_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, OutputSpender, SignerProvider};
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
  22 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase};
  24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
  26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, get_route, RouteParameters};
  30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  31 use crate::ln::msgs;
  32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  33 use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils::{self, WatchtowerPersister};
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
  38 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
  39
  40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  44 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
  45 use bitcoin::network::Network;
  46 use bitcoin::{Amount, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
  47 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  48 use bitcoin::transaction::Version;
  49
  50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  51 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  52
  53 use crate::io;
  54 use crate::prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::iter::repeat;
  57 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  58 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
  59
  60 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  61 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  62
  63 use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS;
  64
  65 #[test]
  66 fn test_channel_resumption_fail_post_funding() {
  67         // If we fail to exchange funding with a peer prior to it disconnecting we'll resume the
  68         // channel open on reconnect, however if we do exchange funding we do not currently support
  69         // replaying it and here test that the channel closes.
  70         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  71         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  72         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  73         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  74
  75         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
  76         let open_chan = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  77         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan);
  78         let accept_chan = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  79         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan);
  80
  81         let (temp_chan_id, tx, funding_output) =
  82                 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
  83         let new_chan_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_output);
  84         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
  85
  86         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  87         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(new_chan_id, true, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer)]);
  88
  89         // After ddf75afd16 we'd panic on reconnection if we exchanged funding info, so test that
  90         // explicitly here.
  91         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
  92                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
  93         }, true).unwrap();
  94         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(), Vec::new());
  95 }
  96
  97 #[test]
  98 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  99         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
 100         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
 101         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
 102         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
 103         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 104         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 105         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
 106         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 107
 108         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
 109         // funding satoshis
 110         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
 111         let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
 112         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 113
 114         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 115         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 116
 117         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
 118         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 119
 120         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
 121         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
 122         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
 123                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
 124                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 125                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
 126                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
 127                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
 128                         match action {
 129                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
 130                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
 131                                 },
 132                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 133                         }
 134                 } else { assert!(false); }
 135         };
 136
 137         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 138
 139         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 140         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 141         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 142
 143         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 144
 145         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 146
 147         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 148
 149         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 150
 151         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 152
 153         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 154
 155         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 156 }
 157
 158 #[test]
 159 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 160         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 161         // them.
 162         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 163         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 164         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 165         *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
 166         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 167         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 168
 169         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None, None) {
 170                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 171                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 172                 },
 173                 _ => panic!()
 174         }
 175 }
 176
 177 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 178         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 179         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 180         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 181         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 182         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 183         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 184         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 185         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 186         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 187
 188         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 189         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 190         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 191         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 192         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 193         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 194
 195         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 196         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 197         if !send_from_initiator {
 198                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 199                 open_channel_message.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 200         }
 201         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
 202
 203         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 204         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 205         if send_from_initiator {
 206                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 207                 accept_channel_message.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 208         }
 209         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
 210         {
 211                 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
 212                 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
 213                 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
 214                 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
 215
 216                 let channel_phase = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 217                 match channel_phase {
 218                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
 219                                 let chan_context = channel_phase.context_mut();
 220                                 chan_context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 221                                 chan_context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 222                         },
 223                         _ => assert!(false),
 224                 }
 225         }
 226
 227         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 228         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 229         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 230
 231         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 232         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 233         if send_from_initiator {
 234                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 235                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 236                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 237                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 238                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
 239         } else {
 240                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 241         }
 242 }
 243
 244 #[test]
 245 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 246         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 247         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 248 }
 249
 250 #[test]
 251 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 252         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 253         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 254         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 255         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 256         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 257
 258         // balancing
 259         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 260
 261         // A                                        B
 262         // update_fee                            ->
 263         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 264         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 265         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 266         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 267         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 268         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 269         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 270         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 271         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 272         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 273         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 274         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 275         //                                       <- RAA
 276         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 277
 278         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 279         {
 280                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 281                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 282         }
 283         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 284         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 285
 286         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 287         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 288         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 289                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 290                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 291                 },
 292                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 293         };
 294
 295         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 296
 297         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 298         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 299         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 300                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 302
 303         let payment_event = {
 304                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 305                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 306                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 307         };
 308         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 309         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 310
 311         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 312         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 313         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 314         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 315         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 316         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 317
 318         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 319         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 320         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 321         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 323
 324         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 325         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 326         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 327         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 328         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 329         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 330         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 331         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 332
 333         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 334         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 335         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 336         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 337         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 338         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 339         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 341
 342         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 343         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 344         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 345         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 346
 347         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 348         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 349         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 350
 351         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 352         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 353
 354         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 355         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 356         match events_2[0] {
 357                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 358                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 359         }
 360
 361         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 362         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 363 }
 364
 365 #[test]
 366 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 367         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 368         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 369         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 370         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 371         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 372         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 373         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 374
 375         // balancing
 376         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 377
 378         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 379         {
 380                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 381                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 382         }
 383         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 384         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 385
 386         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 387         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 388         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 389                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 390                         update_fee.as_ref()
 391                 },
 392                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 393         };
 394
 395         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 396
 397         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 398         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 399         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 400                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 401         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 402
 403         let payment_event = {
 404                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 405                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 406                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 407         };
 408         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 409         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 410
 411         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 412         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 413         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 414         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 415         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 416         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 417
 418         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 419         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 420
 421         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 422 }
 423
 424 #[test]
 425 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 426         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 427         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 428         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 429         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 430         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 431
 432         // A                                        B
 433         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 434         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 435         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 436         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 437         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 438         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 439         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 440         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 441         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 442         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 443         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 444         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 445         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 446         //                                          B should send no response here
 447         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 448         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 449         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 450
 451         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 452         let initial_feerate;
 453         {
 454                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 455                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 456                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 457         }
 458         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 459         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 460
 461         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 462         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 463         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 464                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 465                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 466                 },
 467                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 468         };
 469
 470         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 471         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 472         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 473         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 474         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 475
 476         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 477         // transaction:
 478         {
 479                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 480                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 481         }
 482         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 483         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 484         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 485
 486         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 487         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 488                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 489                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 490         };
 491
 492         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 493
 494         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 495         // Deliver (3)
 496         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 497
 498         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 499         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 500         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 501         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 502         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 503         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 504         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 505         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 506         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 507         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 508         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 509
 510         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 511         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 512         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 513         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 514         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 515
 516         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 517         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 518         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 519
 520         // Delever (4)
 521         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 522         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 523         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 524
 525         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 526         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 527         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 528
 529         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 530         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 531         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 532         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 533
 534         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 535         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 536         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 537 }
 538
 539 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 540         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 541         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 542         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 543         // Node objects.
 544
 545         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 546         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 547         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 548         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 549
 550         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 551                 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
 552                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 553                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 554         }
 555
 556         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 557         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 558         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 559
 560         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 561         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
 562         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 563
 564         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 565         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
 566
 567         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 568
 569         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 570         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 571         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 572         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 573
 574         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 575         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 576         {
 577                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 578                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 579                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 580                 added_monitors.clear();
 581         }
 582         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 583
 584         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 585
 586         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 587         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 588         {
 589                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 590                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 591                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 592                 added_monitors.clear();
 593         }
 594
 595         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 596         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 597         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 598
 599         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 600         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 601
 602         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 603         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 604         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 605         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 606         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 607 }
 608
 609 #[test]
 610 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 611         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 612         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 613         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 614         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 615         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 616         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 617         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 618         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 619         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 620         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 621         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 622         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 623         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 624         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 625         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 626         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 627         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 628         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 629 }
 630
 631 #[test]
 632 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 633         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 634         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 635         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 636         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 637         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 638
 639         {
 640                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 641                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 642         }
 643         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 644         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 645
 646         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 647         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 648         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 649                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 650                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 651                 },
 652                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 653         };
 654         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 655
 656         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 657         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 658         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 659
 660         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 661         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 662         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 663
 664         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 665         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 666         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 667         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 668
 669         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 670         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 671         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 672 }
 673
 674 #[test]
 675 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 676         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 677         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 678         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 679         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 680         let channel_value = 5000;
 681         let push_sats = 700;
 682         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
 683         let channel_id = chan.2;
 684         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 685         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 686         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 687
 688         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 689
 690         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 691         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 692         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 693         // remote limit.
 694         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 695         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
 696         {
 697                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 698                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 699         }
 700         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 701         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 702         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 703
 704         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 705
 706         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 707
 708         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 709         {
 710                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 711
 712                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 713                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 714                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
 715                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value.to_sat());
 716                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 717                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 718         }
 719
 720         {
 721                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 722                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 723                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 724         }
 725         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 726         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 727         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 728
 729         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 730
 731         // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 732         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 733         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 734                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 735                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 736                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 737                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 738                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 739                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 740                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
 741                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 742                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 743         };
 744         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 745                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 746                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 747                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 748                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 749                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 750                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 751                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
 752                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 753                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 754                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 755         };
 756
 757         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 758         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 759                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 760
 761         let res = {
 762                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 763                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 764                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 765                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 766                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 767                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 768                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 769                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 770                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 771                         push_sats,
 772                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
 773                         local_funding, remote_funding,
 774                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 775                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 776                         &mut htlcs,
 777                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 778                 );
 779                 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 780         };
 781
 782         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 783                 channel_id: chan.2,
 784                 signature: res.0,
 785                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
 786                 batch: None,
 787                 #[cfg(taproot)]
 788                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
 789         };
 790
 791         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 792                 channel_id: chan.2,
 793                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 794         };
 795
 796         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 797
 798         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 799         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 800         //Should produce and error.
 801         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 802         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee", 3);
 803         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 804         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 805         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
 806                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], channel_value);
 807 }
 808
 809 #[test]
 810 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 811         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 812         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 813         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 814         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 815         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 816
 817         // balancing
 818         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 819
 820         {
 821                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 822                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 823         }
 824         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 826
 827         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 828         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 829         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 830                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 831                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 832                 },
 833                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 834         };
 835         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 836         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 837         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 838         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 839
 840         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 841
 842         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 843         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 844                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 845         {
 846                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 847                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 848                 added_monitors.clear();
 849         }
 850         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 851         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 852         // node[1] has nothing to do
 853
 854         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 855         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 856         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 857
 858         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 859         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 860         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 861         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 862         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 863         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 864         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 865
 866         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 867         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 868         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 869         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 870         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 871         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 872
 873         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 874         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 875         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 876         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 877
 878         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 879         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 880         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 881
 882         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 883         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 884         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 885         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 886
 887         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 888         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 889         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 890
 891         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 892
 893         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 894         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 895         match events[0] {
 896                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 897                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 898         };
 899
 900         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 901
 902         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 903         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 904         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 905         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 906         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 907 }
 908
 909 #[test]
 910 fn test_update_fee() {
 911         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 912         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 913         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 914         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 915         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 916         let channel_id = chan.2;
 917
 918         // A                                        B
 919         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 920         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 921         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 922         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 923         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 924         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 925         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 926         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 927         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 928         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 929         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 930         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 931
 932         // Create and deliver (1)...
 933         let feerate;
 934         {
 935                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 936                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 937                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 938         }
 939         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 941
 942         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 943         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 944         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 945                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 946                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 947                 },
 948                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 949         };
 950         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 951
 952         // Generate (2) and (3):
 953         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 954         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 956
 957         // Deliver (2):
 958         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 959         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 961
 962         // Create and deliver (4)...
 963         {
 964                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 965                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 966         }
 967         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 968         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 969         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 970         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 971         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 972                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 973                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 974                 },
 975                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 976         };
 977
 978         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 979         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 980         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 981         // ... creating (5)
 982         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 983         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 984
 985         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 986         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 987         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 988         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 989         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 990
 991         // Deliver (5):
 992         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 993         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 995
 996         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 997         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 998         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 999         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1000         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
1001         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1002         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1003         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
1004         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1005
1006         // Deliver (7)
1007         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
1008         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1009         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1010         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1011
1012         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
1013         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1014         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1015
1016         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
1017         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
1018         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
1019         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1020         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1021 }
1022
1023 #[test]
1024 fn fake_network_test() {
1025         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
1026         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
1027         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
1028         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
1029         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
1030         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1031
1032         // Create some initial channels
1033         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1034         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1035         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1036
1037         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1038         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1039         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1040         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1041         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1042
1043         // Send some more payments
1044         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1045         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1046         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1047
1048         // Test failure packets
1049         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1050         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1051
1052         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1053         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1054
1055         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1056         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1057         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1058         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1059         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1060         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1061         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1062
1063         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1064         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1065         hops.push(RouteHop {
1066                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1067                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1068                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1069                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1070                 fee_msat: 0,
1071                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1072                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1073         });
1074         hops.push(RouteHop {
1075                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1076                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1077                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1078                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1079                 fee_msat: 0,
1080                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1081                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1082         });
1083         hops.push(RouteHop {
1084                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1085                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1086                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1087                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1088                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1089                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1090                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1091         });
1092         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1093         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1094         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1095                 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1096                         &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1097
1098         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1099         hops.push(RouteHop {
1100                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1101                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1102                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1103                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1104                 fee_msat: 0,
1105                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1106                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1107         });
1108         hops.push(RouteHop {
1109                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1110                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1111                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1112                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1113                 fee_msat: 0,
1114                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1115                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1116         });
1117         hops.push(RouteHop {
1118                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1119                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1120                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1121                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1122                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1123                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1124                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1125         });
1126         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1127         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1128         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1129                 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1130                         &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1131
1132         // Claim the rebalances...
1133         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1134         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1135
1136         // Close down the channels...
1137         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1138         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1139         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1140         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1141         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1142         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1143         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1144         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1145         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1146         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1147         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1148         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1149 }
1150
1151 #[test]
1152 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1153         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1154         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1155         // commitment dance rounds.
1156         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1157         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1158         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1159         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1160         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1161         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1162
1163         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1164         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1165
1166         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1167         for _ in 0..50 {
1168                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1169                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1170                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1171                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1172         }
1173         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1174
1175         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1176         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1177         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1178         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1179
1180         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1181         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1182         // another HTLC.
1183         {
1184                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1185                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1186                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1187                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1188         }
1189
1190         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1191         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1192         {
1193                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1194                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1195                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1196         }
1197
1198         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1199         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1200         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1201         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1202
1203         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1204         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1205         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1206         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1207         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1208         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1209         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1210
1211         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1212         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1213         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1214
1215         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1216
1217         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1218         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1219         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1221
1222         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1223         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1224         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1225         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1226
1227         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1229         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1230
1231         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1232                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1233         }
1234         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1235         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1236         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1237         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1238         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1239
1240         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1242         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1243         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1244         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1245
1246         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1247         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1248
1249         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1250
1251         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1252         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1253         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1254                 match event {
1255                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1256                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1257                         },
1258                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1259                 };
1260         }
1261
1262         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1263                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1264         }
1265
1266         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1267 }
1268
1269 #[test]
1270 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1271         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1272         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1273         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1274         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1275         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1276         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1277
1278         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1279         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1280         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1281         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1282         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1283         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1284
1285         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1286
1287         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1288         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1289
1290         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1291         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1292
1293         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1294         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1295         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1296 }
1297
1298 #[test]
1299 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1300         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1301         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1302         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1303         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1304         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1305         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1306         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1307
1308         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1309
1310         // balancing
1311         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1312
1313         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1314
1315         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1316         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1317         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1318
1319         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1320         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1321         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1323
1324         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1325         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1326
1327         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1328         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1329         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1330                 if outp.value.to_sat() == 800_000 / 1000 {
1331                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1332                 } else if outp.value.to_sat() == 900_000 / 1000 {
1333                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1334                 }
1335         }
1336         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1337
1338         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1339         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1340         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1341         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1342
1343         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1344         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1345
1346         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1347         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1348         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1349         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1350         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1351                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1352         } else {
1353                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1354         };
1355
1356         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1357         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1358
1359         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1360         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1361         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 800);
1362
1363         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1364         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1365         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1366         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 900);
1367
1368         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1369         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1370         for e in events {
1371                 match e {
1372                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1373                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg } } => {
1374                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1375                                 assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1376                         },
1377                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1378                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1379                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1380                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1381                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1382                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1383                         },
1384                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1385                 }
1386         }
1387 }
1388
1389 #[test]
1390 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1391         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1392         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1393         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1394         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1395         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1396
1397         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1398         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1399
1400         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1401         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1402         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1403         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1404                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1405         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1406         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1407                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1408         match err {
1409                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1410                         if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
1411                         else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
1412                 },
1413                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1414         }
1415         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1416
1417         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1418 }
1419
1420 #[test]
1421 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1422         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1423         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1424         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1425         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1426         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1427
1428         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1429                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1430         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1431         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1432         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1433         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1434
1435         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1436
1437         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1438         let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret);
1439         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1440                 3460001, &recipient_onion_fields, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1441         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1442         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1443                 channel_id: chan.2,
1444                 htlc_id: 0,
1445                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1446                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1447                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1448                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1449                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1450                 blinding_point: None,
1451         };
1452
1453         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1454
1455         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1456         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1457         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1458
1459         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1460
1461         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1462
1463         // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1464         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1465         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1466                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1467                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1468                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1469                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1470                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1471                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1472                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1473                 chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1474
1475                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1476                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1477                  chan_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1478                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1479                  chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1480         };
1481         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1482                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1483                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1484                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1485                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1486                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1487                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1488                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1489                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1490                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1491                  chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1492         };
1493
1494         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1495         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1496                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1497
1498         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1499         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1500         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1501
1502         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1503                 offered: false,
1504                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1505                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1506                 payment_hash,
1507                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1508         };
1509
1510         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1511
1512         let res = {
1513                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1514                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1515                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1516                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1517                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1518                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1519                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1520                         commitment_number,
1521                         95000,
1522                         local_chan_balance,
1523                         local_funding, remote_funding,
1524                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1525                         feerate_per_kw,
1526                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1527                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1528                 );
1529                 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1530         };
1531
1532         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1533                 channel_id: chan.2,
1534                 signature: res.0,
1535                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1536                 batch: None,
1537                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1538                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1539         };
1540
1541         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1542         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1543         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1544
1545         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1546         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1547                 channel_id: chan.2,
1548                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1549                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1550                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1551                 next_local_nonce: None,
1552         };
1553         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1554
1555         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1556         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1557         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1558         match events[0] {
1559                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1560                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1561                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1562                 },
1563                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1564         };
1565         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
1566                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", raa_msg.channel_id), 1);
1567
1568         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1569 }
1570
1571 #[test]
1572 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1573         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1574         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1575         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1576         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1577         // this situation.
1578         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1579         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1580         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1581         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1582         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1583         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1584
1585         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1586         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1587
1588         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1589
1590         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1591
1592         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1593         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1594         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1595         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1596                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1597         }
1598
1599         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1600         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1601                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1602                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1603         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1604 }
1605
1606 #[test]
1607 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1608         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1609         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1610         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1611         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1612         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1613         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1614         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1615
1616         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1617         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1618         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1619         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1620         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1621         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1622         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1623
1624         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1625         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1626                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1627         }
1628
1629         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1630                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1631         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1632         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1633         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1634         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1635         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1636         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1637         let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret);
1638         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1639                 700_000, &recipient_onion_fields, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1640         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1641         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1642                 channel_id: chan.2,
1643                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1644                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1645                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1646                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1647                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1648                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1649                 blinding_point: None,
1650         };
1651
1652         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1653         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1654         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 3);
1655         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1656         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1657         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1658         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1659         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() },
1660                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1661 }
1662
1663 #[test]
1664 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1665         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1666         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1667         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1668         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1669
1670         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1671         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1672         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1673         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1674         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1675
1676         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1677         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1678         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1679         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1680         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1681         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1682         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1683
1684         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1685                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1686         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1687         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1688         // commitment transaction fee.
1689         route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1690
1691         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1692         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1693                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1694         }
1695
1696         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1697         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1698                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1699         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1700         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1701                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1702                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1703 }
1704
1705 #[test]
1706 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1707         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1708         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1709         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1710         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1711         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1712         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1713         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1714         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1715         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1716
1717         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1718         // HTLC.
1719         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1720         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1721         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None, None).unwrap_err(),
1722                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1723
1724         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1725         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1726         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1727         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None, None).unwrap();
1728         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1729         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1730         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1731
1732         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1733         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1734         match msg_events[0] {
1735                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1736                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1737                 },
1738                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1739         }
1740 }
1741
1742 #[test]
1743 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1744         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1745         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1746         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1747         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1748         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1749         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1750         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1751
1752         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1753         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1754         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1755         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1756         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1757         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1758
1759         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1760         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1761         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1762         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1763         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1764         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1765
1766         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1767         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1768         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1769         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1770 }
1771
1772 #[test]
1773 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1774         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1775         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1776         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1777         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1778         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1779         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1780
1781         let feemsat = 239;
1782         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1783         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1784         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1785         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1786
1787         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1788         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1789         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1790         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1791
1792         // Add a pending HTLC.
1793         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1794         let payment_event_1 = {
1795                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1796                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1797                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1798
1799                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1800                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1801                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1802         };
1803         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1804
1805         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1806         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
1807         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1808         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1809         let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1810         route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1811
1812         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1813         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1814         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1815         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1816         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1817         let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty();
1818         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1819                 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &recipient_onion_fields, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1820         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1821         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1822                 channel_id: chan.2,
1823                 htlc_id: 1,
1824                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1825                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1826                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1827                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1828                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1829                 blinding_point: None,
1830         };
1831
1832         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1833         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1834         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value", 3);
1835         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1836         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1837         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1838         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1839         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() },
1840                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1841 }
1842
1843 #[test]
1844 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1845         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1846         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1847         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1848         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1849         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1850         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1851         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1852         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1853         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1854         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1855
1856         let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1857         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1858         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1859
1860         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1861         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1862 }
1863
1864 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1865         (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1866 }
1867
1868 #[test]
1869 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1870         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1871         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1872         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1873         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1874         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1875         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1876         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1877         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1878         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1879         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1880
1881         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1882         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1883
1884         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1885         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1886
1887         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1888                 ($node: expr) => {{
1889                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1890                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1891                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1892                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1893                         payment_event
1894                 }}
1895         }
1896
1897         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1898         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1899         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1900         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1901
1902         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1903
1904         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1905         {
1906                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1907                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1908                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1909                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1910                 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1911
1912                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1913                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1914                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1915                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1916         }
1917
1918         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1919         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1920         loop {
1921                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1922                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1923                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1924                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1925                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1926                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1927                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1928                         break;
1929                 }
1930
1931                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1932                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1933                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1934                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1935                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1936
1937                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1938                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1939                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1940                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1941                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1942                 );
1943
1944                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1945                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1946                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1947                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1948                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1949         }
1950
1951         // adding pending output.
1952         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1953         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1954         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1955         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1956         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1957         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1958         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1959         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1960         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1961         // policy.
1962         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1963         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1964         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1965
1966         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1967         let payment_event_1 = {
1968                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1969                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1970                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1971
1972                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1973                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1974                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1975         };
1976         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1977
1978         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1979         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1980         {
1981                 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1982                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1983                 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1984                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1985                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1986                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1987                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1988         }
1989
1990         // split the rest to test holding cell
1991         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1992         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1993         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1994         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1995         {
1996                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1997                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1998         }
1999
2000         // now see if they go through on both sides
2001         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
2002         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
2003         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
2004                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
2005         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
2006         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2007         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2008
2009         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
2010         {
2011                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
2012                         get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
2013                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
2014                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
2015                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
2016                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
2017                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2018         }
2019
2020         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
2021         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
2022         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
2023                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
2024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
2025         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2026         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2027
2028         // flush the pending htlc
2029         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
2030         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2031         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2032
2033         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
2034         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
2035         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2036         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2037
2038         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
2039         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2040         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
2041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2042
2043         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
2044         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2045         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2046
2047         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2048
2049         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2050         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
2051         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
2052
2053         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2054         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
2055
2056         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
2057         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
2058         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
2059         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
2060         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
2061         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2062
2063         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2064         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2065         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2066         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2067
2068         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2069         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2070
2071         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2072         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2073         match events[0] {
2074                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2075                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2076                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2077                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2078                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2079                         match &purpose {
2080                                 PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2081                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2082                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2083                                 },
2084                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
2085                         }
2086                 },
2087                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2088         }
2089         match events[1] {
2090                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2091                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2092                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2093                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2094                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2095                         match &purpose {
2096                                 PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2097                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2098                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2099                                 },
2100                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
2101                         }
2102                 },
2103                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2104         }
2105
2106         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2107         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2108         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2109
2110         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
2111         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2112         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2113
2114         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
2115         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2116         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2117         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2118         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2119
2120         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2121         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2122 }
2123
2124 #[test]
2125 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2126         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2127         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2128         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2129         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2130         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2131         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2132         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2133         // To test this we:
2134         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2135         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2136         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2137         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2138         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2139         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2140         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2141         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2142         //    claim,
2143         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2144         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2145         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2146         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2147         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2148         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2149         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2150         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2151         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2152         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2153
2154         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2155         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2156         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2157         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2158         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2159
2160         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2161         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2162         let send_1 = {
2163                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2164                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2165                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2166                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2167                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2168                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2169         };
2170
2171         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2172         // initial fulfill/CS.
2173         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2174         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2176         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2177
2178         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2179         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2180         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2181         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2183         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2184
2185         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2186         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2188         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2189         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_1, None, false, false);
2190
2191         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2192         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2194         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2195         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2196
2197         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2198         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2199         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2200
2201         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2203         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2204
2205         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2207         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2208
2209         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2210         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2211         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2212         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2213         // on-chain as necessary).
2214         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2215         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2217         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2218         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, false, false);
2219
2220         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2221         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2222         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2223
2224         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2225         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2226
2227         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2228         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2229         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2230         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2231         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2232         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2233
2234         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2235         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2236         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2237         let send_2 = {
2238                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2239                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2240                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2241                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2242                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2243                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2244         };
2245
2246         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2247         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2248         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2249         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2250
2251         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2252
2253         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2254         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2255         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2256
2257         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2259
2260         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2262         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2263         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2264
2265         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2267         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2268
2269         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2270         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2271
2272         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2273         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2274
2275         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2276         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2277 }
2278
2279 #[test]
2280 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2281         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2282         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2283         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2284         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2285         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2286         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2287
2288         // Create some initial channels
2289         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2290         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2291         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2292         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2293
2294         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2295         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2296         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2297         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2298         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2299         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2300
2301         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2302         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2303         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2304         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2305         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2306
2307         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2308         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
2309         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
2310         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2311         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2312         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2313         {
2314                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2315                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2316                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2317                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2318                         let _ = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2319                 }
2320
2321                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2322                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2323                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2324         }
2325         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2326         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2327         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2328         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2329
2330         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2331         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2332
2333         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2334         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2335         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
2336         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
2337         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2338         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2339         {
2340                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2341                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2342                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2343                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2344                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2345                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2346         }
2347         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2348         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2349         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2350         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2351         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2352
2353         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2354                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2355                         {
2356                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2357                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2358                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2359
2360                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2361                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2362                                 match events[0] {
2363                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2364                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2365                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2366                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2367                                         },
2368                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2369                                 };
2370                         }
2371                 }
2372         }
2373
2374         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2375         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2376         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
2377         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
2378         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2379         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2380         let node2_commitment_txid;
2381         {
2382                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2383                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2384                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2385                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2386
2387                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2388                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2389                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2390                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2391                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2392         }
2393         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2394         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2395         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2396         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2397         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2398
2399         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2400         // confusing us in the following tests.
2401         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2402
2403         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2404         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2405         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2406         // buffer space).
2407
2408         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2409                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2410                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2411                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2412                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[1] {
2413                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2414                                 msg.clone()
2415                         },
2416                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2417                 };
2418                 match events[0] {
2419                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2420                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2421                         },
2422                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2423                 }
2424                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2425
2426                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2427                 {
2428                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2429                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2430                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2431                                         false
2432                                 } else { true }
2433                         });
2434                 }
2435
2436                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2437
2438                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2439                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2440
2441                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2442                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2443                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2444                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[1] {
2445                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2446                                 msg.clone()
2447                         },
2448                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2449                 };
2450                 match events[0] {
2451                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2452                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2453                         },
2454                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2455                 }
2456                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2457                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2458                 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2459
2460                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2461                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2462                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2463         };
2464         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2465         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2466         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2467         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2468
2469         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2470                 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
2471         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2472 }
2473
2474 #[test]
2475 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2476         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2477         let mut alice_config = test_default_channel_config();
2478         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2479         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2480         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2481         let mut bob_config = test_default_channel_config();
2482         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2483         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2484         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2485         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2486         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2487         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2488         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2489         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2490         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2491         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2492         // Create some new channels:
2493         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2494
2495         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2496         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2497         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2498         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2499         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2500         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2501         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2502         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2503         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2504         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2505         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2506         // Revoke the old state
2507         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2508
2509         {
2510                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2511                 {
2512                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2513                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2514                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2515                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2516                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2517                 }
2518                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2519                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2520                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2521
2522                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2523                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2524                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2525                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2526                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2527                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2528                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2529                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2530                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2531         }
2532         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2533         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2534         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2535 }
2536
2537 #[test]
2538 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2539         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2540         let mut alice_config = test_default_channel_config();
2541         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2542         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2543         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2544         let mut bob_config = test_default_channel_config();
2545         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2546         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2547         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2548         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2549         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2550         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2551         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2552         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2553         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2554         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2555         // Create some new channels:
2556         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2557
2558         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2559         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2560         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2561         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2562         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2563         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2564         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2565         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2566         // Revoke the old state
2567         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2568         {
2569                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2570                 {
2571                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2572                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2573                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2574
2575                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2576                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2577                 }
2578                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2579                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2580
2581                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2582                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2583                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2584                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2585                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2586                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2587                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2588         }
2589         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2590         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2591         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2592 }
2593
2594 #[test]
2595 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2596         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2597         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2598         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2599         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2600         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2601         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2602         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2603         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2604         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2605         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2606         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2607         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2608         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2609         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2610
2611         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2612         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2614         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2615         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2616         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2617
2618         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2619
2620         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2621         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2622         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2623         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2624         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2625 }
2626
2627 #[test]
2628 fn test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates() {
2629         do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(true);
2630         do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(false);
2631 }
2632
2633 fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment: bool) {
2634         // Simple test to make sure that the justice tx formed in WatchtowerPersister
2635         // is properly formed and can be broadcasted/confirmed successfully in the event
2636         // that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
2637         // (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
2638         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2639         let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2640         let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2641         let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
2642                 WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
2643         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
2644         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2645         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2646         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2647         let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
2648
2649         if !broadcast_initial_commitment {
2650                 // Send a payment to move the channel forward
2651                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2652         }
2653
2654         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output.
2655         // We'll keep this commitment transaction to broadcast once it's revoked.
2656         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel_id);
2657         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2658         let revoked_commitment_tx = &revoked_local_txn[0];
2659
2660         // Send another payment, now revoking the previous commitment tx
2661         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2662
2663         let justice_tx = persisters[1].justice_tx(funding_txo, &revoked_commitment_tx.txid()).unwrap();
2664         check_spends!(justice_tx, revoked_commitment_tx);
2665
2666         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2667         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2668
2669         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2670         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2671                 &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2672         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 0);
2673
2674         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2675         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2676                 &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2677
2678         // Check that the justice tx has sent the revoked output value to nodes[1]
2679         let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel_id);
2680         let total_claimable_balance = monitor.get_claimable_balances().iter().fold(0, |sum, balance| {
2681                 match balance {
2682                         channelmonitor::Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. } => sum + amount_satoshis,
2683                         _ => panic!("Unexpected balance type"),
2684                 }
2685         });
2686         // On the first commitment, node[1]'s balance was below dust so it didn't have an output
2687         let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value.to_sat() };
2688         let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value.to_sat();
2689         assert_eq!(total_claimable_balance, expected_claimable_balance);
2690 }
2691
2692
2693 #[test]
2694 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2695         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2696         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2697         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2698         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2699         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2700         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2701
2702         // Create some new channel:
2703         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2704
2705         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2706         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2707         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2708         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2709         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2710
2711         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2712         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2713         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2714         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2715         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2716         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2717         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2718         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2719         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2720
2721         //Revoke the old state
2722         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2723
2724         {
2725                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2726                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2727                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2728                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2729                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2730                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2731                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2732                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2733
2734                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2735                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2736
2737                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2738                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2739
2740                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2741                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2742                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2743                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2744                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2745                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2746                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2747                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2748
2749                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2750                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2751                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2752                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2753                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2754         }
2755         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2756         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2757         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2758 }
2759
2760 #[test]
2761 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2762         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2763         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2764         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2765         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2766         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2767         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2768
2769         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2770
2771         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2772         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2773         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2774         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2775         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2776         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2777
2778         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2779         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2780
2781         //Revoke the old state
2782         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2783
2784         {
2785                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2786                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2787                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2788                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2789                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2790                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2791                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(events[0..2].to_vec(), &[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
2792                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2793                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2794                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2795                 }
2796
2797                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2798                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2799
2800                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2801
2802                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2803                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2804                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2805                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2806                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2807                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2808                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2809
2810                 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2811                 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2812                 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2813
2814                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2815                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2816                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2817
2818                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2819                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2820                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2821
2822                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2823                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2824                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2825                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2826                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2827                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2828                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2829                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2830
2831                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2832                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2833                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2834                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2835                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2836                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2837                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2838         }
2839         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2840         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2841         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2842 }
2843
2844 #[test]
2845 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2846         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2847         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2848         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2849         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2850         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2851         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2852         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2853         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2854         // towards B.
2855         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2856         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2857         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2858         // PaymentSent event).
2859
2860         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2861         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2862         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2863         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2864
2865         // Create some initial channels
2866         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2867         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2868
2869         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2870         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2871         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2872         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2873         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2874
2875         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2876         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2877         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2878
2879         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2880         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2881
2882         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2883         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2884         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2885         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2886         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2887         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2888         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2889         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2890         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2891         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2892         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2893         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2894         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2895         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2896         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2897
2898         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2899         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2900         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2901         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2902         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2903         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2904         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2905         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2906         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2907         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2908         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2909         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2910         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2911         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2912
2913         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2914         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2915         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2916         {
2917                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2918                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2919                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2920                 added_monitors.clear();
2921         }
2922         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2923         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2924         match forwarded_events[0] {
2925                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2926                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2927         }
2928         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2929         match forwarded_events[1] {
2930                 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
2931                         next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
2932                 } => {
2933                         assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2934                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2935                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2936                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2937                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2938                 },
2939                 _ => panic!()
2940         }
2941         match forwarded_events[2] {
2942                 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
2943                         next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
2944                 } => {
2945                         assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2946                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2947                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2948                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2949                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2950                 },
2951                 _ => panic!()
2952         }
2953         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2954         {
2955                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2956                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2957                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2958                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2959                 added_monitors.clear();
2960         }
2961         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2962
2963         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2964         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2965
2966         match nodes_2_event {
2967                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2968                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2969         }
2970
2971         match nodes_0_event {
2972                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2973                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2974                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2975                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2976                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2977                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2978                 },
2979                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2980         };
2981
2982         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2983         match events[0] {
2984                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2985                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2986         }
2987
2988         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2989                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2990                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2991                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2992                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2993                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2994                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2995                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2996                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2997                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2998                         if $htlc_offered {
2999                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3000                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3001                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
3002                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
3003                         } else {
3004                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3005                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3006                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
3007                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
3008                         }
3009                         node_txn.clear();
3010                 } }
3011         }
3012         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
3013         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
3014
3015         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
3016         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
3017         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
3018         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3019         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3020         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3021         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3022         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3023         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
3024         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
3025         let commitment_spend =
3026                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
3027                         &node_txn[0]
3028                 } else {
3029                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
3030                         // FullBlockViaListen
3031                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
3032                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3033                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
3034                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
3035                                 &node_txn[0]
3036                         } else {
3037                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3038                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3039                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
3040                                 &node_txn[2]
3041                         }
3042                 };
3043
3044         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3045         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
3046         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3047         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3048         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3049         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
3050         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
3051         // we already checked the same situation with A.
3052
3053         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
3054         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
3055         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3056         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3057         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3058         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3059         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
3060         let mut first_claimed = false;
3061         for event in events {
3062                 match event {
3063                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3064                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
3065                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
3066                                         first_claimed = true;
3067                                 } else {
3068                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
3069                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
3070                                 }
3071                         },
3072                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3073                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
3074                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3075                 }
3076         }
3077         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3078 }
3079
3080 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
3081         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
3082         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
3083         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
3084         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
3085         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
3086         //            \                                  \
3087         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
3088
3089         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3090         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3091         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3092         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3093         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3094         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3095         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3096
3097         // Create some intial channels
3098         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3099         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3100
3101         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
3102         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3103         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3104
3105         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
3106
3107         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
3108         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3109         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
3110         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
3111         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
3112         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
3113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3114
3115         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3116         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3117         match events[0] {
3118                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3119                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3120                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3121                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3122                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3123                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3124                 },
3125                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3126         };
3127         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
3128         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3129         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3130         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3131         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
3132         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3133
3134         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
3135         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
3136         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
3137         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false
3138                 , [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3139         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3140         let timeout_tx = {
3141                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3142                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
3143                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
3144                 } else {
3145                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
3146                 }
3147                 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
3148                 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3149                 txn.remove(0)
3150         };
3151
3152         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3154         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3155
3156         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3157
3158         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3159         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3160         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3161         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3162         match events[0] {
3163                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3164                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3165                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3166                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3167                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3168                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3169                 },
3170                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3171         };
3172
3173         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3174         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3175         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3176
3177         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3178         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3179
3180         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3182         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3183         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3184         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3185         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3186         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3187 }
3188
3189 #[test]
3190 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3191         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3192         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3193         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3194 }
3195
3196 #[test]
3197 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3198         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3199         // and fail backward accordingly.
3200
3201         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3202         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3203         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3204         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3205
3206         // Create some initial channels
3207         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3208         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3209
3210         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3211         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3212         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3213         // Revoke the old state
3214         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3215
3216         let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3217
3218         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3219         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3220         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3221         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3222         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3223
3224         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3225         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3226         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3227         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3228         match events[0] {
3229                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3230                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3231                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3232                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3233                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3234                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3235
3236                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3237                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3238                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3239                 },
3240                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3241         }
3242 }
3243
3244 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3245         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3246         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3247         // commitment transaction anymore.
3248         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3249         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3250         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3251         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3252         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3253         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3254         // transactions:
3255         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3256         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3257         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3258         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3259         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3260         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3261         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3262         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3263         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3264
3265         // Create some initial channels
3266         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3267         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3268
3269         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3270         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3271         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3272         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3273         // Revoke the old state
3274         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3275
3276         let value = if use_dust {
3277                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3278                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3279                 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3280                         .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3281         } else { 3000000 };
3282
3283         let (_, first_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3284         let (_, second_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3285         let (_, third_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3286
3287         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3288         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3290         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3291         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3292         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3293         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3294         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3295         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3296         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3297         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3298         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3299
3300         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3301         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3302         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3303         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3304         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3305         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3306         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3307         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3308         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3309         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3310         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3312         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3313         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3314         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3316
3317         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3318         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3319         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3320         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3321         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3322         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3323         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3324         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3325         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3326         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3327         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3328         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3329         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3330         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3331         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3332         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3333         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3334         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3335
3336         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3337         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3338         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3339         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3340                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3341         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3342         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3343         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3344
3345         if deliver_bs_raa {
3346                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3347                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3348                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3349                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3350                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3351                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3352                 match events[0] {
3353                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3354                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3355                 }
3356                 match events[1] {
3357                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3358                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3359                 };
3360                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3361                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3362         }
3363
3364         let mut failed_htlcs = new_hash_set();
3365         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3366
3367         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3368         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3369         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3370
3371         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3372         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3373         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3374                 ev,
3375                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. }
3376         )));
3377         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3378                 ev,
3379                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3380         )));
3381         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3382                 ev,
3383                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3384         )));
3385
3386         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3387         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3388
3389         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3390         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3391
3392         if deliver_bs_raa {
3393                 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3394                 match nodes_2_event {
3395                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3396                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3397                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3398                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3399                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3400                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3401                         },
3402                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3403                 }
3404         }
3405
3406         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3407         match nodes_2_event {
3408                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data }) }, node_id: _ } => {
3409                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3410                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3411                 },
3412                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3413         }
3414
3415         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3416         match nodes_0_event {
3417                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3418                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3419                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3420                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3421                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3422                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3423
3424                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3425                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3426                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3427
3428                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3429
3430                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3431                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3432                         match events[0] {
3433                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3434                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3435                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3436                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3437                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3438                                                 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3439                                         }
3440                                 },
3441                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3442                         }
3443                         match events[1] {
3444                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3445                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3446                                 },
3447                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3448                         }
3449                         match events[2] {
3450                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3451                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3452                                 },
3453                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3454                         }
3455                         match events[3] {
3456                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3457                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3458                                 },
3459                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3460                         }
3461                         match events[4] {
3462                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3463                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3464                                 },
3465                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3466                         }
3467                         match events[5] {
3468                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3469                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3470                                 },
3471                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3472                         }
3473                 },
3474                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3475         }
3476
3477         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3478         match events[0] {
3479                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3480                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3481         }
3482
3483         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3484         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3485         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3486 }
3487
3488 #[test]
3489 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3490         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3491         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3492         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3493         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3494 }
3495
3496 #[test]
3497 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3498         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3499         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3500         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3501         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3502 }
3503
3504 #[test]
3505 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3506         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3507         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3508         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3509         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3510         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3511
3512         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3513         {
3514                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3515                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3516                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3517                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3518
3519                 let payment_event = {
3520                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3521                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3522                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3523                 };
3524                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3525                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3526         }
3527
3528         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3529         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3530         {
3531                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3532                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3533                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3534
3535                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3536         }
3537
3538         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3539         {
3540                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3541
3542                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3543                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3544                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3545                 let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret);
3546                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3547                         &route.paths[0], 50_000, &recipient_onion_fields, current_height, &None).unwrap();
3548                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3549                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3550
3551                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3552                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3553                         channel_id: chan.2,
3554                         htlc_id: 0,
3555                         amount_msat: 0,
3556                         payment_hash,
3557                         cltv_expiry,
3558                         onion_routing_packet,
3559                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3560                         blinding_point: None,
3561                 };
3562                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3563         }
3564         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3565         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3566         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3567         match events[0] {
3568                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3569                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3570                 },
3571                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3572         }
3573         match events[1] {
3574                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3575                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3576                 },
3577                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3578         }
3579         match events[2] {
3580                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3581                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3582                 },
3583                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3584         }
3585         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3586         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3587 }
3588
3589 #[test]
3590 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3591         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3592         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3593         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3594         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3595         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3596         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3597         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3598                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3599                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3600                 // connect_style.
3601                 return;
3602         }
3603         let funding_tx = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).3;
3604         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
3605         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3606         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
3607         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3608         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3609         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3610         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3611
3612         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
3613         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3614         check_spends!(node_txn[0], funding_tx);
3615         check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
3616
3617         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone()]);
3618         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3619         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3620         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3621         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3622
3623         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3624         // registering new transactions
3625         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3626 }
3627
3628 #[test]
3629 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3630         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3631         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3632         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3633         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3634         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3635         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3636         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3637
3638         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3639
3640         let mut payment_event = {
3641                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3642                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3643                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3644
3645                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3646                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3647                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3648         };
3649
3650         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3651         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3652
3653         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3654
3655         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3656         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3657         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3658         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3659
3660         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3661         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3662         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3663         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3664         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3665
3666         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3667         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3668         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3669         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
3670         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
3671         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3672         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3673         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3674         let commitment_tx = {
3675                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3676                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3677                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3678                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3679                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3680                 node_txn.remove(0)
3681         };
3682
3683         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
3684
3685         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3686         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3688         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3689
3690         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3691         {
3692                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3693                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3694         }
3695         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx);
3696         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3697         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), if nodes[2].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 2 } else { 1 });
3698         let htlc_tx = node_txn.pop().unwrap();
3699         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input.len(), 1);
3700         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, commitment_tx.txid());
3701         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3702         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3703
3704         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx);
3705 }
3706
3707 #[test]
3708 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3709         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3710         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3711         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3712         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3713
3714         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3715         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3716         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3717         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3718         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3719
3720         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3721
3722         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3723         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3724         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3725         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3726         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3727         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
3728
3729         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3730         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3731
3732         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3733         reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3734         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3735         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3736 }
3737
3738 #[test]
3739 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3740         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3741         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted, and doesn't reconnect back within time.
3742         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3743         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3744         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3745         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3746
3747         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3748         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3749         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
3750         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3751         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3752         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3753         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3754
3755         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3756         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3757
3758         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3759
3760         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3761         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3762
3763         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3764         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3765         // broadcasted.
3766         {
3767                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3768         }
3769
3770         // The peers disconnect before the funding is broadcasted.
3771         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3772         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3773
3774         // The time for peers to reconnect expires.
3775         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS {
3776                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
3777         }
3778
3779         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` and a
3780         // `DiscardFunding` event when the peers are disconnected and do not reconnect before the
3781         // funding transaction is broadcasted.
3782         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, true
3783                 , [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3784         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
3785                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3786 }
3787
3788 #[test]
3789 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3790         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3791         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3792         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3793         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3794         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3795         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3796         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3797
3798         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3799         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3800         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3801         reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3802         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3803
3804         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3805         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3806         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3807         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3808
3809         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3810         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3811         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3812
3813         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3814         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3815         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3816         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3817
3818         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3819         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3820
3821         claim_payment_along_route(
3822                 ClaimAlongRouteArgs::new(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], payment_preimage_3)
3823                         .skip_last(true)
3824         );
3825         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3826
3827         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3828         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 = 1;
3829         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3830         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3831         {
3832                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3833                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3834                 match events[0] {
3835                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3836                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3837                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3838                         },
3839                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3840                 }
3841                 match events[1] {
3842                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3843                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3844                 }
3845                 match events[2] {
3846                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3847                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3848                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3849                         },
3850                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3851                 }
3852                 match events[3] {
3853                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3854                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3855                         },
3856                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3857                 }
3858         }
3859         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
3860
3861         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3862         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3863 }
3864
3865 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3866         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3867         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3868         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3869         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3870         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3871
3872         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3873         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3874                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3875                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3876                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3877                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3878                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3879                 chan_id
3880         } else {
3881                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3882         };
3883
3884         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3885
3886         let payment_event = {
3887                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3888                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3889                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3890
3891                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3892                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3893                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3894         };
3895         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3896
3897         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3898                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3899         } else {
3900                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3901                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3902                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3903                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3904                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3905
3906                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3907                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3908                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3909                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3910
3911                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3912                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3913                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3914                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3915                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3916
3917                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3918                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3919                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3920                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3921                                         }
3922                                 }
3923                         }
3924                 }
3925         }
3926
3927         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3928         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3929         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3930                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3931                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3932                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3933                         //
3934                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3935                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3936                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3937                         //
3938                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3939                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3940                 }
3941                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3942                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3943                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3944                 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3945                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = 1;
3946                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3947         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3948                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3949                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3950                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3951                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
3952                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3953         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3954                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3955                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3956                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3957                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3958         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3959                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3960                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3961                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
3962                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3963         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3964                 // Everything was delivered...
3965                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3966         }
3967
3968         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3969         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3970                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3971                 match events_1[0] {
3972                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3973                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3974                 };
3975                 match events_1[1] {
3976                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3977                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3978                 };
3979         } else {
3980                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3981                 match events_1[0] {
3982                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3983                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3984                 };
3985         }
3986
3987         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3988         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3989         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3990
3991         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3992
3993         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3994         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3995         match events_2[0] {
3996                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3997                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3998                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3999                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4000                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
4001                         match &purpose {
4002                                 PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4003                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4004                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
4005                                 },
4006                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
4007                         }
4008                 },
4009                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4010         }
4011
4012         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4013         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4014         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4015
4016         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4017         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4018         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
4019                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
4020                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4021                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4022                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4023                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4024                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4025                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4026                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
4027                 },
4028                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4029         };
4030
4031         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
4032                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
4033
4034                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4035                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4036                 match events_4[0] {
4037                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4038                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
4039                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
4040                         },
4041                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4042                 }
4043
4044                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
4045                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
4046                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4047                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4048
4049                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
4050                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4051                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4052                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4053
4054                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
4055                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
4056                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4057                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4058                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4059
4060                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4061                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4062                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4063                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4064                                         }
4065                                 }
4066                         }
4067                 }
4068         }
4069
4070         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4071         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4072         if messages_delivered < 2 {
4073                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4074                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
4075                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4076                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
4077                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
4078                 } else {
4079                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4080                 }
4081         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4082                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4083                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4084                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4085                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
4086                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4087         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4088                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4089                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4090                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4091                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4092         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4093                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4094                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4095                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
4096                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4097         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4098                 // Everything was delivered...
4099                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4100         }
4101
4102         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
4103                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4104         }
4105         if messages_delivered <= 5 {
4106                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4107                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4108         }
4109         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4110
4111         if messages_delivered > 2 {
4112                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4113         }
4114
4115         // Channel should still work fine...
4116         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4117         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4118         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4119 }
4120
4121 #[test]
4122 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
4123         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
4124         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
4125         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
4126         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
4127 }
4128
4129 #[test]
4130 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
4131         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
4132         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
4133         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
4134         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
4135 }
4136
4137 #[test]
4138 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4139         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4140         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4141         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4142         // channel_ready immediately instead.
4143         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4144         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4145         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4146         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4147         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4148
4149         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4150
4151         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4152         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4153         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4154         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4155         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4156         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4157
4158         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4159         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4160         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4161 }
4162
4163 #[test]
4164 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_leading() {
4165         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4166         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4167         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4168         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4169
4170         // Let channel_manager get ahead of chain_monitor by 1 block.
4171         // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4172         // in case where client calls block_connect on channel_manager first and then on chain_monitor.
4173         let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4174         let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4175
4176         nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4177         nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4178
4179         // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4180         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4181
4182         // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1,
4183         // but it's best_block is block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager
4184         // was running ahead of chain_monitor at the time of funding_created.
4185         // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4186         // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4187         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4188         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4189
4190         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4191         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4192         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4193 }
4194
4195 #[test]
4196 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_lagging() {
4197         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4198         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4199         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4200         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4201
4202         // Let chain_monitor get ahead of channel_manager by 1 block.
4203         // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4204         // in case where client calls block_connect on chain_monitor first and then on channel_manager.
4205         let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4206         let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4207
4208         nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4209         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4210
4211         // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4212         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4213
4214         // channel_manager can't really skip block_1, it should get it eventually.
4215         nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4216
4217         // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1, it's best_block is
4218         // the block before block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager was
4219         // running behind at the time of funding_created.
4220         // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4221         // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4222         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4223         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4224
4225         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4226         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4227         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4228 }
4229
4230 #[test]
4231 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4232         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4233         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4234         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4235         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4236         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4237         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4238         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4239
4240         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4241
4242         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4243         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4244         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
4245                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
4246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4247
4248         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4249         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4250         match events_1[0] {
4251                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4252                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4253         }
4254
4255         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4256         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4258
4259         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4260         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4261         match events_2[0] {
4262                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4263                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4264                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4265                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4266                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4267                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4268                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4269
4270                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4271                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4272                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4273                         match events_3[0] {
4274                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4275                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4276                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4277                                 },
4278                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4279                         }
4280
4281                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4282                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4283                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4284                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4285                 },
4286                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4287         }
4288
4289         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4290         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4291
4292         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4293                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4294         }, true).unwrap();
4295         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4296         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4297         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4298                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4299         }, false).unwrap();
4300         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4301         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4302
4303         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4304         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4305         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4306         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4307
4308         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4309         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4310
4311         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4312         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4313
4314         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4315
4316         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4317         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4318         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4319         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4320         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4321         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4322         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4323         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4324         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4325         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4326
4327         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4328         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4329         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4330         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4331         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4332         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4333         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4334         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4335
4336         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4337         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4338         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4339         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4340         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4341         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4342         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4343         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4344
4345         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4346         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4347         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4348         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4349
4350         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4351         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4352         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4353         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4354
4355         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4356         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4357         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4358
4359         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4360
4361         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4362         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4363         match events_5[0] {
4364                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4365                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4366                         match &purpose {
4367                                 PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4368                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4369                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4370                                 },
4371                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
4372                         }
4373                 },
4374                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4375         }
4376
4377         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4378         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4379         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4380
4381         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4382         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4383 }
4384
4385 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4386         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4387         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4388         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4389         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4390         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4391         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4392
4393         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4394
4395         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4396                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4397                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4398                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4399                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4400                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4401                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4402                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4403                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4404                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4405                         &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4406                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4407                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4408                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4409                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4410                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4411                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4412                 our_payment_hash
4413         } else {
4414                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4415         };
4416
4417         let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4418         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4419         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4420         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4421         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4422                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4423                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4424                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4425         }
4426
4427         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4428
4429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4430         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4431         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4432         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4433         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4434         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4435
4436         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4437         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4438         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4439         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4440         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4441         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4442 }
4443
4444 #[test]
4445 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4446         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4447         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4448 }
4449
4450 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4451         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4452         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4453         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4454         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4455         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4456         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4457         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4458
4459         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4460         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4461         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4462         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4463
4464         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4465         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4466         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4467                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4468         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4469         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4470
4471         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4472         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4473         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4474         sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4475                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4476         if forwarded_htlc {
4477                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4478                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4479                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4480                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4481                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4482         }
4483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4484
4485         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4486         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4487         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4488         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4489
4490         if forwarded_htlc {
4491                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4492                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4493                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4494                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4495                 match fail_commit[0] {
4496                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4497                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4498                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4499                         },
4500                         _ => unreachable!(),
4501                 }
4502                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4503         } else {
4504                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4505         }
4506 }
4507
4508 #[test]
4509 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4510         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4511         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4512 }
4513
4514 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4515         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4516                 {
4517                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4518                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4519                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4520                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4521                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4522                                 match event {
4523                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs, channel_id: _ } => {
4524                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4525                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4526                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4527                                                 }
4528                                         },
4529                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4530                                 };
4531                         }
4532                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4533                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4534                                         txn.push(tx);
4535                                 }
4536                         }
4537                         txn
4538                 }
4539         }
4540 }
4541
4542 #[test]
4543 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4544         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4545         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4546         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4547         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4548         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4549
4550         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4551         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
4552         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
4553         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4554         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4555         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4556         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4557         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4558         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4559         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4560
4561         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4562         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4563
4564         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4565         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4566         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4567         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4568         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4569 }
4570
4571 #[test]
4572 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4573         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4574         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4575         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4576         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4577         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4578         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4579         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
4580
4581         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4582         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
4583         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4584         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4585         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4586
4587         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4588         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4589         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4590         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4591
4592         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4593         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4594         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4595         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4596         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4597
4598         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4599         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4600         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4601 }
4602
4603 #[test]
4604 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4605         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4606         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4607
4608         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4609         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4610         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4611         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4612
4613         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4614         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4615         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4616         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4617         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4618
4619         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4620         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4621         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4623         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4624
4625         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4626         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4627         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4628
4629         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4630         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4631         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4632         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4633         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4634 }
4635
4636 #[test]
4637 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4638         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4639         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4640         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4641         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4642
4643         // Create some initial channels
4644         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4645
4646         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4647
4648         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4649         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4650         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4651
4652         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4653         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4654         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4655         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4656         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4657         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4658         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4659         match events[0] {
4660                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4661                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4662         }
4663         match events[2] {
4664                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4665                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4666         }
4667
4668         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4669         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4670         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4671         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4672         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4673
4674         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4675         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4676         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4677
4678         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4679         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4680         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4681 }
4682
4683 #[test]
4684 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4685         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4686         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4687         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4688         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4689
4690         // Create some initial channels
4691         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4692
4693         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4694         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4695
4696         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4697
4698         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4699         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4700         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4701
4702         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4703         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4704         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4705         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4706         match events[1] {
4707                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4708                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4709         }
4710         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4711
4712         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4713         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4714         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4715         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4716         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4717
4718         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4719         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4720         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4721         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4722
4723         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4724         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4725         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4726         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4727         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4728 }
4729
4730 #[test]
4731 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4732         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4733         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4734         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4735         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4736
4737         // Create some initial channels
4738         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4739
4740         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4741         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4742         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4743         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4744
4745         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4746
4747         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4748         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4749         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4750         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4751
4752         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4753         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4754         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4755         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4756
4757         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4758         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4759
4760         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4761         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4762         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4763 }
4764
4765 #[test]
4766 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4767         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4768         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4769         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4770         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4771         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4772
4773         // Create some initial channels
4774         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4775
4776         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4777         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4778         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4779         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4780
4781         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4782
4783         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4784         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4785         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4786         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4787         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4788         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4789
4790         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4791         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4792         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4793         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4794         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4795         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // HTLC-Timeout
4796
4797         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4798         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4799         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4800         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4801         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4802
4803         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4804         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4805         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4806         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4807         // transactions next...
4808         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4809         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4810
4811         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4812         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4813         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4814                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4815         } else {
4816                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4817                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4818         }
4819
4820         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4821         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4822
4823         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4824         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4825         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4826         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4827         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4828 }
4829
4830 #[test]
4831 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4832         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4833         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4834         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4835         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4836         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4837
4838         // Create some initial channels
4839         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4840
4841         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4842         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4843         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4844         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4845
4846         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4847         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4848
4849         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4850
4851         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4852         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4853         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4854         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4855         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4856         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4857
4858         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4859         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4860         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4861         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4862
4863         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4864         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4865         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4866
4867         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4868         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4869         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4870         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4871         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4872
4873         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4874         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4875
4876         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4877         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4878         // transactions next...
4879         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4880         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4881         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4882                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4883         } else {
4884                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4885                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4886         }
4887
4888         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4889         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4890
4891         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4892         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4893
4894         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4895         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4896
4897         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4898         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4899         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4900         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4901         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4902         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4903         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4904         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4905 }
4906
4907 #[test]
4908 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4909         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4910         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4911         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4912         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4913         // channel.
4914         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4915         // gets broadcast.
4916
4917         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4918         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4919         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4920         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4921
4922         // Create some initial channels
4923         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4924         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4925
4926         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4927         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4928         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4929         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4930         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4931
4932         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4933         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4934         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4935
4936         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4937         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4938         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4939         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4940         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4941         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4942         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4943         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4944         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4945         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4946         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4947
4948         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4949         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4951         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4952
4953         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4954         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4955         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4956         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4957         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4958         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Success tx
4959
4960         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4961         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4962         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4963         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4964         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4965         match events[0] {
4966                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4967                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4968         }
4969         match events[1] {
4970                 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
4971                         next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
4972                 } => {
4973                         assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4974                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4975                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4976                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4977                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4978                 },
4979                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4980         }
4981         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4982         let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4983         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4984         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4985         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4986
4987         match nodes_2_event {
4988                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4989                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4990         }
4991
4992         match nodes_0_event {
4993                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4994                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4995                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4996                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4997                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4998                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4999                 },
5000                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5001         };
5002
5003         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
5004         match msg_events[0] {
5005                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5006                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5007         }
5008
5009         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5010         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5011         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5012         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5013         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5014         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
5015         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5016         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5017         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5018         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5019         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
5020
5021         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5022         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5023 }
5024
5025 #[test]
5026 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5027         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5028         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5029         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5030         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5031         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5032         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5033         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5034         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5035         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5036         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5037         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5038                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5039         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5040
5041         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5042         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5043         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5044
5045         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5046         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5047         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5048         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5049         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5050
5051         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5052
5053         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
5054         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5055         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5056         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5057         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
5058                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
5059         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
5060         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5061
5062         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5063         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5064         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5065
5066         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5067         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5069         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5070         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5071
5072         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5073         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5074                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5075                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
5076                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5077
5078                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5079                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5080                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5081
5082                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5083                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5084                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5085                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5086                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5087
5088                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5089                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5090                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
5091                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5092                 } else {
5093                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5094                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5095                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5096                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5097                 }
5098
5099                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5100                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5101                 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
5102                 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
5103                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5104                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5105                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value.to_sat() < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5106                 } else {
5107                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat() < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5108                 }
5109         }
5110
5111         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5112         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5113
5114         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5116         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5117         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5118         match events[0] {
5119                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5120                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5121         }
5122         match events[2] {
5123                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5124                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5125         }
5126         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5127         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5128         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5129         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5130         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5131         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5132         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5133         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5134         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5135         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5136
5137         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5138         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5139         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5140         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5141         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5142         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5143         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5144         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5145         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5147
5148         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5149         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5150         {
5151                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5152         }
5153         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5154
5155         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5156         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
5157         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
5158         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5159         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5160         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5161         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5162         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5163         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5165
5166         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5167         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5168         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true, true);
5169 }
5170
5171 #[test]
5172 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5173         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5174         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5175         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5176         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5177
5178         // Create some initial channels
5179         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5180
5181         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5182         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5183         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5184         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5185         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5186
5187         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5188         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5189         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5190         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5191
5192         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5194         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5195         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5196         match events[0] {
5197                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5198                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5199         }
5200         match events[2] {
5201                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5202                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5203         }
5204         let node_tx = {
5205                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5206                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5207                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5208                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5209                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5210                 node_txn[0].clone()
5211         };
5212
5213         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5214         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5215
5216         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5217         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5218         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5219         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5220         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5221         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5222 }
5223
5224 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5225         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5226         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5227         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5228         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5229         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5230         // use the same payment hashes.
5231         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5232         //
5233         // A \         / E
5234         //    - C - D -
5235         // B /         \ F
5236         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5237         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5238         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5239         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5240         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5241         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5242         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5243         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5244                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5245         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5246
5247         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5248         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5249         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5250         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5251         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5252
5253         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5254         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5255         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5256         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5257
5258         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
5259                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5260         // 0th HTLC:
5261         let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5262         // 1st HTLC:
5263         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5264         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5265         // 2nd HTLC:
5266         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5267         // 3rd HTLC:
5268         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5269         // 4th HTLC:
5270         let (_, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5271         // 5th HTLC:
5272         let (_, payment_hash_4, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5273         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5274         // 6th HTLC:
5275         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5276         // 7th HTLC:
5277         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5278
5279         // 8th HTLC:
5280         let (_, payment_hash_5, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5281         // 9th HTLC:
5282         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5283         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5284
5285         // 10th HTLC:
5286         let (_, payment_hash_6, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5287         // 11th HTLC:
5288         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5289         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5290
5291         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5292         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5293         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5294         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5295         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5296
5297         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5298         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5299         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5300         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5301         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5302         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5304
5305         let failed_destinations = vec![
5306                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5307                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5308                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5309                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5310         ];
5311         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5312         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5313
5314         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5315         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5316         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5317         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5318         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5319         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5320
5321         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5322         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5323         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5324         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5325
5326         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5327                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5328                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5329         ];
5330         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5331         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5332
5333         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5334         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5335         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5336         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5337
5338         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5339
5340         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5341         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5342                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5343                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5344                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5345                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5346                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5347                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5348         ];
5349         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5350         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5351         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5352         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5353         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5354         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5355         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5356         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5357         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5358         if deliver_last_raa {
5359                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5360         } else {
5361                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5362         }
5363
5364         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5365         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5366         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5367         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5368         //
5369         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5370         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5371         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5372         //
5373         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5374         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5375         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5376
5377         if announce_latest {
5378                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5379         } else {
5380                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5381         }
5382         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5383         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5384                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5385                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5386         } else {
5387                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5388                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5389         };
5390         match close_event {
5391                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5392                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5393         }
5394
5395         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5396         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5397         if deliver_last_raa {
5398                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[1..2], true);
5399
5400                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5401                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5402         } else {
5403                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5404                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5405                 } else {
5406                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5407                 };
5408
5409                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5410         }
5411         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5412
5413         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5414         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5415         let mut a_done = false;
5416         for msg in cs_msgs {
5417                 match msg {
5418                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5419                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5420                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5421                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5422                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5423                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5424                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5425                                         }
5426                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5427                                         assert!(!a_done);
5428                                         a_done = true;
5429                                         &nodes[0]
5430                                 } else {
5431                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5432                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5433                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5434                                         }
5435                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5436                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5437                                         &nodes[1]
5438                                 };
5439                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5440                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5441                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5442                                 if announce_latest {
5443                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5444                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5445                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5446                                         }
5447                                 }
5448                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5449                         },
5450                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5451                 }
5452         }
5453
5454         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5455         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5456         let mut as_faileds = new_hash_set();
5457         let mut as_updates = 0;
5458         for event in as_events.iter() {
5459                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5460                         assert!(as_faileds.insert(*payment_hash));
5461                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5462                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5463                         } else {
5464                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5465                         }
5466                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5467                                 as_updates += 1;
5468                         }
5469                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5470                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5471         }
5472         assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5473         assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5474         if announce_latest {
5475                 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5476                 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5477         }
5478         assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5479
5480         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5481         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5482         let mut bs_faileds = new_hash_set();
5483         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5484         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5485                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5486                         assert!(bs_faileds.insert(*payment_hash));
5487                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5488                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5489                         } else {
5490                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5491                         }
5492                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5493                                 bs_updates += 1;
5494                         }
5495                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5496                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5497         }
5498         assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5499         assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5500         if announce_latest {
5501                 assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5502         }
5503         assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5504
5505         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5506         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5507         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5508         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5509         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5510         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5511 }
5512
5513 #[test]
5514 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5515         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5516 }
5517
5518 #[test]
5519 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5520         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5521 }
5522
5523 #[test]
5524 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5525         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5526         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5527         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5528 }
5529
5530 #[test]
5531 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5532         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5533         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5534         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5535         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5536
5537         // Create some initial channels
5538         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5539
5540         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5541         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5542         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5543         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5544
5545         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5546         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5547         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5548         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5549         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5550         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5551
5552         let htlc_timeout = {
5553                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5554                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5555                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5556                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5557                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5558                 node_txn[0].clone()
5559         };
5560
5561         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5562         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5563         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5564
5565         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5566         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5567         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5568         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5569         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5570         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5571         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5572         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5573         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5574         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5575                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5576 }
5577
5578 #[test]
5579 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5580         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5581         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5582         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5583         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5584
5585         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5586
5587         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5588         let seed = [42; 32];
5589         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5590         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5591         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5592         let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5593         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &scorer);
5594         let message_router = test_utils::TestMessageRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &keys_manager);
5595         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, message_router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5596         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5597         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5598         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5599
5600         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5601         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5602
5603         // Create some initial channels
5604         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5605         // for node 0
5606         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5607         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5608         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5609
5610         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5611         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5612         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5613         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5614         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5615
5616         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5617         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5618         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5619         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5620         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5621
5622         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5623         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5624         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5625         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5626             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5627             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5628             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5629                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5630         }
5631
5632         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5633         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5634         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5635         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5636         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5637         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5638
5639         let htlc_timeout = {
5640                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5641                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5642                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5643                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5644                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5645                 node_txn[0].clone()
5646         };
5647
5648         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5649         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5650         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5651
5652         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5653         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5654         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5655         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5656         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5657         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5658         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5659         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5660         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5661         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5662         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5663                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5664 }
5665
5666 #[test]
5667 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5668         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5669         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5670         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5671         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5672
5673         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5674
5675         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5676         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5677
5678         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5679         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5680         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5681
5682         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5683         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5684         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5685
5686         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5687         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5688         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5689
5690         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5691         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5692         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5693 }
5694
5695 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5696         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5697         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5698         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5699         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5700         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5701
5702         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5703
5704         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5705         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5706         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5707         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5708         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5709
5710         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5711         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5712         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
5713
5714         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5715         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5716         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5717         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5718         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5719
5720         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5721         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5722         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5723                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5724                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5725         }
5726         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5727         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5728         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5729         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5730 }
5731
5732 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5733         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5734         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5735         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5736         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5737         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5738
5739         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5740         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5741                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5742         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5743
5744         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5745
5746         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5747         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5748         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5749
5750         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5751         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5752
5753         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5754                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5755                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5756         }
5757         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5758         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5759         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5760         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5761 }
5762
5763 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5764         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5765         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5766         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5767         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5768         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5769
5770         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5771         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5772         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5773         // actually revoked.
5774         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5775         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5776         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5777         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5778         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5779
5780         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5781         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5782         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5783         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5784         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5785         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5786         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5787         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5788         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5789         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5790
5791         if check_revoke_no_close {
5792                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5793                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5794         }
5795
5796         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5797         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5798         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5799                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5800                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5801         }
5802         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5803                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5804                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5805                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5806                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5807         } else {
5808                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5809         }
5810 }
5811
5812 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5813 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5814 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5815 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5816 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5817 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5818 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5819 // non-dust HTLCs.
5820 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5821 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5822 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5823 #[test]
5824 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5825         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5826         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5827
5828         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5829         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5830 }
5831
5832 #[test]
5833 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5834         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5835         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5836         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5837         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5838 }
5839
5840 #[test]
5841 #[should_panic]
5842 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5843         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5844         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5845         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5846         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5847         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5848         for node in nodes.iter() {
5849                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5850         }
5851
5852         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5853         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5854         let push_msat=10001;
5855         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5856         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5857         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5858         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5859
5860         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5861         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5862         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5863 }
5864
5865 #[test]
5866 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5867         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5868         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5869         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5870         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5871
5872         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5873         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5874         let push_msat=10001;
5875         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5876
5877         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5878         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5879         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5880         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5881         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5882
5883         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5884         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5885         let push_msat=10001;
5886         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5887         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5888         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
5889
5890         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5891         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5892         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.channel_flags<=1);
5893
5894         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5895         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5896         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5897
5898         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5899         let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
5900         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.chain_hash, chain_hash);
5901
5902         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5903         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5904         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5905         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5906         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5907         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5908 }
5909
5910 #[test]
5911 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5912         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5913         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5914         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5915         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5916
5917         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5918         let push_msat=10001;
5919         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5920         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5921         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5922         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5923
5924         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5925         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5926         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5927                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5928                         msg.clone()
5929                 },
5930                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5931         };
5932         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5933 }
5934
5935 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5936 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5937 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5938 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5939 #[test]
5940 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5941         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5942         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5943         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5944         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5945         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5946
5947         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5948         // pending_update_fee.
5949         {
5950                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5951                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5952         }
5953         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5955
5956         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5957         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5958         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5959                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5960                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5961                 },
5962                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5963         };
5964
5965         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5966
5967         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5968         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5969         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5970         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5971
5972         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5973         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
5974         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5975
5976         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5977         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5978                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5979         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5980         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5981
5982         // Flush the pending fee update.
5983         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5984         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5985         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5986         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5987         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5988
5989         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5990         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5991         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5992         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5993         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5994         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
5995
5996         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5997         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5998         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5999         match &events[0] {
6000                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6001                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6002                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6003                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6004                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
6005                 },
6006                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6007         }
6008         match &events[1] {
6009                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6010                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6011                 },
6012                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6013         }
6014 }
6015
6016 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6017 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6018 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6019 #[test]
6020 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6021         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6022         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6023         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6024         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6025         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6026
6027         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6028         // pending_update_fee.
6029         {
6030                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6031                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6032         }
6033         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6034         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6035
6036         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6037         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6038         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6039                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6040                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6041                 },
6042                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6043         };
6044
6045         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6046
6047         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6048         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6049         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6050         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6051
6052         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6053         let amt_1 = 20000;
6054         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
6055         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6056         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6057
6058         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6059         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
6060                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
6061         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6062         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6063         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6064         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
6065                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
6066         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6067         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6068
6069         // Flush the pending fee update.
6070         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6071         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6073         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6074         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6075         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6076
6077         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6078         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6079         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6080         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6081         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6082         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
6083
6084         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6085         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6086         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6087         match &events[0] {
6088                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6089                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6090                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6091                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6092                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
6093                 },
6094                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6095         }
6096         match &events[1] {
6097                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6098                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6099                 },
6100                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6101         }
6102
6103         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6104         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6105                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6106                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6107                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6108         };
6109         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6110                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6111                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6112         };
6113         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6114         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6115         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6116         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6117         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6118         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6119         match events[0] {
6120                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6121                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6122         }
6123         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6124         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6125         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6126         match events[0] {
6127                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
6128                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6129         }
6130         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6132         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6133
6134         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6135         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6136         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6137         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6138 }
6139
6140 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6141 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6142 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6143 // once it's freed.
6144 #[test]
6145 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6146         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6147         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6148         // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
6149         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6150         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
6151         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
6152         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6153         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6154         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6155         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
6156
6157         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6158         // pending_update_fee.
6159         {
6160                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6161                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6162         }
6163         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6165
6166         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6167         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6168         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6169                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6170                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6171                 },
6172                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6173         };
6174
6175         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6176
6177         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6178         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6179         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6180         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6181
6182         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6183         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6184         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6185         let payment_event = {
6186                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6187                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6188                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6189
6190                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6191                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6192
6193                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6194         };
6195         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6196         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6197         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6198         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6199
6200         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
6201         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6202
6203         // Flush the pending fee update.
6204         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6205         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6207         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6208         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6209         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6210
6211         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6212         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6213         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6214
6215         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6216                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6217                         msg.clone()
6218                 },
6219                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6220         };
6221
6222         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6224         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6225
6226         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6227         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6228         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6229         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[1] {
6230                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6231                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6232         }
6233
6234         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6235         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6236         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6237
6238         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6239         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6240         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6241         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6242                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6243                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6244                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6245                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6246                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6247                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6248                 },
6249                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6250         };
6251
6252         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6253         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6254         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6255
6256         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6257         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6259         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6260         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6262         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6263         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6264         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6265                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6266                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6267         };
6268         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6269         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6270         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6271 }
6272
6273 #[test]
6274 fn test_payment_route_reaching_same_channel_twice() {
6275         //A route should not go through the same channel twice
6276         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6277         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6278         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6279         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6280         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6281         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6282
6283         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6284                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6285         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6286
6287         // Extend the path by itself, essentially simulating route going through same channel twice
6288         let cloned_hops = route.paths[0].hops.clone();
6289         route.paths[0].hops.extend_from_slice(&cloned_hops);
6290
6291         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6292                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6293         ), false, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6294         assert_eq!(err, &"Path went through the same channel twice"));
6295 }
6296
6297 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6298 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6299 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6300
6301 #[test]
6302 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6303         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6304         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6305         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6306         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6307         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6308         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6309
6310         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6311         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6312
6313         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6314                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6315                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6316         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6317 }
6318
6319 #[test]
6320 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6321         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6322         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6323         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6324         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6325         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6326         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6327
6328         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6329         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6330         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6331                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6332                 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6333                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6334
6335         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6336         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6337 }
6338
6339 #[test]
6340 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6341         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6342         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6343         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6344         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6345         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6346         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6347
6348         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6349         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6350                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6351         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6352         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6353         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6354
6355         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6356         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC", 3);
6357         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6358         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6359         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() },
6360                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6361 }
6362
6363 #[test]
6364 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6365         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6366         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6367         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6368         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6369         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6370         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6371         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6372
6373         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6374                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6375         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6376         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6377         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6378                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6379                 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6380                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6381 }
6382
6383 #[test]
6384 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6385         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6386         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6387         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6388         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6389         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6390         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6391         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6392         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6393         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6394                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6395
6396         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6397         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6398         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6399                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6400                 let payment_event = {
6401                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6402                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6403                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6404
6405                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6406                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6407                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6408                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6409                         } else {
6410                                 assert!(false);
6411                         }
6412                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6413                 };
6414                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6415                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6416                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6417
6418                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6419                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6420         }
6421         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6422                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6423                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6424
6425         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6426 }
6427
6428 #[test]
6429 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6430         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6431         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6432         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6433         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6434         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6435         let channel_value = 100000;
6436         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6437         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6438
6439         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6440
6441         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6442         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6443         // limits us to.
6444         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6445         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6446                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6447                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6448         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6449
6450         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6451 }
6452
6453 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6454 #[test]
6455 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6456         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6457         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6458         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6459         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6460         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6461         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6462         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6463         {
6464                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6465                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6466                 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6467                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context().get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6468         }
6469
6470         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6471         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6472                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6474         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6475         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6476         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6477         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6478         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6479         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6481         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6482 }
6483
6484 #[test]
6485 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6486         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6487         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6488         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6489         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6490         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6491         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6492
6493         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6494         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6495         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6496         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6497         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6498         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6499
6500         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6501         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6502         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6503                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6504         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6505         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6506
6507         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6508         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6509         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6510         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6511         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6512
6513         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6514         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6515         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6516         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6517         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6518 }
6519
6520 #[test]
6521 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6522         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6523         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6524         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6525         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6526         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6527         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6528         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6529
6530         let send_amt = 3999999;
6531         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6532                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6533         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6534         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6535         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
6536         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6537         let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret);
6538         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6539                 &route.paths[0], send_amt, &recipient_onion_fields, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6540         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6541
6542         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6543                 channel_id: chan.2,
6544                 htlc_id: 0,
6545                 amount_msat: 1000,
6546                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6547                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6548                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6549                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6550                 blinding_point: None,
6551         };
6552
6553         for i in 0..50 {
6554                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6555                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6556         }
6557         msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6558         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6559
6560         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6561         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6562         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6563         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6564         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6565 }
6566
6567 #[test]
6568 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6569         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6570         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6571         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6572         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6573         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6574         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6575
6576         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6577         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6578                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6579         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6580         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6581         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6582         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6583
6584         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6585         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6586         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6587         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6588         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6589 }
6590
6591 #[test]
6592 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6593         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6594         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6595         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6596         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6597         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6598
6599         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6600         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6601         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6602                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6603         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6604         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6605         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6606         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6607
6608         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6609         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6610         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6611         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6612         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6613 }
6614
6615 #[test]
6616 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6617         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6618         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6619         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6620         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6621         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6622         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6623         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6624
6625         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6626         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6627         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6628                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6629         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6630         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6631         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6632
6633         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6634         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6635         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6636         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6637                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6638         }, true).unwrap();
6639         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6640         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6641         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6642                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6643         }, false).unwrap();
6644         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6645         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6646         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6647         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6648         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6649         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6650
6651         //Resend HTLC
6652         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6653         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6654         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6655         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6656         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6657
6658         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6659
6660         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6661         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6662         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6663         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6664         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6665 }
6666
6667 #[test]
6668 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6669         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6670
6671         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6672         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6673         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6674         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6675         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6676         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6677         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6678                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6679
6680         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6681         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6682         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6683
6684         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6685                 channel_id: chan.2,
6686                 htlc_id: 0,
6687                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6688         };
6689
6690         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6691
6692         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6693         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6694         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6695         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6696         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6697 }
6698
6699 #[test]
6700 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6701         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6702
6703         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6704         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6705         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6706         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6707         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6708
6709         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6710         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6711                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6712         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6713         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6714         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6715
6716         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6717                 channel_id: chan.2,
6718                 htlc_id: 0,
6719                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6720         };
6721
6722         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6723
6724         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6725         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6726         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6727         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6728         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6729 }
6730
6731 #[test]
6732 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6733         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6734
6735         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6736         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6737         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6738         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6739         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6740
6741         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6742         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6743                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6744         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6745         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6746         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6747         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6748                 channel_id: chan.2,
6749                 htlc_id: 0,
6750                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6751                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6752         };
6753
6754         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6755
6756         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6757         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6758         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6759         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6760         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6761 }
6762
6763 #[test]
6764 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6765         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6766
6767         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6768         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6769         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6770         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6771         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6772
6773         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6774
6775         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6776         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6777         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6778
6779         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6780         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6781         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6782                 match events[0] {
6783                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6784                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6785                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6786                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6787                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6788                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6789                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6790                         },
6791                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6792                 }
6793         };
6794
6795         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6796
6797         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6798
6799         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6800         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6801         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6803         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6804 }
6805
6806 #[test]
6807 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6808         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6809
6810         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6811         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6812         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6813         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6814         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6815
6816         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6817
6818         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6819         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6820         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6821
6822         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6823         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6824         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6825                 match events[0] {
6826                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6827                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6828                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6829                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6830                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6831                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6832                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6833                         },
6834                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6835                 }
6836         };
6837
6838         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6839
6840         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6841
6842         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6843         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6844         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6845         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6846         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6847 }
6848
6849 #[test]
6850 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6851         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6852
6853         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6854         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6855         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6856         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6857         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6858
6859         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6860         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6861                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6863
6864         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6865         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6866
6867         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6868         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6869         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6870
6871         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6872
6873         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6874                 match events[0] {
6875                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6876                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6877                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6878                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6879                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6880                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6881                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6882                         },
6883                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6884                 }
6885         };
6886         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6887         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6888
6889         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6890         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6891         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6892         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6893         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6894 }
6895
6896 #[test]
6897 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6898         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6899         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6900
6901         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6902         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6903         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6904         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6905         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6906         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6907
6908         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6909
6910         //First hop
6911         let mut payment_event = {
6912                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6913                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6914                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6915                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6916                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6917                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6918         };
6919         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6921         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6922         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6923         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6924         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6925         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6926         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6927         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6928
6929         //Second Hop
6930         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6931         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6932         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6933         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6934
6935         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6936         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6937         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6938                 match events_3[0] {
6939                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6940                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6941                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6942                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6943                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6944                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6945                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6946                         },
6947                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6948                 }
6949         };
6950
6951         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6952
6953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6954         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6955         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6956         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6957         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6958
6959         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6960         match events_4[0] {
6961                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6962                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6963                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6964                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6965                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6966                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6967                 },
6968                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6969         };
6970
6971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6972 }
6973
6974 #[test]
6975 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6976         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6977         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6978         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6979         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6980         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6981         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6982
6983         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6984
6985         // First hop
6986         let mut payment_event = {
6987                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6988                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6989                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6990                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6991         };
6992
6993         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6994         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6995         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6996         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6997         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6998         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6999
7000         // Second Hop
7001         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
7002         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7003         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7004         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7005
7006         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7007         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7008         match events_3[0] {
7009                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7010                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
7011                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
7012                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
7013
7014                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7015                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7016                 },
7017                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7018         }
7019
7020         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
7021                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
7022                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7023         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7024         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7025         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7026
7027         match events_4[0] {
7028                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7029                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7030                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7031                 },
7032                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7033         }
7034
7035         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7036         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
7037
7038         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
7039         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
7040         match events_5[0] {
7041                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
7042                 } => {
7043                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
7044                         assert!(is_permanent);
7045                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
7046                 },
7047                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7048         }
7049         match events_5[1] {
7050                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7051                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
7052                 },
7053                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7054         }
7055
7056         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
7057 }
7058
7059 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7060         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7061         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7062         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7063
7064         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7065         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7066         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7067         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7068         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7069         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7070
7071         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7072                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7073
7074         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7075         let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7076         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7077         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7078
7079         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7080         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7081
7082         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7083         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7085         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7087
7088         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7089         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7090         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7092
7093         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7094         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7095
7096         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7097         match events[0] {
7098                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7099                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7100                 },
7101                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7102         }
7103         match events[1] {
7104                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7105                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7106                 },
7107                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7108         }
7109
7110         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7111         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7112         if announce_latest {
7113                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7114         } else {
7115                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7116         }
7117
7118         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7119         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7120         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7121
7122         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7123         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7124         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7125         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7126         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
7127         let mut first_failed = false;
7128         for event in events {
7129                 match event {
7130                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7131                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7132                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7133                                         first_failed = true;
7134                                 } else {
7135                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7136                                 }
7137                         },
7138                         Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
7139                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7140                 }
7141         }
7142 }
7143
7144 #[test]
7145 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7146         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7147         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7148 }
7149
7150 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7151         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7152         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7153         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7154         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7155         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7156         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7157
7158         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7159         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7160         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7161         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7162         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7163
7164         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7165                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7166
7167         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7168         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7169
7170         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7171         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7172
7173         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7174         if revoked {
7175                 let (payment_preimage_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7176                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7177         }
7178
7179         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7180         if local {
7181                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7182                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7183                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7184                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7185                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7186
7187                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7188                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7189                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7190                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7191                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
7192                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7193                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7194                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7195                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7196                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7197                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7198         } else {
7199                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7200                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7201                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7202                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7203                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7204                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7205
7206                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7207                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7208                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7209                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7210                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7211                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7212                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7213
7214                 if !revoked {
7215                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7216                 } else {
7217                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), 11);
7218                 }
7219                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7220                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7221                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7222                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7223                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7224         }
7225 }
7226
7227 #[test]
7228 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7229         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7230         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7231         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7232 }
7233
7234 #[test]
7235 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7236         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7237
7238         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7239         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7240         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7241         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7242         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7243         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7244         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7245         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7246         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7247
7248         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
7249         if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7250                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7251                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42, None)
7252         {
7253                 match error {
7254                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7255                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7256                 }
7257         } else { assert!(false) }
7258
7259         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7260         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7261         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7262         open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7263         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7264                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7265                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7266         {
7267                 match error {
7268                         ChannelError::Close((err, _)) => {
7269                                 let regex = regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap();
7270                                 assert!(regex.is_match(err.as_str()));
7271                         },
7272                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7273                 }
7274         } else { assert!(false); }
7275
7276         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7277         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7278         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7279         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7280         accept_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7281         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
7282         let reason_msg;
7283         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7284                 match action {
7285                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7286                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7287                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7288                         },
7289                         _ => { panic!(); }
7290                 }
7291         } else { panic!(); }
7292         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7293
7294         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7295         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7296         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7297         open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7298         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7299                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7300                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7301         {
7302                 match error {
7303                         ChannelError::Close((err, _)) => {
7304                                 let regex = regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap();
7305                                 assert!(regex.is_match(err.as_str()));
7306                         },
7307                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7308                 }
7309         } else { assert!(false); }
7310 }
7311
7312 #[test]
7313 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7314         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7315         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7316         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7317
7318         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7319         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7320         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7321         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7322
7323         // Create some initial channels
7324         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7325
7326         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7327         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7328         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
7329                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7330         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000);
7331         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7332                 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7333         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7334         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7335         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7336                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7337         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7338
7339         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7340         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7341         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7342         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7343         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7344
7345         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7346         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7347         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7348         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7349
7350         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7351         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7352         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7353
7354         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7355         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7356         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7357                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7358                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7359                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7360                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7361                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7362                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7363                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7364                 },
7365                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7366         };
7367         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7368
7369         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7370         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7371
7372         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7373         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7374         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7375         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7376 }
7377
7378 #[test]
7379 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7380         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7381         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7382
7383         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7384         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7385         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7386         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7387
7388         // Connect a dummy node for proper future events broadcasting
7389         connect_dummy_node(&nodes[0]);
7390
7391         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7392         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7393         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7394
7395         // Disconnect peers
7396         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7397         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7398
7399         for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7400                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7401         }
7402         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7403         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7404         let mut chans_disabled = new_hash_map();
7405         for e in msg_events {
7406                 match e {
7407                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7408                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7409                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7410                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7411                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7412                                 }
7413                         },
7414                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7415                 }
7416         }
7417         // Reconnect peers
7418         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7419                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7420         }, true).unwrap();
7421         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7422         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7423         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7424                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7425         }, false).unwrap();
7426         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7427         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7428
7429         // Reestablish chan_1
7430         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7431         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7432         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7433         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7434         // Reestablish chan_2
7435         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7436         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7437         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7438         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7439         // Reestablish chan_3
7440         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7441         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7442         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7443         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7444
7445         for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7446                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7447         }
7448         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7449         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7450         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7451         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7452         for e in msg_events {
7453                 match e {
7454                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7455                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7456                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7457                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7458                                         // the old one.
7459                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7460                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7461                                 }
7462                         },
7463                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7464                 }
7465         }
7466         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7467         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7468 }
7469
7470 #[test]
7471 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7472         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7473         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7474
7475         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7476         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7477         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7478         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7479
7480         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7481
7482         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7483         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7484                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7485         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7486         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7487
7488         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7489         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7490         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7491         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7492         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7493         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7494
7495         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7496         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7497                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_p2wsh() {
7498                         penalty_sum += outp.value.to_sat();
7499                 }
7500         }
7501
7502         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7503         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7504
7505         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7506         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7507         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7508         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7509
7510         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7511         let penalty_1;
7512         let feerate_1;
7513         {
7514                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7515                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7516                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7517                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7518                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7519                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat();
7520                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7521                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7522                 node_txn.clear();
7523         };
7524
7525         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7526         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7527         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7528         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7529         {
7530                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7531                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7532                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7533                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7534                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7535                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7536                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7537                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7538                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7539                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat();
7540                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7541                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7542                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7543                         node_txn.clear();
7544                 }
7545         }
7546         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7547
7548         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7549         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7550         let penalty_3;
7551         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7552         {
7553                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7554                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7555                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7556                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7557                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7558                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7559                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7560                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7561                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7562                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat();
7563                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7564                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7565                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7566                         node_txn.clear();
7567                 }
7568         }
7569         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7570
7571         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7572         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7573 }
7574
7575 #[test]
7576 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7577         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7578         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7579
7580         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7581         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7582         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7583         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7584         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7585
7586         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7587         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7588         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7589         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7590         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7591         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7592         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7593                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7594         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7595         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50)
7596                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7597         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7598         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7599                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7600         let failed_payment_hash = send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000).1;
7601
7602         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7603         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7604         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7605
7606         // Revoke local commitment tx
7607         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7608
7609         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7610         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7611         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7612         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7613         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7614         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7615
7616         let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7617                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7618                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7619
7620                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7621                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7622                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7623
7624                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7625                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7626                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7627                 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7628
7629                 txn
7630         };
7631
7632         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7633         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7634         let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7635         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7636         let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7637         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7638         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7639         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(events[0..2].to_vec(), &[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
7640         match events.last().unwrap() {
7641                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7642                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7643         }
7644         let first;
7645         let feerate_1;
7646         let penalty_txn;
7647         {
7648                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7649                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7650                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7651
7652                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7653                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7654                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7655                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7656                 // future).
7657                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7658                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7659                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7660                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7661                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7662                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7663
7664                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7665                 // available, which we check here:
7666                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7667                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7668                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7669
7670                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7671                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7672
7673                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7674                 // output, checked above).
7675                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7676                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7677                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7678
7679                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7680                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7681                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7682                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight().to_wu();
7683                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7684                 node_txn.clear();
7685         }
7686
7687         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7688         let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7689         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7690         let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7691         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7692
7693         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7694         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7695         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7696         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7697         let node_txn = {
7698                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7699                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7700
7701                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7702                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7703                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7704                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7705                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7706                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7707                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7708                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7709                 node_txn.clear();
7710                 txn
7711         };
7712         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7713         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7714         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7715         {
7716                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7717                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7718                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7719                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7720                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7721                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7722                 // up bumped justice generation.
7723                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7724                 node_txn.clear();
7725         }
7726         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7727         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7728 }
7729
7730 #[test]
7731 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7732         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7733         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7734
7735         // Create 2 HTLCs
7736         // Provide preimage for one
7737         // Check aggregation
7738
7739         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7740         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7741         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7742         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7743
7744         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7745         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7746         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7747
7748         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7749         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7750         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7751         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7752         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7753
7754         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7755         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7756         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7757         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7759         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7760
7761         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7762         let timeout;
7763         let preimage;
7764         let preimage_bump;
7765         let feerate_timeout;
7766         let feerate_preimage;
7767         {
7768                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7769                 // 3 transactions including:
7770                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7771                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7772                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7773                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7774                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7775                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7776                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7777                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7778
7779                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7780                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7781                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value.to_sat() - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat();
7782                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7783
7784                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7785                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7786                 } else {
7787                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7788                 };
7789
7790                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7791                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7792                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7793
7794                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7795                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7796                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value.to_sat() - timeout_tx.output[0].value.to_sat();
7797                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight().to_wu();
7798
7799                 node_txn.clear();
7800         };
7801         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7802         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7803
7804         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7805         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7806         {
7807                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7808                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7809                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7810                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7811                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7812                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7813
7814                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7815                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value.to_sat() - preimage_bump.output[0].value.to_sat();
7816                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight().to_wu();
7817                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7818                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7819
7820                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7821                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value.to_sat() - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat();
7822                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7823                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7824                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7825
7826                 node_txn.clear();
7827         }
7828
7829         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7830         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7831 }
7832
7833 #[test]
7834 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7835         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7836         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7837         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7838         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7839         // TestChannelSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7840         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7841         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7842         // implement that).
7843         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7844         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7845         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7846         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7847         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7848
7849         let per_commitment_secret;
7850         let next_per_commitment_point;
7851         {
7852                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7853                 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7854                 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).map(
7855                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7856                 ).flatten().unwrap().get_signer();
7857
7858                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7859
7860                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7861                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7862                 per_commitment_secret = keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7863
7864                 // Must revoke without gaps
7865                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7866                 keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7867
7868                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7869                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7870                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7871         }
7872
7873         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7874                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7875                         channel_id,
7876                         per_commitment_secret,
7877                         next_per_commitment_point,
7878                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7879                         next_local_nonce: None,
7880                 });
7881         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7882         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7883         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() }
7884                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7885 }
7886
7887 #[test]
7888 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7889         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7890         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7891
7892         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7893         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7894         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7895         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7896
7897         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7898         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7899         let (payment_preimage_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7900         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7901
7902         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7903         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7904         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7905
7906         // Revoke local commitment tx
7907         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7908
7909         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7910         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7911         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7912         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7913
7914         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7915         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7916         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7917         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7918         let penalty_txn = {
7919                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7920                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7921                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7922                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7923                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7924                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7925                 node_txn.clear();
7926                 penalty_txn
7927         };
7928         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7929         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7930         {
7931                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7932                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7933                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7934         }
7935 }
7936
7937 #[test]
7938 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7939         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7940         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7941         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7942         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7943         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7944         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7945
7946         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7947
7948         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7949         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7950         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7951         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7952         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7953
7954         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7955         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7957         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7958
7959         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7961         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7962         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7963         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7964         match close_ev[0] {
7965                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7966                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7967                         assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7968                 },
7969                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7970         }
7971 }
7972
7973 #[test]
7974 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7975         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7976         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7977         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7978         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7979
7980         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7981         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7982         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7983
7984         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7985
7986         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7987         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7988         assert_eq!(res.common_fields.channel_flags, 0);
7989         assert_eq!(res.common_fields.to_self_delay, 200);
7990 }
7991
7992 #[test]
7993 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7994         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7995         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7996         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7997         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7998         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7999         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8000
8001         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8002         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8003         assert_eq!(res.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8004
8005         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8006         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8007         assert_eq!(res.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8008 }
8009
8010 #[test]
8011 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8012         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8013         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8014         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8015         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8016         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8017
8018         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8019         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8020         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8021         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8022         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8023         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8024         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8025         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8026         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8027         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8028         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8029         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8030
8031         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8032         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8033         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8034         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8035
8036         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8037         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8038         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8039         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8040         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8041
8042         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
8043         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
8044
8045         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8046         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8047         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
8048         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8049         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8050         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
8051
8052         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8053         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8054         // `channel_value`.
8055         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8056         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8057         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8058         // `channel_value`.
8059         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8060 }
8061
8062 #[test]
8063 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8064         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8065         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8066         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8067         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8068         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8069         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8070
8071         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8072         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8073
8074         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8075
8076         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8077         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8078         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8079
8080         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8081         match events[0] {
8082                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8083                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8084                 }
8085                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8086         }
8087
8088         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8089         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8090
8091         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8092                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8093                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8094                 }
8095                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8096         }
8097         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
8098         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
8099
8100         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8101         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8102
8103         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8104         match events[0] {
8105                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8106                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8107                 }
8108                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8109         }
8110 }
8111
8112 #[test]
8113 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8114         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8115         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8116         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8117         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8118         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8119         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8120
8121         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8122         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8123
8124         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8125
8126         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8127         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8128         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8129         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
8130         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8131         match events[0] {
8132                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8133                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
8134                 }
8135                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8136         }
8137
8138         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8139         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8140
8141         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8142                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8143                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8144                 }
8145                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8146         }
8147
8148         // There should be no more events to process, as the channel was never opened.
8149         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8150 }
8151
8152 #[test]
8153 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8154         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8155         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8156         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8157         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8158         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8159         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8160
8161         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8162         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8163
8164         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8165
8166         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8167         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8168         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8169
8170         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8171         match events[0] {
8172                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8173                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8174                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8175                         match api_res {
8176                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8177                                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8178                                 },
8179                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8180                                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error {:?}", e),
8181                         }
8182                 }
8183                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8184         }
8185
8186         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8187         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8188         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8189
8190         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8191                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8192                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8193                 }
8194                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8195         }
8196 }
8197
8198 #[test]
8199 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8200         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8201         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8202         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8203         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8204
8205         let unknown_channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
8206         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8207         match api_res {
8208                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8209                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8210                 },
8211                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8212                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error: {:?}", e),
8213         }
8214 }
8215
8216 #[test]
8217 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
8218         // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
8219         // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
8220         // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
8221         // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
8222         // a PaymentClaimable event too early
8223         let node_count = 4;
8224         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8225         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8226         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8227         let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8228
8229         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8230         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8231         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8232         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8233
8234         let total_msat = 100_000;
8235         let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
8236         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
8237         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8238
8239         let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8240         path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8241         path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8242         path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8243         path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8244         path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8245         route.paths.push(path_1);
8246
8247         let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8248         path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8249         path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8250         path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8251         path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8252         path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8253         route.paths.push(path_2);
8254
8255         // Send payment
8256         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8257         let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8258                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8259         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8260                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8262
8263         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8264         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8265
8266         // First path
8267         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8268         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8269         let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8270
8271         for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8272                 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8273
8274                 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8275                         let session_priv = [3; 32];
8276                         let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8277                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8278                         let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8279                         let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret);
8280                         let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8281                                 &recipient_onion_fields, height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8282                         // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8283                         // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8284                         if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
8285                                 ref mut sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, ..
8286                         } = onion_payloads[1] {
8287                                 *sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat = 99_000;
8288                         } else { panic!() }
8289                         let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8290                         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8291                 }
8292
8293                 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8294                 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8295                 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8296                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8297
8298                 if idx == 0 {
8299                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8300                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8301                         check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8302                         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8303                         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8304                 } else {
8305                         let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8306                         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8307                 }
8308
8309                 prev_node = node;
8310         }
8311
8312         // Second path
8313         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8314         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8315
8316         claim_payment_along_route(
8317                 ClaimAlongRouteArgs::new(&nodes[0], expected_paths, our_payment_preimage)
8318         );
8319 }
8320
8321 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8322
8323         let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8324         let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8325
8326         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8327         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8328         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8329         let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8330
8331         let src_idx = 0;
8332         let dst_idx = 1;
8333
8334         // Create channels for each amount
8335         let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8336         let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8337         let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8338         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8339                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8340                 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8341                 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8342                 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8343                 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8344                 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8345                 expected_paths.push(path);
8346         }
8347         let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8348
8349         // Create a route for each amount
8350         let example_amount = 100000;
8351         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8352         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8353         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8354                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8355                 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8356                 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8357                 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8358                 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8359                 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8360                 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8361                 route.paths.push(path);
8362         }
8363
8364         // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8365         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8366         let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8367                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8368         nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8369                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8370         check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8371
8372         let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8373         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8374         let mut amount_received = 0;
8375         for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8376                 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8377
8378                 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8379                 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8380                 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8381                 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8382         }
8383
8384         claim_payment_along_route(
8385                 ClaimAlongRouteArgs::new(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, our_payment_preimage)
8386         );
8387 }
8388
8389 #[test]
8390 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8391         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8392         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8393 }
8394
8395 #[test]
8396 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8397         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8398         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8399         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8400         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8401         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8402
8403         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8404         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8405         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8406         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8407
8408         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8409         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8410         route.paths.push(path);
8411         route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8412         route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8413         route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8414         route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8415         route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8416         route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8417         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8418         claim_payment_along_route(
8419                 ClaimAlongRouteArgs::new(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], payment_preimage)
8420         );
8421 }
8422
8423 #[test]
8424 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8425         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8426         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8427         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8428         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8429         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8430
8431         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8432
8433         {
8434                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8435                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8436                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8437                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8438                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8439                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8440                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8441                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8442                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8443         }
8444         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8445         // values from previous calls.
8446         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8447         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8448         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8449         match events[0] {
8450                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8451                         match &purpose {
8452                                 PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8453                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8454                                 },
8455                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
8456                         }
8457                 },
8458                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8459         }
8460 }
8461
8462 #[test]
8463 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8464         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8465         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8466         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8467         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8468         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8469
8470         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8471
8472         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8473         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8474         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8475         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8476
8477         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8478         // resulting events.
8479         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8480                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8481                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8482                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8483                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8484                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8485                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8486
8487                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8488                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8489                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8490                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8491                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8492
8493                         // We should fail the payment back
8494                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8495                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8496                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8497                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8498                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8499                                 },
8500                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8501                         }
8502                 }
8503         }
8504
8505         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8506         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8507         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8508
8509         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8510         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8511                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8512         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8513         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8514
8515         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8516         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8517                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8518         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8519         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8520
8521         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8522         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8523                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8524         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8525         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8526 }
8527
8528 #[test]
8529 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8530         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8531         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8532         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8533         // error.
8534         //
8535         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8536         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8537         // commitment at same time.
8538
8539         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8540         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8541         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8542         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8543
8544         // Create some initial channel
8545         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8546         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8547
8548         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8549         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8550
8551         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8552         let (preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8553
8554         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8555         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8556         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8557         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8558         let watchtower = {
8559                 let new_monitor = {
8560                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8561                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8562                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8563                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8564                         new_monitor
8565                 };
8566                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8567                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8568                 watchtower
8569         };
8570         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8571         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8572         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8573         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8574         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8575
8576         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8577         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8579         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8580
8581         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8582         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8583         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8584         {
8585                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8586                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8587                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8588                         if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8589                                 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8590                                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8591                         } else { assert!(false); }
8592                 } else {
8593                         assert!(false);
8594                 }
8595         }
8596         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8597         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8598         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8599         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8600 }
8601
8602 #[test]
8603 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8604         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8605         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8606         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8607         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8608
8609         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8610         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8611         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8612         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8613
8614         // Create some initial channel
8615         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8616         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8617
8618         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8619         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8620
8621         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8622         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8623
8624         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8625         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8626         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8627         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8628         let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8629                 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8630         );
8631         let watchtower_alice = {
8632                 let new_monitor = {
8633                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8634                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8635                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8636                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8637                         new_monitor
8638                 };
8639                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8640                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8641                 watchtower
8642         };
8643         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8644         // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8645         // requirements here.
8646         const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8647         alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8648         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8649
8650         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8651         {
8652                 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8653                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8654                 check_spends!(txn[0], chan_1.3);
8655                 check_spends!(txn[1], txn[0]);
8656         };
8657
8658         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8659         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8660         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8661         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8662         let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8663         let watchtower_bob = {
8664                 let new_monitor = {
8665                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8666                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8667                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8668                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8669                         new_monitor
8670                 };
8671                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8672                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8673                 watchtower
8674         };
8675         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8676
8677         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8678         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8679         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8680                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8681         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8682
8683         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8684         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8685         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8686         {
8687                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8688                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8689                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8690                         if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8691                                 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8692                                 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8693                                 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8694                                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8695                         } else { assert!(false); }
8696                 } else {
8697                         assert!(false);
8698                 }
8699         }
8700         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8701         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8702
8703         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8704         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8705
8706         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8707         let bob_state_y;
8708         {
8709                 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8710                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8711                 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8712         };
8713
8714         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8715         let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8716         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8717         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8718         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, false,
8719                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8720         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8721         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8722         {
8723                 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8724                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8725                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8726         }
8727 }
8728
8729 #[test]
8730 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8731         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8732         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8733         // message).
8734         //
8735         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8736         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8737         //
8738         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8739         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8740         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8741         // before receiving funding_signed.
8742         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8743         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8744         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8745         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8746
8747         // Create an initial channel
8748         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8749         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8750         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8751         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8752         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8753
8754         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8755         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8756
8757         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8759
8760         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8761         let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index });
8762         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8763         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8764         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true,
8765                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8766 }
8767
8768 #[test]
8769 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8770         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8771         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8772         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8773         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8774         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8775         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8776
8777         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8778         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8779         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8780         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8781
8782         // Create some initial channels
8783         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8784
8785         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8786         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8787         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8788         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8789         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8790         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8791
8792         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8793         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8794         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8795         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8796         // this test before #653 fix.
8797         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8798         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8799         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8800         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8801         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8802
8803         let htlc_timeout = {
8804                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8805                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8806                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8807                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8808                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8809                 node_txn[0].clone()
8810         };
8811
8812         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8813         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8814         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8815 }
8816
8817 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8818         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8819         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8820         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8821         //
8822         // Steps of the test:
8823         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8824         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8825         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8826         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8827         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8828         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8829         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8830         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8831         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8832         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8833         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8834         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8835
8836         // Create some initial channels
8837         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8838         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8839
8840         // Steps (1) and (2):
8841         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8842         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8843
8844         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8845         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8846         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8847         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8848         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8849         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8850         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8851
8852         // Steps (3) and (4):
8853         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8854         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8855         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8856         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8857
8858         // Bob force-closes
8859         if !broadcast_alice {
8860                 force_closing_node = 1;
8861                 counterparty_node = 0;
8862         }
8863         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
8864         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
8865         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8866         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8867         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8868         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8869                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8870                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8871                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8872                 };
8873                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8874                 if broadcast_alice {
8875                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8876                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8877                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8878                 }
8879         }
8880
8881         // Step (5):
8882         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8883         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8884         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8885         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8886         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8887
8888         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8889         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8890         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8891         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8892         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8893         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8894
8895         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8896         let went_onchain = go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1;
8897         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if went_onchain { None } else { Some(1000) }, went_onchain, false);
8898         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8899         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8900                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8901                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8902                 match events[0] {
8903                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8904                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8905                         },
8906                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8907                 };
8908         }
8909         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8910         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8911         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8912         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8913
8914         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8915         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8916         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8917                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8918                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8919                         (*msg).clone()
8920                 },
8921                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8922         };
8923         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8924                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8925                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8926                         (*updates).clone()
8927                 },
8928                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8929         };
8930
8931         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8932         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8933         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8934         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8935
8936         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8937         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8938         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8939                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8940                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8941                         (*msg).clone()
8942                 },
8943                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8944         };
8945         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8947
8948         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8949         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8950         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8951         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8952         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8953                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8954                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8955                 if broadcast_alice {
8956                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8957                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8958                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8959                 }
8960                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8961                 if broadcast_alice {
8962                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8963                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8964                 } else {
8965                         if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
8966                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8967                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].txid(), bob_txn[1].txid());
8968                         } else {
8969                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8970                         }
8971                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8972                 }
8973         }
8974
8975         // Step (6):
8976         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8977         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8978         {
8979                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8980                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8981                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8982                 };
8983                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8984                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8985                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8986                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8987                 if broadcast_alice {
8988                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8989                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8990                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8991                 } else {
8992                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
8993                         let htlc_tx = bob_txn.pop().unwrap();
8994                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8995                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8996                 }
8997         }
8998 }
8999
9000 #[test]
9001 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9002         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9003         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9004         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9005         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9006 }
9007
9008 #[test]
9009 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
9010         // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
9011         // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
9012         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9013         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9014         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9015         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9016
9017         // Create an first channel channel
9018         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9019         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9020
9021         // Create an second channel
9022         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None, None).unwrap();
9023         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9024
9025         // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
9026         // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
9027         open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
9028
9029         // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
9030         // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
9031         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
9032         {
9033                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9034                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9035                 match &events[0] {
9036                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
9037                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9038                                 assert_eq!(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9039                         },
9040                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9041                 }
9042         }
9043
9044         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
9045         {
9046                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9047                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9048                 match &events[0] {
9049                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
9050                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9051                                 assert_eq!(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9052                         },
9053                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9054                 }
9055         }
9056 }
9057
9058 #[test]
9059 fn test_peer_funding_sidechannel() {
9060         // Test that if a peer somehow learns which txid we'll use for our channel funding before we
9061         // receive `funding_transaction_generated` the peer cannot cause us to crash. We'd previously
9062         // assumed that LDK would receive `funding_transaction_generated` prior to our peer learning
9063         // the txid and panicked if the peer tried to open a redundant channel to us with the same
9064         // funding outpoint.
9065         //
9066         // While this assumption is generally safe, some users may have out-of-band protocols where
9067         // they notify their LSP about a funding outpoint first, or this may be violated in the future
9068         // with collaborative transaction construction protocols, i.e. dual-funding.
9069         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9070         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9071         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9072         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9073
9074         let temp_chan_id_ab = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9075         let temp_chan_id_ca = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[2], &nodes[0], 1_000_000, 0);
9076
9077         let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9078                 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9079
9080         let cs_funding_events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9081         assert_eq!(cs_funding_events.len(), 1);
9082         match cs_funding_events[0] {
9083                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => {}
9084                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", cs_funding_events),
9085         }
9086
9087         nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temp_chan_id_ca, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), funding_output.index).unwrap();
9088         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9089         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9090         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9091         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9092         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9093
9094         let res = nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id_ab, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone());
9095         let err_msg = format!("{:?}", res.unwrap_err());
9096         assert!(err_msg.contains("An existing channel using outpoint "));
9097         assert!(err_msg.contains(" is open with peer"));
9098         // Even though the last funding_transaction_generated errored, it still generated a
9099         // SendFundingCreated. However, when the peer responds with a funding_signed it will send the
9100         // appropriate error message.
9101         let as_funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9102         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_created);
9103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9104         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9105         let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: format!("An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}", funding_output, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), };
9106         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_output), true, reason)]);
9107
9108         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9109         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9110         get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9111 }
9112
9113 #[test]
9114 fn test_duplicate_conflicting_funding_from_second_peer() {
9115         // Test that if a user tries to fund a channel with a funding outpoint they'd previously used
9116         // we don't try to remove the previous ChannelMonitor. This is largely a test to ensure we
9117         // don't regress in the fuzzer, as such funding getting passed our outpoint-matches checks
9118         // implies the user (and our counterparty) has reused cryptographic keys across channels, which
9119         // we require the user not do.
9120         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9121         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9122         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9123         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9124
9125         let temp_chan_id = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9126
9127         let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9128                 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9129
9130         // Now that we have a funding outpoint, create a dummy `ChannelMonitor` and insert it into
9131         // nodes[0]'s ChainMonitor so that the initial `ChannelMonitor` write fails.
9132         let dummy_chan_id = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[2], &nodes[3]).3;
9133         let dummy_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[2], dummy_chan_id).clone();
9134         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_output, dummy_monitor).unwrap();
9135
9136         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9137
9138         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9139         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9140         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9142         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9143
9144         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9145         // At this point, the channel should be closed, after having generated one monitor write (the
9146         // watch_channel call which failed), but zero monitor updates.
9147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9148         get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9149         let err_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned() };
9150         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_signed_msg.channel_id, true, err_reason)]);
9151 }
9152
9153 #[test]
9154 fn test_duplicate_funding_err_in_funding() {
9155         // Test that if we have a live channel with one peer, then another peer comes along and tries
9156         // to create a second channel with the same txid we'll fail and not overwrite the
9157         // outpoint_to_peer map in `ChannelManager`.
9158         //
9159         // This was previously broken.
9160         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9161         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9162         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9163         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9164
9165         let (_, _, _, real_channel_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9166         let real_chan_funding_txo = chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9167         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(real_chan_funding_txo), real_channel_id);
9168
9169         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9170         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9171         let node_c_temp_chan_id = open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
9172         open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9173         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9174         let mut accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9175         accept_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = node_c_temp_chan_id;
9176         nodes[2].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
9177
9178         // Now that we have a second channel with the same funding txo, send a bogus funding message
9179         // and let nodes[1] remove the inbound channel.
9180         let (_, funding_tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[2], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9181
9182         nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated(&node_c_temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), funding_tx).unwrap();
9183
9184         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9185         funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9186         // Make the signature invalid by changing the funding output
9187         funding_created_msg.funding_output_index += 10;
9188         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9189         get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9190         let err = "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned();
9191         let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err };
9192         let expected_closing = ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(real_channel_id, false, reason);
9193         check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[expected_closing]);
9194
9195         assert_eq!(
9196                 *nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().get(&real_chan_funding_txo).unwrap(),
9197                 nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
9198         );
9199 }
9200
9201 #[test]
9202 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9203         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9204         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9205         //
9206         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9207         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9208         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9209         // updating logic for the existing channel.
9210         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9211         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9212         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9213         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9214
9215         // Create an initial channel
9216         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9217         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9218         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9219         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9220
9221         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9222         // that it is rejected.
9223         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9224         {
9225                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9226                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9227                 match events[0] {
9228                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9229                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9230                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9231                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9232                                 // move forward with it.
9233                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9234                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9235                         },
9236                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9237                 }
9238         }
9239
9240         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9241         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9242
9243         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9244         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9245
9246         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9247         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9248         {
9249                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9250                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9251                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9252                 added_monitors.clear();
9253         }
9254         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9255
9256         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9257
9258         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9259         let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
9260
9261         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9262         // temporary one).
9263
9264         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9265         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9266         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9267         open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9268         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9269         {
9270                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9271                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9272                 match events[0] {
9273                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9274                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9275                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9276                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9277                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9278                         },
9279                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9280                 }
9281         }
9282
9283         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9284         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9285         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9286         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9287         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9288         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9289
9290         let funding_created = {
9291                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9292                 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9293                 // Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9294                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9295                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9296                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9297                 match a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id).unwrap() {
9298                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan) => {
9299                                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9300                                 chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
9301                         },
9302                         _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9303                 }.unwrap()
9304         };
9305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9306         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9307         // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
9308         // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
9309         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9310
9311         check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[
9312                 ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_created.temporary_channel_id, false, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9313                         err: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned()
9314                 })
9315         ]);
9316
9317         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9318         {
9319                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9320                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9321                 match events[0] {
9322                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9323                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9324                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9325                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9326                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9327                         },
9328                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9329                 }
9330         }
9331
9332         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9333         // everything is functional.
9334         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9335         {
9336                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9337                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9338                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9339                 added_monitors.clear();
9340         }
9341         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9342
9343         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9344         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9345         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9346         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9347
9348         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9349         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9350         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9351
9352         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9353 }
9354
9355 #[test]
9356 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9357         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9358         //
9359         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9360         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9361         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9362         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9363         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9364         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9365         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9366
9367         // Create some initial channels
9368         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9369         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9370         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9371
9372         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9373         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9374         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9375
9376         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9377         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9378         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9379
9380         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9381         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9382         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9383         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9384         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9385                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9386         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9387         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9388         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9389         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9390
9391         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9392         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9393         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(), data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9394         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9395         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9396                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
9397         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9398         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9399         match events[0] {
9400                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9401                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9402                 },
9403                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9404         }
9405         match events[1] {
9406                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9407                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9408                 },
9409                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9410         }
9411         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9412         // peer_disconnected.
9413         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9414         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9415
9416         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9417         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9418         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9419 }
9420
9421 #[test]
9422 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9423         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9424         //
9425         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9426         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9427         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9428         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9429         //
9430         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9431         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9432         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9433         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9434         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9435         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9436         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9437
9438         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9439         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9440         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9441
9442         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9443
9444         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9445         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9446         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9447         // its length.
9448         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9449         let wit_program_script: ScriptBuf = wit_program.into();
9450         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9451                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9452                 output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9453         }
9454
9455         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9456         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9457         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9458         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9459
9460         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9461         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9462         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9463
9464         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9465         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9466
9467         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9468         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9469         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9470
9471         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9472         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9473         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() },
9474                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9475         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9476         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9477         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9478         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9479                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9480                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } = action {
9481                         assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9482                 } else { panic!(); }
9483         } else { panic!(); }
9484         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9485
9486         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9487         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9488         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9489         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9490                 version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9491                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9492                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9493                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9494                                 vout: idx as u32,
9495                         },
9496                         script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
9497                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9498                         witness: Witness::from_slice(&channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9499                 }).collect(),
9500                 output: vec![TxOut {
9501                         value: Amount::from_sat(1000),
9502                         script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new(),
9503                 }]
9504         };
9505         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9506         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9507 }
9508
9509 #[test]
9510 fn test_coinbase_funding_tx() {
9511         // Miners are able to fund channels directly from coinbase transactions, however
9512         // by consensus rules, outputs of a coinbase transaction are encumbered by a 100
9513         // block maturity timelock. To ensure that a (non-0conf) channel like this is enforceable
9514         // on-chain, the minimum depth is updated to 100 blocks for coinbase funding transactions.
9515         //
9516         // Note that 0conf channels with coinbase funding transactions are unaffected and are
9517         // immediately operational after opening.
9518         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9519         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9520         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9521         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9522
9523         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9524         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9525
9526         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9527         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9528
9529         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9530
9531         // Create the coinbase funding transaction.
9532         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_coinbase_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9533
9534         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9535         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9536         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9537
9538         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9539         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9540         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9541
9542         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9543
9544         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9545         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9546
9547         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9548         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9549
9550         // Starting at height 0, we "confirm" the coinbase at height 1.
9551         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 1);
9552         // We connect 98 more blocks to have 99 confirmations for the coinbase transaction.
9553         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9554         // Check that we have no pending message events (we have not queued a `channel_ready` yet).
9555         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9556         // Now connect one more block which results in 100 confirmations of the coinbase transaction.
9557         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
9558         // There should now be a `channel_ready` which can be handled.
9559         let _ = &nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(&nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9560
9561         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9562         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9563         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9564         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
9565         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9566         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9567 }
9568
9569 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9570         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9571         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9572         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9573         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9574         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9575         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9576         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9577         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9578         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9579         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9580         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9581         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9582         // until we learned about an additional block.
9583         //
9584         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9585         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9586         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9587         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9588         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9589         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9590         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9591
9592         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9593         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9594         let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9595         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9596         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9597         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
9598         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
9599         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9600         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9601         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9602         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9603         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9604
9605         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9606         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9607                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9608         }
9609         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9610                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9611         if test_height_before_timelock {
9612                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9613                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9614                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9615                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9616         } else {
9617                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9618                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9619                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9620                 let htlc_tx = if spending_txn[0].txid() == node_txn[0].txid() {
9621                         &spending_txn[1]
9622                 } else {
9623                         &spending_txn[0]
9624                 };
9625                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, node_txn[0]);
9626                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9627                 // timelock is up).
9628                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9629                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9630
9631                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9632                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9633                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9634                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9635                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, htlc_tx)], conf_height + 1);
9636                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9637                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9638
9639                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9640                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9641                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9642                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9643                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9644                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9645                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9646                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9647                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9648         }
9649 }
9650
9651 #[test]
9652 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9653         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9654         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9655 }
9656
9657 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9661         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9662
9663         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9664
9665         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9666                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9667         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9668
9669         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9670
9671         {
9672                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9673                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9674                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9675                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9676                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9677                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9678                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9679                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9680         }
9681         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9682         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9683
9684         {
9685                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9686                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9687                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9688                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9689                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9690                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9691                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9692                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9693                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9694                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9695                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9696                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9697                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9698         }
9699
9700         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9701         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9702
9703         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9704                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9705                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9706
9707                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9708                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9709                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9710                 ];
9711                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9712                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9713
9714                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9715                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9716                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9717
9718                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9719                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9720                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9721
9722                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9723                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9724                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9725                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9726                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9727                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9728         } else {
9729                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9730                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9731                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9732
9733                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9734                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9735                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9736                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9737
9738                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9739
9740                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9741         }
9742 }
9743
9744 #[test]
9745 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9746         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9747         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9748         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9749         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9750         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9751 }
9752
9753 #[test]
9754 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9755         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9756         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9757         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9758 }
9759
9760 #[test]
9761 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9762         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9763         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9764         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9765         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9766         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9767         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9768
9769         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9770         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9771         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9772         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9773
9774         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9775                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9776         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9777         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9778         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9779                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9780                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9781                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9782         });
9783
9784         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9785
9786         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9787         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9788
9789         let session_privs = {
9790                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9791                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9792                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9793                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9794                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9795                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9796         };
9797         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9798                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9799                 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9800         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9801
9802         {
9803                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9804                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9805                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9806         }
9807         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9808
9809         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9810                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9811         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9812
9813         {
9814                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9815                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9816                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9817
9818                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9819                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9820
9821                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9822                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9823
9824                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9825                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9826                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9827
9828                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9829                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9830                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9831
9832                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9833                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9834                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9835         }
9836         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9837         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9838         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9839         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9840
9841         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9842
9843         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9844         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9845         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9846
9847         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9849
9850         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9851         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9852         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9853
9854         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9855
9856         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9857                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9858                 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9859         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9860
9861         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9862         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9863         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9864
9865         do_claim_payment_along_route(
9866                 ClaimAlongRouteArgs::new(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], our_payment_preimage)
9867         );
9868         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true, true);
9869 }
9870
9871 #[test]
9872 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9873         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9874         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9875         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9876         // amount.
9877         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9878         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9879         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9880         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9881
9882         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9883         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9884         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9885         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9886
9887         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9888         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9889         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9890                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9891                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9892                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9893         });
9894
9895         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9896         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9897         // amount of time to respond to.
9898
9899         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9900         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9901         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9902
9903         let failed_destinations = vec![
9904                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9905                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9906         ];
9907         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9908
9909         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9910
9911         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9912         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9913                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9915
9916         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9917         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9918         let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9919         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9920
9921         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9922         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9923         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9925         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9926 }
9927
9928 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9929 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9930 enum ExposureEvent {
9931         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9932         AtHTLCForward,
9933         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9934         AtHTLCReception,
9935         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9936         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9937 }
9938
9939 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool, apply_excess_fee: bool) {
9940         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9941         // policy.
9942         //
9943         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9944         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9945         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9946         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9947         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9948         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9949         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9950         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9951
9952         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9953         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9954
9955         // We hard-code the feerate values here but they're re-calculated furter down and asserted.
9956         // If the values ever change below these constants should simply be updated.
9957         const AT_FEE_OUTBOUND_HTLCS: u64 = 20;
9958         let nondust_htlc_count_in_limit =
9959         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound  {
9960                 AT_FEE_OUTBOUND_HTLCS
9961         } else { 0 };
9962         let initial_feerate = if apply_excess_fee { 253 * 2 } else { 253 };
9963         let expected_dust_buffer_feerate = initial_feerate + 2530;
9964         let mut commitment_tx_cost = commit_tx_fee_msat(initial_feerate - 253, nondust_htlc_count_in_limit, &ChannelTypeFeatures::empty());
9965         commitment_tx_cost +=
9966                 if on_holder_tx {
9967                         htlc_success_tx_weight(&ChannelTypeFeatures::empty())
9968                 } else {
9969                         htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&ChannelTypeFeatures::empty())
9970                 } * (initial_feerate as u64 - 253) / 1000 * nondust_htlc_count_in_limit;
9971         {
9972                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9973                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate;
9974         }
9975         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
9976                 // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
9977                 // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
9978                 // originally written.
9979                 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier((5_000_000 + commitment_tx_cost) / 253)
9980         } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000 + commitment_tx_cost) };
9981         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9982         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9983         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9984
9985         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9986         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9987         open_channel.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9988         open_channel.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9989         if on_holder_tx {
9990                 open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9991         }
9992         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9993         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9994         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9995
9996         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9997
9998         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9999
10000         if on_holder_tx {
10001                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
10002                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
10003                 match get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id) {
10004                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
10005                                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10006                         },
10007                         _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
10008                 }
10009         }
10010
10011         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10012         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10013         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10014         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10015
10016         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10017         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10018         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10019
10020         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10021         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10022         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10023
10024         {
10025                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10026                 *feerate_lock = 253;
10027         }
10028
10029         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
10030         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
10031                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
10032
10033         let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
10034                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10035                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10036                 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10037                 (chan.context().get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
10038                 chan.context().get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(253))
10039         };
10040         assert_eq!(dust_buffer_feerate, expected_dust_buffer_feerate as u64);
10041         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10042         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10043
10044         // Substract 3 sats for multiplier and 2 sats for fixed limit to make sure we are 50% below the dust limit.
10045         // This is to make sure we fully use the dust limit. If we don't, we could end up with `dust_ibd_htlc_on_holder_tx` being 1
10046         // while `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat` is not equal to `dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat`.
10047         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - if multiplier_dust_limit { 3 } else { 2 }) * 1000;
10048         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10049
10050         // This test was written with a fixed dust value here, which we retain, but assert that it is,
10051         // indeed, dust on both transactions.
10052         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
10053         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = 1_250_000;
10054         let calcd_dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - if multiplier_dust_limit { 3 } else { 2 }) * 1000;
10055         assert!(dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat < dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10056         assert!(dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat < calcd_dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10057
10058         if on_holder_tx {
10059                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10060                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10061                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10062                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10063                         for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10064                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10065                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10066                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10067                         }
10068                 } else {
10069                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10070                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10071                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10072                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10073                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10074                         }
10075                 }
10076         } else {
10077                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10078                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10079                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10080                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
10081                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10082                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10083                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10084                         }
10085                 } else {
10086                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10087                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10088                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
10089                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10090                         }
10091                 }
10092         }
10093
10094         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10095                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
10096                         if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
10097                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10098                 if on_holder_tx {
10099                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10100                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
10101                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
10102                 } else {
10103                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10104                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
10105                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
10106                 }
10107         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10108                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
10109                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10110                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10111                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10112                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10113                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10114                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10115                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10116                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10117                 if on_holder_tx {
10118                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10119                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10120                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10121                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10122                 } else {
10123                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10124                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
10125                                 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
10126                                         dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + commitment_tx_cost + 4,
10127                                         max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10128                 }
10129         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10130                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
10131                 // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
10132                 // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
10133                 // to cross the threshold.
10134                 for _ in 0..AT_FEE_OUTBOUND_HTLCS {
10135                         let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
10136                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10137                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10138                 }
10139                 {
10140                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10141                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10142                 }
10143                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10144                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10145                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
10146         }
10147
10148         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10149         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10150         added_monitors.clear();
10151 }
10152
10153 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool, apply_excess_fee: bool) {
10154         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10155         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10156         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10157         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10158         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10159         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10160         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10161         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10162         if !multiplier_dust_limit && !apply_excess_fee {
10163                 // Because non-dust HTLC transaction fees are included in the dust exposure, trying to
10164                 // increase the fee to hit a higher dust exposure with a
10165                 // `MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier` is no longer super practical, so we skip these
10166                 // in the `multiplier_dust_limit` case.
10167                 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10168                 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10169                 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10170                 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10171         }
10172 }
10173
10174 #[test]
10175 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10176         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false, false);
10177         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false, true);
10178         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true, false);
10179         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true, true);
10180 }
10181
10182 #[test]
10183 fn test_nondust_htlc_fees_are_dust() {
10184         // Test that the transaction fees paid in nondust HTLCs count towards our dust limit
10185         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10186         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10187
10188         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10189         // Set the dust limit to the default value
10190         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure =
10191                 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(10_000);
10192         // Make sure the HTLC limits don't get in the way
10193         config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs = 400;
10194         config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs = 400;
10195         config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 1;
10196
10197         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config), Some(config)]);
10198         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10199
10200         // Create a channel from 1 -> 0 but immediately push all of the funds towards 0
10201         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0).2;
10202         while nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat > 0 {
10203                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
10204         }
10205
10206         // First get the channel one HTLC_VALUE HTLC away from the dust limit by sending dust HTLCs
10207         // repeatedly until we run out of space.
10208         const HTLC_VALUE: u64 = 1_000_000; // Doesn't matter, tune until the test passes
10209         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_VALUE).0;
10210
10211         while nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 {
10212                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_VALUE);
10213         }
10214         assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, 0,
10215                 "We don't want to run out of ability to send because of some non-dust limit");
10216         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].pending_outbound_htlcs.len() < 10,
10217                 "We should be able to fill our dust limit without too many HTLCs");
10218
10219         let dust_limit = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat;
10220         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
10221         assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, 0,
10222                 "Make sure we are able to send once we clear one HTLC");
10223
10224         // At this point we have somewhere between dust_limit and dust_limit * 2 left in our dust
10225         // exposure limit, and we want to max that out using non-dust HTLCs.
10226         let commitment_tx_per_htlc_cost =
10227                 htlc_success_tx_weight(&ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) * 253;
10228         let max_htlcs_remaining = dust_limit * 2 / commitment_tx_per_htlc_cost;
10229         assert!(max_htlcs_remaining < 30,
10230                 "We should be able to fill our dust limit without too many HTLCs");
10231         for i in 0..max_htlcs_remaining + 1 {
10232                 assert_ne!(i, max_htlcs_remaining);
10233                 if nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat < dust_limit {
10234                         // We found our limit, and it was less than max_htlcs_remaining!
10235                         // At this point we can only send dust HTLCs as any non-dust HTLCs will overuse our
10236                         // remaining dust exposure.
10237                         break;
10238                 }
10239                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], dust_limit * 2);
10240         }
10241
10242         // At this point non-dust HTLCs are no longer accepted from node 0 -> 1, we also check that
10243         // such HTLCs can't be routed over the same channel either.
10244         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
10245         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
10246                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[2], nodes[1], dust_limit * 2);
10247         let onion = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret);
10248         nodes[2].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, onion, PaymentId([0; 32])).unwrap();
10249         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10250         let send = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[2]);
10251
10252         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send.msgs[0]);
10253         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], send.commitment_msg, false, true);
10254
10255         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
10256         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10257         let node_id_1 = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10258         expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(
10259                 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(),
10260                 &[HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(node_id_1), channel_id: chan_id_1 }]
10261         );
10262
10263         let fail = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
10264         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10265         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], fail.commitment_signed, false);
10266         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[2], payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
10267 }
10268
10269
10270 #[test]
10271 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10272         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10273         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10274         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10275         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10276
10277         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10278         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10279         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10280         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10281         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10282
10283         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10284
10285         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10286         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10287         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[&[1]]) };
10288         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10289         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10290                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10291                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
10292                         Transaction { version: Version(chan_id as i32), lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10293                                 value: Amount::from_sat(*channel_value_satoshis), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10294                         }]}
10295                 },
10296                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10297         };
10298         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10299         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10300                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10301                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10302                 },
10303                 _ => panic!()
10304         }
10305         let err = "Error in transaction funding: Misuse error: Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned();
10306         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(temp_channel_id, false, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err })]);
10307         assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).data, "Failed to fund channel");
10308 }
10309
10310 #[test]
10311 fn test_non_final_funding_tx_within_headroom() {
10312         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10313         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10314         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10315         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10316
10317         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10318         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10319         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10320         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10321         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10322
10323         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10324
10325         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10326         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10327         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[[1]]) };
10328         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10329         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10330                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10331                         // Timelock the transaction within a +1 headroom from the best block.
10332                         Transaction { version: Version(chan_id as i32), lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10333                                 value: Amount::from_sat(*channel_value_satoshis), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10334                         }]}
10335                 },
10336                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10337         };
10338
10339         // Transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
10340         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10341         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10342 }
10343
10344 #[test]
10345 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
10346         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
10347         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
10348         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
10349         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10350         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10351         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10352         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10353
10354         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10355
10356         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
10357         {
10358                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10359                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
10360         }
10361
10362         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
10363         {
10364                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10365                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10366         }
10367         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10368         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10369
10370         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10371         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10372         match events[0] {
10373                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10374                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10375                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10376                 },
10377                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10378         };
10379
10380         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
10381         // it.
10382         {
10383                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10384                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
10385         }
10386         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10387         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10388
10389         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10390         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10391         match events[0] {
10392                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10393                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10394                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10395                 },
10396                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10397         };
10398
10399         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
10400         // channel.
10401         {
10402                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10403                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10404         }
10405         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10406         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10407
10408         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10409         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10410         match events[0] {
10411                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
10412                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10413                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::PeerFeerateTooLow {
10414                                 peer_feerate_sat_per_kw: 1000, required_feerate_sat_per_kw: 5000,
10415                         }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10416                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
10417                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10418                 },
10419                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10420         };
10421 }
10422
10423 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
10424         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10425         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10426         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10427         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10428         let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
10429         let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
10430                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
10431         let recv_value = 100_000;
10432
10433         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10434
10435         let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
10436         let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
10437                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
10438                         Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
10439                 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
10440         } else {
10441                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
10442                 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
10443         };
10444         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
10445         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10446                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10447         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10448         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10449         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10450         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
10451         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10452         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10453         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10454
10455         if valid_delta {
10456                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
10457                         None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10458
10459                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
10460         } else {
10461                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10462
10463                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10464
10465                 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10466                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10467                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10468
10469                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10470         }
10471 }
10472
10473 #[test]
10474 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
10475         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
10476         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
10477         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
10478         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
10479 }
10480
10481 #[test]
10482 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
10483         // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
10484         // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10485         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10486         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10487         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10488         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10489
10490         // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
10491         let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
10492                 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10493                         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
10494                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
10495                                         Some(())
10496                                 } else {
10497                                         None
10498                                 }
10499                         } else {
10500                                 None
10501                         }
10502                 );
10503                 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
10504         };
10505
10506         // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
10507         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10508         let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
10509                 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
10510                 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10511
10512                 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
10513                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
10514                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10515                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10516                 }
10517
10518                 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
10519                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10520                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10521
10522                 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
10523                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10524                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10525         };
10526
10527         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10528
10529         // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
10530         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
10531         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10532         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10533         let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10534         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10535         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
10536         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
10537
10538         // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
10539         let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10540         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
10541         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10542         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
10543         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10544
10545         // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
10546         // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
10547         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10548         let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10549         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10550
10551         // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
10552         //
10553         // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
10554         // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
10555         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10556         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10557         let bob_init = msgs::Init {
10558                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10559         };
10560         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
10561         let alice_init = msgs::Init {
10562                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10563         };
10564         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
10565
10566         // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
10567         // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
10568         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10569         let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
10570                 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
10571         );
10572         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
10573         check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
10574
10575         // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
10576         let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10577                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
10578                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10579                         Some(msg.clone())
10580                 } else {
10581                         None
10582                 }
10583         ).unwrap();
10584         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
10585
10586         // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
10587         for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10588                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10589                 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
10590         }
10591
10592         // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
10593         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10594         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10595
10596         // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
10597         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
10598         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10599
10600         // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
10601         // waiting on any messages.
10602         for node in &nodes {
10603                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10604                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10605                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10606                 }
10607         }
10608 }
10609
10610 #[test]
10611 fn test_remove_expired_outbound_unfunded_channels() {
10612         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10613         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10614         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10615         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10616
10617         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10618         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10619         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10620         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10621         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10622
10623         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10624         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10625         match events[0] {
10626                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10627                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10628         };
10629
10630         // Asserts the outbound channel has been removed from a nodes[0]'s peer state map.
10631         let check_outbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10632                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10633                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10634                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10635         };
10636
10637         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10638         check_outbound_channel_existence(true);
10639
10640         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10641         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10642                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10643                 check_outbound_channel_existence(true)
10644         }
10645
10646         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10647         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10648         check_outbound_channel_existence(false);
10649
10650         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10651         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10652         match msg_events[0] {
10653                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10654                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10655                 },
10656                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10657         }
10658         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(false) }, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10659 }
10660
10661 #[test]
10662 fn test_remove_expired_inbound_unfunded_channels() {
10663         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10664         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10665         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10666         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10667
10668         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10669         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10670         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10671         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10672         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10673
10674         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10675         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10676         match events[0] {
10677                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10678                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10679         };
10680
10681         // Asserts the inbound channel has been removed from a nodes[1]'s peer state map.
10682         let check_inbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10683                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10684                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10685                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10686         };
10687
10688         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10689         check_inbound_channel_existence(true);
10690
10691         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10692         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10693                 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10694                 check_inbound_channel_existence(true)
10695         }
10696
10697         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10698         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10699         check_inbound_channel_existence(false);
10700
10701         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10702         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10703         match msg_events[0] {
10704                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10705                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10706                 },
10707                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10708         }
10709         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(false) }, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10710 }
10711
10712 #[test]
10713 fn test_channel_close_when_not_timely_accepted() {
10714         // Create network of two nodes
10715         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10716         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10717         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10718         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10719
10720         // Simulate peer-disconnects mid-handshake
10721         // The channel is initiated from the node 0 side,
10722         // but the nodes disconnect before node 1 could send accept channel
10723         let create_chan_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10724         let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10725         assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, create_chan_id);
10726
10727         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10728         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10729
10730         // Make sure that we have not removed the OutboundV1Channel from node[0] immediately.
10731         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10732
10733         // Since channel was inbound from node[1] perspective, it should have been dropped immediately.
10734         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10735
10736         // In the meantime, some time passes.
10737         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS {
10738                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10739         }
10740
10741         // Since we disconnected from peer and did not connect back within time,
10742         // we should have forced-closed the channel by now.
10743         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(false) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10744         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10745
10746         {
10747                 // Since accept channel message was never received
10748                 // The channel should be forced close by now from node 0 side
10749                 // and the peer removed from per_peer_state
10750                 let node_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10751                 assert_eq!(node_0_per_peer_state.len(), 0);
10752         }
10753 }
10754
10755 #[test]
10756 fn test_rebroadcast_open_channel_when_reconnect_mid_handshake() {
10757         // Create network of two nodes
10758         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10759         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10760         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10761         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10762
10763         // Simulate peer-disconnects mid-handshake
10764         // The channel is initiated from the node 0 side,
10765         // but the nodes disconnect before node 1 could send accept channel
10766         let create_chan_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10767         let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10768         assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, create_chan_id);
10769
10770         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10771         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10772
10773         // Make sure that we have not removed the OutboundV1Channel from node[0] immediately.
10774         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10775
10776         // Since channel was inbound from node[1] perspective, it should have been immediately dropped.
10777         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10778
10779         // The peers now reconnect
10780         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10781                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10782         }, true).unwrap();
10783         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10784                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10785         }, false).unwrap();
10786
10787         // Make sure the SendOpenChannel message is added to node_0 pending message events
10788         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10789         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10790         match &msg_events[0] {
10791                 MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { msg, .. } => assert_eq!(msg, &open_channel_msg),
10792                 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10793         }
10794 }
10795
10796 fn do_test_multi_post_event_actions(do_reload: bool) {
10797         // Tests handling multiple post-Event actions at once.
10798         // There is specific code in ChannelManager to handle channels where multiple post-Event
10799         // `ChannelMonitorUpdates` are pending at once. This test exercises that code.
10800         //
10801         // Specifically, we test calling `get_and_clear_pending_events` while there are two
10802         // PaymentSents from different channels and one channel has two pending `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s
10803         // - one from an RAA and one from an inbound commitment_signed.
10804         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10805         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10806         let (persister, chain_monitor);
10807         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10808         let nodes_0_deserialized;
10809         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10810
10811         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
10812         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).2;
10813
10814         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10815         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10816
10817         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10818         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10819
10820         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
10821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10822         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
10823
10824         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
10825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10826         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 1_000_000);
10827
10828         for dest in &[1, 2] {
10829                 let htlc_fulfill_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[*dest], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10830                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[*dest].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10831                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[*dest], htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false);
10832                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 0);
10833         }
10834
10835         let (route, payment_hash_3, _, payment_secret_3) =
10836                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
10837         let payment_id = PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0);
10838         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
10839                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), payment_id).unwrap();
10840         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10841
10842         let send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
10843         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
10844         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg);
10845         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10846
10847         if do_reload {
10848                 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
10849                 let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
10850                 let chan_1_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_2).encode();
10851                 reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], persister, chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
10852
10853                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10854                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10855
10856                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
10857                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[2]));
10858         }
10859
10860         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10861         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
10862         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[0] {
10863                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10864         } else { panic!(); }
10865         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] {
10866                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10867         } else { panic!(); }
10868         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
10869         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
10870
10871         // After the events are processed, the ChannelMonitorUpdates will be released and, upon their
10872         // completion, we'll respond to nodes[1] with an RAA + CS.
10873         get_revoke_commit_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10874         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 3);
10875 }
10876
10877 #[test]
10878 fn test_multi_post_event_actions() {
10879         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(true);
10880         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(false);
10881 }
10882
10883 #[test]
10884 fn test_batch_channel_open() {
10885         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10886         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10887         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10888         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10889
10890         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10891         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10892                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10893                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10894         ]);
10895
10896         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10897         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10898         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10899         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10900
10901         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10902         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10903         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10904
10905         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10906         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10907
10908         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10909         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10910         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10911         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10912
10913         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10914         chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10915         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10916         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10917
10918         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before persisting all monitors has been
10919         // completed.
10920         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10921         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
10922
10923         // Complete the persistence of the monitor.
10924         nodes[0].chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(
10925                 &ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 })
10926         );
10927         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10928
10929         // The transaction should only have been broadcast now.
10930         let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10931         assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10932         assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0], tx);
10933
10934         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10935         assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10936                 *e,
10937                 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10938                         ref counterparty_node_id,
10939                         ..
10940                 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
10941         )));
10942         assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10943                 *e,
10944                 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10945                         ref counterparty_node_id,
10946                         ..
10947                 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
10948         )));
10949 }
10950
10951 #[test]
10952 fn test_close_in_funding_batch() {
10953         // This test ensures that if one of the channels
10954         // in the batch closes, the complete batch will close.
10955         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10956         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10957         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10958         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10959
10960         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10961         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10962                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10963                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10964         ]);
10965
10966         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10967         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10968         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10969         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10970
10971         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10972         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10973         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10974
10975         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10976         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10977
10978         // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
10979         let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10980         let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
10981         let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
10982         let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
10983         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
10984         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
10985
10986         // The monitor should become closed.
10987         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10988         {
10989                 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10990                 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10991                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10992                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10993         }
10994
10995         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10996         match msg_events[0] {
10997                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
10998                 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10999         }
11000
11001         // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
11002         {
11003                 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11004                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
11005                 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
11006                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
11007                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
11008         }
11009
11010         // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
11011         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
11012                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
11013                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
11014                         discard_funding: true,
11015                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
11016                         user_channel_id: Some(42),
11017                         ..Default::default()
11018                 },
11019                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
11020                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
11021                         discard_funding: true,
11022                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
11023                         user_channel_id: Some(43),
11024                         ..Default::default()
11025                 },
11026         ]);
11027
11028         // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
11029         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
11030 }
11031
11032 #[test]
11033 fn test_batch_funding_close_after_funding_signed() {
11034         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11035         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11036         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11037         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11038
11039         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
11040         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
11041                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
11042                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
11043         ]);
11044
11045         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
11046         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
11047         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
11048         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11049
11050         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11051         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
11052         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11053
11054         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
11055         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
11056         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
11057         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11058
11059         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11060         chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
11061         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
11062         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11063
11064         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
11065         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
11066
11067         // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
11068         let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
11069         let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
11070         let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
11071         let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
11072         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
11073         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
11074         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 2);
11075         {
11076                 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
11077                 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
11078                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
11079                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
11080                 let monitor_updates_2 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_2).unwrap();
11081                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2.len(), 1);
11082                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
11083         }
11084         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11085         match msg_events[0] {
11086                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
11087                 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
11088         }
11089
11090         // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
11091         {
11092                 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11093                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
11094                 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
11095                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
11096                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
11097         }
11098
11099         // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
11100         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
11101                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
11102                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
11103                         discard_funding: true,
11104                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
11105                         user_channel_id: Some(42),
11106                         ..Default::default()
11107                 },
11108                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
11109                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
11110                         discard_funding: true,
11111                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
11112                         user_channel_id: Some(43),
11113                         ..Default::default()
11114                 },
11115         ]);
11116
11117         // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
11118         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
11119 }
11120
11121 fn do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(confirm_remote_commitment: bool) {
11122         // Tests that a node will forget the channel (when it only requires 1 confirmation) if the
11123         // funding and commitment transaction confirm in the same block.
11124         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11125         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11126         let mut min_depth_1_block_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11127         min_depth_1_block_cfg.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11128         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg), Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg)]);
11129         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11130
11131         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
11132         let chan_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 });
11133
11134         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
11135         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
11136
11137         let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_remote_commitment {
11138                 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
11139         } else {
11140                 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
11141         };
11142         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
11143         closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
11144         let mut msg_events = closing_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11145         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
11146         match msg_events.pop().unwrap() {
11147                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, .. } => {},
11148                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11149         }
11150         check_added_monitors(closing_node, 1);
11151         check_closed_event(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, false, &[other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
11152
11153         let commitment_tx = {
11154                 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11155                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11156                 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
11157                 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
11158                 commitment_tx
11159         };
11160
11161         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
11162         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
11163
11164         check_closed_broadcast(other_node, 1, true);
11165         check_added_monitors(other_node, 1);
11166         check_closed_event(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
11167
11168         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
11169         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
11170 }
11171
11172 #[test]
11173 fn test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block() {
11174         do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(false);
11175         do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(true);
11176 }
11177
11178 #[test]
11179 fn test_accept_inbound_channel_errors_queued() {
11180         // For manually accepted inbound channels, tests that a close error is correctly handled
11181         // and the channel fails for the initiator.
11182         let mut config0 = test_default_channel_config();
11183         let mut config1 = config0.clone();
11184         config1.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 1000;
11185         config1.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11186         config0.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 2000;
11187
11188         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11189         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11190         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config0), Some(config1)]);
11191         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11192
11193         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11194         let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11195
11196         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11197         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11198         match events[0] {
11199                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11200                         match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23) {
11201                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }) => (),
11202                                 _ => panic!(),
11203                         }
11204                 }
11205                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11206         }
11207         assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11208                 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
11209 }