         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6311         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6312
6313         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6314                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6315         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6316         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6317 }
6318
6319 #[test]
6320 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6321         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6322         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6323         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6324         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6325         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6326         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6327
6328         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6329         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6330         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6331                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6332
6333         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6334         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6335 }
6336
6337 #[test]
6338 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6339         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6340         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6341         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6342         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6343         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6344         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6345
6346         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6347         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6348         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6349         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6350         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6351
6352         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6353         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6354         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6355         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6356         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6357 }
6358
6359 #[test]
6360 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6361         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6362         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6363         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6364         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6365         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6366         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6367         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6368
6369         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6370         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6371                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6372 }
6373
6374 #[test]
6375 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6376         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6377         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6378         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6379         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6380         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6381         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6382         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6383         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6384         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6385
6386         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6387                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6388                 let payment_event = {
6389                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6390                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6391
6392                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6393                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6394                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6395                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6396                         } else {
6397                                 assert!(false);
6398                         }
6399                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6400                 };
6401                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6402                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6403                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6404
6405                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6406                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6407         }
6408         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6409         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6410                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6411
6412         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6413         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6414 }
6415
6416 #[test]
6417 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6418         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6419         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6420         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6421         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6422         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6423         let channel_value = 100000;
6424         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6425         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6426
6427         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6428
6429         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6430         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6431         // limits us to.
6432         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6433         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6434                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6435
6436         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6437         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6438
6439         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6440 }
6441
6442 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6443 #[test]
6444 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6445         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6446         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6447         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6448         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6449         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6450         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6451         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6452         {
6453                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6454                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6455                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6456         }
6457
6458         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6459         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6460         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6461         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6462         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6463         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6464         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6465         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6466         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6467         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6468         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6469 }
6470
6471 #[test]
6472 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6473         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6474         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6475         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6476         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6477         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6478         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6479
6480         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6481         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6482         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6483         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6484         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6485
6486         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6487         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6488         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6489         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6490         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6491
6492         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6493         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6494         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6495         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6496         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6497
6498         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6499         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6500         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6501         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6502         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6503 }
6504
6505 #[test]
6506 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6507         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6508         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6509         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6510         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6511         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6512         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6513         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6514
6515         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6516         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6517         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6518         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6519         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6520         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6521
6522         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6523                 channel_id: chan.2,
6524                 htlc_id: 0,
6525                 amount_msat: 1000,
6526                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6527                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6528                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6529         };
6530
6531         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6532                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6533                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6534         }
6535         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6536         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6537
6538         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6539         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6540         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6542         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6543 }
6544
6545 #[test]
6546 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6547         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6548         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6549         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6550         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6551         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6552         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6553
6554         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6555         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6556         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6557         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6558         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6559         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6560
6561         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6562         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6563         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6564         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6565         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6566 }
6567
6568 #[test]
6569 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6570         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6571         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6572         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6573         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6574         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6575
6576         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6577         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6578         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6579         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6580         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6581         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6582         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6583
6584         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6585         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6586         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6587         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6588         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6589 }
6590
6591 #[test]
6592 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6593         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6594         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6595         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6596         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6597         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6598         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6599         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6600
6601         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6602         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6603         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6604         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6605         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6606         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6607
6608         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6609         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6610         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6611         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6612         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6613         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6614         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6615         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6616         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6617         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6618         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6619         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6620         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6621
6622         //Resend HTLC
6623         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6624         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6625         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6627         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6628
6629         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6630
6631         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6632         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6633         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6634         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6635         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6636 }
6637
6638 #[test]
6639 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6640         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6641
6642         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6643         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6644         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6645         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6646         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6647         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6648         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6649
6650         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6651         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6652         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6653
6654         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6655                 channel_id: chan.2,
6656                 htlc_id: 0,
6657                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6658         };
6659
6660         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6661
6662         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6663         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6664         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6665         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6666         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6667 }
6668
6669 #[test]
6670 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6671         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6672
6673         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6674         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6675         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6676         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6677         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6678
6679         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6680         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6681         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6682         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6683         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6684
6685         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6686                 channel_id: chan.2,
6687                 htlc_id: 0,
6688                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6689         };
6690
6691         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6692
6693         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6694         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6695         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6696         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6697         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6698 }
6699
6700 #[test]
6701 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6702         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6703
6704         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6705         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6706         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6707         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6708         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6709
6710         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6711         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6712         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6713         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6714         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6715         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6716                 channel_id: chan.2,
6717                 htlc_id: 0,
6718                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6719                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6720         };
6721
6722         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6723
6724         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6725         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6726         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6727         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6728         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6729 }
6730
6731 #[test]
6732 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6733         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6734
6735         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6736         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6737         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6738         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6739         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6740
6741         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6742
6743         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6744         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6745
6746         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6747         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6748         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6749                 match events[0] {
6750                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6751                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6752                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6753                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6754                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6755                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6756                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6757                         },
6758                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6759                 }
6760         };
6761
6762         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6763
6764         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6765
6766         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6767         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6768         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6769         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6770         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6771 }
6772
6773 #[test]
6774 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6775         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6776
6777         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6778         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6779         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6780         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6781         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6782
6783         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6784
6785         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6786         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6787
6788         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6789         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6790         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6791                 match events[0] {
6792                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6793                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6794                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6795                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6796                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6797                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6798                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6799                         },
6800                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6801                 }
6802         };
6803
6804         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6805
6806         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6807
6808         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6809         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6810         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6811         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6812         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6813 }
6814
6815 #[test]
6816 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6817         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6818
6819         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6820         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6821         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6822         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6823         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6824
6825         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6826         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6827         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6828
6829         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6830         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6831
6832         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6833         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6834         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6835
6836         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6837
6838         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6839                 match events[0] {
6840                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6841                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6842                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6843                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6844                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6845                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6846                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6847                         },
6848                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6849                 }
6850         };
6851         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6852         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6853
6854         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6855         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6856         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6857         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6858         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6859 }
6860
6861 #[test]
6862 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6863         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6864         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6865
6866         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6867         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6868         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6869         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6870         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6871         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6872
6873         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6874
6875         //First hop
6876         let mut payment_event = {
6877                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6878                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6879                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6880                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6881                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6882         };
6883         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6884         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6885         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6886         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6887         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6888         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6889         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6890         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6891         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6892
6893         //Second Hop
6894         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6895         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6897         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6898
6899         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6900         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6901         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6902                 match events_3[0] {
6903                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6904                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6905                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6906                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6907                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6908                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6909                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6910                         },
6911                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6912                 }
6913         };
6914
6915         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6916
6917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6918         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6919         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6920         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6921         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6922
6923         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6924         match events_4[0] {
6925                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6926                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6927                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6928                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6929                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6930                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6931                 },
6932                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6933         };
6934
6935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6936 }
6937
6938 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6939         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6940         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6941         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6942
6943         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6944         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6945         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6946         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6947         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6948         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6949
6950         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6951
6952         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6953         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6954         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6955         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6956
6957         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6958         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6959
6960         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6961         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6962         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6963         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6964         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6965
6966         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6967         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6968         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6969         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6970
6971         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6972         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6973
6974         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6975         match events[0] {
6976                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6977                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6978                 },
6979                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6980         }
6981         match events[1] {
6982                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6983                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6984                 },
6985                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6986         }
6987
6988         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6989         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6990         if announce_latest {
6991                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6992         } else {
6993                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6994         }
6995
6996         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6997         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6998         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6999
7000         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7001         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7002         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7003         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7004         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7005         let mut first_failed = false;
7006         for event in events {
7007                 match event {
7008                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7009                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7010                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7011                                         first_failed = true;
7012                                 } else {
7013                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7014                                 }
7015                         }
7016                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7017                 }
7018         }
7019 }
7020
7021 #[test]
7022 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7023         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7024         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7025 }
7026
7027 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7028         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7029         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7030         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7031         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7032         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7033         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7034
7035         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7036         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7037         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7038         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7039         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7040
7041         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7042
7043         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7044         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7045
7046         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7047         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7048
7049         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7050         if revoked {
7051                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7052                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7053         }
7054
7055         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7056         if local {
7057                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7058                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7059                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7060                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7061                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7062
7063                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7064                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7065                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7066                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7067                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7068                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7069                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7070                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7071                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7072                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7073                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7074         } else {
7075                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7076                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7077                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7078                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7079                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7080                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7081                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7082                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7083                 if !revoked {
7084                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7085                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7086                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7087                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7088                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7089                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7090                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7091                 } else {
7092                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7093                         // commitment tx
7094                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7095                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7096                         let first;
7097                         match events[0] {
7098                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7099                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7100                                         else { first = false; }
7101                                 },
7102                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7103                         }
7104                         match events[1] {
7105                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7106                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7107                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7108                                 },
7109                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7110                         }
7111                 }
7112         }
7113 }
7114
7115 #[test]
7116 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7117         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7118         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7119         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7120 }
7121
7122 #[test]
7123 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7124         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7125
7126         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7127         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7128         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7129         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7130         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7131         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7132         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7135
7136         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7137         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7138                 match error {
7139                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7140                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7141                 }
7142         } else { assert!(false) }
7143
7144         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7145         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7146         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7147         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7148         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7149                 match error {
7150                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7151                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7152                 }
7153         } else { assert!(false); }
7154
7155         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7156         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7157         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7158         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7159         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7160         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7161         let reason_msg;
7162         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7163                 match action {
7164                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7165                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7166                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7167                         },
7168                         _ => { panic!(); }
7169                 }
7170         } else { panic!(); }
7171         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7172
7173         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7174         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7175         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7176         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7177         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7178                 match error {
7179                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7180                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7181                 }
7182         } else { assert!(false); }
7183 }
7184
7185 #[test]
7186 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7187         // We want to be sure that :
7188         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7189         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7190         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7191         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7192         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7193         let persister;
7194         let logger;
7195         let fee_estimator;
7196         let tx_broadcaster;
7197         let chain_source;
7198         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7199         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7200         // during signing due to revoked tx
7201         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7202         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7203         let monitor;
7204         let node_state_0;
7205         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7206         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7207         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7208
7209         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7210
7211         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7212         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7213         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7214         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7215
7216         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7217         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7218
7219         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7220         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7221
7222         // Restore node A from previous state
7223         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7224         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7225         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7226         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7227         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7228         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7229         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7230         node_state_0 = {
7231                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7232                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7233                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7234                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7235                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7236                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7237                         logger: &logger,
7238                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7239                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7240                         channel_monitors,
7241                 }).unwrap().1
7242         };
7243         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7244         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7245         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7246         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7247
7248         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7249
7250         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7251         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7252
7253         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7254
7255         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7256         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7258
7259         {
7260                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7261                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7262         }
7263
7264         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7265         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7266                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7267                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7268                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7269                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7270                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7271                         match action {
7272                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7273                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7274                                 },
7275                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7276                         }
7277                 } else {
7278                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7279                 }
7280         }
7281
7282         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7283         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7284         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7285         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7287
7288         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7289         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7290         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7291         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7292         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7293         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7294         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7295         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7296         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7297         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7298         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7299 }
7300
7301 #[test]
7302 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7303         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7304         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7305         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7306
7307         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7308         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7309         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7310         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7311
7312         // Create some initial channels
7313         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7314
7315         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7316         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7317         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7318         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7319         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7320         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7321         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7322
7323         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7324         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7325         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7326         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7327         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7328
7329         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7330         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7331         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7332         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7333
7334         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7335         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7336         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7337
7338         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7339         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7340         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7341                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7342                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7343                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7344                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7345                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7346                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7347                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7348                 },
7349                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7350         };
7351         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7352
7353         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7354         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7355
7356         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7357         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7358         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7359         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7360 }
7361
7362 #[test]
7363 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7364         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7365         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7366
7367         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7368         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7369         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7370         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7371
7372         let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7373         let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7374         let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7375
7376         // Disconnect peers
7377         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7378         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7379
7380         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7381         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7382         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7383         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7384         let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7385         for e in msg_events {
7386                 match e {
7387                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7388                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7389                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7390                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7391                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7392                                 }
7393                         },
7394                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7395                 }
7396         }
7397         // Reconnect peers
7398         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7399         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7400         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7401         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7402         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7403         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7404
7405         // Reestablish chan_1
7406         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7407         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7408         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7409         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7410         // Reestablish chan_2
7411         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7412         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7413         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7414         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7415         // Reestablish chan_3
7416         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7417         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7418         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7419         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7420
7421         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7422         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7423         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7424         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7425         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7426         chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7427         for e in msg_events {
7428                 match e {
7429                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7430                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7431                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7432                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7433                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7434                                 }
7435                         },
7436                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7437                 }
7438         }
7439 }
7440
7441 #[test]
7442 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7443         // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7444         // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7445         // to forward through that channel.
7446         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7447         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7448         let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7449         no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7450         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7451         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7452         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7453         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7454         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7455         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7456
7457         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7458
7459         // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7460         // not send for private channels.
7461         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7462         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7463         nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7464         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7465         nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7466
7467         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7468         nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7469         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7470         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7471
7472         let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7473         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7474         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7475
7476         let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7477         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7478         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7479         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7480         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7481         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7482         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7483         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7484         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7485         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7486
7487         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7488         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7489         assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7490
7491         // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7492         // channel:
7493         send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7494
7495         // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7496         // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7497         let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7498                 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7499                 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7500                 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7501                 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7502                 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7503                 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7504         }]);
7505         let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7506         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7507
7508         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7509         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7510         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7511         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7512         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7513
7514         let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7515         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7516         assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7517         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7518         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7519
7520         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7521         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7522         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7523
7524         // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7525         // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7526
7527         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7528         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7529
7530         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7531         let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7532         let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7533         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7534         get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7535
7536         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7537         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7538         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7539         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7540
7541         let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7542         let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7543         let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7544         let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7545         assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7546         assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7547
7548         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7549
7550         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7551         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7552                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7553                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7554                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7555                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7556                         default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7557                         keys_manager,
7558                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7559                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7560                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7561                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
7562                         channel_monitors,
7563                 }).unwrap()
7564         };
7565         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7566         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7567
7568         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7569         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7570         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7571         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7572
7573         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7574         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7575         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7576         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7577         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7578         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7579         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7580         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7581
7582         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7583         nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7584         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7585         let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7586         nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7587         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7588         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7589         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7590
7591         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7592         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7593         pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7594         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7595 }
7596
7597 #[test]
7598 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7599         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7600         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7601
7602         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7603         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7604         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7605         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7606
7607         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7608
7609         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7610         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7611         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7612
7613         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7614         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7615         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7616         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7617         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7618         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7619
7620         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7621         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7622                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7623                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7624                 }
7625         }
7626
7627         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7628         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7629
7630         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7631         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7632         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7633         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7634         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7635
7636         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7637         let penalty_1;
7638         let feerate_1;
7639         {
7640                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7641                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7642                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7643                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7644                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7645                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7646                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7647                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7648                 node_txn.clear();
7649         };
7650
7651         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7652         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7653         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7654         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7655         {
7656                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7657                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7658                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7659                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7660                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7661                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7662                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7663                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7664                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7665                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7666                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7667                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7668                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7669                         node_txn.clear();
7670                 }
7671         }
7672         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7673
7674         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7675         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7676         let penalty_3;
7677         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7678         {
7679                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7680                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7681                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7682                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7683                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7684                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7685                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7686                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7687                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7688                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7689                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7690                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7691                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7692                         node_txn.clear();
7693                 }
7694         }
7695         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7696
7697         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7698         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7699 }
7700
7701 #[test]
7702 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7703         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7704         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7705
7706         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7707         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7708         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7709         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7710         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7711
7712         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7713         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7714         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7715         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7716         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7717                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7718         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7719         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7720         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7721                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7722         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7723
7724         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7725         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7726         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7727
7728         // Revoke local commitment tx
7729         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7730
7731         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7732         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7733         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7734         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7735         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7736         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7737         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7738
7739         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7740         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7741         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7742
7743         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7744         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7745         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7746
7747         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7748         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7749         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7750         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7751
7752         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7753         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7754         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7755         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7756         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7757         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7758         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7759         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7760         match events[1] {
7761                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7762                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7763         }
7764         let first;
7765         let feerate_1;
7766         let penalty_txn;
7767         {
7768                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7769                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7770                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7771
7772                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7773                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7774                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7775                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7776                 // future).
7777                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7778                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7779                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7780                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7781                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7782                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7783
7784                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7785                 // available, which we check here:
7786                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7787                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7788                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7789
7790                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7791                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7792
7793                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7794                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7795                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7796                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7797
7798                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7799                 // output, checked above).
7800                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7801                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7802                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7803
7804                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7805                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7806                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7807                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7808                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7809                 node_txn.clear();
7810         }
7811
7812         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7813         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7814         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7815         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7816         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7817         {
7818                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7819                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7820
7821                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7822                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7823                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7824                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7825                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7826                 } else {
7827                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7828                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7829                 }
7830
7831                 node_txn.clear();
7832         };
7833
7834         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7835         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7836         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7837         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7838         let node_txn = {
7839                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7840                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7841
7842                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7843                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7844                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7845                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7846                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7847                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7848                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7849                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7850                 node_txn.clear();
7851                 txn
7852         };
7853         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7854         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7855         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7856         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7857         {
7858                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7859                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7860                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7861                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7862                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7863                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7864                 // up bumped justice generation.
7865                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7866                 node_txn.clear();
7867         }
7868         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7869         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7870 }
7871
7872 #[test]
7873 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7874         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7875         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7876
7877         // Create 2 HTLCs
7878         // Provide preimage for one
7879         // Check aggregation
7880
7881         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7882         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7883         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7884         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7885
7886         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7887         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7888         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7889
7890         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7891         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7892         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7893         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7894         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7895
7896         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7897         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7898         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7899         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7900         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7901
7902         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7903         let timeout;
7904         let preimage;
7905         let preimage_bump;
7906         let feerate_timeout;
7907         let feerate_preimage;
7908         {
7909                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7910                 // 9 transactions including:
7911                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7912                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7913                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7914                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
7915                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7916                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7917                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7918                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7919                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7920                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7921                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7922
7923                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7924                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7925                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7926                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7927
7928                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7929                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7930                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7931                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7932
7933                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7934                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7935                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7936                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7937
7938                 node_txn.clear();
7939         };
7940         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7941         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7942
7943         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7944         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7945         {
7946                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7947                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7948                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7949                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7950                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7951                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7952
7953                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7954                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7955                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7956                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7957                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7958
7959                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7960                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7961                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7962                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7963                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7964
7965                 node_txn.clear();
7966         }
7967
7968         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7969         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7970 }
7971
7972 #[test]
7973 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7974         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7975         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7976         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7977         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7978         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7979         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7980         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7981         // implement that).
7982         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7983         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7984         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7985         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7986         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7987
7988         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7989         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7990
7991         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7992
7993         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7994         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7995         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7996
7997         // Must revoke without gaps
7998         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7999         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8000
8001         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8002         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8003                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8004
8005         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8006                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8007         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8008         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8009         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8010 }
8011
8012 #[test]
8013 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8014         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8015         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8016
8017         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8018         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8019         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8020         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8021
8022         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8023         // Lock HTLC in both directions
8024         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8025         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8026
8027         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8028         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8029         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8030
8031         // Revoke local commitment tx
8032         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8033
8034         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8035         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8036         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8037         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8038
8039         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8040         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8042         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8043         let penalty_txn = {
8044                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8045                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8046                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8047                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8048                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8049                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8050                 node_txn.clear();
8051                 penalty_txn
8052         };
8053         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8054         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8055         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8056         {
8057                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8058                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8059                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8060         }
8061 }
8062
8063 #[test]
8064 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8065         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8066         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8067         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8068         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8069         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8070         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8071
8072         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8073
8074         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8075         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8076         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8077         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8078         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8079
8080         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8081         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8083         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8084
8085         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8087         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8088         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8089         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8090         match close_ev[0] {
8091                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8092                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8093                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8094                 },
8095                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8096         }
8097 }
8098
8099 #[test]
8100 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8101         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8102         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8103         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8104         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8105
8106         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8107         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8108         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8109
8110         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8111
8112         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8113         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8114         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8115         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8116 }
8117
8118 #[test]
8119 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8120         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8121         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8122         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8123         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8124         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8125         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8126
8127         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8128         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8129         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8130
8131         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8132         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8133         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8134 }
8135
8136 #[test]
8137 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8138         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8139         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8140         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8141         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8142         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8143
8144         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8145         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8146         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8147         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8148
8149         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8150         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8151         route.paths.push(path);
8152         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8153         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8154         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8155         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8156         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8157         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8158         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8159         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8160 }
8161
8162 #[test]
8163 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8164         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8165         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8166         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8167         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8168         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8169
8170         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8171
8172         {
8173                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200);
8174                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8175                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8176                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8177                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8178                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8179                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8180                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8181         }
8182         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8183         // values from previous calls.
8184         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8185         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8186         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8187         match events[0] {
8188                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8189                         match &purpose {
8190                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8191                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8192                                 },
8193                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8194                         }
8195                 },
8196                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8197         }
8198 }
8199
8200 #[test]
8201 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8202         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8203         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8204         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8205         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8206         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8207
8208         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8209
8210         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8211
8212         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8213         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8214         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8215                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8216         } else { panic!(); }
8217         let mut block = {
8218                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8219                 Block {
8220                         header: BlockHeader {
8221                                 version: 0x2000000,
8222                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8223                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8224                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8225                         txdata: vec![],
8226                 }
8227         };
8228         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8229         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8230                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8231         } else { panic!(); }
8232
8233         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8234         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8235         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8236         block.header.time += 1;
8237         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8238         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8239         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8240
8241         {
8242                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8243                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8244                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8245                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8246                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8247                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8248                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8249         }
8250         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8251         // values from previous calls.
8252         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8253         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8254         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8255         match events[0] {
8256                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8257                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8258                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8259                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8260                 },
8261                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8262         }
8263 }
8264
8265 #[test]
8266 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8267         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8268         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8269         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8270         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8271         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8272
8273         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8274
8275         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8276         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8277         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8278         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8279
8280         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8281         // resulting events.
8282         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8283                 () => {
8284                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8285                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8286                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8287                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8288                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8289
8290                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8291                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8292                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8293                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8294                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8295
8296                         // We should fail the payment back
8297                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8298                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8299                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8300                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8301                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8302                                 },
8303                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8304                         }
8305                 }
8306         }
8307
8308         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8309         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8310         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8311
8312         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8313         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8314         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8315         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8316
8317         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8318         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8319         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8320         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8321
8322         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8323         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8324         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8325         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8326 }
8327
8328 #[test]
8329 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8330         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8331         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8332         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8333         //
8334         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8335         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8336         // commitment at same time.
8337
8338         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8339         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8340         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8341         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8342
8343         // Create some initial channel
8344         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8345         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8346
8347         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8348         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8349
8350         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8351         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8352
8353         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8354         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8355         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8356         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8357         let watchtower = {
8358                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8359                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8360                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8361                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8362                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8363                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8364                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8365                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8366                 watchtower
8367         };
8368         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8369         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8370         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8371         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8372         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8373
8374         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8375         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8376         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8377         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8378         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8379         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8380         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8381                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8382                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8383                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8384                 } else { assert!(false); }
8385         } else { assert!(false); };
8386         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8387         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8388         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8389         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8390 }
8391
8392 #[test]
8393 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8394         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8395         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8396         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8397         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8398
8399         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8400         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8401         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8402         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8403
8404         // Create some initial channel
8405         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8406         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8407
8408         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8409         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8410
8411         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8412         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8413
8414         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8415         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8416         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8417         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8418         let watchtower_alice = {
8419                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8420                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8421                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8422                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8423                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8424                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8425                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8426                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8427                 watchtower
8428         };
8429         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8430         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8431         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8432         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8433         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8434
8435         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8436         {
8437                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8438                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8439                 txn.clear();
8440         }
8441
8442         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8443         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8444         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8445         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8446         let watchtower_bob = {
8447                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8448                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8449                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8450                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8451                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8452                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8453                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8454                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8455                 watchtower
8456         };
8457         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8458         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8459
8460         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8461         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8462         {
8463                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8464         }
8465         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8466
8467         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8468         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8469         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8470         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8471                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8472                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8473                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8474                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8475                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8476                 } else { assert!(false); }
8477         } else { assert!(false); };
8478         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8480
8481         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8482         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8483         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8484
8485         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8486         let bob_state_y;
8487         {
8488                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8489                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8490                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8491                 txn.clear();
8492         };
8493
8494         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8495         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8496         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8497         {
8498                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8499                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8500                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8501                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8502                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8503                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8504         }
8505 }
8506
8507 #[test]
8508 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8509         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8510         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8511         // message).
8512         //
8513         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8514         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8515         //
8516         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8517         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8518         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8519         // before receiving funding_signed.
8520         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8521         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8522         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8523         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8524
8525         // Create an initial channel
8526         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8527         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8528         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8529         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8530         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8531
8532         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8533         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8534
8535         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8536         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8537
8538         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8539         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8540         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8541         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8542         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8543 }
8544
8545 #[test]
8546 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8547         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8548         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8549         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8550         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8551         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8552         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8553
8554         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8555         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8556         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8557         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8558
8559         // Create some initial channels
8560         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8561
8562         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8563         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8564         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8565         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8566         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8567         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8568
8569         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8570         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8571         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8572         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8573         // this test before #653 fix.
8574         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8575         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8576         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8577         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8578         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8579
8580         let htlc_timeout = {
8581                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8582                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8583                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8584                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8585                 node_txn[1].clone()
8586         };
8587
8588         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8589         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8590         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8591         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8592 }
8593
8594 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8595         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8596         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8597         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8598         //
8599         // Steps of the test:
8600         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8601         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8602         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8603         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8604         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8605         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8606         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8607         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8608         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8609         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8610         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8611         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8612
8613         // Create some initial channels
8614         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8615         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8616
8617         // Steps (1) and (2):
8618         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8619         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8620
8621         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8622         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8623         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8624         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8625         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8626         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8627         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8628
8629         // Steps (3) and (4):
8630         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8631         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8632         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8633         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8634         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8635         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8636         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8637         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8638         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8639                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8640                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8641                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8642                 };
8643                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8644                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8645                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8646                 if broadcast_alice {
8647                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8648                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8649                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8650                 }
8651                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8652                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8653         }
8654
8655         // Step (5):
8656         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8657         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8658         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8659         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8660         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8661         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8662         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8663         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8664         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8665         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8666
8667         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8668         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8669         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8670         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8671                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8672                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8673                 match events[0] {
8674                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8675                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8676                         },
8677                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8678                 };
8679         }
8680         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8681         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8682         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8683         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8684
8685         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8686         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8687         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8688                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8689                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8690                         (*msg).clone()
8691                 },
8692                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8693         };
8694         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8695                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8696                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8697                         (*updates).clone()
8698                 },
8699                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8700         };
8701
8702         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8703         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8704         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8705         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8706
8707         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8708         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8709         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8710                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8711                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8712                         (*msg).clone()
8713                 },
8714                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8715         };
8716         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8717         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8718
8719         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8720         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8721         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8722         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8723         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8724                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8725                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8726                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8727                 if broadcast_alice {
8728                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8729                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8730                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8731                 }
8732                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8733                 if broadcast_alice {
8734                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8735                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8736                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8737                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8738                         // broadcasted.
8739                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8740                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8741                 } else {
8742                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8743                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8744                 }
8745         }
8746
8747         // Step (6):
8748         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8749         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8750         {
8751                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8752                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8753                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8754                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8755                 }
8756                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8757                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8758                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8759                 };
8760                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8761                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8762                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8763                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8764                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8765                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8766                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8767                 } else {
8768                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8769                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8770                 }
8771         }
8772 }
8773
8774 #[test]
8775 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8776         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8777         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8778         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8779         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8780 }
8781
8782 #[test]
8783 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8784         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8785         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8786         //
8787         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8788         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8789         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8790         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8791         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8792         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8793         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8794         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8795
8796         // Create an initial channel
8797         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8798         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8799         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8800         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8801
8802         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8803         // that it is rejected.
8804         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8805         {
8806                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8807                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8808                 match events[0] {
8809                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8810                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8811                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8812                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8813                                 // move forward with it.
8814                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8815                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8816                         },
8817                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8818                 }
8819         }
8820
8821         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8822         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8823
8824         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8826
8827         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8828         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8829         {
8830                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8831                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8832                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8833                 added_monitors.clear();
8834         }
8835         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8836
8837         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8838         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8839
8840         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8841         // temporary one).
8842
8843         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8844         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8845         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8846         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8847         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8848         {
8849                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8850                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8851                 match events[0] {
8852                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8853                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8854                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8855                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8856                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8857                         },
8858                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8859                 }
8860         }
8861
8862         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8863         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8864         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8865         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8866         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8867         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8868
8869         let funding_created = {
8870                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8871                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8872                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8873                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8874         };
8875         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8876         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8877         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8878         // still needs to be cleared here.
8879         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8880
8881         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8882         {
8883                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8884                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8885                 match events[0] {
8886                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8887                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8888                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8889                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8890                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8891                         },
8892                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8893                 }
8894         }
8895
8896         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8897         // everything is functional.
8898         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8899         {
8900                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8901                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8902                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8903                 added_monitors.clear();
8904         }
8905
8906         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8907         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8908         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8909         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8910
8911         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8912         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8913         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8914         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8915 }
8916
8917 #[test]
8918 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8919         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8920         //
8921         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8922         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8923         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8924         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8925         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8926         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8927         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8928
8929         // Create some initial channels
8930         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8931         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8932         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8933
8934         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8935         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8936         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8937
8938         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8939         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8940         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8941
8942         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8943         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8944         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8945         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8946         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8947         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8948         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8949         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8950         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8951
8952         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8953         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8954         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8956         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8957         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8958         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8959         match events[0] {
8960                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8961                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8962                 },
8963                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8964         }
8965         match events[1] {
8966                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8967                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8968                 },
8969                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8970         }
8971         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8972         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8973         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8974         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8975         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8976         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8977
8978         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8979         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8980         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8981 }
8982
8983 #[test]
8984 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8985         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8986         //
8987         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8988         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8989         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8990         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8991         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8992         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8993         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8994         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8995
8996         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8997         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8998         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8999
9000         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9001         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9002                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9003                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9004         }
9005
9006         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9007         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9008         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9009
9010         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9011         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9012
9013         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9014         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9015
9016         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9017         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9018         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9019
9020         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9021         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9022         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9023         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9024         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9025         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9026         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9027                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9028                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9029                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9030                 } else { panic!(); }
9031         } else { panic!(); }
9032         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9033 }
9034
9035 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9036         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9037         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9038         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9039         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9040         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9041         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9042         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9043         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9044         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9045         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9046         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9047         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9048         // until we learned about an additional block.
9049         //
9050         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9051         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9052         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9053         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9054         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9055         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9056         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9057
9058         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9059         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9060         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9061         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9062         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9063
9064         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9065         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9066         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9068         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9069         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9070
9071         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9072         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9073                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9074         }
9075         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9076                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9077         if test_height_before_timelock {
9078                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9079                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9080                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9081                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9082         } else {
9083                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9084                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9085                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9086                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9087                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9088                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9089                 // timelock is up).
9090                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9091                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9092
9093                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9094                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9095                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9096                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9097                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9098                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9099                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9100
9101                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9102                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9103                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9104                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9105                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9106                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9107                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9108                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9109                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9110         }
9111 }
9112
9113 #[test]
9114 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9115         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9116         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9117 }
9118
9119 #[test]
9120 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9121         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9122         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9123         // HTLCs.
9124         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9125
9126         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9127         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9128         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9129         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9130         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9131         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9132         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9133         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9134         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9135
9136         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9137         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9138         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9140
9141         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9142         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9143         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9144         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9145         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9146
9147         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9148
9149         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9150         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9151         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9153
9154         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9155         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9156         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9157         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9158         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9159
9160         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9161         // generated
9162         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9163
9164         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9165         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9166         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9167
9168         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9169         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9170         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9171         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9172         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9173
9174         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9175         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9176         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9177         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9178
9179         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9180         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9181                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9182         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9183         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9184         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9185                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9186         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9187
9188         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9189         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9190                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9191                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9192                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9193                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9194                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9195                         keys_manager,
9196                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9197                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9198                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9199                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9200                         channel_monitors,
9201                 }).unwrap()
9202         };
9203         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9204         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9205
9206         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9207         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9208         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9209         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9210
9211         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9212         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9213         // the commitment state.
9214         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9215
9216         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9217
9218         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9219         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9221
9222         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9223         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9224         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9225         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9226         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9227         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9228         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9229
9230         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9231         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9232 }
9233
9234 #[test]
9235 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9236         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9237         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9238         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9239         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9240
9241         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9242         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9243         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9244         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9245         let params = RouteParameters {
9246                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9247                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9248                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9249         };
9250         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9251         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9252
9253         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9254         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9256         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9257         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9258         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9259         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9260         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9261         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9262 }
9263
9264 #[test]
9265 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9266         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9267         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9268         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9269         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9270
9271         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9272         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9273         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9274         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9275
9276         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9277         let params = RouteParameters {
9278                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9279                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9280                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9281         };
9282         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9283         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9284         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9285         let route = find_route(
9286                 &payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9287                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9288         ).unwrap();
9289
9290         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9291         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9293         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9294         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9295         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9296         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9297         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9298         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9299 }
9300
9301 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9302 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9303 enum ExposureEvent {
9304         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9305         AtHTLCForward,
9306         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9307         AtHTLCReception,
9308         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9309         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9310 }
9311
9312 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9313         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9314         // policy.
9315         //
9316         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9317         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9318         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9319         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9320         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9321         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9322         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9323         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9324
9325         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9326         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9327         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9328         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9329         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9330         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9331
9332         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9333         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9334         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9335         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9336         if on_holder_tx {
9337                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9338         }
9339         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9340         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9341         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9342
9343         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9344
9345         if on_holder_tx {
9346                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9347                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9348                 }
9349         }
9350
9351         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9352         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9353         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9354
9355         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9356         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9357
9358         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9359         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9360         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9361
9362         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9363                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9364                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9365                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9366         };
9367         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9368         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9369
9370         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9371         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9372
9373         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9374         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9375
9376         if on_holder_tx {
9377                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9378                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9379                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9380                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9381                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9382                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9383                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9384                         }
9385                 } else {
9386                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9387                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9388                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9389                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9390                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9391                         }
9392                 }
9393         } else {
9394                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9395                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9396                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9397                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9398                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9399                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9400                         }
9401                 } else {
9402                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9403                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9404                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9405                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9406                         }
9407                 }
9408         }
9409
9410         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9411         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9412                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9413                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9414                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9415                 if on_holder_tx {
9416                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9417                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9418                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9419                 } else {
9420                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9421                 }
9422         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9423                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9424                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9425                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9426                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9427                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9428                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9429                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9430                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9431                 if on_holder_tx {
9432                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9433                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9434                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9435                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9436                 } else {
9437                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9438                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9439                 }
9440         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9441                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9442                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9443                 {
9444                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9445                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9446                 }
9447                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9448                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9449                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9450         }
9451
9452         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9453         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9454         added_monitors.clear();
9455 }
9456
9457 #[test]
9458 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9459         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9460         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9461         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9462         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9463         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9464         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9465         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9466         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9467         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9468         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9469         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9470         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9471 }