_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
  22 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase};
  24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
  26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, get_route, RouteParameters};
  30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  31 use crate::ln::msgs;
  32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  33 use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils::{self, WatchtowerPersister};
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
  38 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
  39
  40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  44 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
  45 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  46 use bitcoin::{Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
  47 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  48
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  51
  52 use regex;
  53
  54 use crate::io;
  55 use crate::prelude::*;
  56 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  57 use core::default::Default;
  58 use core::iter::repeat;
  59 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  60 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
  61
  62 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  63 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  64
  65 use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS;
  66
  67 #[test]
  68 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  69         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  70         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  71         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  72         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  73         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  74         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  75         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  76         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  77
  78         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  79         // funding satoshis
  80         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  81         let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  82         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  83
  84         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  85         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
  86
  87         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  88         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  89
  90         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  91         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  92         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  93                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  94                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  95                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  96                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  97                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  98                         match action {
  99                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
 100                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
 101                                 },
 102                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 103                         }
 104                 } else { assert!(false); }
 105         };
 106
 107         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 108
 109         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 110         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 111         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 118
 119         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 120
 121         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 122
 123         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 124
 125         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 126 }
 127
 128 #[test]
 129 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 130         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 131         // them.
 132         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 133         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 134         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 135         *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
 136         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 137         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 138
 139         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None, None) {
 140                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 141                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 142                 },
 143                 _ => panic!()
 144         }
 145 }
 146
 147 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 148         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 149         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 150         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 151         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 152         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 153         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 154         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 155         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 156         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 157
 158         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 159         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 160         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 161         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 162         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 163         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 164
 165         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 166         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 167         if !send_from_initiator {
 168                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 169                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 170         }
 171         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
 172
 173         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 174         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 175         if send_from_initiator {
 176                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 177                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 178         }
 179         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
 180         {
 181                 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
 182                 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
 183                 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
 184                 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
 185
 186                 let channel_phase = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 187                 match channel_phase {
 188                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
 189                                 let chan_context = channel_phase.context_mut();
 190                                 chan_context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 191                                 chan_context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 192                         },
 193                         ChannelPhase::Funded(_) => assert!(false),
 194                 }
 195         }
 196
 197         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 198         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 199         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 200
 201         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 202         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 203         if send_from_initiator {
 204                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 205                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 206                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 207                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 208                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
 209         } else {
 210                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 211         }
 212 }
 213
 214 #[test]
 215 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 216         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 217         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 218 }
 219
 220 #[test]
 221 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 222         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 223         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 224         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 225         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 226         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 227
 228         // balancing
 229         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 230
 231         // A                                        B
 232         // update_fee                            ->
 233         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 234         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 235         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 236         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 237         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 238         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 239         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 240         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 241         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 242         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 243         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 244         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 245         //                                       <- RAA
 246         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 247
 248         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 249         {
 250                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 251                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 252         }
 253         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 254         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 255
 256         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 257         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 258         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 259                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 260                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 261                 },
 262                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 263         };
 264
 265         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 266
 267         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 268         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 269         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 270                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 272
 273         let payment_event = {
 274                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 275                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 276                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 277         };
 278         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 279         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 280
 281         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 282         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 283         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 284         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 285         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 287
 288         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 289         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 290         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 291         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 293
 294         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 295         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 296         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 297         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 298         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 299         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 300         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 302
 303         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 304         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 305         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 306         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 307         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 308         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 309         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 310         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 311
 312         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 313         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 314         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 316
 317         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 318         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 319         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 320
 321         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 323
 324         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 325         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 326         match events_2[0] {
 327                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 328                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 329         }
 330
 331         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 332         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 333 }
 334
 335 #[test]
 336 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 337         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 338         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 339         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 340         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 341         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 342         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 343         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 344
 345         // balancing
 346         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 347
 348         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 349         {
 350                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 351                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 352         }
 353         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 354         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 355
 356         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 357         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 358         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 359                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 360                         update_fee.as_ref()
 361                 },
 362                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 363         };
 364
 365         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 366
 367         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 368         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 369         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 370                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 372
 373         let payment_event = {
 374                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 375                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 376                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 377         };
 378         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 379         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 380
 381         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 382         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 383         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 384         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 385         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 386         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 387
 388         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 389         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 390
 391         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 392 }
 393
 394 #[test]
 395 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 396         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 397         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 398         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 399         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 400         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 401
 402         // A                                        B
 403         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 404         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 405         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 406         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 407         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 408         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 409         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 410         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 411         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 412         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 413         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 414         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 415         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 416         //                                          B should send no response here
 417         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 418         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 419         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 420
 421         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 422         let initial_feerate;
 423         {
 424                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 425                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 426                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 427         }
 428         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 430
 431         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 432         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 433         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 434                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 435                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 436                 },
 437                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 438         };
 439
 440         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 441         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 442         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 443         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 445
 446         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 447         // transaction:
 448         {
 449                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 450                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 451         }
 452         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 453         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 454         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 455
 456         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 457         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 458                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 459                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 460         };
 461
 462         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 463
 464         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 465         // Deliver (3)
 466         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 467
 468         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 469         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 470         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 472         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 473         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 474         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 475         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 476         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 477         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 478         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 479
 480         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 481         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 482         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 484         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 485
 486         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 487         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 488         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 489
 490         // Delever (4)
 491         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 492         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 494
 495         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 496         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 497         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 498
 499         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 500         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 501         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 502         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 503
 504         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 505         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 507 }
 508
 509 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 510         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 511         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 512         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 513         // Node objects.
 514
 515         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 516         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 517         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 518         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 519
 520         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 521                 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
 522                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 523                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 524         }
 525
 526         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 527         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 528         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 529
 530         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 531         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
 532         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 533
 534         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 535         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
 536
 537         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 538
 539         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 540         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 542         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 543
 544         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 545         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 546         {
 547                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 548                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 549                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 550                 added_monitors.clear();
 551         }
 552         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 553
 554         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 555
 556         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 557         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 558         {
 559                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 560                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 561                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 562                 added_monitors.clear();
 563         }
 564
 565         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 566         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 567         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 568
 569         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 570         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 571
 572         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 573         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 574         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 575         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 576         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 577 }
 578
 579 #[test]
 580 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 589         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 590         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 591         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 592         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 593         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 594         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 595         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 596         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 597         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 598         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 599 }
 600
 601 #[test]
 602 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 603         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 604         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 605         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 606         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 607         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 608
 609         {
 610                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 611                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 612         }
 613         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 615
 616         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 617         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 618         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 619                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 620                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 621                 },
 622                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 623         };
 624         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 625
 626         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 627         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 628         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 629
 630         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 631         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 632         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 633
 634         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 635         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 636         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 637         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 638
 639         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 640         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 641         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 642 }
 643
 644 #[test]
 645 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 646         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 647         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 648         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 649         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 650         let channel_value = 5000;
 651         let push_sats = 700;
 652         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
 653         let channel_id = chan.2;
 654         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 655         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 656         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 657
 658         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 659
 660         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 661         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 662         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 663         // remote limit.
 664         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 665         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
 666         {
 667                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 668                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 669         }
 670         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 671         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 672         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 673
 674         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 675
 676         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 677
 678         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 679         {
 680                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 681
 682                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 683                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 684                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
 685                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 686                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 687                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 688         }
 689
 690         {
 691                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 692                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 693                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 694         }
 695         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 696         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 698
 699         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 700
 701         // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 702         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 703         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 704                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 705                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 706                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 707                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 708                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 709                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 710                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
 711                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 712                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 713         };
 714         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 715                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 716                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 717                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 718                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 719                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 720                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 721                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
 722                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 723                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 724                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 725         };
 726
 727         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 728         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 729                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 730
 731         let res = {
 732                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 733                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 734                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 735                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 736                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 737                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 738                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 739                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 740                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 741                         push_sats,
 742                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
 743                         local_funding, remote_funding,
 744                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 745                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 746                         &mut htlcs,
 747                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 748                 );
 749                 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 750         };
 751
 752         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 753                 channel_id: chan.2,
 754                 signature: res.0,
 755                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
 756                 #[cfg(taproot)]
 757                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
 758         };
 759
 760         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 761                 channel_id: chan.2,
 762                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 763         };
 764
 765         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 766
 767         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 768         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 769         //Should produce and error.
 770         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 771         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee", 3);
 772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 773         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 774         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
 775                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], channel_value);
 776 }
 777
 778 #[test]
 779 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 780         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 781         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 782         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 783         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 784         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 785
 786         // balancing
 787         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 788
 789         {
 790                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 791                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 792         }
 793         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 794         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 795
 796         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 797         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 798         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 799                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 800                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 801                 },
 802                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 803         };
 804         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 805         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 806         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 808
 809         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 810
 811         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 812         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 813                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 814         {
 815                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 816                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 817                 added_monitors.clear();
 818         }
 819         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 820         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 821         // node[1] has nothing to do
 822
 823         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 824         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 826
 827         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 828         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 829         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 831         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 832         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 833         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 834
 835         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 836         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 837         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 838         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 839         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 840         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 841
 842         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 843         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 844         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 845         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 846
 847         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 849         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 850
 851         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 852         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 853         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 854         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 855
 856         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 857         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 858         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 859
 860         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 861
 862         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 863         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 864         match events[0] {
 865                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 866                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 867         };
 868
 869         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 870
 871         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 872         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 873         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 874         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 875         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 876 }
 877
 878 #[test]
 879 fn test_update_fee() {
 880         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 881         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 882         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 883         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 884         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 885         let channel_id = chan.2;
 886
 887         // A                                        B
 888         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 889         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 890         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 891         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 892         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 893         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 894         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 895         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 896         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 897         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 898         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 899         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 900
 901         // Create and deliver (1)...
 902         let feerate;
 903         {
 904                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 905                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 906                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 907         }
 908         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 910
 911         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 912         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 913         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 914                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 915                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 916                 },
 917                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 918         };
 919         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 920
 921         // Generate (2) and (3):
 922         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 923         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 925
 926         // Deliver (2):
 927         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 928         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 930
 931         // Create and deliver (4)...
 932         {
 933                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 934                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 935         }
 936         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 937         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 938         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 939         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 940         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 941                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 942                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 943                 },
 944                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 945         };
 946
 947         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 948         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 950         // ... creating (5)
 951         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 952         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 953
 954         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 955         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 957         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 958         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 959
 960         // Deliver (5):
 961         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 962         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 964
 965         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 966         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 967         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 968         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 969         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 970         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 971         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 972         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 974
 975         // Deliver (7)
 976         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 977         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 978         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 979         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 980
 981         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 982         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 983         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 984
 985         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 986         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 987         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 988         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 989         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 990 }
 991
 992 #[test]
 993 fn fake_network_test() {
 994         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 995         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 996         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 997         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 998         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 999         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1000
1001         // Create some initial channels
1002         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1003         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1004         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1005
1006         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1007         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1009         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1011
1012         // Send some more payments
1013         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1014         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1015         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1016
1017         // Test failure packets
1018         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1019         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1020
1021         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1022         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1023
1024         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1025         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1026         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1027         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1028         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1029         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1030         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1031
1032         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1033         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1034         hops.push(RouteHop {
1035                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1039                 fee_msat: 0,
1040                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1041                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1042         });
1043         hops.push(RouteHop {
1044                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1048                 fee_msat: 0,
1049                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1050                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1051         });
1052         hops.push(RouteHop {
1053                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1054                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1055                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1056                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1057                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1058                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1059                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1060         });
1061         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1062         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1063         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1064                 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1065                         &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1066
1067         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1068         hops.push(RouteHop {
1069                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1070                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1071                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1072                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1073                 fee_msat: 0,
1074                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1075                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1076         });
1077         hops.push(RouteHop {
1078                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1079                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1080                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1081                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1082                 fee_msat: 0,
1083                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1084                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1085         });
1086         hops.push(RouteHop {
1087                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1088                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1089                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1090                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1091                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1092                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1093                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1094         });
1095         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1096         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1097         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1098                 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1099                         &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1100
1101         // Claim the rebalances...
1102         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1103         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1104
1105         // Close down the channels...
1106         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1107         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1108         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1109         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1110         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1111         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1112         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1113         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1114         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1115         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1116         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1117         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1118 }
1119
1120 #[test]
1121 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1122         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1123         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1124         // commitment dance rounds.
1125         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1126         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1127         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1128         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1129         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1130         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1131
1132         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1133         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1134
1135         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1136         for _ in 0..50 {
1137                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1138                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1139                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1140                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1141         }
1142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1143
1144         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1145         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1146         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1147         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1148
1149         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1150         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1151         // another HTLC.
1152         {
1153                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1154                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1155                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1156                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1157         }
1158
1159         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1160         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1161         {
1162                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1163                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1164                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1165         }
1166
1167         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1168         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1169         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1170         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1171
1172         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1173         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1174         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1175         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1176         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1177         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1179
1180         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1181         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1182         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1183
1184         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1185
1186         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1187         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1188         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1190
1191         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1192         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1194         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1195
1196         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1198         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1199
1200         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1201                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1202         }
1203         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1205         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1207         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1208
1209         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1211         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1213         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1214
1215         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1217
1218         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1219
1220         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1221         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1222         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1223                 match event {
1224                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1225                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1226                         },
1227                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1228                 };
1229         }
1230
1231         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1232                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1233         }
1234
1235         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1236 }
1237
1238 #[test]
1239 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1240         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1241         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1242         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1243         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1244         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1245         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1246
1247         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1248         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1249         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1250         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1251         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1252         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1253
1254         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1255
1256         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1257         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1258
1259         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1260         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1261
1262         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1263         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1264         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1265 }
1266
1267 #[test]
1268 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1269         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1270         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1271         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1272         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1273         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1274         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1275         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1276
1277         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1278
1279         // balancing
1280         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1281
1282         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1283
1284         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1285         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1286         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1287
1288         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1289         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1290         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1292
1293         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1294         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1295
1296         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1297         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1298         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1299                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1300                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1301                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1302                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1303                 }
1304         }
1305         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1306
1307         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1309         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1310         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1311
1312         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1313         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1314
1315         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1316         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1317         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1318         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1319         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1320                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1321         } else {
1322                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1323         };
1324
1325         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1326         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1327
1328         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1329         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1330         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1331
1332         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1333         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1334         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1335         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1336
1337         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1338         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1339         for e in events {
1340                 match e {
1341                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1342                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg } } => {
1343                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1344                                 assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1345                         },
1346                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1347                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1348                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1349                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1350                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1351                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1352                         },
1353                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1354                 }
1355         }
1356 }
1357
1358 #[test]
1359 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1360         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1361         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1362         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1363         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1364         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1365
1366         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1367         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1368
1369         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1370         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1371         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1372         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1373                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1374         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1375         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1376                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1377         match err {
1378                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1379                         if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
1380                         else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
1381                 },
1382                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1383         }
1384         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1385
1386         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1387 }
1388
1389 #[test]
1390 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1391         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1392         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1393         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1394         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1395         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1396
1397         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1398                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1399         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1400         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1401         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1402         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1403
1404         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1405
1406         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1407         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1408                 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1409         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1410         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1411                 channel_id: chan.2,
1412                 htlc_id: 0,
1413                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1414                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1415                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1416                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1417                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1418                 blinding_point: None,
1419         };
1420
1421         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1422
1423         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1424         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1425         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1426
1427         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1428
1429         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1430
1431         // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1432         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1433         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1434                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1435                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1436                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1437                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1438                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1439                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1440                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1441                 chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1442
1443                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1444                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1445                  chan_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1446                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1447                  chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1448         };
1449         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1450                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1451                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1452                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1453                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1454                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1455                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1456                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1457                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1458                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1459                  chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1460         };
1461
1462         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1463         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1464                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1465
1466         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1467         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1468         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1469
1470         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1471                 offered: false,
1472                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1473                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1474                 payment_hash,
1475                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1476         };
1477
1478         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1479
1480         let res = {
1481                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1482                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1483                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1484                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1485                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1486                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1487                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1488                         commitment_number,
1489                         95000,
1490                         local_chan_balance,
1491                         local_funding, remote_funding,
1492                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1493                         feerate_per_kw,
1494                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1495                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1496                 );
1497                 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1498         };
1499
1500         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1501                 channel_id: chan.2,
1502                 signature: res.0,
1503                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1504                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1505                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1506         };
1507
1508         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1509         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1510         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1511
1512         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1513         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1514                 channel_id: chan.2,
1515                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1516                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1517                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1518                 next_local_nonce: None,
1519         };
1520         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1521
1522         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1523         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1524         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1525         match events[0] {
1526                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1527                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1528                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1529                 },
1530                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1531         };
1532         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
1533                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", raa_msg.channel_id), 1);
1534
1535         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1536 }
1537
1538 #[test]
1539 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1540         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1541         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1542         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1543         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1544         // this situation.
1545         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1546         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1547         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1548         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1549         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1550         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1551
1552         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1553         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1554
1555         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1556
1557         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1558
1559         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1560         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1561         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1562         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1563                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1564         }
1565
1566         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1567         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1568                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1569                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1570         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1571 }
1572
1573 #[test]
1574 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1575         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1576         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1577         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1578         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1579         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1580         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1581         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1582
1583         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1584         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1585         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1586         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1587         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1588         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1589         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1590
1591         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1592         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1593                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1594         }
1595
1596         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1597                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1598         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1599         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1600         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1601         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1602         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1603         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1604         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1605                 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1606         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1607         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1608                 channel_id: chan.2,
1609                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1610                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1611                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1612                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1613                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1614                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1615                 blinding_point: None,
1616         };
1617
1618         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1619         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1620         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 3);
1621         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1622         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1623         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1624         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1625         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() },
1626                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1627 }
1628
1629 #[test]
1630 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1631         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1632         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1633         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1634         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1635
1636         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1637         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1638         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1639         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1640         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1641
1642         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1643         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1644         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1645         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1646         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1647         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1648         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1649
1650         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1651                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1652         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1653         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1654         // commitment transaction fee.
1655         route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1656
1657         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1658         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1659                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1660         }
1661
1662         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1663         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1664                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1665         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1666         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1667                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1668                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1669 }
1670
1671 #[test]
1672 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1673         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1674         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1675         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1676         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1677         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1678         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1679         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1680         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1681         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1682
1683         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1684         // HTLC.
1685         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1686         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1687         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None, None).unwrap_err(),
1688                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1689
1690         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1691         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1692         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1693         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None, None).unwrap();
1694         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1695         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1696         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1697
1698         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1699         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1700         match msg_events[0] {
1701                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1702                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1703                 },
1704                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1705         }
1706 }
1707
1708 #[test]
1709 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1710         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1711         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1712         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1713         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1714         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1715         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1716         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1717
1718         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1719         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1720         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1721         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1722         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1723         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1724
1725         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1726         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1727         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1728         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1729         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1730         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1731
1732         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1733         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1734         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1735         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1736 }
1737
1738 #[test]
1739 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1740         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1741         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1742         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1743         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1744         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1745         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1746
1747         let feemsat = 239;
1748         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1749         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1750         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1751         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1752
1753         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1754         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1755         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1756         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1757
1758         // Add a pending HTLC.
1759         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1760         let payment_event_1 = {
1761                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1762                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1763                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1764
1765                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1766                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1767                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1768         };
1769         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1770
1771         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1772         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
1773         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1774         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1775         let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1776         route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1777
1778         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1779         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1780         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1781         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1782         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1783         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1784                 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1785         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1786         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1787                 channel_id: chan.2,
1788                 htlc_id: 1,
1789                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1790                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1791                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1792                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1793                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1794                 blinding_point: None,
1795         };
1796
1797         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1798         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1799         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value", 3);
1800         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1801         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1802         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1803         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1804         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() },
1805                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1806 }
1807
1808 #[test]
1809 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1810         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1811         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1812         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1813         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1814         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1815         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1816         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1817         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1818         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1819         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1820
1821         let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1822         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1823         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1824
1825         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1826         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1827 }
1828
1829 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1830         (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1831 }
1832
1833 #[test]
1834 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1835         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1836         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1837         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1838         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1839         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1840         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1841         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1842         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1843         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1844         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1845
1846         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1847         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1848
1849         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1850         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1851
1852         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1853                 ($node: expr) => {{
1854                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1855                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1856                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1857                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1858                         payment_event
1859                 }}
1860         }
1861
1862         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1863         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1864         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1865         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1866
1867         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1868
1869         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1870         {
1871                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1872                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1873                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1874                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1875                 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1876
1877                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1878                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1879                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1880                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1881         }
1882
1883         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1884         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1885         loop {
1886                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1887                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1888                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1889                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1890                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1891                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1892                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1893                         break;
1894                 }
1895
1896                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1897                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1898                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1899                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1900                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1901
1902                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1903                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1904                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1905                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1906                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1907                 );
1908
1909                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1910                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1911                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1912                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1913                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1914         }
1915
1916         // adding pending output.
1917         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1918         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1919         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1920         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1921         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1922         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1923         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1924         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1925         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1926         // policy.
1927         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1928         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1929         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1930
1931         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1932         let payment_event_1 = {
1933                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1934                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1935                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1936
1937                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1938                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1939                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1940         };
1941         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1942
1943         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1944         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1945         {
1946                 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1947                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1948                 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1949                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1950                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1951                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1952                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1953         }
1954
1955         // split the rest to test holding cell
1956         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1957         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1958         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1959         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1960         {
1961                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1962                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1963         }
1964
1965         // now see if they go through on both sides
1966         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1967         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1968         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1969                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1970         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1971         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1972         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1973
1974         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1975         {
1976                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1977                         get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1978                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1979                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1980                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1981                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1982                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1983         }
1984
1985         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1986         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1987         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1988                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1990         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1991         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1992
1993         // flush the pending htlc
1994         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1995         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1996         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1997
1998         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1999         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
2000         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2001         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2002
2003         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
2004         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2005         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
2006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2007
2008         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
2009         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2010         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2011
2012         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2013
2014         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2015         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
2016         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
2017
2018         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2019         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
2020
2021         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
2022         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
2023         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
2024         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
2025         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
2026         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2027
2028         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2029         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2030         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2031         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2032
2033         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2034         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2035
2036         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2037         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2038         match events[0] {
2039                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2040                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2041                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2042                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2043                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2044                         match &purpose {
2045                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2046                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2047                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2048                                 },
2049                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2050                         }
2051                 },
2052                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2053         }
2054         match events[1] {
2055                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2056                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2057                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2058                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2059                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2060                         match &purpose {
2061                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2062                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2063                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2064                                 },
2065                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2066                         }
2067                 },
2068                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2069         }
2070
2071         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2072         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2073         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2074
2075         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
2076         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2077         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2078
2079         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
2080         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2081         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2082         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2083         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2084
2085         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2086         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2087 }
2088
2089 #[test]
2090 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2091         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2092         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2093         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2094         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2095         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2096         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2097         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2098         // To test this we:
2099         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2100         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2101         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2102         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2103         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2104         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2105         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2106         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2107         //    claim,
2108         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2109         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2110         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2111         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2112         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2113         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2114         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2115         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2116         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2117         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2118
2119         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2120         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2121         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2122         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2123         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2124
2125         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2126         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2127         let send_1 = {
2128                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2129                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2130                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2131                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2132                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2133                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2134         };
2135
2136         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2137         // initial fulfill/CS.
2138         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2139         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2141         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2142
2143         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2144         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2145         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2146         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2148         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2149
2150         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2151         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2153         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2154         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_1, None, false, false);
2155
2156         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2157         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2158         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2159         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2160         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2161
2162         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2164         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2165
2166         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2167         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2168         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2169
2170         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2172         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2173
2174         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2175         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2176         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2177         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2178         // on-chain as necessary).
2179         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2180         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2182         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2183         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, false, false);
2184
2185         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2187         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2188
2189         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2190         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2191
2192         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2193         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2194         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2195         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2196         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2197         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2198
2199         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2200         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2201         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2202         let send_2 = {
2203                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2204                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2205                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2206                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2207                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2208                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2209         };
2210
2211         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2212         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2213         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2214         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2215
2216         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2217
2218         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2219         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2220         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2221
2222         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2224
2225         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2226         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2227         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2228         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2229
2230         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2231         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2232         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2233
2234         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2235         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2236
2237         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2238         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2239
2240         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2241         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2242 }
2243
2244 #[test]
2245 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2246         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2247         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2248         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2249         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2250         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2251         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2252
2253         // Create some initial channels
2254         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2255         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2256         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2257         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2258
2259         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2260         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2261         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2262         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2263         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2264         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2265
2266         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2267         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2268         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2269         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2270         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2271
2272         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2273         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2274         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2275         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2276         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2277         {
2278                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2279                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2280                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2281                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2282                         let _ = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2283                 }
2284
2285                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2286                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2287                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2288         }
2289         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2290         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2291         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2292         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2293
2294         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2295         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2296
2297         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2298         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2299         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2300         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2302         {
2303                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2304                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2305                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2306                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2307                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2308                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2309         }
2310         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2311         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2312         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2313         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2314         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2315
2316         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2317                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2318                         {
2319                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2320                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2321                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2322
2323                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2324                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2325                                 match events[0] {
2326                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2327                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2328                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2329                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2330                                         },
2331                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2332                                 };
2333                         }
2334                 }
2335         }
2336
2337         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2338         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2339         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2341         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2342         let node2_commitment_txid;
2343         {
2344                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2345                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2346                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2347                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2348
2349                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2350                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2351                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2352                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2353                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2354         }
2355         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2356         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2357         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2358         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2359         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2360
2361         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2362         // confusing us in the following tests.
2363         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2364
2365         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2366         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2367         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2368         // buffer space).
2369
2370         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2371                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2372                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2373                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2374                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2375                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2376                                 msg.clone()
2377                         },
2378                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2379                 };
2380                 match events[1] {
2381                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2382                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2383                         },
2384                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2385                 }
2386                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2387
2388                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2389                 {
2390                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2391                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2392                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2393                                         false
2394                                 } else { true }
2395                         });
2396                 }
2397
2398                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2399
2400                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2401                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2402
2403                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2404                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2405                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2406                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2407                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2408                                 msg.clone()
2409                         },
2410                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2411                 };
2412                 match events[1] {
2413                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2414                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2415                         },
2416                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2417                 }
2418                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2419                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2420                 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2421
2422                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2423                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2424                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2425         };
2426         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2427         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2428         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2429         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2430
2431         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2432                 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
2433         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2434 }
2435
2436 #[test]
2437 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2438         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2439         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2440         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2441         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2442         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2443         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2444         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2445         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2446         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2447         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2448         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2449         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2450         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2451         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2452         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2453         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2454         // Create some new channels:
2455         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2456
2457         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2458         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2459         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2460         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2461         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2462         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2463         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2464         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2465         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2466         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2467         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2468         // Revoke the old state
2469         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2470
2471         {
2472                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2473                 {
2474                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2475                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2476                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2477                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2478                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2479                 }
2480                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2481                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2482                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2483
2484                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2485                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2486                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2487                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2488                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2489                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2490                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2491                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2492                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2493         }
2494         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2495         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2496         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2497 }
2498
2499 #[test]
2500 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2501         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2502         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2503         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2504         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2505         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2506         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2507         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2508         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2509         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2510         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2511         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2512         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2513         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2514         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2515         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2516         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2517         // Create some new channels:
2518         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2519
2520         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2521         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2522         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2523         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2524         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2525         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2526         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2527         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2528         // Revoke the old state
2529         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2530         {
2531                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2532                 {
2533                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2534                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2535                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2536
2537                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2538                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2539                 }
2540                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2541                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2542
2543                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2545                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2546                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2547                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2548                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2549                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2550         }
2551         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2552         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2553         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2554 }
2555
2556 #[test]
2557 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2558         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2559         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2560         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2561         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2562         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2563         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2564         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2565         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2566         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2567         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2568         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2569         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2570         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2571         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2572
2573         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2574         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2575         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2576         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2577         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2578         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2579
2580         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2581
2582         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2583         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2584         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2585         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2586         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2587 }
2588
2589 #[test]
2590 fn test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates() {
2591         do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(true);
2592         do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(false);
2593 }
2594
2595 fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment: bool) {
2596         // Simple test to make sure that the justice tx formed in WatchtowerPersister
2597         // is properly formed and can be broadcasted/confirmed successfully in the event
2598         // that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
2599         // (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
2600         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2601         let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2602         let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2603         let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
2604                 WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
2605         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
2606         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2607         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2608         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2609         let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
2610
2611         if !broadcast_initial_commitment {
2612                 // Send a payment to move the channel forward
2613                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2614         }
2615
2616         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output.
2617         // We'll keep this commitment transaction to broadcast once it's revoked.
2618         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel_id);
2619         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2620         let revoked_commitment_tx = &revoked_local_txn[0];
2621
2622         // Send another payment, now revoking the previous commitment tx
2623         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2624
2625         let justice_tx = persisters[1].justice_tx(funding_txo, &revoked_commitment_tx.txid()).unwrap();
2626         check_spends!(justice_tx, revoked_commitment_tx);
2627
2628         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2629         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2630
2631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2632         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2633                 &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2634         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 0);
2635
2636         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2637         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2638                 &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2639
2640         // Check that the justice tx has sent the revoked output value to nodes[1]
2641         let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel_id);
2642         let total_claimable_balance = monitor.get_claimable_balances().iter().fold(0, |sum, balance| {
2643                 match balance {
2644                         channelmonitor::Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. } => sum + amount_satoshis,
2645                         _ => panic!("Unexpected balance type"),
2646                 }
2647         });
2648         // On the first commitment, node[1]'s balance was below dust so it didn't have an output
2649         let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value };
2650         let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value;
2651         assert_eq!(total_claimable_balance, expected_claimable_balance);
2652 }
2653
2654
2655 #[test]
2656 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2657         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2658         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2659         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2660         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2661         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2662         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2663
2664         // Create some new channel:
2665         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2666
2667         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2668         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2669         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2670         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2671         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2672
2673         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2674         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2675         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2676         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2677         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2678         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2679         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2680         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2681         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2682
2683         //Revoke the old state
2684         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2685
2686         {
2687                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2688                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2689                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2690                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2691                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2692                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2693                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2694                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2695
2696                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2697                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2698
2699                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2700                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2701
2702                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2703                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2704                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2705                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2706                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2707                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2708                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2709                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2710
2711                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2712                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2713                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2714                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2715                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2716         }
2717         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2718         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2719         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2720 }
2721
2722 #[test]
2723 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2724         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2725         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2726         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2727         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2728         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2729         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2730
2731         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2732
2733         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2734         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2735         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2736         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2737         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2738         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2739
2740         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2741         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2742
2743         //Revoke the old state
2744         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2745
2746         {
2747                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2748                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2749                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2750                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2751                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2752                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2753                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2754                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2755                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2756                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2757                 }
2758
2759                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2760                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2761
2762                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2763
2764                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2765                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2766                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2767                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2768                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2769                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2770                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2771
2772                 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2773                 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2774                 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2775
2776                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2777                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2778                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2779
2780                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2781                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2782                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2783
2784                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2785                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2786                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2787                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2788                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2789                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2790                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2791                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2792
2793                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2794                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2795                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2796                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2797                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2798                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2799                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2800         }
2801         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2802         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2803         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2804 }
2805
2806 #[test]
2807 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2808         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2809         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2810         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2811         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2812         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2813         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2814         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2815         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2816         // towards B.
2817         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2818         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2819         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2820         // PaymentSent event).
2821
2822         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2823         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2824         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2825         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2826
2827         // Create some initial channels
2828         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2829         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2830
2831         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2832         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2833         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2834         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2835         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2836
2837         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2838         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2839         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2840
2841         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2842         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2843
2844         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2845         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2846         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2847         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2848         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2849         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2850         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2851         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2852         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2853         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2854         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2855         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2856         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2857         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2858         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2859
2860         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2861         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2863         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2864         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2865         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2866         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2867         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2868         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2869         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2870         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2871         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2872         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2873         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2874
2875         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2876         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2877         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2878         {
2879                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2880                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2881                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2882                 added_monitors.clear();
2883         }
2884         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2885         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2886         match forwarded_events[0] {
2887                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2888                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2889         }
2890         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2891         match forwarded_events[1] {
2892                 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
2893                         next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
2894                 } => {
2895                         assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2896                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2897                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2898                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2899                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2900                 },
2901                 _ => panic!()
2902         }
2903         match forwarded_events[2] {
2904                 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
2905                         next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
2906                 } => {
2907                         assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2908                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2909                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2910                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2911                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2912                 },
2913                 _ => panic!()
2914         }
2915         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2916         {
2917                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2918                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2919                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2920                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2921                 added_monitors.clear();
2922         }
2923         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2924
2925         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2926         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2927
2928         match nodes_2_event {
2929                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2930                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2931         }
2932
2933         match nodes_0_event {
2934                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2935                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2936                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2937                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2938                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2939                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2940                 },
2941                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2942         };
2943
2944         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2945         match events[0] {
2946                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2947                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2948         }
2949
2950         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2951                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2952                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2953                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2954                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2955                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2956                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2957                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2958                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2959                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2960                         if $htlc_offered {
2961                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2962                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2963                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2964                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2965                         } else {
2966                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2967                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2968                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2969                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2970                         }
2971                         node_txn.clear();
2972                 } }
2973         }
2974         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2975         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2976
2977         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2978         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2979         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2980         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2981         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2982         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2983         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2984         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2985         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2986         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2987         let commitment_spend =
2988                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2989                         &node_txn[0]
2990                 } else {
2991                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2992                         // FullBlockViaListen
2993                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2994                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2995                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2996                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2997                                 &node_txn[0]
2998                         } else {
2999                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3000                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3001                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
3002                                 &node_txn[2]
3003                         }
3004                 };
3005
3006         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3007         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
3008         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3009         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3010         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3011         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
3012         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
3013         // we already checked the same situation with A.
3014
3015         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
3016         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
3017         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3018         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3019         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3020         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3021         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
3022         let mut first_claimed = false;
3023         for event in events {
3024                 match event {
3025                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3026                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
3027                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
3028                                         first_claimed = true;
3029                                 } else {
3030                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
3031                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
3032                                 }
3033                         },
3034                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3035                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
3036                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3037                 }
3038         }
3039         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3040 }
3041
3042 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
3043         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
3044         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
3045         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
3046         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
3047         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
3048         //            \                                  \
3049         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
3050
3051         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3052         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3053         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3054         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3055         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3056         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3057         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3058
3059         // Create some intial channels
3060         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3061         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3062
3063         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
3064         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3065         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3066
3067         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
3068
3069         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
3070         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3071         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
3072         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
3073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
3074         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
3075         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3076
3077         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3078         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3079         match events[0] {
3080                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3081                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3082                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3083                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3084                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3085                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3086                 },
3087                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3088         };
3089         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
3090         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3092         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3093         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
3094         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3095
3096         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
3097         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
3098         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
3099         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false
3100                 , [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3101         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3102         let timeout_tx = {
3103                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3104                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
3105                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
3106                 } else {
3107                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
3108                 }
3109                 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
3110                 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3111                 txn.remove(0)
3112         };
3113
3114         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3116         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3117
3118         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3119
3120         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3122         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3123         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3124         match events[0] {
3125                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3126                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3127                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3128                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3129                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3130                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3131                 },
3132                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3133         };
3134
3135         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3136         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3137         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3138
3139         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3140         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3141
3142         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3144         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3145         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3146         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3147         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3148         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3149 }
3150
3151 #[test]
3152 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3153         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3154         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3155         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3156 }
3157
3158 #[test]
3159 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3160         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3161         // and fail backward accordingly.
3162
3163         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3164         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3165         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3166         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3167
3168         // Create some initial channels
3169         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3170         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3171
3172         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3173         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3174         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3175         // Revoke the old state
3176         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3177
3178         let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3179
3180         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3181         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3182         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3184         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3185
3186         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3188         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3189         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3190         match events[0] {
3191                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3192                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3193                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3194                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3195                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3196                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3197
3198                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3199                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3200                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3201                 },
3202                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3203         }
3204 }
3205
3206 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3207         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3208         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3209         // commitment transaction anymore.
3210         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3211         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3212         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3213         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3214         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3215         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3216         // transactions:
3217         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3218         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3219         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3220         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3221         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3222         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3223         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3224         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3225         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3226
3227         // Create some initial channels
3228         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3229         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3230
3231         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3232         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3233         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3234         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3235         // Revoke the old state
3236         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3237
3238         let value = if use_dust {
3239                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3240                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3241                 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3242                         .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3243         } else { 3000000 };
3244
3245         let (_, first_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3246         let (_, second_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3247         let (_, third_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3248
3249         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3250         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3251         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3252         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3253         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3254         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3255         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3256         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3257         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3258         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3259         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3260         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3261
3262         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3263         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3264         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3265         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3266         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3267         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3268         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3269         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3270         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3271         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3272         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3273         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3274         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3275         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3276         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3277         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3278
3279         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3280         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3281         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3282         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3283         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3284         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3285         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3286         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3287         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3288         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3289         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3290         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3291         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3293         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3294         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3295         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3297
3298         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3299         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3300         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3301         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3302                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3303         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3304         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3306
3307         if deliver_bs_raa {
3308                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3309                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3310                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3311                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3312                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3313                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3314                 match events[0] {
3315                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3316                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3317                 };
3318                 match events[1] {
3319                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3320                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3321                 }
3322                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3323                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3324         }
3325
3326         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3327         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3328
3329         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3330         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3331         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3332
3333         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3334         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3335         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3336                 ev,
3337                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. }
3338         )));
3339         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3340                 ev,
3341                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3342         )));
3343         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3344                 ev,
3345                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3346         )));
3347
3348         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3349         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3350
3351         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3352         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3353
3354         if deliver_bs_raa {
3355                 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3356                 match nodes_2_event {
3357                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3358                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3359                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3360                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3361                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3362                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3363                         },
3364                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3365                 }
3366         }
3367
3368         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3369         match nodes_2_event {
3370                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data }) }, node_id: _ } => {
3371                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3372                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3373                 },
3374                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3375         }
3376
3377         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3378         match nodes_0_event {
3379                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3380                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3381                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3382                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3383                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3384                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3385
3386                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3387                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3388                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3389
3390                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3391
3392                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3393                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3394                         match events[0] {
3395                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3396                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3397                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3398                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3399                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3400                                                 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3401                                         }
3402                                 },
3403                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3404                         }
3405                         match events[1] {
3406                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3407                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3408                                 },
3409                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3410                         }
3411                         match events[2] {
3412                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3413                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3414                                 },
3415                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3416                         }
3417                         match events[3] {
3418                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3419                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3420                                 },
3421                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3422                         }
3423                         match events[4] {
3424                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3425                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3426                                 },
3427                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3428                         }
3429                         match events[5] {
3430                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3431                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3432                                 },
3433                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3434                         }
3435                 },
3436                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3437         }
3438
3439         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3440         match events[0] {
3441                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3442                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3443         }
3444
3445         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3446         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3447         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3448 }
3449
3450 #[test]
3451 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3452         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3453         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3454         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3455         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3456 }
3457
3458 #[test]
3459 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3460         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3461         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3462         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3463         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3464 }
3465
3466 #[test]
3467 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3468         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3469         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3470         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3471         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3472         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3473
3474         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3475         {
3476                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3477                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3478                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3479                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3480
3481                 let payment_event = {
3482                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3483                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3484                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3485                 };
3486                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3487                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3488         }
3489
3490         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3491         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3492         {
3493                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3494                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3495                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3496
3497                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3498         }
3499
3500         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3501         {
3502                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3503
3504                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3505                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3506                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3507                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3508                         &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3509                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3510                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3511
3512                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3513                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3514                         channel_id: chan.2,
3515                         htlc_id: 0,
3516                         amount_msat: 0,
3517                         payment_hash,
3518                         cltv_expiry,
3519                         onion_routing_packet,
3520                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3521                         blinding_point: None,
3522                 };
3523                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3524         }
3525         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3526         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3527         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3528         match events[0] {
3529                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3530                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3531                 },
3532                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3533         }
3534         match events[1] {
3535                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3536                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3537                 },
3538                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3539         }
3540         match events[2] {
3541                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3542                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3543                 },
3544                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3545         }
3546         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3547         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3548 }
3549
3550 #[test]
3551 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3552         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3553         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3554         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3555         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3556         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3557         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3558         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3559                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3560                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3561                 // connect_style.
3562                 return;
3563         }
3564         let funding_tx = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).3;
3565
3566         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3567         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3568         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3569         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3570         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3571         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3572
3573         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
3574         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3575         check_spends!(node_txn[0], funding_tx);
3576         check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
3577
3578         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone()]);
3579         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3580         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3581         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3582         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3583
3584         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3585         // registering new transactions
3586         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3587 }
3588
3589 #[test]
3590 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3591         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3592         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3593         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3594         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3595         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3596         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3597         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3598
3599         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3600
3601         let mut payment_event = {
3602                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3603                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3604                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3605
3606                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3607                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3608                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3609         };
3610
3611         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3612         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3613
3614         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3615
3616         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3617         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3618         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3619         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3620
3621         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3622         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3623         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3624         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3625         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3626
3627         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3628         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3629         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3630
3631         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3632         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3633         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3634         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3635         let commitment_tx = {
3636                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3637                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3638                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3639                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3640                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3641                 node_txn.remove(0)
3642         };
3643
3644         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
3645
3646         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3647         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3648         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3649         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3650
3651         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3652         {
3653                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3654                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3655         }
3656         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx);
3657         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3658         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), if nodes[2].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 2 } else { 1 });
3659         let htlc_tx = node_txn.pop().unwrap();
3660         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input.len(), 1);
3661         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, commitment_tx.txid());
3662         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3663         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3664
3665         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx);
3666 }
3667
3668 #[test]
3669 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3670         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3671         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3672         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3673         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3674
3675         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3676         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3677         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3678         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3679         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3680
3681         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3682
3683         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3684         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3685         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3686         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3687         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3688         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
3689
3690         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3691         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3692
3693         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3694         reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3695         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3696         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3697 }
3698
3699 #[test]
3700 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3701         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3702         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3703         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3704         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3705         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3706         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3707
3708         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3709         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3710         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
3711         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3712         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3713         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3714         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3715
3716         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3717         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3718
3719         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3720
3721         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3722         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3723
3724         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3725         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3726         // broadcasted.
3727         {
3728                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3729         }
3730
3731         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3732         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3733         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3734         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3735
3736         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, true
3737                 , [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3738         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
3739                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3740 }
3741
3742 #[test]
3743 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3744         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3745         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3746         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3747         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3748         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3749         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3750         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3751
3752         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3753         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3754         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3755         reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3756         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3757
3758         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3759         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3760         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3761         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3762
3763         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3764         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3765         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3766
3767         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3768         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3769         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3770         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3771
3772         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3773         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3774
3775         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3776         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3777
3778         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3779         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 = 1;
3780         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3781         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3782         {
3783                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3784                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3785                 match events[0] {
3786                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3787                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3788                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3789                         },
3790                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3791                 }
3792                 match events[1] {
3793                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3794                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3795                 }
3796                 match events[2] {
3797                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3798                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3799                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3800                         },
3801                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3802                 }
3803                 match events[3] {
3804                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3805                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3806                         },
3807                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3808                 }
3809         }
3810         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
3811
3812         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3813         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3814 }
3815
3816 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3817         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3818         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3819         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3820         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3821         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3822
3823         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3824         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3825                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3826                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3827                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3828                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3829                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3830                 chan_id
3831         } else {
3832                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3833         };
3834
3835         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3836
3837         let payment_event = {
3838                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3839                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3840                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3841
3842                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3843                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3844                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3845         };
3846         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3847
3848         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3849                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3850         } else {
3851                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3852                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3853                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3854                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3855                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3856
3857                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3858                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3859                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3860                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3861
3862                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3863                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3864                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3865                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3866                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3867
3868                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3869                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3870                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3871                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3872                                         }
3873                                 }
3874                         }
3875                 }
3876         }
3877
3878         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3879         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3880         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3881                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3882                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3883                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3884                         //
3885                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3886                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3887                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3888                         //
3889                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3890                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3891                 }
3892                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3893                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3894                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3895                 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3896                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = 1;
3897                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3898         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3899                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3900                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3901                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3902                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
3903                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3904         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3905                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3906                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3907                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3908                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3909         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3910                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3911                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3912                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
3913                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3914         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3915                 // Everything was delivered...
3916                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3917         }
3918
3919         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3920         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3921                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3922                 match events_1[0] {
3923                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3924                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3925                 };
3926                 match events_1[1] {
3927                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3928                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3929                 };
3930         } else {
3931                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3932                 match events_1[0] {
3933                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3934                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3935                 };
3936         }
3937
3938         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3939         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3940         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3941
3942         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3943
3944         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3945         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3946         match events_2[0] {
3947                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3948                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3949                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3950                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3951                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3952                         match &purpose {
3953                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3954                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3955                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3956                                 },
3957                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3958                         }
3959                 },
3960                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3961         }
3962
3963         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3964         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3965         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3966
3967         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3968         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3969         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3970                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3971                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3972                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3973                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3974                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3975                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3976                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3977                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3978                 },
3979                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3980         };
3981
3982         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3983                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3984
3985                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3986                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3987                 match events_4[0] {
3988                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3989                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3990                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3991                         },
3992                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3993                 }
3994
3995                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3996                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3997                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3998                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3999
4000                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
4001                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4002                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4003                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4004
4005                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
4006                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
4007                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4008                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4009                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4010
4011                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4012                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4013                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4014                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4015                                         }
4016                                 }
4017                         }
4018                 }
4019         }
4020
4021         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4022         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4023         if messages_delivered < 2 {
4024                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4025                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
4026                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4027                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
4028                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
4029                 } else {
4030                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4031                 }
4032         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4033                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4034                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4035                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4036                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
4037                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4038         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4039                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4040                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4041                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4042                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4043         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4044                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4045                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4046                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
4047                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4048         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4049                 // Everything was delivered...
4050                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4051         }
4052
4053         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
4054                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4055         }
4056         if messages_delivered <= 5 {
4057                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4058                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4059         }
4060         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4061
4062         if messages_delivered > 2 {
4063                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4064         }
4065
4066         // Channel should still work fine...
4067         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4068         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4069         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4070 }
4071
4072 #[test]
4073 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
4074         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
4075         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
4076         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
4077         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
4078 }
4079
4080 #[test]
4081 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
4082         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
4083         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
4084         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
4085         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
4086 }
4087
4088 #[test]
4089 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4090         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4091         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4092         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4093         // channel_ready immediately instead.
4094         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4095         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4096         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4097         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4098         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4099
4100         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4101
4102         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4103         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4104         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4105         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4106         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4107         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4108
4109         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4110         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4111         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4112 }
4113
4114 #[test]
4115 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_leading() {
4116         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4117         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4118         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4119         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4120
4121         // Let channel_manager get ahead of chain_monitor by 1 block.
4122         // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4123         // in case where client calls block_connect on channel_manager first and then on chain_monitor.
4124         let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4125         let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4126
4127         nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4128         nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4129
4130         // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4131         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4132
4133         // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1,
4134         // but it's best_block is block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager
4135         // was running ahead of chain_monitor at the time of funding_created.
4136         // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4137         // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4138         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4139         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4140
4141         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4142         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4143         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4144 }
4145
4146 #[test]
4147 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_lagging() {
4148         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4149         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4150         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4151         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4152
4153         // Let chain_monitor get ahead of channel_manager by 1 block.
4154         // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4155         // in case where client calls block_connect on chain_monitor first and then on channel_manager.
4156         let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4157         let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4158
4159         nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4160         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4161
4162         // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4163         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4164
4165         // channel_manager can't really skip block_1, it should get it eventually.
4166         nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4167
4168         // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1, it's best_block is
4169         // the block before block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager was
4170         // running behind at the time of funding_created.
4171         // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4172         // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4173         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4174         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4175
4176         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4177         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4178         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4179 }
4180
4181 #[test]
4182 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4183         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4184         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4185         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4186         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4187         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4188         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4189         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4190
4191         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4192
4193         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4194         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4195         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
4196                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
4197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4198
4199         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4200         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4201         match events_1[0] {
4202                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4203                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4204         }
4205
4206         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4207         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4208         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4209
4210         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4211         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4212         match events_2[0] {
4213                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4214                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4215                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4216                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4217                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4218                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4219                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4220
4221                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4222                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4223                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4224                         match events_3[0] {
4225                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4226                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4227                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4228                                 },
4229                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4230                         }
4231
4232                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4233                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4234                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4235                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4236                 },
4237                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4238         }
4239
4240         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4241         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4242
4243         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4244                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4245         }, true).unwrap();
4246         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4247         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4248         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4249                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4250         }, false).unwrap();
4251         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4252         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4253
4254         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4255         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4256         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4257         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4258
4259         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4260         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4261
4262         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4263         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4264
4265         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4266
4267         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4268         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4269         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4270         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4271         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4272         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4273         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4274         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4275         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4277
4278         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4279         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4280         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4281         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4282         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4283         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4284         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4285         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4286
4287         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4288         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4289         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4290         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4291         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4292         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4293         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4294         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4295
4296         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4297         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4298         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4299         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4300
4301         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4302         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4303         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4304         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4305
4306         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4307         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4309
4310         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4311
4312         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4313         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4314         match events_5[0] {
4315                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4316                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4317                         match &purpose {
4318                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4319                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4320                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4321                                 },
4322                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4323                         }
4324                 },
4325                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4326         }
4327
4328         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4329         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4330         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4331
4332         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4333         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4334 }
4335
4336 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4337         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4338         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4339         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4340         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4341         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4342         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4343
4344         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4345
4346         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4347                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4348                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4349                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4350                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4351                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4352                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4353                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4354                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4355                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4356                         &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4357                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4358                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4359                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4360                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4361                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4362                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4363                 our_payment_hash
4364         } else {
4365                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4366         };
4367
4368         let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4369         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4370         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4371         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4372         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4373                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4374                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4375                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4376         }
4377
4378         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4379
4380         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4381         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4382         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4383         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4384         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4385         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4386
4387         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4388         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4389         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4390         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4391         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4392         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4393 }
4394
4395 #[test]
4396 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4397         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4398         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4399 }
4400
4401 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4402         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4403         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4404         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4405         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4406         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4407         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4408         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4409
4410         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4411         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4412         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4413         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4414
4415         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4416         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4417         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4418                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4419         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4420         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4421
4422         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4423         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4424         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4425         sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4426                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4427         if forwarded_htlc {
4428                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4429                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4430                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4431                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4432                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4433         }
4434         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4435
4436         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4437         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4438         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4439         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4440
4441         if forwarded_htlc {
4442                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4443                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4444                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4445                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4446                 match fail_commit[0] {
4447                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4448                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4449                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4450                         },
4451                         _ => unreachable!(),
4452                 }
4453                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4454         } else {
4455                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4456         }
4457 }
4458
4459 #[test]
4460 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4461         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4462         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4463 }
4464
4465 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4466         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4467                 {
4468                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4469                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4470                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4471                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4472                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4473                                 match event {
4474                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs, channel_id: _ } => {
4475                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4476                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4477                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4478                                                 }
4479                                         },
4480                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4481                                 };
4482                         }
4483                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4484                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4485                                         txn.push(tx);
4486                                 }
4487                         }
4488                         txn
4489                 }
4490         }
4491 }
4492
4493 #[test]
4494 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4495         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4496         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4497         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4498         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4499         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4500
4501         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4502         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4503         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4504         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4505         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4506         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4507         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4508         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4509         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4510
4511         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4512         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4513
4514         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4515         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4516         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4517         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4518         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4519 }
4520
4521 #[test]
4522 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4523         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4524         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4525         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4526         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4527         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4528         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4529
4530         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4531         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4532         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4533         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4534         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4535
4536         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4537         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4538         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4539         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4540
4541         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4542         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4543         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4544         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4545         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4546
4547         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4548         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4549         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4550 }
4551
4552 #[test]
4553 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4554         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4555         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4556
4557         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4558         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4559         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4560         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4561
4562         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4563         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4564         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4565         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4566         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4567
4568         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4569         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4570         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4571         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4572         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4573
4574         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4575         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4576         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4577
4578         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4579         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4580         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4581         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4582         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4583 }
4584
4585 #[test]
4586 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4587         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4588         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4589         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4590         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4591
4592         // Create some initial channels
4593         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4594
4595         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4596
4597         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4598         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4599         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4600
4601         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4602         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4603         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4604         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4605         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4606         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4607         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4608         match events[0] {
4609                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4610                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4611         }
4612         match events[1] {
4613                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4614                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4615         }
4616
4617         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4618         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4619         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4620         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4621         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4622
4623         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4624         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4625         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4626
4627         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4628         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4629         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4630 }
4631
4632 #[test]
4633 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4634         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4635         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4636         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4637         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4638
4639         // Create some initial channels
4640         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4641
4642         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4643         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4644
4645         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4646
4647         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4648         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4649         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4650
4651         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4652         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4653         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4654         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4655         match events[0] {
4656                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4657                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4658         }
4659         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4660
4661         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4662         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4663         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4664         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4665         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4666
4667         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4668         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4669         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4670         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4671
4672         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4673         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4674         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4675         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4676         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4677 }
4678
4679 #[test]
4680 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4681         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4682         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4683         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4684         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4685
4686         // Create some initial channels
4687         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4688
4689         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4690         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4691         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4692         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4693
4694         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4695
4696         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4697         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4698         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4699         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4700
4701         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4702         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4703         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4704         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4705
4706         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4707         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4708
4709         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4710         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4711         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4712 }
4713
4714 #[test]
4715 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4716         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4717         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4718         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4719         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4720         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4721
4722         // Create some initial channels
4723         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4724
4725         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4726         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4727         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4728         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4729
4730         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4731
4732         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4733         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4734         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4735         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4736         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4737         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4738
4739         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4740         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4741         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4742         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4743         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4744         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // HTLC-Timeout
4745
4746         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4747         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4748         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4749         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4750         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4751
4752         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4753         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4754         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4755         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4756         // transactions next...
4757         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4758         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4759
4760         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4761         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4762         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4763                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4764         } else {
4765                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4766                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4767         }
4768
4769         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4770         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4771
4772         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4773         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4774         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4775         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4776         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4777 }
4778
4779 #[test]
4780 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4781         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4782         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4783         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4784         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4785         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4786
4787         // Create some initial channels
4788         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4789
4790         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4791         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4792         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4793         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4794
4795         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4796         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4797
4798         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4799
4800         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4801         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4802         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4803         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4804         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4805         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4806
4807         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4808         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4809         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4810         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4811
4812         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4813         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4814         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4815
4816         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4817         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4818         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4819         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4820         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4821
4822         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4823         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4824
4825         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4826         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4827         // transactions next...
4828         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4829         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4830         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4831                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4832         } else {
4833                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4834                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4835         }
4836
4837         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4838         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4839
4840         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4841         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4842
4843         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4844         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4845
4846         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4847         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4848         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4849         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4850         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4851         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4852         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4853         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4854 }
4855
4856 #[test]
4857 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4858         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4859         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4860         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4861         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4862         // channel.
4863         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4864         // gets broadcast.
4865
4866         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4867         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4868         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4869         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4870
4871         // Create some initial channels
4872         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4873         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4874
4875         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4876         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4877         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4878         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4879         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4880
4881         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4882         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4883         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4884
4885         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4886         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4887         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4888         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4889         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4891         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4892         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4893         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4894         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4895         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4896
4897         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4898         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4899         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4900         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4901
4902         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4903         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4904         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4905         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4906         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4907         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Success tx
4908
4909         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4910         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4911         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4912         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4913         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4914         match events[0] {
4915                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4916                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4917         }
4918         match events[1] {
4919                 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
4920                         next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
4921                 } => {
4922                         assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4923                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4924                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4925                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4926                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4927                 },
4928                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4929         }
4930         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4931         let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4932         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4933         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4934         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4935
4936         match nodes_2_event {
4937                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4938                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4939         }
4940
4941         match nodes_0_event {
4942                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4943                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4944                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4945                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4946                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4947                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4948                 },
4949                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4950         };
4951
4952         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4953         match msg_events[0] {
4954                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4955                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4956         }
4957
4958         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4959         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4960         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4961         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4962         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4963         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4964         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4965         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4966         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4967         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4968         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
4969
4970         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4972 }
4973
4974 #[test]
4975 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4976         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4977         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4978         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4979         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4980         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4981         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4982         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4983         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4984         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4985         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4986         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4987                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4988         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4989
4990         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4991         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4992         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4993
4994         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4995         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4996         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4997         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4998         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4999
5000         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5001
5002         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
5003         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5004         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5005         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5006         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
5007                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
5008         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
5009         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5010
5011         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5012         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5013         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5014
5015         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5016         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5017         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5018         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5019         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5020
5021         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5022         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5023                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5024                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
5025                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5026
5027                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5028                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5029                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5030
5031                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5032                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5033                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5034                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5035                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5036
5037                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5038                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5039                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
5040                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5041                 } else {
5042                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5043                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5044                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5045                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5046                 }
5047
5048                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5049                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5050                 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
5051                 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
5052                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5053                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5054                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5055                 } else {
5056                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5057                 }
5058         }
5059
5060         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5061         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5062
5063         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5064         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5065         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5066         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5067         match events[0] {
5068                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5069                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5070         }
5071         match events[1] {
5072                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5073                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5074         }
5075         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5076         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5077         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5078         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5079         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5080         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5081         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5082         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5083         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5084         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5085
5086         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5087         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5088         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5089         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5090         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5091         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5092         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5093         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5094         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5095         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5096
5097         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5098         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5099         {
5100                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5101         }
5102         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5103
5104         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5105         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
5106         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
5107         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5108         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5109         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5110         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5111         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5112         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5114
5115         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5116         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5117         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true, true);
5118 }
5119
5120 #[test]
5121 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5122         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5123         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5124         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5125         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5126
5127         // Create some initial channels
5128         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5129
5130         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5131         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5132         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5133         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5134         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5135
5136         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5137         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5138         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5140
5141         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5143         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5144         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5145         match events[0] {
5146                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5147                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5148         }
5149         match events[1] {
5150                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5151                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5152         }
5153         let node_tx = {
5154                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5155                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5156                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5157                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5158                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5159                 node_txn[0].clone()
5160         };
5161
5162         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5163         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5164
5165         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5166         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5167         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5168         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5169         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5170         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5171 }
5172
5173 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5174         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5175         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5176         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5177         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5178         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5179         // use the same payment hashes.
5180         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5181         //
5182         // A \         / E
5183         //    - C - D -
5184         // B /         \ F
5185         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5186         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5187         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5188         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5189         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5190         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5191         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5192         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5193                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5194         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5195
5196         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5197         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5198         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5199         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5200         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5201
5202         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5203         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5204         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5205         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5206
5207         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
5208                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5209         // 0th HTLC:
5210         let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5211         // 1st HTLC:
5212         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5213         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5214         // 2nd HTLC:
5215         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5216         // 3rd HTLC:
5217         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5218         // 4th HTLC:
5219         let (_, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5220         // 5th HTLC:
5221         let (_, payment_hash_4, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5222         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5223         // 6th HTLC:
5224         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5225         // 7th HTLC:
5226         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5227
5228         // 8th HTLC:
5229         let (_, payment_hash_5, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5230         // 9th HTLC:
5231         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5232         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5233
5234         // 10th HTLC:
5235         let (_, payment_hash_6, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5236         // 11th HTLC:
5237         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5238         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5239
5240         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5241         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5242         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5243         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5244         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5245
5246         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5247         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5248         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5249         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5250         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5251         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5252         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5253
5254         let failed_destinations = vec![
5255                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5256                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5257                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5258                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5259         ];
5260         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5262
5263         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5264         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5265         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5266         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5267         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5268         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5269
5270         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5271         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5272         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5273         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5274
5275         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5276                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5277                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5278         ];
5279         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5281
5282         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5283         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5284         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5285         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5286
5287         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5288
5289         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5290         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5291                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5292                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5293                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5294                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5295                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5296                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5297         ];
5298         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5299         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5300         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5301         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5302         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5303         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5304         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5305         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5306         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5307         if deliver_last_raa {
5308                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5309         } else {
5310                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5311         }
5312
5313         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5314         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5315         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5316         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5317         //
5318         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5319         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5320         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5321         //
5322         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5323         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5324         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5325
5326         if announce_latest {
5327                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5328         } else {
5329                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5330         }
5331         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5332         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5333                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5334                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5335         } else {
5336                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5337                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5338         };
5339         match close_event {
5340                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5341                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5342         }
5343
5344         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5345         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5346         if deliver_last_raa {
5347                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5348
5349                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5350                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5351         } else {
5352                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5353                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5354                 } else {
5355                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5356                 };
5357
5358                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5359         }
5360         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5361
5362         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5363         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5364         let mut a_done = false;
5365         for msg in cs_msgs {
5366                 match msg {
5367                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5368                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5369                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5370                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5371                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5372                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5373                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5374                                         }
5375                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5376                                         assert!(!a_done);
5377                                         a_done = true;
5378                                         &nodes[0]
5379                                 } else {
5380                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5381                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5382                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5383                                         }
5384                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5385                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5386                                         &nodes[1]
5387                                 };
5388                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5389                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5390                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5391                                 if announce_latest {
5392                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5393                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5394                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5395                                         }
5396                                 }
5397                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5398                         },
5399                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5400                 }
5401         }
5402
5403         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5404         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5405         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5406         let mut as_updates = 0;
5407         for event in as_events.iter() {
5408                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5409                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5410                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5411                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5412                         } else {
5413                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5414                         }
5415                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5416                                 as_updates += 1;
5417                         }
5418                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5419                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5420         }
5421         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5422         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5423         if announce_latest {
5424                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5425                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5426         }
5427         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5428
5429         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5430         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5431         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5432         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5433         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5434                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5435                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5436                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5437                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5438                         } else {
5439                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5440                         }
5441                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5442                                 bs_updates += 1;
5443                         }
5444                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5445                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5446         }
5447         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5448         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5449         if announce_latest {
5450                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5451         }
5452         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5453
5454         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5455         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5456         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5457         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5458         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5459         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5460 }
5461
5462 #[test]
5463 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5464         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5465 }
5466
5467 #[test]
5468 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5469         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5470 }
5471
5472 #[test]
5473 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5474         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5475         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5476         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5477 }
5478
5479 #[test]
5480 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5481         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5482         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5483         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5484         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5485
5486         // Create some initial channels
5487         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5488
5489         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5490         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5491         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5492         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5493
5494         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5495         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5496         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5497         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5498         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5499         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5500
5501         let htlc_timeout = {
5502                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5503                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5504                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5505                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5506                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5507                 node_txn[0].clone()
5508         };
5509
5510         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5511         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5512         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5513
5514         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5515         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5516         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5517         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5518         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5519         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5520         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5521         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5522         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5523         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5524                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5525 }
5526
5527 #[test]
5528 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5529         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5530         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5531         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5532         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5533
5534         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5535
5536         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5537         let seed = [42; 32];
5538         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5539         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5540         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5541         let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5542         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &scorer);
5543         let message_router = test_utils::TestMessageRouter::new(network_graph.clone());
5544         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, message_router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5545         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5546         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5547         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5548
5549         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5550         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5551
5552         // Create some initial channels
5553         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5554         // for node 0
5555         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5556         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5557         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5558
5559         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5560         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5561         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5562         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5563         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5564
5565         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5566         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5567         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5568         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5569         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5570
5571         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5572         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5573         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5574         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5575             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5576             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5577             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5578                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5579         }
5580
5581         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5582         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5583         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5584         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5585         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5586         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5587
5588         let htlc_timeout = {
5589                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5590                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5591                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5592                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5593                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5594                 node_txn[0].clone()
5595         };
5596
5597         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5598         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5599         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5600
5601         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5602         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5603         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5604         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5605         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5606         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5607         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5608         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5609         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5610         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5611         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5612                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5613 }
5614
5615 #[test]
5616 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5617         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5618         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5619         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5620         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5621
5622         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5623
5624         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5625         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5626
5627         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5628         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5629         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5630
5631         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5632         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5633         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5634
5635         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5636         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5637         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5638
5639         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5640         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5641         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5642 }
5643
5644 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5645         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5646         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5647         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5648         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5649         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5650
5651         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5652
5653         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5654         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5655         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5657         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5658
5659         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5660         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5661         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
5662
5663         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5664         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5665         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5666         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5667         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5668
5669         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5670         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5671         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5672                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5673                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5674         }
5675         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5676         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5677         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5678         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5679 }
5680
5681 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5682         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5683         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5684         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5685         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5686         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5687
5688         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5689         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5690                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5691         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5692
5693         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5694
5695         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5696         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5697         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5698
5699         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5700         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5701
5702         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5703                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5704                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5705         }
5706         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5707         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5708         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5709         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5710 }
5711
5712 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5713         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5714         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5715         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5716         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5717         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5718
5719         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5720         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5721         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5722         // actually revoked.
5723         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5724         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5725         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5726         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5727         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5728
5729         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5730         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5731         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5733         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5734         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5735         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5736         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5737         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5738         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5739
5740         if check_revoke_no_close {
5741                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5742                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5743         }
5744
5745         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5746         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5747         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5748                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5749                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5750         }
5751         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5752                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5753                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5754                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5755                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5756         } else {
5757                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5758         }
5759 }
5760
5761 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5762 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5763 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5764 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5765 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5766 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5767 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5768 // non-dust HTLCs.
5769 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5770 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5771 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5772 #[test]
5773 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5774         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5775         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5776
5777         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5778         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5779 }
5780
5781 #[test]
5782 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5783         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5784         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5785         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5786         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5787 }
5788
5789 #[test]
5790 #[should_panic]
5791 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5792         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5793         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5794         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5795         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5796         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5797         for node in nodes.iter() {
5798                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5799         }
5800
5801         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5802         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5803         let push_msat=10001;
5804         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5805         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5806         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5807         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5808
5809         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5810         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5811         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5812 }
5813
5814 #[test]
5815 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5816         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5817         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5818         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5819         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5820
5821         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5822         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5823         let push_msat=10001;
5824         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5825
5826         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5827         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5828         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5829         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5830         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5831
5832         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5833         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5834         let push_msat=10001;
5835         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5836         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5837         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5838
5839         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5840         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5841         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5842
5843         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5844         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5845         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5846
5847         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5848         let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
5849         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash, chain_hash);
5850
5851         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5852         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5853         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5854         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5855         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5856         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5857 }
5858
5859 #[test]
5860 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5861         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5862         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5863         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5864         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5865
5866         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5867         let push_msat=10001;
5868         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5869         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5870         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5871         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5872
5873         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5874         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5875         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5876                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5877                         msg.clone()
5878                 },
5879                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5880         };
5881         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5882 }
5883
5884 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5885 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5886 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5887 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5888 #[test]
5889 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5890         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5891         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5892         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5893         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5894         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5895
5896         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5897         // pending_update_fee.
5898         {
5899                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5900                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5901         }
5902         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5903         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5904
5905         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5906         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5907         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5908                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5909                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5910                 },
5911                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5912         };
5913
5914         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5915
5916         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5917         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5918         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5919         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5920
5921         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5922         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
5923         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5924
5925         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5926         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5927                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5928         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5929         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5930
5931         // Flush the pending fee update.
5932         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5933         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5934         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5935         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5936         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5937
5938         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5939         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5940         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5941         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5942         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5943         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
5944
5945         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5946         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5947         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5948         match &events[0] {
5949                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5950                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5951                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5952                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5953                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5954                 },
5955                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5956         }
5957         match &events[1] {
5958                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5959                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5960                 },
5961                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5962         }
5963 }
5964
5965 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5966 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5967 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5968 #[test]
5969 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5970         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5971         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5972         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5973         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5974         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5975
5976         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5977         // pending_update_fee.
5978         {
5979                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5980                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5981         }
5982         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5983         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5984
5985         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5986         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5987         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5988                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5989                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5990                 },
5991                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5992         };
5993
5994         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5995
5996         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5997         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5998         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5999         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6000
6001         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6002         let amt_1 = 20000;
6003         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
6004         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6005         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6006
6007         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6008         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
6009                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
6010         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6011         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6012         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6013         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
6014                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
6015         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6016         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6017
6018         // Flush the pending fee update.
6019         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6020         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6021         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6022         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6023         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6025
6026         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6027         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6028         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6029         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6030         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6031         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
6032
6033         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6034         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6035         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6036         match &events[0] {
6037                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6038                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6039                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6040                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6041                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
6042                 },
6043                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6044         }
6045         match &events[1] {
6046                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6047                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6048                 },
6049                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6050         }
6051
6052         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6053         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6054                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6055                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6056                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6057         };
6058         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6059                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6060                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6061         };
6062         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6064         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6065         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6066         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6067         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6068         match events[0] {
6069                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6070                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6071         }
6072         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6073         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6074         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6075         match events[0] {
6076                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
6077                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6078         }
6079         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6080         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6081         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6082
6083         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6084         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6085         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6086         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6087 }
6088
6089 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6090 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6091 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6092 // once it's freed.
6093 #[test]
6094 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6095         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6096         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6097         // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
6098         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6099         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
6100         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
6101         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6102         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6103         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6104         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
6105
6106         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6107         // pending_update_fee.
6108         {
6109                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6110                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6111         }
6112         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6114
6115         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6116         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6117         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6118                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6119                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6120                 },
6121                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6122         };
6123
6124         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6125
6126         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6127         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6128         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6129         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6130
6131         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6132         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6133         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6134         let payment_event = {
6135                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6136                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6137                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6138
6139                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6140                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6141
6142                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6143         };
6144         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6145         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6146         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6147         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6148
6149         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
6150         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6151
6152         // Flush the pending fee update.
6153         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6154         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6156         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6157         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6158         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6159
6160         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6161         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6162         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6163
6164         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6165                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6166                         msg.clone()
6167                 },
6168                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6169         };
6170
6171         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6173         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6174
6175         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6176         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6177         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6178         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6179                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6180                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6181         }
6182
6183         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6184         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6185         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6186
6187         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6188         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6189         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6190         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6191                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6192                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6193                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6194                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6195                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6196                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6197                 },
6198                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6199         };
6200
6201         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6202         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6203         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6204
6205         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6206         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6207         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6208         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6209         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6211         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6212         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6213         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6214                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6215                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6216         };
6217         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6218         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6219         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6220 }
6221
6222 #[test]
6223 fn test_payment_route_reaching_same_channel_twice() {
6224         //A route should not go through the same channel twice
6225         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6226         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6227         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6228         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6229         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6230         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6231
6232         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6233                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6234         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6235
6236         // Extend the path by itself, essentially simulating route going through same channel twice
6237         let cloned_hops = route.paths[0].hops.clone();
6238         route.paths[0].hops.extend_from_slice(&cloned_hops);
6239
6240         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6241                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6242         ), false, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6243         assert_eq!(err, &"Path went through the same channel twice"));
6244 }
6245
6246 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6247 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6248 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6249
6250 #[test]
6251 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6252         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6253         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6254         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6255         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6256         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6257         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6258
6259         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6260         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6261
6262         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6263                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6264                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6265         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6266 }
6267
6268 #[test]
6269 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6270         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6271         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6272         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6273         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6274         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6275         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6276
6277         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6278         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6279         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6280                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6281                 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6282                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6283
6284         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6285         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6286 }
6287
6288 #[test]
6289 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6290         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6291         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6292         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6293         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6294         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6295         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6296
6297         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6298         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6299                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6301         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6302         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6303
6304         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6305         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC", 3);
6306         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6307         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6308         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() },
6309                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6310 }
6311
6312 #[test]
6313 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6314         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6315         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6316         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6317         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6318         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6319         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6320         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6321
6322         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6323                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6324         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6325         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6326         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6327                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6328                 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6329                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6330 }
6331
6332 #[test]
6333 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6334         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6335         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6336         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6337         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6338         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6339         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6340         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6341         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6342         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6343                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6344
6345         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6346         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6347         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6348                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6349                 let payment_event = {
6350                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6351                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6352                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6353
6354                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6355                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6356                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6357                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6358                         } else {
6359                                 assert!(false);
6360                         }
6361                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6362                 };
6363                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6364                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6365                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6366
6367                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6368                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6369         }
6370         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6371                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6372                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6373
6374         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6375 }
6376
6377 #[test]
6378 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6379         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6380         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6381         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6382         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6383         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6384         let channel_value = 100000;
6385         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6386         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6387
6388         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6389
6390         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6391         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6392         // limits us to.
6393         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6394         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6395                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6396                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6397         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6398
6399         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6400 }
6401
6402 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6403 #[test]
6404 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6405         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6406         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6407         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6408         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6409         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6410         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6411         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6412         {
6413                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6414                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6415                 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6416                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context().get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6417         }
6418
6419         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6420         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6421                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6422         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6423         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6424         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6425         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6426         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6427         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6428         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6430         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6431 }
6432
6433 #[test]
6434 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6435         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6436         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6437         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6438         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6439         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6440         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6441
6442         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6443         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6444         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6445         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6446         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6447         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6448
6449         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6450         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6451         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6452                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6453         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6454         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6455
6456         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6457         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6458         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6459         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6460         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6461
6462         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6463         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6464         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6465         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6466         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6467 }
6468
6469 #[test]
6470 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6471         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6472         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6473         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6474         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6475         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6476         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6477         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6478
6479         let send_amt = 3999999;
6480         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6481                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6482         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6483         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6484         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6485         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6486         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6487                 &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6488         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6489
6490         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6491                 channel_id: chan.2,
6492                 htlc_id: 0,
6493                 amount_msat: 1000,
6494                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6495                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6496                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6497                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6498                 blinding_point: None,
6499         };
6500
6501         for i in 0..50 {
6502                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6503                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6504         }
6505         msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6506         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6507
6508         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6509         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6510         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6511         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6512         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6513 }
6514
6515 #[test]
6516 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6517         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6518         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6519         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6520         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6521         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6522         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6523
6524         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6525         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6526                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6527         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6528         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6529         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6530         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6531
6532         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6533         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6534         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6535         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6536         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6537 }
6538
6539 #[test]
6540 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6541         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6542         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6543         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6544         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6545         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6546
6547         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6548         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6549         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6550                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6551         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6552         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6553         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6554         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6555
6556         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6557         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6558         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6559         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6560         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6561 }
6562
6563 #[test]
6564 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6565         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6566         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6567         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6568         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6569         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6570         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6571         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6572
6573         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6574         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6575         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6576                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6577         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6578         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6579         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6580
6581         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6582         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6583         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6584         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6585                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6586         }, true).unwrap();
6587         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6588         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6589         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6590                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6591         }, false).unwrap();
6592         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6593         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6594         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6595         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6596         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6597         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6598
6599         //Resend HTLC
6600         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6601         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6602         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6603         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6604         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6605
6606         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6607
6608         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6609         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6610         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6611         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6612         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6613 }
6614
6615 #[test]
6616 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6617         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6618
6619         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6620         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6621         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6622         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6623         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6624         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6625         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6626                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6627
6628         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6629         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6630         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6631
6632         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6633                 channel_id: chan.2,
6634                 htlc_id: 0,
6635                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6636         };
6637
6638         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6639
6640         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6641         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6642         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6643         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6644         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6645 }
6646
6647 #[test]
6648 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6649         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6650
6651         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6652         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6653         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6654         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6655         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6656
6657         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6658         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6659                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6660         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6661         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6662         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6663
6664         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6665                 channel_id: chan.2,
6666                 htlc_id: 0,
6667                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6668         };
6669
6670         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6671
6672         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6673         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6674         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6675         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6676         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6677 }
6678
6679 #[test]
6680 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6681         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6682
6683         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6684         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6685         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6686         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6687         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6688
6689         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6690         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6691                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6692         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6693         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6694         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6695         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6696                 channel_id: chan.2,
6697                 htlc_id: 0,
6698                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6699                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6700         };
6701
6702         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6703
6704         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6705         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6706         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6707         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6708         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6709 }
6710
6711 #[test]
6712 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6713         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6714
6715         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6716         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6717         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6718         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6719         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6720
6721         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6722
6723         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6724         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6725         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6726
6727         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6728         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6729         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6730                 match events[0] {
6731                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6732                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6733                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6734                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6735                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6736                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6737                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6738                         },
6739                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6740                 }
6741         };
6742
6743         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6744
6745         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6746
6747         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6748         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6749         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6750         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6751         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6752 }
6753
6754 #[test]
6755 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6756         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6757
6758         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6759         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6760         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6761         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6762         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6763
6764         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6765
6766         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6767         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6768         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6769
6770         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6771         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6772         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6773                 match events[0] {
6774                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6775                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6776                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6777                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6778                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6779                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6780                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6781                         },
6782                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6783                 }
6784         };
6785
6786         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6787
6788         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6789
6790         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6791         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6792         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6793         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6794         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6795 }
6796
6797 #[test]
6798 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6799         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6800
6801         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6802         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6803         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6804         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6805         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6806
6807         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6808         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6809                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6810         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6811
6812         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6813         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6814
6815         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6817         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6818
6819         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6820
6821         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6822                 match events[0] {
6823                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6824                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6825                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6826                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6827                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6828                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6829                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6830                         },
6831                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6832                 }
6833         };
6834         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6835         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6836
6837         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6838         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6839         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6841         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6842 }
6843
6844 #[test]
6845 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6846         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6847         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6848
6849         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6850         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6851         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6852         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6853         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6854         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6855
6856         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6857
6858         //First hop
6859         let mut payment_event = {
6860                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6861                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6862                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6863                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6864                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6865                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6866         };
6867         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6868         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6869         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6870         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6871         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6872         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6873         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6874         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6875         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6876
6877         //Second Hop
6878         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6879         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6880         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6881         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6882
6883         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6884         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6885         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6886                 match events_3[0] {
6887                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6888                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6889                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6890                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6891                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6892                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6893                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6894                         },
6895                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6896                 }
6897         };
6898
6899         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6900
6901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6902         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6903         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6904         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6905         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6906
6907         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6908         match events_4[0] {
6909                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6910                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6911                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6912                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6913                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6914                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6915                 },
6916                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6917         };
6918
6919         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6920 }
6921
6922 #[test]
6923 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6924         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6925         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6926         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6927         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6928         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6929         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6930
6931         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6932
6933         // First hop
6934         let mut payment_event = {
6935                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6936                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6937                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6938                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6939         };
6940
6941         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6942         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6943         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6944         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6945         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6946         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6947
6948         // Second Hop
6949         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6950         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6951         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6952         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6953
6954         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6955         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6956         match events_3[0] {
6957                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6958                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6959                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6960                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6961
6962                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6963                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6964                 },
6965                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6966         }
6967
6968         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6969                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6970                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6971         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6972         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6974
6975         match events_4[0] {
6976                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6977                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6978                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6979                 },
6980                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6981         }
6982
6983         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6984         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6985
6986         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6987         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6988         match events_5[0] {
6989                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6990                 } => {
6991                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6992                         assert!(is_permanent);
6993                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6994                 },
6995                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6996         }
6997         match events_5[1] {
6998                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6999                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
7000                 },
7001                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7002         }
7003
7004         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
7005 }
7006
7007 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7008         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7009         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7010         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7011
7012         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7013         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7014         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7015         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7016         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7017         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7018
7019         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7020                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7021
7022         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7023         let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7024         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7025         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7026
7027         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7028         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7029
7030         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7031         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7032         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7033         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7034         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7035
7036         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7037         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7038         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7040
7041         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7042         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7043
7044         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7045         match events[0] {
7046                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7047                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7048                 },
7049                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7050         }
7051         match events[1] {
7052                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7053                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7054                 },
7055                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7056         }
7057
7058         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7059         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7060         if announce_latest {
7061                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7062         } else {
7063                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7064         }
7065
7066         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7068         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7069
7070         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7071         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7072         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7073         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7074         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
7075         let mut first_failed = false;
7076         for event in events {
7077                 match event {
7078                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7079                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7080                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7081                                         first_failed = true;
7082                                 } else {
7083                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7084                                 }
7085                         },
7086                         Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
7087                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7088                 }
7089         }
7090 }
7091
7092 #[test]
7093 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7094         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7095         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7096 }
7097
7098 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7099         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7100         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7101         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7102         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7103         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7104         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7105
7106         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7107         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7108         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7109         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7110         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7111
7112         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7113                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7114
7115         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7116         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7117
7118         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7119         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7120
7121         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7122         if revoked {
7123                 let (payment_preimage_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7124                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7125         }
7126
7127         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7128         if local {
7129                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7130                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7131                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7132                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7133                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7134
7135                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7136                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7137                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7138                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7139                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
7140                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7141                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7142                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7143                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7144                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7145                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7146         } else {
7147                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7148                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7149                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7150                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7151                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7152                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7153
7154                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7155                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7156                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7157                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7158                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7159                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7160                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7161
7162                 if !revoked {
7163                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7164                 } else {
7165                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), 11);
7166                 }
7167                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7168                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7169                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7170                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7171                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7172         }
7173 }
7174
7175 #[test]
7176 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7177         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7178         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7179         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7180 }
7181
7182 #[test]
7183 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7184         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7185
7186         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7187         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7188         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7189         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7190         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7191         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7192         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7193         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7194         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7195
7196         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
7197         if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7198                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7199                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42, None)
7200         {
7201                 match error {
7202                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7203                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7204                 }
7205         } else { assert!(false) }
7206
7207         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7208         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7209         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7210         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7211         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7212                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7213                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7214         {
7215                 match error {
7216                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7217                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7218                 }
7219         } else { assert!(false); }
7220
7221         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7222         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7223         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7224         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7225         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7226         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
7227         let reason_msg;
7228         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7229                 match action {
7230                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7231                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7232                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7233                         },
7234                         _ => { panic!(); }
7235                 }
7236         } else { panic!(); }
7237         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7238
7239         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7240         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7241         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7242         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7243         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7244                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7245                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7246         {
7247                 match error {
7248                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7249                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7250                 }
7251         } else { assert!(false); }
7252 }
7253
7254 #[test]
7255 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7256         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7257         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7258         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7259
7260         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7261         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7262         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7263         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7264
7265         // Create some initial channels
7266         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7267
7268         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7269         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7270         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
7271                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7272         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000);
7273         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7274                 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7275         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7276         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7277         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7278                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7279         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7280
7281         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7282         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7283         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7284         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7285         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7286
7287         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7288         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7289         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7290         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7291
7292         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7293         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7294         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7295
7296         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7297         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7298         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7299                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7300                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7301                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7302                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7303                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7304                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7305                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7306                 },
7307                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7308         };
7309         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7310
7311         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7312         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7313
7314         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7315         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7316         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7317         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7318 }
7319
7320 #[test]
7321 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7322         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7323         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7324
7325         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7326         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7327         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7328         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7329
7330         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7331         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7332         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7333
7334         // Disconnect peers
7335         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7336         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7337
7338         for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7339                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7340         }
7341         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7342         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7343         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7344         for e in msg_events {
7345                 match e {
7346                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7347                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7348                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7349                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7350                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7351                                 }
7352                         },
7353                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7354                 }
7355         }
7356         // Reconnect peers
7357         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7358                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7359         }, true).unwrap();
7360         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7361         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7362         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7363                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7364         }, false).unwrap();
7365         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7366         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7367
7368         // Reestablish chan_1
7369         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7370         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7371         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7372         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7373         // Reestablish chan_2
7374         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7375         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7376         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7377         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7378         // Reestablish chan_3
7379         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7380         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7381         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7382         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7383
7384         for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7385                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7386         }
7387         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7388         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7389         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7390         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7391         for e in msg_events {
7392                 match e {
7393                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7394                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7395                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7396                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7397                                         // the old one.
7398                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7399                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7400                                 }
7401                         },
7402                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7403                 }
7404         }
7405         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7406         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7407 }
7408
7409 #[test]
7410 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7411         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7412         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7413
7414         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7415         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7416         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7417         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7418
7419         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7420
7421         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7422         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7423                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7424         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7425         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7426
7427         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7428         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7429         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7430         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7431         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7432         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7433
7434         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7435         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7436                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7437                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7438                 }
7439         }
7440
7441         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7442         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7443
7444         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7445         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7446         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7447         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7448
7449         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7450         let penalty_1;
7451         let feerate_1;
7452         {
7453                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7454                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7455                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7456                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7457                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7458                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7459                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7460                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7461                 node_txn.clear();
7462         };
7463
7464         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7465         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7466         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7467         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7468         {
7469                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7470                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7471                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7472                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7473                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7474                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7475                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7476                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7477                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7478                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7479                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7480                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7481                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7482                         node_txn.clear();
7483                 }
7484         }
7485         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7486
7487         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7488         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7489         let penalty_3;
7490         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7491         {
7492                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7493                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7494                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7495                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7496                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7497                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7498                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7499                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7500                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7501                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7502                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7503                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7504                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7505                         node_txn.clear();
7506                 }
7507         }
7508         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7509
7510         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7511         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7512 }
7513
7514 #[test]
7515 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7516         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7517         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7518
7519         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7520         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7521         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7522         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7523         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7524
7525         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7526         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7527         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7528         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7529         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7530         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7531         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7532                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7533         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7534         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50)
7535                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7536         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7537         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7538                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7539         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7540
7541         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7542         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7543         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7544
7545         // Revoke local commitment tx
7546         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7547
7548         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7549         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7550         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7551         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7552         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7553         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7554
7555         let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7556                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7557                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7558
7559                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7560                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7561                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7562
7563                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7564                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7565                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7566                 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7567
7568                 txn
7569         };
7570
7571         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7572         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7573         let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7574         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7575         let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7576         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7577         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7578         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7579         match events.last().unwrap() {
7580                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7581                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7582         }
7583         let first;
7584         let feerate_1;
7585         let penalty_txn;
7586         {
7587                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7588                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7589                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7590
7591                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7592                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7593                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7594                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7595                 // future).
7596                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7597                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7598                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7599                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7600                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7601                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7602
7603                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7604                 // available, which we check here:
7605                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7606                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7607                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7608
7609                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7610                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7611
7612                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7613                 // output, checked above).
7614                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7615                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7616                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7617
7618                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7619                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7620                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7621                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight().to_wu();
7622                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7623                 node_txn.clear();
7624         }
7625
7626         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7627         let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7628         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7629         let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7630         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7631
7632         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7633         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7634         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7635         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7636         let node_txn = {
7637                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7638                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7639
7640                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7641                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7642                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7643                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7644                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7645                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7646                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7647                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7648                 node_txn.clear();
7649                 txn
7650         };
7651         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7652         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7653         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7654         {
7655                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7656                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7657                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7658                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7659                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7660                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7661                 // up bumped justice generation.
7662                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7663                 node_txn.clear();
7664         }
7665         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7666         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7667 }
7668
7669 #[test]
7670 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7671         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7672         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7673
7674         // Create 2 HTLCs
7675         // Provide preimage for one
7676         // Check aggregation
7677
7678         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7679         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7680         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7681         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7682
7683         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7684         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7685         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7686
7687         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7688         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7689         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7690         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7691         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7692
7693         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7694         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7695         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7696         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7698         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7699
7700         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7701         let timeout;
7702         let preimage;
7703         let preimage_bump;
7704         let feerate_timeout;
7705         let feerate_preimage;
7706         {
7707                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7708                 // 3 transactions including:
7709                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7710                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7711                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7712                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7713                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7714                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7715                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7716                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7717
7718                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7719                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7720                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7721                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7722
7723                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7724                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7725                 } else {
7726                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7727                 };
7728
7729                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7730                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7731                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7732
7733                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7734                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7735                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7736                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight().to_wu();
7737
7738                 node_txn.clear();
7739         };
7740         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7741         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7742
7743         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7744         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7745         {
7746                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7747                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7748                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7749                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7750                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7751                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7752
7753                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7754                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7755                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight().to_wu();
7756                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7757                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7758
7759                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7760                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7761                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7762                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7763                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7764
7765                 node_txn.clear();
7766         }
7767
7768         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7769         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7770 }
7771
7772 #[test]
7773 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7774         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7775         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7776         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7777         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7778         // TestChannelSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7779         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7780         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7781         // implement that).
7782         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7783         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7784         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7785         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7786         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7787
7788         let per_commitment_secret;
7789         let next_per_commitment_point;
7790         {
7791                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7792                 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7793                 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).map(
7794                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7795                 ).flatten().unwrap().get_signer();
7796
7797                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7798
7799                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7800                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7801                 per_commitment_secret = keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7802
7803                 // Must revoke without gaps
7804                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7805                 keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7806
7807                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7808                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7809                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7810         }
7811
7812         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7813                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7814                         channel_id,
7815                         per_commitment_secret,
7816                         next_per_commitment_point,
7817                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7818                         next_local_nonce: None,
7819                 });
7820         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7822         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() }
7823                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7824 }
7825
7826 #[test]
7827 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7828         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7829         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7830
7831         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7832         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7833         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7834         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7835
7836         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7837         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7838         let (payment_preimage_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7839         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7840
7841         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7842         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7843         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7844
7845         // Revoke local commitment tx
7846         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7847
7848         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7849         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7850         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7851         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7852
7853         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7854         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7855         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7856         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7857         let penalty_txn = {
7858                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7859                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7860                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7861                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7862                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7863                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7864                 node_txn.clear();
7865                 penalty_txn
7866         };
7867         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7868         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7869         {
7870                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7871                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7872                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7873         }
7874 }
7875
7876 #[test]
7877 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7878         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7879         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7880         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7881         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7882         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7883         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7884
7885         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7886
7887         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7888         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7889         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7890         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7891         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7892
7893         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7894         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7896         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7897
7898         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7899         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7900         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7901         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7902         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7903         match close_ev[0] {
7904                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7905                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7906                         assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7907                 },
7908                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7909         }
7910 }
7911
7912 #[test]
7913 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7914         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7915         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7916         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7917         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7918
7919         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7920         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7921         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7922
7923         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7924
7925         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7926         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7927         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7928         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7929 }
7930
7931 #[test]
7932 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7933         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7934         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7935         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7936         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7937         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7938         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7939
7940         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7941         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7942         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7943
7944         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7945         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7946         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7947 }
7948
7949 #[test]
7950 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7951         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7952         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7953         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7954         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7955         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7956
7957         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7958         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7959         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7960         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7961         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7962         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7963         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7964         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7965         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7966         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7967         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7968         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7969
7970         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7971         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7972         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7973         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7974
7975         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7976         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7977         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7978         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7979         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7980
7981         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7982         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7983
7984         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7985         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7986         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7987         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7988         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7989         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7990
7991         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7992         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7993         // `channel_value`.
7994         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7995         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7996         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7997         // `channel_value`.
7998         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7999 }
8000
8001 #[test]
8002 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8003         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8004         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8005         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8006         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8007         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8008         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8009
8010         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8011         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8012
8013         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8014
8015         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8016         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8017         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8018
8019         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8020         match events[0] {
8021                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8022                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8023                 }
8024                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8025         }
8026
8027         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8028         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8029
8030         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8031                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8032                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8033                 }
8034                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8035         }
8036
8037         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8038
8039         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8040         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8041
8042         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8043         match events[0] {
8044                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8045                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8046                 }
8047                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8048         }
8049 }
8050
8051 #[test]
8052 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8053         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8054         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8055         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8056         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8057         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8058         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8059
8060         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8061         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8062
8063         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8064
8065         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8066         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8067         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8068
8069         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8070         match events[0] {
8071                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8072                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8073                 }
8074                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8075         }
8076
8077         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8078         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8079
8080         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8081                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8082                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8083                 }
8084                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8085         }
8086
8087         // There should be no more events to process, as the channel was never opened.
8088         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8089 }
8090
8091 #[test]
8092 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8093         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8094         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8095         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8096         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8097         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8098         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8099
8100         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8101         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8102
8103         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8104
8105         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8106         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8107         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8108
8109         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8110         match events[0] {
8111                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8112                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8113                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8114                         match api_res {
8115                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8116                                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8117                                 },
8118                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8119                                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error {:?}", e),
8120                         }
8121                 }
8122                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8123         }
8124
8125         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8126         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8127         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8128
8129         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8130                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8131                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8132                 }
8133                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8134         }
8135 }
8136
8137 #[test]
8138 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8139         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8140         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8141         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8142         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8143
8144         let unknown_channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
8145         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8146         match api_res {
8147                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8148                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8149                 },
8150                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8151                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error: {:?}", e),
8152         }
8153 }
8154
8155 #[test]
8156 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
8157         // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
8158         // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
8159         // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
8160         // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
8161         // a PaymentClaimable event too early
8162         let node_count = 4;
8163         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8164         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8165         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8166         let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8167
8168         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8169         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8170         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8171         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8172
8173         let total_msat = 100_000;
8174         let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
8175         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
8176         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8177
8178         let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8179         path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8180         path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8181         path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8182         path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8183         path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8184         route.paths.push(path_1);
8185
8186         let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8187         path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8188         path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8189         path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8190         path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8191         path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8192         route.paths.push(path_2);
8193
8194         // Send payment
8195         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8196         let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8197                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8198         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8199                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8200         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8201
8202         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8203         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8204
8205         // First path
8206         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8207         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8208         let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8209
8210         for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8211                 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8212
8213                 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8214                         let session_priv = [3; 32];
8215                         let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8216                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8217                         let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8218                         let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8219                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8220                         // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8221                         // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8222                         if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
8223                                 ref mut sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, ..
8224                         } = onion_payloads[1] {
8225                                 *sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat = 99_000;
8226                         } else { panic!() }
8227                         let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8228                         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8229                 }
8230
8231                 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8232                 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8233                 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8234                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8235
8236                 if idx == 0 {
8237                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8238                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8239                         check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8240                         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8241                         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8242                 } else {
8243                         let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8244                         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8245                 }
8246
8247                 prev_node = node;
8248         }
8249
8250         // Second path
8251         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8252         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8253
8254         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8255 }
8256
8257 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8258
8259         let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8260         let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8261
8262         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8263         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8264         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8265         let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8266
8267         let src_idx = 0;
8268         let dst_idx = 1;
8269
8270         // Create channels for each amount
8271         let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8272         let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8273         let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8274         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8275                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8276                 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8277                 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8278                 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8279                 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8280                 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8281                 expected_paths.push(path);
8282         }
8283         let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8284
8285         // Create a route for each amount
8286         let example_amount = 100000;
8287         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8288         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8289         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8290                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8291                 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8292                 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8293                 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8294                 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8295                 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8296                 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8297                 route.paths.push(path);
8298         }
8299
8300         // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8301         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8302         let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8303                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8304         nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8305                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8307
8308         let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8309         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8310         let mut amount_received = 0;
8311         for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8312                 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8313
8314                 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8315                 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8316                 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8317                 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8318         }
8319
8320         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8321 }
8322
8323 #[test]
8324 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8325         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8326         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8327 }
8328
8329 #[test]
8330 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8331         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8332         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8333         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8334         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8335         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8336
8337         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8338         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8339         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8340         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8341
8342         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8343         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8344         route.paths.push(path);
8345         route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8346         route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8347         route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8348         route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8349         route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8350         route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8351         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8352         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8353 }
8354
8355 #[test]
8356 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8357         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8358         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8359         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8360         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8361         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8362
8363         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8364
8365         {
8366                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8367                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8368                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8369                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8370                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8371                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8372                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8373                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8374                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8375         }
8376         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8377         // values from previous calls.
8378         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8379         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8380         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8381         match events[0] {
8382                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8383                         match &purpose {
8384                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8385                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8386                                 },
8387                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8388                         }
8389                 },
8390                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8391         }
8392 }
8393
8394 #[test]
8395 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8396         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8397         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8398         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8399         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8400         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8401
8402         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8403
8404         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8405         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8406         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8407         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8408
8409         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8410         // resulting events.
8411         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8412                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8413                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8414                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8415                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8416                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8417                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8418
8419                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8420                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8421                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8422                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8423                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8424
8425                         // We should fail the payment back
8426                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8427                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8428                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8429                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8430                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8431                                 },
8432                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8433                         }
8434                 }
8435         }
8436
8437         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8438         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8439         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8440
8441         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8442         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8443                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8444         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8445         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8446
8447         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8448         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8449                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8450         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8451         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8452
8453         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8454         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8455                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8456         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8457         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8458 }
8459
8460 #[test]
8461 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8462         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8463         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8464         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8465         // error.
8466         //
8467         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8468         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8469         // commitment at same time.
8470
8471         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8472         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8473         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8474         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8475
8476         // Create some initial channel
8477         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8478         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8479
8480         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8481         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8482
8483         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8484         let (preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8485
8486         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8487         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8488         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8489         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8490         let watchtower = {
8491                 let new_monitor = {
8492                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8493                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8494                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8495                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8496                         new_monitor
8497                 };
8498                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8499                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8500                 watchtower
8501         };
8502         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8503         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8504         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8505         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8506         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8507
8508         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8509         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8510         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8511         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8512
8513         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8514         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8515         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8516         {
8517                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8518                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8519                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8520                         if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8521                                 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8522                                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8523                         } else { assert!(false); }
8524                 } else {
8525                         assert!(false);
8526                 }
8527         }
8528         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8530         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8531         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8532 }
8533
8534 #[test]
8535 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8536         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8537         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8538         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8539         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8540
8541         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8542         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8543         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8544         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8545
8546         // Create some initial channel
8547         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8548         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8549
8550         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8551         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8552
8553         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8554         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8555
8556         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8557         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8558         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8559         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8560         let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8561                 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8562         );
8563         let watchtower_alice = {
8564                 let new_monitor = {
8565                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8566                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8567                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8568                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8569                         new_monitor
8570                 };
8571                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8572                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8573                 watchtower
8574         };
8575         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8576         // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8577         // requirements here.
8578         const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8579         alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8580         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8581
8582         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8583         {
8584                 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8585                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8586                 check_spends!(txn[0], chan_1.3);
8587                 check_spends!(txn[1], txn[0]);
8588         };
8589
8590         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8591         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8592         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8593         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8594         let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8595         let watchtower_bob = {
8596                 let new_monitor = {
8597                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8598                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8599                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8600                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8601                         new_monitor
8602                 };
8603                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8604                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8605                 watchtower
8606         };
8607         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8608
8609         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8610         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8611         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8612                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8614
8615         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8616         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8617         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8618         {
8619                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8620                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8621                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8622                         if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8623                                 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8624                                 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8625                                 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8626                                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8627                         } else { assert!(false); }
8628                 } else {
8629                         assert!(false);
8630                 }
8631         }
8632         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8633         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8634
8635         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8636         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8637
8638         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8639         let bob_state_y;
8640         {
8641                 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8642                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8643                 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8644         };
8645
8646         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8647         let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8648         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8649         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8650         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
8651                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8652         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8653         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8654         {
8655                 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8656                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8657                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8658         }
8659 }
8660
8661 #[test]
8662 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8663         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8664         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8665         // message).
8666         //
8667         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8668         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8669         //
8670         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8671         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8672         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8673         // before receiving funding_signed.
8674         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8675         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8676         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8677         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8678
8679         // Create an initial channel
8680         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8681         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8682         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8683         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8684         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8685
8686         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8687         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8688
8689         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8690         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8691
8692         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8693         let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index });
8694         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8695         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8696         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true,
8697                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8698 }
8699
8700 #[test]
8701 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8702         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8703         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8704         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8705         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8706         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8707         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8708
8709         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8710         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8711         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8712         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8713
8714         // Create some initial channels
8715         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8716
8717         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8718         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8719         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8720         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8721         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8722         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8723
8724         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8725         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8726         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8727         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8728         // this test before #653 fix.
8729         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8730         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8731         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8732         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8733         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8734
8735         let htlc_timeout = {
8736                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8737                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8738                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8739                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8740                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8741                 node_txn[0].clone()
8742         };
8743
8744         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8745         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8746         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8747 }
8748
8749 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8750         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8751         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8752         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8753         //
8754         // Steps of the test:
8755         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8756         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8757         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8758         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8759         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8760         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8761         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8762         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8765         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8766         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8767
8768         // Create some initial channels
8769         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8770         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8771
8772         // Steps (1) and (2):
8773         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8774         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8775
8776         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8777         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8778         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8779         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8780         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8781         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8782         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8783
8784         // Steps (3) and (4):
8785         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8786         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8787         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8788         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8789
8790         // Bob force-closes
8791         if !broadcast_alice {
8792                 force_closing_node = 1;
8793                 counterparty_node = 0;
8794         }
8795         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8796         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8797         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8798         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8799         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8800                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8801                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8802                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8803                 };
8804                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8805                 if broadcast_alice {
8806                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8807                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8808                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8809                 }
8810         }
8811
8812         // Step (5):
8813         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8814         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8815         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8817         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8818
8819         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8820         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8821         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8822         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8823         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8824         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8825
8826         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8827         let went_onchain = go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1;
8828         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if went_onchain { None } else { Some(1000) }, went_onchain, false);
8829         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8830         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8831                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8832                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8833                 match events[0] {
8834                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8835                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8836                         },
8837                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8838                 };
8839         }
8840         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8841         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8842         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8843         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8844
8845         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8846         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8847         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8848                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8849                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8850                         (*msg).clone()
8851                 },
8852                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8853         };
8854         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8855                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8856                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8857                         (*updates).clone()
8858                 },
8859                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8860         };
8861
8862         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8863         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8864         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8865         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8866
8867         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8868         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8869         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8870                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8871                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8872                         (*msg).clone()
8873                 },
8874                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8875         };
8876         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8877         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8878
8879         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8880         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8881         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8882         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8883         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8884                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8885                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8886                 if broadcast_alice {
8887                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8888                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8889                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8890                 }
8891                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8892                 if broadcast_alice {
8893                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8894                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8895                 } else {
8896                         if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
8897                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8898                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].txid(), bob_txn[1].txid());
8899                         } else {
8900                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8901                         }
8902                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8903                 }
8904         }
8905
8906         // Step (6):
8907         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8908         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8909         {
8910                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8911                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8912                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8913                 };
8914                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8915                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8916                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8917                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8918                 if broadcast_alice {
8919                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8920                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8921                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8922                 } else {
8923                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
8924                         let htlc_tx = bob_txn.pop().unwrap();
8925                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8926                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8927                 }
8928         }
8929 }
8930
8931 #[test]
8932 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8933         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8934         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8935         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8936         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8937 }
8938
8939 #[test]
8940 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8941         // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8942         // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8943         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8944         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8945         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8946         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8947
8948         // Create an first channel channel
8949         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8950         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8951
8952         // Create an second channel
8953         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None, None).unwrap();
8954         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8955
8956         // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8957         // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8958         open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8959
8960         // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8961         // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8962         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8963         {
8964                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8965                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8966                 match &events[0] {
8967                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8968                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8969                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8970                         },
8971                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8972                 }
8973         }
8974
8975         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8976         {
8977                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8978                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8979                 match &events[0] {
8980                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8981                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8982                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8983                         },
8984                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8985                 }
8986         }
8987 }
8988
8989 #[test]
8990 fn test_peer_funding_sidechannel() {
8991         // Test that if a peer somehow learns which txid we'll use for our channel funding before we
8992         // receive `funding_transaction_generated` the peer cannot cause us to crash. We'd previously
8993         // assumed that LDK would receive `funding_transaction_generated` prior to our peer learning
8994         // the txid and panicked if the peer tried to open a redundant channel to us with the same
8995         // funding outpoint.
8996         //
8997         // While this assumption is generally safe, some users may have out-of-band protocols where
8998         // they notify their LSP about a funding outpoint first, or this may be violated in the future
8999         // with collaborative transaction construction protocols, i.e. dual-funding.
9000         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9001         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9002         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9003         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9004
9005         let temp_chan_id_ab = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9006         let temp_chan_id_ca = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[2], &nodes[0], 1_000_000, 0);
9007
9008         let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9009                 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9010
9011         let cs_funding_events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9012         assert_eq!(cs_funding_events.len(), 1);
9013         match cs_funding_events[0] {
9014                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => {}
9015                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", cs_funding_events),
9016         }
9017
9018         nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temp_chan_id_ca, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), funding_output.index).unwrap();
9019         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9020         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9021         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9022         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9023         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9024
9025         let res = nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id_ab, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone());
9026         let err_msg = format!("{:?}", res.unwrap_err());
9027         assert!(err_msg.contains("An existing channel using outpoint "));
9028         assert!(err_msg.contains(" is open with peer"));
9029         // Even though the last funding_transaction_generated errored, it still generated a
9030         // SendFundingCreated. However, when the peer responds with a funding_signed it will send the
9031         // appropriate error message.
9032         let as_funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9033         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_created);
9034         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9035         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9036         let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: format!("An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}", funding_output, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), };
9037         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_output), true, reason)]);
9038
9039         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9040         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9041         get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9042 }
9043
9044 #[test]
9045 fn test_duplicate_conflicting_funding_from_second_peer() {
9046         // Test that if a user tries to fund a channel with a funding outpoint they'd previously used
9047         // we don't try to remove the previous ChannelMonitor. This is largely a test to ensure we
9048         // don't regress in the fuzzer, as such funding getting passed our outpoint-matches checks
9049         // implies the user (and our counterparty) has reused cryptographic keys across channels, which
9050         // we require the user not do.
9051         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9052         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9053         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9054         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9055
9056         let temp_chan_id = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9057
9058         let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9059                 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9060
9061         // Now that we have a funding outpoint, create a dummy `ChannelMonitor` and insert it into
9062         // nodes[0]'s ChainMonitor so that the initial `ChannelMonitor` write fails.
9063         let dummy_chan_id = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[2], &nodes[3]).3;
9064         let dummy_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[2], dummy_chan_id).clone();
9065         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_output, dummy_monitor).unwrap();
9066
9067         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9068
9069         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9070         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9071         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9073         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9074
9075         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9076         // At this point, the channel should be closed, after having generated one monitor write (the
9077         // watch_channel call which failed), but zero monitor updates.
9078         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9079         get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9080         let err_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned() };
9081         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_signed_msg.channel_id, true, err_reason)]);
9082 }
9083
9084 #[test]
9085 fn test_duplicate_funding_err_in_funding() {
9086         // Test that if we have a live channel with one peer, then another peer comes along and tries
9087         // to create a second channel with the same txid we'll fail and not overwrite the
9088         // outpoint_to_peer map in `ChannelManager`.
9089         //
9090         // This was previously broken.
9091         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9092         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9093         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9094         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9095
9096         let (_, _, _, real_channel_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9097         let real_chan_funding_txo = chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9098         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(real_chan_funding_txo), real_channel_id);
9099
9100         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9101         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9102         let node_c_temp_chan_id = open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id;
9103         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9104         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9105         let mut accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9106         accept_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = node_c_temp_chan_id;
9107         nodes[2].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
9108
9109         // Now that we have a second channel with the same funding txo, send a bogus funding message
9110         // and let nodes[1] remove the inbound channel.
9111         let (_, funding_tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[2], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9112
9113         nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated(&node_c_temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), funding_tx).unwrap();
9114
9115         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9116         funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9117         // Make the signature invalid by changing the funding output
9118         funding_created_msg.funding_output_index += 10;
9119         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9120         get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9121         let err = "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned();
9122         let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err };
9123         let expected_closing = ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(real_channel_id, false, reason);
9124         check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[expected_closing]);
9125
9126         assert_eq!(
9127                 *nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().get(&real_chan_funding_txo).unwrap(),
9128                 nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
9129         );
9130 }
9131
9132 #[test]
9133 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9134         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9135         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9136         //
9137         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9138         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9139         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9140         // updating logic for the existing channel.
9141         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9142         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9143         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9144         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9145
9146         // Create an initial channel
9147         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9148         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9149         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9150         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9151
9152         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9153         // that it is rejected.
9154         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9155         {
9156                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9157                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9158                 match events[0] {
9159                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9160                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9161                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9162                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9163                                 // move forward with it.
9164                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9165                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9166                         },
9167                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9168                 }
9169         }
9170
9171         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9172         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9173
9174         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9176
9177         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9178         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9179         {
9180                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9181                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9182                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9183                 added_monitors.clear();
9184         }
9185         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9186
9187         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9188
9189         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9190         let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
9191
9192         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9193         // temporary one).
9194
9195         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9196         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9197         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9198         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9199         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9200         {
9201                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9202                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9203                 match events[0] {
9204                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9205                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9206                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9207                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9208                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9209                         },
9210                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9211                 }
9212         }
9213
9214         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9215         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9216         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9217         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9218         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9219         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9220
9221         let funding_created = {
9222                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9223                 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9224                 // Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9225                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9226                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9227                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9228                 match a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap() {
9229                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan) => {
9230                                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9231                                 chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
9232                         },
9233                         _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9234                 }.unwrap()
9235         };
9236         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9237         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9238         // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
9239         // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
9240         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9241
9242         check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[
9243                 ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_created.temporary_channel_id, false, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9244                         err: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned()
9245                 })
9246         ]);
9247
9248         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9249         {
9250                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9251                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9252                 match events[0] {
9253                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9254                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9255                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9256                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9257                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9258                         },
9259                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9260                 }
9261         }
9262
9263         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9264         // everything is functional.
9265         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9266         {
9267                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9268                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9269                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9270                 added_monitors.clear();
9271         }
9272         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9273
9274         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9275         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9276         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9277         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9278
9279         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9280         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9281         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9282
9283         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9284 }
9285
9286 #[test]
9287 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9288         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9289         //
9290         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9291         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9292         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9293         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9294         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9295         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9296         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9297
9298         // Create some initial channels
9299         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9300         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9301         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9302
9303         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9304         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9305         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9306
9307         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9308         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9309         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9310
9311         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9312         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9313         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9314         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9315         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9316                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9317         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9318         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9319         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9320         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9321
9322         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9323         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9324         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(), data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9325         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9326         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9327                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
9328         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9329         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9330         match events[0] {
9331                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9332                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9333                 },
9334                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9335         }
9336         match events[1] {
9337                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9338                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9339                 },
9340                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9341         }
9342         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9343         // peer_disconnected.
9344         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9345         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9346
9347         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9348         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9349         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9350 }
9351
9352 #[test]
9353 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9354         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9355         //
9356         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9357         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9358         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9359         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9360         //
9361         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9362         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9363         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9364         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9365         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9366         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9367         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9368
9369         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9370         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9371         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9372
9373         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9374
9375         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9376         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9377         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9378         // its length.
9379         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9380         let wit_program_script: ScriptBuf = wit_program.into();
9381         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9382                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9383                 output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9384         }
9385
9386         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9387         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9388         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9389         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9390
9391         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9392         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9393         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9394
9395         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9396         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9397
9398         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9399         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9400         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9401
9402         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9403         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9404         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() },
9405                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9406         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9407         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9408         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9409         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9410                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9411                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } = action {
9412                         assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9413                 } else { panic!(); }
9414         } else { panic!(); }
9415         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9416
9417         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9418         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9419         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9420         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9421                 version: 2i32, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9422                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9423                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9424                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9425                                 vout: idx as u32,
9426                         },
9427                         script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
9428                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9429                         witness: Witness::from_slice(&channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9430                 }).collect(),
9431                 output: vec![TxOut {
9432                         value: 1000,
9433                         script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new(),
9434                 }]
9435         };
9436         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9437         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9438 }
9439
9440 #[test]
9441 fn test_coinbase_funding_tx() {
9442         // Miners are able to fund channels directly from coinbase transactions, however
9443         // by consensus rules, outputs of a coinbase transaction are encumbered by a 100
9444         // block maturity timelock. To ensure that a (non-0conf) channel like this is enforceable
9445         // on-chain, the minimum depth is updated to 100 blocks for coinbase funding transactions.
9446         //
9447         // Note that 0conf channels with coinbase funding transactions are unaffected and are
9448         // immediately operational after opening.
9449         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9450         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9451         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9452         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9453
9454         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9455         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9456
9457         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9458         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9459
9460         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9461
9462         // Create the coinbase funding transaction.
9463         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_coinbase_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9464
9465         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9466         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9467         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9468
9469         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9470         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9471         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9472
9473         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9474
9475         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9476         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9477
9478         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9479         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9480
9481         // Starting at height 0, we "confirm" the coinbase at height 1.
9482         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 1);
9483         // We connect 98 more blocks to have 99 confirmations for the coinbase transaction.
9484         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9485         // Check that we have no pending message events (we have not queued a `channel_ready` yet).
9486         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9487         // Now connect one more block which results in 100 confirmations of the coinbase transaction.
9488         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
9489         // There should now be a `channel_ready` which can be handled.
9490         let _ = &nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(&nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9491
9492         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9493         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9494         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9495         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
9496         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9497         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9498 }
9499
9500 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9501         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9502         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9503         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9504         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9505         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9506         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9507         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9508         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9509         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9510         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9511         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9512         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9513         // until we learned about an additional block.
9514         //
9515         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9516         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9517         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9518         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9519         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9520         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9521         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9522
9523         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9524         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9525         let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9526         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9527         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9528
9529         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9530         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9531         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9532         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9533         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9534         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9535
9536         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9537         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9538                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9539         }
9540         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9541                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9542         if test_height_before_timelock {
9543                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9544                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9545                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9546                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9547         } else {
9548                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9549                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9550                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9551                 let htlc_tx = if spending_txn[0].txid() == node_txn[0].txid() {
9552                         &spending_txn[1]
9553                 } else {
9554                         &spending_txn[0]
9555                 };
9556                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, node_txn[0]);
9557                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9558                 // timelock is up).
9559                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9560                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9561
9562                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9563                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9564                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9565                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9566                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, htlc_tx)], conf_height + 1);
9567                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9568                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9569
9570                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9571                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9572                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9573                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9574                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9575                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9576                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9577                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9578                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9579         }
9580 }
9581
9582 #[test]
9583 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9584         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9585         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9586 }
9587
9588 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9589         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9590         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9591         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9592         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9593
9594         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9595
9596         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9597                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9598         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9599
9600         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9601
9602         {
9603                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9604                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9605                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9606                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9607                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9608                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9609                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9610                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9611         }
9612         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9613         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9614
9615         {
9616                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9617                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9618                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9619                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9620                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9621                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9622                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9623                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9624                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9625                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9626                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9627                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9628                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9629         }
9630
9631         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9632         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9633
9634         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9635                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9636                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9637
9638                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9639                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9640                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9641                 ];
9642                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9643                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9644
9645                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9646                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9647                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9648
9649                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9650                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9651                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9652
9653                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9654                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9655                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9656                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9657                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9658                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9659         } else {
9660                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9661                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9662                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9663
9664                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9665                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9666                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9667                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9668
9669                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9670
9671                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9672         }
9673 }
9674
9675 #[test]
9676 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9677         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9678         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9679         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9680         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9681         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9682 }
9683
9684 #[test]
9685 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9686         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9687         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9688         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9689 }
9690
9691 #[test]
9692 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9693         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9694         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9695         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9696         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9697         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9698         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9699
9700         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9701         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9702         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9703         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9704
9705         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9706                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9707         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9708         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9709         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9710                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9711                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9712                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9713         });
9714
9715         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9716
9717         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9718         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9719
9720         let session_privs = {
9721                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9722                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9723                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9724                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9725                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9726                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9727         };
9728         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9729                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9730                 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9731         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9732
9733         {
9734                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9735                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9736                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9737         }
9738         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9739
9740         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9741                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9742         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9743
9744         {
9745                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9746                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9747                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9748
9749                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9750                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9751
9752                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9753                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9754
9755                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9756                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9757                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9758
9759                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9760                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9761                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9762
9763                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9764                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9765                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9766         }
9767         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9768         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9769         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9770         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9771
9772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9773
9774         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9775         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9776         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9777
9778         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9779         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9780
9781         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9782         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9783         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9784
9785         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9786
9787         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9788                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9789                 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9790         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9791
9792         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9793         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9794         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9795
9796         do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9797         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true, true);
9798 }
9799
9800 #[test]
9801 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9802         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9803         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9804         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9805         // amount.
9806         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9807         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9808         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9809         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9810
9811         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9812         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9813         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9814         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9815
9816         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9817         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9818         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9819                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9820                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9821                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9822         });
9823
9824         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9825         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9826         // amount of time to respond to.
9827
9828         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9829         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9830         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9831
9832         let failed_destinations = vec![
9833                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9834                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9835         ];
9836         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9837
9838         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9839
9840         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9841         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9842                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9843         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9844
9845         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9846         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9847         let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9848         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9849
9850         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9851         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9852         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9853         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9854         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9855 }
9856
9857 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9858 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9859 enum ExposureEvent {
9860         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9861         AtHTLCForward,
9862         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9863         AtHTLCReception,
9864         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9865         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9866 }
9867
9868 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
9869         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9870         // policy.
9871         //
9872         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9873         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9874         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9875         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9876         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9877         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9878         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9879         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9880
9881         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9882         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9883         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
9884                 // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
9885                 // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
9886                 // originally written.
9887                 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253)
9888         } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000) }; // initial default setting value
9889         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9890         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9891         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9892
9893         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9894         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9895         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9896         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9897         if on_holder_tx {
9898                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9899         }
9900         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9901         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9902         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9903
9904         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9905
9906         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9907
9908         if on_holder_tx {
9909                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9910                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9911                 match get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id) {
9912                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9913                                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9914                         },
9915                         _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9916                 }
9917         }
9918
9919         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9920         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9922         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9923
9924         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9925         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9926         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9927
9928         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9929         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9930         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9931
9932         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
9933         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
9934                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
9935
9936         let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
9937                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9938                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9939                 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9940                 (chan.context().get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
9941                 chan.context().get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
9942         };
9943         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9944         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9945
9946         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9947         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9948
9949         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
9950         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9951
9952         if on_holder_tx {
9953                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9954                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9955                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9956                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9957                         for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9958                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9959                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9960                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9961                         }
9962                 } else {
9963                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9964                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9965                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9966                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9967                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9968                         }
9969                 }
9970         } else {
9971                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9972                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9973                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9974                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9975                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9976                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9977                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9978                         }
9979                 } else {
9980                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9981                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9982                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9983                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9984                         }
9985                 }
9986         }
9987
9988         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9989                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
9990                         if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
9991                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9992                 if on_holder_tx {
9993                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9994                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9995                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9996                 } else {
9997                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9998                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9999                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
10000                 }
10001         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10002                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
10003                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10004                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10005                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10006                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10007                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10008                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10009                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10010                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10011                 if on_holder_tx {
10012                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10013                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10014                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10015                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10016                 } else {
10017                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10018                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
10019                                 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
10020                                         dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4,
10021                                         max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10022                 }
10023         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10024                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
10025                 // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
10026                 // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
10027                 // to cross the threshold.
10028                 for _ in 0..20 {
10029                         let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
10030                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10031                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10032                 }
10033                 {
10034                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10035                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10036                 }
10037                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10038                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10039                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
10040         }
10041
10042         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10043         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10044         added_monitors.clear();
10045 }
10046
10047 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
10048         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10049         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10050         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10051         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10052         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10053         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10054         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10055         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10056         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10057         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10058         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10059         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10060 }
10061
10062 #[test]
10063 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10064         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false);
10065         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true);
10066 }
10067
10068 #[test]
10069 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10070         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10071         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10072         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10073         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10074
10075         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10076         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10077         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10078         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10079         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10080
10081         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10082
10083         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10084         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10085         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[&[1]]) };
10086         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10087         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10088                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10089                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
10090                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10091                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10092                         }]}
10093                 },
10094                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10095         };
10096         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10097         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10098                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10099                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10100                 },
10101                 _ => panic!()
10102         }
10103         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10104         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10105         match events[0] {
10106                 Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, .. } => {
10107                         assert_eq!(channel_id, temp_channel_id);
10108                 },
10109                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10110         }
10111 }
10112
10113 #[test]
10114 fn test_non_final_funding_tx_within_headroom() {
10115         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10116         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10117         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10118         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10119
10120         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10121         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10122         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10123         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10124         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10125
10126         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10127
10128         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10129         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10130         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[[1]]) };
10131         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10132         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10133                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10134                         // Timelock the transaction within a +1 headroom from the best block.
10135                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10136                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10137                         }]}
10138                 },
10139                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10140         };
10141
10142         // Transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
10143         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10144         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10145 }
10146
10147 #[test]
10148 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
10149         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
10150         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
10151         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
10152         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10153         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10154         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10155         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10156
10157         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10158
10159         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
10160         {
10161                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10162                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
10163         }
10164
10165         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
10166         {
10167                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10168                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10169         }
10170         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10172
10173         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10174         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10175         match events[0] {
10176                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10177                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10178                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10179                 },
10180                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10181         };
10182
10183         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
10184         // it.
10185         {
10186                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10187                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
10188         }
10189         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10190         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10191
10192         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10193         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10194         match events[0] {
10195                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10196                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10197                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10198                 },
10199                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10200         };
10201
10202         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
10203         // channel.
10204         {
10205                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10206                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10207         }
10208         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10209         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10210
10211         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10212         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10213         match events[0] {
10214                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
10215                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10216                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
10217                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000".to_owned() },
10218                                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10219                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
10220                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10221                 },
10222                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10223         };
10224 }
10225
10226 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
10227         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10228         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10229         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10230         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10231         let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
10232         let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
10233                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
10234         let recv_value = 100_000;
10235
10236         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10237
10238         let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
10239         let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
10240                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
10241                         Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
10242                 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
10243         } else {
10244                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
10245                 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
10246         };
10247         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
10248         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10249                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10250         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10251         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10252         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10253         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
10254         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10255         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10256         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10257
10258         if valid_delta {
10259                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
10260                         None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10261
10262                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
10263         } else {
10264                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10265
10266                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10267
10268                 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10269                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10270                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10271
10272                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10273         }
10274 }
10275
10276 #[test]
10277 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
10278         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
10279         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
10280         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
10281         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
10282 }
10283
10284 #[test]
10285 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
10286         // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
10287         // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10288         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10289         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10290         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10291         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10292
10293         // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
10294         let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
10295                 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10296                         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
10297                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
10298                                         Some(())
10299                                 } else {
10300                                         None
10301                                 }
10302                         } else {
10303                                 None
10304                         }
10305                 );
10306                 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
10307         };
10308
10309         // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
10310         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10311         let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
10312                 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
10313                 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10314
10315                 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
10316                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
10317                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10318                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10319                 }
10320
10321                 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
10322                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10323                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10324
10325                 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
10326                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10327                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10328         };
10329
10330         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10331
10332         // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
10333         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
10334         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10335         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10336         let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10337         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10338         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
10339         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
10340
10341         // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
10342         let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10343         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
10344         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10345         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
10346         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10347
10348         // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
10349         // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
10350         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10351         let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10352         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10353
10354         // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
10355         //
10356         // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
10357         // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
10358         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10359         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10360         let bob_init = msgs::Init {
10361                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10362         };
10363         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
10364         let alice_init = msgs::Init {
10365                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10366         };
10367         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
10368
10369         // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
10370         // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
10371         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10372         let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
10373                 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
10374         );
10375         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
10376         check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
10377
10378         // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
10379         let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10380                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
10381                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10382                         Some(msg.clone())
10383                 } else {
10384                         None
10385                 }
10386         ).unwrap();
10387         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
10388
10389         // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
10390         for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10391                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10392                 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
10393         }
10394
10395         // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
10396         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10397         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10398
10399         // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
10400         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
10401         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10402
10403         // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
10404         // waiting on any messages.
10405         for node in &nodes {
10406                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10407                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10408                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10409                 }
10410         }
10411 }
10412
10413 #[test]
10414 fn test_remove_expired_outbound_unfunded_channels() {
10415         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10416         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10417         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10418         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10419
10420         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10421         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10422         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10423         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10424         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10425
10426         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10427         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10428         match events[0] {
10429                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10430                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10431         };
10432
10433         // Asserts the outbound channel has been removed from a nodes[0]'s peer state map.
10434         let check_outbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10435                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10436                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10437                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10438         };
10439
10440         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10441         check_outbound_channel_existence(true);
10442
10443         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10444         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10445                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10446                 check_outbound_channel_existence(true)
10447         }
10448
10449         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10450         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10451         check_outbound_channel_existence(false);
10452
10453         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10454         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10455         match msg_events[0] {
10456                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10457                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10458                 },
10459                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10460         }
10461         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10462 }
10463
10464 #[test]
10465 fn test_remove_expired_inbound_unfunded_channels() {
10466         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10467         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10468         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10469         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10470
10471         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10472         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10473         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10474         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10475         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10476
10477         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10478         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10479         match events[0] {
10480                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10481                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10482         };
10483
10484         // Asserts the inbound channel has been removed from a nodes[1]'s peer state map.
10485         let check_inbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10486                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10487                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10488                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10489         };
10490
10491         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10492         check_inbound_channel_existence(true);
10493
10494         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10495         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10496                 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10497                 check_inbound_channel_existence(true)
10498         }
10499
10500         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10501         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10502         check_inbound_channel_existence(false);
10503
10504         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10505         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10506         match msg_events[0] {
10507                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10508                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10509                 },
10510                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10511         }
10512         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10513 }
10514
10515 fn do_test_multi_post_event_actions(do_reload: bool) {
10516         // Tests handling multiple post-Event actions at once.
10517         // There is specific code in ChannelManager to handle channels where multiple post-Event
10518         // `ChannelMonitorUpdates` are pending at once. This test exercises that code.
10519         //
10520         // Specifically, we test calling `get_and_clear_pending_events` while there are two
10521         // PaymentSents from different channels and one channel has two pending `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s
10522         // - one from an RAA and one from an inbound commitment_signed.
10523         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10524         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10525         let (persister, chain_monitor);
10526         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10527         let nodes_0_deserialized;
10528         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10529
10530         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
10531         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).2;
10532
10533         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10534         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10535
10536         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10537         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10538
10539         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
10540         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10541         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
10542
10543         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
10544         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10545         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 1_000_000);
10546
10547         for dest in &[1, 2] {
10548                 let htlc_fulfill_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[*dest], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10549                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[*dest].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10550                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[*dest], htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false);
10551                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 0);
10552         }
10553
10554         let (route, payment_hash_3, _, payment_secret_3) =
10555                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
10556         let payment_id = PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0);
10557         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
10558                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), payment_id).unwrap();
10559         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10560
10561         let send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
10562         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
10563         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg);
10564         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10565
10566         if do_reload {
10567                 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
10568                 let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
10569                 let chan_1_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_2).encode();
10570                 reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], persister, chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
10571
10572                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10573                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10574
10575                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
10576                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[2]));
10577         }
10578
10579         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10580         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
10581         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[0] {
10582                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10583         } else { panic!(); }
10584         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] {
10585                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10586         } else { panic!(); }
10587         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
10588         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
10589
10590         // After the events are processed, the ChannelMonitorUpdates will be released and, upon their
10591         // completion, we'll respond to nodes[1] with an RAA + CS.
10592         get_revoke_commit_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10593         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 3);
10594 }
10595
10596 #[test]
10597 fn test_multi_post_event_actions() {
10598         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(true);
10599         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(false);
10600 }
10601
10602 #[test]
10603 fn test_batch_channel_open() {
10604         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10605         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10606         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10607         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10608
10609         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10610         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10611                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10612                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10613         ]);
10614
10615         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10616         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10617         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10618         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10619
10620         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10621         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10622         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10623
10624         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10625         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10626
10627         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10628         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10629         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10630         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10631
10632         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10633         chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10634         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10635         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10636
10637         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before persisting all monitors has been
10638         // completed.
10639         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10640         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
10641
10642         // Complete the persistence of the monitor.
10643         nodes[0].chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(
10644                 &ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 })
10645         );
10646         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10647
10648         // The transaction should only have been broadcast now.
10649         let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10650         assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10651         assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0], tx);
10652
10653         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10654         assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10655                 *e,
10656                 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10657                         ref counterparty_node_id,
10658                         ..
10659                 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
10660         )));
10661         assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10662                 *e,
10663                 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10664                         ref counterparty_node_id,
10665                         ..
10666                 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
10667         )));
10668 }
10669
10670 #[test]
10671 fn test_disconnect_in_funding_batch() {
10672         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10673         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10674         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10675         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10676
10677         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10678         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10679                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10680                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10681         ]);
10682
10683         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10684         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10685         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10686         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10687
10688         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10689         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10690         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10691
10692         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10693         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10694
10695         // The remaining peer in the batch disconnects.
10696         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
10697
10698         // The channels in the batch will close immediately.
10699         let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10700         let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
10701         let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
10702         let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
10703         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10704                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10705                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10706                         discard_funding: true,
10707                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
10708                         user_channel_id: Some(42),
10709                         ..Default::default()
10710                 },
10711                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10712                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
10713                         discard_funding: true,
10714                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
10715                         user_channel_id: Some(43),
10716                         ..Default::default()
10717                 },
10718         ]);
10719
10720         // The monitor should become closed.
10721         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10722         {
10723                 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10724                 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10725                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10726                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10727         }
10728
10729         // The funding transaction should not have been broadcast, and therefore, we don't need
10730         // to broadcast a force-close transaction for the closed monitor.
10731         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10732
10733         // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
10734         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10735 }
10736
10737 #[test]
10738 fn test_batch_funding_close_after_funding_signed() {
10739         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10740         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10741         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10742         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10743
10744         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10745         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10746                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10747                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10748         ]);
10749
10750         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10751         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10752         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10753         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10754
10755         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10756         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10757         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10758
10759         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10760         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10761         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10762         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10763
10764         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10765         chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10766         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10767         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10768
10769         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10770         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10771
10772         // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
10773         let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10774         let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
10775         let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
10776         let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
10777         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10778         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 2);
10779         {
10780                 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10781                 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10782                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10783                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10784                 let monitor_updates_2 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_2).unwrap();
10785                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2.len(), 1);
10786                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10787         }
10788         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10789         match msg_events[0] {
10790                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
10791                 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10792         }
10793
10794         // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
10795         {
10796                 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10797                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10798                 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
10799                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
10800                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
10801         }
10802
10803         // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
10804         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10805                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10806                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10807                         discard_funding: true,
10808                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
10809                         user_channel_id: Some(42),
10810                         ..Default::default()
10811                 },
10812                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10813                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
10814                         discard_funding: true,
10815                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
10816                         user_channel_id: Some(43),
10817                         ..Default::default()
10818                 },
10819         ]);
10820
10821         // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
10822         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10823 }
10824
10825 fn do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(confirm_remote_commitment: bool) {
10826         // Tests that a node will forget the channel (when it only requires 1 confirmation) if the
10827         // funding and commitment transaction confirm in the same block.
10828         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10829         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10830         let mut min_depth_1_block_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10831         min_depth_1_block_cfg.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10832         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg), Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg)]);
10833         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10834
10835         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
10836         let chan_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 });
10837
10838         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10839         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10840
10841         let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_remote_commitment {
10842                 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
10843         } else {
10844                 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
10845         };
10846
10847         closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10848         let mut msg_events = closing_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10849         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10850         match msg_events.pop().unwrap() {
10851                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, .. } => {},
10852                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10853         }
10854         check_added_monitors(closing_node, 1);
10855         check_closed_event(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
10856
10857         let commitment_tx = {
10858                 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10859                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
10860                 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
10861                 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
10862                 commitment_tx
10863         };
10864
10865         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
10866         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
10867
10868         check_closed_broadcast(other_node, 1, true);
10869         check_added_monitors(other_node, 1);
10870         check_closed_event(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
10871
10872         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10873         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10874 }
10875
10876 #[test]
10877 fn test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block() {
10878         do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(false);
10879         do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(true);
10880 }