_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
  22 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase};
  24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
  26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, get_route, RouteParameters};
  30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  31 use crate::ln::msgs;
  32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  33 use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils::{self, WatchtowerPersister};
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
  38 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
  39
  40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  44 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
  45 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  46 use bitcoin::{Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
  47 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  48
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  51
  52 use regex;
  53
  54 use crate::io;
  55 use crate::prelude::*;
  56 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  57 use core::default::Default;
  58 use core::iter::repeat;
  59 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  60 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
  61
  62 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  63 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  64
  65 use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS;
  66
  67 #[test]
  68 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  69         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  70         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  71         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  72         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  73         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  74         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  75         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  76         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  77
  78         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  79         // funding satoshis
  80         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  81         let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  82         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  83
  84         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  85         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
  86
  87         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  88         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  89
  90         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  91         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  92         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  93                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  94                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  95                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  96                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  97                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  98                         match action {
  99                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
 100                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
 101                                 },
 102                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 103                         }
 104                 } else { assert!(false); }
 105         };
 106
 107         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 108
 109         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 110         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 111         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 118
 119         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 120
 121         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 122
 123         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 124
 125         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 126 }
 127
 128 #[test]
 129 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 130         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 131         // them.
 132         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 133         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 134         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 135         *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
 136         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 137         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 138
 139         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None, None) {
 140                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 141                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 142                 },
 143                 _ => panic!()
 144         }
 145 }
 146
 147 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 148         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 149         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 150         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 151         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 152         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 153         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 154         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 155         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 156         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 157
 158         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 159         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 160         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 161         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 162         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 163         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 164
 165         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 166         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 167         if !send_from_initiator {
 168                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 169                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 170         }
 171         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
 172
 173         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 174         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 175         if send_from_initiator {
 176                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 177                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 178         }
 179         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
 180         {
 181                 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
 182                 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
 183                 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
 184                 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
 185
 186                 let channel_phase = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 187                 match channel_phase {
 188                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
 189                                 let chan_context = channel_phase.context_mut();
 190                                 chan_context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 191                                 chan_context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 192                         },
 193                         ChannelPhase::Funded(_) => assert!(false),
 194                 }
 195         }
 196
 197         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 198         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 199         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 200
 201         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 202         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 203         if send_from_initiator {
 204                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 205                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 206                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 207                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 208                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
 209         } else {
 210                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 211         }
 212 }
 213
 214 #[test]
 215 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 216         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 217         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 218 }
 219
 220 #[test]
 221 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 222         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 223         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 224         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 225         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 226         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 227
 228         // balancing
 229         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 230
 231         // A                                        B
 232         // update_fee                            ->
 233         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 234         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 235         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 236         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 237         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 238         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 239         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 240         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 241         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 242         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 243         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 244         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 245         //                                       <- RAA
 246         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 247
 248         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 249         {
 250                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 251                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 252         }
 253         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 254         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 255
 256         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 257         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 258         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 259                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 260                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 261                 },
 262                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 263         };
 264
 265         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 266
 267         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 268         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 269         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 270                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 272
 273         let payment_event = {
 274                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 275                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 276                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 277         };
 278         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 279         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 280
 281         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 282         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 283         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 284         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 285         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 287
 288         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 289         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 290         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 291         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 293
 294         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 295         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 296         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 297         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 298         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 299         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 300         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 302
 303         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 304         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 305         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 306         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 307         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 308         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 309         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 310         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 311
 312         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 313         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 314         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 316
 317         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 318         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 319         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 320
 321         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 323
 324         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 325         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 326         match events_2[0] {
 327                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 328                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 329         }
 330
 331         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 332         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 333 }
 334
 335 #[test]
 336 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 337         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 338         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 339         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 340         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 341         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 342         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 343         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 344
 345         // balancing
 346         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 347
 348         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 349         {
 350                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 351                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 352         }
 353         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 354         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 355
 356         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 357         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 358         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 359                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 360                         update_fee.as_ref()
 361                 },
 362                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 363         };
 364
 365         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 366
 367         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 368         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 369         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 370                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 372
 373         let payment_event = {
 374                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 375                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 376                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 377         };
 378         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 379         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 380
 381         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 382         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 383         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 384         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 385         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 386         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 387
 388         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 389         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 390
 391         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 392 }
 393
 394 #[test]
 395 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 396         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 397         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 398         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 399         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 400         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 401
 402         // A                                        B
 403         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 404         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 405         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 406         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 407         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 408         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 409         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 410         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 411         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 412         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 413         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 414         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 415         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 416         //                                          B should send no response here
 417         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 418         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 419         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 420
 421         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 422         let initial_feerate;
 423         {
 424                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 425                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 426                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 427         }
 428         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 430
 431         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 432         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 433         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 434                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 435                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 436                 },
 437                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 438         };
 439
 440         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 441         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 442         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 443         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 445
 446         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 447         // transaction:
 448         {
 449                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 450                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 451         }
 452         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 453         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 454         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 455
 456         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 457         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 458                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 459                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 460         };
 461
 462         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 463
 464         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 465         // Deliver (3)
 466         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 467
 468         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 469         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 470         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 472         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 473         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 474         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 475         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 476         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 477         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 478         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 479
 480         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 481         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 482         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 484         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 485
 486         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 487         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 488         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 489
 490         // Delever (4)
 491         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 492         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 494
 495         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 496         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 497         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 498
 499         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 500         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 501         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 502         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 503
 504         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 505         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 507 }
 508
 509 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 510         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 511         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 512         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 513         // Node objects.
 514
 515         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 516         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 517         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 518         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 519
 520         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 521                 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
 522                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 523                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 524         }
 525
 526         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 527         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 528         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 529
 530         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 531         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
 532         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 533
 534         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 535         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
 536
 537         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 538
 539         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 540         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 542         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 543
 544         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 545         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 546         {
 547                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 548                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 549                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 550                 added_monitors.clear();
 551         }
 552         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 553
 554         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 555
 556         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 557         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 558         {
 559                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 560                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 561                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 562                 added_monitors.clear();
 563         }
 564
 565         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 566         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 567         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 568
 569         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 570         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 571
 572         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 573         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 574         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 575         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 576         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 577 }
 578
 579 #[test]
 580 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 589         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 590         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 591         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 592         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 593         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 594         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 595         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 596         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 597         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 598         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 599 }
 600
 601 #[test]
 602 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 603         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 604         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 605         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 606         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 607         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 608
 609         {
 610                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 611                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 612         }
 613         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 615
 616         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 617         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 618         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 619                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 620                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 621                 },
 622                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 623         };
 624         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 625
 626         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 627         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 628         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 629
 630         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 631         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 632         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 633
 634         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 635         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 636         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 637         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 638
 639         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 640         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 641         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 642 }
 643
 644 #[test]
 645 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 646         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 647         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 648         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 649         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 650         let channel_value = 5000;
 651         let push_sats = 700;
 652         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
 653         let channel_id = chan.2;
 654         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 655         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 656         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 657
 658         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 659
 660         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 661         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 662         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 663         // remote limit.
 664         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 665         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
 666         {
 667                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 668                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 669         }
 670         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 671         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 672         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 673
 674         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 675
 676         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 677
 678         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 679         {
 680                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 681
 682                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 683                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 684                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
 685                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 686                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 687                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 688         }
 689
 690         {
 691                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 692                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 693                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 694         }
 695         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 696         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 698
 699         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 700
 701         // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 702         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 703         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 704                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 705                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 706                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 707                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 708                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 709                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 710                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
 711                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 712                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 713         };
 714         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 715                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 716                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 717                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 718                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 719                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 720                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 721                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
 722                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 723                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 724                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 725         };
 726
 727         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 728         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 729                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 730
 731         let res = {
 732                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 733                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 734                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 735                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 736                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 737                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 738                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 739                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 740                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 741                         push_sats,
 742                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
 743                         local_funding, remote_funding,
 744                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 745                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 746                         &mut htlcs,
 747                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 748                 );
 749                 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 750         };
 751
 752         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 753                 channel_id: chan.2,
 754                 signature: res.0,
 755                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
 756                 #[cfg(taproot)]
 757                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
 758         };
 759
 760         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 761                 channel_id: chan.2,
 762                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 763         };
 764
 765         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 766
 767         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 768         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 769         //Should produce and error.
 770         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 771         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee", 3);
 772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 773         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 774         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
 775                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], channel_value);
 776 }
 777
 778 #[test]
 779 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 780         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 781         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 782         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 783         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 784         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 785
 786         // balancing
 787         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 788
 789         {
 790                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 791                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 792         }
 793         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 794         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 795
 796         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 797         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 798         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 799                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 800                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 801                 },
 802                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 803         };
 804         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 805         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 806         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 808
 809         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 810
 811         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 812         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 813                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 814         {
 815                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 816                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 817                 added_monitors.clear();
 818         }
 819         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 820         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 821         // node[1] has nothing to do
 822
 823         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 824         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 826
 827         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 828         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 829         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 831         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 832         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 833         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 834
 835         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 836         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 837         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 838         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 839         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 840         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 841
 842         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 843         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 844         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 845         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 846
 847         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 849         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 850
 851         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 852         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 853         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 854         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 855
 856         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 857         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 858         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 859
 860         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 861
 862         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 863         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 864         match events[0] {
 865                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 866                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 867         };
 868
 869         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 870
 871         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 872         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 873         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 874         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 875         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 876 }
 877
 878 #[test]
 879 fn test_update_fee() {
 880         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 881         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 882         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 883         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 884         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 885         let channel_id = chan.2;
 886
 887         // A                                        B
 888         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 889         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 890         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 891         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 892         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 893         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 894         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 895         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 896         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 897         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 898         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 899         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 900
 901         // Create and deliver (1)...
 902         let feerate;
 903         {
 904                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 905                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 906                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 907         }
 908         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 910
 911         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 912         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 913         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 914                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 915                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 916                 },
 917                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 918         };
 919         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 920
 921         // Generate (2) and (3):
 922         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 923         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 925
 926         // Deliver (2):
 927         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 928         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 930
 931         // Create and deliver (4)...
 932         {
 933                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 934                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 935         }
 936         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 937         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 938         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 939         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 940         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 941                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 942                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 943                 },
 944                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 945         };
 946
 947         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 948         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 950         // ... creating (5)
 951         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 952         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 953
 954         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 955         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 957         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 958         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 959
 960         // Deliver (5):
 961         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 962         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 964
 965         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 966         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 967         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 968         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 969         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 970         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 971         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 972         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 974
 975         // Deliver (7)
 976         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 977         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 978         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 979         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 980
 981         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 982         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 983         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 984
 985         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 986         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 987         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 988         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 989         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 990 }
 991
 992 #[test]
 993 fn fake_network_test() {
 994         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 995         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 996         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 997         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 998         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 999         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1000
1001         // Create some initial channels
1002         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1003         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1004         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1005
1006         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1007         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1009         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1011
1012         // Send some more payments
1013         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1014         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1015         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1016
1017         // Test failure packets
1018         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1019         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1020
1021         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1022         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1023
1024         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1025         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1026         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1027         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1028         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1029         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1030         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1031
1032         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1033         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1034         hops.push(RouteHop {
1035                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1039                 fee_msat: 0,
1040                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1041                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1042         });
1043         hops.push(RouteHop {
1044                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1048                 fee_msat: 0,
1049                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1050                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1051         });
1052         hops.push(RouteHop {
1053                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1054                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1055                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1056                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1057                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1058                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1059                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1060         });
1061         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1062         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1063         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1064                 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1065                         &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1066
1067         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1068         hops.push(RouteHop {
1069                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1070                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1071                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1072                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1073                 fee_msat: 0,
1074                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1075                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1076         });
1077         hops.push(RouteHop {
1078                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1079                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1080                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1081                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1082                 fee_msat: 0,
1083                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1084                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1085         });
1086         hops.push(RouteHop {
1087                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1088                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1089                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1090                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1091                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1092                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1093                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1094         });
1095         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1096         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1097         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1098                 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1099                         &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1100
1101         // Claim the rebalances...
1102         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1103         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1104
1105         // Close down the channels...
1106         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1107         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1108         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1109         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1110         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1111         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1112         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1113         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1114         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1115         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1116         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1117         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1118 }
1119
1120 #[test]
1121 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1122         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1123         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1124         // commitment dance rounds.
1125         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1126         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1127         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1128         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1129         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1130         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1131
1132         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1133         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1134
1135         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1136         for _ in 0..50 {
1137                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1138                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1139                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1140                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1141         }
1142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1143
1144         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1145         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1146         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1147         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1148
1149         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1150         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1151         // another HTLC.
1152         {
1153                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1154                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1155                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1156                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1157         }
1158
1159         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1160         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1161         {
1162                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1163                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1164                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1165         }
1166
1167         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1168         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1169         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1170         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1171
1172         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1173         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1174         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1175         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1176         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1177         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1179
1180         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1181         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1182         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1183
1184         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1185
1186         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1187         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1188         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1190
1191         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1192         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1194         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1195
1196         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1198         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1199
1200         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1201                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1202         }
1203         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1205         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1207         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1208
1209         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1211         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1213         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1214
1215         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1217
1218         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1219
1220         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1221         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1222         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1223                 match event {
1224                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1225                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1226                         },
1227                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1228                 };
1229         }
1230
1231         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1232                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1233         }
1234
1235         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1236 }
1237
1238 #[test]
1239 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1240         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1241         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1242         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1243         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1244         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1245         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1246
1247         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1248         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1249         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1250         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1251         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1252         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1253
1254         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1255
1256         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1257         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1258
1259         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1260         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1261
1262         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1263         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1264         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1265 }
1266
1267 #[test]
1268 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1269         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1270         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1271         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1272         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1273         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1274         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1275         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1276
1277         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1278
1279         // balancing
1280         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1281
1282         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1283
1284         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1285         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1286         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1287
1288         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1289         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1290         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1292
1293         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1294         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1295
1296         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1297         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1298         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1299                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1300                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1301                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1302                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1303                 }
1304         }
1305         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1306
1307         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1309         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1310         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1311
1312         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1313         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1314
1315         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1316         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1317         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1318         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1319         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1320                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1321         } else {
1322                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1323         };
1324
1325         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1326         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1327
1328         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1329         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1330         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1331
1332         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1333         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1334         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1335         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1336
1337         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1338         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1339         for e in events {
1340                 match e {
1341                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1342                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg } } => {
1343                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1344                                 assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1345                         },
1346                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1347                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1348                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1349                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1350                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1351                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1352                         },
1353                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1354                 }
1355         }
1356 }
1357
1358 #[test]
1359 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1360         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1361         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1362         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1363         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1364         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1365
1366         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1367         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1368
1369         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1370         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1371         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1372         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1373                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1374         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1375         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1376                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1377         match err {
1378                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1379                         if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
1380                         else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
1381                 },
1382                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1383         }
1384         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1385
1386         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1387 }
1388
1389 #[test]
1390 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1391         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1392         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1393         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1394         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1395         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1396
1397         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1398                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1399         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1400         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1401         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1402         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1403
1404         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1405
1406         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1407         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1408                 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1409         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1410         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1411                 channel_id: chan.2,
1412                 htlc_id: 0,
1413                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1414                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1415                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1416                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1417                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1418                 blinding_point: None,
1419         };
1420
1421         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1422
1423         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1424         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1425         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1426
1427         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1428
1429         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1430
1431         // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1432         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1433         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1434                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1435                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1436                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1437                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1438                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1439                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1440                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1441                 chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1442
1443                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1444                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1445                  chan_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1446                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1447                  chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1448         };
1449         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1450                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1451                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1452                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1453                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1454                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1455                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1456                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1457                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1458                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1459                  chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1460         };
1461
1462         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1463         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1464                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1465
1466         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1467         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1468         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1469
1470         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1471                 offered: false,
1472                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1473                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1474                 payment_hash,
1475                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1476         };
1477
1478         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1479
1480         let res = {
1481                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1482                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1483                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1484                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1485                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1486                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1487                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1488                         commitment_number,
1489                         95000,
1490                         local_chan_balance,
1491                         local_funding, remote_funding,
1492                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1493                         feerate_per_kw,
1494                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1495                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1496                 );
1497                 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1498         };
1499
1500         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1501                 channel_id: chan.2,
1502                 signature: res.0,
1503                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1504                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1505                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1506         };
1507
1508         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1509         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1510         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1511
1512         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1513         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1514                 channel_id: chan.2,
1515                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1516                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1517                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1518                 next_local_nonce: None,
1519         };
1520         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1521
1522         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1523         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1524         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1525         match events[0] {
1526                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1527                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1528                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1529                 },
1530                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1531         };
1532         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
1533                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", raa_msg.channel_id), 1);
1534
1535         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1536 }
1537
1538 #[test]
1539 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1540         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1541         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1542         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1543         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1544         // this situation.
1545         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1546         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1547         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1548         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1549         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1550         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1551
1552         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1553         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1554
1555         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1556
1557         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1558
1559         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1560         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1561         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1562         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1563                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1564         }
1565
1566         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1567         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1568                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1569                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1570         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1571 }
1572
1573 #[test]
1574 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1575         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1576         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1577         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1578         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1579         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1580         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1581         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1582
1583         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1584         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1585         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1586         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1587         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1588         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1589         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1590
1591         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1592         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1593                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1594         }
1595
1596         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1597                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1598         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1599         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1600         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1601         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1602         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1603         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1604         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1605                 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1606         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1607         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1608                 channel_id: chan.2,
1609                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1610                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1611                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1612                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1613                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1614                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1615                 blinding_point: None,
1616         };
1617
1618         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1619         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1620         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 3);
1621         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1622         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1623         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1624         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1625         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() },
1626                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1627 }
1628
1629 #[test]
1630 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1631         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1632         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1633         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1634         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1635
1636         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1637         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1638         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1639         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1640         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1641
1642         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1643         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1644         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1645         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1646         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1647         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1648         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1649
1650         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1651                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1652         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1653         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1654         // commitment transaction fee.
1655         route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1656
1657         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1658         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1659                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1660         }
1661
1662         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1663         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1664                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1665         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1666         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1667                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1668                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1669 }
1670
1671 #[test]
1672 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1673         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1674         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1675         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1676         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1677         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1678         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1679         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1680         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1681         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1682
1683         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1684         // HTLC.
1685         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1686         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1687         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None, None).unwrap_err(),
1688                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1689
1690         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1691         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1692         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1693         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None, None).unwrap();
1694         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1695         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1696         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1697
1698         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1699         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1700         match msg_events[0] {
1701                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1702                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1703                 },
1704                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1705         }
1706 }
1707
1708 #[test]
1709 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1710         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1711         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1712         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1713         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1714         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1715         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1716         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1717
1718         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1719         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1720         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1721         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1722         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1723         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1724
1725         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1726         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1727         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1728         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1729         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1730         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1731
1732         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1733         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1734         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1735         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1736 }
1737
1738 #[test]
1739 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1740         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1741         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1742         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1743         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1744         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1745         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1746
1747         let feemsat = 239;
1748         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1749         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1750         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1751         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1752
1753         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1754         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1755         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1756         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1757
1758         // Add a pending HTLC.
1759         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1760         let payment_event_1 = {
1761                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1762                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1763                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1764
1765                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1766                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1767                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1768         };
1769         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1770
1771         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1772         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
1773         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1774         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1775         let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1776         route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1777
1778         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1779         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1780         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1781         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1782         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1783         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1784                 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1785         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1786         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1787                 channel_id: chan.2,
1788                 htlc_id: 1,
1789                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1790                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1791                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1792                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1793                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1794                 blinding_point: None,
1795         };
1796
1797         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1798         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1799         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value", 3);
1800         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1801         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1802         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1803         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1804         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() },
1805                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1806 }
1807
1808 #[test]
1809 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1810         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1811         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1812         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1813         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1814         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1815         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1816         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1817         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1818         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1819         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1820
1821         let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1822         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1823         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1824
1825         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1826         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1827 }
1828
1829 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1830         (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1831 }
1832
1833 #[test]
1834 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1835         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1836         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1837         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1838         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1839         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1840         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1841         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1842         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1843         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1844         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1845
1846         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1847         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1848
1849         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1850         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1851
1852         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1853                 ($node: expr) => {{
1854                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1855                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1856                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1857                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1858                         payment_event
1859                 }}
1860         }
1861
1862         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1863         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1864         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1865         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1866
1867         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1868
1869         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1870         {
1871                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1872                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1873                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1874                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1875                 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1876
1877                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1878                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1879                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1880                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1881         }
1882
1883         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1884         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1885         loop {
1886                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1887                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1888                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1889                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1890                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1891                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1892                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1893                         break;
1894                 }
1895
1896                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1897                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1898                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1899                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1900                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1901
1902                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1903                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1904                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1905                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1906                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1907                 );
1908
1909                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1910                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1911                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1912                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1913                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1914         }
1915
1916         // adding pending output.
1917         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1918         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1919         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1920         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1921         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1922         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1923         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1924         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1925         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1926         // policy.
1927         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1928         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1929         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1930
1931         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1932         let payment_event_1 = {
1933                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1934                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1935                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1936
1937                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1938                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1939                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1940         };
1941         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1942
1943         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1944         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1945         {
1946                 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1947                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1948                 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1949                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1950                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1951                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1952                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1953         }
1954
1955         // split the rest to test holding cell
1956         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1957         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1958         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1959         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1960         {
1961                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1962                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1963         }
1964
1965         // now see if they go through on both sides
1966         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1967         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1968         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1969                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1970         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1971         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1972         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1973
1974         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1975         {
1976                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1977                         get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1978                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1979                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1980                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1981                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1982                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1983         }
1984
1985         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1986         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1987         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1988                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1990         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1991         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1992
1993         // flush the pending htlc
1994         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1995         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1996         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1997
1998         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1999         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
2000         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2001         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2002
2003         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
2004         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2005         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
2006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2007
2008         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
2009         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2010         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2011
2012         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2013
2014         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2015         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
2016         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
2017
2018         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2019         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
2020
2021         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
2022         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
2023         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
2024         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
2025         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
2026         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2027
2028         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2029         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2030         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2031         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2032
2033         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2034         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2035
2036         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2037         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2038         match events[0] {
2039                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2040                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2041                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2042                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2043                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2044                         match &purpose {
2045                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2046                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2047                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2048                                 },
2049                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2050                         }
2051                 },
2052                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2053         }
2054         match events[1] {
2055                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2056                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2057                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2058                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2059                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2060                         match &purpose {
2061                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2062                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2063                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2064                                 },
2065                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2066                         }
2067                 },
2068                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2069         }
2070
2071         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2072         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2073         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2074
2075         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
2076         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2077         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2078
2079         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
2080         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2081         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2082         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2083         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2084
2085         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2086         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2087 }
2088
2089 #[test]
2090 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2091         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2092         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2093         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2094         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2095         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2096         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2097         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2098         // To test this we:
2099         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2100         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2101         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2102         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2103         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2104         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2105         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2106         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2107         //    claim,
2108         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2109         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2110         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2111         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2112         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2113         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2114         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2115         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2116         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2117         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2118
2119         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2120         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2121         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2122         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2123         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2124
2125         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2126         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2127         let send_1 = {
2128                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2129                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2130                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2131                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2132                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2133                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2134         };
2135
2136         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2137         // initial fulfill/CS.
2138         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2139         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2141         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2142
2143         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2144         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2145         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2146         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2148         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2149
2150         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2151         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2153         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2154         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_1, None, false, false);
2155
2156         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2157         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2158         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2159         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2160         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2161
2162         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2164         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2165
2166         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2167         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2168         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2169
2170         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2172         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2173
2174         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2175         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2176         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2177         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2178         // on-chain as necessary).
2179         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2180         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2182         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2183         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, false, false);
2184
2185         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2187         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2188
2189         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2190         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2191
2192         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2193         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2194         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2195         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2196         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2197         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2198
2199         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2200         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2201         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2202         let send_2 = {
2203                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2204                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2205                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2206                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2207                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2208                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2209         };
2210
2211         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2212         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2213         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2214         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2215
2216         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2217
2218         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2219         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2220         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2221
2222         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2224
2225         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2226         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2227         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2228         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2229
2230         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2231         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2232         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2233
2234         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2235         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2236
2237         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2238         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2239
2240         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2241         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2242 }
2243
2244 #[test]
2245 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2246         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2247         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2248         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2249         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2250         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2251         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2252
2253         // Create some initial channels
2254         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2255         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2256         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2257         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2258
2259         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2260         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2261         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2262         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2263         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2264         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2265
2266         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2267         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2268         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2269         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2270         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2271
2272         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2273         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2274         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2275         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2276         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2277         {
2278                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2279                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2280                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2281                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2282                         let _ = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2283                 }
2284
2285                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2286                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2287                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2288         }
2289         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2290         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2291         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2292         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2293
2294         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2295         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2296
2297         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2298         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2299         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2300         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2302         {
2303                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2304                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2305                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2306                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2307                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2308                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2309         }
2310         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2311         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2312         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2313         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2314         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2315
2316         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2317                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2318                         {
2319                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2320                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2321                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2322
2323                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2324                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2325                                 match events[0] {
2326                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2327                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2328                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2329                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2330                                         },
2331                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2332                                 };
2333                         }
2334                 }
2335         }
2336
2337         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2338         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2339         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2341         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2342         let node2_commitment_txid;
2343         {
2344                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2345                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2346                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2347                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2348
2349                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2350                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2351                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2352                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2353                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2354         }
2355         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2356         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2357         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2358         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2359         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2360
2361         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2362         // confusing us in the following tests.
2363         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2364
2365         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2366         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2367         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2368         // buffer space).
2369
2370         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2371                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2372                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2373                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2374                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[1] {
2375                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2376                                 msg.clone()
2377                         },
2378                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2379                 };
2380                 match events[0] {
2381                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2382                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2383                         },
2384                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2385                 }
2386                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2387
2388                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2389                 {
2390                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2391                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2392                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2393                                         false
2394                                 } else { true }
2395                         });
2396                 }
2397
2398                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2399
2400                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2401                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2402
2403                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2404                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2405                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2406                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[1] {
2407                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2408                                 msg.clone()
2409                         },
2410                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2411                 };
2412                 match events[0] {
2413                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2414                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2415                         },
2416                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2417                 }
2418                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2419                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2420                 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2421
2422                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2423                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2424                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2425         };
2426         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2427         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2428         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2429         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2430
2431         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2432                 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
2433         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2434 }
2435
2436 #[test]
2437 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2438         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2439         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2440         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2441         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2442         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2443         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2444         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2445         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2446         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2447         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2448         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2449         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2450         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2451         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2452         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2453         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2454         // Create some new channels:
2455         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2456
2457         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2458         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2459         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2460         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2461         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2462         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2463         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2464         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2465         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2466         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2467         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2468         // Revoke the old state
2469         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2470
2471         {
2472                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2473                 {
2474                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2475                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2476                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2477                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2478                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2479                 }
2480                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2481                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2482                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2483
2484                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2485                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2486                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2487                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2488                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2489                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2490                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2491                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2492                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2493         }
2494         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2495         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2496         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2497 }
2498
2499 #[test]
2500 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2501         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2502         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2503         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2504         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2505         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2506         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2507         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2508         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2509         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2510         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2511         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2512         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2513         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2514         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2515         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2516         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2517         // Create some new channels:
2518         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2519
2520         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2521         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2522         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2523         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2524         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2525         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2526         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2527         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2528         // Revoke the old state
2529         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2530         {
2531                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2532                 {
2533                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2534                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2535                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2536
2537                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2538                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2539                 }
2540                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2541                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2542
2543                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2545                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2546                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2547                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2548                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2549                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2550         }
2551         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2552         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2553         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2554 }
2555
2556 #[test]
2557 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2558         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2559         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2560         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2561         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2562         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2563         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2564         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2565         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2566         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2567         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2568         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2569         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2570         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2571         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2572
2573         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2574         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2575         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2576         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2577         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2578         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2579
2580         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2581
2582         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2583         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2584         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2585         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2586         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2587 }
2588
2589 #[test]
2590 fn test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates() {
2591         do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(true);
2592         do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(false);
2593 }
2594
2595 fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment: bool) {
2596         // Simple test to make sure that the justice tx formed in WatchtowerPersister
2597         // is properly formed and can be broadcasted/confirmed successfully in the event
2598         // that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
2599         // (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
2600         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2601         let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2602         let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2603         let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
2604                 WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
2605         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
2606         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2607         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2608         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2609         let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
2610
2611         if !broadcast_initial_commitment {
2612                 // Send a payment to move the channel forward
2613                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2614         }
2615
2616         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output.
2617         // We'll keep this commitment transaction to broadcast once it's revoked.
2618         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel_id);
2619         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2620         let revoked_commitment_tx = &revoked_local_txn[0];
2621
2622         // Send another payment, now revoking the previous commitment tx
2623         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2624
2625         let justice_tx = persisters[1].justice_tx(funding_txo, &revoked_commitment_tx.txid()).unwrap();
2626         check_spends!(justice_tx, revoked_commitment_tx);
2627
2628         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2629         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2630
2631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2632         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2633                 &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2634         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 0);
2635
2636         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2637         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2638                 &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2639
2640         // Check that the justice tx has sent the revoked output value to nodes[1]
2641         let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel_id);
2642         let total_claimable_balance = monitor.get_claimable_balances().iter().fold(0, |sum, balance| {
2643                 match balance {
2644                         channelmonitor::Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. } => sum + amount_satoshis,
2645                         _ => panic!("Unexpected balance type"),
2646                 }
2647         });
2648         // On the first commitment, node[1]'s balance was below dust so it didn't have an output
2649         let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value };
2650         let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value;
2651         assert_eq!(total_claimable_balance, expected_claimable_balance);
2652 }
2653
2654
2655 #[test]
2656 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2657         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2658         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2659         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2660         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2661         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2662         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2663
2664         // Create some new channel:
2665         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2666
2667         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2668         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2669         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2670         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2671         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2672
2673         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2674         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2675         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2676         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2677         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2678         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2679         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2680         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2681         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2682
2683         //Revoke the old state
2684         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2685
2686         {
2687                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2688                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2689                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2690                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2691                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2692                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2693                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2694                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2695
2696                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2697                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2698
2699                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2700                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2701
2702                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2703                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2704                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2705                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2706                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2707                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2708                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2709                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2710
2711                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2712                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2713                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2714                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2715                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2716         }
2717         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2718         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2719         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2720 }
2721
2722 #[test]
2723 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2724         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2725         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2726         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2727         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2728         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2729         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2730
2731         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2732
2733         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2734         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2735         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2736         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2737         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2738         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2739
2740         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2741         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2742
2743         //Revoke the old state
2744         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2745
2746         {
2747                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2748                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2749                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2750                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2751                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2752                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2753                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2754                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2755                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2756                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2757                 }
2758
2759                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2760                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2761
2762                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2763
2764                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2765                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2766                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2767                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2768                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2769                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2770                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2771
2772                 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2773                 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2774                 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2775
2776                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2777                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2778                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2779
2780                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2781                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2782                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2783
2784                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2785                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2786                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2787                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2788                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2789                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2790                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2791                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2792
2793                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2794                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2795                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2796                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2797                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2798                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2799                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2800         }
2801         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2802         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2803         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2804 }
2805
2806 #[test]
2807 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2808         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2809         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2810         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2811         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2812         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2813         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2814         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2815         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2816         // towards B.
2817         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2818         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2819         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2820         // PaymentSent event).
2821
2822         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2823         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2824         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2825         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2826
2827         // Create some initial channels
2828         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2829         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2830
2831         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2832         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2833         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2834         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2835         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2836
2837         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2838         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2839         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2840
2841         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2842         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2843
2844         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2845         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2846         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2847         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2848         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2849         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2850         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2851         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2852         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2853         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2854         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2855         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2856         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2857         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2858         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2859
2860         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2861         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2863         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2864         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2865         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2866         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2867         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2868         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2869         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2870         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2871         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2872         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2873         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2874
2875         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2876         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2877         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2878         {
2879                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2880                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2881                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2882                 added_monitors.clear();
2883         }
2884         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2885         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2886         match forwarded_events[0] {
2887                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2888                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2889         }
2890         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2891         match forwarded_events[1] {
2892                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2893                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2894                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2895                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2896                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2897                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2898                 },
2899                 _ => panic!()
2900         }
2901         match forwarded_events[2] {
2902                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2903                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2904                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2905                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2906                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2907                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2908                 },
2909                 _ => panic!()
2910         }
2911         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2912         {
2913                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2914                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2915                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2916                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2917                 added_monitors.clear();
2918         }
2919         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2920
2921         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2922         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2923
2924         match nodes_2_event {
2925                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2926                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2927         }
2928
2929         match nodes_0_event {
2930                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2931                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2932                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2933                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2934                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2935                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2936                 },
2937                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2938         };
2939
2940         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2941         match events[0] {
2942                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2943                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2944         }
2945
2946         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2947                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2948                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2949                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2950                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2951                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2952                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2953                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2954                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2955                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2956                         if $htlc_offered {
2957                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2958                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2959                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2960                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2961                         } else {
2962                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2963                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2964                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2965                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2966                         }
2967                         node_txn.clear();
2968                 } }
2969         }
2970         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2971         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2972
2973         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2974         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2975         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2976         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2977         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2978         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2979         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2980         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2981         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2982         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2983         let commitment_spend =
2984                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2985                         &node_txn[0]
2986                 } else {
2987                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2988                         // FullBlockViaListen
2989                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2990                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2991                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2992                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2993                                 &node_txn[0]
2994                         } else {
2995                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2996                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2997                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2998                                 &node_txn[2]
2999                         }
3000                 };
3001
3002         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3003         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
3004         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3005         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3006         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3007         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
3008         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
3009         // we already checked the same situation with A.
3010
3011         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
3012         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
3013         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3014         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3015         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3016         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3017         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
3018         let mut first_claimed = false;
3019         for event in events {
3020                 match event {
3021                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3022                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
3023                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
3024                                         first_claimed = true;
3025                                 } else {
3026                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
3027                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
3028                                 }
3029                         },
3030                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3031                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
3032                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3033                 }
3034         }
3035         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3036 }
3037
3038 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
3039         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
3040         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
3041         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
3042         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
3043         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
3044         //            \                                  \
3045         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
3046
3047         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3048         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3049         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3050         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3051         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3052         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3053         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3054
3055         // Create some intial channels
3056         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3057         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3058
3059         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
3060         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3061         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3062
3063         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
3064
3065         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
3066         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3067         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
3068         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
3069         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
3070         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
3071         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3072
3073         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3074         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3075         match events[0] {
3076                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3077                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3078                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3079                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3080                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3081                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3082                 },
3083                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3084         };
3085         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
3086         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3087         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3088         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3089         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
3090         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3091
3092         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
3093         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
3094         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
3095         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false
3096                 , [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3097         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3098         let timeout_tx = {
3099                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3100                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
3101                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
3102                 } else {
3103                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
3104                 }
3105                 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
3106                 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3107                 txn.remove(0)
3108         };
3109
3110         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3111         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3112         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3113
3114         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3115
3116         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3117         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3118         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3119         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3120         match events[0] {
3121                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3122                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3123                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3124                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3125                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3126                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3127                 },
3128                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3129         };
3130
3131         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3132         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3133         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3134
3135         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3136         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3137
3138         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3140         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3141         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3142         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3143         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3144         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3145 }
3146
3147 #[test]
3148 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3149         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3150         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3151         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3152 }
3153
3154 #[test]
3155 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3156         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3157         // and fail backward accordingly.
3158
3159         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3160         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3161         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3162         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3163
3164         // Create some initial channels
3165         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3166         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3167
3168         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3169         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3170         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3171         // Revoke the old state
3172         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3173
3174         let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3175
3176         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3177         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3178         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3180         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3181
3182         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3184         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3185         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3186         match events[0] {
3187                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3188                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3189                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3190                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3191                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3192                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3193
3194                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3195                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3196                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3197                 },
3198                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3199         }
3200 }
3201
3202 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3203         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3204         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3205         // commitment transaction anymore.
3206         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3207         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3208         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3209         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3210         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3211         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3212         // transactions:
3213         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3214         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3215         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3216         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3217         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3218         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3219         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3220         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3221         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3222
3223         // Create some initial channels
3224         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3225         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3226
3227         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3228         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3229         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3230         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3231         // Revoke the old state
3232         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3233
3234         let value = if use_dust {
3235                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3236                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3237                 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3238                         .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3239         } else { 3000000 };
3240
3241         let (_, first_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3242         let (_, second_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3243         let (_, third_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3244
3245         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3246         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3247         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3248         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3249         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3250         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3251         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3252         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3253         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3254         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3255         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3256         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3257
3258         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3259         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3260         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3261         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3262         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3263         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3264         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3265         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3266         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3267         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3268         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3269         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3270         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3271         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3272         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3273         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3274
3275         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3276         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3277         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3278         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3279         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3280         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3281         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3282         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3283         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3284         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3285         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3286         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3287         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3288         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3289         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3290         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3291         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3293
3294         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3295         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3296         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3297         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3298                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3299         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3300         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3302
3303         if deliver_bs_raa {
3304                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3305                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3306                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3307                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3308                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3309                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3310                 match events[0] {
3311                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3312                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3313                 };
3314                 match events[1] {
3315                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3316                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3317                 }
3318                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3319                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3320         }
3321
3322         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3323         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3324
3325         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3326         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3327         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3328
3329         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3330         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3331         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3332                 ev,
3333                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. }
3334         )));
3335         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3336                 ev,
3337                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3338         )));
3339         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3340                 ev,
3341                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3342         )));
3343
3344         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3345         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3346
3347         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3348         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3349
3350         if deliver_bs_raa {
3351                 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3352                 match nodes_2_event {
3353                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3354                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3355                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3356                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3357                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3358                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3359                         },
3360                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3361                 }
3362         }
3363
3364         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3365         match nodes_2_event {
3366                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data }) }, node_id: _ } => {
3367                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3368                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3369                 },
3370                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3371         }
3372
3373         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3374         match nodes_0_event {
3375                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3376                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3377                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3378                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3379                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3380                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3381
3382                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3383                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3384                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3385
3386                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3387
3388                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3389                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3390                         match events[0] {
3391                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3392                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3393                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3394                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3395                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3396                                                 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3397                                         }
3398                                 },
3399                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3400                         }
3401                         match events[1] {
3402                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3403                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3404                                 },
3405                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3406                         }
3407                         match events[2] {
3408                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3409                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3410                                 },
3411                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3412                         }
3413                         match events[3] {
3414                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3415                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3416                                 },
3417                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3418                         }
3419                         match events[4] {
3420                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3421                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3422                                 },
3423                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3424                         }
3425                         match events[5] {
3426                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3427                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3428                                 },
3429                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3430                         }
3431                 },
3432                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3433         }
3434
3435         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3436         match events[0] {
3437                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3438                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3439         }
3440
3441         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3442         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3443         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3444 }
3445
3446 #[test]
3447 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3448         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3449         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3450         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3451         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3452 }
3453
3454 #[test]
3455 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3456         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3457         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3458         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3459         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3460 }
3461
3462 #[test]
3463 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3464         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3465         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3466         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3467         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3468         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3469
3470         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3471         {
3472                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3473                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3474                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3475                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3476
3477                 let payment_event = {
3478                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3479                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3480                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3481                 };
3482                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3483                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3484         }
3485
3486         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3487         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3488         {
3489                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3490                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3491                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3492
3493                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3494         }
3495
3496         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3497         {
3498                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3499
3500                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3501                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3502                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3503                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3504                         &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3505                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3506                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3507
3508                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3509                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3510                         channel_id: chan.2,
3511                         htlc_id: 0,
3512                         amount_msat: 0,
3513                         payment_hash,
3514                         cltv_expiry,
3515                         onion_routing_packet,
3516                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3517                         blinding_point: None,
3518                 };
3519                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3520         }
3521         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3522         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3523         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3524         match events[0] {
3525                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3526                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3527                 },
3528                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3529         }
3530         match events[1] {
3531                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3532                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3533                 },
3534                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3535         }
3536         match events[2] {
3537                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3538                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3539                 },
3540                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3541         }
3542         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3543         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3544 }
3545
3546 #[test]
3547 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3548         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3549         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3550         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3551         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3552         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3553         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3554         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3555                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3556                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3557                 // connect_style.
3558                 return;
3559         }
3560         let funding_tx = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).3;
3561
3562         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3563         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3564         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3565         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3566         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3567         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3568
3569         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
3570         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3571         check_spends!(node_txn[0], funding_tx);
3572         check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
3573
3574         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone()]);
3575         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3576         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3577         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3578         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3579
3580         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3581         // registering new transactions
3582         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3583 }
3584
3585 #[test]
3586 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3587         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3588         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3591         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3592         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3593         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3594
3595         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3596
3597         let mut payment_event = {
3598                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3599                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3600                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3601
3602                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3603                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3604                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3605         };
3606
3607         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3608         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3609
3610         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3611
3612         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3613         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3614         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3615         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3616
3617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3618         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3619         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3620         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3621         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3622
3623         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3624         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3625         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3626
3627         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3628         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3629         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3630         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3631         let commitment_tx = {
3632                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3633                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3634                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3635                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3636                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3637                 node_txn.remove(0)
3638         };
3639
3640         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
3641
3642         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3643         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3644         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3645         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3646
3647         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3648         {
3649                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3650                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3651         }
3652         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx);
3653         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3654         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), if nodes[2].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 2 } else { 1 });
3655         let htlc_tx = node_txn.pop().unwrap();
3656         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input.len(), 1);
3657         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, commitment_tx.txid());
3658         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3659         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3660
3661         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx);
3662 }
3663
3664 #[test]
3665 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3666         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3667         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3668         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3669         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3670
3671         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3672         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3673         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3674         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3675         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3676
3677         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3678
3679         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3680         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3681         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3682         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3683         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3684         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
3685
3686         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3687         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3688
3689         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3690         reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3691         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3692         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3693 }
3694
3695 #[test]
3696 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3697         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3698         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3699         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3700         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3701         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3702         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3703
3704         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3705         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3706         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
3707         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3708         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3709         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3710         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3711
3712         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3713         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3714
3715         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3716
3717         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3718         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3719
3720         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3721         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3722         // broadcasted.
3723         {
3724                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3725         }
3726
3727         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3728         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3729         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3730         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3731
3732         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, true
3733                 , [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3734         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
3735                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3736 }
3737
3738 #[test]
3739 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3740         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3741         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3742         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3743         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3744         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3745         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3746         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3747
3748         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3749         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3750         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3751         reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3752         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3753
3754         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3755         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3756         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3757         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3758
3759         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3760         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3761         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3762
3763         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3764         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3765         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3766         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3767
3768         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3769         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3770
3771         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3772         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3773
3774         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3775         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 = 1;
3776         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3777         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3778         {
3779                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3780                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3781                 match events[0] {
3782                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3783                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3784                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3785                         },
3786                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3787                 }
3788                 match events[1] {
3789                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3790                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3791                 }
3792                 match events[2] {
3793                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3794                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3795                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3796                         },
3797                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3798                 }
3799                 match events[3] {
3800                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3801                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3802                         },
3803                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3804                 }
3805         }
3806         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
3807
3808         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3809         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3810 }
3811
3812 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3813         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3814         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3815         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3816         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3817         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3818
3819         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3820         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3821                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3822                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3823                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3824                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3825                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3826                 chan_id
3827         } else {
3828                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3829         };
3830
3831         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3832
3833         let payment_event = {
3834                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3835                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3836                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3837
3838                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3839                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3840                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3841         };
3842         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3843
3844         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3845                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3846         } else {
3847                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3848                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3849                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3850                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3851                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3852
3853                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3854                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3855                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3856                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3857
3858                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3859                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3860                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3861                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3862                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3863
3864                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3865                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3866                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3867                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3868                                         }
3869                                 }
3870                         }
3871                 }
3872         }
3873
3874         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3875         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3876         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3877                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3878                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3879                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3880                         //
3881                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3882                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3883                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3884                         //
3885                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3886                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3887                 }
3888                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3889                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3890                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3891                 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3892                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = 1;
3893                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3894         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3895                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3896                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3897                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3898                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
3899                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3900         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3901                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3902                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3903                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3904                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3905         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3906                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3907                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3908                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
3909                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3910         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3911                 // Everything was delivered...
3912                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3913         }
3914
3915         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3916         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3917                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3918                 match events_1[0] {
3919                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3920                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3921                 };
3922                 match events_1[1] {
3923                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3924                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3925                 };
3926         } else {
3927                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3928                 match events_1[0] {
3929                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3930                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3931                 };
3932         }
3933
3934         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3935         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3936         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3937
3938         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3939
3940         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3941         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3942         match events_2[0] {
3943                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3944                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3945                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3946                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3947                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3948                         match &purpose {
3949                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3950                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3951                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3952                                 },
3953                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3954                         }
3955                 },
3956                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3957         }
3958
3959         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3961         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3962
3963         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3964         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3965         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3966                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3967                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3968                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3969                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3970                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3971                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3972                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3973                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3974                 },
3975                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3976         };
3977
3978         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3979                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3980
3981                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3982                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3983                 match events_4[0] {
3984                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3985                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3986                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3987                         },
3988                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3989                 }
3990
3991                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3992                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3993                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3994                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3995
3996                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3997                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3998                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3999                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4000
4001                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
4002                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
4003                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4004                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4005                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4006
4007                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4008                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4009                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4010                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4011                                         }
4012                                 }
4013                         }
4014                 }
4015         }
4016
4017         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4018         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4019         if messages_delivered < 2 {
4020                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4021                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
4022                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4023                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
4024                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
4025                 } else {
4026                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4027                 }
4028         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4029                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4030                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4031                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4032                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
4033                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4034         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4035                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4036                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4037                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4038                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4039         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4040                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4041                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4042                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
4043                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4044         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4045                 // Everything was delivered...
4046                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4047         }
4048
4049         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
4050                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4051         }
4052         if messages_delivered <= 5 {
4053                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4054                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4055         }
4056         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4057
4058         if messages_delivered > 2 {
4059                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4060         }
4061
4062         // Channel should still work fine...
4063         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4064         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4065         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4066 }
4067
4068 #[test]
4069 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
4070         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
4071         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
4072         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
4073         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
4074 }
4075
4076 #[test]
4077 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
4078         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
4079         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
4080         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
4081         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
4082 }
4083
4084 #[test]
4085 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4086         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4087         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4088         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4089         // channel_ready immediately instead.
4090         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4091         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4092         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4093         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4094         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4095
4096         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4097
4098         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4099         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4100         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4101         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4102         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4103         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4104
4105         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4106         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4107         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4108 }
4109
4110 #[test]
4111 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_leading() {
4112         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4113         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4114         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4115         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4116
4117         // Let channel_manager get ahead of chain_monitor by 1 block.
4118         // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4119         // in case where client calls block_connect on channel_manager first and then on chain_monitor.
4120         let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4121         let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4122
4123         nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4124         nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4125
4126         // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4127         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4128
4129         // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1,
4130         // but it's best_block is block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager
4131         // was running ahead of chain_monitor at the time of funding_created.
4132         // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4133         // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4134         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4135         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4136
4137         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4138         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4139         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4140 }
4141
4142 #[test]
4143 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_lagging() {
4144         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4145         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4146         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4147         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4148
4149         // Let chain_monitor get ahead of channel_manager by 1 block.
4150         // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4151         // in case where client calls block_connect on chain_monitor first and then on channel_manager.
4152         let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4153         let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4154
4155         nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4156         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4157
4158         // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4159         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4160
4161         // channel_manager can't really skip block_1, it should get it eventually.
4162         nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4163
4164         // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1, it's best_block is
4165         // the block before block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager was
4166         // running behind at the time of funding_created.
4167         // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4168         // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4169         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4170         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4171
4172         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4173         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4174         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4175 }
4176
4177 #[test]
4178 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4179         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4180         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4181         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4182         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4183         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4184         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4185         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4186
4187         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4188
4189         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4190         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4191         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
4192                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
4193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4194
4195         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4196         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4197         match events_1[0] {
4198                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4199                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4200         }
4201
4202         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4203         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4205
4206         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4207         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4208         match events_2[0] {
4209                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4210                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4211                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4212                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4213                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4214                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4215                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4216
4217                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4218                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4219                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4220                         match events_3[0] {
4221                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4222                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4223                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4224                                 },
4225                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4226                         }
4227
4228                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4229                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4230                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4231                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4232                 },
4233                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4234         }
4235
4236         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4237         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4238
4239         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4240                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4241         }, true).unwrap();
4242         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4243         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4244         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4245                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4246         }, false).unwrap();
4247         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4248         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4249
4250         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4251         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4252         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4253         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4254
4255         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4256         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4257
4258         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4259         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4260
4261         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4262
4263         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4264         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4265         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4266         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4267         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4268         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4269         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4270         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4271         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4273
4274         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4275         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4276         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4277         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4278         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4279         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4280         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4281         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4282
4283         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4284         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4285         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4286         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4287         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4288         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4289         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4290         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4291
4292         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4293         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4294         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4295         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4296
4297         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4298         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4299         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4301
4302         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4303         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4304         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4305
4306         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4307
4308         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4309         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4310         match events_5[0] {
4311                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4312                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4313                         match &purpose {
4314                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4315                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4316                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4317                                 },
4318                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4319                         }
4320                 },
4321                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4322         }
4323
4324         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4325         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4326         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4327
4328         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4329         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4330 }
4331
4332 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4333         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4334         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4335         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4336         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4337         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4338         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4339
4340         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4341
4342         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4343                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4344                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4345                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4346                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4347                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4348                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4349                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4350                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4351                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4352                         &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4353                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4354                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4355                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4356                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4357                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4358                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4359                 our_payment_hash
4360         } else {
4361                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4362         };
4363
4364         let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4365         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4366         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4367         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4368         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4369                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4370                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4371                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4372         }
4373
4374         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4375
4376         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4377         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4378         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4379         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4380         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4381         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4382
4383         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4384         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4385         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4386         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4387         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4388         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4389 }
4390
4391 #[test]
4392 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4393         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4394         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4395 }
4396
4397 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4398         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4399         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4400         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4401         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4402         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4403         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4404         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4405
4406         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4407         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4408         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4409         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4410
4411         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4412         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4413         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4414                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4415         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4416         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4417
4418         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4419         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4420         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4421         sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4422                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4423         if forwarded_htlc {
4424                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4425                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4426                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4427                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4428                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4429         }
4430         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4431
4432         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4433         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4434         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4435         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4436
4437         if forwarded_htlc {
4438                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4439                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4440                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4441                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4442                 match fail_commit[0] {
4443                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4444                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4445                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4446                         },
4447                         _ => unreachable!(),
4448                 }
4449                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4450         } else {
4451                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4452         }
4453 }
4454
4455 #[test]
4456 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4457         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4458         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4459 }
4460
4461 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4462         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4463                 {
4464                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4465                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4466                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4467                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4468                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4469                                 match event {
4470                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs, channel_id: _ } => {
4471                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4472                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4473                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4474                                                 }
4475                                         },
4476                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4477                                 };
4478                         }
4479                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4480                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4481                                         txn.push(tx);
4482                                 }
4483                         }
4484                         txn
4485                 }
4486         }
4487 }
4488
4489 #[test]
4490 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4491         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4492         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4493         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4494         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4495         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4496
4497         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4498         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4499         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4501         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4502         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4503         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4504         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4505         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4506
4507         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4508         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4509
4510         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4511         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4512         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4513         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4514         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4515 }
4516
4517 #[test]
4518 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4519         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4520         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4521         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4522         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4523         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4524         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4525
4526         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4527         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4528         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4530         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4531
4532         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4533         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4534         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4535         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4536
4537         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4538         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4539         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4540         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4541         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4542
4543         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4544         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4545         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4546 }
4547
4548 #[test]
4549 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4550         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4551         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4552
4553         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4554         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4555         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4556         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4557
4558         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4559         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4560         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4561         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4562         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4563
4564         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4565         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4566         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4567         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4568         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4569
4570         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4571         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4572         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4573
4574         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4575         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4576         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4577         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4578         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4579 }
4580
4581 #[test]
4582 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4583         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4584         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4585         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4586         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4587
4588         // Create some initial channels
4589         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4590
4591         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4592
4593         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4594         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4595         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4596
4597         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4598         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4599         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4600         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4601         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4602         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4603         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4604         match events[0] {
4605                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4606                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4607         }
4608         match events[2] {
4609                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4610                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4611         }
4612
4613         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4614         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4615         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4616         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4617         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4618
4619         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4620         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4621         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4622
4623         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4624         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4625         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4626 }
4627
4628 #[test]
4629 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4630         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4631         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4632         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4633         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4634
4635         // Create some initial channels
4636         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4637
4638         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4639         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4640
4641         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4642
4643         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4644         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4645         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4646
4647         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4648         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4649         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4650         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4651         match events[1] {
4652                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4653                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4654         }
4655         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4656
4657         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4658         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4659         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4660         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4661         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4662
4663         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4664         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4665         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4666         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4667
4668         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4669         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4670         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4671         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4672         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4673 }
4674
4675 #[test]
4676 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4677         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4678         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4679         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4680         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4681
4682         // Create some initial channels
4683         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4684
4685         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4686         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4687         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4688         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4689
4690         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4691
4692         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4693         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4694         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4695         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4696
4697         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4698         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4699         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4700         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4701
4702         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4703         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4704
4705         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4706         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4707         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4708 }
4709
4710 #[test]
4711 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4712         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4713         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4714         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4715         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4716         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4717
4718         // Create some initial channels
4719         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4720
4721         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4722         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4723         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4724         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4725
4726         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4727
4728         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4729         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4730         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4731         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4732         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4733         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4734
4735         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4736         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4737         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4738         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4739         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4740         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // HTLC-Timeout
4741
4742         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4743         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4744         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4745         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4746         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4747
4748         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4749         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4750         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4751         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4752         // transactions next...
4753         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4754         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4755
4756         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4757         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4758         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4759                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4760         } else {
4761                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4762                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4763         }
4764
4765         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4766         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4767
4768         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4769         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4770         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4771         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4772         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4773 }
4774
4775 #[test]
4776 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4777         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4778         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4779         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4780         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4781         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4782
4783         // Create some initial channels
4784         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4785
4786         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4787         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4788         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4789         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4790
4791         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4792         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4793
4794         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4795
4796         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4797         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4798         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4799         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4800         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4801         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4802
4803         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4804         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4805         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4806         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4807
4808         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4809         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4810         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4811
4812         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4813         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4814         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4816         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4817
4818         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4819         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4820
4821         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4822         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4823         // transactions next...
4824         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4825         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4826         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4827                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4828         } else {
4829                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4830                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4831         }
4832
4833         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4834         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4835
4836         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4837         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4838
4839         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4840         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4841
4842         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4843         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4844         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4845         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4846         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4847         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4848         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4849         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4850 }
4851
4852 #[test]
4853 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4854         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4855         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4856         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4857         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4858         // channel.
4859         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4860         // gets broadcast.
4861
4862         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4863         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4864         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4865         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4866
4867         // Create some initial channels
4868         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4869         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4870
4871         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4872         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4873         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4874         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4875         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4876
4877         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4878         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4879         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4880
4881         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4882         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4883         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4884         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4885         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4886         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4887         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4888         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4889         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4890         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4891         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4892
4893         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4894         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4896         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4897
4898         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4899         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4900         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4901         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4902         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4903         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Success tx
4904
4905         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4906         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4907         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4908         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4909         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4910         match events[0] {
4911                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4912                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4913         }
4914         match events[1] {
4915                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4916                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4917                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4918                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4919                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4920                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4921                 },
4922                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4923         }
4924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4925         let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4926         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4927         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4928         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4929
4930         match nodes_2_event {
4931                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4932                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4933         }
4934
4935         match nodes_0_event {
4936                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4937                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4938                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4939                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4940                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4941                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4942                 },
4943                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4944         };
4945
4946         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4947         match msg_events[0] {
4948                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4949                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4950         }
4951
4952         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4953         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4954         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4955         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4956         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4957         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4958         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4959         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4960         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4961         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4962         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
4963
4964         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4966 }
4967
4968 #[test]
4969 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4970         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4971         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4972         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4973         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4974         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4975         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4976         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4977         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4978         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4979         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4980         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4981                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4982         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4983
4984         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4985         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4986         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4987
4988         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4989         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4990         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4991         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4992         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4993
4994         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4995
4996         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4997         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4998         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4999         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5000         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
5001                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
5002         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
5003         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5004
5005         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5006         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5007         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5008
5009         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5010         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5011         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5012         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5013         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5014
5015         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5016         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5017                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5018                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
5019                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5020
5021                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5022                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5023                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5024
5025                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5026                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5027                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5028                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5029                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5030
5031                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5032                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5033                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
5034                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5035                 } else {
5036                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5037                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5038                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5039                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5040                 }
5041
5042                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5043                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5044                 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
5045                 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
5046                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5047                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5048                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5049                 } else {
5050                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5051                 }
5052         }
5053
5054         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5055         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5056
5057         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5058         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5059         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5060         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5061         match events[0] {
5062                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5063                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5064         }
5065         match events[2] {
5066                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5067                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5068         }
5069         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5070         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5071         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5072         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5073         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5074         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5075         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5076         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5077         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5078         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5079
5080         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5081         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5082         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5083         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5084         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5085         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5086         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5087         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5088         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5090
5091         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5092         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5093         {
5094                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5095         }
5096         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5097
5098         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5099         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
5100         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
5101         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5102         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5103         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5104         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5105         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5106         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5107         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5108
5109         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5110         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5111         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true, true);
5112 }
5113
5114 #[test]
5115 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5116         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5117         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5118         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5119         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5120
5121         // Create some initial channels
5122         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5123
5124         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5125         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5126         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5127         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5128         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5129
5130         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5131         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5132         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5133         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5134
5135         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5137         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5138         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5139         match events[0] {
5140                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5141                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5142         }
5143         match events[2] {
5144                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5145                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5146         }
5147         let node_tx = {
5148                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5149                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5150                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5151                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5152                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5153                 node_txn[0].clone()
5154         };
5155
5156         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5157         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5158
5159         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5160         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5161         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5162         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5163         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5164         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5165 }
5166
5167 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5168         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5169         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5170         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5171         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5172         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5173         // use the same payment hashes.
5174         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5175         //
5176         // A \         / E
5177         //    - C - D -
5178         // B /         \ F
5179         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5180         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5181         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5182         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5183         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5184         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5185         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5186         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5187                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5188         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5189
5190         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5191         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5192         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5193         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5194         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5195
5196         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5197         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5198         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5199         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5200
5201         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
5202                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5203         // 0th HTLC:
5204         let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5205         // 1st HTLC:
5206         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5207         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5208         // 2nd HTLC:
5209         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5210         // 3rd HTLC:
5211         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5212         // 4th HTLC:
5213         let (_, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5214         // 5th HTLC:
5215         let (_, payment_hash_4, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5216         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5217         // 6th HTLC:
5218         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5219         // 7th HTLC:
5220         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5221
5222         // 8th HTLC:
5223         let (_, payment_hash_5, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5224         // 9th HTLC:
5225         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5226         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5227
5228         // 10th HTLC:
5229         let (_, payment_hash_6, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5230         // 11th HTLC:
5231         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5232         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5233
5234         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5235         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5236         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5237         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5238         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5239
5240         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5241         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5242         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5243         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5244         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5245         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5247
5248         let failed_destinations = vec![
5249                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5250                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5251                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5252                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5253         ];
5254         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5256
5257         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5258         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5259         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5260         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5261         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5262         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5263
5264         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5265         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5266         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5267         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5268
5269         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5270                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5271                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5272         ];
5273         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5274         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5275
5276         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5277         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5278         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5279         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5280
5281         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5282
5283         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5284         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5285                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5286                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5287                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5288                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5289                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5290                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5291         ];
5292         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5293         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5294         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5295         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5296         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5297         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5298         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5299         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5300         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5301         if deliver_last_raa {
5302                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5303         } else {
5304                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5305         }
5306
5307         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5308         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5309         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5310         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5311         //
5312         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5313         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5314         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5315         //
5316         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5317         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5318         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5319
5320         if announce_latest {
5321                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5322         } else {
5323                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5324         }
5325         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5326         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5327                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5328                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5329         } else {
5330                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5331                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5332         };
5333         match close_event {
5334                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5335                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5336         }
5337
5338         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5339         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5340         if deliver_last_raa {
5341                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5342
5343                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5344                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5345         } else {
5346                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5347                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5348                 } else {
5349                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5350                 };
5351
5352                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5353         }
5354         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5355
5356         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5357         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5358         let mut a_done = false;
5359         for msg in cs_msgs {
5360                 match msg {
5361                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5362                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5363                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5364                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5365                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5366                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5367                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5368                                         }
5369                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5370                                         assert!(!a_done);
5371                                         a_done = true;
5372                                         &nodes[0]
5373                                 } else {
5374                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5375                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5376                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5377                                         }
5378                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5379                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5380                                         &nodes[1]
5381                                 };
5382                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5383                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5384                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5385                                 if announce_latest {
5386                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5387                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5388                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5389                                         }
5390                                 }
5391                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5392                         },
5393                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5394                 }
5395         }
5396
5397         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5398         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5399         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5400         let mut as_updates = 0;
5401         for event in as_events.iter() {
5402                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5403                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5404                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5405                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5406                         } else {
5407                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5408                         }
5409                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5410                                 as_updates += 1;
5411                         }
5412                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5413                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5414         }
5415         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5416         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5417         if announce_latest {
5418                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5419                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5420         }
5421         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5422
5423         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5424         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5425         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5426         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5427         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5428                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5429                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5430                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5431                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5432                         } else {
5433                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5434                         }
5435                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5436                                 bs_updates += 1;
5437                         }
5438                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5439                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5440         }
5441         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5442         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5443         if announce_latest {
5444                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5445         }
5446         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5447
5448         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5449         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5450         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5451         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5452         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5453         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5454 }
5455
5456 #[test]
5457 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5458         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5459 }
5460
5461 #[test]
5462 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5463         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5464 }
5465
5466 #[test]
5467 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5468         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5469         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5470         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5471 }
5472
5473 #[test]
5474 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5475         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5476         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5477         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5478         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5479
5480         // Create some initial channels
5481         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5482
5483         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5484         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5485         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5486         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5487
5488         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5489         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5490         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5492         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5493         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5494
5495         let htlc_timeout = {
5496                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5497                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5498                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5499                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5500                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5501                 node_txn[0].clone()
5502         };
5503
5504         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5505         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5506         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5507
5508         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5509         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5510         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5511         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5512         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5513         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5514         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5515         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5516         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5517         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5518                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5519 }
5520
5521 #[test]
5522 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5523         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5524         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5525         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5526         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5527
5528         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5529
5530         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5531         let seed = [42; 32];
5532         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5533         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5534         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5535         let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5536         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &scorer);
5537         let message_router = test_utils::TestMessageRouter::new(network_graph.clone());
5538         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, message_router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5539         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5540         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5541         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5542
5543         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5544         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5545
5546         // Create some initial channels
5547         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5548         // for node 0
5549         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5550         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5551         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5552
5553         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5554         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5555         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5556         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5557         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5558
5559         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5560         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5561         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5562         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5563         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5564
5565         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5566         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5567         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5568         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5569             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5570             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5571             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5572                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5573         }
5574
5575         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5576         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5577         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5578         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5579         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5580         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5581
5582         let htlc_timeout = {
5583                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5584                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5585                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5586                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5587                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5588                 node_txn[0].clone()
5589         };
5590
5591         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5592         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5593         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5594
5595         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5596         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5597         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5598         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5599         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5600         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5601         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5602         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5603         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5604         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5605         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5606                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5607 }
5608
5609 #[test]
5610 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5611         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5612         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5613         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5614         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5615
5616         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5617
5618         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5619         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5620
5621         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5622         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5623         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5624
5625         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5626         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5627         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5628
5629         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5630         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5631         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5632
5633         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5634         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5635         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5636 }
5637
5638 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5639         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5640         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5641         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5642         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5643         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5644
5645         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5646
5647         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5648         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5649         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5650         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5651         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5652
5653         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5654         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5655         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
5656
5657         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5658         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5659         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5660         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5662
5663         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5664         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5665         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5666                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5667                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5668         }
5669         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5670         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5671         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5672         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5673 }
5674
5675 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5676         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5677         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5678         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5679         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5680         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5681
5682         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5683         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5684                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5685         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5686
5687         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5688
5689         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5690         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5691         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5692
5693         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5694         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5695
5696         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5697                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5698                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5699         }
5700         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5701         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5702         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5703         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5704 }
5705
5706 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5707         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5708         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5709         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5710         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5711         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5712
5713         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5714         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5715         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5716         // actually revoked.
5717         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5718         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5719         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5720         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5721         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5722
5723         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5724         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5725         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5726         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5727         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5728         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5729         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5730         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5731         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5732         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5733
5734         if check_revoke_no_close {
5735                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5736                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5737         }
5738
5739         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5740         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5741         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5742                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5743                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5744         }
5745         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5746                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5747                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5748                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5749                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5750         } else {
5751                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5752         }
5753 }
5754
5755 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5756 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5757 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5758 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5759 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5760 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5761 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5762 // non-dust HTLCs.
5763 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5764 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5765 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5766 #[test]
5767 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5768         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5769         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5770
5771         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5772         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5773 }
5774
5775 #[test]
5776 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5777         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5778         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5779         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5780         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5781 }
5782
5783 #[test]
5784 #[should_panic]
5785 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5786         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5787         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5788         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5789         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5790         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5791         for node in nodes.iter() {
5792                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5793         }
5794
5795         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5796         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5797         let push_msat=10001;
5798         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5799         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5800         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5801         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5802
5803         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5804         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5805         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5806 }
5807
5808 #[test]
5809 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5810         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5811         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5812         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5813         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5814
5815         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5816         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5817         let push_msat=10001;
5818         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5819
5820         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5821         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5822         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5823         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5824         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5825
5826         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5827         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5828         let push_msat=10001;
5829         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5830         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5831         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5832
5833         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5834         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5835         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5836
5837         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5838         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5839         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5840
5841         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5842         let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
5843         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash, chain_hash);
5844
5845         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5846         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5847         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5848         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5849         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5850         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5851 }
5852
5853 #[test]
5854 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5855         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5856         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5857         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5858         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5859
5860         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5861         let push_msat=10001;
5862         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5863         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5864         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5865         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5866
5867         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5868         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5869         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5870                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5871                         msg.clone()
5872                 },
5873                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5874         };
5875         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5876 }
5877
5878 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5879 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5880 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5881 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5882 #[test]
5883 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5884         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5885         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5886         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5887         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5888         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5889
5890         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5891         // pending_update_fee.
5892         {
5893                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5894                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5895         }
5896         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5897         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5898
5899         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5900         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5901         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5902                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5903                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5904                 },
5905                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5906         };
5907
5908         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5909
5910         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5911         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5912         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5913         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5914
5915         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5916         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
5917         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5918
5919         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5920         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5921                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5922         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5923         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5924
5925         // Flush the pending fee update.
5926         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5927         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5929         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5930         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5931
5932         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5933         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5934         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5935         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5936         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5937         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
5938
5939         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5940         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5941         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5942         match &events[0] {
5943                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5944                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5945                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5946                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5947                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5948                 },
5949                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5950         }
5951         match &events[1] {
5952                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5953                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5954                 },
5955                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5956         }
5957 }
5958
5959 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5960 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5961 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5962 #[test]
5963 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5964         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5965         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5966         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5967         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5968         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5969
5970         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5971         // pending_update_fee.
5972         {
5973                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5974                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5975         }
5976         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5977         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5978
5979         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5980         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5981         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5982                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5983                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5984                 },
5985                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5986         };
5987
5988         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5989
5990         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5991         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5992         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5993         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5994
5995         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5996         let amt_1 = 20000;
5997         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
5998         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5999         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6000
6001         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6002         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
6003                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
6004         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6005         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6006         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6007         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
6008                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
6009         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6010         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6011
6012         // Flush the pending fee update.
6013         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6014         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6015         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6016         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6017         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6018         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6019
6020         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6021         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6022         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6023         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6024         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6025         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
6026
6027         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6028         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6029         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6030         match &events[0] {
6031                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6032                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6033                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6034                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6035                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
6036                 },
6037                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6038         }
6039         match &events[1] {
6040                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6041                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6042                 },
6043                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6044         }
6045
6046         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6047         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6048                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6049                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6050                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6051         };
6052         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6053                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6054                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6055         };
6056         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6057         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6058         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6059         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6060         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6061         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6062         match events[0] {
6063                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6064                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6065         }
6066         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6067         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6068         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6069         match events[0] {
6070                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
6071                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6072         }
6073         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6074         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6075         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6076
6077         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6078         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6079         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6080         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6081 }
6082
6083 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6084 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6085 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6086 // once it's freed.
6087 #[test]
6088 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6089         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6090         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6091         // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
6092         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6093         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
6094         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
6095         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6096         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6097         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6098         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
6099
6100         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6101         // pending_update_fee.
6102         {
6103                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6104                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6105         }
6106         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6107         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6108
6109         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6110         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6111         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6112                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6113                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6114                 },
6115                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6116         };
6117
6118         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6119
6120         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6121         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6122         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6123         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6124
6125         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6126         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6127         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6128         let payment_event = {
6129                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6130                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6131                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6132
6133                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6134                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6135
6136                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6137         };
6138         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6140         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6141         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6142
6143         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
6144         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6145
6146         // Flush the pending fee update.
6147         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6148         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6150         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6151         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6153
6154         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6155         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6156         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6157
6158         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6159                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6160                         msg.clone()
6161                 },
6162                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6163         };
6164
6165         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6167         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6168
6169         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6170         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6171         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6172         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6173                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6174                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6175         }
6176
6177         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6178         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6180
6181         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6182         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6183         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6184         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6185                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6186                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6187                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6188                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6189                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6190                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6191                 },
6192                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6193         };
6194
6195         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6196         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6197         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6198
6199         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6200         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6201         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6202         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6203         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6205         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6206         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6207         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6208                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6209                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6210         };
6211         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6212         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6213         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6214 }
6215
6216 #[test]
6217 fn test_payment_route_reaching_same_channel_twice() {
6218         //A route should not go through the same channel twice
6219         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6220         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6221         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6222         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6223         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6224         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6225
6226         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6227                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6228         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6229
6230         // Extend the path by itself, essentially simulating route going through same channel twice
6231         let cloned_hops = route.paths[0].hops.clone();
6232         route.paths[0].hops.extend_from_slice(&cloned_hops);
6233
6234         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6235                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6236         ), false, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6237         assert_eq!(err, &"Path went through the same channel twice"));
6238 }
6239
6240 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6241 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6242 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6243
6244 #[test]
6245 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6246         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6247         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6248         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6249         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6250         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6251         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6252
6253         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6254         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6255
6256         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6257                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6258                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6259         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6260 }
6261
6262 #[test]
6263 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6264         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6265         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6266         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6267         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6268         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6269         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6270
6271         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6272         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6273         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6274                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6275                 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6276                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6277
6278         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6279         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6280 }
6281
6282 #[test]
6283 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6284         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6285         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6286         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6287         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6288         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6289         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6290
6291         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6292         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6293                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6294         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6295         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6296         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6297
6298         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6299         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC", 3);
6300         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6302         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() },
6303                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6304 }
6305
6306 #[test]
6307 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6308         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6309         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6310         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6311         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6312         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6313         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6314         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6315
6316         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6317                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6318         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6319         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6320         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6321                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6322                 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6323                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6324 }
6325
6326 #[test]
6327 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6328         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6329         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6330         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6331         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6332         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6333         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6334         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6335         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6336         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6337                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6338
6339         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6340         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6341         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6342                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6343                 let payment_event = {
6344                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6345                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6346                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6347
6348                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6349                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6350                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6351                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6352                         } else {
6353                                 assert!(false);
6354                         }
6355                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6356                 };
6357                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6358                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6359                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6360
6361                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6362                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6363         }
6364         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6365                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6366                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6367
6368         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6369 }
6370
6371 #[test]
6372 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6373         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6374         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6375         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6376         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6377         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6378         let channel_value = 100000;
6379         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6380         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6381
6382         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6383
6384         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6385         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6386         // limits us to.
6387         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6388         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6389                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6390                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6391         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6392
6393         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6394 }
6395
6396 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6397 #[test]
6398 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6399         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6400         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6401         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6402         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6403         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6404         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6405         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6406         {
6407                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6408                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6409                 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6410                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context().get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6411         }
6412
6413         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6414         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6415                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6416         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6417         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6418         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6419         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6420         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6421         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6422         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6423         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6424         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6425 }
6426
6427 #[test]
6428 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6429         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6430         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6431         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6432         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6433         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6434         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6435
6436         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6437         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6438         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6439         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6440         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6441         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6442
6443         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6444         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6445         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6446                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6447         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6448         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6449
6450         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6451         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6452         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6453         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6454         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6455
6456         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6457         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6458         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6459         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6460         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6461 }
6462
6463 #[test]
6464 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6465         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6466         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6467         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6468         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6469         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6470         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6471         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6472
6473         let send_amt = 3999999;
6474         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6475                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6476         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6477         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6478         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6479         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6480         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6481                 &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6482         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6483
6484         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6485                 channel_id: chan.2,
6486                 htlc_id: 0,
6487                 amount_msat: 1000,
6488                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6489                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6490                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6491                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6492                 blinding_point: None,
6493         };
6494
6495         for i in 0..50 {
6496                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6497                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6498         }
6499         msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6500         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6501
6502         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6503         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6504         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6505         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6506         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6507 }
6508
6509 #[test]
6510 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6511         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6512         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6513         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6514         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6515         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6516         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6517
6518         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6519         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6520                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6521         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6522         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6523         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6524         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6525
6526         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6527         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6528         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6530         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6531 }
6532
6533 #[test]
6534 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6535         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6536         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6537         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6538         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6539         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6540
6541         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6542         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6543         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6544                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6545         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6546         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6547         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6548         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6549
6550         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6551         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6552         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6553         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6554         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6555 }
6556
6557 #[test]
6558 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6559         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6560         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6561         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6562         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6563         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6564         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6565         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6566
6567         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6568         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6569         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6570                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6571         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6572         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6573         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6574
6575         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6576         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6577         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6578         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6579                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6580         }, true).unwrap();
6581         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6582         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6583         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6584                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6585         }, false).unwrap();
6586         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6587         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6588         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6589         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6590         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6591         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6592
6593         //Resend HTLC
6594         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6595         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6596         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6597         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6598         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6599
6600         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6601
6602         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6603         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6604         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6605         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6606         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6607 }
6608
6609 #[test]
6610 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6611         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6612
6613         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6614         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6615         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6616         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6617         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6618         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6619         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6620                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6621
6622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6623         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6624         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6625
6626         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6627                 channel_id: chan.2,
6628                 htlc_id: 0,
6629                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6630         };
6631
6632         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6633
6634         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6635         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6636         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6637         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6638         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6639 }
6640
6641 #[test]
6642 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6643         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6644
6645         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6646         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6647         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6648         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6649         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6650
6651         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6652         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6653                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6654         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6655         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6656         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6657
6658         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6659                 channel_id: chan.2,
6660                 htlc_id: 0,
6661                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6662         };
6663
6664         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6665
6666         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6667         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6668         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6669         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6670         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6671 }
6672
6673 #[test]
6674 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6675         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6676
6677         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6678         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6679         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6680         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6681         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6682
6683         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6684         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6685                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6686         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6687         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6688         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6689         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6690                 channel_id: chan.2,
6691                 htlc_id: 0,
6692                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6693                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6694         };
6695
6696         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6697
6698         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6699         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6700         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6701         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6702         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6703 }
6704
6705 #[test]
6706 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6707         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6708
6709         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6710         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6711         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6712         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6713         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6714
6715         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6716
6717         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6718         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6719         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6720
6721         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6722         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6723         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6724                 match events[0] {
6725                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6726                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6727                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6728                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6729                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6730                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6731                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6732                         },
6733                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6734                 }
6735         };
6736
6737         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6738
6739         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6740
6741         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6742         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6743         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6744         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6745         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6746 }
6747
6748 #[test]
6749 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6750         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6751
6752         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6753         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6754         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6755         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6756         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6757
6758         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6759
6760         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6761         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6762         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6763
6764         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6765         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6766         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6767                 match events[0] {
6768                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6769                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6770                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6771                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6772                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6773                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6774                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6775                         },
6776                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6777                 }
6778         };
6779
6780         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6781
6782         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6783
6784         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6785         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6786         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6787         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6788         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6789 }
6790
6791 #[test]
6792 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6793         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6794
6795         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6796         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6797         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6798         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6799         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6800
6801         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6802         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6803                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6805
6806         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6807         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6808
6809         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6810         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6811         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6812
6813         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6814
6815         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6816                 match events[0] {
6817                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6818                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6819                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6820                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6821                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6822                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6823                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6824                         },
6825                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6826                 }
6827         };
6828         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6829         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6830
6831         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6832         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6833         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6834         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6835         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6836 }
6837
6838 #[test]
6839 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6840         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6841         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6842
6843         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6844         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6845         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6846         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6847         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6848         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6849
6850         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6851
6852         //First hop
6853         let mut payment_event = {
6854                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6855                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6856                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6857                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6858                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6859                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6860         };
6861         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6863         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6864         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6865         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6866         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6867         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6868         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6869         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6870
6871         //Second Hop
6872         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6873         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6874         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6875         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6876
6877         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6878         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6879         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6880                 match events_3[0] {
6881                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6882                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6883                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6884                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6885                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6886                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6887                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6888                         },
6889                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6890                 }
6891         };
6892
6893         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6894
6895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6896         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6897         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6898         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6899         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6900
6901         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6902         match events_4[0] {
6903                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6904                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6905                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6906                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6907                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6908                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6909                 },
6910                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6911         };
6912
6913         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6914 }
6915
6916 #[test]
6917 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6918         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6919         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6920         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6921         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6922         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6923         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6924
6925         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6926
6927         // First hop
6928         let mut payment_event = {
6929                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6930                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6931                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6932                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6933         };
6934
6935         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6936         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6937         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6938         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6939         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6940         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6941
6942         // Second Hop
6943         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6944         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6946         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6947
6948         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6949         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6950         match events_3[0] {
6951                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6952                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6953                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6954                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6955
6956                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6957                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6958                 },
6959                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6960         }
6961
6962         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6963                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6964                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6965         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6966         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6968
6969         match events_4[0] {
6970                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6971                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6972                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6973                 },
6974                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6975         }
6976
6977         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6978         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6979
6980         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6981         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6982         match events_5[0] {
6983                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6984                 } => {
6985                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6986                         assert!(is_permanent);
6987                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6988                 },
6989                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6990         }
6991         match events_5[1] {
6992                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6993                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6994                 },
6995                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6996         }
6997
6998         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6999 }
7000
7001 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7002         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7003         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7004         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7005
7006         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7007         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7008         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7009         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7010         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7011         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7012
7013         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7014                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7015
7016         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7017         let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7018         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7019         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7020
7021         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7022         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7023
7024         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7025         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7027         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7029
7030         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7031         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7032         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7033         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7034
7035         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7036         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7037
7038         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7039         match events[0] {
7040                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7041                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7042                 },
7043                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7044         }
7045         match events[1] {
7046                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7047                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7048                 },
7049                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7050         }
7051
7052         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7053         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7054         if announce_latest {
7055                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7056         } else {
7057                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7058         }
7059
7060         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7061         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7062         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7063
7064         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7065         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7066         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7067         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7068         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
7069         let mut first_failed = false;
7070         for event in events {
7071                 match event {
7072                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7073                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7074                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7075                                         first_failed = true;
7076                                 } else {
7077                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7078                                 }
7079                         },
7080                         Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
7081                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7082                 }
7083         }
7084 }
7085
7086 #[test]
7087 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7088         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7089         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7090 }
7091
7092 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7093         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7094         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7095         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7096         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7097         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7098         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7099
7100         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7101         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7102         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7103         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7104         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7105
7106         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7107                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7108
7109         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7110         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7111
7112         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7113         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7114
7115         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7116         if revoked {
7117                 let (payment_preimage_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7118                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7119         }
7120
7121         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7122         if local {
7123                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7124                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7125                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7126                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7127                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7128
7129                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7130                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7131                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7132                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7133                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
7134                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7135                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7136                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7137                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7138                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7139                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7140         } else {
7141                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7142                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7143                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7144                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7145                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7146                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7147
7148                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7149                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7150                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7151                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7152                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7153                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7154                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7155
7156                 if !revoked {
7157                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7158                 } else {
7159                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), 11);
7160                 }
7161                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7162                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7163                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7164                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7165                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7166         }
7167 }
7168
7169 #[test]
7170 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7171         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7172         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7173         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7174 }
7175
7176 #[test]
7177 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7178         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7179
7180         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7181         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7182         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7183         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7184         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7185         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7186         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7187         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7188         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7189
7190         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
7191         if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7192                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7193                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42, None)
7194         {
7195                 match error {
7196                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7197                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7198                 }
7199         } else { assert!(false) }
7200
7201         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7202         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7203         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7204         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7205         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7206                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7207                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7208         {
7209                 match error {
7210                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7211                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7212                 }
7213         } else { assert!(false); }
7214
7215         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7216         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7217         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7218         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7219         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7220         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
7221         let reason_msg;
7222         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7223                 match action {
7224                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7225                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7226                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7227                         },
7228                         _ => { panic!(); }
7229                 }
7230         } else { panic!(); }
7231         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7232
7233         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7234         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7235         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7236         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7237         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7238                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7239                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7240         {
7241                 match error {
7242                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7243                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7244                 }
7245         } else { assert!(false); }
7246 }
7247
7248 #[test]
7249 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7250         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7251         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7252         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7253
7254         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7255         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7256         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7257         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7258
7259         // Create some initial channels
7260         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7261
7262         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7263         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7264         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
7265                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7266         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000);
7267         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7268                 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7269         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7270         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7271         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7272                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7273         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7274
7275         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7276         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7277         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7278         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7279         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7280
7281         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7282         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7283         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7284         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7285
7286         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7287         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7288         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7289
7290         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7291         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7292         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7293                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7294                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7295                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7296                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7297                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7298                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7299                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7300                 },
7301                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7302         };
7303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7304
7305         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7306         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7307
7308         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7309         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7310         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7311         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7312 }
7313
7314 #[test]
7315 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7316         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7317         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7318
7319         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7320         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7321         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7322         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7323
7324         // Connect a dummy node for proper future events broadcasting
7325         connect_dummy_node(&nodes[0]);
7326
7327         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7328         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7329         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7330
7331         // Disconnect peers
7332         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7333         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7334
7335         for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7336                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7337         }
7338         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7339         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7340         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7341         for e in msg_events {
7342                 match e {
7343                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7344                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7345                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7346                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7347                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7348                                 }
7349                         },
7350                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7351                 }
7352         }
7353         // Reconnect peers
7354         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7355                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7356         }, true).unwrap();
7357         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7358         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7359         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7360                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7361         }, false).unwrap();
7362         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7363         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7364
7365         // Reestablish chan_1
7366         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7367         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7368         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7369         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7370         // Reestablish chan_2
7371         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7372         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7373         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7374         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7375         // Reestablish chan_3
7376         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7377         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7378         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7379         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7380
7381         for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7382                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7383         }
7384         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7385         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7386         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7387         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7388         for e in msg_events {
7389                 match e {
7390                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7391                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7392                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7393                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7394                                         // the old one.
7395                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7396                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7397                                 }
7398                         },
7399                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7400                 }
7401         }
7402         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7403         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7404 }
7405
7406 #[test]
7407 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7408         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7409         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7410
7411         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7412         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7413         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7414         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7415
7416         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7417
7418         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7419         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7420                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7421         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7422         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7423
7424         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7425         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7426         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7427         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7428         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7429         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7430
7431         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7432         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7433                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7434                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7435                 }
7436         }
7437
7438         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7439         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7440
7441         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7442         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7443         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7445
7446         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7447         let penalty_1;
7448         let feerate_1;
7449         {
7450                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7451                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7452                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7453                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7454                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7455                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7456                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7457                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7458                 node_txn.clear();
7459         };
7460
7461         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7462         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7463         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7464         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7465         {
7466                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7467                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7468                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7469                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7470                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7471                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7472                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7473                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7474                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7475                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7476                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7477                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7478                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7479                         node_txn.clear();
7480                 }
7481         }
7482         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7483
7484         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7485         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7486         let penalty_3;
7487         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7488         {
7489                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7490                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7491                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7492                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7493                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7494                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7495                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7496                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7497                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7498                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7499                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7500                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7501                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7502                         node_txn.clear();
7503                 }
7504         }
7505         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7506
7507         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7508         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7509 }
7510
7511 #[test]
7512 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7513         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7514         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7515
7516         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7517         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7518         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7519         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7520         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7521
7522         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7523         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7524         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7525         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7526         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7527         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7528         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7529                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7530         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7531         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50)
7532                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7533         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7534         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7535                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7536         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7537
7538         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7539         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7540         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7541
7542         // Revoke local commitment tx
7543         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7544
7545         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7546         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7547         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7548         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7549         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7550         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7551
7552         let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7553                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7554                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7555
7556                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7557                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7558                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7559
7560                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7561                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7562                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7563                 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7564
7565                 txn
7566         };
7567
7568         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7569         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7570         let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7571         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7572         let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7573         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7574         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7575         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7576         match events.last().unwrap() {
7577                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7578                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7579         }
7580         let first;
7581         let feerate_1;
7582         let penalty_txn;
7583         {
7584                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7585                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7586                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7587
7588                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7589                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7590                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7591                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7592                 // future).
7593                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7594                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7595                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7596                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7597                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7598                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7599
7600                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7601                 // available, which we check here:
7602                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7603                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7604                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7605
7606                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7607                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7608
7609                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7610                 // output, checked above).
7611                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7612                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7613                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7614
7615                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7616                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7617                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7618                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight().to_wu();
7619                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7620                 node_txn.clear();
7621         }
7622
7623         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7624         let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7625         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7626         let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7627         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7628
7629         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7630         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7631         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7632         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7633         let node_txn = {
7634                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7635                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7636
7637                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7638                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7639                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7640                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7641                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7642                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7643                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7644                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7645                 node_txn.clear();
7646                 txn
7647         };
7648         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7649         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7650         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7651         {
7652                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7653                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7654                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7655                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7656                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7657                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7658                 // up bumped justice generation.
7659                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7660                 node_txn.clear();
7661         }
7662         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7663         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7664 }
7665
7666 #[test]
7667 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7668         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7669         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7670
7671         // Create 2 HTLCs
7672         // Provide preimage for one
7673         // Check aggregation
7674
7675         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7676         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7677         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7678         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7679
7680         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7681         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7682         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7683
7684         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7685         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7686         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7687         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7688         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7689
7690         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7691         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7692         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7693         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7694         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7695         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7696
7697         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7698         let timeout;
7699         let preimage;
7700         let preimage_bump;
7701         let feerate_timeout;
7702         let feerate_preimage;
7703         {
7704                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7705                 // 3 transactions including:
7706                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7707                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7708                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7709                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7710                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7711                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7712                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7713                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7714
7715                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7716                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7717                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7718                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7719
7720                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7721                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7722                 } else {
7723                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7724                 };
7725
7726                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7727                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7728                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7729
7730                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7731                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7732                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7733                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight().to_wu();
7734
7735                 node_txn.clear();
7736         };
7737         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7738         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7739
7740         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7741         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7742         {
7743                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7744                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7745                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7746                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7747                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7748                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7749
7750                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7751                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7752                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight().to_wu();
7753                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7754                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7755
7756                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7757                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7758                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7759                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7760                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7761
7762                 node_txn.clear();
7763         }
7764
7765         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7766         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7767 }
7768
7769 #[test]
7770 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7771         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7772         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7773         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7774         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7775         // TestChannelSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7776         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7777         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7778         // implement that).
7779         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7780         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7781         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7782         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7783         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7784
7785         let per_commitment_secret;
7786         let next_per_commitment_point;
7787         {
7788                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7789                 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7790                 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).map(
7791                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7792                 ).flatten().unwrap().get_signer();
7793
7794                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7795
7796                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7797                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7798                 per_commitment_secret = keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7799
7800                 // Must revoke without gaps
7801                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7802                 keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7803
7804                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7805                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7806                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7807         }
7808
7809         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7810                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7811                         channel_id,
7812                         per_commitment_secret,
7813                         next_per_commitment_point,
7814                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7815                         next_local_nonce: None,
7816                 });
7817         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7818         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7819         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() }
7820                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7821 }
7822
7823 #[test]
7824 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7825         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7826         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7827
7828         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7829         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7830         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7831         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7832
7833         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7834         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7835         let (payment_preimage_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7836         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7837
7838         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7839         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7840         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7841
7842         // Revoke local commitment tx
7843         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7844
7845         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7846         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7847         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7848         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7849
7850         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7851         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7852         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7853         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7854         let penalty_txn = {
7855                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7856                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7857                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7858                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7859                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7860                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7861                 node_txn.clear();
7862                 penalty_txn
7863         };
7864         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7865         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7866         {
7867                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7868                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7869                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7870         }
7871 }
7872
7873 #[test]
7874 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7875         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7876         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7877         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7878         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7879         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7880         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7881
7882         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7883
7884         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7885         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7886         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7887         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7888         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7889
7890         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7891         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7892         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7893         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7894
7895         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7897         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7898         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7899         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7900         match close_ev[0] {
7901                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7902                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7903                         assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7904                 },
7905                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7906         }
7907 }
7908
7909 #[test]
7910 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7911         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7912         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7913         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7914         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7915
7916         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7917         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7918         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7919
7920         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7921
7922         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7923         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7924         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7925         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7926 }
7927
7928 #[test]
7929 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7930         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7931         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7932         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7933         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7934         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7935         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7936
7937         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7938         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7939         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7940
7941         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7942         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7943         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7944 }
7945
7946 #[test]
7947 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7948         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7949         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7950         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7951         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7952         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7953
7954         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7955         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7956         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7957         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7958         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7959         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7960         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7961         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7962         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7963         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7964         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7965         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7966
7967         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7968         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7969         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7970         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7971
7972         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7973         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7974         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7975         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7976         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7977
7978         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7979         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7980
7981         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7982         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7983         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7984         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7985         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7986         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7987
7988         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7989         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7990         // `channel_value`.
7991         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7992         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7993         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7994         // `channel_value`.
7995         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7996 }
7997
7998 #[test]
7999 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8000         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8001         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8002         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8003         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8004         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8005         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8006
8007         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8008         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8009
8010         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8011
8012         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8013         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8014         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8015
8016         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8017         match events[0] {
8018                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8019                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8020                 }
8021                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8022         }
8023
8024         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8025         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8026
8027         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8028                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8029                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8030                 }
8031                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8032         }
8033
8034         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8035
8036         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8037         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8038
8039         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8040         match events[0] {
8041                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8042                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8043                 }
8044                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8045         }
8046 }
8047
8048 #[test]
8049 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8050         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8051         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8052         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8053         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8054         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8055         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8056
8057         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8058         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8059
8060         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8061
8062         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8063         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8064         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8065
8066         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8067         match events[0] {
8068                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8069                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8070                 }
8071                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8072         }
8073
8074         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8075         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8076
8077         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8078                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8079                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8080                 }
8081                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8082         }
8083
8084         // There should be no more events to process, as the channel was never opened.
8085         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8086 }
8087
8088 #[test]
8089 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8090         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8091         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8092         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8093         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8094         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8095         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8096
8097         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8098         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8099
8100         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8101
8102         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8103         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8104         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8105
8106         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8107         match events[0] {
8108                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8109                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8110                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8111                         match api_res {
8112                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8113                                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8114                                 },
8115                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8116                                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error {:?}", e),
8117                         }
8118                 }
8119                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8120         }
8121
8122         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8123         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8124         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8125
8126         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8127                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8128                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8129                 }
8130                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8131         }
8132 }
8133
8134 #[test]
8135 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8136         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8137         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8138         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8139         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8140
8141         let unknown_channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
8142         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8143         match api_res {
8144                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8145                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8146                 },
8147                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8148                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error: {:?}", e),
8149         }
8150 }
8151
8152 #[test]
8153 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
8154         // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
8155         // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
8156         // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
8157         // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
8158         // a PaymentClaimable event too early
8159         let node_count = 4;
8160         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8161         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8162         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8163         let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8164
8165         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8166         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8167         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8168         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8169
8170         let total_msat = 100_000;
8171         let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
8172         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
8173         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8174
8175         let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8176         path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8177         path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8178         path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8179         path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8180         path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8181         route.paths.push(path_1);
8182
8183         let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8184         path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8185         path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8186         path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8187         path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8188         path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8189         route.paths.push(path_2);
8190
8191         // Send payment
8192         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8193         let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8194                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8195         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8196                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8198
8199         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8200         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8201
8202         // First path
8203         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8204         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8205         let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8206
8207         for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8208                 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8209
8210                 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8211                         let session_priv = [3; 32];
8212                         let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8213                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8214                         let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8215                         let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8216                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8217                         // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8218                         // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8219                         if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
8220                                 ref mut sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, ..
8221                         } = onion_payloads[1] {
8222                                 *sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat = 99_000;
8223                         } else { panic!() }
8224                         let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8225                         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8226                 }
8227
8228                 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8229                 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8230                 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8231                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8232
8233                 if idx == 0 {
8234                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8235                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8236                         check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8237                         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8238                         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8239                 } else {
8240                         let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8241                         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8242                 }
8243
8244                 prev_node = node;
8245         }
8246
8247         // Second path
8248         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8249         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8250
8251         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8252 }
8253
8254 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8255
8256         let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8257         let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8258
8259         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8260         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8261         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8262         let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8263
8264         let src_idx = 0;
8265         let dst_idx = 1;
8266
8267         // Create channels for each amount
8268         let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8269         let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8270         let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8271         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8272                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8273                 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8274                 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8275                 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8276                 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8277                 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8278                 expected_paths.push(path);
8279         }
8280         let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8281
8282         // Create a route for each amount
8283         let example_amount = 100000;
8284         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8285         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8286         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8287                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8288                 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8289                 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8290                 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8291                 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8292                 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8293                 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8294                 route.paths.push(path);
8295         }
8296
8297         // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8298         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8299         let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8300                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8301         nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8302                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8304
8305         let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8306         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8307         let mut amount_received = 0;
8308         for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8309                 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8310
8311                 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8312                 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8313                 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8314                 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8315         }
8316
8317         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8318 }
8319
8320 #[test]
8321 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8322         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8323         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8324 }
8325
8326 #[test]
8327 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8328         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8329         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8330         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8331         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8332         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8333
8334         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8335         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8336         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8337         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8338
8339         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8340         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8341         route.paths.push(path);
8342         route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8343         route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8344         route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8345         route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8346         route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8347         route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8348         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8349         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8350 }
8351
8352 #[test]
8353 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8354         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8355         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8356         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8357         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8358         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8359
8360         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8361
8362         {
8363                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8364                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8365                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8366                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8367                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8368                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8369                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8370                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8371                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8372         }
8373         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8374         // values from previous calls.
8375         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8376         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8377         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8378         match events[0] {
8379                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8380                         match &purpose {
8381                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8382                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8383                                 },
8384                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8385                         }
8386                 },
8387                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8388         }
8389 }
8390
8391 #[test]
8392 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8393         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8394         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8395         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8396         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8397         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8398
8399         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8400
8401         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8402         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8403         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8404         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8405
8406         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8407         // resulting events.
8408         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8409                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8410                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8411                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8412                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8413                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8414                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8415
8416                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8417                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8418                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8419                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8420                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8421
8422                         // We should fail the payment back
8423                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8424                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8425                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8426                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8427                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8428                                 },
8429                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8430                         }
8431                 }
8432         }
8433
8434         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8435         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8436         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8437
8438         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8439         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8440                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8441         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8442         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8443
8444         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8445         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8446                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8447         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8448         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8449
8450         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8451         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8452                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8453         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8454         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8455 }
8456
8457 #[test]
8458 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8459         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8460         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8461         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8462         // error.
8463         //
8464         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8465         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8466         // commitment at same time.
8467
8468         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8469         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8470         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8471         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8472
8473         // Create some initial channel
8474         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8475         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8476
8477         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8478         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8479
8480         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8481         let (preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8482
8483         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8484         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8485         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8486         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8487         let watchtower = {
8488                 let new_monitor = {
8489                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8490                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8491                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8492                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8493                         new_monitor
8494                 };
8495                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8496                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8497                 watchtower
8498         };
8499         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8500         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8501         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8502         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8503         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8504
8505         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8506         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8507         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8508         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8509
8510         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8511         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8512         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8513         {
8514                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8515                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8516                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8517                         if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8518                                 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8519                                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8520                         } else { assert!(false); }
8521                 } else {
8522                         assert!(false);
8523                 }
8524         }
8525         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8526         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8527         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8528         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8529 }
8530
8531 #[test]
8532 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8533         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8534         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8535         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8536         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8537
8538         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8539         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8540         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8541         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8542
8543         // Create some initial channel
8544         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8545         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8546
8547         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8548         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8549
8550         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8551         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8552
8553         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8554         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8555         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8556         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8557         let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8558                 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8559         );
8560         let watchtower_alice = {
8561                 let new_monitor = {
8562                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8563                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8564                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8565                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8566                         new_monitor
8567                 };
8568                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8569                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8570                 watchtower
8571         };
8572         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8573         // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8574         // requirements here.
8575         const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8576         alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8577         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8578
8579         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8580         {
8581                 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8582                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8583                 check_spends!(txn[0], chan_1.3);
8584                 check_spends!(txn[1], txn[0]);
8585         };
8586
8587         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8588         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8589         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8590         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8591         let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8592         let watchtower_bob = {
8593                 let new_monitor = {
8594                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8595                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8596                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8597                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8598                         new_monitor
8599                 };
8600                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8601                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8602                 watchtower
8603         };
8604         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8605
8606         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8607         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8608         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8609                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8610         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8611
8612         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8613         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8614         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8615         {
8616                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8617                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8618                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8619                         if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8620                                 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8621                                 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8622                                 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8623                                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8624                         } else { assert!(false); }
8625                 } else {
8626                         assert!(false);
8627                 }
8628         }
8629         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8630         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8631
8632         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8633         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8634
8635         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8636         let bob_state_y;
8637         {
8638                 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8639                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8640                 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8641         };
8642
8643         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8644         let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8645         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8646         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8647         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
8648                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8649         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8650         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8651         {
8652                 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8653                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8654                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8655         }
8656 }
8657
8658 #[test]
8659 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8660         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8661         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8662         // message).
8663         //
8664         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8665         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8666         //
8667         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8668         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8669         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8670         // before receiving funding_signed.
8671         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8672         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8673         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8674         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8675
8676         // Create an initial channel
8677         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8678         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8679         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8680         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8681         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8682
8683         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8684         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8685
8686         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8688
8689         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8690         let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index });
8691         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8692         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8693         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true,
8694                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8695 }
8696
8697 #[test]
8698 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8699         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8700         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8701         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8702         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8703         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8704         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8705
8706         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8707         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8708         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8709         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8710
8711         // Create some initial channels
8712         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8713
8714         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8715         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8716         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8717         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8718         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8719         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8720
8721         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8722         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8723         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8724         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8725         // this test before #653 fix.
8726         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8727         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8728         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8729         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8730         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8731
8732         let htlc_timeout = {
8733                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8734                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8735                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8736                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8737                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8738                 node_txn[0].clone()
8739         };
8740
8741         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8742         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8743         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8744 }
8745
8746 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8747         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8748         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8749         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8750         //
8751         // Steps of the test:
8752         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8753         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8754         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8755         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8756         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8757         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8758         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8759         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8760         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8761         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8762         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8763         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8764
8765         // Create some initial channels
8766         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8767         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8768
8769         // Steps (1) and (2):
8770         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8771         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8772
8773         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8774         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8775         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8776         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8777         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8778         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8779         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8780
8781         // Steps (3) and (4):
8782         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8783         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8784         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8785         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8786
8787         // Bob force-closes
8788         if !broadcast_alice {
8789                 force_closing_node = 1;
8790                 counterparty_node = 0;
8791         }
8792         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8793         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8794         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8795         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8796         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8797                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8798                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8799                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8800                 };
8801                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8802                 if broadcast_alice {
8803                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8804                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8805                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8806                 }
8807         }
8808
8809         // Step (5):
8810         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8811         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8812         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8813         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8814         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8815
8816         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8817         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8818         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8819         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8820         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8821         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8822
8823         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8824         let went_onchain = go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1;
8825         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if went_onchain { None } else { Some(1000) }, went_onchain, false);
8826         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8827         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8828                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8829                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8830                 match events[0] {
8831                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8832                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8833                         },
8834                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8835                 };
8836         }
8837         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8838         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8839         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8841
8842         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8843         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8844         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8845                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8846                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8847                         (*msg).clone()
8848                 },
8849                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8850         };
8851         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8852                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8853                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8854                         (*updates).clone()
8855                 },
8856                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8857         };
8858
8859         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8860         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8861         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8863
8864         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8865         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8866         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8867                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8868                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8869                         (*msg).clone()
8870                 },
8871                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8872         };
8873         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8874         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8875
8876         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8877         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8878         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8879         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8880         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8881                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8882                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8883                 if broadcast_alice {
8884                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8885                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8886                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8887                 }
8888                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8889                 if broadcast_alice {
8890                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8891                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8892                 } else {
8893                         if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
8894                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8895                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].txid(), bob_txn[1].txid());
8896                         } else {
8897                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8898                         }
8899                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8900                 }
8901         }
8902
8903         // Step (6):
8904         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8905         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8906         {
8907                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8908                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8909                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8910                 };
8911                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8912                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8913                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8914                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8915                 if broadcast_alice {
8916                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8917                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8918                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8919                 } else {
8920                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
8921                         let htlc_tx = bob_txn.pop().unwrap();
8922                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8923                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8924                 }
8925         }
8926 }
8927
8928 #[test]
8929 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8930         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8931         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8932         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8933         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8934 }
8935
8936 #[test]
8937 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8938         // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8939         // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8940         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8941         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8942         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8943         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8944
8945         // Create an first channel channel
8946         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8947         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8948
8949         // Create an second channel
8950         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None, None).unwrap();
8951         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8952
8953         // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8954         // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8955         open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8956
8957         // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8958         // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8959         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8960         {
8961                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8962                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8963                 match &events[0] {
8964                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8965                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8966                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8967                         },
8968                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8969                 }
8970         }
8971
8972         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8973         {
8974                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8975                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8976                 match &events[0] {
8977                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8978                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8979                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8980                         },
8981                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8982                 }
8983         }
8984 }
8985
8986 #[test]
8987 fn test_peer_funding_sidechannel() {
8988         // Test that if a peer somehow learns which txid we'll use for our channel funding before we
8989         // receive `funding_transaction_generated` the peer cannot cause us to crash. We'd previously
8990         // assumed that LDK would receive `funding_transaction_generated` prior to our peer learning
8991         // the txid and panicked if the peer tried to open a redundant channel to us with the same
8992         // funding outpoint.
8993         //
8994         // While this assumption is generally safe, some users may have out-of-band protocols where
8995         // they notify their LSP about a funding outpoint first, or this may be violated in the future
8996         // with collaborative transaction construction protocols, i.e. dual-funding.
8997         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8998         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8999         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9000         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9001
9002         let temp_chan_id_ab = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9003         let temp_chan_id_ca = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[2], &nodes[0], 1_000_000, 0);
9004
9005         let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9006                 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9007
9008         let cs_funding_events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9009         assert_eq!(cs_funding_events.len(), 1);
9010         match cs_funding_events[0] {
9011                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => {}
9012                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", cs_funding_events),
9013         }
9014
9015         nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temp_chan_id_ca, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), funding_output.index).unwrap();
9016         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9017         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9018         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9019         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9020         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9021
9022         let res = nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id_ab, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone());
9023         let err_msg = format!("{:?}", res.unwrap_err());
9024         assert!(err_msg.contains("An existing channel using outpoint "));
9025         assert!(err_msg.contains(" is open with peer"));
9026         // Even though the last funding_transaction_generated errored, it still generated a
9027         // SendFundingCreated. However, when the peer responds with a funding_signed it will send the
9028         // appropriate error message.
9029         let as_funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9030         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_created);
9031         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9032         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9033         let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: format!("An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}", funding_output, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), };
9034         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_output), true, reason)]);
9035
9036         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9037         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9038         get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9039 }
9040
9041 #[test]
9042 fn test_duplicate_conflicting_funding_from_second_peer() {
9043         // Test that if a user tries to fund a channel with a funding outpoint they'd previously used
9044         // we don't try to remove the previous ChannelMonitor. This is largely a test to ensure we
9045         // don't regress in the fuzzer, as such funding getting passed our outpoint-matches checks
9046         // implies the user (and our counterparty) has reused cryptographic keys across channels, which
9047         // we require the user not do.
9048         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9049         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9050         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9051         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9052
9053         let temp_chan_id = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9054
9055         let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9056                 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9057
9058         // Now that we have a funding outpoint, create a dummy `ChannelMonitor` and insert it into
9059         // nodes[0]'s ChainMonitor so that the initial `ChannelMonitor` write fails.
9060         let dummy_chan_id = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[2], &nodes[3]).3;
9061         let dummy_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[2], dummy_chan_id).clone();
9062         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_output, dummy_monitor).unwrap();
9063
9064         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9065
9066         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9067         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9068         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9069         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9070         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9071
9072         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9073         // At this point, the channel should be closed, after having generated one monitor write (the
9074         // watch_channel call which failed), but zero monitor updates.
9075         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9076         get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9077         let err_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned() };
9078         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_signed_msg.channel_id, true, err_reason)]);
9079 }
9080
9081 #[test]
9082 fn test_duplicate_funding_err_in_funding() {
9083         // Test that if we have a live channel with one peer, then another peer comes along and tries
9084         // to create a second channel with the same txid we'll fail and not overwrite the
9085         // outpoint_to_peer map in `ChannelManager`.
9086         //
9087         // This was previously broken.
9088         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9089         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9090         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9091         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9092
9093         let (_, _, _, real_channel_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9094         let real_chan_funding_txo = chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9095         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(real_chan_funding_txo), real_channel_id);
9096
9097         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9098         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9099         let node_c_temp_chan_id = open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id;
9100         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9101         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9102         let mut accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9103         accept_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = node_c_temp_chan_id;
9104         nodes[2].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
9105
9106         // Now that we have a second channel with the same funding txo, send a bogus funding message
9107         // and let nodes[1] remove the inbound channel.
9108         let (_, funding_tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[2], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9109
9110         nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated(&node_c_temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), funding_tx).unwrap();
9111
9112         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9113         funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9114         // Make the signature invalid by changing the funding output
9115         funding_created_msg.funding_output_index += 10;
9116         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9117         get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9118         let err = "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned();
9119         let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err };
9120         let expected_closing = ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(real_channel_id, false, reason);
9121         check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[expected_closing]);
9122
9123         assert_eq!(
9124                 *nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().get(&real_chan_funding_txo).unwrap(),
9125                 nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
9126         );
9127 }
9128
9129 #[test]
9130 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9131         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9132         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9133         //
9134         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9135         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9136         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9137         // updating logic for the existing channel.
9138         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9139         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9140         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9141         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9142
9143         // Create an initial channel
9144         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9145         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9146         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9147         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9148
9149         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9150         // that it is rejected.
9151         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9152         {
9153                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9154                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9155                 match events[0] {
9156                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9157                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9158                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9159                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9160                                 // move forward with it.
9161                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9162                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9163                         },
9164                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9165                 }
9166         }
9167
9168         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9169         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9170
9171         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9173
9174         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9175         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9176         {
9177                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9178                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9179                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9180                 added_monitors.clear();
9181         }
9182         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9183
9184         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9185
9186         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9187         let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
9188
9189         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9190         // temporary one).
9191
9192         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9193         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9194         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9195         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9196         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9197         {
9198                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9199                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9200                 match events[0] {
9201                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9202                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9203                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9204                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9205                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9206                         },
9207                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9208                 }
9209         }
9210
9211         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9212         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9213         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9214         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9215         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9216         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9217
9218         let funding_created = {
9219                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9220                 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9221                 // Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9222                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9223                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9224                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9225                 match a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap() {
9226                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan) => {
9227                                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9228                                 chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
9229                         },
9230                         _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9231                 }.unwrap()
9232         };
9233         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9234         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9235         // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
9236         // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
9237         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9238
9239         check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[
9240                 ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_created.temporary_channel_id, false, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9241                         err: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned()
9242                 })
9243         ]);
9244
9245         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9246         {
9247                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9248                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9249                 match events[0] {
9250                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9251                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9252                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9253                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9254                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9255                         },
9256                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9257                 }
9258         }
9259
9260         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9261         // everything is functional.
9262         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9263         {
9264                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9265                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9266                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9267                 added_monitors.clear();
9268         }
9269         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9270
9271         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9272         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9273         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9274         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9275
9276         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9277         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9278         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9279
9280         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9281 }
9282
9283 #[test]
9284 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9285         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9286         //
9287         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9288         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9289         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9290         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9291         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9292         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9293         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9294
9295         // Create some initial channels
9296         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9297         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9298         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9299
9300         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9301         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9302         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9303
9304         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9305         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9306         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9307
9308         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9309         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9310         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9311         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9312         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9313                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9314         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9315         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9316         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9317         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9318
9319         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9320         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9321         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(), data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9323         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9324                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
9325         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9326         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9327         match events[0] {
9328                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9329                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9330                 },
9331                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9332         }
9333         match events[1] {
9334                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9335                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9336                 },
9337                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9338         }
9339         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9340         // peer_disconnected.
9341         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9342         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9343
9344         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9345         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9346         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9347 }
9348
9349 #[test]
9350 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9351         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9352         //
9353         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9354         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9355         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9356         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9357         //
9358         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9359         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9360         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9361         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9362         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9363         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9364         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9365
9366         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9367         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9368         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9369
9370         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9371
9372         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9373         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9374         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9375         // its length.
9376         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9377         let wit_program_script: ScriptBuf = wit_program.into();
9378         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9379                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9380                 output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9381         }
9382
9383         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9384         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9385         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9386         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9387
9388         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9389         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9390         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9391
9392         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9393         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9394
9395         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9396         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9397         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9398
9399         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9400         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9401         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() },
9402                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9403         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9404         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9405         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9406         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9407                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9408                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } = action {
9409                         assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9410                 } else { panic!(); }
9411         } else { panic!(); }
9412         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9413
9414         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9415         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9416         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9417         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9418                 version: 2i32, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9419                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9420                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9421                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9422                                 vout: idx as u32,
9423                         },
9424                         script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
9425                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9426                         witness: Witness::from_slice(&channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9427                 }).collect(),
9428                 output: vec![TxOut {
9429                         value: 1000,
9430                         script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new(),
9431                 }]
9432         };
9433         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9434         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9435 }
9436
9437 #[test]
9438 fn test_coinbase_funding_tx() {
9439         // Miners are able to fund channels directly from coinbase transactions, however
9440         // by consensus rules, outputs of a coinbase transaction are encumbered by a 100
9441         // block maturity timelock. To ensure that a (non-0conf) channel like this is enforceable
9442         // on-chain, the minimum depth is updated to 100 blocks for coinbase funding transactions.
9443         //
9444         // Note that 0conf channels with coinbase funding transactions are unaffected and are
9445         // immediately operational after opening.
9446         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9447         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9448         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9449         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9450
9451         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9452         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9453
9454         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9455         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9456
9457         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9458
9459         // Create the coinbase funding transaction.
9460         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_coinbase_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9461
9462         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9463         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9464         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9465
9466         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9467         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9468         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9469
9470         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9471
9472         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9474
9475         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9476         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9477
9478         // Starting at height 0, we "confirm" the coinbase at height 1.
9479         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 1);
9480         // We connect 98 more blocks to have 99 confirmations for the coinbase transaction.
9481         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9482         // Check that we have no pending message events (we have not queued a `channel_ready` yet).
9483         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9484         // Now connect one more block which results in 100 confirmations of the coinbase transaction.
9485         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
9486         // There should now be a `channel_ready` which can be handled.
9487         let _ = &nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(&nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9488
9489         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9490         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9491         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9492         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
9493         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9494         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9495 }
9496
9497 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9498         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9499         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9500         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9501         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9502         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9503         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9504         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9505         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9506         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9507         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9508         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9509         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9510         // until we learned about an additional block.
9511         //
9512         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9513         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9514         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9515         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9516         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9517         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9518         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9519
9520         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9521         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9522         let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9523         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9524         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9525
9526         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9527         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9528         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9530         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9531         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9532
9533         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9534         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9535                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9536         }
9537         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9538                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9539         if test_height_before_timelock {
9540                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9541                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9542                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9543                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9544         } else {
9545                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9546                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9547                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9548                 let htlc_tx = if spending_txn[0].txid() == node_txn[0].txid() {
9549                         &spending_txn[1]
9550                 } else {
9551                         &spending_txn[0]
9552                 };
9553                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, node_txn[0]);
9554                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9555                 // timelock is up).
9556                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9557                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9558
9559                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9560                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9561                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9562                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9563                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, htlc_tx)], conf_height + 1);
9564                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9565                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9566
9567                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9568                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9569                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9570                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9571                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9572                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9573                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9574                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9575                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9576         }
9577 }
9578
9579 #[test]
9580 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9581         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9582         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9583 }
9584
9585 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9586         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9587         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9588         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9589         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9590
9591         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9592
9593         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9594                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9595         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9596
9597         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9598
9599         {
9600                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9601                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9602                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9603                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9604                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9605                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9606                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9607                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9608         }
9609         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9610         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9611
9612         {
9613                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9614                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9615                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9616                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9617                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9618                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9619                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9620                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9621                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9622                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9623                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9624                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9625                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9626         }
9627
9628         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9629         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9630
9631         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9632                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9633                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9634
9635                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9636                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9637                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9638                 ];
9639                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9640                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9641
9642                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9643                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9644                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9645
9646                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9647                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9648                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9649
9650                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9651                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9652                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9653                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9654                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9655                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9656         } else {
9657                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9658                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9659                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9660
9661                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9662                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9663                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9664                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9665
9666                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9667
9668                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9669         }
9670 }
9671
9672 #[test]
9673 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9674         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9675         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9676         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9677         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9678         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9679 }
9680
9681 #[test]
9682 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9683         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9684         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9685         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9686 }
9687
9688 #[test]
9689 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9690         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9691         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9692         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9693         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9694         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9695         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9696
9697         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9698         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9699         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9700         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9701
9702         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9703                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9704         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9705         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9706         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9707                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9708                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9709                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9710         });
9711
9712         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9713
9714         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9715         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9716
9717         let session_privs = {
9718                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9719                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9720                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9721                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9722                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9723                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9724         };
9725         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9726                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9727                 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9728         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9729
9730         {
9731                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9732                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9733                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9734         }
9735         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9736
9737         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9738                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9739         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9740
9741         {
9742                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9743                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9744                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9745
9746                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9747                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9748
9749                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9750                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9751
9752                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9753                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9754                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9755
9756                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9757                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9758                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9759
9760                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9761                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9762                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9763         }
9764         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9765         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9766         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9767         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9768
9769         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9770
9771         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9772         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9773         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9774
9775         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9776         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9777
9778         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9779         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9780         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9781
9782         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9783
9784         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9785                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9786                 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9787         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9788
9789         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9790         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9791         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9792
9793         do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9794         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true, true);
9795 }
9796
9797 #[test]
9798 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9799         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9800         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9801         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9802         // amount.
9803         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9804         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9805         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9806         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9807
9808         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9809         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9810         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9811         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9812
9813         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9814         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9815         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9816                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9817                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9818                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9819         });
9820
9821         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9822         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9823         // amount of time to respond to.
9824
9825         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9826         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9827         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9828
9829         let failed_destinations = vec![
9830                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9831                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9832         ];
9833         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9834
9835         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9836
9837         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9838         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9839                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9841
9842         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9843         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9844         let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9845         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9846
9847         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9848         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9849         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9850         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9851         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9852 }
9853
9854 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9855 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9856 enum ExposureEvent {
9857         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9858         AtHTLCForward,
9859         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9860         AtHTLCReception,
9861         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9862         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9863 }
9864
9865 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
9866         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9867         // policy.
9868         //
9869         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9870         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9871         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9872         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9873         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9874         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9875         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9876         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9877
9878         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9879         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9880         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
9881                 // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
9882                 // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
9883                 // originally written.
9884                 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253)
9885         } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000) }; // initial default setting value
9886         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9887         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9888         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9889
9890         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9891         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9892         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9893         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9894         if on_holder_tx {
9895                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9896         }
9897         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9898         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9899         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9900
9901         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9902
9903         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9904
9905         if on_holder_tx {
9906                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9907                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9908                 match get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id) {
9909                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9910                                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9911                         },
9912                         _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9913                 }
9914         }
9915
9916         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9917         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9918         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9919         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9920
9921         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9922         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9923         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9924
9925         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9926         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9927         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9928
9929         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
9930         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
9931                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
9932
9933         let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
9934                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9935                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9936                 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9937                 (chan.context().get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
9938                 chan.context().get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
9939         };
9940         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9941         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9942
9943         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9944         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9945
9946         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
9947         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9948
9949         if on_holder_tx {
9950                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9951                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9952                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9953                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9954                         for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9955                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9956                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9957                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9958                         }
9959                 } else {
9960                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9961                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9962                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9963                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9964                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9965                         }
9966                 }
9967         } else {
9968                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9969                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9970                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9971                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9972                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9973                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9974                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9975                         }
9976                 } else {
9977                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9978                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9979                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9980                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9981                         }
9982                 }
9983         }
9984
9985         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9986                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
9987                         if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
9988                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9989                 if on_holder_tx {
9990                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9991                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9992                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9993                 } else {
9994                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9995                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9996                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9997                 }
9998         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9999                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
10000                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10001                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10002                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10003                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10004                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10005                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10006                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10007                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10008                 if on_holder_tx {
10009                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10010                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10011                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10012                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10013                 } else {
10014                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10015                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
10016                                 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
10017                                         dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4,
10018                                         max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10019                 }
10020         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10021                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
10022                 // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
10023                 // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
10024                 // to cross the threshold.
10025                 for _ in 0..20 {
10026                         let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
10027                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10028                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10029                 }
10030                 {
10031                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10032                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10033                 }
10034                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10035                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10036                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
10037         }
10038
10039         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10040         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10041         added_monitors.clear();
10042 }
10043
10044 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
10045         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10046         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10047         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10048         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10049         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10050         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10051         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10052         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10053         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10054         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10055         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10056         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10057 }
10058
10059 #[test]
10060 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10061         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false);
10062         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true);
10063 }
10064
10065 #[test]
10066 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10067         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10068         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10069         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10070         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10071
10072         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10073         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10074         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10075         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10076         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10077
10078         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10079
10080         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10081         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10082         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[&[1]]) };
10083         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10084         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10085                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10086                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
10087                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10088                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10089                         }]}
10090                 },
10091                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10092         };
10093         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10094         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10095                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10096                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10097                 },
10098                 _ => panic!()
10099         }
10100         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10101         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10102         match events[0] {
10103                 Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, .. } => {
10104                         assert_eq!(channel_id, temp_channel_id);
10105                 },
10106                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10107         }
10108 }
10109
10110 #[test]
10111 fn test_non_final_funding_tx_within_headroom() {
10112         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10113         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10114         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10115         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10116
10117         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10118         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10119         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10120         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10121         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10122
10123         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10124
10125         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10126         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10127         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[[1]]) };
10128         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10129         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10130                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10131                         // Timelock the transaction within a +1 headroom from the best block.
10132                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10133                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10134                         }]}
10135                 },
10136                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10137         };
10138
10139         // Transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
10140         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10141         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10142 }
10143
10144 #[test]
10145 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
10146         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
10147         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
10148         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
10149         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10150         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10151         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10152         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10153
10154         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10155
10156         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
10157         {
10158                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10159                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
10160         }
10161
10162         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
10163         {
10164                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10165                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10166         }
10167         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10169
10170         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10171         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10172         match events[0] {
10173                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10174                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10175                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10176                 },
10177                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10178         };
10179
10180         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
10181         // it.
10182         {
10183                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10184                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
10185         }
10186         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10188
10189         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10190         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10191         match events[0] {
10192                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10193                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10194                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10195                 },
10196                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10197         };
10198
10199         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
10200         // channel.
10201         {
10202                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10203                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10204         }
10205         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10207
10208         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10209         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10210         match events[0] {
10211                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
10212                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10213                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
10214                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000".to_owned() },
10215                                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10216                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
10217                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10218                 },
10219                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10220         };
10221 }
10222
10223 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
10224         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10225         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10226         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10227         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10228         let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
10229         let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
10230                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
10231         let recv_value = 100_000;
10232
10233         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10234
10235         let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
10236         let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
10237                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
10238                         Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
10239                 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
10240         } else {
10241                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
10242                 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
10243         };
10244         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
10245         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10246                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10247         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10248         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10249         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10250         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
10251         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10252         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10253         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10254
10255         if valid_delta {
10256                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
10257                         None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10258
10259                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
10260         } else {
10261                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10262
10263                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10264
10265                 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10266                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10267                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10268
10269                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10270         }
10271 }
10272
10273 #[test]
10274 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
10275         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
10276         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
10277         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
10278         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
10279 }
10280
10281 #[test]
10282 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
10283         // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
10284         // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10285         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10286         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10287         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10288         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10289
10290         // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
10291         let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
10292                 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10293                         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
10294                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
10295                                         Some(())
10296                                 } else {
10297                                         None
10298                                 }
10299                         } else {
10300                                 None
10301                         }
10302                 );
10303                 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
10304         };
10305
10306         // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
10307         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10308         let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
10309                 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
10310                 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10311
10312                 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
10313                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
10314                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10315                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10316                 }
10317
10318                 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
10319                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10320                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10321
10322                 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
10323                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10324                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10325         };
10326
10327         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10328
10329         // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
10330         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
10331         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10332         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10333         let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10334         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10335         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
10336         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
10337
10338         // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
10339         let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10340         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
10341         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10342         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
10343         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10344
10345         // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
10346         // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
10347         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10348         let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10349         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10350
10351         // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
10352         //
10353         // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
10354         // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
10355         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10356         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10357         let bob_init = msgs::Init {
10358                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10359         };
10360         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
10361         let alice_init = msgs::Init {
10362                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10363         };
10364         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
10365
10366         // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
10367         // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
10368         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10369         let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
10370                 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
10371         );
10372         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
10373         check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
10374
10375         // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
10376         let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10377                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
10378                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10379                         Some(msg.clone())
10380                 } else {
10381                         None
10382                 }
10383         ).unwrap();
10384         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
10385
10386         // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
10387         for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10388                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10389                 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
10390         }
10391
10392         // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
10393         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10394         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10395
10396         // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
10397         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
10398         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10399
10400         // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
10401         // waiting on any messages.
10402         for node in &nodes {
10403                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10404                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10405                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10406                 }
10407         }
10408 }
10409
10410 #[test]
10411 fn test_remove_expired_outbound_unfunded_channels() {
10412         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10413         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10414         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10415         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10416
10417         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10418         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10419         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10420         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10421         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10422
10423         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10424         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10425         match events[0] {
10426                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10427                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10428         };
10429
10430         // Asserts the outbound channel has been removed from a nodes[0]'s peer state map.
10431         let check_outbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10432                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10433                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10434                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10435         };
10436
10437         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10438         check_outbound_channel_existence(true);
10439
10440         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10441         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10442                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10443                 check_outbound_channel_existence(true)
10444         }
10445
10446         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10447         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10448         check_outbound_channel_existence(false);
10449
10450         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10451         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10452         match msg_events[0] {
10453                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10454                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10455                 },
10456                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10457         }
10458         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10459 }
10460
10461 #[test]
10462 fn test_remove_expired_inbound_unfunded_channels() {
10463         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10464         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10465         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10466         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10467
10468         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10469         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10470         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10471         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10472         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10473
10474         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10475         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10476         match events[0] {
10477                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10478                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10479         };
10480
10481         // Asserts the inbound channel has been removed from a nodes[1]'s peer state map.
10482         let check_inbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10483                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10484                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10485                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10486         };
10487
10488         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10489         check_inbound_channel_existence(true);
10490
10491         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10492         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10493                 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10494                 check_inbound_channel_existence(true)
10495         }
10496
10497         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10498         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10499         check_inbound_channel_existence(false);
10500
10501         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10502         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10503         match msg_events[0] {
10504                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10505                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10506                 },
10507                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10508         }
10509         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10510 }
10511
10512 fn do_test_multi_post_event_actions(do_reload: bool) {
10513         // Tests handling multiple post-Event actions at once.
10514         // There is specific code in ChannelManager to handle channels where multiple post-Event
10515         // `ChannelMonitorUpdates` are pending at once. This test exercises that code.
10516         //
10517         // Specifically, we test calling `get_and_clear_pending_events` while there are two
10518         // PaymentSents from different channels and one channel has two pending `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s
10519         // - one from an RAA and one from an inbound commitment_signed.
10520         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10521         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10522         let (persister, chain_monitor);
10523         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10524         let nodes_0_deserialized;
10525         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10526
10527         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
10528         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).2;
10529
10530         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10531         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10532
10533         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10534         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10535
10536         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
10537         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10538         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
10539
10540         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
10541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10542         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 1_000_000);
10543
10544         for dest in &[1, 2] {
10545                 let htlc_fulfill_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[*dest], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10546                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[*dest].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10547                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[*dest], htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false);
10548                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 0);
10549         }
10550
10551         let (route, payment_hash_3, _, payment_secret_3) =
10552                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
10553         let payment_id = PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0);
10554         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
10555                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), payment_id).unwrap();
10556         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10557
10558         let send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
10559         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
10560         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg);
10561         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10562
10563         if do_reload {
10564                 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
10565                 let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
10566                 let chan_1_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_2).encode();
10567                 reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], persister, chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
10568
10569                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10570                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10571
10572                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
10573                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[2]));
10574         }
10575
10576         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10577         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
10578         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[0] {
10579                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10580         } else { panic!(); }
10581         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] {
10582                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10583         } else { panic!(); }
10584         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
10585         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
10586
10587         // After the events are processed, the ChannelMonitorUpdates will be released and, upon their
10588         // completion, we'll respond to nodes[1] with an RAA + CS.
10589         get_revoke_commit_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10590         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 3);
10591 }
10592
10593 #[test]
10594 fn test_multi_post_event_actions() {
10595         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(true);
10596         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(false);
10597 }
10598
10599 #[test]
10600 fn test_batch_channel_open() {
10601         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10602         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10603         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10604         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10605
10606         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10607         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10608                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10609                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10610         ]);
10611
10612         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10613         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10614         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10615         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10616
10617         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10618         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10619         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10620
10621         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10622         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10623
10624         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10625         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10626         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10627         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10628
10629         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10630         chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10631         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10632         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10633
10634         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before persisting all monitors has been
10635         // completed.
10636         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10637         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
10638
10639         // Complete the persistence of the monitor.
10640         nodes[0].chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(
10641                 &ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 })
10642         );
10643         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10644
10645         // The transaction should only have been broadcast now.
10646         let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10647         assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10648         assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0], tx);
10649
10650         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10651         assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10652                 *e,
10653                 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10654                         ref counterparty_node_id,
10655                         ..
10656                 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
10657         )));
10658         assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10659                 *e,
10660                 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10661                         ref counterparty_node_id,
10662                         ..
10663                 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
10664         )));
10665 }
10666
10667 #[test]
10668 fn test_disconnect_in_funding_batch() {
10669         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10670         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10671         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10672         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10673
10674         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10675         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10676                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10677                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10678         ]);
10679
10680         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10681         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10682         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10683         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10684
10685         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10686         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10687         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10688
10689         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10690         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10691
10692         // The remaining peer in the batch disconnects.
10693         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
10694
10695         // The channels in the batch will close immediately.
10696         let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10697         let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
10698         let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
10699         let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
10700         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10701                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10702                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10703                         discard_funding: true,
10704                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
10705                         user_channel_id: Some(42),
10706                         ..Default::default()
10707                 },
10708                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10709                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
10710                         discard_funding: true,
10711                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
10712                         user_channel_id: Some(43),
10713                         ..Default::default()
10714                 },
10715         ]);
10716
10717         // The monitor should become closed.
10718         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10719         {
10720                 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10721                 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10722                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10723                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10724         }
10725
10726         // The funding transaction should not have been broadcast, and therefore, we don't need
10727         // to broadcast a force-close transaction for the closed monitor.
10728         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10729
10730         // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
10731         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10732 }
10733
10734 #[test]
10735 fn test_batch_funding_close_after_funding_signed() {
10736         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10737         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10738         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10739         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10740
10741         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10742         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10743                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10744                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10745         ]);
10746
10747         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10748         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10749         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10750         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10751
10752         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10753         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10754         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10755
10756         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10757         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10758         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10759         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10760
10761         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10762         chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10763         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10764         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10765
10766         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10767         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10768
10769         // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
10770         let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10771         let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
10772         let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
10773         let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
10774         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10775         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 2);
10776         {
10777                 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10778                 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10779                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10780                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10781                 let monitor_updates_2 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_2).unwrap();
10782                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2.len(), 1);
10783                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10784         }
10785         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10786         match msg_events[0] {
10787                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
10788                 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10789         }
10790
10791         // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
10792         {
10793                 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10794                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10795                 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
10796                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
10797                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
10798         }
10799
10800         // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
10801         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10802                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10803                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10804                         discard_funding: true,
10805                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
10806                         user_channel_id: Some(42),
10807                         ..Default::default()
10808                 },
10809                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10810                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
10811                         discard_funding: true,
10812                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
10813                         user_channel_id: Some(43),
10814                         ..Default::default()
10815                 },
10816         ]);
10817
10818         // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
10819         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10820 }
10821
10822 fn do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(confirm_remote_commitment: bool) {
10823         // Tests that a node will forget the channel (when it only requires 1 confirmation) if the
10824         // funding and commitment transaction confirm in the same block.
10825         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10826         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10827         let mut min_depth_1_block_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10828         min_depth_1_block_cfg.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10829         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg), Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg)]);
10830         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10831
10832         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
10833         let chan_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 });
10834
10835         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10836         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10837
10838         let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_remote_commitment {
10839                 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
10840         } else {
10841                 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
10842         };
10843
10844         closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10845         let mut msg_events = closing_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10846         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10847         match msg_events.pop().unwrap() {
10848                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, .. } => {},
10849                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10850         }
10851         check_added_monitors(closing_node, 1);
10852         check_closed_event(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
10853
10854         let commitment_tx = {
10855                 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10856                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
10857                 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
10858                 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
10859                 commitment_tx
10860         };
10861
10862         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
10863         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
10864
10865         check_closed_broadcast(other_node, 1, true);
10866         check_added_monitors(other_node, 1);
10867         check_closed_event(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
10868
10869         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10870         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10871 }
10872
10873 #[test]
10874 fn test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block() {
10875         do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(false);
10876         do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(true);
10877 }