1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use crate::util::test_utils;
34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use crate::prelude::*;
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
66 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
67 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
68 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
69 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
70 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
71 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
72 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
73 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
75 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
77 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
78 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
79 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
81 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
82 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
84 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
85 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
87 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
88 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
89 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
90 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
91 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
92 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
93 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
94 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
96 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
97 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
99 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
101 } else { assert!(false); }
104 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
106 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
107 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
116 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
122 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
127 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
129 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
131 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
132 *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
136 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
137 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
138 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
145 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
146 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
147 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
148 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
149 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
150 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
151 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
152 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
153 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
155 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
156 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
157 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
158 let opt_anchors = false;
159 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
160 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
162 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
163 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
164 if !send_from_initiator {
165 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
166 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
170 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
171 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
172 if send_from_initiator {
173 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
176 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
178 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
179 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
180 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
181 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
182 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
183 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
184 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
187 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
188 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
189 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
191 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
192 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
193 if send_from_initiator {
194 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
195 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
196 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
197 // well as an additional HTLC.
198 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
200 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
205 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
206 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
207 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
211 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
215 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
219 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
223 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
224 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
225 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
226 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
227 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
228 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
229 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
230 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
231 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
232 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
234 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
236 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
238 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
240 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
243 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
246 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
247 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
248 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
249 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
250 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
255 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
257 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
258 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
259 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
262 let payment_event = {
263 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
264 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
265 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
267 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
268 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
270 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
271 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
272 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
273 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
274 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
277 // deliver(1), generate (3):
278 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
279 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
280 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
283 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
284 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
285 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
286 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
287 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
288 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
289 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
292 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
293 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
294 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
295 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
296 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
297 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
298 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
301 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
302 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
303 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
306 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
307 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
310 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
313 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
314 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
316 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
320 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
325 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
326 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
327 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
328 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
329 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
330 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
331 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
332 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
335 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
337 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
339 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
342 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
345 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
346 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
347 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
348 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
351 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
354 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
356 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
357 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
358 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
361 let payment_event = {
362 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
363 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
364 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
366 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
367 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
369 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
370 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
371 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
372 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
373 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
376 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
379 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
383 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
384 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
385 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
386 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
387 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
388 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
391 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
392 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
393 // update_fee (never committed) ->
395 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
396 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
397 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
398 // <- (1) RAA delivered
399 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
400 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
401 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
402 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
404 // B should send no response here
405 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
406 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
409 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
412 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
413 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
414 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
416 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
419 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
420 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
421 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
422 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
423 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
425 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
428 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
429 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
430 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
431 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
434 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
437 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
438 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
440 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
441 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
442 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
444 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
445 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
446 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
447 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
450 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
452 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
454 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
456 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
457 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
458 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
460 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
461 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
462 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
463 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
464 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
465 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
466 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
468 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
469 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
470 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
472 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
474 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
475 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
479 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
480 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
483 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
484 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
487 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
488 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
489 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
492 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
493 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
497 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
498 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
499 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
500 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
503 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
504 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
505 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
506 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
508 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
510 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
513 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
514 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
517 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
518 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
519 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
521 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
522 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
523 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
525 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
526 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
528 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
530 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
531 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
533 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
535 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
536 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
538 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
539 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
540 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
541 added_monitors.clear();
543 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
545 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
546 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
548 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
549 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
550 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
551 added_monitors.clear();
554 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
555 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
557 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
558 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
560 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
561 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
562 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
563 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
564 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
568 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
590 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
591 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
592 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
593 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
594 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
595 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
598 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
601 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
604 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
605 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
606 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
607 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
608 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
610 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
612 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
614 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
615 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
618 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
619 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
622 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
623 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
624 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
627 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
628 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
633 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
634 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
637 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
638 let channel_value = 5000;
640 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
641 let channel_id = chan.2;
642 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
643 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
644 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
646 let opt_anchors = false;
648 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
649 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
650 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
652 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
653 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
655 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
656 *feerate_lock = feerate;
658 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
660 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
662 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
664 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
666 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
668 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
670 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
671 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
672 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
673 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
674 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
675 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
679 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
680 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
683 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
684 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
687 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
689 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
690 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
691 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
692 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
693 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
694 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
695 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
696 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
697 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
698 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
700 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
701 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
702 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
703 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
704 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
705 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
706 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
707 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
708 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
711 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
712 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
713 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
716 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
717 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
718 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
719 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
720 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
721 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
722 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
724 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
725 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
726 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
727 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
729 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
731 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
734 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
737 htlc_signatures: res.1
740 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
742 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
745 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
747 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
748 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
749 //Should produce and error.
750 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
751 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
753 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
754 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
758 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
759 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
760 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
761 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
762 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
763 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
766 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
769 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
772 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
775 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
776 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
777 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
778 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
779 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
781 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
783 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
784 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
785 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
788 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
790 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
791 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
793 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
794 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
795 added_monitors.clear();
797 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
798 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
799 // node[1] has nothing to do
801 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
802 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
805 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
806 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
807 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
809 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
811 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
813 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
814 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
815 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
816 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
817 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
818 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
820 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
821 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
823 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
825 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
827 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
829 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
831 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
832 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
834 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
836 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
838 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
840 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
841 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
843 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
844 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
847 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
849 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
850 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
851 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
852 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
853 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
857 fn test_update_fee() {
858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
861 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
862 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
863 let channel_id = chan.2;
866 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
867 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
868 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
869 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
870 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
871 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
872 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
873 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
874 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
875 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
876 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
879 // Create and deliver (1)...
882 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
883 feerate = *feerate_lock;
884 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
886 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
889 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
890 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
891 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
892 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
893 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
895 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
897 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
899 // Generate (2) and (3):
900 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
901 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
905 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
906 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
909 // Create and deliver (4)...
911 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
912 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
914 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
916 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
917 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
918 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
919 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
920 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
922 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
925 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
926 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
929 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
930 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
932 // Handle (3), creating (6):
933 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
935 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
936 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
939 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
940 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
943 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
944 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
945 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
946 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
947 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
948 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
949 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
950 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
954 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
956 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
957 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
959 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
961 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
963 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
964 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
965 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
966 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
967 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
971 fn fake_network_test() {
972 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
973 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
974 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
975 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
976 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
977 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
979 // Create some initial channels
980 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
981 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
982 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
984 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
985 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
986 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
987 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
988 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
990 // Send some more payments
991 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
992 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
993 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
995 // Test failure packets
996 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
997 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
999 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1000 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1002 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1003 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1004 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1005 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1006 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1011 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1012 hops.push(RouteHop {
1013 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1014 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1015 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1016 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1018 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1020 hops.push(RouteHop {
1021 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1022 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1023 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1024 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1026 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1028 hops.push(RouteHop {
1029 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1030 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1031 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1032 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1034 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1036 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1037 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1038 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1040 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1041 hops.push(RouteHop {
1042 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1043 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1044 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1045 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1047 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1049 hops.push(RouteHop {
1050 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1051 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1052 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1053 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1055 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1057 hops.push(RouteHop {
1058 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1059 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1060 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1061 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1063 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1065 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1066 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1067 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1069 // Claim the rebalances...
1070 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1071 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1073 // Close down the channels...
1074 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1075 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1078 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1080 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1081 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1083 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1084 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1089 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1090 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1091 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1092 // commitment dance rounds.
1093 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1094 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1095 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1096 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1097 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1098 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1100 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1101 for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1102 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1103 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1104 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1108 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1109 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1110 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1111 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1113 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1114 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1116 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1118 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1119 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1120 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1121 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1124 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1125 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1127 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1131 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1132 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1133 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1134 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1136 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1137 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1138 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1139 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1140 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1141 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1144 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1145 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1146 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1148 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1150 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1151 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1152 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1155 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1156 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1158 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1160 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1162 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1164 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1165 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1167 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1169 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1171 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1173 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1175 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1177 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1179 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1182 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1184 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1185 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1186 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1188 &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1189 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1195 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1196 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1199 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1203 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1204 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1205 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1206 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1207 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1208 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1209 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1211 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1212 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1213 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1214 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1215 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1218 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1220 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1221 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1223 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1224 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1226 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1227 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1228 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1232 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1233 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1234 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1235 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1236 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1237 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1238 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1239 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1241 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1244 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1246 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1248 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1249 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1250 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1252 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1253 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1254 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1257 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1258 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1260 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1261 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1262 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1263 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1264 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1265 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1266 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1269 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1271 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1273 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1274 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1276 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1277 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1279 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1280 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1281 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1282 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1283 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1284 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1286 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1289 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1290 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1292 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1293 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1294 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1296 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1297 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1298 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1299 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1301 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1302 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1305 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1306 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1307 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1308 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1310 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1311 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1312 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1313 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1314 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1315 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1323 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1324 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1325 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1326 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1327 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1328 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1330 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1331 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1333 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1334 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1335 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1336 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1337 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1339 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1341 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1342 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1343 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1346 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1348 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1349 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1351 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1355 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1356 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1357 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1358 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1359 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1360 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1362 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1363 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1364 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1365 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1367 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1369 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1370 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1371 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1372 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1375 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1376 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1377 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1378 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1381 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1383 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1384 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1385 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1387 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1389 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1391 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1392 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1393 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1394 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1395 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1396 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1397 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1398 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1399 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1401 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1402 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1403 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1404 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1405 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1407 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1408 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1409 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1410 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1411 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1412 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1413 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1414 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1415 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1418 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1419 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1420 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1422 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1423 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1424 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1426 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1428 amount_msat: 3460001,
1429 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1431 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1434 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1437 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1438 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1439 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1440 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1441 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1445 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1446 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1448 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1449 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1451 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1454 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1457 htlc_signatures: res.1
1460 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1461 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1462 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1464 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1465 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1467 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1468 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1470 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1472 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1473 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1474 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1476 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1477 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1478 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1480 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1482 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1483 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1489 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1490 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1491 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1492 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1493 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1495 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1496 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1497 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1498 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1499 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1500 let opt_anchors = false;
1502 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1503 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1505 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1507 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1509 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1510 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1511 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1514 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1515 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1516 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1517 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1518 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1519 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1523 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1524 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1525 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1526 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1527 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1528 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1529 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1530 let opt_anchors = false;
1532 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1533 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1534 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1535 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1536 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1537 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1538 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1540 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1541 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1542 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1545 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1546 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1547 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1548 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1549 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1550 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1551 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1552 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1553 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1555 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1556 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1557 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1558 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1559 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1562 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1563 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1564 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1565 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1566 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1567 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1569 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1573 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1574 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1575 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1576 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1577 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1579 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1580 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1581 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1582 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1583 let opt_anchors = false;
1585 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1586 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1587 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1588 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1589 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1590 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1591 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1593 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1594 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1595 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1596 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1597 // commitment transaction fee.
1598 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1600 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1601 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1602 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1605 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1606 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1607 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1608 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1612 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1613 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1614 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1615 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1616 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1617 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1618 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1619 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1620 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1621 let opt_anchors = false;
1623 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1625 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1626 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1627 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1628 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1630 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1631 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1632 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1633 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1634 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1635 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1636 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1638 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1639 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1640 match msg_events[0] {
1641 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1642 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1644 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1649 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1650 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1651 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1652 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1653 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1654 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1655 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1656 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1658 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1659 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1660 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1666 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1673 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1674 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1675 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1679 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1680 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1681 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1682 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1683 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1684 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1685 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1688 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1689 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1690 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1691 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1693 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1694 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1695 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1696 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1698 // Add a pending HTLC.
1699 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1700 let payment_event_1 = {
1701 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1704 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1705 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1706 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1708 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1710 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1711 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1712 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1713 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1714 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1716 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1717 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1718 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1719 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1720 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1721 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1722 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1723 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1726 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1727 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1728 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1729 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1732 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1733 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1734 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1735 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1736 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1737 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1739 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1743 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1744 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1745 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1747 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1748 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1749 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1750 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1751 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1752 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1753 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1755 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1756 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1757 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1759 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1760 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1763 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1764 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1768 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1769 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1770 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1771 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1772 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1773 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1774 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1775 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1776 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1777 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1778 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1780 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1781 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1783 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1784 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1786 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1788 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1789 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1790 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1791 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1796 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1797 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1798 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1799 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1801 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1803 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1805 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1806 .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1807 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1808 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1809 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1811 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1812 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1813 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1814 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1817 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1818 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1820 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1821 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1822 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1823 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1824 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1825 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1826 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1830 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1831 .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1832 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1833 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1834 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1836 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1837 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1838 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1839 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1840 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1843 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1844 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1845 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1846 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1847 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1850 // adding pending output.
1851 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1852 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1853 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1854 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1855 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1856 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1857 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1858 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1859 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1861 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1862 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1863 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1865 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1866 let payment_event_1 = {
1867 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1870 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1871 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1872 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1874 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1876 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1877 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1879 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1880 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1881 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1882 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1885 // split the rest to test holding cell
1886 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1887 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1888 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1889 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1891 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1892 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1895 // now see if they go through on both sides
1896 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1897 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1898 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1900 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1901 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1903 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1905 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1906 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1907 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1908 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1909 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1912 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1913 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1914 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1916 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1917 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1919 // flush the pending htlc
1920 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1921 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1924 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1925 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1927 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1929 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1930 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1931 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1934 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1935 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1938 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1940 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1941 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1942 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1944 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1945 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1947 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1948 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1949 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1950 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1951 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1952 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1954 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1955 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1956 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1957 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1959 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1960 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1962 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1963 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1965 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1966 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1967 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1968 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1969 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1971 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1972 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1973 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1975 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1981 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1982 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1983 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1984 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1985 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1987 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1988 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1989 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1991 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1997 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1998 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1999 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2001 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2002 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2003 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2005 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2006 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2007 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2008 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2009 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2011 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2012 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2016 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2017 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2018 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2019 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2020 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2021 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2022 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2023 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2025 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2026 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2027 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2028 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2029 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2030 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2031 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2032 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2034 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2035 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2036 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2037 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2038 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2039 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2040 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2041 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2042 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2043 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2045 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2046 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2047 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2048 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2049 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2051 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2052 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2054 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2056 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2057 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2058 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2061 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2062 // initial fulfill/CS.
2063 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2064 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2066 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2068 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2069 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2070 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2071 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2075 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2076 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2078 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2079 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2081 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2082 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2084 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2085 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2087 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2089 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2091 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2093 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2095 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2097 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2099 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2100 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2101 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2102 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2103 // on-chain as necessary).
2104 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2105 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2107 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2108 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2110 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2112 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2114 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2115 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2117 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2118 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2119 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2121 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2122 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2124 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2125 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2126 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2128 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2130 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2131 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2132 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2135 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2136 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2138 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2140 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2142 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2144 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2146 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2149 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2151 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2152 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2154 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2156 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2158 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2161 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2162 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2164 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2165 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2169 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2170 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2171 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2172 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2173 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2174 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2175 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2177 // Create some initial channels
2178 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2179 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2180 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2181 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2183 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2184 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2185 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2186 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2187 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2188 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2190 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2191 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2192 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2193 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2194 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2196 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2197 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2199 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2201 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2202 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2203 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2205 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2207 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2208 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2209 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2210 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2211 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2213 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2214 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2216 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2217 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2218 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2219 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2222 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2223 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2224 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2225 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2227 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2229 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2230 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2231 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2232 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2233 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2235 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2236 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2238 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2239 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2240 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2242 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2243 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2245 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2246 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2247 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2248 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2250 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2256 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2257 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2258 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2260 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2261 let node2_commitment_txid;
2263 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2264 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2265 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2266 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2268 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2269 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2270 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2272 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2274 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2275 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2276 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2277 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2278 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2280 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2281 // confusing us in the following tests.
2282 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2284 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2285 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2286 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2289 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2290 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2291 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2292 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2293 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2294 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2300 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2301 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2307 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2309 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2310 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2311 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2317 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2319 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2320 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2322 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2323 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2325 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2326 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2332 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2333 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2338 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2340 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2341 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2342 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2344 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2345 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2346 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2347 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2349 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2350 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2351 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2352 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2356 fn test_justice_tx() {
2357 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2358 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2359 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2360 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2361 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2362 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2363 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2364 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2365 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2366 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2367 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2368 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2369 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2370 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2371 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2372 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2373 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2374 // Create some new channels:
2375 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2377 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2378 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2379 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2380 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2381 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2382 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2383 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2384 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2385 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2386 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2387 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2388 // Revoke the old state
2389 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2392 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2394 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2395 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2396 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2398 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2399 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2402 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2403 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2405 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2406 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2407 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2408 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2410 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2411 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2412 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2413 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2415 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2417 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2418 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2420 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2421 // Create some new channels:
2422 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2424 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2428 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2429 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2430 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2431 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2432 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2433 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2434 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2435 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2436 // Revoke the old state
2437 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2439 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2442 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2443 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2445 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2446 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2449 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2451 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2452 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2453 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2455 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2456 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2457 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2459 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2460 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2461 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2465 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2466 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2467 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2468 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2470 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2471 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2472 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2473 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2474 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2475 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2476 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2477 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2478 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2479 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2481 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2482 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2484 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2485 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2486 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2488 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2490 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2491 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2492 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2494 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2498 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2499 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2500 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2501 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2502 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2503 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2504 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2506 // Create some new channel:
2507 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2509 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2510 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2511 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2512 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2513 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2515 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2516 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2517 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2518 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2519 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2520 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2521 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2522 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2523 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2525 //Revoke the old state
2526 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2529 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2531 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2532 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2534 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2535 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2536 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2538 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2539 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2541 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2542 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2545 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2546 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2547 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2548 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2549 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2550 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2551 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2553 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2554 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2555 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2556 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2557 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2559 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2560 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2561 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2565 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2566 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2567 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2568 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2569 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2571 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2573 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2575 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2576 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2577 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2578 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2579 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2580 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2582 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2583 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2585 //Revoke the old state
2586 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2589 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2591 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2593 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2594 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2595 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2596 match events.last().unwrap() {
2597 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2601 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2602 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2604 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2605 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
2607 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2608 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2609 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2610 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2611 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2612 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2613 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2615 // Justice transactions are indices 2-3-4
2616 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2617 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2618 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2620 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2621 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2622 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2624 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2625 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2626 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2627 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2628 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2629 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2630 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2631 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2633 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2634 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2635 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2636 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2637 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2638 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2639 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2641 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2642 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2643 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2647 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2648 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2649 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2650 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2651 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2652 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2653 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2654 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2655 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2657 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2658 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2659 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2660 // PaymentSent event).
2662 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2665 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2667 // Create some initial channels
2668 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2669 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2671 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2672 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2673 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2674 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2675 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2677 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2678 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2679 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2681 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2682 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2684 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2685 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2686 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2687 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2688 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2689 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2690 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2691 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2692 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2694 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2695 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2696 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2697 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2698 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2700 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2701 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2703 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2704 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2705 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2706 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2707 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2708 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2709 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2710 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2711 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2712 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2713 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2715 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2716 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2717 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
2718 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2720 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2721 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2722 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2723 added_monitors.clear();
2725 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2726 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2727 match forwarded_events[0] {
2728 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2729 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2731 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2732 match forwarded_events[1] {
2733 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2734 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2735 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2736 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2737 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2741 match forwarded_events[2] {
2742 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2743 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2744 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2745 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2746 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2750 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2752 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2753 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2754 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2755 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2756 added_monitors.clear();
2758 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2760 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2761 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2763 match nodes_2_event {
2764 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2765 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2768 match nodes_0_event {
2769 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2770 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2771 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2772 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2773 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2774 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2776 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2779 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2781 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2785 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2786 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2787 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2788 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2789 // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2790 // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2791 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2792 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2793 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2794 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2796 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2797 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2798 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2799 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2801 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2802 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2803 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2804 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2809 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2810 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2812 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2813 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2814 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2815 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2816 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2817 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2819 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2820 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2821 assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2822 let commitment_spend =
2823 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2826 // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2827 // FullBlockViaListen
2828 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2829 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2830 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2831 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2834 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2835 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2836 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2841 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2842 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2843 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2844 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2845 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2846 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2847 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2848 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2850 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2851 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2852 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2853 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2854 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2856 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2857 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2858 let mut first_claimed = false;
2859 for event in events {
2861 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2862 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2863 assert!(!first_claimed);
2864 first_claimed = true;
2866 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2867 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2870 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2871 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2875 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2878 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2879 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2880 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2881 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2882 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2883 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2885 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2887 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2888 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2889 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2890 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2891 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2892 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2893 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2895 // Create some intial channels
2896 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2897 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2899 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2900 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2901 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2903 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2905 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2906 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2907 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2908 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2910 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2913 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2914 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2916 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2917 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2918 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2919 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2920 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2921 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2925 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2926 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2928 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2929 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2930 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2932 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2933 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2934 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2935 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2936 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2939 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2940 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2942 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2943 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2945 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2946 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2947 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2948 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2950 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2954 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2956 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2958 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2960 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2962 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2963 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2965 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2966 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2967 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2968 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2969 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2970 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2972 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2975 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2976 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2977 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2979 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2980 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2982 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2984 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2985 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
2986 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2987 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2988 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2992 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2993 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2994 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2995 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2999 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3000 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3001 // and fail backward accordingly.
3003 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3004 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3005 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3006 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3008 // Create some initial channels
3009 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3010 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3012 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3013 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3014 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3015 // Revoke the old state
3016 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3018 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3020 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3021 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3022 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3024 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3026 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3028 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3029 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3031 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3032 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3033 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3034 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3035 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3036 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3038 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3039 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3040 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3046 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3047 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3048 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3049 // commitment transaction anymore.
3050 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3051 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3052 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3053 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3054 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3055 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3057 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3058 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3059 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3060 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3061 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3062 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3063 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3064 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3065 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3067 // Create some initial channels
3068 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3069 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3071 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3072 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3073 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3074 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3075 // Revoke the old state
3076 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3078 let value = if use_dust {
3079 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3080 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3081 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3082 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3085 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3086 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3087 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3089 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3090 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3092 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3093 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3094 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3095 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3096 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3097 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3098 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3099 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3100 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3102 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3105 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3106 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3107 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3108 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3109 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3110 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3111 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3112 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3114 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3115 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3116 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3119 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3120 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3122 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3123 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3124 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3125 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3126 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3127 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3128 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3129 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3130 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3131 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3133 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3134 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3135 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3138 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3139 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3140 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3141 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3142 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3143 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3147 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3148 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3149 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3151 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3152 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3154 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3155 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3158 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3159 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3161 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3162 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3165 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3166 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3168 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3170 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3172 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3173 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3175 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3176 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3179 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3180 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3185 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3186 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3188 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3191 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3194 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3195 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3198 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3199 match nodes_2_event {
3200 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3201 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3202 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3203 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3204 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3205 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3207 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3211 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3212 match nodes_2_event {
3213 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3214 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3215 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3217 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3220 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3221 match nodes_0_event {
3222 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3223 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3224 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3225 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3226 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3227 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3229 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3230 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3231 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3233 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3235 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3236 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3238 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3239 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3240 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3241 // that we should update our routing table for.
3242 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3243 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3249 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3250 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3255 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3256 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3257 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3259 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3262 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3263 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3265 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3268 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3269 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3270 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3272 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3275 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3276 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3278 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3281 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3284 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3286 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3287 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3290 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3291 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3292 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3296 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3297 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3298 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3299 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3300 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3304 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3305 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3306 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3307 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3308 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3312 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3313 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3314 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3315 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3316 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3317 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3319 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3321 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3322 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3325 let payment_event = {
3326 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3327 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3328 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3330 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3331 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3334 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3335 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3337 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3340 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3343 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3345 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3347 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3348 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3349 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3350 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3351 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3352 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3354 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3355 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3361 onion_routing_packet,
3363 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3365 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3366 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3367 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3369 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3370 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3375 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3376 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3378 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3381 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3382 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3384 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3386 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3391 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3392 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3393 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3394 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3395 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3396 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3397 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3398 if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3399 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3400 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3404 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3406 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3407 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3408 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3409 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3411 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3413 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3414 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3415 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3417 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3418 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3419 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3421 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3423 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3424 // registering new transactions
3425 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3429 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3430 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3431 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3432 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3433 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3434 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3435 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3436 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3438 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3440 let mut payment_event = {
3441 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3444 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3445 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3446 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3449 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3450 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3452 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3454 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3455 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3456 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3457 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3460 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3461 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3463 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3465 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3466 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3467 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3469 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3470 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3472 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3474 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3475 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3476 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3477 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3478 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3482 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3484 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3485 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3487 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3489 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3491 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3492 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3494 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3495 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3496 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3497 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3498 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3499 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3500 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3502 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3506 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3507 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3508 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3509 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3510 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3512 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3513 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3514 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3515 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3516 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3518 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3520 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3521 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3523 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3524 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3525 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3527 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3528 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3530 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3531 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3535 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3536 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3537 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3538 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3539 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3540 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3541 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3543 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3544 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3545 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3546 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3547 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3548 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3549 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3551 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3552 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3554 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3556 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3557 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3559 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3560 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3563 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3566 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3567 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3568 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3569 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3571 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3572 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3576 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3577 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3578 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3579 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3580 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3581 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3582 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3583 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3585 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3586 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3587 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3589 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3590 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3591 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3592 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3594 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3595 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3596 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3598 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3599 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3600 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3601 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3603 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3604 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3606 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3607 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3609 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3611 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3612 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3614 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3615 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3616 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3618 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3621 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3625 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3626 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3627 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3629 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3632 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3633 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3635 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3639 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3640 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3643 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3644 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3645 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3646 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3647 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3648 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3650 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3651 let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3652 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3653 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3654 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3655 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3656 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3659 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3662 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3664 let payment_event = {
3665 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3668 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3669 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3670 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3672 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3674 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3675 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3677 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3678 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3679 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3681 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3683 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3684 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3685 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3688 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3689 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3690 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3691 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3694 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3695 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3696 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3704 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3705 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3706 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3707 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3708 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3709 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3711 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3712 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3713 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3715 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3716 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3718 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3719 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3720 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3721 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3722 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3723 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3724 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3725 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3726 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3727 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3728 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3729 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3730 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3731 // Everything was delivered...
3732 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3735 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3736 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3737 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3739 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3743 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3747 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3749 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3750 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3754 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3755 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3756 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3758 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3760 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3761 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3763 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
3764 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3765 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3766 assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3767 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3769 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3770 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3771 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3773 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3776 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3779 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3781 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3783 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3784 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3785 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3786 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3787 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3788 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3789 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3790 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3791 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3792 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3793 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3795 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3798 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3799 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3801 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3802 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3804 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3805 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3806 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3808 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3811 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3812 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3814 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3816 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3817 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3818 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3821 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3822 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3823 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3824 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3827 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3828 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3829 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3837 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3838 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3839 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3840 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3841 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3842 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3844 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3846 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3847 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3848 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3849 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3850 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3851 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3852 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3853 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3854 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3855 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3856 // Everything was delivered...
3857 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3860 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3861 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3863 if messages_delivered <= 5 {
3864 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3865 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3867 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3869 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3870 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3873 // Channel should still work fine...
3874 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3875 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3876 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3880 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3881 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3882 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3883 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3884 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3888 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3889 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3890 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3891 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3892 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3896 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3897 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3898 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3899 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3900 // channel_ready immediately instead.
3901 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3902 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3903 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3904 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3905 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3907 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
3909 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3910 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3911 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3912 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3913 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3914 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3916 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3917 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3918 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3922 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3923 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3924 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3925 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3926 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3927 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3928 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3929 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3931 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3933 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3934 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3935 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3938 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3939 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3941 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3942 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3945 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3946 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3949 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3950 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3952 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3953 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3954 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3955 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3956 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3957 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3958 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3960 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3961 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3962 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3964 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3965 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3966 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3968 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3971 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3972 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3973 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3976 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3979 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3980 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3982 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3983 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3984 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3985 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3986 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3987 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3989 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3990 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3991 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3992 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3994 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3995 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3997 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3998 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4000 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4002 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4003 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4004 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4005 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4006 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4007 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4008 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4009 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4010 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4013 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4014 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4015 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4016 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4017 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4018 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4019 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4022 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4023 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4024 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4025 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4026 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4027 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4028 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4031 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4032 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4033 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4036 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4037 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4038 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4041 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4042 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4045 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4047 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4048 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4050 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4051 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4053 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4054 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4055 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4057 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4060 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4063 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4064 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4067 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4068 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4071 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4072 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4073 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4074 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4075 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4076 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4077 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4079 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4081 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4082 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4083 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4084 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4085 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4086 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4087 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4088 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4090 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4091 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4092 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4093 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4094 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4097 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4100 let mut block = Block {
4101 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4104 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4105 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4106 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4107 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4108 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4109 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4110 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4113 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4116 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4117 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4118 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4119 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4120 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4122 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4123 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4124 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4125 let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4126 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4127 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4131 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4132 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4133 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4136 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4137 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4138 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4139 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4140 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4141 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4142 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4143 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4145 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4146 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4147 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4148 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4150 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4151 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4153 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4155 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4158 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4159 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4160 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4161 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4164 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4165 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4166 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4167 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4171 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4172 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4173 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4174 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4177 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4179 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4180 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4181 match fail_commit[0] {
4182 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4183 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4184 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4186 _ => unreachable!(),
4188 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4190 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4195 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4196 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4197 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4200 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4201 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4203 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4204 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4205 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4206 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4207 for event in events.drain(..) {
4209 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4210 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4211 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4212 all_outputs.push(outp);
4215 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4218 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4219 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4229 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4230 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4231 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4232 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4233 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4234 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4236 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4237 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4238 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4240 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4241 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4242 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4243 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4244 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4246 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4247 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4249 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4250 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4251 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4252 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4253 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4257 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4258 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4259 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4260 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4261 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4262 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4263 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4265 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4266 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4267 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4269 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4271 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4272 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4273 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4274 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4276 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4277 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4279 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4280 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4282 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4283 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4284 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4288 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4289 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4290 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4295 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4297 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4298 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4299 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4300 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4301 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4303 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4304 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4305 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4307 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4309 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4310 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4311 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4313 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4314 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4315 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4316 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4317 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4321 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4322 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4323 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4324 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4325 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4327 // Create some initial channels
4328 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4330 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4332 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4333 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4334 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4336 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4337 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4338 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4340 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4342 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4344 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4345 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4348 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4349 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4352 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4353 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4354 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4355 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4356 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4358 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4359 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4360 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4362 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4363 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4364 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4368 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4369 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4370 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4371 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4372 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4374 // Create some initial channels
4375 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4377 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4378 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4380 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4382 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4383 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4384 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4386 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4387 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4389 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4391 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4392 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4394 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4396 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4397 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4398 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4399 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4400 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4402 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4403 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4404 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4405 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4407 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4408 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4409 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4410 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4411 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4415 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4416 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4417 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4418 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4419 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4421 // Create some initial channels
4422 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4424 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4425 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4426 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4427 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4429 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4431 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4432 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4434 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4436 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4437 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4438 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4439 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4441 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4442 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4444 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4445 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4446 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4450 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4451 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4452 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4453 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4454 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4455 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4457 // Create some initial channels
4458 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4460 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4461 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4462 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4463 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4465 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4467 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4468 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4469 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4471 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4472 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4474 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4475 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4476 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4477 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4478 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4479 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4481 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4482 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4483 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4484 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4486 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4488 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4489 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4490 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4491 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4492 // transactions next...
4493 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4494 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4496 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4497 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4498 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4499 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4501 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4502 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4505 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4506 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4508 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4509 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4510 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4511 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4512 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4516 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4517 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4518 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4519 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4520 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4521 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4523 // Create some initial channels
4524 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4526 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4527 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4528 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4529 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4531 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4532 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4534 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4536 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4537 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4538 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4540 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4541 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4543 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4544 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4545 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4546 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4548 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4549 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4550 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4552 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4553 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4554 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4555 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4557 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4559 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4560 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4562 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4563 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4564 // transactions next...
4565 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4566 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4567 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4568 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4570 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4571 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4574 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4575 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4577 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4578 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4580 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4581 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4583 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4584 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4585 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4586 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4587 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4588 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4589 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4590 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4594 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4595 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4596 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4597 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4598 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4600 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4603 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4604 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4605 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4606 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4608 // Create some initial channels
4609 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4610 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4612 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4613 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4614 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4615 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4616 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4618 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4619 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4620 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4622 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4623 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4624 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4625 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4626 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4628 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4629 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4630 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4631 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4632 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4634 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4635 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4637 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4639 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4640 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4641 check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4642 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4643 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4644 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4646 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4647 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4648 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]});
4649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4650 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4651 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4653 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4657 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
4658 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4659 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4660 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4661 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4663 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4666 let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4667 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4668 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4669 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4671 match nodes_2_event {
4672 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4673 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4676 match nodes_0_event {
4677 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4678 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4679 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4680 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4681 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4682 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4684 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4687 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4688 match msg_events[0] {
4689 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4693 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4694 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4695 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4696 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4697 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4698 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4699 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4700 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4701 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4702 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4703 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4705 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4710 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4711 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4712 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4713 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4714 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4715 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4716 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4717 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4718 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4719 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4720 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4721 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4722 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4723 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4725 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4726 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4727 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4729 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4730 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4731 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4732 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4733 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4735 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4737 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4738 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4739 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4740 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4741 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4742 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
4743 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4744 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4746 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4747 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4748 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4750 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4751 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4753 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4754 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4756 let htlc_timeout_tx;
4757 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4758 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4759 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4760 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4762 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4763 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4764 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4766 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4767 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4768 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4769 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4770 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4772 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4773 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4774 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
4775 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4777 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4778 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4779 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4780 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4783 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4784 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4785 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
4786 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
4787 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4788 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4789 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4791 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4795 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4796 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4798 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4800 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4801 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4803 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4804 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4807 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4808 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4810 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4811 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4812 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4813 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4814 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4815 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4816 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4817 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4818 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4819 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4821 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4822 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4823 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4824 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4825 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4826 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4827 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4828 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4829 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4832 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4833 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4835 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4837 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4839 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4840 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4841 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
4842 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4843 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4844 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4845 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4846 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4847 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4850 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4851 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4853 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4855 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4856 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4857 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4859 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4864 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4865 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4866 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4867 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4868 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4870 // Create some initial channels
4871 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4873 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4874 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4875 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4876 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4877 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4879 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4880 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4881 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4884 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4886 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4887 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4889 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4890 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4893 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4894 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4897 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4898 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4899 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4900 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4901 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4905 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4906 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4908 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4909 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4910 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4911 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4912 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4913 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4916 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4917 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4918 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4919 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4920 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4921 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4922 // use the same payment hashes.
4923 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4928 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4929 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4930 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4931 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4932 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4933 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4934 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4935 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4936 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4937 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4939 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
4940 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4941 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4942 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4943 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4945 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4946 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4947 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4948 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4950 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
4951 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4953 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4955 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4956 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4958 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4960 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4962 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4964 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4965 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4967 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4969 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4972 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4974 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4975 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4978 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4980 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4981 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4983 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
4984 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
4985 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
4986 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
4987 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
4989 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
4990 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
4991 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
4992 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
4993 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
4994 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
4995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
4997 let failed_destinations = vec![
4998 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
4999 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5000 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5001 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5003 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5006 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5007 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5008 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5009 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5010 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5011 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5013 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5014 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5015 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5018 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5019 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5020 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5022 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5025 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5026 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5027 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5028 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5030 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5032 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5033 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5034 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5035 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5036 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5037 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5038 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5039 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5041 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5043 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5044 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5045 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5046 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5047 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5048 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5049 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5050 if deliver_last_raa {
5051 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5053 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5056 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5057 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5058 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5059 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5061 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5062 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5063 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5065 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5066 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5067 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5069 if announce_latest {
5070 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5072 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5074 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5075 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5076 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5077 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5079 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5080 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5083 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5084 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5087 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5088 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5089 if deliver_last_raa {
5090 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5092 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5093 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5095 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5096 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5098 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5101 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5105 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5106 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5107 let mut a_done = false;
5108 for msg in cs_msgs {
5110 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5111 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5112 // should be failed-backwards here.
5113 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5114 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5115 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5116 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5118 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5123 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5124 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5125 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5127 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5128 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5131 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5132 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5133 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5134 if announce_latest {
5135 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5136 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5137 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5140 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5142 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5146 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5147 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5148 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5149 let mut as_updates = 0;
5150 for event in as_events.iter() {
5151 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5152 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5153 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5154 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5156 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5158 if network_update.is_some() {
5161 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5162 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5164 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5165 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5166 if announce_latest {
5167 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5168 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5170 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5172 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5173 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5174 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5175 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5176 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5177 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5178 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5179 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5180 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5182 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5184 if network_update.is_some() {
5187 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5188 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5190 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5191 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5192 if announce_latest {
5193 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5195 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5197 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5198 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5199 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5200 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5201 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5202 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5206 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5207 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5211 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5212 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5216 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5217 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5218 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5219 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5223 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5224 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5225 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5226 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5227 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5229 // Create some initial channels
5230 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5232 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5233 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5234 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5235 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5237 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5238 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5239 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5241 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5242 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5244 let htlc_timeout = {
5245 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5246 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5247 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5248 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5249 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5253 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5254 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5255 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5257 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5258 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5259 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5260 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5261 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5262 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5263 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5264 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5265 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5266 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5267 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5271 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5272 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5273 // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5274 // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5275 // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5277 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5279 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5280 let seed = [42; 32];
5281 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5282 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5283 let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5284 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5285 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5286 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5287 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5288 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5289 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5291 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5292 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5294 // Create some initial channels
5295 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5297 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5298 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5299 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5301 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5302 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5303 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5304 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5305 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5307 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5308 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5309 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5310 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5311 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5313 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5314 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5315 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5316 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5317 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5318 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5319 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5320 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5323 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5324 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5325 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5326 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5328 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5330 let htlc_timeout = {
5331 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5332 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5333 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5334 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5335 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5339 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5340 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5341 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5343 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5344 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5345 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5346 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5347 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5348 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5349 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5350 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5351 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5352 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5353 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5354 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5358 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5359 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5360 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5361 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5362 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5364 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5366 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5367 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5369 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5370 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5371 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5373 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5374 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5375 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5377 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5378 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5379 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5381 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5382 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5383 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5386 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5387 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5388 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5389 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5390 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5391 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5393 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5395 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5396 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5397 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5399 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5401 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5402 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5403 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5405 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5407 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5408 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5411 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5412 let mut block = Block {
5413 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5416 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5417 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5418 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5420 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5421 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5423 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5426 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5427 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5428 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5429 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5430 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5431 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5433 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5434 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5437 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5439 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5440 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5441 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5443 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5444 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5446 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5447 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5448 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5450 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5451 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5453 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5456 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5457 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5458 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5459 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5460 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5461 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5463 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5464 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5465 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5466 // actually revoked.
5467 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5468 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5469 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5470 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5473 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5474 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5475 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5477 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5478 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5480 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5482 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5484 if check_revoke_no_close {
5485 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5489 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5490 let mut block = Block {
5491 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5494 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5495 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5496 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5498 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5499 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5500 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5502 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5504 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5508 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5509 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5510 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5511 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5512 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5513 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5514 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5516 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5517 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5518 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5520 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5521 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5522 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5524 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5525 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5529 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5530 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5531 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5532 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5533 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5538 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5539 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5540 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5541 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5542 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5543 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5544 for node in nodes.iter() {
5545 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5548 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5549 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5550 let push_msat=10001;
5551 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5552 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5553 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5554 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5556 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5557 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5558 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5562 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5563 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5564 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5565 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5566 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5568 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5569 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5570 let push_msat=10001;
5571 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5573 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5574 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5575 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5576 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5577 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5579 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5580 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5581 let push_msat=10001;
5582 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5583 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5584 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5586 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5587 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5588 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5590 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5591 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5592 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5594 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5595 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5596 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5598 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5599 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5600 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5601 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5602 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5603 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5607 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5608 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5609 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5610 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5611 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5613 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5614 let push_msat=10001;
5615 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5616 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5617 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5618 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5620 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5621 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5622 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5623 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5626 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5628 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5631 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5632 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5633 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5634 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5636 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5637 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5638 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5639 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5640 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5641 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5643 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5644 // pending_update_fee.
5646 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5647 *feerate_lock += 20;
5649 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5652 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5653 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5654 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5655 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5656 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5658 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5661 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5663 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5664 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5665 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5666 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5668 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5669 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5670 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5672 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5673 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5674 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5675 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5677 // Flush the pending fee update.
5678 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5679 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5681 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5684 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5685 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5686 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5687 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5688 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5689 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5690 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5691 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5692 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5694 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5695 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5696 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5698 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5699 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5700 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5701 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5702 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5703 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5704 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5709 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5710 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5712 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5716 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5717 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5718 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5720 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5721 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5722 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5723 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5724 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5725 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5727 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5728 // pending_update_fee.
5730 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5731 *feerate_lock += 200;
5733 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5736 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5737 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5738 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5739 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5740 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5742 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5745 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5747 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5748 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5749 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5750 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5752 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5754 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5755 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5756 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5758 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5759 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5760 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5761 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5762 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5763 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5764 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5765 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5767 // Flush the pending fee update.
5768 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5769 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5770 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5771 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5772 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5775 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5776 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5777 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5778 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5779 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5780 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5781 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5782 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5783 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5785 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5786 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5787 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5789 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5790 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5791 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5792 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5793 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5794 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5795 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5797 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5800 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5801 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5803 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5806 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5807 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5808 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5809 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5810 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5812 let raa = match send_raa_event {
5813 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5814 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5816 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5818 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5819 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5820 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5821 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5823 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5824 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5826 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5827 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5828 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5830 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5831 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5833 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5835 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5837 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5838 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5839 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5840 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5843 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5844 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5845 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5848 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5849 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5850 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5851 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5852 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5853 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5854 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5855 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5856 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5857 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5858 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
5860 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5861 // pending_update_fee.
5863 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5864 *feerate_lock += 20;
5866 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5869 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5870 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5871 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5872 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5873 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5875 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5878 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5880 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5881 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5882 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5883 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5885 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5887 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5888 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5889 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5890 let payment_event = {
5891 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5894 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5895 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5897 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5899 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5901 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5902 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5904 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5905 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5907 // Flush the pending fee update.
5908 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5909 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5911 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5912 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5915 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5916 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5917 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5919 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5920 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5926 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5928 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5930 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5931 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5932 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5933 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5934 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5935 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5938 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5939 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5942 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5943 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5944 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5945 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5946 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5947 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5948 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5949 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5950 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5951 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5956 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5957 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5958 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5960 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5961 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5963 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5964 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5966 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5967 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5968 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5969 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5972 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5973 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
5974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5977 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
5978 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
5979 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
5982 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
5983 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
5984 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5985 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5986 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5987 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5988 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5990 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5991 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
5993 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5994 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
5995 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5996 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6000 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6001 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6002 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6003 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6004 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6005 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6006 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6008 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6009 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6010 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6011 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6013 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6014 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6018 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6019 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6020 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6022 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6023 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6024 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6026 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6027 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6029 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6030 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6032 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6033 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6034 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6036 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6040 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6041 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6042 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6043 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6044 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6045 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6046 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6047 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6049 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6050 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6051 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6052 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6053 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6054 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6058 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6059 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6060 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6061 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6062 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6063 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6064 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6065 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6066 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6067 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6068 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6070 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6071 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6072 let payment_event = {
6073 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6076 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6077 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6078 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6079 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6083 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6085 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6087 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6089 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6090 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6092 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6093 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6094 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6096 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6097 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6101 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6102 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6103 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6104 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6105 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6106 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6107 let channel_value = 100000;
6108 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6109 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6111 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6113 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6114 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6116 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6117 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6118 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6120 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6121 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6123 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6126 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6128 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6129 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6131 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6132 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6133 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6134 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6135 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6137 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6138 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6139 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6140 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6143 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6144 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6146 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6147 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6148 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6149 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6150 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6151 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6153 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6157 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6158 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6159 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6160 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6161 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6162 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6163 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6165 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6166 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6167 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6168 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6169 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6170 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6172 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6173 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6174 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6176 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6178 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6179 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6180 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6181 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6182 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6184 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6185 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6186 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6188 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6192 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6193 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6194 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6195 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6196 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6197 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6198 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6199 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6201 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6202 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6203 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6204 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6205 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6206 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6208 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6212 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6213 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6214 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6217 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6218 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6219 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6221 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6222 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6224 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6225 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6226 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6228 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6232 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6233 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6234 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6235 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6236 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6237 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6238 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6240 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6241 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6243 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6244 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6245 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6247 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6248 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6249 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6251 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6255 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6256 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6257 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6258 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6259 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6260 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6262 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6263 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6264 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6266 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6267 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6268 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6270 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6271 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6272 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6274 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6278 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6279 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6280 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6281 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6282 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6283 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6284 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6285 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6287 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6288 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6289 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6291 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6292 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6294 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6295 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6296 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6297 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6298 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6299 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6300 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6301 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6302 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6303 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6304 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6305 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6306 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6309 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6310 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6311 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6313 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6315 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6317 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6318 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6319 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6321 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6325 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6326 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6328 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6329 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6330 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6331 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6332 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6333 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6334 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6337 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6338 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6340 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6343 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6346 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6348 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6349 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6350 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6352 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6356 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6357 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6359 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6360 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6361 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6362 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6363 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6365 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6366 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6368 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6369 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6371 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6374 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6377 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6379 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6380 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6381 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6383 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6387 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6388 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6390 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6391 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6392 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6393 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6394 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6396 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6397 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6399 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6400 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6401 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6404 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6405 failure_code: 0x8000,
6408 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6410 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6411 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6412 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6414 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6418 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6419 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6421 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6422 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6423 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6424 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6425 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6427 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6429 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6431 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6433 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6434 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6435 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6437 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6438 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6439 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6440 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6441 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6442 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6443 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6445 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6449 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6451 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6453 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6454 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6455 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6457 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6461 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6462 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6464 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6465 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6466 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6467 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6468 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6470 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6472 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6474 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6476 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6477 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6478 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6480 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6481 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6482 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6483 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6484 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6485 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6486 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6488 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6492 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6494 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6496 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6497 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6498 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6500 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6504 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6505 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6507 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6508 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6509 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6510 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6511 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6513 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6514 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6517 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6518 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6520 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6522 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6524 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6526 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6528 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6529 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6530 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6531 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6532 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6533 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6534 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6536 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6539 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6540 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6542 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6543 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6544 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6546 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6550 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6551 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6552 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6554 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6555 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6556 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6557 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6558 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6559 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6561 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6564 let mut payment_event = {
6565 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6567 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6568 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6569 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6571 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6573 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6574 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6575 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6576 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6578 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6579 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6582 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6583 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6585 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6587 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6588 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6589 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6591 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6592 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6593 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6594 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6595 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6596 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6597 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6603 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6606 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6607 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6608 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6609 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6611 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6613 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6614 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6615 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6616 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6617 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6618 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6620 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6627 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6628 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6629 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6630 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6631 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6632 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6633 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6635 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6638 let mut payment_event = {
6639 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6641 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6644 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6645 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6646 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6648 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6649 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6652 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6653 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6655 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6657 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6658 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6660 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6661 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6662 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6663 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6665 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6666 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6671 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6672 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6673 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6674 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6675 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6679 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6680 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6681 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6683 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6686 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6687 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6689 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6690 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6692 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
6693 Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
6695 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6696 assert!(is_permanent);
6697 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6699 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6702 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6703 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6705 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6708 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6711 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6712 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6713 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6714 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6716 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6717 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6718 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6719 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6720 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6721 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6723 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6724 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6726 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6727 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6728 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6729 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6731 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6732 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6734 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6735 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6737 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6740 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6741 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6742 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6745 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6746 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6748 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6750 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6751 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6753 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6756 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6757 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6762 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6763 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6764 if announce_latest {
6765 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6767 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6770 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6772 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6774 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6775 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6776 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6777 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6778 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
6779 let mut first_failed = false;
6780 for event in events {
6782 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6783 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6784 assert!(!first_failed);
6785 first_failed = true;
6787 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6790 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
6791 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6797 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6798 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6799 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6802 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6803 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6804 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6805 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6806 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6807 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6808 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6810 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6811 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6812 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6813 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6814 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6816 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6817 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6819 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6820 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6822 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6823 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6825 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6827 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6828 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6831 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6833 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6834 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6835 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6836 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6837 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6839 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6840 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6842 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6843 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6844 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6845 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6846 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6847 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6848 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6849 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6851 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6852 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6853 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6855 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6856 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6858 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6859 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6860 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6861 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6862 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6863 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6864 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6867 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6869 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
6871 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6872 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6873 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6874 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6875 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6880 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6881 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6882 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6883 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6887 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6888 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6890 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6891 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6892 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6893 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6894 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6895 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6896 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6897 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6898 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6900 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6901 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6902 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6903 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6906 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6907 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6909 } else { assert!(false) }
6911 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6912 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6913 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6914 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6915 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6916 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6917 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6920 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6921 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6923 } else { assert!(false); }
6925 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6926 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6927 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6928 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6929 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6930 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
6932 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6934 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6935 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6936 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6940 } else { panic!(); }
6941 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6943 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6944 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6945 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6946 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6947 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6948 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6949 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6952 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6955 } else { assert!(false); }
6959 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
6960 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
6961 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
6962 // to B, B should refuse payment.
6964 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6965 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6966 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6967 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6969 // Create some initial channels
6970 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6972 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
6973 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6974 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6975 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
6976 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6977 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
6978 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6981 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6982 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6983 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
6984 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6985 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6987 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
6988 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
6989 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6990 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6992 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
6993 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
6994 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6996 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6997 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6998 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6999 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7000 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7001 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7002 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7003 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7004 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7005 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7007 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7011 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7012 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7014 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7015 let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7016 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7017 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7021 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7022 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7023 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7025 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7026 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7027 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7028 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7030 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7031 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7032 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7035 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7036 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7038 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7039 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7040 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7041 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7042 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7043 for e in msg_events {
7045 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7046 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7047 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7048 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7049 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7052 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7056 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7057 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7058 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7059 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7060 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7061 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7063 // Reestablish chan_1
7064 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7065 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7066 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7067 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7068 // Reestablish chan_2
7069 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7070 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7071 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7072 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7073 // Reestablish chan_3
7074 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7075 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7076 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7077 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7079 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7080 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7081 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7082 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7083 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7084 for e in msg_events {
7086 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7087 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7088 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7089 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7091 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7092 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7098 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7099 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7103 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7104 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7105 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7107 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7108 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7109 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7110 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7112 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7114 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7115 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7116 .with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7117 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7118 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7120 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7121 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7122 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7123 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7124 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7125 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7127 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7128 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7129 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7130 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7134 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7135 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7137 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7138 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7139 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7140 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7143 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7147 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7148 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7149 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7150 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7151 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7152 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7153 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7154 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7158 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7159 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7160 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7161 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7163 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7164 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7165 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7166 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7167 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7168 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7169 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7170 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7171 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7172 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7173 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7174 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7175 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7179 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7181 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7182 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7184 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7186 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7187 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7188 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7189 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7190 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7191 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7192 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7193 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7194 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7195 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7196 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7197 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7198 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7202 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7204 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7205 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7209 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7210 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7211 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7213 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7214 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7215 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7216 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7217 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7219 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7220 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7221 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
7222 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7223 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7224 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7225 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7226 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7227 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7228 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7229 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7230 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7232 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7233 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7234 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7236 // Revoke local commitment tx
7237 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7239 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7240 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7241 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7242 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7244 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7245 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7247 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7248 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7250 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7251 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7252 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7254 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7255 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7256 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7257 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7259 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7260 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7261 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7262 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7263 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7264 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
7265 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7266 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7267 match events.last().unwrap() {
7268 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7269 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7275 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7276 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7277 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7279 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7280 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7281 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7282 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7284 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7285 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7286 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7287 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7288 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7289 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7291 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7292 // available, which we check here:
7293 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7294 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7295 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7297 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7298 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7300 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7301 // output, checked above).
7302 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7303 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7304 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7306 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7307 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7308 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7309 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7310 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7314 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7315 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7316 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7317 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7318 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7320 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7321 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7322 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7323 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7325 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7326 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7328 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7329 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7330 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7331 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7332 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7333 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7334 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7335 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7339 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7340 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7341 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7342 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7344 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7345 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7346 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7347 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7348 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7349 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7350 // up bumped justice generation.
7351 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7354 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7359 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7360 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7361 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7364 // Provide preimage for one
7365 // Check aggregation
7367 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7368 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7369 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7370 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7372 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7373 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7374 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7376 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7377 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7378 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7379 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7380 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7382 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7383 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7384 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7385 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7387 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7389 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7393 let feerate_timeout;
7394 let feerate_preimage;
7396 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7397 // 3 transactions including:
7398 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7399 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7400 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7401 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7402 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7403 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7404 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7405 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7407 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7408 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7409 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7410 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7412 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7413 (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7415 (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7418 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7419 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7420 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7422 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7423 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7424 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7425 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7429 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7430 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7432 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7433 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7435 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7436 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7437 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7438 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7439 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7440 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7442 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7443 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7444 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7445 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7446 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7448 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7449 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7450 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7451 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7452 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7457 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7458 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7462 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7463 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7464 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7465 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7466 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7467 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7468 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7469 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7471 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7472 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7473 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7474 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7475 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7477 let per_commitment_secret;
7478 let next_per_commitment_point;
7480 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7481 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7482 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7484 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7486 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7487 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7488 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7490 // Must revoke without gaps
7491 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7492 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7494 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7495 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7496 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7499 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7500 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7501 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7503 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7507 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7508 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7509 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7511 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7512 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7513 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7514 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7516 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7517 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7518 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7519 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7521 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7522 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7523 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7525 // Revoke local commitment tx
7526 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7528 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7529 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7530 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7531 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7533 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7534 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7536 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7538 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7539 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7540 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7541 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7542 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7543 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7547 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7548 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7549 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7551 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7552 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7553 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7558 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7559 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7560 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7561 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7562 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7563 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7564 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7565 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
7567 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7568 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7569 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7571 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7573 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7574 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7575 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7577 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7579 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7580 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7581 // can get our balance.
7583 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7584 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7585 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7586 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7587 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7588 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7589 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7590 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7592 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7596 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7597 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7598 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7599 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7600 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7601 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7602 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7604 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7606 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7607 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7608 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7609 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7610 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7612 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7613 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7615 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7617 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7619 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7620 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7621 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7623 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7624 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7625 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7627 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7632 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7633 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7634 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7635 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7636 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7638 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7639 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7640 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7642 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7644 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7645 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7646 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7647 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7651 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7652 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7653 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7654 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7655 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7656 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7657 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7659 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7660 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7661 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7663 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7664 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7665 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7669 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7670 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7671 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7672 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7673 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7674 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7676 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7677 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7678 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7679 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7680 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7681 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7682 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7683 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7684 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7685 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7686 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7687 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7689 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7690 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7691 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7692 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7694 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7695 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7696 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7697 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7698 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7700 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7701 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7703 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7704 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7705 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7706 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7707 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7708 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7710 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7711 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7713 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7714 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7715 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7717 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7721 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7722 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7723 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7724 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7725 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7726 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7727 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7729 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7730 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7732 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7734 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7735 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7736 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7738 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7740 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7741 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7743 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7746 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7747 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7749 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7750 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7751 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7753 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7756 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7758 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7759 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7761 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7763 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7764 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7766 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7771 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7772 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7773 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7774 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7775 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7776 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7777 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7779 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7780 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7782 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7784 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7785 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7786 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7788 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7790 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7791 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7793 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7796 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7797 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7799 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7800 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7801 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7803 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7805 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7809 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7810 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7811 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7812 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7813 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7814 // and the channel should be closed.
7815 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7816 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7817 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7818 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7819 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7820 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7822 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7823 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7824 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7826 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7828 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7829 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7831 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7832 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7834 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7835 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7836 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7837 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7838 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7839 let accept_chan_msg = {
7840 let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
7841 let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
7842 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
7843 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7845 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
7847 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7849 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7850 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7852 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7853 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7855 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7856 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7858 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7859 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7860 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7861 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7862 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7863 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7868 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7872 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7873 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7874 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7875 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7876 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7877 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7878 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7880 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7881 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7883 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7885 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7886 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7887 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7889 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7891 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7892 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7893 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7895 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7896 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7898 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7899 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7902 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7905 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7906 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7907 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7909 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7910 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7911 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7913 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7918 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7919 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7920 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7921 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7922 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7924 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7925 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7927 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7928 assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7930 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7931 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7936 fn test_simple_mpp() {
7937 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
7938 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7939 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7940 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7941 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7943 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7944 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7945 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7946 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7948 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7949 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7950 route.paths.push(path);
7951 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7952 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7953 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7954 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7955 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7956 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7957 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
7958 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
7962 fn test_preimage_storage() {
7963 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
7964 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7965 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7966 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7967 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7969 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7972 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7973 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7974 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7976 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7977 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7978 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7979 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7981 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7982 // values from previous calls.
7983 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7984 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7985 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7987 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
7989 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
7990 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
7992 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
7995 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8000 #[allow(deprecated)]
8001 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8002 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8003 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8004 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8005 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8006 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8007 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8009 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8011 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8013 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8014 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8015 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8016 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8017 } else { panic!(); }
8019 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8021 header: BlockHeader {
8023 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8024 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
8025 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8029 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8030 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8031 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8032 } else { panic!(); }
8034 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8035 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8036 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8037 block.header.time += 1;
8038 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8039 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8040 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8043 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8044 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8046 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8047 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8048 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8049 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8051 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8052 // values from previous calls.
8053 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8054 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8055 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8057 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8058 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8059 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8060 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8062 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8067 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8068 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8069 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8070 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8071 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8072 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8074 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8076 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8077 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8078 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8079 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8081 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8082 // resulting events.
8083 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8084 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8086 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8087 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8088 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8089 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8091 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8092 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8093 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8094 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8097 // We should fail the payment back
8098 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8099 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8100 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8101 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8102 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8104 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8109 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8110 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8111 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8113 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8114 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8115 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8116 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8118 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8119 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8120 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8121 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8123 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8124 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8125 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8126 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8130 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8131 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8132 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8133 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8136 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8137 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8138 // commitment at same time.
8140 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8141 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8142 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8143 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8145 // Create some initial channel
8146 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8147 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8149 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8150 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8152 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8153 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8155 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8156 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8157 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8158 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8160 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8161 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8162 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8163 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8164 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8165 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8166 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8167 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8170 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8171 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8172 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8173 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8174 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8175 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8177 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8178 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8180 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8182 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8183 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8184 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8186 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8187 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8188 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8189 if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8190 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8191 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8192 } else { assert!(false); }
8194 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8196 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8197 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8201 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8202 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8203 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8204 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8205 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8207 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8208 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8209 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8210 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8212 // Create some initial channel
8213 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8214 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8216 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8217 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8219 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8220 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8222 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8223 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8224 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8225 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8226 let watchtower_alice = {
8227 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8228 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8229 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8230 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8231 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8232 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8233 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8234 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8237 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8238 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8239 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8240 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8241 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8242 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8244 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8246 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8247 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8251 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8252 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8253 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8254 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8255 let watchtower_bob = {
8256 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8257 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8258 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8259 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8260 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8261 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8262 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8263 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8266 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8267 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8269 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8270 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8272 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8276 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8277 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8278 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8280 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8281 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8282 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8283 if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8284 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8285 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8286 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8287 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8288 } else { assert!(false); }
8290 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8293 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8294 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8295 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8297 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8300 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8301 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8302 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8306 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8307 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8308 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8310 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8311 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8312 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8317 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8318 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8319 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8322 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8323 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8325 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8326 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8327 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8328 // before receiving funding_signed.
8329 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8330 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8331 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8332 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8334 // Create an initial channel
8335 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8336 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8337 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8338 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8339 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8341 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8342 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8344 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8347 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8348 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8349 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8350 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8351 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8355 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8356 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8357 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8358 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8359 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8360 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8361 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8363 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8364 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8365 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8366 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8368 // Create some initial channels
8369 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8371 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8372 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8373 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8374 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8375 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8376 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8378 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8379 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8380 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8381 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8382 // this test before #653 fix.
8383 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8384 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8386 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8387 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8389 let htlc_timeout = {
8390 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8391 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8392 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8393 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8394 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8398 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8399 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8400 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8401 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8404 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8405 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8406 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8407 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8409 // Steps of the test:
8410 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8411 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8412 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8413 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8414 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8415 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8416 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8417 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8418 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8419 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8420 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8421 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8423 // Create some initial channels
8424 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8425 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8427 // Steps (1) and (2):
8428 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8429 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8431 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8432 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8433 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8434 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8435 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8436 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8437 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8439 // Steps (3) and (4):
8440 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8441 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8442 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8443 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8446 if !broadcast_alice {
8447 force_closing_node = 1;
8448 counterparty_node = 0;
8450 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8451 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8453 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8454 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8455 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8456 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8457 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8459 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8460 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8461 if broadcast_alice {
8462 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8464 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8469 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8470 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8471 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8473 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8475 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8476 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8477 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8478 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8479 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8480 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8482 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8483 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8484 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8485 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8486 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8487 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8489 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8490 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8492 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8495 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8496 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8497 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8500 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8501 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8502 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8503 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8504 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8507 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8509 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8510 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8511 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8514 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8517 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8519 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8522 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8523 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8524 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8525 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8526 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8529 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8531 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8534 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8535 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8536 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8537 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8538 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8539 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8540 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8541 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8542 if broadcast_alice {
8543 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8545 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8547 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8548 if broadcast_alice {
8549 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8550 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8552 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8553 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8558 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8559 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8561 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8562 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8563 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8565 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8566 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8567 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8568 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8569 if broadcast_alice {
8570 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8571 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8572 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8574 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8575 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8576 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8582 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8583 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8584 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8585 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8586 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8590 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8591 // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8592 // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8593 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8594 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8595 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8596 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8598 // Create an first channel channel
8599 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8600 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8602 // Create an second channel
8603 nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8604 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8606 // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8607 // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8608 open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8610 // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8611 // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8612 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8614 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8615 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8617 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8618 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8619 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8625 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8627 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8628 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8630 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8631 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8632 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8634 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8640 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8641 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8642 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8644 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8645 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8646 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8647 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8648 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8649 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8650 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8651 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8653 // Create an initial channel
8654 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8655 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8656 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8657 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8659 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8660 // that it is rejected.
8661 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8663 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8664 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8666 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8667 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8668 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8669 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8670 // move forward with it.
8671 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8672 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8678 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8679 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8681 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8684 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8685 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8687 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8688 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8689 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8690 added_monitors.clear();
8692 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8694 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8695 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8697 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8700 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8701 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8702 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8703 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8704 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8706 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8707 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8709 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8710 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8711 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8712 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8713 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8715 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8719 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8720 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8721 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8722 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8723 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8724 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8726 let funding_created = {
8727 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8728 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8729 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8730 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8731 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8732 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8733 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8734 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8735 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8738 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8739 // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
8740 // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
8741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8743 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8745 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8746 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8748 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8749 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8750 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8751 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8752 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8754 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8758 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8759 // everything is functional.
8760 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8762 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8763 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8764 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8765 added_monitors.clear();
8768 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8769 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8770 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8771 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8773 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8774 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8775 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8777 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8781 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8782 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8784 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8785 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8786 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8787 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8788 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8789 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8790 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8792 // Create some initial channels
8793 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8794 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8795 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
8797 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8798 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8799 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8801 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8802 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8803 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8805 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8806 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8808 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8809 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8810 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8811 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8812 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8813 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8815 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8816 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8817 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8819 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8820 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8821 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8823 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8824 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8829 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8830 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8832 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8834 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8835 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8836 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8837 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8838 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8839 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8841 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8842 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8843 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8847 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8848 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8850 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8851 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8852 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8853 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8855 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
8856 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
8857 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
8858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8861 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8863 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8864 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8865 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8867 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8869 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
8870 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
8871 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
8873 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
8874 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
8875 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8876 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8877 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
8880 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8881 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8884 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8887 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8888 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8890 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8891 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8892 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8894 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8895 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8896 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8898 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8899 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8900 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8901 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8902 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8903 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8904 } else { panic!(); }
8905 } else { panic!(); }
8906 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8908 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
8909 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
8910 // as its not 32 bytes long.
8911 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8912 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
8913 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
8914 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
8918 script_sig: Script::new(),
8919 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
8920 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
8922 output: vec![TxOut {
8924 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
8927 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
8928 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
8931 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8932 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8933 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8934 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8935 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8936 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8937 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8938 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8939 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8940 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8941 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8942 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8943 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8944 // until we learned about an additional block.
8946 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8947 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8948 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8949 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8950 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8951 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8952 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8954 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8955 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8956 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8957 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8958 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8960 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8961 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8962 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8964 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8965 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8967 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8968 if !test_height_before_timelock {
8969 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8971 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8972 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8973 if test_height_before_timelock {
8974 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8975 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8976 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8977 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8979 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8980 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8981 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8982 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8983 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8984 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8986 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8987 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8989 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8990 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8991 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8992 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8993 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
8994 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
8995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8997 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8998 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8999 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9000 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9001 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9002 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9003 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9004 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9005 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9010 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9011 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9012 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9015 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9016 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9017 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9018 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9019 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9021 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9023 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9024 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
9025 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9027 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9030 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9032 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9033 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9034 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9035 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9036 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9038 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9039 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9042 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9043 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9045 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9046 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9047 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9048 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9049 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9050 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9051 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9052 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9053 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9056 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9057 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9059 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9060 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9061 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9063 let expected_destinations = vec![
9064 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9065 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9067 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9068 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9071 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9072 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9074 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9075 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9076 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9078 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9079 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9080 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9081 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9082 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9083 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9085 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9086 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9087 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9090 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9091 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9092 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9094 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9096 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9101 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9102 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9103 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9104 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9105 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9106 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9110 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9111 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9112 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9113 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9117 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9118 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9119 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9120 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9121 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9122 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9123 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9125 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9126 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9127 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9128 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9130 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9131 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
9132 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9133 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9134 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9135 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9136 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9137 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9139 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9141 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9143 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9144 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9146 let session_privs = {
9147 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9148 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9149 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9150 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9151 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9154 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9157 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9158 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9159 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9161 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9164 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9167 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9168 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9169 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9171 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9172 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9174 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9177 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9178 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9179 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9181 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9183 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9185 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9186 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9187 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9189 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9190 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9191 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9192 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9196 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9197 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9198 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9200 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9203 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9204 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9205 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9207 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9209 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9212 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9213 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9214 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9216 do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9217 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9218 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9220 Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => { // The payment was abandoned earlier, so the fee paid will be None
9221 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
9223 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9226 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_hash, .. } => {
9227 assert_eq!(payment_hash.unwrap(), our_payment_hash);
9229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9232 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_hash, .. } => {
9233 assert_eq!(payment_hash.unwrap(), our_payment_hash);
9235 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9240 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9241 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9242 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9243 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9244 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9246 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9247 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9248 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9249 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9250 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9251 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9252 final_value_msat: 10000,
9253 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9255 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9256 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9257 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9259 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9260 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9262 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9263 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9264 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9265 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9266 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9267 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9271 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9272 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9273 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9274 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9275 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9277 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9278 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9280 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9281 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9282 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9283 final_value_msat: 10000,
9284 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9286 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9287 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9288 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9289 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9290 let route = find_route(
9291 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9292 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9295 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9296 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9298 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9299 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9300 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9301 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9302 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9303 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9307 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9308 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9309 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9310 // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9312 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9313 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9314 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9315 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9317 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9318 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9319 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9320 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9322 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9323 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9324 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9325 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9326 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9327 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9330 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9331 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9332 // amount of time to respond to.
9334 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9335 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9336 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9338 let failed_destinations = vec![
9339 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9340 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9342 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9344 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9346 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9347 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9350 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9351 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9352 let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9353 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9355 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9356 // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9357 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9359 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9362 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9363 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9364 enum ExposureEvent {
9365 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9367 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9369 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9370 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9373 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9374 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9377 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9378 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9379 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9380 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9381 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9382 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9383 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9384 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9386 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9387 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9388 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9389 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9390 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9391 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9393 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9394 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9395 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9396 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9398 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9400 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9401 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9402 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9404 let opt_anchors = false;
9406 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9409 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9410 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9411 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9412 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9415 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9416 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9419 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9422 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9423 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9424 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9426 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9427 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9428 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9429 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9430 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9432 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9433 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9435 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9436 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9438 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9439 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9442 if dust_outbound_balance {
9443 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9444 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9445 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9446 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9447 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9448 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9451 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9452 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9453 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9454 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9455 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9459 if dust_outbound_balance {
9460 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9461 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9462 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9463 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9464 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9467 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9468 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9469 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9470 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9475 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9476 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9477 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9478 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9479 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9481 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9482 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9483 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9485 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9487 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9488 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9489 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9491 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9492 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9493 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9494 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9495 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9497 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9498 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9499 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9500 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9502 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9503 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9505 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9506 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9507 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9509 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9510 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9512 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9514 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9517 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9518 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9519 added_monitors.clear();
9523 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9524 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9525 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9526 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9527 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9528 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9529 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9530 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9531 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9532 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9533 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9534 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9535 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9539 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9540 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9541 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9542 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9543 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9545 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9546 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9547 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9548 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9549 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9551 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9553 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9554 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9555 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9556 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9557 let mut tx = match events[0] {
9558 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9559 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9560 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9561 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9564 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9566 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9567 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9568 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9569 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9574 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9575 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9576 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9577 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9581 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9582 // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9583 // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9584 // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9585 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9586 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9587 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9588 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9590 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9592 // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9594 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9595 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9598 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9600 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9601 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9603 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9606 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9607 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9609 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9610 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9611 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9613 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9616 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9619 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9620 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9622 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9625 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9626 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9628 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9629 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9630 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9632 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9635 // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9638 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9639 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9641 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9644 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9645 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9647 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9648 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9649 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9650 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9651 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9658 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9659 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9660 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9661 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9662 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9663 let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9664 let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9665 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9666 let recv_value = 100_000;
9668 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9670 let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9671 let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9672 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9673 Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9674 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9676 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9677 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9679 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value, final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32).unwrap();
9680 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9682 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9683 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9684 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9685 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9686 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9687 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9690 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9691 None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9693 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9695 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9699 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9700 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9701 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9703 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9708 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
9709 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
9710 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
9711 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
9712 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);